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Town and Country: Economy and Institutions in Late
Town and Country: Economy and Institutions in Late Medieval Italy Author(s): S. R. Epstein Source: The Economic History Review, New Series, Vol. 46, No. 3 (Aug., 1993), pp. 453-477 Published by: Wiley on behalf of the Economic History Society Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2598363 . Accessed: 20/01/2014 14:04 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. . Wiley and Economic History Society are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Economic History Review. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 128.111.62.78 on Mon, 20 Jan 2014 14:04:39 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Economic History Review,XLVI, 3(I993), pp. 453-477 economy and Townand country: in latemedievalItaly institutions By S. R. EPSTEIN The foundationof everydivisionof labour . . . is the separationof town from country.One mightwell say thatthe wholeeconomichistoryof societyis of thisantithesis. summedup in themovement However,forthemomentwe shallnotgo intothis.' W havebeena centralthemeof Krrhile relations betweentownand country since the mid sixteenthcentury,2their social W Italian historiography and economicfeatureshave been studiedin theirown rightonly fromthe have emerged.3Initially, i89os. Since then,two main linesof interpretation school4put forwardthe view thatthe historiansof the 'economico-juridical' Italian communesbetweenthe mid twelfth expansionof the north-central transformed relations.Communes town-country centuryand the thirteenth subordinated theruralhinterland (contado)totheireconomicand jurisdictional authorityin the interestsof the urban populationand of the commercial bourgeoisie;the passage of powersfromfeudalto urbanlordshipmeantfor the peasantrya sharp loss of judicial and economicfreedoms.While this view has since been considerablyextended and refined,5it is generally accepted that the city statesof centraland northernItaly did exploitthe countrysidethroughinequitable rates of taxation,regulationsrestricting most trade and industryto the rulingtown, compulsorylabour services, and (increasinglyduring the fourteenthand fifteenth centuries)judicial supportforcitizens'claimsover theirruraltenants.6 This view was challengedby Fiumi, who on the basis of thirteenthand Florentineevidence, argued that communalrule early fourteenth-century While Fiumi's defenceofeconomic was ofmajorbenefitto the countryside.7 I Marx,Capital,I, xii, p. 4. Versions History Society's ofthisarticle werediscussed at theEconomic oftheEuropeanAssociation of AnnualConference, Leicester 9-I2 AprilI992 andtheFirstConference Amsterdam in research UrbanHistorians, 4-7 September i992. I havebeenassisted bya MollyCotton and, lastbut not ResearchFellowship (i990-I), a BritishAcademyPostdoctoral Fellowship (I99I-2) least,by Carloand FernandaAstuti.I also wishto thankRita Astuti,JamesThomson,and Chris Wickham fortheircritical comments. 2 Toubert, "'CittA"et "contado"'. 3 MaireVigueur, 'Rapports ville-campagne', pp. 2I-3. 4 In particular Salvemini, Magnati e popolani;idem,'Comunerurale';Caggese,Comunelibero;idem, di Siena';idem,Classie comuni 'Repubblica rurali.See alsoArias,Sistema, pp. 207-27. 5 Bordone, 'Temacittadino'; Brezzi,'Relazioni'. 6 General statements to thiseffect in Cammarosano, Campagne, pp. I29-40, i83-7; Pini,'Comune cittA-stato', pp. 490-6; Waley,Italian city-republics, ch. 4; Hay and Law, Italy, pp. 5i-8; Berengo, The needto 'CittA', pp. 685-9I; Racine,'Villeet contado';MaireVigueur,'Rapports ville-campagne'. overcome communes andgeneralizations about thecurrent dichotomy between casestudiesofindividual 'communal' oftown-country is arguedby Italyas a wholethrough a comparative 'geography' relations Cammarosano, 'CittA e campagna';see alsobelow,n. i6. 7 Fiumi,'Rapporti economici'; idem,Fioriturae decadenza,pp. I27, I3I, 195. ? EconomicHistorySocietyi993. Publishedby Blackwell Publishers,io8 CowleyRoad, OxfordOX4 iJF, UK and 238 Main Street, Cambridge, MA 02I42, USA. This content downloaded from 128.111.62.78 on Mon, 20 Jan 2014 14:04:39 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 454 S. R. EPSTEIN relationsbetweencommuneand contadohas foundlittlecredit,8he was of urban successful in shifting thefocusof thedebatefromthecharacter institutional power(whichhad been the mainconcernof the 'economicoto thefunction oftownsin thelatemedievaleconomy. juridical'historians), model'of preFiumidid thisby drawingon an 'integrated "town-based" thedynamism ofurbancapitaland industrial development, whichcontrasts of peasantsociety.9In thisview,one still culturewiththe conservatism Italiancommunes capital,markets, widely acceptedbymedievalists, purveyed to a less advancedif not and economicand administrative rationality altogether stagnant countryside.'0 facedbythedebate As thisbriefoutlinesuggests, manyoftheproblems roleof Italiancommunes on theeconomically sincethe I950s 'progressive' arise fromthe ambiguity of its terms.In particular, whereasFiumi'D havebeenwidelycriticized, hiseconomicideas,a 1a institutional arguments thatruraleconomieswould h,ye the implicitcounterfactual hypothesis and enterprise, are on the lesswellwithouturbanexpenditure performed of town-country relations wholeaccepted.Hence bothmaininterpretations theviewthatmedievalurbandomination was conveymoreor lessexplicitly a powerful sourceof ruralgrowth.This in turnoftenleadsto thecircular townsmusthavehad 'backward'or thatregionslackingpowerful argument economies."I underdeveloped The evidencemakes it impossibleeitherto prove or disprovesuch Whensufficient records do become beforethefourteenth arguments century. available,however,theysuggestthatthe economyof regionswithstrong communal suchas Tuscany,mightcompareratherpoorlywith traditions, thatofareaswithfarweakerurbaninstitutions, suchas Sicily.'2If correct, thisconclusiondisprovesthe theorythatstrongurbanpowersinvariably stimulatedeconomicgrowth;but it also fails to prove the economic itselfis the resultof of 'country'over'town'.The dichotomy superiority or theeconomicfeatures eithertheinstitutional of townoveremphasizing withoutat thesametimeclearlydistinguishing between country relations, ifonefirst setsapart,and thetwo.This problemcanbe overcome precisely thesetwofeatures market structures. thendrawstogether, by analysing 8 p. 30, mademuchofthefactthatin theI330s taxesper For exampleidem,'Rapporti economici', headin theFlorentine countryside wereone-fifth ofurbanones.Percaputtaxreturns fromthecontado in I392, I399, and I400 werealso' 8.9-20.6 percentofurbanones,withthemediancloseto thelatter is basedon a I: 3.4 ratioofurban figure (Molho,Florentine publicfinances,pp. I0, 29-30; myestimate and Klapisch-Zuber, Les Toscans, to ruralpopulation as in I427: Herlihy p. 664). To whatdegreethis ruraltaxpayers can be seenfromthetaxassessment of I427, whichreports allocation favoured average and 20 timesthatin theTuscan per caputwealthin FlorenceI7 to i9 timesthatin the contado, as a whole(ibid.,pp. 243, 664); on thebasisof thesefigures countryside (whichtakeno accountof to Florentines), ruraltaxpayers afterI350 werepaying2 to 4 theconsiderable tax-exemptions granted withthemeancloserto 4. Eventhoughtheremayhave timesas muchpercaputas urbandwellers, beena redistribution ofwealthfrom country totownafter themidfourteenth century (Molho,Florentine thatpercaputtaxation in thecontadoapproximately publicfinances,pp. 29-30 suggests doubledbetween theI330s and I390-14i0; Brown, Shadow,pp. i67-8 suggests a fourfold increase forthetownofPescia), comitatini beforeI348 wouldstillhavebeenpayingcloseto twiceas manytaxesas Florentines. 9 Langton p. 4; Epstein,'Cities',pp. I2-3. and Hoppe,Townand country, 0 Brown,'Economic "decline"',pp. I03-4; see alsoBraudel,Capitalismand materiallife,ch. 8. Epstein,Island for itself,ch. I; Del Treppo,'Medioevoe Mezzogiorno', pp. 252-7; Britnell, 'Englandandnorthern Italy'. 12 Epstein,'Cities'. C EconomicHistorySocietyi993 This content downloaded from 128.111.62.78 on Mon, 20 Jan 2014 14:04:39 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions ECONOMY AND INSTITUTIONS IN LATE MEDIEVAL ITALY 455 Therehas neverbeen,noris therenow,sucha thingas an idealmarket economy.Thisis becausemarkets arecomplexbundlesofsocialinstitutions (sets of enforceable is as muchto disciplineas to rules),whosefunction allocateresources.'3 This impliesthatdevelopment does not arisefroma spontaneous growthof productive forcesand commerce per se, but from thewayclaimsarisingfromincreasing tradeare enforced and constrained bytheinstitutions thatorganizemarket exchange.A particular institutional constellation can as muchretardas promoteeconomicgrowth.'4 The role of socialinstitutions in orienting in establishing development, particularly thedivisionof labourbetweentownand country, is especially clearin late medieval Italy.On theonehand,theincorporation ofindependent communes into territorial states(in north-central Italy)and the growthof a more powerful monarchy (in the south)modified thewiderpoliticalcontextof relations.On theother,local marketscentredon individual town-country townsbeganto mergeintomoreintegrated regionalones.'5The character andrateofinstitutional between changevariedconsiderably states,however, andI shallarguethatthesedifferences hadsignificant economic consequences. Thesechangesmeanthatwemustshift thefocusofenquiry fromrelations betweenindividualtownsand theirhinterlands to relations betweentown and betweendifferent and country, townswithinnascentterritorial states and economicregions.'6 Here we will considerthreeItalian statesof sizeandratesofurbanization-Sicily comparable (25,000 sq. km.),Tuscany (I2,000 sq. km.), and Lombardy(27,000 sq. km. at its fullestextent)between theearlyfourteenth andthemidsixteenth. To demonstrate century theinfluence ofinstitutions we mustbe ableto showthattheydo notderive fromchangesin underlying endowments. This proposition can be tested, forwhereasthefourteenth-century ofthe epidemicssubjectedtheeconomy threeregionsto a similarexogenousshock,theirinstitutions evolvedquite overtime.Urbanauthority overthe countryside differently in the early fourteenth centurywas far greaterin Tuscanyand Lombardy,where or semi-independent independent citystatesheldsway,thanin Sicily,where feudalmonarchshad ruledthe townssincethe eleventhcentury.By the 13 See Bardhan, 'New institutional economics'; of idem,'Conceptof power'forrecentdiscussions economicpower.The definition of thelatteradoptedhereis thatquotedibid.,p. 266 fromTaylor, 'A haspoweroverB ifA canaffect Community: theincentives facingB in sucha waythatit is rational forB to do something he wouldnototherwise havechosento do. The incentives ofB areaffected by A mainlythrough theoffer ofa rewardor thethreat ofa penalty or somecombination ofa threat and an offer' (itis ofcourseassumedthattheopportunity costsforA ofacquiring andusingitspowerover B arelowerthanthelatter'scostsofnon-compliance). This definition ofeconomic powerincludesA's toestablish andmaintain ability theinstitutional framework (enforceable rules)ofproduction andexchange withinwhichB operates.In a slightly narrower sense,economic poweris also exercised whenA is at thesametimefirstpartyto, and thirdpartyenforcer withB. Notethatto endowcities of,exchange withagency,as I do below,is notto lapseintofunctionalism; north-central Italiancities(or rather, theirrulingelites)wereconsciously organized bodieswhichcouldpromote corporate urbaninterests action. through collective 14 See Hodgson, Economicsand institutions; North, Institutions;Eggertson, Economic behavior; of thisproposition. Gustafsson, versions This approachis at odds withthe ed., Powerfordifferent basic assumption of the 'New Institutional Economics',thatinstitutional innovation is derivative of changesin factor prices,andhencethateconomic institutions areoptimal or Pareto-efficient; see Field, 'Problem';idem,'Microeconomics'; Basu,Jones,and Schlicht, 'Growth and decay'. 15 Epstein, 'Cities'. 16 See Cammarosano, 'CittA e campagna', pp. 303, 3i6-7. (C EconomicHisty Societyi993 This content downloaded from 128.111.62.78 on Mon, 20 Jan 2014 14:04:39 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 456 S. R. EPSTEIN fifteenth thethreeregions ofcontemporcentury spannedtheentirespectrum ary Europeanstates:Sicilybelongedto an Iberiancompositemonarchy; Tuscanywas ruled by an urbanoligarchy;Lombardycame underthe of a duke.'7 authority The firstsectionof thisarticlediscusseshowthepoliticalorderaffected of latemedievaltowns,and therateof thesize and economiccontribution It contrasts regional economic integration. theeffects ofchanging institutional relationsbetweentownand country, betweenthe townsthemselves, and betweentownsand the state. In the second section,developments in are used to assesstheeffect of socialand politicalconflict clothmaking on bothon the divisionof labourbetweentown regionalmarketstructures, and on regionalintegration as a whole. and country I Centralplace theoryis an increasingly populartool foranalysing prethetheorystates industrial marketstructures.18 Holdingall else constant, thatin competitive markets,the townsof a regionplottedby size on a scale will distribute logarithmic alonga straight line; thisis knownas a distribution.'9 The degreeto whicha region'surbanhierarchy lognormal is takento reflect to a lognormal distribution theextentto which conforms between theregion'stowns.20 goodsandlabouraredistributed competitively is seldomfoundin the real world,it distribution Althougha lognormal does providea usefulbenchmark whichcan be comparedagainstactual In particular, distributions. sincedirectevidenceofhowpeopleandmaterial between resources weredistributed pre-industrial townsis seldomavailable, vital of urbandistribution indirect market provides proof changesin regional structures overtime. restson fourgeneralpremises. The discussionof urbanhierarchies2' the is made that sizeis a surrogate First, customary assumption population measureof a town'sresources.Second,urbanhierarchies are takento be to enforceable access and human shapedby fiscal,financial, commercial, 17 I 10-2. 18 of economic justify the definition regionsin politico-institutional termsin Epstein,'Cities',pp. in history. See vanderWoude,Hayami,andde Vries,eds., Urbanization 19A specialkindoflognormal knownas therank-size distribution, rule,is oftenusedas a benchmark deviations from therank-size areseenas evidence ofeconomic foractualurbandistributions; inefficiency rulerefers to a pattern ofcitydistribution in whichthepopulation ofrank anddisorder. The rank-size ofthelargestcitydividedby X; thusthepopulation ofthethirdlargest X is equal to thepopulation citywillbe one-third ofthatofthelargest city,andso on. The theory ofurbanlognormal distribution anditspitfalls arediscussedbyde Vries,European urbanization, pp. 87-95. 20 Smith, 'Regionaleconomicsystems' and idem,'City-size distributions', esp. pp. 30-I, 33, 40 has on urbanhierarchies, particularly emphasized theimpactofimperfect labourmarkets butherpointcan be extended to all factor andproduct markets. 21 Lack ofadequate datahasrestricted to theio largest centres at any demographic analysis regional one time;thishas meantexcluding thesmallertownsfromthepicture.Whilethispragmatic solution to theproblemof defining theurbanthreshold raisesfewproblems forSicily,whereadministrative did littleto determine urbansize,it is lessstraightforward forTuscanyand Lombardy, factors where citieshad well-defined politicaland administrative prerogatives whichdistinguished themfromother on size. For theeconomicsignificance of theseinstitutional centralplacesand had powerful effects differences see below,pp. 460-5. C EconomicHistorySocietyI993 This content downloaded from 128.111.62.78 on Mon, 20 Jan 2014 14:04:39 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions ECONOMY AND INSTITUTIONS IN LATE MEDIEVAL ITALY 457 resources withina region;changesin thestructure ofurbanhierarchies will therefore reflect changesin allocation ofresources. Third,theregional urban hierarchies thatexistedin earlysixteenth-century Europeare assumedto have been the resultof greaterregionalintegration and specialization 'crisis'.Latemedieval triggered bythelatemedieval townsbecameembedded in a moreextensive regionalhierarchy and mustbe examined in thiswider context.22 Finally,latemedievalcitiesarepresumed to havedrawnmostof fromthesurrounding and fromtheactivities theirresources countryside of thestateitself.The statereallocated wealthbetweensubjecttownsthrough taxesand administration, bothof whichwereexpandingrapidlyin our also drewresources fromtheterritory as a wholeto period;stateactivities thepoliticaland administrative therefore capital,whoseregionalhegemony tendedto increase. The onlyregionin oursampleto lackcitystates,Sicilyhad twofurther of urbansize and ranking, distinctive features:a considerable instability ofurbanranking, rather thanone.23Instability andtworegional metropolises forresources betweenSicilian whichis proofofa highdegreeofcompetition a generalscarcity towns,canbe tracedto twosourcesofindividual mobility: of freeproperty in peasanthands,whichmadeit easierforindividuals to and weak urbancontrol migratein searchof improvedlivingstandards, overthecountryside. Urbanpowersincreased in thelatefourteenth century, and urbanelite groupsreactedto when the Sicilianfeudalaristocracy and a collapseof up to 70 per centin landrents declining royalauthority and by intensifying by takingchargeof localurbanadministration control overruralmarkets. of theregionalmarket, This causedthefragmentation at a timewhen Sicilywas also beingbrokenup into semi-autonomous territories underseigneurial lordship.However,the onlycityto achieve tomorenortherly communes wasMessina, jurisdictional powerscomparable all butceasedtoexpandaftertheAragonese andurbanpowersofjurisdiction re-established centralauthority and territorial monarchy unityin theI390S. ensuredoncemorethattowns Thereafter highratesof individual mobility competedfor economicand human resourcesratherthan relyingon institutional privilege. in theurbanhierarchy? In themidto reflected How werethesefeatures Palermoand Messina,withthreeto fourtimesthe latethirteenth century, of theresources of thethirdlargestSiciliantown,monopolized population In practice, western and easternSicilyrespectively. theywerestilldistinct, extendedin partto non-competing metropolitan 'capitals',whoseinfluence thesouthern mainlandand whichdrewtheirwealthas muchfrompolitical and administrative as fromeconomicsources.The functional similarities of the Sicilianregional theweakintegration betweenthetwocitiesreflect marketat thistime. 22 pp. 255-7.The declineof the 'decentralized Epstein,'Cities';de Vries,Europeanurbanization, ofregional, rather thanof medievalurbanstructure' seemsto havebeencausedmainlybythegrowth towns interregional tradeas arguedbyde Vriesat p. 256. The impliedviewthatpre-fourteenth-century ofa fiction: centres see Hohenberg and Lees,Makingof wereisolatedmarket is, ofcourse,something urbanEurope,p. 57. 23 Epstein,'Cities',pp. 22-6; idem,Island foritself,chs.2-3. C EconomicHisty Societyi993 This content downloaded from 128.111.62.78 on Mon, 20 Jan 2014 14:04:39 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 458 S. R. EPSTEIN 100 90- 80- Ns 70- . 60- \ 50- ---1277 \\ \ -- \040- a 30 1439 1497 1548 ...__ 20\ N ' 10-\ 1 2 3 4 5 678 9 10 Rank distribution in Sicily,I277, I439, I497, and I548 FigureI. Urbanrank-size at a ratioof I:4.5. Hearths havebeenconverted toinhabitants Note:thescaleon bothaxesis logarithmic. pp. 42-9; forI548, Beloch,Bevdlkerungsgeschichte Sources:forI277, I439, and I497, see Epstein,Islandforitself, Italiens, I, pp. I35, I36, I59. The politicalcrisescausedby theWar of theVespers(I282-I372) and theurbanhierarchy Palermo significantly. by civilwar(I348-62) modified andMessinalosttheirstatusas themainpoliticalandadministrative centres in southernItaly,whileretaining someof thesefunctions withintwo of duringthelate integration Sicily'sthreesub-regions (valli).Weakerregional in thehorizontal fourteenth centuries is reflected levelling andearlyfifteenth oftheI439 linein figureI.34Although townscompeted within increasingly undertheimpactof individualvalli,the regionalmarketwas fragmented thecivilwar. The slowlyrisingslopeof therank-size distribution during thelaterfifteenth andearlysixteenth reflects centuries increasing urbanand marketintegration. Messinaand Palermotook on morespecializedand 24 of urban hierarchiesare, of course, highlymisleadingif they are Purely formalrepresentations isolated fromtheirbroadersocial context;it is, for example, impossibleto inferfromfigs.I-3 alone that urban hierarchieswere less integratedbeforethe Black Death than after. (? EconomicHistorySocietyI993 This content downloaded from 128.111.62.78 on Mon, 20 Jan 2014 14:04:39 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions ECONOMY AND INSTITUTIONS IN LATE MEDIEVAL ITALY 459 roles. Messina'straditional complementary metropolitan functionas the andtheeastern gateway between Sicily,thesouthern mainland, Mediterranean whereasPalermodrewincreasing commerwas enhanced,25 administrative, fromcapitalstatus.26 But despiteconsiderable cial, and financial benefits to growth afterI450, Palermoneverachievedregionalprimacy comparable othercapitalssuchas Naples,Parisor London,or indeed,as we shallsee, oftheIO largestSicilian suchas Florence.Palermo'sshareofthepopulation cities,whichwas c.32 per centin I277 and had droppedto C. I7 per cent in I464, was stillno morethan32 percentin I548.27 As figureI suggests,Sicilyhad achieveda high degreeof market and territorial integration specialization alreadyby I500.28 One reasonfor over thislayin theweaknessofurbanjurisdictional privileges, particularly and thehighdegreeof urbanand ruralcompetition the ruralhinterland, afterthe that this conditionentailed.A second sourceof integration in I392-8 was the royalpolicyof grantingtoll Aragoneserestoration demesnetowns,a policythat andmarket franchises toindividual reductions had established an almosttoll-free demesne. by themid fifteenth century Giventhe unusuallylargesize of theroyaldemesneand queen'sbenefice (Camerareginale),whichincludedmorethanhalfoftheSicilianpopulation knock-on for and all thelargestcities,thepolicyhad considerable effects bothpotentialinstitutional the island'seconomyas a whole.Nonetheless, weaknessand a sourcesof commercial integration (urbanjurisdictional loweringof transaction costsin the demesne)came intoeffectafterthe i390S onlyfortworeasons:becausethemonarchy wished,forindependent reasonsofpolicy,to curryfavourwiththedemesnetownsand to maintain a degreeof balancebetweenthemand thefeudalaristocracy, and because fromthemidfourteenth urbansocietyhad slowlygainedin both century wealthand powerat theexpenseof thefeudalelite.29 to therapidlyshifting urbanhierarchy of Sicily,the In striking contrast same IO Tuscan citiesstayedthe largestin the regionup to the early sixteenth werefewand decreasedover century. Changesin urbanranking time. The only exceptionwas the slow declineof Volterraand San whichhad heldfourth andeighthpositionc.I330 and sixthand Gimignano, tenthin I427, but werereplacedby thefirsthalfof thesixteenth century withPalermo,Florentine byBorgoSan SepolcroandPescia.Alsobycontrast increasedsteadily betweenthemidfourteenth and themid primacy century sixteenth;the city'sshare of the top IO cities'population,alreadyan unusuallyhighproportion (c.49 per cent)beforetheBlack Death,roseto 53.I per centin I427 and to 53.3 percentin I552.30 The lack of significant despite changesin Tuscany'surbanhierarchy, Epstein,Island foritself,ch. 5. Conditionsin late medievalSicilyare somewhatreminiscent of late sixteenth-century Brabant,with Palermoanalogousto Antwerpas thepoliticalcapitaland Messina resemblingBrugesas themain centre of trade (Hohenbergand Lees, 'Urban decline'). 27 For Sicilian population figuressee Beloch, Bevblkerungsgeschichte Italiens, pp. 96-i6i; Epstein, Island foritself,ch. 2. 28 Ibid., chs. 3, 5. 29 Ibid., ch. 7. 30 Ginatempoand Sandri,Italia dellecittd,pp. 258-63. 25 26 (C EconomicHistorySociety1993 This content downloaded from 128.111.62.78 on Mon, 20 Jan 2014 14:04:39 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions S. R. EPSTEIN 460 populationlossesof morethan6o per centbetweenI348 and I4Io-20,31 suggeststhatneitherthe socialand demographic crisis,northegrowthof territorial theFlorentine state,did muchto changethewayresources were distributed withintheregion,exceptby allocating an evenlargershareto the capitalitself.32 Florence'sterritorial was largelyachieved hegemony fiscaland economic through discriminatory (albeitad hocandunsystematic) policiestowardssubjecttownsand theTuscancountryside.33 As a resultof thesepolicies,bothTuscany'spopulationand its rateof tookseveralcenturies to recover fromthefourteenth-century urbanization34 demographic slump;whenthepopulation beganto riseagainafterthemid fifteenth it did so moreslowlythanin mostotherItalianregions, century thatTuscanywassuffering relative economic decline.35 suggesting Florentine lordshipmay also have done moreto hinderthan to promotea more andcompetitive Territorial integrated regional economy.36 expansion occurred additionratherthanintegration.37 in the at firstthrough Despiteattempts centuries and stabilizeits and earlyfifteenth to consolidate latefourteenth Florenceseemsto have done littleto modify territorial administration,38 betweensubjecttownsandtheirterritories, to reduce imbalances traditional or to weakenthe the manybarriersto tradebetweendifferent contadi,39 andcommercial ofsubjecttownsovertheirhinterlands industrial monopolies withtheshort-term ofthecapital's exceptwheretheyconflicted requirements elite.The Florentine oligarchy appearsto havepursuedregional integration as it benefited thecityitself,withoutsignificantly the insofar transforming markets thatexistedbeforetheannexation clusterof largelyself-contained of othercitystates.40 The lack of competitive betweensubject integration in the S-shapedurbandistribution Tuscan townsafterc.I400 is reflected in figure aroundan increasingly flatcentrerepresented 2. in late medievalLombardylie somewhere in Patternsof urbanization Pinto,Toscana,pp. 68, 77. and peacemaking', p. 253 (on Florence'sholdon regionalgrain Contrast e.g. Webb,'Penitence grainsuppliesin subject suppliesc.I399) and Fiumi, 'Rapportieconomici,p. 50 (on Florentine 'Di territories afterthe Black Death),withPinto,Librodel Biadaiolo,pp. 73-io6 and Tangheroni, beforeI348). alcuniaccordi'(on Florence'sdependence on grainsuppliesfromoutsideitscontado 33 Epstein,'Cities',pp. I9-20, 3I-3, 36-42; n. 8 above.Florentine attitudes towardstheirsubjects who arguedthatArezzo'srebellion of by Machiavelli, wereformulated withcharacteristic starkness Florence's I502 wasto havebeenpunished byrazingthecityto theground;thiswouldhaveenhanced and providedit withadequatefoodsupplies:Discorsi, and reputation politicaland military security 31 32 bk. II, ch. 23. 34 Ginatempo and Sandri,Italia dellecitta,pp. I09-I5. 36 beforetheBlackDeathseemsto havebeenrather weak:ibid.,p. 3I. Regionalmarket integration 35 Epstein, 'Cities',pp. 43-7. 3 Chittolini,Formazione,p. 293. 38 Ibid., pp. 292-5; FasanoGuarini, in; Zorzi,'Stato 'Statuti';Guidi,Governodella cittcz-repubblica, Thesepoliciesweresetin motionbythefearsofeconomic andterritorial territoriale'. blockadearoused waroftheEightSaints(I375-8)and bytheensuingupheavalon theItalianpolitical bytheanti-papal scene:Trexler, Civic world,pp. I02-25. Spiritualpower,pp. ioi-8; Brucker, 39FasanoGuarini,'CittA soggette', p. i6; Diaz, 'Articolazione'. 40 Epstein, a similar pattern 'Cities',pp. 3I-3. Hohenberg andLees,'Urbandecline',p. 455identifies in seventeenth-century Castile.The fiscaland legal supportgrantedby Florencefor a typeof sharecropping contract(mezzadria poderale),whichaimedto maximizethe landlordand tenant's ratherthanthe production of surplusesforthe market,mayhave also agricultural self-sufficiency forruralinnovation: 'Transizione', p. I157. For a reducedincentives Epstein,'Cities',p. 39; Aymard, statementto thiseffectsee Alberti,Libri dellafamiglia,pp. 237-43 (writtenin I432-4). contemporary (C EconomicHistorySocietyI993 This content downloaded from 128.111.62.78 on Mon, 20 Jan 2014 14:04:39 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions IN LATE AND INSTITUTIONS ECONOMY ITALY MEDIEVAL 46i 110 100 i 90 \ 80 \ 70 60. 50 ' ---c. 40- 1300/30 1427 ....... 1552 __*._ 30- 20 . o~~ -N , 10\ 9\ :'-__ 87 654 3- 2- 1 1 ,, 2 3 I 4 I 5 I, 6 7 8 9 10 Rank in Tuscany,c.I300/I330, distribution Figure2. Urbanrank-size I552 I427, and Note:thescaleon bothaxesis logarithmic. Sources:forI300/30, and Sandri,Italia dellecitta4, see Ginatempo Florence,II, pp. 649-96;Herlihy p. I48; Ronciere, and Klapisch-Zuber, pp. 7I-2; fori427,ibid.,p. 238; forI552,Repetti, Dizionario v, pp. 566-77; geografico, Toscans, Brown,Shadow of Florence,p. 27. ? Economic History Society I993 This content downloaded from 128.111.62.78 on Mon, 20 Jan 2014 14:04:39 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 462 S. R. EPSTEIN between thosein SicilyandTuscany.Firstly, changesin theurbanhierarchy in Lombardythanin Tuscany.Betweenthe early weremoresignificant fourteenth century and themidfifteenth, Bresciadroppedfromsecondto sixthpositionbehindMilan,Cremona, Piacenza,Parma,andPavia,possibly becauseof devastation duringthewarthatled to submission to Venicein the I420S. The mostsignificant gainwas madeby Vigevano,whichbefore theBlackDeath had notfigured amongthetop i0 regionalcities;in fact, Vigevanois one ofthefewcasesofa latemedievalnorthItaliantownwhich was successfully recognizedas a new civitas(it was grantedthe titlein withTuscany,whereall thelargesti0 citieswere I530).41 Alsoby contrast stillfarsmallerc.I500 thanin the I330s, in Lombardy, Brescia,Piacenza, andpossibly Cremawereactually Lodi,Vigevano, largerbythelatefifteenth thanbeforeI348, suggesting neteconomicgrowth.42 century significant Late medievalLombardydiffered further fromTuscanyin the relative in relation ofthecapital.BeforeI348, Milan'simportance tocentral strength and westernLombardy(includingBergamo,Brescia,and Crema,which weakerthan cameunderVenetianrulein theI420S) was alreadysomewhat after thatof Florence.Milan'spositionchangedverylittlein thecentury the Black Death, but betweenthe mid fifteenth centuryand the mid it declined,so thatMilan'sshareofLombardy's urbanpopulation sixteenth was less thanhalfof Florence'sshareof Tuscany's.Whereasin theearly fourteenth and the secondhalfof the fifteenth, Milan accounted century forc.35 per centof the populationof the largesti0 cities,by I540-50 Milan's sharehad droppedto 26 per cent.43Althoughthe Italianwars theduchy'slossofParmaand Piacenzain i5I2, and thegreat (I494-I559), to do withthesechanges,Milan's epidemicsof I527-9 mayhavesomething relativedeclineafterI500 did not coincidewith an overallslump in orin its'urbanpotential'. The increasing rateofurbanization Lombardy's ofthelargerLombardcitiestoa straight, distribution approximation loglinear insteadthatMilan'sdeclinewastheresultofincreased (see figure 3) suggests and of theriseofcompeting urbancentres.45 regionalintegration urbansystem46 was partlythe outcome This polycentric and pluralistic of territorial consolidation by the Viscontiand laterby the Sforza.Two Theirpropensity effects. aspectsoftheirpolicyhadparticularly far-reaching ofsubjects'interests, rather as territorial lordstorespondto a widespectrum thanidentify withthoseof a singlegroupor institution (forinstance,a and economic dominantcitystate),ensureda degreeof representational Chittolini,"'Quasi-cittA"',pp. 20-I; Vigevanonell'etavisconteo-sforzesca. Ginatempoand Sandri,Italia dellecitta,pp. 73-9, 250-I. 43 Milan's share rises to 46 per cent if one excludesBrescia,Piacenza, Bergamo,Parma, and Crema, which were no longerpart of the duchyof Milan. It is suggested,however(below, n. 45), that these cities remainedpart of the Milanese economicregiondespitebeing politicallydetached,and thatthey thereforeshould be includedin the region'surban hierarchy. I de Vries,Europeanurbanization, pp. i60-2. 45 The shape of the mid-sixteenth-century Lombard urbanhierarchychangesif one excludesBrescia, Bergamo, Crema, Parma, and Piacenza, which by I550 no longerbelonged to the duchy of Milan. However,thesecitiesseem stillto have gravitatedeconomicallytowardsMilan more thantowardsother metropolitancentressuch as Venice, to which Bergamo,Brescia, and Crema were by then politically subject. See Epstein, 'Manifatturetessili',p. 6 n. I4; Ventura,Nobiltize popolo,p. 382. 46 Ginatempoand Sandri,Italia dellecitta,pp. i98-9, 214-5. 41 42 (? EconomicHistorySociety1993 This content downloaded from 128.111.62.78 on Mon, 20 Jan 2014 14:04:39 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions ECONOMY AND INSTITUTIONS 120 110100 go IN LATE MEDIEVAL 463 ITALY \ \ 80- 7060- \<\ - -- \\\ c.1300/30 c.1450 50- . . .... c.1541/8* --c.1541/8 40- 30- = 0 20- Cl) 10- 9 876 5- 4- 3- I 2 1 , 3 , 4 I 5 I 6 7 8 ; 9 10 Rank in Lombardy,c. I300/I330, Figure 3. Urban rank-sizedistribution and i54i/i548. C. I450, The urbanhierarchy forI54I/8* excludesBergamo, Note:thescaleon bothaxes is logarithmic. Brescia,Crema, Parma,andPiacenza;see alson. 43. Sources:Beloch,Bevolkerungsgeschichte Italiens,II, pp. 243, 252; III, pp. I2I-2, I45, I58, I90, 208, 2II, 2I7, 226, and Sandri,Italiadellecitta,pp. ioo-i. 229, 23I, 235, 239, 243; Ginatempo ? EconomicHistorySociety1993 This content downloaded from 128.111.62.78 on Mon, 20 Jan 2014 14:04:39 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 464 S. R. EPSTEIN pluralismthat was lackingin Tuscany. Furthermore, fromthe early fourteenth centurythe futuredukesfolloweda long-term fiscalstrategy tradethrough thataimedto promoteLombardcross-regional commercial withneighbouring agreements states,a moreunifiedregionaltoll system, anda network ofnavigable waterways.47 Bytheearlydecadesofthefifteenth to establishnew centurythe Viscontihad probablygainedfullauthority andfairsandto setroadtollsin theirdomain;48 markets theSforzafollowed theirlead afterI450.49 Notably,bothpolicieswerethe outcomeof the lords'quite considerable politicalweakness: theywereunableto establish overtheLombardcities50 fulljurisdictional and behavelikethe sovereignty and absolutist autocratic princesofhistorical myth. The Viscontiand Sforzapromoted institutional pluralism and weakened localseigneurial urbanjurisdictions andbyrewarding byestablishing support ofmercenary leaders(condottieri) withfeudalholdings.5' theloyalty During the fifteenth century,the dukes also increasingly grantedor confirmed territorial and 'liberties' fromurbanjurisdicindependent status,franchises, situated at themountainous andmilitarily tionto lessercommunities mostly At the sametime,theywerecarefulto of the state.52 strategic periphery franchise did notincludemarketand excise ensurethatgrantsofterritorial Devolutionof local powerseemstherefore to havegonehandin rights.53 ofinstitutional barriers to regionaltrade.54 handwitha reduction Th- reasonsfor rural requestsfor independence were most clearly in dozensofagreements drawnup betweenFrancescoSforzaand expressed local communitiesbetweenthe summerof I447 and the earlyI450S, as the overtheduchy.The communities' condottiere established authority requests attackedthe privileges whichthe regionalstatestillgranted deliberately The mostfrequent urbancentresand theircitizens.55 demandsinvoked freedomof trade,includingthe rightto hold marketsand fairsagainst urbanopposition, andindependence fromthecity'sfiscalandadministrative an inherently control.Ruralpetitions modelof put forward revolutionary state.The citiesviewedthenew stateas a simpleaggregate theterritorial inwhichthecommunes' oflarge,compact, andindependent urbanprovinces, and commercial overtheircontadi political,jurisdictional, fiscal, privileges hadin minda more wouldremainin place.The smallertowns,bycontrast, in whicha federation ofsmaller, autonomous centres pluralistic framework, directand independent relations withthe sovereign.56 established Indeed, thisrepublican modelwas notrestricted to thesmalltowns.The Milanese Noto, ed., Liber datii; Ugolini,'Formazione',pp. 20I-8. Mira, Fiere lombarde;idem,'Organizzazionefieristica'. 49 Annoni,'Rapporti'; Kellenbenz,'Oberdeutschlandund Mailand'. 50 Bueno de Mesquita, 'Sforza prince'; Black, 'Limits of ducal authority';Massetto, 'Fonti del diritto'; Storti Storchi, 'Statuti viscontei'; idem, 'Statuto quattrocentesco';idem, 'Aspetti generali'; Varanini,'Dal comuneallo statoregionale, pp. 703-6. 51 Chittolini, Formazione,pp. 36-ioo; Bueno de Mesquita, 'Ludovico Sforza'. 52 Chittolini, 'Governoducale'; idem,'Terre separate';idem,'Legislazionestatutaria'. 53 Bognetti, 'Storia',pp. 267-8; Mira, Fiere lombarde, Formazione, pp. 45-5i, 65-9. p. II4; Chittolini, 54 See Mira, 'Alcuni aspetti' for the fifteenth-century grain trade; contraVivanti,'Storia politica e sociale', p. 302. 55 Chittolini,'Capitoli', pp. 677-8. 56 Ibid., pp. 688, 69i-2. 47 48 (C EconomicHistorySociety'993 This content downloaded from 128.111.62.78 on Mon, 20 Jan 2014 14:04:39 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions ECONOMY AND INSTITUTIONS IN LATE MEDIEVAL ITALY 465 did notperceiveof itselfas a dominant forcewithin elite,whichcorrectly the duchy,seemsalso to have aspiredto a formof 'Swiss',independent republican statuswithina widerregionalfederation, firstduringtheshortlivedAmbrosian Republicin the I440s, and againduringthe warsover LombardybetweenFranceand Spainin theearlysixteenth century.57 Both the politicaland the fiscalaspectsof ducal policy promoted competition58 and weakenedthe cities'controloverthe hinterland. They helpto explainwhyMilandid notemergeas a monopolistic regionalcapital likeFlorence.WhilecapitalstatusmayhaveincreasedMilan'sdominance over regionaltrade routes,59attemptsto extendcommercialor guild monopoliesoutsidethe city'simmediate jurisdiction wereinconclusive.60 Furthercompetition and marketswereprovidedby metropolises such as Veniceand Genoa,and by largecitiessuchas Bresciaand Bergamo(from the earlyfifteenth century)and Piacenza and Parma (fromthe early whichcame withinMilan's rangeof economicinfluence but sixteenth), traditional economic remained politically independent.6" Theyalsoweakened members oftheterritorial state. barriers betweenindividual Milan'slimitedpoliticaland economicpowersappearto havebenefited theeconomyof LombardymorethanFlorence'spoliticaland institutional ofTuscany.This pointalso seemsborneoutby did theeconomy privileges thelack of seriousanti-Milanese conflict,62 comparedwithoftenextreme casesof resistance or opposition to Florentine of authority (thedispersion in thecommercial eliteof Pisa afterFlorentine conquest I4o6;63 Volterra's revoltsin I429, I47I, and I50I ;64 Pisa's rebellionof I494-I509;65or Arezzo's of I50266). Tuscancentralization uprising ensuredpoliticalandinstitutional at the cost of social and economicfragmentation and the continuity, alienationof subjects;Lombardy'sgreaterpoliticalpluralismmay have causedurbandisaffection towardstheirlordsand lostthestateto French andlaterSpanishrule,butitalsopromoted morebalancedrelations between and the centralstate,and a betterintegrated and more town,country, dynamic regionaleconomy. 5 Idem,'Alcuniaspetti', p. 33; see Brady,Turning Swiss.See also Buenode Mesquita,'Ludovico ofpolitical in I500. Bycontrast, Sforza',p. 2I4 on theLombardtowns''widespread sentiment fatalism' oftheSforzas' pastexplanations difficulties at theturnofthesixteenth haveemphasized political century theallegedly excessive powerofan independent feudalclass:ibid.,p. 203, withreferences. 58 See Roveda,'Boschi',pp. I028-9 fora ducalproject oftheI46os to builda canalfortransporting timber to PaviaandMilanfromtheterritory ofPiacenza,despitethelatter's opposition. 59 Ugolini, 'Formazione', pp. 204-5. 60 Epstein, 'Manifatture tessili',pp. i6-9. Milan'smonopsony overitshinterland's grainsuppliesmay alsohaveweakened in thisperiod:Mira,'Alcuniaspetti'. 61 Ugolini,'Formazione', pp. 204-5. 62 Politicalinstability in latemedievalLombardy stemmed fromthedifficulty of bindingtogether subjectcitiesand formerly autonomous territories 'Alcuniaspetti'),ratherthanfromthe (Chittolini, oppression byonecityofmany(see e.g. Fossati,'Problema di storia',forVigevano's rebellion of I499). 63 Petralia, "'Crisi"'. 64 Brucker, Civic world,pp. 494-5, 505; Fiumi,Impresa;Fubini,ed., Lorenzode' Medici,pp. 363-6, 547-53. 65 66 Luzzati,Guerradi popolo. Pezzati, 'Diario'. (C EconomicHistorySociety'993 This content downloaded from 128.111.62.78 on Mon, 20 Jan 2014 14:04:39 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 466 S. R. EPSTEIN II thatregional This last pointtakesus back to the initialsuggestion, politicalinstitutions playeda majorrolein establishing thedivisionoflabour The pointcan betweentownand country andin shapinglong-term growth. in one ofthemoreadvanced be testedbycomparing regional developments medievalindustries, clothmanufacture. and betterdocumented This is especially appropriate oflow-andmedium-quality becauseproduction cloth seemsto haveexpandedin muchofwestern EuropeaftertheBlackDeath.67 it was believedthatclothweavingin late medieval Untilquiterecently and thatlargequantities of woollenclothhad Sicilywas underdeveloped, to be imported to meetlocaldemand.A closerlook,however, has revealed ofwoollen,cotton,fustian, thata numberofmanufactures and linencloth andfifteenth in response did in factdevelopin thelatefourteenth centuries to risingdomestic demand.Atleasta dozendistinctive cottonmanufactures fustianmanufactures were have been identified. By thefifteenth century, wellestablished and theirproductsevenexported abroad.The weavingof butspecialized also linenand hempclothis notas wellreported, industries appear.By contrast, despitethegrowthof somelow-and medium-quality to establishhigh-quality woollenindustries, wereon attempts production thewholeunsuccessful. Althoughwe knowverylittleabouthow the clothwas manufactured, including thedegreeofurbanspecialization and theextentofruralputting of supplywereratherunusual.The out, it is quite clearthatconditions lackofevidenceforclothguildsis particularly striking, although thereare a number offactors thatcanexplainit.Sicilylackedanimportant institutional urbanterritorial basisforurbanguilds,namelystrong control;therelatively highdegreeof marketcompetition mayhavealso restricted gainsaccruing to corporations. In pre-industrial craftswithlocal Europe,easilymastered oflinenorcheap,unstandardized andregional outlets suchas themanufacture and thesewereprecisely theindustries woolusuallylackedguildstructures, foundin late medievalSicily.In addition,Sicilianurban mostcommonly and unstructured societybeforethe I430s seemsto havebeenremarkably informal.This informality, expressed,for example,in the weaknessof ties of neighbourhood and cognaticdescentgroupsand of extra-familial was accentuated and must fraternity, by highratesof individualmobility havelessenedbothopportunities and demandto establishcorporate bonds of solidarity.69 All of this ensuredthatclothweavingdevelopedwhere productioncosts were lowest;thereis no evidenceof urbancorporate or labour. overrawmaterials monopolies Sinceresearchon Tuscan clothmanufacturing has concentrated on the Florentinewoollenindustry, our view of broaderregional high-quality is stillratherhazy.Nonetheless, twogeneralpatterns developments emerge fromtheavailableevidence.First,duringthefourteenth century formerly 67 68 69 Epstein,'Textileindustry', pp. I48-9. Ibid.; idem,Island foritself,pp. I94-9. Ibid., pp. 349-52. (C EconomicHistorySociety'993 This content downloaded from 128.111.62.78 on Mon, 20 Jan 2014 14:04:39 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions AND INSTITUTIONS ECONOMY IN LATE MEDIEVAL ITALY 467 control.70 urbancorporate cameunderincreasing ruralproducers independent the mid I430s, of the betweenthelate I38os and Second,the transition, territorial direct more to protectorate regional statefroma formof Florentine monopoly a regional to establish guild wool Florentine rule,71enabledthe woollensforexport.This forcedsubject of higher-quality overproduction regional thelower-quality towards industries their woollen townstore-orient because but only in Pescia, expanded may have manufacture Wool market.72 thatset it apartfrom privileges Florencegrantedit fiscaland commercial otherurbancentres;thisverysuccessupholdstheviewthatFlorencewas powersto sustainor stifleregional capable of exertingdiscretionary competitors.73 theriseof theterritorial therefore, development, In termsof industrial overthecountryside hold urban corporate strengthened stateseemsto have This was theresultpartlyof over the region. domination and Florentine Florentine in before relations Tuscany nature of town-country theexploitative city which independent of by of method conquest, the and partly conquest, of balance the existing challenging seriously without added stateswere betweentown and countryin the provinces.Generalrural authority centurybecauseof oppressive afterthe mid fourteenth impoverishment encouraged suchas sharecropping fiscalpoliciesand tenurialarrangements for demand middle-class and restricted lowerhave also the towns74 may by Thereis fordomestic growth.75 opportunities compressed clothand further linen,77 thatcheaperwoollen,76 on theotherhandalso evidencesuggesting and early weavingexpandedin the late fourteenth and possiblyfustian78 fifteenth century. andfifteenth-century thereis littledoubtthatlatefourteenthBycontrast acrosstheentire of manufacturing a stronggrowth Lombardyexperienced Kotel'nikova,'Produzione',pp. 22I-3; Herlihy,Pisa, p. I59. See the recentoverviewby Zorzi, 'Stato territoriale. I, pp. I72-3; Melis, 'Sguardo', pp. 75-6, 78; Doren, Artiflorentine, 72 Poehlmann,Wirtschaftspolitik, pp. I35-7; idem, 'Pistoia', pp. i66, i68; idem,'Momenti', p. I94; Tangheroni,'Sistema economico, pp. 58-9; Brown, 'Economic "decline"', p. i05. It has recentlybeen suggestedthatthe wool industry in Prato, which was previouslybelieved to have been exemptedfromFlorentinemonopoly(Epstein, centuryundercommercialpressurefromthe capital: 'Cities', p. 42), also contractedduringthe fifteenth e industrialpp. 418, 437-8. Cassandro,'Commercio,manifatture 73 Epstein, 'Cities', p. 42; Poehlmann,Wirtschaftspolitik, pp. I03-9, I50. Like otherexport-ledwool pp. I30-3), the FlorentineArtedeltalana of the time(Munro,'Industrialtransformations', manufactures seems to have respondedto decliningforeignmarketshareafterthe Black Death by raisingqualityand its output.While dwindlingforeignmarketsand risingeconomiesof scale in the context differentiating of a growingregionalmarketmusthave increasedthe competitionbetweenTuscan wool manufacturers and have contributedto industrialrationalizationwithinthe region, it would still appear that the legislation bypassingdiscriminatory industrialhegemonywas achievedprimarily Florentines'long-lasting (which included monopolizingimportsof high-qualitywool afterconqueringthe main Tuscan port, Pisa, in I406) againstregionalrivals. 74 Herlihy, 'Santa Maria Impruneta';Mazzi and Raveggi, Uominie cose; Kotel'nikova, 'Tendenze progressive';Conti, Catastiagrari,p. 78; idem,Impostadiretta,p. 28; Fasano Guarini,'CittAsoggette', pp.48-54. 75 Herlihy,'Distributionof wealth',p. I55. 76 Brown,Shadow of Florence,pp. I04-5, I07-8; de la Ronciere,Florence,iII, pp. 8oo-i. 77 Doren, Artifiorentine, expandedin theneighbouring II, pp. 92 n. I, 94 n. 3, 96 n. i. Flax cultivation of Siena and Lucca (Cherubini,'Campagneitaliane',p. 384 n. 3; Hicks, 'Sources of wealth'). territories 78 p. I48. Mazzaoui, Italian cottonindustry, 70 71 (C EconomicHistorySociety1993 This content downloaded from 128.111.62.78 on Mon, 20 Jan 2014 14:04:39 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 468 S. R. EPSTEIN rangeof linen,fustian, and woollencloth.79 There,thecriticalroleplayed in shapingthenewmanufactures factors is evenclearerthan byinstitutional forSicily.In particular, lower'rural'production costswereneither necessary nor sufficient forindustrial success.Clothmakingdid not prerequisites to 'marginal', as mosttheories spreadinvariably uplandor pastoralregions, of the 'ruralization' of manufacture or ofproto-industry predict.Although nearlyeveryLombardcityhad a linenindustry of its own,forexample, did notdevelophaphazardly or evenwhere specialized'rural'manufactures flaxwas in good supply.Whetherin 'town'or 'country', the growthof a strongurbanfustianindustry linenweavingwas checkedwherever was failedto developin the cities alreadypresent.Stronglinenmanufactures ofMilan,Cremona,Piacenza,Brescia,and Bergamoforlackof and contadi thenecessary fustian supportto competewithlongerestablished industries, commercial whosepowerful andpolitical backinghadbeenenshrined already in monopolies overflaxand spunthreadin by themidthirteenth century theurbanhinterland. andextended Theseurbanmonopolies wereconfirmed in responseto risingcompetition in thefourteenth and fifteenth centuries on theregionalflaxand labourmarkets by lesserlinenmanufactures and, in sizeabletownssuchas whichemerged industries increasingly, by fustian BustoArsizio,and Rivieradel Garda.Those Lecco, Vigevano,Melegnano, defensivemeasures,however,were never entirelysuccessful.In fact, at thelowerend ofthemarketcontributed, Lombardcompetition together inthehigherwithcentral andLiguriancompetition European,Piedmontese, of Milan qualityranges,to theslowdeclineof thegreatfustianindustries and Cremonaafterthe I38os.80 Lesser Lombardclothmanufacturing developedin spiteof the cities' stubbornand occasionally violentresistancethanksto the jurisdictional fromurbanauthority and immunities autonomies, franchises, described above. Yet even jurisdictional freedoms wereno guaranteeof industrial success.For example,no fustianindustries emergedoffthemaintrading routesand awayfromthelargerurbanmarkets (suchas themoreoutlying of Novara,Bergamo,and Brescia),despitethepresencein those provinces andoflargesuppliesofcheaprural areasofmanyautonomous communities labour.The reasonseemsto have been the near monopolyover cotton of thelargerLombardcities. imports Newindustries Similargrowth canbe foundinwoolmanufacture. patterns in areasfreeof urbaninterference, whichin thiscase included prospered areasthathad easyaccessto local wool and Lombardy'smoreperipheral streams.Villagemanufactures fast-running expandeddespitethe hostility ofurbanwoolguilds,whichtriedto subordinate ordestroy ruralcompetitors accessto by stipulating compulsory corporate membership, by regulating the betterqualitiesof wool and dyeingmaterials, or by controlling retail markets.Whilethe bestknownsuccessstoryis thatof Vigevano,whose woollenindustry it to urbanranking in theearlyfifteenth propelled century Epstein, 'Manifatturetessili'. Mazzaoui, 'Cottonindustry',pp. 283-6; idem,Italian cotton industry, pp. I39, i44-6, I5o; Frangioni, 'Merci di Lombardia', pp. 64, 67; Heers, Genes,p. 229; Mainoni, 'AttivitA mercantile',p. 577. 79 80 C) EconomicHistorySociety'993 This content downloaded from 128.111.62.78 on Mon, 20 Jan 2014 14:04:39 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions ECONOMY AND INSTITUTIONS IN LATE MEDIEVAL ITALY 469 in thetownsand and to fullurbanstatusa century later,woollenindustries valleysof Torno, Lecco, Cannobio,Varese,Cantui,and Madreraalso ratesofgrowth. achievedcomparable So, althoughLombardcitiesusuallysucceededin quashingindustrial rivalswithin theirownjurisdiction, theywereunabletowithstand competition fromtheincreasing numberofindependent communities withintheregion. In thelongrun,of course,urbanindustries stoodto gainnearlyas much as theirlesserrivalsfromweakerlocal monopolies and a less fragmented territorial market.For protectionism was a double-edged sword,which but foreclosed thosein preservedmarketsin the immediatehinterland neighbouring Lombardtowns.Bothpointsemergefromtherepealin I457 by Duke FrancescoSforzaofa decreeof I454 forbidding imports to Milan in theduchy.The reasonfortherepealwas of woolclothmadeelsewhere that otherLombardcitieswere demandingsimilarbans in theirown territories, and also thatthe I454 importban was provingunableto stop inflowsto Milan of cheaperclothfromlessertownssuch as Vigevano.8 a stricterban on the latter,however,as urban Ratherthan enforcing producersdemanded,the duke decidedthatthe cheaperwoollensshould be markedso theycould be easilyrecognizedby buyers.This was a toavoidthezero-sum characteristic outcomeofurbanprotectionism attempt andtoreconcile allpolitically whichbythemidfifteenth significant interests, century includedthoseof themany'separate'or autonomous communities and 'quasi-cities' on whosesupportthedukerelied.82 III This articlehas pursuedtwoparalleland distinct themes.First,we have to economicdevelopment seentheextentto whichthesizeandcontribution of late medievaltownsdependedupon theirplace in a regionalpolitical as muchbyinstitutional weredefined constraints order.Latemedieval regions on tradeas by locationand naturalendowments, and thoseconstraints afterthe Black playeda criticalpartin the growthof urbanhierarchies of earlysixteenth-century urbanhierarchies Death. The moreintegrated fromthelate did notemergespontaneously Europeidentified byde Vries83 trendtowards medievalsocialand economic'crisis'and froma generalized and theregional larger,morestructured polities.Rather,thosehierarchies, balanceofauthority wereshapedbythechanging economies thattheyreflect, betweentownand country, betweentownsand thestate,and betweenthe townsthemselves. had important Secondly,it is evidentthatsocialand politicalconflict formarketstructures and theeconomyas staticand dynamic consequences a whole. Regional patternsof politicalauthorityhelp to explain 'variation in theinstitutionalization ofmarketing in turn,theevolution of systems'84; economicgrowth.I marketstructures playeda criticalroleforlong-term tessili',p. i9. Epstein,'Manifatture '. Chittolini, "'Quasi-cittA" pp. 253-7. de Vries,Europeanurbanization, p. 5I (myitalics). systems', Smith,'Regionaleconomic 81 Barbieri, Economiae political,pp. I30-2; 82 83 84 ?OEconomicHistorySociety1993 This content downloaded from 128.111.62.78 on Mon, 20 Jan 2014 14:04:39 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 470 S. R. EPSTEIN have suggested thattheincreasedapproximation of Sicilianand Lombard hierarchies to rank-sizerule duringthe fifteenth centuryreflects rising economicintegration; thisprocesswas promoted and sustainedby theway territorial statechallenged and redefined former the emerging relations of authority betweentownandcountryside and between thetownsthemselves. In Sicily,theCatalan-Aragonese oftheI390S nippedin politicalrestoration the bud the growthof urbanterritorial jurisdictions, and promoted trade in theroyaldemesnethrough tollreductions. Although themonarchy had littleinfluence overtransaction costsin landsunderfeudalauthority, which werein a senseinstitutionally independent markets, thesize and economic to tradein feudal weightof theroyaldemesnehelpedto weakenbarriers In Lombardy,the Viscontiand Sforzawerewillingto support territory. 'rural'claimsofindependence fromcommunal whileguarding jurisdiction, theirrightsof excisethroughout theregion.In bothSicily and expanding thecreation ofa moreintegrated undermined andLombardy regional economy metropolitan primacy,despite the increasingfiscaland administrative resources thatwentto Palermo,Messina,and Milan.Florence,bycontrast, seemsto have deployedincreasedterritorial its gripon powersto tighten To quotetheFlorentine and strengthen itsprimacy.85 theTuscaneconomy LeonardoBruni,at theturnof thefifteenth 'thecity chancellor, century, itselfstandsin thecenter, likea guardian andlord,whilethetownssurround Florenceon theperiphery, eachin itsownplace'.86In theory, thispolitical andeconomiccentralization neednothaveretarded regional developmentweakenthe traditional but as Florencedid not seriously hold of subject communesover theirhinterland, and specialization regionalintegration progressedmore slowlythan elsewhere,and the Tuscan economywas scarred.87 permanently urbanhierarchies Theseexamplesofhowpre-industrial coulddiffer over space and timealso raise some broaderpointsfordebate.Wrigleyhas in earlymodernEuropepossessed thaturbanhierarchies recently suggested the 'stabilityof urbanneed, a 'strikingregularshape', whichreflected into patternsof demand'.88The translated throughmarketmechanisms in Wrigley's as seemsimplicit Italianmaterial raisesthequestionwhether, a lackofmarkets fromtherank-size rulereflect or an deviations argument, 89 Perhapsinsteadthey or degenerate 'incomplete stageof urbanization'. reflectthe factthat,as sociallyboundedand historical institutions, premarkets weremorecomplexandvariedthanis usuallyenvisaged. industrial The evidencemustered heresuggests thatwe can helpto explainlong-term in regionaleconomicgrowthby recognizing the historical differences and pathdependence ofmarketstructures. complexity This recognition toolforcomparative providesa powerful analysis,and 85 See by contrastMuth,'Urbanconcentration', pp. 6i8-9: 'in independent stateswithlimited andItaly-primacy territorial spansofcontrol-asin premodern Germany was nonexistent'. 86 Bruni,'Panegyric', p. I44 (c. I403-4). 87 Notehowever thatmarket as expressed distributions arenotnecessarily 'imperfections' bynon-rank-size withlong-term and Lees, Makingof urban incompatible socialand economic development (Hohenberg Europe,pp. 348-9; Smith, 'City-size distributions', pp. 35-6; de Vries,Europeanurbanization, pp. 92-3). 88 is qualified on p. I. Wrigley, 'Cityandcountry', p. io; thissuggestion 89 Hohenberg and Lees,MakingofurbanEurope,p. 348; Smith,'City-size distributions', p. 22. (C EconomicHistorySociety1993 This content downloaded from 128.111.62.78 on Mon, 20 Jan 2014 14:04:39 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions ECONOMY AND INSTITUTIONS IN LATE MEDIEVAL ITALY 47I also dispelsthe teleological presumption that,historically, marketshave followeda straight and narrowpath towardsincreasingly efficient, neoclassicalforms.For example,patterns ofchangein latemedievalTuscany, where Florenceincreasedits regionalprimacyand retardedregional integration, andinlatesixteenthandseventeenth-century Lombardy, where Milan'sprimacy also increased despitea generaldeclinein theregion'srate of urbanization,90 show thatmarketintegration can be haltedor even reversed fornon-economic reasons. can we concludeaboutcurrent What,in thiscontext, debateson 'town' and 'country'?Recentlytherehave been increasing calls to abandonthe of 'urban'and 'rural',on thegroundsthatthetermsofcontrast dichotomy are individually so diverse,91or havesuchstrongreciprocal connections,92 that theyovershadowratherthan illuminatethe past. Some take the a stepfurther, andsuggest that'town'and 'country' as suchstand argument butaresimply theinevitable outcomeofa spontaneous in no logicalcontrast, in latemedieval processoffunctional specialization. Although developments of Italysupportthefirstpoint,theyalso clearlydisprovethereductionism the second.The characteristically ambiguousquotationfromMarx(taken froma discussionof the socialdivisionof labourand used as epigraphto in definingthedivision thisarticle)remindsus oftheroleofsocialinstitutions and in establishing theconditions of labourbetween'town'and 'country' and modalities ofexchange. The suggestion, thatthedivisionof labourbetweentownand however, country was due to socialand politicalratherthan'spontaneous' economic processes,and the argument (as has been presented implicitly here)that manymedievaltownspractised'surplusextraction by means of extraeconomic shouldnotbetakentomeanthaturbanjurisdictional compulsion',93 economicgrowth.Late medievalLombard'rural' stifled powersinvariably clothmanufactures becausethetraditional weresuccessful economic, political, andjurisdictional ofcitystatescouldbe challenged authority bycommunities albeitterritorially farmorerestricted, exerting similar, powersof coercion It is also well recognized that'rural'manufactures overthe countryside. and information; required'urban'resources(capital,marketing networks, In a regionsuchas latemedieval sometimes evenurbanartisans) toexpand.94 remainedstrong,the 'country's' Lombardywherecommunalinstitutions onlychanceof breakingfreeof the urbanmouldwas to adoptas faras ofa 'town'.In a regionsuchas late possiblethejurisdictional prerogatives was unnecessary, medievalSicily,on theotherhand,thisstrategy because between'town'and 'country' was of primarily theinstitutional distinction ratherthanpracticalsignificance. symbolic oftheroleofpoliticsin thedevelopment oflatemedieval My discussion withsome recentinterpretations of Europeanstate townsalso contrasts 91Hohenberg and Lees, 'Urbandecline',pp. 443-6. 91 Langton and Hoppe,Town and country, pp. 36, 38; Abrams, 'Townsandeconomic growth'. 92 Genicot, 'Villeset campagnes'. 93 Epstein, 'Cities',pp. I4-5. See also Hibbert,'Economicpolicy',pp. I97-8; Merrington, 'Town and country'. 94 Hohenberg and Lees, 'Urbandecline',pp. 449-50. (C) EconomicHistorySociety'993 This content downloaded from 128.111.62.78 on Mon, 20 Jan 2014 14:04:39 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 472 S. R. EPSTEIN whichdraw a starkdichotomy formation, between'cities'and 'states', between'capital'and 'coercion'thatthe two allegedlyembody,on the assumption thattheypursuedfundamentally conflicting goals.Specifically, it is suggested thatlatemedievaland earlymoderncitiestendedto resist, ratherthanpromote, theexpansion of statepower.95 This view underestimates the degreeto whichthe economicpowersof of theirpoliticalauthority. citieswerea function Citiesexertedpolitical (oftenincludingterritorial) powerswhichwere parallelto, ratherthan To reify'capital'and 'coercion'as subordinate to, commercial interests. seemsto misrepresent the extentto whichurbanelites starkalternatives andjurisdictional as wellas economic pursuedpolitical goalsintheirrelations lords.96Whetherurbanelitesfavoured withterritorial one at the expense ofrelative costsandopportunities, oftheotherdependedon theirassessment ratherthanon somepostulated hostility towardsterritorial expansion;on the otherhand,urbanenmityof higherpoliticalauthority was rootedin the real and usuallywell justifiedfear of losing existingrightsand ratherthan in ill-defined prerogatives, includingterritorial jurisdiction, to statepower.97 'capitalist' opposition to assesshowfarcitiesstoodto 'gain'or to 'lose' If we wish,therefore, fromthegrowthof morepowerful states,it seemsthatwe mustconsider Town-country relations helpedset politicalas muchas economicfactors.98 thebalanceof politicalauthority withina state,and affected theextentto or compromise whichthestatewas willingto promote, restrict, with,the of subjecttowns.In fifteenth-century prerogatives Sicilythecities,which wereformally underroyalcontroland had weak ruraljurisdictions, had togainbyallying everything withthemonarchy againstthefeudalaristocracy statefinancesand bureaucracy.99 Once Florencehad and by promoting it was ableto dominate subduedrivalTuscancities,bycontrast, theregion had survivedthe Tuscan unchecked,forno strong,non-urban authority Florencehad littleneed to communes'earlierterritorial expansion.100 withits subjectsand grantthemgreater compromise politicalor economic thehold of subjectcitiesovertheir rights;its mainreasonforweakening 9 Tilly,Coercion, capital;Blockmans, 'Stadt,Regionund Staat';idem,'Princesconquerants'; idem, states'. 'Voracious 9 See forexample Nicholas,Townand countryside; idem,'Economicreorientation'; Brady,Turning Swiss. 97 Oncewe assumethaturbaneconomic andpolitical was not (including territorial) aggrandizement in terms,theanomaly a contradiction ofnorth-central Italiancities-theonlyonesin medieval Europe motuproprio states-becomes an exampleof a more to establish independent citystatesand territorial in whichthe'coercive'aspirations inherent to medievaltownswereable to develop generalpattern, in western further or competing thanelsewhere Europeforlackofeffective territorial superior powers Theseunusually favourable for'coercive' urbangrowth (Chittolini, 'Cities,"city-states"'). opportunities Italianpolitical at all successfully alsoexplainwhynorth-central withforms powers'didnotexperiment ofeconomic organization thatweredistinct frompoliticalforms. Theirmeansofpursuing commercial foodsupply,or thecontrolof production wereoriented objectives, to politicalconquestand chiefly subjugation oftheterritory' (ibid.,p. 695). 98 Idem,'CittA thatthedebateon latemedievalEnglishtowns,whichhas europea'.This suggests focusedmainly on economic factors couldalsogainbytakinga closerlook (Dyer,Declineandgrowth), at changesin thepoliticalroleoftowns(see ibid.,pp. 35-6, 48). 99 Epstein, Island foritself,ch. 7. 100Idem, 'Cities',p. 3I (C EconomicHistorySocietyI993 This content downloaded from 128.111.62.78 on Mon, 20 Jan 2014 14:04:39 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions ECONOMY AND INSTITUTIONS IN LATE MEDIEVAL ITALY 473 metropolitan contadiseemsto have been to establisha morecentralized, forits own sake.101 ratherthanto promoteruralautonomy administration thanin Tuscanyin Communalrule in Lombardywas farless effective bodies.Whenthetimecame,this'backwardness' submerging rivalterritorial morepluralistic territorial statelackingoverwhelming produceda politically urbanprerogatives, helpedto promoteaggregateeconomicgrowth,and overtheurbansectoras a whole.Whilethe undermined Milan'shegemony rulea source of theTuscancommunes becameunderFlorentine strength or decline,the initialgreaterweaknessof of relativeeconomicstagnation centurya considerable Lombardcitieshad becomeby the late fifteenth pointof strength. andPoliticalScience LondonSchoolofEconomics 101 Chittolini, Formazione, pp. 292-352; FasanoGuarini, 'CittA soggette'; Berengo, 'CittA', p. 69i. 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