The Division of the German Navy and Merchant Marine at... Tony Demchak, PhD candidate, Kansas State University

The Division of the German Navy and Merchant Marine at the Potsdam Conference
Tony Demchak, PhD candidate, Kansas State University
At the Potsdam Conference (July 17 -August 1, 1945), the Soviet Union, United
Kingdom, and United States discussed a number of important issues about postwar Allied policy
in Germany. One of those issues was the division of the German fleet and merchant marine
amongst the Allies. While the division of the German ships was not as controversial or polarizing
as the issue of reparations, for example, it had a considerable impact upon the Cold War. The
Soviet Union was able to win major concessions in the division of these ships because of
superior coordination between civilian and military officials, a greater degree of preparedness,
and taking advantage of British mistakes and American passivity.
Even though the US and UK had possession of most of the German ships after the
German surrender, the Soviet Union still acquired a third of the German navy and merchant
marine. The British were able to replace a healthy portion of their merchant marine and the
Soviets gained access to advanced German naval technology. The US intended to use their
portion of the German ships to support a Japanese invasion and supplement the American
commercial fleet until American-built replacements could be had.
However, this division was not as equitable it might first appear. All three sides needed,
or at the very least would benefit greatly from, the addition of new freighters to their merchant
marines. On the issue of warships, however, the Soviet Union needed the German vessels much
more than either their American or British counterparts, both quantitatively and qualitatively.
This material gap gave the Americans and particularly the British leverage in negotiations; after
all, they possessed the vast majority of the captured German fleet. High-ranking officers in the
Tony Demchak, Kansas State University, 2
British and American navies and diplomatic corps recognized this fact and advised their political
masters to use it to their respective country's advantage. However, Harry Truman and Winston
Churchill did not.1 All three leaders were far more concerned with the German merchant marine
than the German navy, a preoccupation Josef Stalin was able to exploit to great effect.
Of the so-called "Big Three," Stalin was the first to investigate the German fleet’s
division officially. According to the memoirs of Admiral Nikolai G. Kuznetsov, People’s
Commissar of the Navy and a participant at the Potsdam Conference, Stalin had already asked
him in April 1945 to consider how best to use the expected Soviet share of the German fleet.2
Stalin formally brought the German fleet’s disposition to the attention of Harry Truman and
Winston Churchill on May 23, 1945. This letter set the tone of Stalin’s position on the German
fleet.
In the May 23 letter, Stalin informed Truman and Churchill that Germany “has delivered
her navy and merchant marine to the British and Americans.” He claimed that “Germans have
refused to surrender a single warship or merchant vessel to the Soviet armed forces.”3 The
minimum the Soviet Union was willing to accept was a third of the German navy and merchant
marine. Stalin thought he was entitled to this share with “full justification and according to
fairness.”4 Stalin made his position very clear, adopting a wounded air and insisting he only
wanted what he was due. By May 29, both Truman and Churchill approved discussing this issue
at Potsdam.5
The British and Americans clearly did not see the issue of the German fleet as being as
important as the Soviets did. The preliminary draft of the conference agenda on May 30,
prepared by the British, left the German fleet completely off.6 British minister John Balfour
Tony Demchak, Kansas State University, 3
wrote to Acting Secretary of State Joseph Grew the following day and rectified his mistake.
However, Grew did not inform Truman that the division of the German fleet had been added to
the agenda until June 5, four days later.7 The State Department prepared a brief memorandum for
the upcoming conference on June 14. The division of the German fleet appears last under
“Germany” and there is absolutely no commentary on the subject.8
Thus, while Stalin and Kuznetsov had considered the topic of the division of the German
ships since April, some of the key negotiators on the American and British sides were not even
aware the issue existed. On June 15, presidential Chief of Staff Admiral William Leahy
requested a report from the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). He asked the JCS about the “disposition
[and] distribution” of the German navy and merchant marine.9 The JCS submitted their official
report on July 10, nearly a month later. Meanwhile, the State Department prepared a briefing
book on the ultimate fate of the merchant marine, leaving the German navy to the military.
In the briefing book submitted on June 27, the State Department focused on the
immediate use of German merchantmen against Japan and the long-range implications of the
division of the German merchant marine. In particular, the State Department wanted large
German vessels for use against Japan either as personnel carriers or medical ships.10 Ships that
were captured by the Germans were to be restored to the Allied country that had owned them
before the war. Another key short-term objective for the State Department was to secure Soviet
accession to the United Maritime Authority (UMA), which was a recurring topic in the memos
and briefings of the State Department.11 The UMA’s mission was to allocate German freighters
for the war against Japan and to decide the final disposition of each ship of the German
commercial fleet.
Tony Demchak, Kansas State University, 4
There were two main long-term objectives for the State Department. The primary longterm goal of the State Department was to ensure the German shipbuilding industry, particularly
the naval sector, was not rebuilt. In the briefing book, the State Department stated that “in so far
as disarmament and reparations considerations clash, the former should take precedence, so far
as possible.” The Allies were not to build any new warships in German shipyards.12
A secondary long-term consideration for the State Department was to have the dispersal
of the German merchant marine counted towards reparations for the Allies. The Germans had
roughly 700-800 commercial ships at the time of the surrender, according to an older attachment
to the briefing book. Three hundred of these ships were captured from other countries and would
be returned, leaving 500 to be distributed among the Allies, including 25 ships built during the
war. It was completely legitimate to consider these ships as reparations, according to the
attachment. The official US policy should be to make sure the Germans had just enough shipping
to serve the needs of coastal trade. The US should ensure they only claim those ships that cannot
compete with the American domestic market.13
US policy on the German navy, on the other hand, did not get the consideration that the
policy on the merchant marine did. The State Department wanted no part of the discussion on the
disposition of the German navy. A State Department memo stated that any decision on the
German fleet was “subject to the approval of military authorities.”14 Nearly a month after Leahy
requested a report by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the President received a response.
Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall prepared a memorandum for President Truman.
According to Marshall, as much of the German fleet as possible should either be scrapped or
scuttled. A few might be kept for “experimental or test purposes,” but the majority should be
Tony Demchak, Kansas State University, 5
destroyed. Marshall clearly recognized that the only power that would benefit from the German
technology would probably be the Soviets. However, Marshall recognized that it was highly
unlikely that either the British or Soviets would accept simply destroying the German warships.
He proposed a two-point plan. First, he argued, “All capital ships such as battleships, pocket
battleships, cruisers, and also submarines [should] be destroyed.” The remaining auxiliary ships
would then be divided among the United States, United Kingdom, Soviet Union, and France.15
Marshall’s backup, in case the first point of his plan was unacceptable, was simply to
divide the German fleet four ways. He continued to stress that the German U-boats should all be
sunk, even if all the surface ships were left intact. In either case, Marshall excluded the smaller
Allied nations from having any input. If the smaller nations wished to claim individual ships,
they could request that particular ship from the major Allied nation that received it. One of his
more shocking pieces of advice was to give the United States’ share of the German fleet to the
Soviet Union, if Stalin asked for it, perhaps as a concession to ensure the U-boats were sunk.16
On July 11th, the day after the President received the memo from Marshall, Chief of Naval
Operations Ernest J. King telegraphed Leahy to disregard that particular part of the memo.17 This
memo constituted the only communication between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the President
before the Potsdam Conference.
The British shared the American concern with the German fleet. The First Lord of the
Admiralty, Brendan Bracken, provided his briefing recommendations to Churchill on July 6,
1945. He makes his position very plain: "It would clearly be in the interest of this country, and in
the interest of the World as a whole, to scrap the entire German fleet." However, he is concerned
that the Americans are unlikely to agree to this proposal, and without active American support,
the British would be in a "minority of one." Whatever the British and Americans decide to do
Tony Demchak, Kansas State University, 6
with the German fleet, they must get some major concession for sharing it with the Soviets,
however. He writes that "this [the German fleet] is about the best card we hold in our hand for
Terminal [Potsdam]."18
A comparison of Marshall's and Bracken's memos to their delegations shows that there
was considerable agreement between the two Allies. The scrapping of U-boats, which Marshall
explicitly mentions but Bracken does not, is a continuous theme throughout the preparations for
the conference. Both sides were heavily damaged by German U-boat traffic during World War
II.19 The German submarines were superior in some respects to any Allied submarine,
particularly in sonar and quietness.20 If all three sides got some of the best German submarines -the Type XXI or the Type XVII 'Walter' boats -- instead of the then-existing American and
British superiority in submarines, the playing field would be level, something neither the
Americans nor the British wanted.21 With such agreement, it is something of a shock that neither
the British nor the Americans actually got what they wanted when the conference began on July
17, 1945.
Almost the entire first day of the conference passed without any discussion of the
German navy or merchant marine. Stalin only brought it up at the very end of the first day,
saying he had only one more question: “Why does Mr. Churchill refuse the Russian receipt of
their share of the German fleet?” Churchill responded: “I am not against [it]. But since you pose
the question to me, such is my answer: this fleet should be sunk or divided.” Stalin asked: “Are
you for sinking or dividing?” Nearly every publication on the Berlin Conference reports
Churchill’s answer and Stalin’s rejoinder.22
Churchill: All means of war are terrible things.
Tony Demchak, Kansas State University, 7
Stalin: The fleet must be divided. If Mr. Churchill prefers to sink the fleet, he may sink his own share. I do
not intend to sink mine.
What is rarely reported is Churchill’s answer: “At the present time, nearly all the German fleet is
in our hands.”23
The exchange between Churchill and Stalin is notable for two reasons. Churchill was the
one to offer division as a possible recourse, completely undercutting the British (and American)
position. Foreign Minister Sir Anthony Eden was absolutely furious with Churchill. Eden wrote
a brief note to Churchill after the meeting: “… We have not many cards in our hand. … We must
not, I am sure, yield a single German ship in our possession until we have obtained satisfaction
for our interests, which the Russians are treating with contempt.” Eden cited Russian policy on
British oil interests in Romania as one example.24 It is fair to say that the American and British
bargaining position was greatly weakened.
The second reason that this conversation is notable is that Truman did not say anything at
the conference. He neither attacked Stalin nor supported Churchill. He presented no American
position. Truman may have stayed silent because he was exhausted and just wanted the meeting
to end: by all reports the meeting lasted several hours. He may have tacitly supported Churchill,
which seems reasonable given the memos of the JCS. It is also possible that Truman thought that
Stalin had a perfectly legitimate right to the ships in question. Truman was certainly wary of both
Churchill and Stalin manipulating him, and he might have felt the best course was to stay silent.
In any case, Truman missed an opportunity to push that the German fleet be sunk.
Two private conversations, one between Churchill and Truman and the other between
Churchill and Stalin on July 18, show something very surprising about Churchill's position. In
the conversation with Truman, Churchill offered a reason why he did not oppose Stalin's position
Tony Demchak, Kansas State University, 8
more strongly, telling Truman that "I found it hard to deny the Russians the right to keep their
third of the Fleet afloat if they needed it." He still remained firmly opposed to U-boats, but even
here suggested that some could be kept around: "I made it clear that the case of the U-boats must
be considered separately, as they were nasty things to have knocking about in large numbers25."
This conversation with Truman is one of two things: an attempt to rationalize a mistake
or the official pronouncement of a policy. His conversation with Stalin, a few hours, suggests the
latter. One particularly illuminating statement reinforces this: "He [I] wished to see Russian ships
sailing across the oceans of the world. Russia had been like a giant with his nostrils pinched."26
He even welcomed a Russian naval presence in the Mediterranean, something that had horrified
the British as recently as 1936. He reportedly agreed to revise the Montreux Convention, which
demilitarized the Turkish straits in time of war, prohibiting all foreign warships from passing
through them, and forbidding aircraft carriers even during time of peace. When Stalin pressed
him for a concrete position, Churchill demurred.27
To a certain extent, the flowery speech ought to be taken with a grain of salt. Statesmen
often use high-sounding speech, particularly when a conversation is being recorded, as his
conversations with Stalin and Truman were. It does not necessarily eliminate that Churchill
simply refused the fact that he made a mistake and instead of retracting it, pretended that his
mistake was intentional all along. Such a move would be entirely in keeping with Churchill's
public image. However, the concessions he offered, especially with regards to the Mediterranean,
suggest that he envisioned a change in British policy. Perhaps he wanted to reduce the British
commitment to the Mediterranean so as to keep a better eye on defeated Germany. Maybe he
wanted to devote a greater part of the British fleet to the Indian Ocean. Since Churchill is in
office for less than a week more, it is impossible to say for certain, but by the time Foreign
Tony Demchak, Kansas State University, 9
Minister Ernest Bevin and Prime Minister Clement Atlee arrived, there was no real opportunity
to change the British position.
Regardless of his ultimate intentions, as soon as Churchill agreed to divide the German
fleet and merchant marine, he lost the right to demand key concessions. The report of the
technical subcommittee, dated August 1, contains a number of provisions. The delegation
adopted the British suggestion to keep the agreement to divide the fleet and merchant marine a
secret. For the navy, the tripartite division was accepted, although the British registered an
objection and demanded a fourth share for the French. Clarifying the status of unfinished ships,
the delegation decided that if a ship were three months or less from completion, it would be
finished. If a ship were between three and six months from completion, its fate would be decided
on a case-by-case basis. Any ship that would require more than six months to complete or repair
would be scrapped. The purpose of this decision was to avoid stimulating the German shipping
industry. There was one final disagreement about the number of submarines: the US and UK
wanted a total of 30, ten subs for each nation, while the Soviets wanted 30 submarines all for
themselves, making a total of 90 subs to be preserved.28 The Soviets ended up having to settle for
ten, but ended up getting four Type XXIs, the best diesel subs the Germans had.29
The key outstanding issue for the merchant marine -- whether it was reparations or war
booty -- was given away by another mistake. With the resolution of the questions on the division
of the German navy, the foreign ministers moved on to discussing the merchant marine. Bevin
tried a new tactic, realizing that the Soviets would not accept any division into four parts –
American, Soviet, British, and French, a move designed to reduce the number of ships that might
be allocated to the Soviet Union. Instead, Bevin proposed that the US, UK, and USSR settle the
accounts of their respective partners out of their own shares. He requested that the USSR take
Tony Demchak, Kansas State University, 10
care of Poland with their share while the US and UK took care of their own allies. Molotov
absolutely refused. He pointed out that the report had not mentioned any specific countries.
Bevin offered that the US and UK would address the needs of Holland, Norway, France,
Belgium, and, with Byrnes’ urging, Greece. The only obligation for the Soviet Union that Bevin
proposed was Poland.30
Molotov continued to stubbornly insist on the original agreement. After all, the Poles
would get their share from the German payments of reparations, suggested Molotov. Bevin
stated that the merchant fleet had nothing to do with reparations and was war booty. The UK lost
48% of her merchant marine, while the USSR had only lost 1%. Essentially, said Bevin, Molotov
was being unreasonable and should simply agree to Bevin’s proposal.31 Bevin made a mistake
here every bit as damaging as Churchill’s alleged mistake that gave the Soviets a third of the
German fleet.
For the first time, a British delegate had dropped the demand that the German merchant
marine would be considered part of reparations and had in fact insisted the merchant marine was
war booty. Molotov could certainly be infuriating, and in this instance, Molotov’s tactics
worked.32 The Soviets had won a tremendous concession, although Molotov did not realize it.
While the foreign ministers continued to argue about various other issues in the division of the
German merchant marine, Molotov had succeeded, inadvertently, in winning a key concession
on which the US and UK would likely never have budged on if not for Bevin’s faux pas. By
referring to the German ships as “war booty,” Bevin effectively increased the amount the Soviets
could demand as reparations, a major reversal of British policy.
Tony Demchak, Kansas State University, 11
In the final analysis, the Soviet victory is a classic example of the results of any
confrontation in which one side is both better prepared and more determined to win. Compared
to the pre-war Red Navy, the Soviet Union made significant gains. For example, the total number
of Soviet submarines, prior to World War II, was 218.33 The Soviet Union lost a total of 137
ships during World War II, of which about 100 were submarines.34 The ten submarines not only
provided much needed reinforcement, but those subs provided extremely useful technical data of
which the Soviets made excellent use.
The proekt (project) 611 submarine, commissioned in 1949, benefitted from the German
knowledge.35 The proekt 611 submarine, although only 300 tons heavier, offered a range of
22,000 km, an increase of 33%. The sub was a bit slower at a surface speed 17 knots, but relied
more heavily on electric engines, allowing the sub a maximum speed of 9.2 knots while
submerged. It used three 2000 horsepower engines, which while less powerful were far more
reliable and less prone to failure. It did all this with the same size crew, 65 officers and enlisted
men, as the K-class.36 Increases in other areas of naval technology were similar in scope.
It is much harder to judge the improvement of the merchant marine. Figures for the size
of the pre-war merchant marine are unavailable. The 1945 merchant marine was 2.5 million tons
displacement. The average size of a Soviet merchant vessel in 1967 was about 7600 tons, a fairly
standard size for the time.37 As ships generally increase in size over time, one might expect a
decrease of 1000-1500 tons from 1967 to 1945. Given that 500 ships were divided between the
Allies, the Soviets would have received about 167 merchant vessels. The estimated size of a
1945 Soviet vessel being 6100 tons suggests that the total tonnage gained from the Potsdam
Conference would have been about 1,018,700 tons, which would have been half the 1945 fleet.38
Since the American and British fleets, both commercial and naval, were already larger and more
Tony Demchak, Kansas State University, 12
advanced than the Soviet fleet, their share of the German ships was correspondingly less
noticeable and less important.
With better preparation, or coordination, the British and the Americans could have used
their leverage far more effectively. When the Americans and British cooperated, the Soviets
were defeated nearly every time. When they did not, they lost. At this stage in their political
lives, at least, neither Churchill nor Truman appear to be the Cold Warriors they would later
become. Truman, in particular, was surprisingly passive during the discussion of this issue.
Churchill's ill-preparedness almost singlehandedly destroyed the negotiating position of the
British. It is certainly possible that both Churchill and Truman were doing their best to maintain
the wartime alliance, but that would not account for their more vociferous objections and
arguments with Stalin over the division of Germany, for example. The most logical explanation
is that the division of the German ships just was not a priority for the Americans or British and it
was for the Soviets.
1
By the time newly-elected British Prime Minister Clement Atlee got to Potsdam, the biggest issues had already
been concluded and he had little opportunity to correct Churchill's mistake.
2
People’s Commissar of the Navy is the rough equivalent to the Chief of Naval Operations in the American defense
community. N. G. Kuznetsov, Memoirs of wartime Minister of the Navy (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1990), 396.
3
Stalin to Churchill, May 23, 1945. Stalin’s Correspondence with Churchill, Atlee, Roosevelt, and Truman 19411945 (New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., Inc, 1958), 359. A similar letter was sent to Truman.
4
Quoted in A. Komarov, “The End of the Kriegsmarine: The decision of the question about the division of the
German Fleet” in Morskoi Sbornik [Naval Digest], Issue 5, 1999, 76. The English translation in Stalin’s
Correspondence is “with good reason and in all fairness.”
5
Truman to Churchill, May 28, 1945 and Truman to Stalin, May 29, 1945. Department of State, Conference of
Berlin (Potsdam) 1945. Foreign Relations of the United States series, vol. 1 (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1960), 156-7. Hereafter cited as FRUS 1 or FRUS 2, for first and second volume, respectively.
6
Grew to Truman, May 30, 1945, FRUS 1, 158-60.
7
Balfour to Grew, June 1, 1945, FRUS 1, 161. Footnote 2 mentions that Grew told Truman on 6/5.
8
Grew to Truman, June 14, 1945, FRUS 1, 167.
9
Leahy to Secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff McFarland, FRUS 1, 174-5.
10
State Department Briefing Book, June 27, 1945, FRUS 1, 563-5.
11
Ibid, 565-6.
12
State Department Briefing Book, June 27, 1945, FRUS 1, 566-8.
13
Attachment to Briefing Book, March 29, 1945, FRUS 1, 568-571.
14
State Department Memorandum, June 30, 1945, FRUS 1, 573.
15
Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President, July 10, 1945, FRUS 1, 573.
Tony Demchak, Kansas State University, 13
16
Ibid, 573-574.
Chief of Naval Operations King to Chief of Staff Leahy, July 11th, 1945, FRUS 1, 574. According to FRUS, the
item was added in error, as someone (Marshall, perhaps?) had misunderstood what the navy had proposed. It is not
clear what discussion is being referred to.
18
Brief of the United Kingdom Delegation to the Conference at Potsdam, from
Rohan Butler, M. E. Pelly, and H. J. Yasamee, eds., Documents on British Policy Overseas: The Conference at
Potsdam July -- August 1945, (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1984), 16-18.
19
According to John Keegan, 2603 ships were sunk, accounting for the loss of 30,000 Allied sailors. John Keegan,
The Price of Admiralty, (New York: Penguin Group, 1988), 315.
20
Norman Polmar and Jurrien Noot, Submarines of the Russian and Soviet Navies, 1718-1990, 137.
21
Polmar and Noot, 137-138. The Type XXI boats were superior in sonar, speed, endurance, torpedo reloading, and
depth compared to Allied boats. The chief feature of the Walter boats was a unique propulsion system, where
hydrogen peroxide was used to produce steam and oxygen that would ignite the fuel oil. The consequence was a
superior sub that could stay submerged for weeks, as opposed to the average diesel sub, which had a maximum
battery life of 18 hours. See also Keegan, 277-278 and
22
For example, FRUS, Truman’s memoirs, and most of the secondary literature mention the exchange, when they
mention the fleet at all.
23
Transcript of the first meeting of the heads of government, July 17, 1945, 5:08 PM from Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of the USSR, Berlin (Potsdam) Conference of the leaders of the three Allied powers – USSR, USA, and
Great Britain: A collection of documents (Moscow: Publisher of Political Literature, 1990), 54. Cited hereafter as
Berlin Conference. Only Russian language sources provide complete transcripts; FRUS and the originals from the
Truman Library provide summaries.
24
Anthony Eden, The Eden Memoirs: The Reckoning (London: Cassell & Company Ltd, 1965), 546.
25
Butler et. al., 368.
26
The source is from a summarized version of the conversation, but this quote was verbatim. "Nostrils pinched"
refers to the narrow openings to the Black Sea and the Baltic Sea.
27
Butler, et. al., 386.
28
Report by the Technical Subcommittee on Disposition of the German Navy and Merchant Marine, August 1,
1945, FRUS 2, 980-2.
29
Polmar and Noot, 138. Although the Soviets did not get any of the Walter boats, they did get the plans and some
engines by capturing the German design office and a shipyard.
30
Ibid, 21.
31
Ibid, 22-3.
32
Molotov’s stubbornness was legendary. His sobriquet by the Americans was “Stone Ass Molotov.”
33
V. I. Achkasov and N. B. Pavlovich, Soviet Naval Operations in the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945(Annapolis,
MD: Naval Institute Press, 1981), 16-21.
34
“Allied War Ships – Allied War Losses”, http://uboat.net/allies/warships/war_losses.html?navy=USSR, accessed
May 12, 2009.
35
Polmar and Noot, 281. The Whiskey class, which dates from 1944, was heavily revised to include the new
technology.
36
Rowher and Monakov, 205-7.
37
“Soviet Merchant Marine”, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/morflot-sov.htm, accessed May
12, 2009. The Soviet navy had 11 million tons and roughly 1450 vessels in 1967.
38
It is not clear if the 1945 figures include the Potsdam ships or not. If they do not, it is an increase of 50%.
17
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King, Admiral Ernest J. Fleet Admiral King: A Naval Record. New York: W.W. Norton and
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