The Long-Term Effects of Family Circumstances and Adversity on the
by user
Comments
Transcript
The Long-Term Effects of Family Circumstances and Adversity on the
The Long-Term Effects of Family Circumstances and Adversity on the Incidence of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder: The Case of Vietnam-Era Veterans Elizabeth Savoca Smith College Northampton, MA 01063 The All-UC Group in Economic History Conference April 30-May 2, 2010 Berkeley, CA Acknowledgements: This research was supported by the U.S. National Institute of Mental Health (R03 MH067598-02). I thank Joan Repaal, Chris Rohlfs, and Robert Rosenheck for their assistance in gaining access to the data. I thank participants in the Eighth Workshop on Costs and Assessments in Psychiatry, sponsored by the International Center of Mental Health Policy and Economics and participants in the 16th International Meeting of the Psychometric Society for their helpful comments and suggestions on earlier drafts. And I thank Shivani Aryal for her most able research assistance. Introduction There is much controversy today about whether Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) is over-diagnosed in U. S. veterans (McNally 2003, 2007). This issue is the focus of intense policy debates as the current U. S. government grapples with the fiscal challenges it faces in providing sufficient support to those veterans who need and seek psychiatric treatment and disability compensation (U.S. Department of Veteran Affairs 2005). At the same time, a long-standing question in academic and professional circles is why relatively few people exposed to intensely traumatic events develop the full-blown symptoms of the disorder (Bowman and Yehuda 2004). This paper provides econometric evidence that contributes to both debates for the answer to the first question may have serious implications for the answer to the second question. The analysis is based on the male veterans who participated in the National Survey of the Vietnam Generation, a landmark study, sponsored by the U.S. Veterans Affairs Administration in the late 1980s (Kulka et al. 1988). This is a uniquely rich crosssectional survey containing detailed information on the veteran’s current psychiatric health as well as retrospective data on his traumatic experiences and on the family dynamics and the structure of the household in which the veteran was raised. In addition to the usual indicators of parents’ socioeconomic status, it paints a vivid picture of their emotional and behavioral stability; it indicates a veteran’s birth order as well as the number of siblings; and it contains diagnostic data designed to simulate a clinical assessment of PTSD. This paper contributes to two major literatures. For one, it adds to the growing research in household economics on the effects of the family rearing environment on a 1 person’s development and achievements. Economic models of family investments of both time and money in their children predict variations in investments not only with household income but also with birth rank, number of siblings, parents’ educational attainment and partnering arrangements. Most empirical work has focused on the effects of these family characteristics on children’s educational outcomes and subsequent success in the workplace (Booth and Kee 2009; Caceres-Delpiano 2006; Kantarevic and Mechoulan 2006; Conley and Glauber 2006; Black et al. 2005; Ejrnaes and Portner 2004; Behrman and Taubman 1986; Lindhert 1977; Astone and McLanahan 1991; Krein and Beller 1988; Manski et al. 1992; Lang and Zagorsky 2001; Ginther and Pollak 2004). Far fewer studies have considered their impact on health capital formation. The amount of time, energy, and financial resources that parents provide to their children, though, may also have significant consequences for the child’s emotional stability and physical health later in life. Indeed, recent work by Argys et al. (2006) finds that birth order is significantly correlated with risky health-related behavior among adolescents: first-born teens are less likely to be sexually active, smoke, use drugs, and drink alcohol— behaviors which often persist into adulthood and may have long-lasting consequences for health and well-being. Second, this paper considers two sources of bias in measures of association between survey indicators of PTSD and its covariates, endogeneity bias and measurement error bias. The endogeneity bias may arise from the possibility that combat exposure, a necessary condition for the diagnosis of combat-related PTSD, is endogenously determined. In recent studies of the effects of military service on long-term health, Angrist et al. (2009), Conley and Heerwig (2009) and Dobkin and Shabani (2009), 2 recognize that self-selection into service may confound health comparisons between civilians and veterans. This paper, which compares veterans with PTSD to those without, allows for the possibility that the unobserved variables which affect how the veteran reacts to combat stress may also influence the likelihood of exposure to combat. Measurement error bias may arise from misclassifications in the veteran’s PTSD status. A large body of research has documented substantial errors in survey classifications of both physical and mental impairments (Bound et al. 2001; Baker et al. 2004; Thomas and Frankenberg 2000; and Savoca 1992, 1995), even among survey instruments that are designed to simulate clinical appraisals (Helzer et al. 1985; Anthony et al. 1985; and Kessler et al. 1998, 2005). Scholars in the social sciences have long been mindful of the implications of classification errors for prevalence estimates and for regression coefficients when the error-ridden variable is a regressor (Aigner 1973). Few studies, however, have recognized the complications for estimates of measures of association caused by classification errors in categorical outcome variables, particularly in health-related applications.1 This paper illustrates a method of accounting for classification errors in outcome variables, proposed by Hausman et al. (1998) and Hausman (2001), which has broad applications to analyses of health survey data. Posttraumatic Stress Disorder As far back as the U.S. Civil War, military physicians documented a constellation of symptoms—shortness of breath, chest pain, fatigue, heart palpitations, dizziness, disturbed sleep patterns—they found difficult to ascribe to physiological causes (Hyams et al. 1996). In 1864, Dr. Henry Hartshorne applied the diagnostic label, “muscular exhaustion of the heart”; in 1871 Dr. Jacob Da Costa called it “irritable heart syndrome” 3 (Paul 1987). The notion that these symptoms could be precipitated by terrifying events was first suggested by Dr. Jean-Martin Charcot in several case studies of veterans of the1870-1871 Franco-Prussian War (Jones and Wessley 2007). During World War I, a similar set of symptoms occurred on an epidemic scale. Hospitals in England were deluged with servicemen who were sent back for treatment for what was variously labeled, ‘shell shock,’ ‘effort syndrome,’ and ‘war neuroses’ (Shephard 2001). In Britain, these syndromes were the third most common reason for disability compensation claims filed by World War I veterans (Hyams et al. 1996). Psychiatric disability claims paid to U.S. veterans average $30,000 per claim for a total cost of nearly $42 billion by 1940 (Shephard 2001). Research programs for the study of the determinants of these disorders and effective treatments were given high priority by the British War Office and fostered many collaborative efforts by American and British medical scientists. (Shephard 2001). By the start of the Second World War, the dominant view of the medical communities in Britain and America was that their origins were psychological rather than physiological (Hyams et al. 1996; Paul 1987). In World War II, the U.S. military committed to the psychiatric screening of potential recruits. In their study of Air Force personnel, Grinker and Spiegel wrote that “the goal of successful psychiatric selection is the weeding out of candidates who, although capable of learning to fly, will readily succumb emotionally to the stresses of …the dangers of combat.” They argued that military psychologists had “perfected a battery of tests” designed to select those fit for service, tests which could be administered 1 But see Kenkel et al. (2004). 4 “with great speed.” 2 During the first year of the war, this program screened out onefourth of the white draft registrants. Nonetheless, high rates of psychiatric breakdowns were reported, in both Europe and the Pacific theater (Shephard 2001). In 1952, the American Psychiatric Association (APA) published its first edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-I), its official classification of mental diseases. Military psychiatrists played a key role in establishing a diagnostic category for the current diagnosis of PTSD (Institute of Medicine 2008). It was labeled, “Gross Stress Reactions,” under the category, “Transient Situational Personality Disorders.” This nomenclature reflected the view that even the most emotionally stable personalities could break under unusually extreme, “intolerable” stress, in particular, stress related to combat or “civilian catastrophe.” However, once the danger has subsided only those with pre-disposing conditions would continue to present symptoms. For the latter “a more definitive diagnosis” would need to be established. (APA 1952). Officially, the disorder was considered acute not chronic. Sixteen years later, the APA published its second edition of the DSM. Although psychiatric casualty rates during the Korean War were high (Hyams et al. 1996), DSM-II omitted any specific category for combat-related disorders but, instead, provided, as examples of triggers for a new disorder labeled, “adjustment reaction to adult life”, a set of rather disparate events, including the “fear associated with military combat” along with the “resentment… associated with an unwanted pregnancy.” (APA 1968, page 49). Retrospective studies of the evolution of PTSD could find no official explanation for this diagnostic shift. Various explanations, though, have emerged: the authors of DSM-II had 2 They did admit, however, that the tests had not yet been given “scientific validity.” (Grinker and Spiegel 1945, page 10). 5 little military experience; the military had developed highly successful front-line treatments so that the rate of psychiatric breakdowns in the first two years of the Vietnam War (1965-1967) was so negligible that the diagnosis was hardly worth its own category; the U.S. Veterans Administration wanted to the reduce the financial burdens on its compensation system (Shephard 2001; Scott 1990; Wilson 1994). In the sixties and seventies, the medical profession was generally dissatisfied with psychiatric diagnostic methods. Many argued that they lacked reliability and scientific validity. They used, as a case in point, the wide regional variation in rejection rates for psychiatric disorders by draft boards during World War II, variations that could not plausibly reflect regional differences in disease prevalence (Spiegal 2005). In the early 1970s, the APA appointed Dr. Robert Spitzer to head the task force assigned to the third DSM revision. Spitzer’s mission was to construct an evidenced-based set of disorders. At this time, psychiatrists were encountering Vietnam veterans with what appeared to be delayed onset of the symptoms associated with acute combat disorders, to which they assigned the label, “Post-Vietnam Syndrome.” They lobbied Spitzer for the opportunity to present to members of the DSM-III taskforce systematic empirical evidence to support a separate diagnostic category for combat-related disorders (Scott 1990). They succeeded in their efforts; included in DSM-III was the new diagnosis of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder. (APA 1980). The DSM defined two types: acute, where symptoms begin soon after the trauma and end within six months, for which “the prognosis for remission is good,” and chronic, which lasts longer than six months (APA 1980, page 237). 6 The National Survey of the Vietnam Generation Population based surveys are essential for studying questions related to the prevalence, causes, correlates and consequences of psychiatric disorders. This is so, because psychiatric diseases often go unnoticed by physicians and surgeons in the general medical sector (Saravey et al. 1991). And also because it is widely believed that a relatively small fraction of the population at-risk seeks treatment in the specialty mental health sector (Robins and Regier 1991). Recognizing this need, in the 1980s and 1990s, the U.S. government sponsored many large-scale surveys of the U.S. population in order to estimate community-based prevalence rates and treatment needs and to identify high risk groups. The National Survey of the Vietnam Generation (NSVG), completed in the late 1980s, was one such survey. Because the cost of conducting clinical psychiatric evaluations of each survey participant would be prohibitive, the surveys included structured diagnostic interviews that could be self-administered or administered by lay interviewers with no more than one or two weeks of training. An algorithm would then process the responses to the interview questions to arrive at psychiatric diagnoses that followed the professional diagnostic criteria detailed various versions of the DSM. The principal investigators for the NSVG specified as one of its major goals the collection of information about PTSD that would be credible to the scientific community (Kulka et al. 1988). Consequently, the first step in the survey design tested six candidate PTSD survey measures on clinical subjects, that is, veterans undergoing psychiatric treatment. Diagnosis based on the Mississippi Scale for Combat-Related Stress, a 35 item self-reported questionnaire, was found to have the highest concordance with direct 7 clinical appraisals in the clinical setting. A follow-up validation study selected a sample of NSVG respondents for more thorough clinical assessments conducted by experienced mental health professionals. In Table 1 we see that the accuracy of the Mississippi scale is lower in the community sample but still satisfies some professional standards for a valid screening instrument (Rogan and Gladen 1978). The probability that it detects the disorder among true cases (77.3%)3 is far greater than the fraction that it detects among true noncases (17.2%). Its accuracy is comparable to the screening instrument in current use by the U. S. Department of Defense to assess PTSD among veterans returning from deployment to Iraq (Tanielian and Jaycox 2008).4 Moreover, its accuracy exceeds that of other widely used survey screening instruments for psychiatric disorders in the general population (Anthony et al. 1985; Helzer et al. 1985; Kessler et al. 1998). For example, validation studies of the diagnostic screening instruments in the U.S. National Comorbidity Survey, the first large-scale epidemiological survey of the mental health of the general U.S. population, found K values in excess of 0.60 only for two disorders, (agoraphobia and social phobia); K values in the range of 0.50 to 0.60 for only four disorders (major depressive episode, mania, simple phobia, and alcoholism). The remainder fell below 0.50, in particular, PTSD had a K value of only 0.39 (Kessler et al. 1998). 3 The proportion of true cases receiving a positive survey diagnosis equals one minus the false negative rate. (See Table 1). 4 The U. S. Department of the Defense assesses PTSD with a screening instrument developed for use in the primary care setting. A test of its validity among veterans under patient care found a K value of 0.61 (Prins et al. 2004). The K value or Kappa score compares the actual agreement between the two diagnoses to the chance agreement we would observe if the diagnoses were completely independent. In Table 1, for the post-survey study, the 95% confidence interval in parentheses beneath the Kappa score (author’s calculations) falls far above zero, strongly suggesting that the agreement between the two screening methods is more than what would occur 8 The 35 items in the Mississippi Scale were chosen to cover the diagnostic criteria established in the third (revised) version of the DSM (APA 1987). In that version, a necessary condition for a positive diagnosis is the experience of at least one traumatic event “that is outside the range of usual human experience and would be markedly distressing to almost anyone” (APA 1987, pg. 247).5 Once it is established that such an event has occurred, diagnosis is based on the intensity of the subject’s reactions to the event. Symptoms include flashbacks, excessive avoidance of situations or people that might lead the subject to recall the event, and physiological reactions to events that remind the subject of the traumatic event (increased heart rate and sweating, e.g.). (Appendix A lists the full DSM-III-R diagnostic criteria). The subject rates each of the 35 items on a 5-point Likert scale according to symptom severity. The Mississippi Scale is the total of the 35 item scores, thus ranging from 35 to 175. The NSVG study team chose a cutoff of 89 or higher for its PTSD diagnosis. These criteria resulted in a 31% lifetime prevalence rate; 15% were assessed as currently meeting full diagnostic criteria (Kulka et al. 1990). Many scholars regarded the NSVG prevalence rates for PTSD as implausibly high. Critics pointed to the fact that only about 15% of Vietnam veterans had combatrelated occupational specialties; others questioned the reliability of the veteran’s recollection of war-related traumatic events, events which, for the NSVG participants, occurred well over a decade prior to the interview (McNally 2003). Still others wondered whether the diagnosis was a result of help-seeking and compensation-seeking behavior by chance. The typical rule of thumb is that a score in excess of .75 implies excellent agreement; between .4 and .75, fair to good (Kulka et al. 1988). 5 The subject need not be the direct victim of the event. For example, a soldier who witnesses wartime atrocities against civilians and enemy soldiers meets the DSM-III-R exposure criteria. 9 (Frueh 2005). Over the past decade dozens of articles have debated this issue; McNally (2007) summarizes the current view in psychiatry: Outright malingering [is]…unlikely to account for many of the PTSD-respondents in the [NSVG]…One factor likely contributing to the prevalence of PTSD is the number of individuals who did not have a combat MOS [military occupational specialty], but who were nevertheless exposed to horrific, life-threatening events (e.g., medics, ambushed truck drivers)…Finally, some individuals experiencing psychological, interpersonal, and occupational problems might have attributed their difficulties to war-related events despite the true causes lying elsewhere. The Vietnam-PTSD narrative would [have] been one way for some veterans to make sense of their lives since the war.” (page 198). Empirical Analysis of Patterns in Stress Reactions to Traumatic Events I begin with an analysis of the determinants of a veteran’s overall score on the Mississippi Scale for Combat-related Stress, a continuous measure of PTSD, which can be interpreted as representing a veteran’s propensity to develop a diagnosis of PTSD. This approach provides a convenient framework for testing the exogeneity of trauma exposure. The true propensity, Y*, is a function of observed exogenous pre-disposing conditions, X, as well as trauma exposure, Trauma: (1) Y * = β X + γTrauma + ε Table 2 reports summary statistics on the covariates selected to represent the underlying source of variation in the veterans’ responses to trauma exposure. Many capture aspects of the family structure and the family rearing environment during childhood, which have been shown, in the general population, to influence success and both physical and emotional well-being later in life In their comprehensive review of the empirical research on the determinants of children’s attainment, Haveman and Wolfe (1995) note four parental choice variables that have been studied extensively by economists: parents’ education, marital stability, 10 income, and mother’s labor force participation decisions. These variables reflect multiple aspects of the family rearing environment: the time and economic resources available for investments in children, the quality of these investments, the cultural and intellectual environment of the home, and the genetic endowment that the parents pass on to their offspring. In Table 2 we see that 34% percent of veterans answered “poor” to the question, “Was your family well-to-do, average, or poor?” The fraction was higher among positive PTSD cases than among negative cases. Positive cases were also more likely to have parents who did not graduate from high school, especially fathers. Seventyseven percent of veterans grew up in an ‘intact’ family, that is, they lived with both biological parents until age sixteen. That fraction is lower for positive PTSD cases while the fraction who reported that their mothers worked outside the home during their childhood was higher. Models with a psychosocial orientation suggest that potentially disruptive episodic events can also permanently alter a child’s development regardless of the presence of chronic childhood adversity (Haveman and Wolfe 1995; Haas 2008). Table 2 shows that veterans suffering from PTSD were more likely to report that their fathers experienced at least one episode of unemployment and that they switched schools at least once because of a family location move. In recent decades much has been written on the relationship between fertility decisions and children’s outcomes. The initial work focused on the effect of family size on children’s attainment, addressing Becker’s “quantity-quality tradeoff’ hypothesis (Becker and Lewis 1973; Becker and Tomes 1976). Later work explored the effects of birth order. The theoretical underpinnings for the relationship between educational 11 attainment and birth order suggest that the relationship is not monotonic. The time spent by parents with a child is an important factor in increasing his capacities. An only child or a first-born child, during the critical early years, presumably faces less competition for his parents’ time and resources than do later born children. While last-born children, particularly in large families, may be at a disadvantage in their early years, they have a ‘monopoly’ on their parents’ time during their teenage years as their siblings leave home. They also gain the attentions of older siblings throughout their childhood.6 Indeed, Lindert (1977) finds that the total amount of time devoted to the care of a child until age eighteen by any person in the household is highest for the first- and the last-born in families of three or more children. Keller and Zach (2002) find that first-born infants receive significantly more attention from their parents, particularly from their fathers than do later-born. Much has been written on the empirical challenges of disentangling family size 6 More nuanced arguments predict that the relationship between birth order and parental time and money inputs depends on the parents’ preferences. Parents who are “nondiscriminatory” will allocate their resources equally among their offspring. Any observed birth order differences in achievements, then, will reflect relationships between birth order and innate talents. There is a widespread belief that first-born have richer genetic endowments. Parents who are “achievement maximizers” will allocate their resources disproportionately to the child who will provide the highest return on their investment. They are strategic not only in how they allocate their resources but also in when they decide to stop having children. Each child is a random draw from the gene pool; parents stop having children when they have the one who exceeds their expectations. These models predict that the last born will have the greatest innate abilities, will receive the most attention from their families, and, consequently, will be the most successful later in life. Parents who are adverse to inequalities in their children’s well-being and success will devote the greatest resources to the least able child. This “overcompensation” should minimize correlation between birth order and success. See Ejrnaes and Portner (2004), Behrman and Taubman (1986), and Hanushek (1992) for formal expositions of these models. In other disciplines the theories relating birth order to intelligence rely on biological factors (the high levels of maternal antibodies in higher order births may cause fetal brain damage) or emphasize the how the intellectual environment of the family varies with family structure (Kristensen and Bjerkedal 2007). The relationship between birth order and personality traits is still hotly debated (The Independent 2007). 12 effects from birth-order effects.7 The potential endogeneity of family size to unobservable family factors that might also affect a person’s observed development may contaminate the estimate effects of other control variables that are highly correlated with family size, such as birth order. To mitigate this problem I use an index of relative birth order, proposed by Ejrnaes and Portner (2004), which equals (p-1)/(n-1), where p is the respondent’s birth order and n is the number of children in the family into which he was born. It is easy to interpret; it ranges from 0 for first-born to 1 for last-born. And it is virtually free of correlation with number of siblings. As we see in the bivariate comparisons in Table 2, there is little difference in either the average relative birth order or the average number of siblings between positive and negative PTSD cases. Many scholars have argued that the longstanding empirical finding that parental divorce adversely affects the development and achievements of their offspring may reflect the effects of parental characteristics that are correlated with marital discord but are often left out of the analysis (Manski et al. 1992; Cherlin 1999; Lang and Zagorsky 2001). The NSVG contains detailed indicators of the family rearing environment which allow us to control for other potentially disruptive parental behavior. These variables are based on the respondent’s recollection and assessment of whether either of his parents had mental or nervous conditions, had a serious drinking or drug problem, or had been arrested or jailed during the respondent’s childhood. Veterans who received positive PTSD diagnoses reported a much higher incidence of substance abuse, mental health problems and potentially criminal behavior among their parents. 7 For recent discussions, see Black et al. (2005), Conley and Glauber (2006), and Booth and Lee (2009). 13 In addition to the self-administered questionnaire, which forms the basis of the outcome variable of this study, the NSVG gave the respondents the opportunity to discuss at length with the interviewer up to thirty traumatic events in their lives, both war-related and not war-related, and the degree of stress each event may have caused. Trained coders then independently reviewed the survey responses and rated each event according to how closely it corresponded to the DSM definition of trauma: “unlikely to be traumatic,” “probably traumatic,” “definitely traumatic,” and “severely traumatic.” These variables serve as indicators of the events which triggered the stress reactions. Studies have shown that the likelihood of developing PTSD varies by type of stressor (Kessler et al. 1999; Ilkin et al. 2005). Therefore, two trauma indicators are included in the set of regressors, one war-related and one not related to war. Each takes on a value of one only if the NSVG study team coded the event as definitely meeting clinically defined trauma. OLS Estimation Table 3 reports OLS estimates of equation (1). Among the standard set of characteristics, parents’ education has no significant relationship, either practically or statistically, to a veteran’s propensity to development symptoms of the disorder, nor does the veteran’s report of family income. This result stands in sharp contrast to studies of parental education and a child’s intellectual development but is somewhat consistent with the findings of Argys et al. (2006). They report very weak relationships between parents’ education and income (broadly defined) and alcohol and drug use among adolescents; most estimates are statistically insignificant. These adolescent behaviors are strong predictors of adult substance use problems (Mullahy and Sindelar 1989), which, in turn, occur at dramatically higher rates among veterans classified as positive for PTSD (Kulka 14 et al. 1990). Marital stability and the mother’s work decision do matter. Veterans reared in what were then regarded as traditional families, those whose parents stayed together and whose mothers did not work outside the home, are predicted to score 8 points less on the Mississippi Scale. In ‘non-intact’ families, the mother’s work decision has no statistically significant effect on the score, while the benefits of marital stability disappear if the mother works outside the home (95% confidence interval: (-3.89, 3.00)). This finding is consistent with Hayward and Gorman’s study of the effect of childhood circumstances on adult male mortality using the U.S. National Longitudinal Survey of Older Men, 1966-1990 (2004); middle-age men raised in traditional households had the lowest death rate. Veterans reared in families with at least one parent who has a history of mental illness exhibit much higher scores on the Mississippi Scale. This result is consistent with the findings of DeWit et al. (2005) in their study of social phobia in a population sample and with Kessler et al. (1999) in their study of the risk factors for PTSD in the general population. These findings may reflect genetic factors in the transmission of psychopathology. They may also reflect learned behavior and the parents’ ability to adequately develop a nurturing, supportive relationship with the child. The advantages of birth order accrue in equal measure to the first and last-born. The middle child scores roughly 5 points higher than the first-born and the last-born (95% confidence intervals: (2.48, 8.60) and (1.99, 8.69), respectively).8 This finding is consistent with some of the literature on birth order and educational achievement. Hanushek (1992) finds that in large families the first- and last-born perform better in 8 Recall that the index of relative birth order is set to zero for first-borns, one for last-borns, and one-half for the middle child. 15 elementary school on reading comprehension and vocabulary tests than do middle-born children. The last-born, however, has a distinct advantage over the first-born. Lindert (1977) finds the same pattern in his study of the relationship between birth order and educational attainment. Kanterevic and Mechoulan (2006), though, find that the estimated educational advantage of the last-born disappears when they control for mother’s age at birth. Black et al. (2005) and Booth and Kee (2009) also find a declining monotonic effect, for Norway and Britain, respectively, with the first-born achieving the highest level of schooling. Argys et al. (2006) find that later-born children are much more prone to risky health-related behavior; they do not explore nonlinearities in this relationship. Number of siblings, however, was found to have no relationship to the PTSD score. Younger veterans, non-white veterans and veterans whose fathers experienced disruptions in employment scored higher on the Mississippi scale. Instrumental Variables Estimation It is reasonable to assume that the Mississippi Scale (Y) measures the true illness propensity (Y*) with error: Y = Y * + ν . Then the estimated regression model becomes: (2) Y = β X + γTrauma + ε + ν The OLS coefficients are consistent estimates of and as long as the regressors are uncorrelated with the regression error, ε + . If the measurement error, , were purely random, then OLS estimates would remain consistent. However, many have speculated that there may be a systematic bias in self-reports of the symptoms arising from trauma exposure, so that COV(Trauma, ) 0. Furthermore, True and Lyons (1999) and others have argued that genetically determined personality traits and the family rearing environment may influence a person’s taste or tolerance for risk. Individuals with higher 16 tolerance may enter hazardous occupations, such as fire-fighting and demolition, which put them at greater risk of exposure to highly stressful situations. In military life, such people may enter branches of the armed forces which are more likely to engage in combat or they may be more likely to volunteer for dangerous combat missions. If there is some correlation between the unobservable factors affecting reactions to stress with the occurrence of traumatic stress, then the COV(Trauma, ε) 0 as well, thus introducing endogeneity bias into the OLS coefficient. One solution is to use an instrumental variables strategy. Following Rohlfs (2007) and Dobkin and Shabani (2009), as a measure of exogenous trauma risk, I use the number of combat casualties per 1000 males in the veteran’s birth year. (See Appendix B for details). Table 4 reports first stage reduced-form estimates relating the occurrence of any trauma to the exogenous risk factors. The first column lists the probit estimates of the probability of trauma exposure; the second the linear probability estimates. Veterans from cohorts that had high rates of combat deaths were much more likely to have been exposed to trauma themselves. We also see that the probability of exposure to intensely traumatic events is much higher for veterans who were raised in families in which at least one parent had a history of drug and alcohol problems and/or mental illness. The effects of parental psychopathology on trauma exposure could reflect both genetic factors and the impact of early childhood environment. The data are not sufficiently rich to differentiate between the two explanations or to identify the underlying causal effects. However, it is worth noting that in their study of genetic risk factors for PTSD using the Vietnam Era Twin Registry, True and Lyon (1999) find that aspects of their shared family rearing 17 environment contributed nothing toward explaining differences in combat exposure while genetic factors could account for 47% of the variance in exposure. Persons raised in disadvantaged environments may have limited educational opportunities, thus, denying them access to positions that are insulated from physical risk. Individuals who grow up in families with parents who have serious mental and behavioral problems may be at greater risk of being victims of abuse or of witnessing physical harm to close relations. Bromet et al. (1998) found that the men and women in the U. S. National Comorbidity Survey, who reported incidents of neglect or abuse during their childhood, were more likely to report a family history of mental disorders and substance abuse and were less likely to have been raised in an intact family. Table 5 reports the second stage estimates relating the PTSD Mississippi Score to the instrument for trauma and the other demographic and family background characteristics. Column (1) uses the instrument for the probability of trauma exposure constructed from the first stage probit estimates in Table 4; Column (2) uses the instrument constructed from the linear probability model of Table 4. The third column in Table 5 also reports the OLS estimates, which assume exogeneity. The instrumental variable estimates of the effect of Trauma are somewhat larger than the OLS estimates, implying that COV(Trauma, + ) < 0. This result is consistent with many hypotheses. The veterans who were exposed to intensely traumatic events may be more resilient, COV(Trauma, ) < 0, or they may be more reluctant to acknowledge the psychological toll of the experience, COV(Trauma, )< 0. That COV(Trauma, ) may be negative also implies that veterans who were not exposed to high levels of combat stress may have exaggerated their symptoms. However, a Hausman test finds that the difference between 18 the OLS and two-stage least squares estimates are statistically insignificant (p-value = 0.80). Empirical Analysis of Risk Factors for Diagnosed Cases of PTSD Here I consider whether family background can help distinguish between veterans who reach the threshold level of symptoms for a positive diagnosis from veterans who do not. The outcome variable is a binary variable indicating the presence or absence of the diagnosis. Although the instrumental variables estimation and the Hausman test suggest that trauma exposure may be treated as an exogenous risk factor, even purely random misclassification in PTSD status, uncorrelated with any of the exogenous variables, can bias regression coefficients. The population model specifies that the probability of a positive diagnosis is a function of a set of observed exogenous background characteristics and events that are assumed to be measured without error: (3) P ( y = 1 | x ) = F ( xβ ) where y represents the true disease status; it takes on a value of 0 if the diagnosis is negative, 1 if positive. The vector, x = ( x1 x 2 , and β = ( β1 , β 2 , x k ) , consists of k exogenous covariates β k ) is a k -dimensional parameter vector. The variable Y is the survey disease classification with misclassification parameters: r0 = P (Y = 1 | y = 0) and r1 = P (Y = 0 | y = 1) . The standard misclassification model assumes that the misclassification mechanism is nondifferential, that is, given the true diagnosis, no other characteristic (z) of the respondent provides additional information about the observed disease classification: P (Y | y, z ) = P (Y | y ) . 19 The relationship between Y and y can be expressed as: P (Y = 1 | x) = r0 + (1 − r0 − r1 ) P ( y = 1 | x). 9 This structure allows us to specify an estimable relationship between the observed disease classification and the observed covariates: (4) P (Y = 1 | x) = r0 + (1 − r0 − r1 )F (xβ ) In equation (4) it becomes apparent that the marginal effect of a covariate on the probability of a positive survey diagnosis equals its effect on the probability of truly having the disease only if the survey classification is error free. The standard estimation strategy for equation (4) assumes either the logit or probit specification for F and maximizes the likelihood function or minimizes the regression sum of squares over β , setting the values of r0 and r1 to estimates derived from a validation study (Savoca 2004; Poterba and Summers 1995). As long as the estimated error rates are consistent estimates of the error rates in the study population, then the estimates of β will be consistent as well. There are many reasons, however, why one might suspect that the error rates from the validity study contain bias. For one, selection into the validation sample was not purely random, but was based, in part, on the survey diagnosis (Kulka et al. 1988). The validity study oversampled veterans who screened positive on the survey instrument. Even if selection into the validation sample were entirely random, the assessment of validity calls for an independent assessment under identical conditions (Bound et al. 9 P(Y = 1| x) = P(Y = 1, y = 1| x) + P(Y = 1, y = 0| x) = P(Y = 1| y = 1, x)P(y = 1| x) + P(Y = 1| y = 0, x)P(y = 0| x) = P(Y = 1|y = 1)P(y = 1| x) + P(Y = 1|y = 0)P(y = 0| x) = (1 – r1)P(y = 1| x) + r0(1 – P(y = 1| x) = r0 + (1 – r0 – r1)P(y = 1 |x). 20 2001). In this validity study, independent assessments were unlikely to have occurred since the respondents selected into the validity sample were probably affected by the first assessment. Some respondents may have deliberately attempted to be consistent across the two interviews. Others may have reflected on their responses to the initial interview and used the re-interview as an opportunity to correct recall errors or to cast themselves in a different light. Furthermore, clinical conditions may have changed between the initial survey interview and the clinical re-interview. Instead of the standard approach, I adopt an alternative strategy proposed by Hausman et al. 1998. Here the error rates are estimated simultaneously with the parameter vector, β . The regression sum of squares for equation (4) is minimized over β , r , and r1 .10 0 Results I estimate two versions of equation (4) via nonlinear least squares; both assume the probit specification for F as well as for the misclassification parameters. Model 1 makes the standard assumption that the error rates are constant across the respondents. 10 See Savoca (2010) for a detailed discussion of the conditions for identification. 21 Model 2 allows the error rates to vary with race and age.11 Table 6 reports estimates of the misclassification parameters. The top panel reports the parameter estimates. A series of F-tests established that the false positive rates differ by age but not race, while the false negative rates are unrelated to race and age. Model 3 presents estimates that impose this latter constraint. The bottom panel uses the parameter estimates to predict the errors rates for selected cohorts. Overall, the estimated false positive rates are relatively low. This is consistent with studies of classification errors in other widely used psychiatric screening instruments in general population surveys. Estimated false positive rates for the diseases covered by the Composite International Diagnostic Interview (CIDI), used in the U.S. National Comorbidity Survey, range from a low of .8% for mania to a high of only 7.8% for major depression (Savoca 2004, 2005). Analysis of the Diagnostic Interview Schedule (DIS), the pre-curser to the CIDI, shows, with the exception of alcohol use disorders, false positive rates no higher than 4% (Savoca 2004). The estimates in Table 6 are also comparable to error rates found in self-reports of physical diseases. In a large scale study of the general Canadian population, Baker et al. (2004) compare self assessments to 11 There is a vast empirical literature in cognitive and social psychology on the circumstances under which survey responses are most likely to contain errors (Bound et al. 2001). Much of it focuses on the respondent' s cognitive processes: his comprehension of the survey questions, his retrieval of information from memory, and his communication skills. Many empirical studies have also looked at the relationship between response errors and the length of the recall period. Both literatures suggest that the time since discharge from the military and the education level of the respondent might also be a source of variation in the error rates. Both variables, however, are potentially endogenous. A veteran’s post-military educational advancement may be directly impeded by the readjustment difficulties caused by PTSD or may be influenced by unobservable characteristics that also make him more susceptible to PTSD. Studies have shown that soldiers suffering mental disorders diagnosed during active duty have much higher service attrition rates than other soldiers (Hoge et al. 2005). Since identification of models which depart from the nondifferential error assumption has been established only for the case where the source of variation is exogenous (Lewbel 2000), I restricted the specification of Model 2 to exogenous characteristics of the respondent. 22 administrative records. With very few exceptions, false positive rates for a wide range of chronic illnesses fall well within a range of 0% to 18%. For all three models, we also see that the estimated false positive rates are lower than the estimated false negative rates. This, too, is a pattern that shows up in all major survey measures of physical and psychiatric diseases. The estimated false negative rates reported here, however, are somewhat lower than the false negative rates for other commonly used survey indicators of health in the general population. Savoca (2004, 2005) finds false negative rates ranging from 32.8% for agoraphobia to 79% for manic disorders. Baker et al. (2004) find that an overwhelming majority of self-reports of physical ailments have false negative rates well above 30%. Many, such as cancer and bronchitis, exceed 50%. Nonwhites are estimated to have higher false positive rates and lower false negative rates than those of whites, although the differences are not statistically significant. Both rates decline with age; this pattern in the false positive rates is statistically significant. Table 7 reports estimates of the effects of the control variables on true disease status, that is, it reports estimates of the parameters in F(x ) in equation (4). Overall, the coefficient estimates across models generally agree in sign and statistical significance. However, the magnitudes of the coefficients in the error-adjusted regressions are substantially larger than the estimates from the naïve model, which does not account for classification errors. These differences imply substantial differences in the estimated effects of key variables on the true versus the survey probability of a positive PTSD diagnosis. For example, with the other regressors set to sample means, both the naïve model and the error-corrected model predict that combat exposure versus no exposure 23 will raise the probability of a positive PTSD diagnosis; but the naïve model predicts an increase of 33.5 percentage points while the error-corrected models predict increases slightly higher than 50 percentage points. Similarly, all models predict that veterans reared in families with parental histories of mental illness are much more likely to develop PTSD. The predicted increases in the error-corrected models fall in the range of 35 to 38 percentage points; the naïve model predicts a 20 percentage point rise in the probability of a positive diagnosis. To assess the implications of misclassification errors on prevalence estimates, we can compare the sum of the predicted probabilities of a positive diagnosis, F(xβ ) , using the error corrected coefficient estimates from Model 3, to the sample prevalence estimate, Y / n . The sample prevalence overstates true prevalence by 6 percentage points (22% versus 16%), or 27%.12 Proportionately, this closely matches the results of Dohrenwend et al. (2006) in their study of a subsample of the veterans who participated in the NSVG; their prevalence estimate drops from 12% to 9% (25%). Conclusions Recent empirical studies of the accuracy of PTSD diagnoses in the National Survey of the Vietnam Generation (NSVG), an influential study of veterans from the 12 Given that the false negative rates are higher than the false positive rates, a reader might be puzzled by these results. Equation (4) implies that the survey prevalence exceeds the ‘true’ prevalence, i.e., P(Y = 1) > P(y = 1) whenever r0 (1 - P(y = 1)) > r1P(y = 1). Therefore, if the disease-free population is relatively large, a small false positive rate can still imply that a large number of respondents were incorrectly classified as positive cases. Conversely, a large false negative rate applied to relatively small number of true positives is consistent with having a small number of positive cases misclassified as negative cases. 24 Vietnam-Era, suggest that its PTSD prevalence estimates may somewhat overstate true prevalence. These findings are based largely on re-examinations of the professional criteria used to arrive at the diagnosis and on efforts to independently verify the veterans’ accounts of traumatic war-time events. This study provides new statistical evidence on the extent of misclassification in the NSVG indicators of combat-related PTSD. The approach here is indirect. Guided by economic and psychosocial models of the childhood antecedents of adult success and well-being, I use variables that reflect the veteran’s child-rearing environment to help predict which are likely to develop PTSD and then allow the data to re-classify veterans to achieve the best fit. My findings are consistent with the literature. When adjusted for errors in diagnoses, my sample PTSD prevalence estimate falls from 22% to 16%, a drop of 6.0 percentage points, or 27%. Proportionately, this closely matches the results of contemporary analyses of the same data. Furthermore, the false-positive and falsenegative rates implied by the data follow a pattern found in virtually all validation studies of epidemiological surveys of population health -- relatively high false-negative rates and relatively low false positive rates. There is little evidence that the measurement error in the PTSD screening instrument is endogenous to the veteran’s combat experience. A Hausman test supports the null hypothesis of the exogeneity of trauma exposure. Veteran’s exposed to high levels of combat stress are no more or less likely to misreport their symptoms. Classification errors, however, do vary with exogenous characteristics; old veterans have lower false positive rates. These classification errors have serious consequences not only for PTSD 25 prevalence estimates but also for inferences about measures of association. Failure to correct for misclassification in PTSD may dramatically understate the effects of risk factors, both war-related and not war-related. Veterans who were reared in families with parental histories of mental illness are more likely to be exposed to trauma and to have reactions severe enough to lead to a positive diagnosis. Similarly, growing up in what was then (1950s and earlier) considered a traditional household, where both parents are present and where the mother does not work outside the home, substantially reduces vulnerability to the disorder. These findings corroborate numerous studies in psychiatric epidemiology. What this paper shows, however, is that the magnitude of their effects are substantially larger when misclassification bias is taken into account. Hence, conventional risk factors have a greater ability to differentiate true cases from noncases than is widely believed. 26 Appendix A. Diagnostic Criteria for Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (Source: APA, 1987, page 248.) A. The person has experienced an event that is outside the range of usual human experience and that would be markedly distressing to almost anyone, e.g., serious threat to one’s life or physical integrity; serious threat or harm to one’s children, spouse, or other close relatives and friends; sudden destruction of one’s home or community; or seeing another person who has recently been, or is being, seriously injured or killed as a result of an accident or physical violence. B. The traumatic event is persistently reexperienced in at least one of the following ways: (1) recurrent and intrusive distressing recollections of the event (in young children, repetitive play in which themes or aspects of the trauma are expressed) (2) recurrent distressing dreams of the event (3) sudden acting or feeling as if the traumatic event were recurring (includes a sense of reliving the experience, illusions, hallucinations, and dissociative [flashback] episodes, even those that occur upon awakening or when intoxicated) (4) intense psychological distress at exposure to events that symbolize or resemble an aspect of the traumatic event, including anniversaries of the trauma C. Persistent avoidance of stimuli associated with the trauma or numbing of general responsiveness (not present before the trauma), as indicated by at least three of the following: (1) (2) (3) (4) efforts to avoid thoughts or feelings associated with the trauma efforts to avoid activities or situations that arouse recollections of the trauma inability to recall an important aspect of the trauma (psychogenic amnesia) markedly diminished interest in significant activities (in young children, loss of recently acquired developmental skills such as toilet training or language skills) (5) feelings of detachment or estrangement from others (6) restricted range of affect, e.g., unable to have loving feelings (7) sense of a foreshortened future, e.g., does not expect to have a career, marriage, or children, or a long life D. Persistent symptoms of increase arousal (not present before the trauma), as indicated by at least two of the following: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) difficulty falling asleep or staying awake irritability or outbursts of anger difficulty concentrating hypervigilance exaggerated startle response physiologic reactivity upon exposure to events that symbolize or resemble an aspect of the traumatic event (e.g., a woman who was raped in an elevator breaks out in a sweat when entering any elevator) 27 Appendix B. Construction of the Instrument for Combat Risk Total male casualties by year were obtained from the Defense Casualty Analysis System File from the National Archives online database: http://aad.archives/gov/aad. Total births by year were derived from Historical Statistics, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 2003, Table No. HS-13. Live Births, Deaths, Infant Deaths, and Maternal Deaths, 19002001. Yearly male-female sex ratios were derived from Birth, Stillbirth, and Infant Mortality Statistics for the Continental United States, the Territory of Hawaii, and the Virgin Island. U.S. Department of Commerce, 1936 and from “Trend Analysis of the Sex Ratio in the United States,” Mathews and Hamilton (2005), Table A. 28 References Aigner, D. 1973. “Regression With a Binary Independent Variable Subject to Errors of Observation.” Journal of Econometrics, Vol. 1, pages 49-59. American Psychiatric Association. 1952. Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, first edition. Washington, D. C.: American Psychiatric Association. American Psychiatric Association. 1968. Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, second edition. Washington, D. C.: American Psychiatric Association. American Psychiatric Association. 1980. Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, third edition. Washington, D. C.: American Psychiatric Association American Psychiatric Association. 1987. Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, third edition, revised. Washington, D. C.: American Psychiatric Association. Angrist, J. D., Chen, S. H., and B. R. Frandsen. 2009. “Did Vietnam Veterans Get Sicker in the 1990s? The Complicated Effects of Military Service on Self-Reported Health” National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 14781. Anthony, J. C., Folstein, M. Romanoski, A. J., Von Korff, M. R., Nestadt G. R., Chahal, R., Merchant, A., Brown, H., Shapiro, S., Kramer, M., Gruenberg, E. M.. 1985. "Comparisons of the DIS and a Standardize Psychiatric Diagnosis." Archives of General Psychiatry, Vol. 42, pages 667-675. Argys, L. M., Rees, D. I., Averett, S. L., and B. Witoonchart. 2006. “Birth Order and Risky Adolescent Behavior.” Economic Inquiry, Vol. 44, No. 2, pages 215-233. Astone, N. M. and S. McLanahan. 1991. "Family Structure, Parental Practices, and High School Completion." American Sociological Review, Vol. 56, pp. 309-320. Baker, M., Stabile, M. and Deri, C. 2004. “What Do Self-Reported, Objective, Measures 29 of Health Measure?” The Journal of Human Resources, Vol. 39, No. 4, pages 10671093. Becker, G. and G. Lewis. 1973. “On the Interaction between the Quantity and Quality of Children.” Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 81. No. 2, Part 2, pages S279-S288. Becker, G. and N. Tomes. 1976. “Child Endowments, and the Quantity and Quality of Children.” Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 84, No. 4, pages S143-S162. Behrman, J. R., and P. Taubman. 1986. "Birth Order, Schooling, and Earnings." Journal of Labor Economics, Vol. 4, No. 3, Part 2, pp. S121-S145. Black, S. E., Devereux, P. G., and K. G. Salvanes. 2005. "The More the Merrier? The Effect of Family Size and Birth Order on Children' s Education." Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. CXX, No. 2, pp. 669-700. Booth, A. L. and H. J. Kee. 2009. “Birth Order Matters: The Effect of Family Size and Birth Order on Educational Attainment.” Journal of Population Economics, Vol. 22, No. 2, pages 367-397. Bound, J., Brown, C., and N. Mathiowetz. 2001. “Measurement Error in Survey Data.” In Heckman, J., J., and E., Leamer, eds, Handbook of Econometrics, Vol., 5. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science, B. V. Bowman, M. L. and R. Yehuda. 2004. “Risk Factors and the Adversity-Stress Model.” In Rosen, G. M., editor, Posttraumatic Stress Disorder: Issues and Controversies. Chicester, England: John Wiley & Sons. Bromet E., Sonnaga, A. and R. C. Kessler. 1998. "Risk-Factors for DSM-III-R Posttraumatic Stress Disorder: Findings from the National Comorbidity Survey." American Journal of Epidemiology, Vol. 147, pages 353-361. 30 Caceres-Delpiano, J. 2006. “The Impacts of Family Size on Investment in Child Quality.” Journal of Human Resources, Vol. 41, No. 4, pages, 738-754. Cherlin, A. 1999. “Going to Extremes: Family Structure, Children’s Well-Being, and Social Science.” Demography, Vol. 26, No. 4, pages 421-428. Conley, D. and R. Glauber. 2006. “Parental Educational Investment and Children’s Academic Risk: Estimates of the Impact of Sibship Size and Birth Order from Exogenous Variation in Fertility.” Journal of Human Resources, Vol. 41, No. 4, pages 722-737. Conley, D. and J. A. Heerwig. 2009. “The Long-Term Effects of Military Conscription on Mortality: Estimates from the Vietnam-Era Draft Lottery.” National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 15105. DeWit, D. J., Chandler-Coutts, M., Offord, D. R., King, G., McDougall, J., Specht, J., and S. Stewart. 2005. “Gender Differences in the Effects of Family Adversity on the Risk of Onset of DSM-III-R Social Phobia.” Journal of Anxiety Disorders. Vol. 19, No. 5, pages 479-502. Dobkin, C. and Shabani, R. 2009. “The Health Effects of Military Service: Evidence from the Vietnam Draft.” Economic Inquiry, Vo. 47, No. 1, pages 69-80. Dohrenwend, B. P., Turner, J. B., Turse, N. A., Adams, B. G., Koenan, K.C., and Marshall, R. 2006. “The Psychological Risks of Vietnam for U.S. Veterans: A Revisit with New Data and Methods.” 2006. Science, Vol. 313, No. 5789, pages 979-982. Ejrnaes, J. and C. C. Portner. 2004. "Birth Order and Intrahousehold Allocation of Time and Education." The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol., 86, No. 4, pp. 10091019. 31 Frueh, B. C., J. D. Elhai, A. L. Grubaugh, J. Monnier, T. B. Kashdan, J. A. Sauvageot, M. B. Hamner, B. G. Burkett and G. W. Arana. 2005. “Documented Combat Exposure of U. S. Veterans Seeking Treatment for Combat-Related Posttraumatic Stress Disoder.” British Journal of Psychiatry, Vol. 186, pages 467-472. Ginther, D. K. and R. A. Pollack. 2004. “Family Structure and Children’s Educational Outcomes: Blended Families, Stylized Facts, and Descriptive Regression.” Demography, Vol. 41, No. 4, pages 671-696. Grinker, R.R and J. P. Spiegel. 1945. Men Under Stress. Philadephia: The Blakeston Company. Haas, S. 2008. “Trajectories of Functional Health: The ‘Long-Arm’ of Childhood Health and Socioeconomic Factors.” Social Science and Medicine, Vol. 66, No. 4, pages 849-861. Hanushek, E. 1992. “The Trade-off Between Child Quantity and Quality.” The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 100, No. 1, pages 84-117. Hausman, J. A., Abrevaya, J., Scott-Morton, F. M. 1998. “Misclassification of the Dependent Variable in a Discrete Response Setting.” Journal of Econometrics, Vol. 87, pages 239-269. Hausman, J. A. 2001. “Mismeasured Variables in Econometric Analysis: Problems from the Right and Problems from the Left.” Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 15, No. 4, pages 57-68. Haveman, R. and B. Wolfe. 1995. “The Determinants of Children’s Attainments: A Review of Methods and Findings.” The Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 33, No. 4, pages 1829-1878. 32 Hayward, M. D. and B. Gorman. 2004. “The Long Arm of Childhood: The Influence of Early-Life Social Conditions on Men’s Mortality.” Demography, Vol. 41, No. 1, pages 87-107. Helzer, J. Robin, L. N., McEvoy, L. R., Spitnagel, El. L., Stoltzman, R. K., Farmer, A., and I. F. Brockington. 1985. "A Comparison of Clinical and Diagnostic Interview Schedule Diagnoses." Archives of General Psychiatry, Col. 42, pages 657-666. Hoge, C. W., Toboni, H. E., Messer, S. C., Bell, N., Amoroso, P., Orman, D. T. 2005. “The Occupational Burden of Mental Disorders in the U.S. Military: Psychiatric Hospitalizations, Involuntary Separations, and Disability.” American Journal of Psychiatry, Vol. 162, pages 585-591. Hyams, C. H., Wignall, F. S., Roberts, R. 1996. “War Syndrome and Their Evaluation: From the U.S. Civil War to the Persian Gulf War.” Annals of Internal Medicine, Vol. 125, No. 5, pages 398-405. Ilkin, J. F., McKenzie, D. P., Creamer, M. C., McFarlane, A. C., Kelsall, H. L., Glass, D. C., Forbes, A. B., Horsley, K. W. A., Harrex, W. K., Sim, M. R. 2005.“War Zone Stress Without Direct Combat: The Australian Naval Experience of the Gulf War.” Journal of Traumatic Stress, Vol. 18, No. 3, pages 193-204. Institute of Medicine. 2008. Gulf War and Health: Physiologic, Psychologic, and Psychosocial Effects of Deployment-Related Stress. Washington D.C.: The National Academies Press. The Independent. 2007. “Are the Family Clichés True?”, November 27. Jones, E. and Wessley, S. 2007. “A Paradigm Shift in the Conceptualization of Psychological Trauma in the 20th Century.” Journal of Anxiety Disorders, Vol. 21, 33 pages 164-175. Kantarevic, J. and S. Mechoulan. 2006. “Birth Order, Educational Attainment, and Earnings: An Investigation Using PSID.” Journal of Human Resources, Vol. 41, No. 4, pages 755-778. Keller, H. and U. Zach. 2002. “Gender and Birth Order as Determinants of Parental Behavior.” International Journal of Behavioral Development, Vol. 26, No. 2, pages 177-184. Kenkel, D. S., Lillard, D. R., and A. D. Mathios. 2004. “Accounting for Misclassification Error in Retrospective Smoking Data.” Health Economics, Vol. 13, pages 1031-1044. Kessler, R.C., Berglund, P., Demler, O., Jin R., Merikangas,, K. R. , PhD, and Walters E. E. 2005. “Lifetime Prevalence and Age-of-Onset Distributions of DSM-IV Disorders in the National Comorbidity Survey Replication.” Archives of General Psychaatry, Vol. 62, pages 593-602. Kessler, R. C., Sonnega, A., Bromet, E., Hughes, M., Nelson, C., and N. Breslau. 1999. "Epidemiological Risk Factors for Trauma and PTSD." In Yehuda, R., editor, Risk Factors for Posttraumatic Stress Disorder. Washington D.C.: American Psychiatric Press, Inc. Kessler, R. C., Wittchen, H., Abelson, McGonable, J. M., Schwarz, N., Kendler, K. S., Knauper, B., and S. Zhao. 1998. “Methodological Studies of the Composite International Diagnostic Interview (CIDI) in the U.S. National Comorbidity Survey (NCS). International Journal of Methods in Psychiatric Research, Vol. 7, No. 1, pages 33-35. Krein, S. F. and A. H. Beller. 1988. "Educational Attainment of Children from Single- 34 Parent Families: Differences by Exposure, Gender, and Race." Demography, Vol. 25, pp. 679-690. Kristensen, P. and Bjerkedal T. 2007. “Explaining the Relation Between Birth Order and Intelligence.” Science, Vol. 316, No. 5832, page 1717. Kulka, R.A,, Schlenger, W.E., Fairbank, J. A., Hough, R. L., Jordan, B. K., Marmar, C. R., and D. S. Weiss. 1988. Contractual Report of the Findings from the National Vietnam Veterans Readjustment Study. Volume 1: Executive Summary, Description of Findings, and Technical Appendices. Research Triangle Park, NC: Research Triangle Institute. Kulka, R.A,, Schlenger, W.E., Fairbank, J. A., Hough, R. L., Jordan, B. K., Marmar, C. R., and D. S. Weiss. 1990. Trauma and the Vietnam War Generation: Report of Findings From the National Vietnam Veterans Readjustment Study. New York: Brunner/Mazel. Lang, K. and J.L. Zagorsky. 2001. “Does Growing Up With a Single Parent Really Hurt?” Journal of Human Resources, Vol. 36, No. 2, pages 253-273. Lindert, P. H. 1977. "Sibling Position and Achievement." Journal of Human Resources, Vol. 12, No. 1, pp. 198-219. Lewbel, A. 2000. “Identification of the Binary Choice Model with Misclassification.” Econometric Theory, Vol. 16, pages 603-609. Manski, C. F., G. D. Sandfur, S. McLanahan, and D. Powers. 1992. "Alternative Estimates of the Effect of Family Structure During Adolescence on High School Graduation." Journal of the American Statistical Association, Vol. 87, No. 417, pp. 25-37. 35 Mathews T.J., and Hamilton, B.E. 2005. “Trend analysis of the sex ratio at birth in the United States.” National Vital Statistics Reports, Vol. 53, No 20. McNally, Richard. 2003. “Progress and Controversy in the Study of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder.” Annual Review of Psychology, Vol. 54. pp. 229-252. McNally, R. 2007. “Can We Solve the Mysteries of the National Vietnam Veterans Readjustment Study?” Journal of Anxiety Disorders, Vol. 21, pages 192-200. McNally, Richard. 2004. “Conceptual Problems with the DSM-IV Criteria for Posttraumatic Stress Disorder.” In Rosen, G. M., editor, Posttraumatic Stress Disorder: Issues and Controversies. Chicester, England: John Wiley & Sons. Mullahy, J. and J. Sindelar. 1989. “Life-cycle Effects of Alcoholism on Education, Earnings, and Occupation.” Inquiry, Vol. 26, pages 272-282. Paul, O. 1987. “Da Costa Syndrome or Neurocirculatory Asthenia.” British Heart Journal, Vol. 58, pages 306-315. Poterba, J. M., and L. Summers. 2005. “Unemployment Benefits and Labor Market Transitions: A Multinomial Logit Model With Errors in Classification.” The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 77, No. 2, pages 207-216. Prins, A., P. Ouimette, R. Kimmerling, R. P. Cameron, D. S. Hugelshofer, J. ShawHegwer, A. Thrailkill, F. D. Gusman, and J. I. Sheikh. “The Primary Care PTSD Screen (PC-PTSD): Development and Operating Characteristics. Primary Care Psychiatry, Vol. 9, No. 1, pages 9-14. Robins, L. and Regier, D. 1991. Psychiatric Disorders in America. Free Press: New York. Rogan, W. J. and B. Gladen. 1978. “Estimating Prevalence from the Results of a 36 Screening Test.” American Journal of Epidemiology, Vol. 107, No. 1, pages 71-76. Rohlfs, C. 2007. "Does Combat Exposure Make You a More Violent or Criminal Person?: Evidence from the Pre-Lottery Vietnam Draft." Manuscript. Saravey, S. M., Steinberg, M. D., Weinschel, B., Pollack, S. and Alovis, N. 1991. “Psychological Comorbidity and Length of Stay in the General Hospital.” American Journal of Psychiatry, Vol. 148, pages 423-329. Savoca, E. 1992. “Measurement Error in Self-Evaluations of Mental Health: Implications for Labor Market Analysis.” In Frank, R. G., and W. G. Manning, editors, Economics and Mental Health. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press. Savoca, E. 1995. “Controlling for Mental Health in Earnings Equations: What Do We Gain and What Do We Lose?” Health Economics, Vol. 4, pages 399-410. Savoca, E. 2000. “Measurement Error in Binary Regressors: An Application to Measuring the Effects of Specific Psychiatric Diseases on Earnings.” Health Services and Outcomes Research Methodology, Vol. 1, No. 2, pages 149-164. Savoca, E. 2004. “Sociodemographic Correlates of Psychiatric Diseases: Accounting for Misclassification in Survey Diagnoses of Major Depression, Alcohol and Drug Use Disorders.” Health Services and Outcomes Research Methodology, Vol. 5, pages 175191. Savoca, E. 2005. “Revised Estimates of the Risk Factors for Psychiatric Diseases in the United States.” In 2005 Proceedings of the Health Policy Statistics Section, American Statistical Association. Alexandria, VA: American Statistical Association. 37 Savoca E. 2010. “Accounting for Misclassification Bias in Binary Outcome Measures of Illness: The Case of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder in Male Veterans.” Manuscript. Scott, W. J. 1990. “PTSD in DSM-III: A Case in the Politics of Diagnosis and Disease.” Social Problems, Vol. 37, No. 3, pages 294-310. Shephard, B. 2001. A War of Nerves: Soldiers and Psychiatrists in the Twentieth Century. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Spiegal A. 2005. “The Dictionary of Disorder: How One Man Revolutionized Psychiatry.” The New Yorker, January 3rd. Tanielian T. and Jaycox, L. H. 2008. Invisible Wounds of War: Psychological and Cognitive Injuries, Their Consequences, and Services to Assist Recovery. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation. Thomas, D. and E. Frankenberg. 2000. “The Measurement and Interpretation of Health in Social Surveys.” Rand Corporation, Labor and Population P rogram, Working Paper Series, No. 01-06. True, W. R. and M. Lyons. 1999. "Genetic Risk Factors for PTSD: A Twin Study." In Yehuda, R., editor, Risk Factors for Posttraumatic Stress Disorder. Washington D.C.: American Psychiatric Press, Inc. U. S. Census Bureau. 2003. Historical Statistics, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 2003. Washington D.C. U.S. Department of Commerce. 1936. Birth, Stillbirth, and Infant Mortality Statistics for the Continental United States, the Territory of Hawaii, and the Virgin Islands. U. S. Department of Veteran Affairs. 2005. “Review of State Variances in VA Disability Compensation Payments.” Report No. 05-00765-137. 38 Wilson, J. P. 1994. “The Historical Evolution of PTSD Diagnostic Criteria: From Freud to DSM-IV.” Journal of Traumatic Stress, Vol. 7, No. 4, pages 681-698. 39 Table 1. Diagnostic Accuracy of the Mississippi Scale for Combat-Related Stress Diagnostic Accuracy in a Clinical Sample (Pre-Survey): Percent Correctly Classified Kappa 88.9% 0.753 False Negative Rate 6.0% False Positive Rate 20.3% Diagnostic Accuracy in a Validation Study of NSVG Participants (Post-Survey): Percent Correctly Classified 81.6% Kappa False Negative Rate 22.7% False Positive Rate 0.528 17.2% (0.332, 0.724) Source: Kulka et al. (1988), Appendix D, Exhibit D-3 and Exhibit D-8. Notes: Percent correctly classified is the percent of veterans whose survey and clinical diagnoses were in agreement. The false negative rate is the percent of veterans with a positive clinical diagnosis who received a negative survey diagnosis. The false positive rate is the percent of veterans with a negative clinical diagnosis who received a positive survey diagnosis. The Kappa score compares the actual agreement between the diagnoses to the chance agreement we would observe if the diagnoses were completely independent, with a zero score corresponding to pure chance agreement. 40 Table 2. Description of Variables Mean (Standard Deviation) Full Sample Positive PTSD Cases Negative PTSD Cases Dependent Variables Indicators of PTSD Diagnosis (positive = 1; negative = 0) Mississippi Score (min=35, max = 175) 0.22 (0.41) 72.50 (21.77) 1.00 (0.00) 105.41 (15.90) 0.00 (0.00) 63.40 (12.27) Independent Variables Indicators of Trauma Exposure (At least one definite or severely traumatic event = 1; otherwise = 0) Combat-related Trauma Trauma, not related to war 0.367 (0.482) 0.190 (0.392) 0.691 (0.463) 0.373 (0.485) 0.277 (0.448) 0.138 (0.346) Family Characteristics Number of Siblings Intact Family Poor Relative Birth Order Location Move Involving School Switch 3.859 (2.986) 0.772 (0.420) 0.337 (0 .473) 0.398 (0.383) 0.414 (0.493) 4.000 (2.957) 0.712 (0.454) 0.399 (0.491) 0.403 (0 .370) 0.451 (0.499) 3.819 (2.995) 0.788 (0.409) 0.320 (0.467) 0.397 (0.386) 0.403 (0.491) 0.057 (0.233) 0.154 (0.361) 0.120 (0.326) 0.219 (0.414) 0.040 (0.195) 0.136 (0.343) 0.043 (0.203) 0.605 (0.489) 0.069 (0.253) 0.670 (0.471) 0.036 (0.187) 0.587 (0.493) 0.488 (0.500) 0.511 (0.501) 0.481 (0.500) 0.602 (0.490) 0.678 (0.468) 0.580 (0.494) 0.210 (0.407) 0.279 (0.449) 0.190 (0.393) 41.197 (5.165) 0.539 (0.499) 39.820 (3.579) 0.476 (0.501) 41.584 (5.468) 0.556 (0.497) 1064 233 831 Parental Characteristics History of Mental Illness History of Problems with Alcohol or Drugs History of Criminal Behavior Father Did Not Graduate from High School Mother Did Not Graduate from High School Mother Worked During Respondent’s Childhood Father experienced at least one spell of Unemployment during the respondent’s childhood Characteristics of the Respondent Age White Sample Size 41 Table 3. Ordinary Regression Estimates of Intensity of Stress Reactions To Traumatic Events Dependent Variable Independent Variables: Indicators of Trauma Exposure (At least one definite or severely traumatic event = 1; otherwise = 0) Combat-related Trauma Trauma, not related to war Score on Mississippi Scale (1) (2) Log of Score on Mississippi Scale (3) 15.972a (1.516) 5.491a (2.006) 0.354 0.099 0.240 a (0.023) 0.068a (0.025) -7.736 b (3.025) -3.622 (3.265) 7.292 b (3.488) 0.220 (1.400) -0.008 (0.219) 21.963a (5.833) -21.760a (5.807) -0.699 (1.203) -0.149 -0.081 0.166 0.005 -0.001 0.386 -0.381 -0.016 -0.092b (0.035) -0.037 (0.040) 0.095 (0.049) 0.006 (0.018) 0.000 (0.003) 0.291a (0.076) -0.280a (0.076) -0.009 (0.016) 10.001a (3.150) 3.372c (1.986) 3.794 (3.045) 1.078 (1.429) -0.586 (1.485) 3.247 b (1.548) 0.107 0.056 0.035 0.024 -0.013 0.061 0.114a 0.040c 0.061 0.011 -0.005 0.042b Family Characteristics Intact Family Mother Worked During Respondent’s Childhood Interaction Effect (mother worked, family intact) Poor Number of Siblings Relative Birth Order Relative Birth Order Squared Location Move Involving School Switch Parental Characteristics (Yes = 1; No = 0) History of Mental Illness History of Problems with Alcohol or Drugs History of Criminal Behavior Father Did Not Graduate from High School Mother Did Not Graduate from High School Father experienced at least one spell of Unemployment during the respondent’s childhood (0.040) (0.025) (0.041) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) Characteristics of the Respondent -0.159 -0.009a (0.001) Age -0.668a (0.098) a White -3.851 (1.328) -0.088 -0.051a (0.016) Notes: Standard errors, in parentheses next to the coefficient estimates, are heteroscadastic consistent. Column (2) reports the beta coefficients for the estimates in column (1). For the discrete covariates in the log specification of Column (3), exp( β̂ ) -1 and its standard error is reported as a measure of the impact of a categorical change on the proportionate change in the Mississippi score. Sample Size = 1064. a p-value .01; b .01< p-value .05; c .05< p-value .10. 42 Table 4. Estmates of the Probability of Exposure to Trauma Dependent Variable :Exposure to Any Type of Trauma (Yes = 1; No = 0) Independent Variables Cohort Combat Casualty Rate (deaths per 1000) Probit Model Linear Probability Model 0.102a (0.025) 0.038a (0.009) 0.062 0.031 0.010 0.136 -0.018 -0.352 0.294 0.089 0.023 0.011 0.003 0.051 -0.006 -0.129 0.107 0.033 Family Characteristics Intact Family Mother Worked During Respondent’s Childhood Interaction (mother worked and family intact) Poor Number of Siblings Relative Birth Order Relative Birth Order Squared Location Move Involving School Switch Parental Characteristics (Yes = 1; No = 0) History of Mental Illness History of Problems with Alcohol or Drugs History of Criminal Behavior Father Did Not Graduate from High School Mother Did Not Graduate from High School Father experienced at least one spell of Unemployment during the respondent’s childhood (0.185) (0.197) (0.216) (0.093) (0.016) (0.402) (0.403) (0.083) 0.361b (0.172) -0.233a (0.207) 0.318 (0.113) 0.062 (0.096) -0.012 (0.098) -0.010 (0.103) (0.067) (0.072) (0.079) (0.035) (0.006) (0.150) (0.150) (0.031) 0.138b (0.066) 0.122a (0.044) -0.089 (0.075) 0.023 (0.036) -0.003 (0.037) -0.037 (0.038) Characteristics of the Respondent Age 0.004 (0.009) 0.001 (0.003) White 0.002 (0.090) 0.001 (0.034) Notes: Standard errors, in parentheses next to the coefficient estimates, are heteroscadastic consistent. Sample Size = 1064. a p-value .01; b .01< p-value .05. 43 Table 5. Instrumental Variables Estimates of the Intensity of Stress To Traumatic Events Dependent Variable: Score on the Mississippi Scale Instrumental Variables (1) (2) OLS (3) Independent Variables: Exposure to Traumatic Event (Yes = 1; No = 0) Family Characteristics Intact Family Mother Worked During Respondent’s Childhood Interaction (mother worked and family intact) Poor Number of Siblings Relative Birth Order Relative Birth Order Squared Location Move Involving School Switch Parental Characteristics History of Mental Illness History of Problems with Alcohol or Drugs History of Criminal Behavior Father Did Not Graduate from High School Mother Did Not Graduate from High School Father experienced at least one spell of Unemployment during the respondent’s childhood 23.444b (10.192) 20.911b (9.773) 18.477 a (1.242) -8.029a (2.861) -4.092 (2.663) 7.294b (3.120) -0.064 (1.218) -0.008 (0.224) 22.972a (6.899) -22.695a (6.673) -0.738 (1.234) -7.968a (3.098) -4.084 (3.327) 7.326b (3.532) 0.060 (1.469) -0.026 (0.226) 22.584a (6.108) -22.367a (6.021) -0.659 (1.245) -8.012a (3.021) -4.178 (3.274) 7.455b (3.491) 0.169 (1.406) -0.044 (0.220) 22.322a (5.891) -22.158a (5.848) -0.568 (1.203) 9.681a 2.644 4.422 1.110 -0.978 3.634b 10.024a (3.446) 2.950 (2.390) 4.179 (3.258) 1.174 (1.451) -0.985 (1.491) 3.559b (1.556) 10.347a 3.235 3.945 1.256 -1.005 3.486b (2.763) (2.193) (3.061) (1.811) (1.715) (1.735) (3.221) (1.995) (3.097) (1.430) (1.490) (1.548) Characteristics of the Respondent Age -0.652a (0.086) -0.659a (0.102) -0.668a (0.097) a a -4.158 (1.340) -4.156a (1.336) White -4.151 (1.376) Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses next to the coefficient estimates. Column (1) uses the instrument for trauma constructed from the probit model in Table 4; Column (2) uses the instrument for trauma constructed from the linear probability model in Table 4. Sample size = 1064. a p-value .01; b .01< p-value .05. 44 Table 6. Nonlinear Weighted Least Squares Estimates of Probit Models of the Errors in PTSD Diagnoses Parameter Estimates Model 1 False Positive Rate Constant White Age False Negative Rate Constant White Age Model 2 Model 3 -1.228a (0.064) 0.638 (0.689) -0.230c (0.136) -0.043a (0.017) 0.374 (0.643) ---0.039b (0.016) -0.729a (0.258) 0.559 (2.516) 0.218 (0.425) -0.035 (0.064) -0.740a (0.261) ----- Predicted Error Rates for Selected Cohortsd False Positive Rates Age 35 White Nonwhite Age 40 White Nonwhite Age 45 White Nonwhite Age 50 White Nonwhite 0.110a (0.012) 0.136a (0.028) 0.192a (0.036) a 0.094 (0.016) 0.139a (0.021) 0.063a (0.015) 0.096a (0.020) a 0.040 (0.017) 0.065a (0.023) 0.162a (0.027) 0.119a (0.013) 0.084a (0.015) 0.058a (0.019) 0.230a (0.079) False Negative Rates 0.233a (0.079) Age 35 White 0.326b (0.134) Nonwhite 0.252c (0.148) Age 40 White 0.266a (0.095) Nonwhite 0.200c (0.115) Age 45 White 0.211 (0.140) Nonwhite 0.154 (0.136) Age 50 White 0.164 (0.191) Nonwhite 0.116 (0.163) Notes: Standard errors, in parentheses next to the coefficient estimates, are heteroscedastic-consistent. Sample Size = 1064. Model 1 specifies constant error rates. In Model 2 the error rates vary by age and race. In Model 3, only the false positive rate varies across observations, and only by age. a p-value 0.01; b0.01< p-value 0.05; c 0.05< p-value 0.10. dStandard errors computed via the delta method. 45 Table 7. Nonlinear Weighted Least Squares Estimates of Probit Models of the Determinants of the Probability of a Positive PTSD Diagnosis Without Error Corrections With Error Corrections Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 0.944a (0.112) 0.263b (0.128) 4.237a (1.287) 0.457 (0.304) 4.095a (1.372) 0.459 (0.298) 4.194a (1.379) 0.533c (0.318) -0.509b (0.205) -0.111 (0.218) 0.377 (0.244) -0.002 (0.109) -0.006 (0.018) 1.522a (0.472) -1.428a (0.477) -0.045 (0.099) -1.858b (0.733) -0.697 (0.613) 1.931b (0.839) 0.574c (0.312) 0.055 (0.055) 3.700b (1.640) -3.657b (1.646) 0.585c (0.308) -1.768b (0.710) -0.724 (0.607) 1.827b (0.814) 0.535c (0.308) 0.051 (0.054) 3.302 b (1.558) -3.222b (1.563) 0.587c (0.307) -1.948a -0.743 2.035b 0.629c 0.061 3.679b -3.659b 0.626c (0.753) (0.621) (0.869) (0.328) (0.056) (1.683) (1.695) (0.321) 0.496a (0.180) 0.128 (0.135) 0.296 (0.225) 0.146 (0.115) -0.081 (0.115) 0.250b (0.114) 2.445b (0.979) -0.337 (0.347) 1.282c (0.755) 0.493 (0.319) -0.491 (0.332) 0.643c (0.342) 2.254b -0.256 1.187c 0.578c -0.423 0.570c 2.347b -0.341 1.196 0.549c -0.521 0.648c (1.011) (0.360) (0.743) (0.332) (0.344) (0.344) -0.051a (0.011) -0.185c (0.108) -0.129b (0.052) -0.287 (0.303) -0.109c (0.056) 0.057 (0.401) Independent Variables Trauma Exposure (At least one definite or severely traumatic event = 1; otherwise = 0) Combat-related trauma Trauma, not related to war Family Characteristics Intact Family Mother Worked During Respondent’s Childhood Interaction (mother worked and family intact) Poor Number of Siblings Relative Birth Order Relative Birth Order Squared Location Move Involving School Switch Characteristics of Parents (Yes = 1; No = 0) History of Mental Illness History of Problems with Alcohol or Drugs History of Criminal Behavior Father Did Not Graduate from High School Mother Did Not Graduate from High School Father experienced at least one spell of Unemployment during the respondent’s childhood Characteristics of the Respondent Age White Notes: See Table 6. a p-value 0.01; b0.01< p-value 0.05; c 0.05< p-value (1.037) (0.353) (0.711) (0.326) (0.321) (0.326) -0.102b (0.048) -0.256 (0.311) 0.10 46