- 5 2006

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U.S. Department of Homeland Securih
Washington. DC‘ 2 0 52 x
OCT
- 5 2006
Mr. Jim Caldwell
Regional Administrator
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region I11
2443 Warrenville Road
Lisle. Illinois 60542-435 1
Dear Mr. Caldweli:
Enclosed is a copy of the Final Report for the June 6-7, 2006, plume and ingestion exposure
pathway exercise of the offsite radiological emergency response plans site-specific to the Fermi 2
Nuclear Power Plant. The State of Michigan, and Monroe and Wayne Counties fully participated
in this exercise. The utility owner/operator, Detroit Edison, also participated in this exercise.
The final exercise report was prepared by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Radiological Eniergency Preparedness program (REPP) Chicago Field Office staff.
There were no Deficiencies identified during this exercise. There were two Areas Requiring
Corrective Action (ARCAs) identified for Monroe County and one ARCA identified for Wayne
County as a result of this exercise. One previous ARCA each for Monroe and Wayne Counties
were resolved during this exercise. The final report contains the evaluation of the biennial
exercise and a detailed discussion of these ARCAs. These issues can be found on Part IV of the
final report.
Based on the results of the June 6-7,2006, exercise, the offsite radiological emergency response
plans and preparedness for the State of Michigan and affected local jurisdictions, site-specific to
the Fermi 2 Nuclear Power Plant, can be implemented and are adequate to provide reasonable
assurance that appropriate measures can be taken offsite to protect the health and safety of the
public in the event of a radiological emergency at the site. Therefore, the Title 44 CFR, Part 350,
approval of the offsite radiological emergency response plans and preparedness for the State of
Michigan site-specific to the Fermi 2 Nuclear Power Plant, granted on March 9, 1987, remain in
effect.
n wn.dhS.gO1’
RECEIVED OCT 1 6 2006
If you should haire :in). questions. please contact William King, Regional Assistancc Committee
Chair, REPP Chicago Field Office. at (312) 408-5575.
Sincerely,
W , Craig ConkinyActing Director
Chemical and Nuclear Preparedness
and Protection L> i v i si o 11
Office of the Infrastructure Protection
Preparedness Directorate
Enclosure
cc: Mr. Anthony McMurtray, Chief
Inspection and Communications Section
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Mail Stop 0-6H2
Washington, DC 20555-0001
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Enrico Fermi 2 Nuclear Power Plant
Exercise - June 6 and 7,2006
Final Report - Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program
August 30, 2006
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Homeland
(‘liicirgo Field Oflee
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Homeland
Security
III
Final Exercise Report
Enrico Fermi 2 Nuclear Power Plant
Licensee:
Detroit Edison Company
Exercise Date:
June 6 and 7,2006
Report Date:
August 30,2006
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
CHICAGO FIELD OFFICE
536 South Clark Street, 6th Floor
Chicago, Illinois 60605-1521
ii
.
.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
.
I.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .................................................................................................
1
I1.
INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................................
3
111.
EXERCISE OVERVIEW ...................................................................................................
5
A.
Plume/Ingestion Emergency Planning Zone Description .......................................
5
B.
Exercise Participants ...............................................................................................
6
C.
Exercise Timeline ...................................................................................................
8
EXERCISE EVALUATION AND RESULTS .................................................................
10
.
A.
Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation .............................................................
10
.
B.
Status of Jurisdictions Evaluated ..........................................................................
13
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.
.
.
IV
1.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
STATE OF MICHIGAN ...........................................................................
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
1.7
1.8
1.9
1.10
1.11
1.12
1.13
1.14
1.15
1.16
1.17
1.18
1.19
1.20
15
Initial Notification Point ............................................................... 15
Emergency Operations Center ......................................................
15
State DEQ Laboratory .Day 1 ......................................................
15
SEOC Ingestion Phase - Day 2 ..................................................... 16
Joint Public Information Center - Days 1 and 2 ............................ 16
Technical Support Group - Day 1 ................................................. 16
Technical Support Group - Day 2 ................................................. 16
Field Team Center (FTC) - Day 1 ..................................................
17
Traffic and Access control Point at FTC ....................................... 17
Field Team 1 - Day 1 .....................................................................
17
Field Team 2 - Day 1 ..................................................................... 18
Field Team 3 - Day 1 .....................................................................
18
FTC - Day 2 ................................................................................... 18
Field Team 1 - Day 2 .....................................................................
19
Field Team 2 - Day 2 .....................................................................
19
Field Team 3 - Day 2 .....................................................................
19
FTC - Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Workers .19
FTC - Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Worker
Equipment ....................................................................................
20
State Liaison - Monroe County EOC ............................................. 20
State Liaison - Wayne County EOC .............................................. 20
.
...
111
1.21
1.22
1.23
2.
Department of Environmental Quality Liaison - Evacuee Vehicle
and Evacuee Monitoring and Decontamination - Wayne County
- Taylor Center ............................................................................... 21
Department of Environmental Quality Liaison - Evacuee Vehicle
and Evacuee Monitoring and Decontamination - Monroe County
- Ida Public Schools ...................................................................... 2 1
Department of Environmental Quality Liaison - Evacuee Vehicle
and Evacuee Monitoring and Decontamination - Monroe County
- Dundee High School .................................................................... 21
RISK COUNTIES ....................................................................................
.22
Monroe County .............................................................................
22
2.1
2.1.1 Initial Notification Point ................................................... 22
2.1.2 Emergency Operations Center ......................................... .22
2.1.3 Traffic and Access Control Point ...................................... 23
2.1.4 Dosimetry - County Health Department ............................ 23
2.1.5 Joint Public Information Center Representative ...............24
24
2.1.6 County Hotline - EOC .......................................................
2.1.7 Evacuee Vehicle Monitoring and Decontamination - Ida
School .............................................................................. .24
2.1.8 Evacuee Monitoring, Decontamination and Registration
- Ida School ....................................................................... 25
2.1.9 Congregate Care - Ida School ......................................... ..25
2.1.10 Evacuee Vehicle Monitoring and Decontamination Dundee High School ........................................................ 25
2.1.1 1 Evacuee Monitoring, Decontamination and Registration Dundee High School ........................................................ 26
2.1.12 Congregate Care - Dundee High School ........................... 26
2.2
Wayne County ...............................................................................
27
Initial Notification Point ................................................... 27
Emergency Operations Center ........................................ ..27
Traffic and Access Control Point ...................................... 28
Joint Public Information Center Representative ................29
Emergency Alert System Radio Station - WJR ................29
Evacuee Vehicle Monitoring and Decontamination 29
Taylor Center ....................................................................
2.2.7 Evacuee Monitoring, Decontamination and Registration
- Taylor Center ................................................................... 30
2.2.8 Congregate Care - Taylor Center ...................................... 30
2.2.1
2.2.2
2.2.3
2.2.4
2.2.5
2.2.6
iv
List of Appendices
APPENDIX 1 - ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS ...........................................................
31
APPENDIX 2 - EXERCISE EVALUATORS AND TEAM LEADERS .....................................
33
APPENDIX 3 - EXERCISE CRITERIA AND EXTENT-OF-PLAY AGREEMENT ................36
APPENDIX 4 - EXERCISE SCENARIO ....................................................................................
.5 1
List of Tables
Table 1 - Exercise Timeline ............................................................................................................ 9
Table 2 - Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation .....................................................................
V
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I.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
On June 6 and 7,2006, a Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Full-Participation
Ingestion Exposure Pathway exercise was conducted in the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone
(EPZ) around the Enrico Fermi 2 Nuclear Power Plant by the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security (DHS), Chicago Field Office (CFO). The purpose of this exercise was to assess the
level of State and local preparedness in responding to a radiological emergency. This exercise
was held in accordance with DHS' policies and guidance concerning the exercise of State and
local Radiological Emergency Response Plans (RERPs) and procedures.
The most recent exercise at this site was conducted on March 23,2004. The qualifjmg
emergency preparedness exercise was conducted on February 2, 1982.
DHS wishes to acknowledge the efforts of the many individuals who participated in this exercise.
In the State of Michigan the risk counties of Monroe and Wayne participated along with the State
government.
Protecting the public health and safety is the full-time job of some of the exercise participants
and an additional assigned responsibility for others. Still others have willingly sought this
responsibility by volunteering to provide vital emergency services to their communities.
Cooperation and teamwork on the part of all the participants was evident during this exercise.
This Final Report contains the evaluation of the biennial exercise and the evaluation of the
following out-of-sequence activities: Michigan Department of Environmental Quality activities
at Monroe and Wayne County out of sequence demonstrations; Evacuee Vehicle Monitoring and
Decontamination; Evacuee Monitoring, Decontamination and Registration; and Congregate Care
Centers .
The State and local organizations, except where noted in this report, demonstrated knowledge of
their emergency response plans and procedures, and adequately implemented them.
No Deficiencies were identified for the State of Michigan or for Monroe or Wayne Counties
during this exercise.
There were no Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCAs) identified for the State of Michigan.
There were no ARCAs from previous exercises for the State of Michigan that were required to be
demonstrated during this exercise.
There was one ARCA for Monroe County from a previous exercise that was required to be
demonstrated during the exercise.
There were two ARCAs identified during this exercise for Monroe County. One ARCA was
successfully re-demonstrated. One ARCA remains as an open issue.
1
There was one ARCA for Wayne County from a previous exercise that was required to be
demonstrated during this exercise.
There was one ARCA identified during this exercise for Wayne County. This ARCA remains as
an open issue.
The first ARCA for Monroe County was identified at the Monroe County Health Department
under Criterion 1.e. 1 - Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations, whereby all 200 ArrowTech Direct-Reading Dosimeters did not have evidence of current calibration.
The second ARCA for Monroe County was identified at the Evacuee Vehicle Monitoring and
Decontamination demonstration at Dundee High School under Criterion 3 .a. 1 - Implementation
of Emergency Worker Exposure Control, whereby two Dundee Fire Department crew members
interviewed concerning their knowledge of radiation exposure control were not able to
adequately explain the use of personal dosimetry and individual exposure limits. This ARCA
was successfully re-demonstrated during the exercise.
One prior ARCA for Monroe County, Issue Number 23-02-5.b. I-A-01, regarding Public Inquiry
Hotline (Emergency InformatiodRumor Control Center) staff providing inaccurate or improper
information to the public after confusing a Utility Protective Action Recommendation (PAR)
with a State PAO, was resolved.
The only ARCA for Wayne County was identified under Criterion 5.b. 1 - Emergency
Information and Instructions for the Public and the Media, whereby the two EAS messages sent
to the EAS radio station were missing attachments containing evacuation routes and included
incorrect television station call letters.
One prior ARCA for Wayne County, Issue Number 23-02-5.a. 1-A-02, wherein the EAS
messages, simulated broadcast at 1039 hours and 1305 hours by Wayne County, were in conflict
with the Governor’s PAOs, was resolved.
A detailed discussion of these issues can be found in Part N of this report.
2
11.
INTRODUCTION
On December 7, 1979, the President directed FEMA to assume the lead responsibility for all offsite nuclear planning and response. DHS’ activities are conducted pursuant to 44 Code of
Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 350,351, and 352. These regulations are a key element in the
Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Program that was established following the Three
Mile Island Nuclear Station accident in March 1979.
The FEMA Rule 44 CFR 350 establishes the policies and procedures for DHS’ initial and
continued approval of State and local governments’ radiological emergency planning and
preparedness for commercial nuclear power plants. This approval is contingent, in part, on State
and local governments‘ participation in joint exercises with licensees.
DHS’ responsibilities in radiological emergency planning for fixed nuclear facilities include the
following:
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Taking the lead in off-site emergency planning and in the review and evaluation of
RERPs and procedures developed by State and local governments;
Determining whether such plans and procedures can be implemented on the basis of
observation and evaluation of exercises of the plans and procedures conducted by State
and local governments;
Responding to requests by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) pursuant to
the Memorandum of Understanding between the NRC and FEMA dated June 17,1993
(Federal Register, Vol. 58, No. 176, September 14, 1993); and
Coordinating the activities of Federal agencies with responsibilities in the radiological
emergency planning process:
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U.S. Department of Agriculture;
U.S. Department of Energy;
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services;
U.S. Department of the Interior;
U.S. Department of Transportation;
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency;
U.S. Food and Drug Administration; and
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Representatives of these agencies serve on the DHS Radiological Preparedness Coordinating
Committee (RPCC), which is chaired by DHS.
Formal submission of the RERPs for the Enrico Fermi 2 Nuclear Power Plant to FEMA Region
V by the State of Michigan and involved local jurisdictions occurred on March 22, 1982. Formal
approval of these RERPs was granted by FEMA on March 9, 1987, under 44 CFR 350.
3
A REP Ingestion exercise was conducted on June 6 and 7,2006, by DHS to assess the
capabilities of State and local emergency preparedness organizations in implementing their
RERPs and procedures to protect the public health and safety during a radiological emergency
involving the Enrico Fermi 2 Nuclear Power Plant. The purpose of this exercise report is to
present the exercise results and findings on the performance of the offsite response organizations
(OROs) during a simulated radiological emergency.
The findings presented in this report are based on the evaluations of the Federal evaluation team,
with final determinations made by the DHS Chicago Field Office RPCC Chairman, and approved
by DHS Headquarters.
The criteria utilized in the DHS evaluation process are contained in:
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NUREG-O654/FEMA-REP-l, Rev. 1, "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of
Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power
Plants," November 1980;
FEMA-REP- 14, "Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise Manual." September
1991; and
FEMA "Radiological Emergency Preparedness: Exercise Evaluation Methodology" as
published in the Federal Register NoticeNol. 67, No. 80, dated April 25, 2002.
Section I11 of this report, entitled "Exercise Overview," presents basic information and data
relevant to the exercise. This section of the report contains a description of the plume pathway
EPZ, a listing of all participating jurisdictions and functional entities, which were evaluated, and
a tabular presentation of the time of actual occurrence of key exercise events and activities.
Section IV of this report, entitled "Exercise Evaluation and Results," presents detailed
information on the demonstration of applicable exercise criteria at each jurisdiction or functional
entity evaluated in a jurisdiction-based, issues only format. This section also contains: (1)
descriptions of all Deficiencies and ARCAs assessed during this exercise, recommended
corrective actions, and the State and local governments' schedule of corrective actions, if
applicable, for each identified exercise issue and (2) descriptions of unresolved ARC As assessed
during previous exercises and the status of the OROs' efforts to resolve them.
4
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111. EXERCISE OVERVIEW
Contained in this section are data and basic information relevant to the June 6 and 7,2006, REP
Ingestion exercise to test the offsite emergency response capabilities in the area surrounding the
Enrico Fermi 2 Nuclear Power Plant. This section of the exercise report includes a description of
the plume pathway EPZ, a listing of all participating jurisdictions and hnctional entities which
were evaluated, and a tabular presentation of the time of the actual occurrence of key exercise
events and activities.
A.
Plume Emergency Planning Zonehgestion Pathway Zone Descriptions
The Enrico Fermi 2 Nuclear Power Plant is comprised of approximately 1,120 acres of
land owned by the Detroit Edison Company (Edison). The site is bounded on the north
by Swan Creek, on the east by Lake Erie, on the south by Pointe Aux Peaux Road, and on
the west by Toll Road. Entrance to the site is from Enrico Fermi Drive (a private road
owned by Edison) to the west, and from Pointe Aux Peaux Road to another private road
owned by Edison to the south.
The plant is approximately six miles northeast of Monroe, Michigan; 30 miles southwest
of downtown Detroit, Michigan; and 25 miles northeast of downtown Toledo, Ohio. The
latitude of the site is 41" 57' 48" north and the longitude is 83" 15' 3 1 west. Site
elevations range from the level of Lake Erie, on the eastern edge of the site, to
approximately 25 feet above the lake level, on the western edge of the site.
I'
The 10-mile EPZ includes parts of Monroe and Wayne Counties in Michigan; parts of
Lake Erie; and the southern tip of Essex County, (Bay Point) Canada. Most of the 10mile EPZ lies within Monroe County. Coordinated efforts occur between the two
counties, which are divided into five Protective Action Areas. The following
jurisdictions are located within the 10-mile EPZ: Ash Township, Carleton Village, Berlin
Township, Estral Beach Village, Exeter Township, South Rockwood Village, Frenchtown
Township, Monroe City, Monroe Township, Raisinville Township, Brownstown
Township, Gibraltar City, Flat Rock City, and Rockwood City. The population in the 10mile EPZ, based on the 2000 census, is 88,897.
Land use within the EPZ is diverse. About 55 percent of the land is farmland; the
majority of agricultural land is located in Monroe County. The portion of Wayne County
nearest to Detroit is a growing residential suburb. Twelve state parks and recreational
areas, and several light industries are located within the 10-mile EPZ.
There are three major roads within 10 miles of the plant, Interstates 75 and 275, and U.S.
Route 24. Their closest approach to the plant is 4.1 miles, 4.2 miles and 5.8 miles,
respectively. Five railroad lines operate within 10 miles of the plant. These include the
Canadian National Railroad, the Norfolk Southern Railroad, the Chesapeake and Ohio
Railroad, the Detroit Toledo and Ironton Railroad, and the Detroit and Toledo Shore Line
Railroad. There are no major airports within 15 miles of the site.
5
The following protective action areas are included within the 10-mile EPZ: areas 1,2, 3,
4,and 5.
The 50-mile Ingestion Pathway EPZ for the Enrico Fermi 2 Nuclear Power Plant includes
portions of Canada, all of Monroe and Wayne counties, parts of Macomb, Oakland,
Livingston, Washtenaw, Jackson, and Lenawee Counties in Michigan. The 50-mile
Ingestion Pathway EPZ also includes part of Lake Erie, all or parts of Erie, Fulton, Lucas,
Ottawa, Sandusky, and Wood Counties in Ohio. The Michigan 2000 census indicates
over 5,500,000 people are within the 50-mile EPZ, of which approximately 3.3 million
are in Oakland and Wayne Counties.
B.
Exercise Participants
The following agencies, organizations, and units of government participated in the Enrico
Fermi 2 Nuclear Power Plant exercise on June 6 and 7, 2006:
STATE OF MICHIGAN
Department of Agriculture
Department of Community Health
Department of Environmental Quality
Department of Information Technology
Department of Military and Veterans Affairs
Department of Natural Resources
Department of State Police
Department of Transportation
Emergency Management and Homeland Security Division
Family Independence Agency
Michigan Disaster Medical Assistance Team
Office of the Governor - Executive Office
Office of Services to the Aging
RISK JURISDICTIONS
MONROE COUNTY
County Board of Commissioners
Emergency Management Division
Emergency Medical Services
Family Independence Agency
Fire Services
Frenchtown Township
Health Services
Human Services
Information Technology Department
Intermediate School District
6
Michigan State University Agricultural Extension Services
Monroe City Police Services
Prosecutor's Office - Public Inquiry
Public Affairs
Public Works
Road Commission
Sheriffs Office
Social Services
WAYNE COUNTY
Brownstone Police Department
Brownstown Township
City of Gibraltar
City of Flat Rock
City of Rockwood
County Board of Commissioners
Department of Health and Human Services
Department of Homeland Security and Emergency Management
Department of Public Service
Family Independence Agency
Fire Services
Police Services
Regional Education Services Agency
Sheriff's Office
Social Services
Wayne County Crisis Team
Wayne County Fire Department Mutual Aid Association
RISK SCHOOL DISTRICTS
Dundee Community Schools - Dundee High School
Ida Public Schools - Ida Middle/High School
Taylor School District - Taylor Center
PRIVATENOLUNTEER ORGANIZATIONS
American Red Cross
Detroit Edison Company
Dundee Volunteer Fire Department
Ida Volunteer Fire Department
Mercy Memorial Hospital
Monroe Community Ambulance
Monroe County Community College
Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Services
WJR Radio Station
7
C.
Exercise Timeline
Table 1, on the following page, presents the times at which key events and activities
occurred during the Enrico Fermi 2 Nuclear Power Plant REP Ingestion exercise on June
6 and 7,2006. Also included are times that notifications were made to the participating
jurisdictions/functional entities.
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Table 1. Exercise Timeline
DATE AND SITE: June 6 and 7,2006 - Enrico Fermi 2 Nuclear Power Plant
Time
Emergency Classification
Level or Event
Unusual Event
Alert
Site Area Emergency
General Emergency
Simulated Release of Radioactive Materials
Simulated Release of Radioactive Materials Terminated
W
Facility Declared Operational
State: Declaration State of Disaster
Local: Declaration State of Emergency
Exercise Terminated
1st Early Precautionary Action Decision:
Agricultural Advisory - placed animals on stored feed and protected water in areas 1 , 2 , 4
2nd Early Precautionary Action Decision:
Embargo areas 1 , 2 , 4
3rd Early Precautionary Action Decision:
Embargo areas 1,2,3,4
1st Protective Action Order:
Evacuate areas 1 & 2 and restrict marine activity out to 5 miles
1st Siren Activation
1st EAS Activation
2nd Protective Action Order:
Evacuate areas I , 2, 3, & 4 and restrict marine activity out to IO miles
2nd Siren Activation
2nd EAS Message
Recommendation to take KI: Areas 1 & 2
Recommendation to take KI: Areas 3 & 4
Utility
Declared
State of
Michgan
Monroe
County
Wayne
County
Joint Public
Information Center
0815
0855
0956
1122
1139
N/A
0828
0928
0829
0908
0842
0915
N/A
NIA
1022
1020
NIA
1358
1
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1320
1133
1015
N/A
0910
1355
I
0937
N/A
0937
1355
1
N/A
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1
1
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1110
1
I
NIA
NIA
1415
1
1305
NIA
I
N/A
I
N/A
N/A
1
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1140
N/A
I
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NIA
1150
I
NIA
N/A
1315
NIA
NIA
N/A
NIA
NIA
1230
1330
1323
NIA
1230
N/A
NIA
1334
N/A
1330
NIA
NIA
1351
NIA
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IV. EXERCISE EVALUATION AND RESULTS
Contained in this section are the results and findings of the evaluation of all jurisdictions
and functional entities that participated in the June 6 and 7, 2006, REP Ingestion exercise
to test the off-site emergency response capabilities of State and local governments in the
10-mile EPZ surrounding the Enrico Fermi 2 Nuclear Power Plant.
Each jurisdiction and functional entity was evaluated based on its demonstration of
exercise criteria delineated in Federal Register Notice/Vol. 67, No. 80, dated April 25,
2002. Detailed information on the exercise criteria and the extent-of-play agreement used
in this exercise are found in Appendix 3 of this report.
A.
Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation
The matrix presented in Table 2, on the following page(s), presents the status of
all exercise criteria fiom Federal Register NoticeNol. 67, No. 80, dated
April 25,2002, that were scheduled for demonstration during this exercise by all
participating jurisdictions and functional entities. Exercise criteria are listed by
number and the demonstration status of those criteria are indicated by the use of
the following letters:
M
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Met (No Deficiency or ARCA assessed and no unresolved ARCAs
from prior exercises)
D
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Deficiency assessed
A
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ARCA(s) assessed or unresolved ARCA(s) from prior exercise(s)
N
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Not Demonstrated (Reason explained in Section 1V.B.)
Blank
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Not scheduled for demonstration
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Table 2. Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation
DATE AND SITE: June 6 and 7,2006 - Enrico F e d 2 Nuclear Power Plant
I.EGI:NU:
M = Met (No Deficiency or AKCA(s) assessed)
D = Ikficiency assessed
(Sheet 1 of 2)
A = ARCA(s) assessed (Not affecting health and safety of puhlic)
U = Unresolved AK<'A(s) from prior exercise(s)
Blank = Not scheduled for demonstration
N = Not demonstrated as scheduled (Reason explained in Section 1V.U.
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Table 2. Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation
DATE AND SITE: June 6 and 7,2006 - Enrico Fermi 2 Nuclear Power Plant
LEGEND:
(Sheet 2 of 2 )
M = Met (No Deficiency or AKCA(s) assessed
A = AKCA(s) assessed (Not affecting health and safety of public)
D = Deficiency assessed
U = 1Jnresolved AR(’A(s) from prior exercise(s)
Blank = Not scheduled for demonstration
N =Not demonstrated as scheduled (Keason explained
in
Section 1V.U.)
B.
Status of Jurisdictions Evaluated
This subsection provides information on the evaluation of each participating
jurisdiction and functional entity in a jurisdiction-based, issues-only format.
Presented below are definitions of the terms used in this subsection relative to
criteria demonstration status.
Met - Listing of the demonstrated exercise criteria under which no
Deficiencies or ARCAs were assessed during this exercise and under
which no ARCAs assessed during prior exercises remain unresolved.
Deficiency - Listing of the demonstrated exercise criteria under which one
or more Deficiencies were assessed during this exercise. Included is a
description of each Deficiency and recommended corrective actions.
Area Requiring Corrective Action - Listing of the demonstrated
exercise criteria under which one or more ARCAs were assessed during
the current exercise or ARCAs assessed during prior exercises remain
unresolved. Included is a description of the ARCAs assessed during this
exercise and the recommended corrective action to be demonstrated before
or during the next biennial exercise.
Not Demonstrated - Listing of the exercise criteria that were not
demonstrated as scheduled during this exercise and the reason(s) they were
not demonstrated.
Prior ARCAs - Resolved - Descriptions of ARCAs assessed during
previous exercises that were resolved in this exercise and the corrective
actions demonstrated.
Prior ARCAs - Unresolved - Descriptions of ARCAs assessed during
prior exercises that were not resolved in this exercise. Included is the
reason the ARCA remains unresolved and recommended corrective
actions to be demonstrated before or during the next biennial exercise.
The following are definitions of the two types of exercise issues that maybe
discussed in this report.
A Deficiency is defined in FEMA-REP-14 as "...an observed or identified
inadequacy of organizational performance in an exercise that could cause a
finding that offsite emergency preparedness is not adequate to provide
reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can be taken in
the event of a radiological emergency to protect the health and safety of
the public living in the vicinity of a nuclear power plant."
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An ARCA is defined in FEMA-REP-14 as "...an observed or identified
inadequacy of organizational performance in an exercise that is not
considered, by itself, to adversely impact public health and safety."
DHS has developed a standardized system for numbering exercise issues
(Deficiencies and ARCAs). This system is used to achieve consistency in
numbering exercise issues among DHS Field Offices and site-specific exercise
reports within each Field Office. It also is used to expedite tracking of exercise
issues on a nationwide basis.
The identifjrlng number of Deficiencies and ARCAs includes the following
elements, with each element separated by a hyphen (-).
0
0
0
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Plant Site Identifier - A two-digit number, corresponding to the Utility
Billable Plant Site Code.
Exercise Year - The last two digits of the year the exercise was
conducted.
Criterion Number - An alpha and two-digit number corresponding to the
criteria numbers in the six Exercise Evaluation Areas described in Federal
Register Notice/Vol. 67, No. 80 dated April 25, 2002, which amends
FEMA-REP 14, Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise Manual.
Issue Classification Identifier - (D = Deficiency, A = ARCA). Only
Deficiencies and ARCAs are included in exercise reports. Plan issues are
reported to the State(s) via a letter from the RPCC Chairman. Therefore,
standardized issue numbers are not assigned to Plan Issues.
Exercise Identification Number - A separate two- (or three-) digit
indexing number assigned to each issue identified in the exercise.
14
1.
STATE OF MICHIGAN
1.1
Initial Notification Point
1.2
1.3
a.
MET: Criteria 1.a.l and 1.d.l
b.
DEFICIENCY: NONE
c.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE
d.
NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE
e.
PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: NONE
f.
PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: NONE
Emergency Operations Center
a.
MET: Criteria l.a.1; l.c.1; l.d.1; l.e.1; 2.a.l; 2.b.2; 2.c.l; 3.b.l; 3.d.l; 5.a.l; and
5.b.l
b.
DEFICIENCY: NONE
c.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE
d.
NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE
e.
PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: NONE
f.
PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: NONE
State DEQ Laboratory - Day 1
a.
MET: Criteria 1.e. 1 and 4.c. 1
b.
DEFICIENCY: NONE
c.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE
d.
NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE
e.
PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: NONE
f.
PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: NONE
15
1.4
1.5
1.6
1.7
SEOC Ingestion Phase - Day 2
a.
MET: Criteria 2.d.l; 2.e.l; 3.e.l; 3.e.2; and 3.f.l
b.
DEFICIENCY: NONE
C.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE
d.
NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE
e.
PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: NONE
f.
PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: NONE
Joint Public Information Center - Days 1 and 2
a.
MET: Criteria l.a.1; 1.c.l; l.d.1; l.e.1; 3.e.2; and 5.b.l
b.
DEFICIENCY: NONE
c.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE
d.
NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE
e.
PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: NONE
f.
PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: NONE
-
Technical Support Group Day 1
a.
MET:Criteria l.a.1; l.d.1; l.e.1;2.a.1;2.b.1;2.b.2;and2.c.l
b.
DEFICIENCY: NONE
c.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE
d.
NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE
e.
PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: NONE
f.
PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: NONE
-
Technical Support Group Day 2
a.
MET: Criteria 2.d.l; 2.e.l; 3.e.l; 3.e.2; and 3.f.l
16
1.8
1.9
b.
DEFICIENCY: NONE
c.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE
d.
NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE
e.
PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: NONE
f.
PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: NONE
Field Team Center (FTC) - Day 1
a.
MET: Criteria2.a.l;2.b.l;2.b.2; 3.a.l; 3.b.l;4.a.2;4.a.3; and4.b.1
b.
DEFICIENCY: NONE
c.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE
d.
NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE
e.
PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: NONE
f.
PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: NONE
Traffic and Access Control Point at FTC
a.
MET: Criteria l.d.1; l.e.1; 3.a.l; 3.b.l; and 3.d.l
b.
DEFICIENCY: NONE
C.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE
d.
NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE
e.
PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: NONE
f.
PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: NONE
-
1.10 Field Team 1 Day 1
a.
MET: Criteria l.d.1; l.e.1; 3.a.l; 3.b.l; 4.a.l; and4.a.3
b.
DEFICIENCY: NONE
c.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE
17
d.
NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE
e.
PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: NONE
f.
PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: NONE
1.1 1 Field Team 2 - Day 1
a.
MET: Criteria l.d.1; l.e.1; 3.a.l; 3.b.l; 4.a.l; and 4.a.3
b.
DEFICIENCY: NONE
C.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE
d.
NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE
e.
PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: NONE
f.
PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: NONE
1.12 Field Team 3 - Day 1
a.
MET: Criteria l.d.1; l.e.1; 3.a.l; 3.b.l; 4.a.l; and 4.a.3
b.
DEFICIENCY: NONE
c.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE
d.
NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE
e.
PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: NONE
f.
PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: NONE
1.13 FTC - Day 2
a.
MET: Criteria l.d.1; l.e.1; 3.a.l; 3.b.l; and4.b.1
b.
DEFICIENCY: NONE
c.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE
d.
NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE
e.
PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: NONE
18
f.
-
PRIOR ISSUES UNRESOLVED: NONE
1.14 Field Team 1 - Day 2
a.
MET: Criteria l.d,l; l.e.1; 3.a.l; 3.b.l; and4.b.l
b.
DEFICIENCY: NONE
C.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE
d.
NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE
e.
PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: NONE
f.
PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: NONE
1.15 Field Team 2 - Day 2
a.
MET: Criteria l.d.1; l.e.1; 3.a.l; 3.b.l; and 4.b.l
b.
DEFICIENCY: NONE
C.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE
d.
NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE
e.
PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: NONE
f.
PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: NONE
1.16 Field Team 3 - Day 2
a.
MET:Criteria l.d.1; l.e.1;3.a.l;3.b.l;and4.b.l
b.
DEFICIENCY: NONE
c.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE
d.
NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE
e.
PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: NONE
f.
PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: NONE
1.17 FTC - Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Workers
19
a.
MET: Criteria l.d.1; I.e.I;3.a.l;3.b.l;and6.a.I
b.
DEFICIENCY: NONE
c.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE
d.
NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE
e.
PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: NONE
f.
PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: NONE
1.18 FTC - Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Worker
Equipment
1.19
a.
MET: Criteria l.d.1; l.e.1; 3.a.l; and 6.b.l
b.
DEFICIENCY: NONE
c.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE
d.
NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE
f.
PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: NONE
State Liaison - Monroe County EOC
e.
PRIOR ISSUES RESOLVED: NONE
a.
MET: Criteria 2.a.l; 2.b.l; 5.a.l; and 5.b.l
b.
DEFICIENCY: NONE
c.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE
d.
NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE
e.
PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: NONE
f.
PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: NONE
-
1.20 State Liaison Wayne County EOC
a.
MET: Criteria 2.a.l; 2.b.l; 5.a.l; and 5.b.l
b.
DEFICIENCY: NONE
20
C.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE
d.
NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE
e.
PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: NONE
f.
PRIOR ISSUES UNRESOLVED: NONE
-
1.21 Department of Environmental Quality Liaison - Evacuee Vehicle and
Evacuee Monitoring and Decontamination - Wayne County - Taylor
Center
a.
MET: Criteria l.d.1; l.e.1; 3.a.l; and 6.a.l
b.
DEFICIENCY: NONE
C.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE
d.
NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE
e.
PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: NONE
f.
PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: NONE
1.22 Department of Environmental Quality Liaison - Evacuee Vehicle and
Evacuee Monitoring and Decontamination - Monroe County - Ida
Public Schools
a.
MET: Criteria l.d.1; l.e.1; 3.a.l; and 6.a.l
b.
DEFICIENCY: NONE
c.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE
d.
NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE
e.
PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: NONE
f.
PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: NONE
1.23 Department of Environmental Quality Liaison - Evacuee Vehicle and
Evacuee Monitoring and Decontamination - Monroe County - Dundee
High School
a.
MET: Criteria l.d.1; l.e.1; 3.a.l; and 6.a.l
21
2.
b.
DEFICIENCY: NONE
c.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE
d.
NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE
e.
PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: NONE
f.
PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: NONE
RISK COUNTIES
2.1 MONROE COUNTY
2.1.1 Initial Notification Point
a.
MET: Criteria 1.a. 1 and 1.d. 1
b.
DEFICIENCY: NONE
c.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE
d.
NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE
e.
PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: NONE
f.
PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: NONE
2.1.2 Emergency Operations Center
a.
MET: Criteria l.a.1; l.c.1; l.d.1; l.e.1; 2.c.l; 3.c.l; 3.c.2; 3.d.l; 3.d.2; 5.a.l; and
5.b. 1
b.
DEFICIENCY: NONE
c.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE
d.
NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE
e.
PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: Criterion 5.b.l
Issue No.: 23-02-5.b. 1 -A-01
Description: The Public Inquiry Hotline (Emergency InfonnatiordRumor Control
Center) staff provided inaccurate or improper information to the public after
22
confirsing a Utility Protective Action Recommendation (PAR) with a State PAO.
In addition, they advised people that they could enter an area that had been
evacuated, under a PAO, to retrieve personnel goods and relatives, but that
the police probably would stop them.
Corrective Action Demonstrated: The previous issues of issuing incorrect
information were not repeated. The PI operation made extensive and consistent
use of visual aids, and shared only approved and current information.
f.
PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: NONE
2.1.3 Traffic and Access Control Point
a.
MET: Criteria 1.d. 1 ; 1.e.l; 3.a. 1; 3.b. 1 ; and 3.d. 1
b.
DEFICIENCY: NONE
c.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE
d.
NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE
e.
PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: NONE
f.
PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: NONE
2.1.4 Dosimetry - County Health Department
a.
MET: NONE
b.
DEFICIENCY: NONE
c.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: Criterion 1 .e. 1
Issue No.: 23-06- 1.e. 1-A-01
Description: Monroe County Health Department Arrow-Tech 0-2.0 Roentgen
dosimeter (200 units) did not have evidence of current calibration.
Possible Cause: Documentation lost or administrative process failed to order
calibration.
Reference: NUREG-0654, H. 10.
Effect: Uncalibrated DRDs cannot be relied upon for measurement of absorbed
dose by DRD users.
Recommendation: Immediately replace DRDs in question with currently
23
calibrated DRDs, and investigate why DRDs were not calibrated in accordance
with the manufacturer's recommendations.
Schedule of Corrective Action: The Michigan Department of Environmental
Quality now has the assignment of the calibration for the DRDs for the Counties.
Calibration shall take place in accordance with the manufacturer's
recommendations. This Criterion will be demonstrated during the Fermi 2 2008
REP exercise.
d.
NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE
e.
PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: NONE
f.
PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: NONE
2.1.5 Joint Public Information Center Representative
a.
MET: Criterion 5.b. I
b.
DEFICIENCY: NONE
c.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE
d.
NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE
e.
PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: NONE
f.
PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: NONE
2.1.6 County Hotline - EOC
a.
MET: Criterion 5.b.l
b.
DEFICIENCY: NONE
c.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE
d.
NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE
e.
PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: NONE
f.
PRIOR ISSUES -UNRESOLVED: NONE
2.1.7 Evacuee Vehicle Monitoring and Decontamination - Ida School
24
a.
MET: Criteria l.d.1; l.e.1; 3.a.l; and 6.a.l
b.
DEFICIENCY: NONE
c.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE
d.
NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE
e.
PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: NONE
f.
PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: NONE
2.1.8 Evacuee Monitoring, Decontamination and Registration - Ida School
a.
MET: Criteria l.d.1; l.e.1; 3.a.l and 6.a.l
b.
DEFICIENCY: NONE
c.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE
d.
NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE
e.
PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: NONE
f.
PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: NONE
-
2.1.9 Congregate Care Ida School
a.
MET: Criteria 1.d.l; 1 .e.l; 3.a.l; and 6.c.l
b.
DEFICIENCY: NONE
C.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE
d.
NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE
e.
PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: NONE
f.
PRIOR ISSUES UNRESOLVED: NONE
2.1.10 Evacuee Vehicle Monitoring and Decontamination - Dundee High
School
a.
MET: Criteria l.d.1; l.e.1; 3.a.l; and 6.a.l
b.
DEFICIENCY: NONE
c.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: Criterion 3.a.l
25
Issue No.: 23-06-3.a. 1-A-02
Description: Two Dundee Fire Department crew interviewed concerning their
knowledge of radiation exposure control were not able to adequately explain the
use of personal dosimetry and individual exposure limits.
Possible Cause: Fire Department crew require more extensive training regarding
exposure control, use of personal dosimetry and individual exposure control
limits.
Reference: NUREG-0654, K.3.a, b
Effect: During a real event, the individuals interviewed may not appropriately
manage their individual radiation exposure in an appropriate manner.
Corrective Action Demonstrated: In agreement with the exercise controller at
the location, a re-demonstration was performed. After a brief period in which the
individuals reviewed the information provided in the dosimetry packet, the
evaluator determined that they had obtained the information needed to manage
their exposure in compliance with federal and state regulations, and applicable
plans, and procedures.
d.
NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE
e.
PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: NONE
f.
PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: NONE
2.1.1 1Evacuee Monitoring, Decontamination and Registration - Dundee High
School
a.
MET: Criteria l.d.1; l.e.1; 3.a.l; and 6.a.l
b.
DEFICIENCY: NONE
c.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE
d.
NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE
e.
PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: NONE
f.
PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: NONE
2.1.12Congregate Care - Dundee High School
a.
MET: Criteria l.d.1; l.e.1; 3.a.l; and 6.c.l
26
b.
DEFICIENCY: NONE
C.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE
d.
NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE
e.
PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: NONE
f.
PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: NONE
2.2 WAYNE COUNTY
2.2.1 Initial Notification Point
a.
MET: Criteria 1.a. 1 and 1.d. 1
b.
DEFICIENCY: NONE
c.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE
d.
NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE
e.
PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: NONE
f.
PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: NONE
2.2.2 Emergency Operations Center
a.
MET: Criteria l.a.1; 1.c.I; l.d.1; l.e.1; 2.c.l; 3.c.l; 3.c.2; 3.d.l; 3.d.2; and 5.a.l
b.
DEFICIENCY: NONE
c.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: Criterion 5.b. 1
Issue No.: 23-06-5.b. 1-A-03
Description: The two EAS messages sent to WJR for broadcast were missing
attachments containing evacuation routes, and included incorrect television station
call letters.
Possible Cause: Although the pre-scripted message forms had a place holder for
the radio station to read an attached list of evacuation routes, Wayne County EOC
did not include an attached list. The change in call letters for television channel
20 appears to have been overlooked during the last revision of the Wayne County
Emergency Operations Plan.
27
Reference: NUREG 0654 E.5, 7; G.2.a; G.4.c
Effect: Evacuees without an Emergency Preparedness Booklet would not have
information on the routes they should follow. The outdated call letters for
television channel 20 could confuse some viewers about which station to receive
information from.
Recommendation: Ensure that Wayne County EOC procedures adequately
instruct staff to review EAS messages and insert applicable information into the
pre-scripted message. The pre-scripted forms should be structured so that place
holder locations cannot be easily overlooked. In addition, the public information
annex to the Wayne County Plan and the pre-scripted forms should be revised to
include the correct call letters for all radio and television stations listed on the
form.
Schedule of Corrective Action: The Wayne County plan will have the radio and
television stations’ fiequency numbers only and not the call letters because of
constant, recurring changes in ownership. Training for the EAS procedures will
include adequate instruction to the staff on the steps to take to proceed with the
pre-scripted messages for the radio and television stations. This Criterion will be
demonstrated during the Fermi 2 2008 REP exercise.
d.
NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE
e.
PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: Criterion 5.a. 1
Issue No.: 23-02-5.a. 1-A-02
Description: The Emergency Alert System (EAS) messages, simulated broadcast
at 1039 hours and 1305 hours by Wayne County, were in conflict with the
Governor’s PAOs. The EAS messages instructed the general public to ”evacuate
immediately”, and at the same time instructed farmers to stay behind and “shelter
their animals and provide stored feed and water”.
Corrective Action Demonstrated: Wayne County removed the generic
Agricultural Advisory information from the pre-scripted EAS messages. During
this exercise, the State of Michigan and Wayne County issued Agricultural
Advisories separate from the EAS messages with the Governor’s PAOs regarding
evacuation of the general public. Wayne County issued EAS messages at 1 I50
hours and 1334 hours regarding the evacuation of the general public. Wayne
County issued Agricultural Advisory messages to Radio Station WJR at 1 109
hours and 1218 hours.
f.
PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: NONE
2.2.3 Traffic and Access Control Point
28
a.
MET: Criteria l.d.1; l.e.1; 3.a.l; 3.b.l; and 3.d.l
b.
DEFICIENCY: NONE
c.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE
d.
NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE
e.
PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: NONE
f.
PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: NONE
2.2.4 Joint Public Information Center Representative
a.
MET: Criterion 5.b. 1
b.
DEFICIENCY: NONE
e.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE
d.
NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE
e.
PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: NONE
f.
PRIOR ISSUES -UNRESOLVED: NONE
2.2.5 Emergency Alert System Radio Station - WJR
a.
MET: Criterion 5.a.l
b.
DEFICIENCY: NONE
c.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE
d.
NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE
e.
PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: NONE
f.
PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: NONE
2.2.6 Evacuee Vehicle Monitoring and Decontamination - Taylor Center
a.
MET: Criteria l.d.1; l.e.1; 3.a.l; and 6.a.l
b.
DEFICIENCY: NONE
29
c.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE
d.
NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE
e.
PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: NONE
f.
PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: NONE
2.2.7 Evacuee Monitoring, Decontamination and Registration - Taylor
Center
a.
MET: Criteria 1 .d.l; l.e.1; 3.a.l; and 6.a.l
b.
DEFICIENCY: NONE
c.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE
d.
NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE
e.
PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: NONE
f.
PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: NONE
2.2.8 Congregate Care - Taylor Center
a.
MET: Criteria l.d.1; l.e.1; 3.a.l; and6.c.1
b.
DEFICIENCY: NONE
c.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE
d.
NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE
e.
PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: NONE
f.
PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: NONE
30
APPENDIX 1
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
The following is a list of the acronyms and abbreviations that were used in this report and the
REP Program.
ACP
ALARA
ARCA
ARES
Access Control Point
As Low As Reasonably Achievable
Area Requiring Corrective Action
Amateur Radio Emergency Service
CFO
CFR
CPm
Chicago Field Office
Code of Federal Regulations
counts per minute
DEQ
DHS
DRD
Department of Environmental Quality
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Direct-Reading Dosimeter
EAS
EBS
EMS
EMHSD
EOC
EOF
EPZ
EW
Emergency Alert System
Emergency Broadcast System
Emergency Medical Service
Emergency Management and Homeland Security Division
Emergency Operations Center
Emergency Operations Facility
Emergency Planning Zone
Emergency Worker
FEMA
FIA
FTC
Federal Emergency Management Agency
Family Independence Agency
Field Team Center
HP
HS
Health Physics or Health Physicist
High School
ICF
ICF Consulting
JPIC
Joint Public Information Center
KI
Potassium Iodide
M&D
mR
mR/hr
MS- 1
Monitoring and Decontamination
milliRoentgens
milliRoentgens per Hour
Medical Services Drill
31
MSP
Michigan State Police
NIA
NRC
NRP
NUREG-0654
Not Applicable
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
National Response Plan
NUREG-0654lFEMA-REP- 1, Rev. 1, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation
of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of
Nuclear Power Plants, November 1980
National Weather Service
NWS
OR0
osc
Off-site Response Organization
Operations Support Center
PA0
PAR
Protective Action Order
Protective Action Recommendation
R
R/hr
RACES
RASCAL
RCP
RCS
REA
Reg.
rem
REP
RERP
RPCC
Roentgen
Roentgens per hour
Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Services
Radiological Assessment System for Consequence Analysis
Reactor Coolant Pump
Reactor Coolant System
Radiation Emergency Area
Registration
Roentgen Equivalent Man
Radiological Emergency Preparedness
Radiological Emergency Response Plan
Radiological Preparedness Coordinating Committee
SEOC
SGTS
State Emergency Operations Center
Standby Gas Treatment System
T/L
TCP/ACP
TSC
Team Leader
Traffic and Access Control Point
Technical Support Center
32
APPENDIX 2
EXERCISE EVALUATORS AND TEAM LEADERS
The following is a list of the personnel who evaluated the Enrico Fermi 2 Nuclear Power Plant REP
Ingestion exercise on June 6 and 7,2006. Evaluator Team Leaders are indicated by the letters
"(TL)" after their names. The organization which each evaluator represents is indicated by the
following abbreviations:
DHS
ICF
Department of Homeland Security
ICF Consulting
TITLE
NAME
ORGANIZATION
RPCC Chair
Exercise Director
Regional Site Specialist
William King
Gary Naskrent
Clinton E. Crackel
DHS
DHS
DHS
EVALUATION SITE
EVALUATOR
ORGANIZATION
STATE OF MICHIGAN
Initial Notification Point
Glen Kinnear
ICF
Emergency Operations Center Day 1
Sandra Bailey (TL)
Clint Fransen
Glen Kinnear
Douglas Stutz
DHS
ICF
ICF
ICF
DEQ Laboratory
Marynette Herndon
ICF
Emergency Operations Center Day 2
Sandra Bailey (TL)
Marynette Herndon
Glen Kinnear
DHS
ICF
ICF
Joint Public Information Center
Pat Tenorio
DHS
Technical Support Group - Day 1
Richard Grundstrom
ICF
Technical Support Group - Day 2
Richard Grundstrom
Marynette Herndon
ICF
ICF
Field Team Center - Days 1 and 2
Harry Harrison
ICF
Field Team Center - TACP
Clark Cofer
ICF
33
EVALUATION SITE
EVALUATOR
ORGANIZATION
Field Team 1 - Day 1
Field Team 1 - Day 2
David Seebarf
Steve Denson
ICF
ICF
Field Team 2 - Day 1
Field Team 2 - Day 2
Steve Denson
Gary Goldberg
ICF
ICF
Field Team 3 - Day 1
Field Team 3 - Day 2
Gary Goldberg
David Seebart
ICF
ICF
FTC - M&D EWS
Tracey Green
ICF
FTC - M&D EW Equipment
Robert Duggleby
ICF
State Liaison - Monroe County EOC
Harral Logaras
DHS
Delwyn Kinsley
DHS
Gary Bolender
ICF
State DEQ Rep.- Ida Schools
Neil1 Howey
ICF
State DEQ Rep. - Dundee HS
Douglas Stutz
ICF
Initial Notification Point
Terri Connors-Hartman
DHS
Emergency Operations Center
Clint Crackel (TL)
Terri Connors-Hartman
Harral Logaras
Roy Smith
Patrick Taylor
DHS
DHS
DHS
ICF
ICF
Traffic & Access Control Point
Roy Smith
ICF
Dosimetry - Health Department
Harral Logaras
DHS
Monroe County JPIC Rep.
Pat Tenorio
DHS
County Hotline - EOC
Terri Connors-Hartman
DHS
Evacuee Vehicle M&D - Ida Schools
Patrick Taylor
ICF
State Liaison - Wayne County EOC
State DEQ Rep. - Taylor Center
MONROE COUNTY
34
EVALUATION SITE
EVALUATOR
ORGANIZATION
Evacuee M&D/Reg. - Ida Schools
Robert Duggleby
ICF
Congregate Care - Ida Schools
William McCance
ICF
Evacuee Vehicle M&D - Dundee HS
Gary Bolender
Neill Howey
ICF
ICF
Evacuee M&D/Reg. - Dundee HS
William Vocke
ICF
Congregate Care - Dundee HS
William McCance
ICF
Initial Notification Point
Neill Howey
ICF
Emergency Operations Center
Carolyn Sturghill (TL)
Delwyn Kinsley
William Vocke
Carl Wentzell
DHS
DHS
ICF
ICF
Traffic & Access Control Point
Carl Wentzell
ICF
Wayne County JPIC Rep.
Pat Tenorio
DHS
Emergency Alert System Radio
Station - WJR
William McCance
ICF
Evacuee Vehicle M&D - Taylor
Center
Tracey Green
ICF
Evacuee M&D/Reg. - Taylor Center
Roy Smith
ICF
Congregate Care - Taylor Center
Carl Wentzell
ICF
WAYNE COUNTY
35
APPENDIX 3
EXERCISE CRITERIA AND EXTENT-OF-PLAY AGREEMENT
This appendix lists the exercise criteria that were scheduled for demonstration in the Enrico
Fermi 2 Nuclear Power Plant REP Ingestion exercise on June 6 and 7,2006, and the off-site
extent-of-play agreement approved by DHS CFO on May 3 1,2006.
The exercise criteria, contained in FEMA “Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise
Evaluation Methodology” as published in the Federal Register NoticeNol. 67, No 80, dated
April 25,2002, represent a functional translation of the planning standards and evaluation criteria
of NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-l, Rev. 1, Criteria for the Preparation and Evaluation of
Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants,
November 1980.
Because the exercise criteria are intended for use at all nuclear power plant sites, and because of
variations among off-site plans and procedures, an extent-of-play agreement is prepared by the
State and approved by DHS to provide evaluators with guidance on expected actual
demonstration of the criteria.
A.
Exercise Criteria and Extent-of-Play
Listed below are the specific REP criteria scheduled for demonstration during this
exercise.
EVALUATION AREA 1: EMERGENCY OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT
CRITERION l.a.1: OROs use effective procedures to alert, notify and mobilize
emergency personnel and facilities in a timely manner.
CRITERION l.c.1: Key personnel with leadership roles for the O R 0 provide
direction and control to that part of the overall response effort for which they are
responsible.
CRITERION l.d.1: At least two communications systems are available, at least one
operates properly, and communication links are established and maintained with
appropriate locations. Communications capabilities are managed in support of
emergency operations.
CRITERION 1.e.l : Equipment, maps, displays, dosimetry, potassium iodide (KI),
and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations.
EVALUATION AREA 2: PROTECTIVE ACTION DECISION-MAKING
CRITERION 2.a.l: OROs use a decision-making process, considering relevant
factors and appropriate coordination, to ensure that an exposure control system,
36
including the use of KI, is in place for emergency workers including provisions to
authorize radiation exposure in excess of administrative limits or protective action
guides.
CRITERION 2.b.l: Appropriate protective action recommendations are based on
available information on plant conditions, field monitoring data, and licensee and
O R 0 dose projections, as well as knowledge of on-site and off-site environmental
conditions.
CRITERION 2.b.2: A decision-making process involving consideration of
appropriate factors and necessary coordination is used to make protective action
decisions (PADS)for the general public (including the recommendation for the use
of KI, if O R 0 policy).
CRITERION 2.c.l: Protective action decisions are made, as appropriate, for special
population groups.
CRITERION 2.d.l: Radiological consequences for the ingestion pathway are
assessed and appropriate protective action decisions are made based on the ORO's
planning criteria.
CRITERION 2.e.l: Timely relocation, re-entry, and return decisions are made and
coordinated as appropriate, based on assessments of the radiological conditions and
criteria in the ORO's plan and/or procedures.
EVALUATION AREA 3: PROTECTIVE ACTION IMPLEMENTATION
CRITERION 3.a.l: The OROs issue appropriate dosimetry and procedures, and
manage radiological exposure to emergency workers in accordance with the plans
and procedures. Emergency workers periodically and at the end of each mission
read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record
or chart.
CRITERION 3.b.l: KI and appropriate instructions are available should a decision
to recommend use of KI be made. Appropriate record keeping of the
administration of KI for emergency workers and institutionalized individuals (not
the general public) is maintained.
CRITERION 3.c.l: Protective action decisions are implemented for special
populations other than schools within areas subject to protective actions.
CRITERION 3.c.2: OROs/School officials decide upon and implement protective
actions for schools.
CRITERION 3.d.l: Appropriate traffic and access control is established. Accurate
instructions are provided to traffic and access control personnel.
37
CRITERION 3.d.2: Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved.
CRITERION 3.e.l: The O R 0 demonstrates the availability and appropriate use of
adequate information regarding water, food supplies, milk and agricultural
production within the ingestion exposure pathway emergency planning zone for
implementation of protective actions.
CRITERION 3.e.2: Appropriate measures, strategies and pre-printed instructional
material are developed for implementing protective action decisions for
contaminated water, food products, milk and agricultural production.
CRITERION 3.f.l: Decisions regarding controlled re-entry of emergency workers
and relocation and return of the public are coordinated with appropriate
organizations and implemented.
EVALUATION AREA 4 - FIELD MEASUREMENTS AND ANALYSIS
CRITERION 4.a.l: The field teams are equipped to perform field measurements of
direct radiation exposure (cloud and ground shine) and to sample airborne
radioiodine and particulates.
CRITERION 4.a.2: Field teams are managed to obtain sufficient information to
help characterize the release and to control radiation exposure.
CRITERION 4.a.3: Ambient radiation measurements are made and recorded at
appropriate locations, and radioiodine and particulate samples are collected. Teams
will move to an appropriate low background location to determine whether any
significant (as specified in the plan and/or procedures) amount of radioactivity has
been collected on the sampling media.
CRITERION 4.b.l: The field teams demonstrate the capability to make appropriate
measurements and to collect appropriate samples (e.g., food crops, milk, water,
vegetation, and soil) to support adequate assessments and protective action decisionmaking.
CRITERION 4.c.l: The laboratory is capable of performing required radiological
analyses to support protective action decisions.
EVALUATION AREA 5: EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION & PUBLIC
INFORMATION
CRITERION 5.a.l: Activities associated with primary alerting and notification of
the public are completed in as timely manner following the initial decision by
authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation.
The initial instructional message to the public must include as a minimum the
elements required by current FEMA REP guidance.
38
CRITERION 5.a.3: Activities associated with FEMA approved exception areas
(where applicable) are completed within 45 minutes following the initial decision by
authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation.
Backup alert and notification of the public is completed within 45 minutes following
the decision by the O R 0 of a failure of the primary alert and notification system.
CRITERION 5.b.l: OROs provide accurate emergency information and
instructions to the public and the news media in a timely manner.
EVALUATION AREA 6: SUPPORT OPERATION/FACILITIES
CRITERION 6.a.l: The reception centedemergency worker facility has appropriate
space, adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide monitoring,
decontamination, and registration of evacuees and/or emergency workers.
CRITERION 6.b.l: The facility/ORO has adequate procedures and resources for
the accomplishment of monitoring and decontamination of emergency worker
equipment including vehicles.
CRITERION 6.c.l: Managers of congregate care facilities demonstrate that the
centers have resources to provide services and accommodations consistent with
American Red Cross planning guidelines (found in MASS CARE-Preparedness
Operations, ARC 3031). Managers demonstrate the procedures to assure that
evacuees have been monitored for contamination and have been decontaminated as
appropriate prior to entering congregate care facilities.
CRITERION 6.d.l: The facility/ORO has the appropriate space, adequate
resources, and trained personnel to provide transport, monitoring,
decontamination, and medical services to contaminated injured individuals.
B.
Extent-of-Play Agreement
The extent-of-play agreement on the following pages was submitted by the State of
Michigan, and Monroe and Wayne Counties in preparation for the Enrico Fermi 2
Nuclear Power Plant REP Ingestion exercise on March 6, 2006. The extent-of-play
agreement includes any significant modification or change in the level of demonstration
of each exercise criterion listed in Subsection A of this appendix.
39
STATE OF MICHIGAN AND MONROE AND WAYNE COUNTIES' EXTENT OF
PLAY AGREEMENT
FOR THE
FERMI 2 NUCLEAR POWER PLANT REP EXERCISE
June 6 and 7,2006
EVALUATION AREA 1 - EMERGENCY OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT
Criterion l.a.1: OROs use effective procedures to alert, noti@ and mobilize emergency
personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner.
The State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) will be fully activated. State personnel will be
mobilized in accordance with procedures with the exception of personnel reporting to the
Monroe and Wayne Counties' EOCs and the JPIC. State personnel reporting to the Monroe and
Wayne Counties' EOC will be pre-positioned at the State Police 2nd District Headquarters and
will report when mobilized by the SEOC. State personnel reporting to the JPIC will begin
participation 30 minutes after the arrival of Monroe County JPIC personnel. The State Field
Team Center personnel will begin participation 30 minutes after the decision to activate the
facility. State personnel involved in out of sequence demonstrations will be pre-staged. A roster
will be provided to demonstrate 24-hour staffing.
The Monroe and Wayne Counties' EOCs will be fully activated. Personnel will be mobilized in
accordance with procedures, including those responding to the JPIC. Personnel involved in out
of sequence demonstrations will be pre-staged. Rosters will be provided to demonstrate 24-hour
staffing.
Note: Any interaction with the DOE Home team will not be evaluated.
Criterion l.b.1: Facilities are sufficient to support the emergency response.
This objective was demonstrated by Monroe and Wayne Counties on September 24,2002. The
SEOC was demonstrated during the Palisades exercise on June 4,2002. Both County and the
State EOCs is permanently set-up. The JPIC, which was demonstrated on September 24,2002,
will be set-up during the morning of 6/6/2006. Setup time will be provided in the table of out of
sequence demonstrations to allow evaluation by Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
Criterion l.c.1: Key personnel with leadership roles for the OR0 provide direction and control
to that part of the overall response effort for which they are responsible.
This criterion will be demonstrated at county EOCs, the SEOC, JPIC, FTC and in all out of
sequence demonstrations.
Criterion l.d.1: At least two communication systems are available, at least one operates
properly, and communication links are established and maintained with appropriate locations.
Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations.
40
This criterion will be demonstrated at the SEOC, FTC, Monroe and Wayne Countip' EOCs, and
the JPIC. If both the primary and back-up systems fail, this objective may be demonstrated by
successful use of an alternate method of communication.
Criterion l.e.1: Equipment, maps, displays, dosimetry, potassium iodide (KI) and other supplies
are sufficient to support emergency operations.
Equipment, maps, displays, and other supplies will be demonstrated to support emergency
operations at the SEOC, JPIC, and Monroe and Wayne Counties' EOCs. Personnel
demonstrating traffic and access control points will demonstrate knowledge of where to secure
traffic control equipment. The FTC will be demonstrated. Potassium iodide and dosimetry are
stored at the Monroe County Health Department, Wayne County EOC, and at the MSP/EMD
office in Lansing. Monroe County will provide dosimetry/KI records and give briefings at the
Public Reception Decontamination Center demonstration on June 5 and 7 2006. The Michigan
Department of Environmental Quality also maintains supplies of potassium iodide and dosimetry
for use by its personnel. Documentation related to KI shelf life extension is maintained by
MSP/EMD and will be provided to DHS for review.
EVALUATION AREA 2 - PROTECTIVE ACTION DECISION MAKING
Criterion 2.a.l: OROs use a decision-making process, considering relevant factors and
appropriate coordination, to ensure that an exposure control system, including the use of KI, is in
place for emergency workers including provisions to authorize radiation exposure in excess of
administrative limits or protective action guides.
The ability to make the decision to recommend the use of KI to emergency workers will be
demonstrated by the SEOC. Authorization to exceed state exposure limits will be demonstrated.
If the scenario does not provide an opportunity to demonstrate these items, a controller inject
will be issued to demonstrate the ability to perform these actions.
This criterion may be re-demonstrated as approved on a case-by-case basis by the Chair of the
Regional Preparedness Coordinating Committee.
Criterion 2.b.l: Appropriate protective action recommendations are based on available
information on plant conditions, field monitoring data and licensee and O R 0 dose projections, as
well as knowledge of on-site and off-site environmental conditions.
The Technical Support Group in the SEOC will evaluate licensee and Field Team Center
provided information and complete an independent analysis of scenario data. Dose assessment
evaluation will be conducted with the individuals performing at the FTC.
This criterion may be re-demonstrated as approved on a case-by-case basis by the Chair of the
Radiological Preparedness Coordinating Committee.
This criterion does not apply to Monroe and Wayne counties.
Criterion 2.b.2: A decision-making process involving consideration of appropriate factors and
41
necessary coordination is used to make protective action decisions (PADS) for the general public
(including the recommendation for the use of KI, if O R 0 policy).
This criterion will be demonstrated by the Executive Group in the SEOC in conjunction with
applicable support staff, i.e. FTC and Community Health.
This criterion may be re-demonstrated as approved on a case-by-case basis by the Chair of the
Radiological Preparedness Coordinating Committee.
This criterion does not apply to Monroe and Wayne counties.
Criterion 2.c.l: Protective action decisions are made, as appropriate, for special population
groups.
This criterion will be demonstrated by the Executive Group in the SEOC in conjunction with
applicable support staff through the decision to recommend the use of KI to institutionalized
persons.
Lists of transportation dependent and special needs populations are kept by Monroe and Wayne
counties. No personnel will be moved. Equipment lists and rosters will be available in the
Monroe and Wayne counties EOCs. No phone calls to transportation dependent persons will be
made.
The School Services Representatives in the Monroe and Wayne counties EOCs will make phone
contact with affected school districts if schools are in session. No scenario information will be
discussed during these calls.
Criterion 2.d.l: Radiological consequences for the ingestion pathway are assessed and
appropriate protective action decisions are made based on the ORO’s planning criteria.
This criterion will be demonstrated by the Technical Support Group in the SEOC in conjunction
with applicable support staff through the capability to project dose to the public for the ingestion
exposure pathway and to recommend protective actions
The State of Michigan will assess the radiological consequences of a release on the food and water
supplies. This assessment will include the evaluation of the radiological analyses of representative
samples of water, food, and other ingestible substances of local interest from potentially impacted
areas, the characterization of the releases from the facility, and the extent of areas potentially
impacted by the release. The radiological impacts on the food and water will then be compared to
the appropriate ingestion PAGs based on specific dose commitment criteria. Timely and
appropriate recommendations will be provided to the SEOC Ingestion Pathway Committee (IPC)
for communication and implementation decisions.
The SEOC will coordinate with Federal resources, as identified in the National Response Plan
(NRP), and other resources (e.g., compacts, nuclear insurers, etc.), if available.
Criterion 2.e.l: Timely re-location, re-entry and return decisions are made and coordinated as
42
appropriate, based on assessments of the radiological conditions and criteria in the OROs plan
and/or procedures.
This criterion will be demonstrated by the SEOC. The capability to develop decisions on
relocation, re-entry, and return coordinated as appropriate.
Relocation: The State of Michigan will demonstrate the capability to estimate integrated dose in
contaminated areas. Compare these estimates with PAGs, will be made. Decision criteria will be
applied for relocation of those individuals in the general public who have not been evacuated, but
where projected doses are in excess of relocation PAGs and control access to evacuated areas.
Decisions will be made for relocating members of the evacuated public who lived in areas that now
have residual radiation levels in excess of the PAGs.
Re-entry: The State of Michigan will identify the location of control points. Demonstrate, at the
FTC, decision making and based on policies regarding access and exposure control for
emergency workers and members of the general public who need to temporarily enter the
evacuated area to perform specific tasks or missions.
Return: The State of Michigan will demonstrate the SEOC Ingestion Pathway Committee (IPC)
decision making, as appropriate, based on environmental data and political boundaries or
physical/geological features, (Areas 1,2,3,4 and 5) which allow identification of the boundaries
of areas to which members of the general public may return.
The SEOC will coordinate with Federal resources as identified in the NRP, and other resources (e.g.
compacts, nuclear insurers, etc.), if available.
EVALUATION AREA 3 - PROTECTIVE ACTION IMPLEMENTATION
Criterion 3.a.l: The OROs issue appropriate dosimetry and procedures, and manage radiological
exposure to emergency workers in accordance with the plan and procedures. Emergency workers
periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the
appropriate exposure record or chart.
This criterion will be demonstrated by the State of Michigan, Monroe and Wayne Counties
during out of sequence reception center, decontamination center, and access control
demonstrations when dosimetry is issued for use by emergency workers. The Monroe County
and State of Michigan demonstrations will be initiated by the Monroe County briefing on use of
KI and dosimetry. The briefing on dosimeters and KI use for the State of Michigan access control
demonstration will be at FTC.
This criterion may be re-demonstrated immediately for credit, at the discretion of the evaluator.
Criterion 3.b.l: KI and appropriate instructions are available should a decision to recommend
use of KI be made. Appropriate record keeping of the administration of KI for emergency
workers and institutionalized individuals (not the general public) is maintained.
43
This criterion will be demonstrated during the traffic and access control demonstrations for
Monroe and Wayne Counties and the state of Michigan. Response personnel will demonstrate
knowledge of when it is appropriate to take KI, but not actually ingest KI.
KI will be distributed to emergency workers in Monroe and Wayne Counties along with their
dosimetry. The state will demonstrate this objective at the Field Team Center and through
decision-making and directives to implement appropriate Protective Action Orders.
This criterion may be re-demonstrated immediately for credit, at the discretion of the evaluator
Note-Wayne County KI will be in the form of candy.
Criterion 3.c.l: Protective action decisions are implemented for special population groups
within areas subject to protective actions.
This criterion will be demonstrated in the Monroe and Wayne Counties' EOCs via EOC staff
discussions which may include evacuation of hospitals, nursing homes, correctional facilities,
mobility impaired individuals, and transportation dependent. These discussions will be
documented in situation logs. Actual contacts to special population groups will not be made.
Monroe and Wayne counties will contact a minimum of four providers of transportation services
which may include public transit authorities, school systems for buses, ambulance services, or
firehescue services. An attempt will be made to contact a third of the total number of
transportation providers. There will be no discussion of scenario information during these calls.
Criterion 3.c.2: OROs/School officials decide upon and implement protective actions for
schools.
This criterion will be demonstrated in the Monroe and Wayne Counties' EOCs as driven by the
scenario. If schools are not in session, the DHS evaluator will conduct an interview with the
school representatives in the Monroe and Wayne Counties' EOCs.
An EV-2 interview will be conducted in Monroe County. Refer to the Table of Exercise
Demonstrations for specific times and locations.
Criterion 3.d.l: Appropriate traffic and access control is established. Accurate instructions are
provided to traffic and access control personnel.
Decisions related to traffic and access control will be demonstrated in the Monroe and Wayne
counties EOCs. Monroe and Wayne Counties, and the State of Michigan will demonstrate one
traffic and access control point each. State of Michigan will be demonstrated at the FTC.
Demonstration locations will be determined during the exercise at a time agreed upon by the
DHS evaluator, the State Controller, and the county emergency management coordinator.
Staffing of all other access and traffic control points will be simulated.
This criterion may be re-demonstrated immediately for credit, at the discretion of the evaluator.
44
Criterion 3.d.2: Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved.
This Criterion will be demonstrated through discussions at the Monroe and Wayne Counties'
EOCs. Messages will be injected by the State Controller to drive this demonstration. Personnel
will deal with the impediments by discussing the need for equipment, discussing its estimated
time of arrival, etc. If the impediment posed involves road closures that would have been known
to exercise participants during the course of normal operations, this information will be provided
to the players as part of the initial conditions for the exercise. All contacts, actual or simulated
will be logged.
This criterion does not apply to the State of Michigan.
This criterion may be re-demonstrated immediately for credit, at the discretion of the evaluator
Criterion 3.e.l: The O R 0 demonstrates the availability and appropriate use of adequate
information regarding water, food supplies, milk and agricultural production within the ingestion
exposure pathway emergency planning zone for implementation of protective actions.
This criterion will be demonstrated in the SEOC the capability to implement protective actions
for the ingestion exposure pathway in conjunction with applicable SEOC support staff, i.e.
MDA, DEQ, and Community Health.
The State will coordinate with Federal resources as identified in the NRP, and other resources
(e.g. compacts, nuclear insurers, etc.), if available.
Criterion 3.e.2: Appropriate measures, strategies and pre-printed instructional material are
developed for implementing protective action decisions for contaminated water, food products,
milk and agricultural production.
This criterion will be demonstrated with the pre-distributed public information in the EPZ.
Development of measures and strategies for implementation of ingestion pathway zone (IPZ)
protective actions will be demonstrated by the SEOC during exercise play by formulation of
protective action information for the general public and food producers and processors. The
SEOC will demonstrate the capability to control, restrict or prevent distribution of contaminated
food by commercial sectors. Actual field play of implementation activities may be simulated.
Actual communications with food producers and processors may be simulated.
This criterion will be demonstrated at the JPIC via dissemination of announcements/ public
information and briefings in coordination with the SEOC.
Criterion 3.f.l: Decisions regarding controlled re-entry of emergency workers and relocation
and return of the public are coordinated with appropriate organizations and implemented.
This criterion will be demonstrated by the SEOC, coordinated as appropriate the capability to
develop decisions on relocation, re-entry, and return.
45
Relocation: The State of Michigan will demonstrate the capability to coordinate and implement
decisions concerning relocation of individuals, not previously evacuated, to an area where
radiological contamination will not expose the general public to doses that exceed the relocation
PAGs. The State of Michigan will also demonstrate the capability to provide for short-term or
long-term relocation of evacuees who lived in areas that have residual radiation levels above the
PAGs.
Re-entry: The State of Michigan will demonstrate, the capability to control re-entry and exit of
individuals who need to temporarily re-enter the evacuated area, to protect them from unnecessary
radiation exposure and for exit of vehicles and other equipment to control the spread of
contamination outside the evacuated area. County monitoring and decontamination facilities will
be established, and may also be used, as appropriate.
Return: The State of Michigan SEOC IPC will demonstrate the capability to implement policies
concerning return of members of the public to areas that were evacuated during the plume phase.
The IPC will demonstrate the capability to identify and prioritize services and facilities that require
restoration within a few days, and to identi@ the procedures and resources for their restoration.
Examples of these services and facilities are medical and social services, utilities, roads and
schools.
The State will coordinate with Federal resources as identified in the NRP, and other resources
(e.g. compacts, nuclear insurers, etc.), if available.
EVALUATION AREA 4 - FIELD MEASUREMENTS AND ANALYSIS
Criterion 4.a.l: The field teams are equipped to perform field measurements of direct radiation
exposure (cloud and ground shine) and to sample airborne radioiodine and particulates.
This criterion will be demonstrated during this exercise at the Field Team Center by State
personnel. Three field teams will demonstrate this criterion.
Field teams will have instruments capable of measuring gamma exposure rates and detecting the
presence of beta radiation. These instruments will be capable of measuring a range of activity
and exposure consistent with the intended use of the instrument and the State's plans and
procedures, including radiological protectiodexposure control of team members and detection of
activity on the air sample collection media. All instruments, including air sampling flow meters,
will be operated, maintained, and calibrated in accordance with the manufacturer's
recommendations. A label indicating such calibration will be on each instrument or verifiable by
other means. An appropriate radioactive check source will be used to verify proper operational
response for each radiation measurement instrument (less than 1 Rhr) and for high range
instruments when available.
Criterion 4.a.2: Field teams are managed to obtain sufficient information to help characterize
the release and to control radiation exposure.
46
This criterion will be demonstrated during this exercise at the Field Team Center by State and
Federal personnel.
Field measurements will be taken to help characterize the release and to support the adequacy of
implemented protective actions or to be a factor in modifylng protective actions. Teams will be
directed to take measurements in such locations, at such times to provide information sufficient
to characterize the plume and impacts.
The State will coordinate with Federal resources as identified in the NRP, and other resources
(e,g. compacts, nuclear insurers, etc.), if available.
Criterion 4.a.3: Ambient radiation measurements are made and recorded at appropriate
locations, and radioiodine and particulate samples are collected. Teams will move to an
appropriate low background location to determine whether any significant (as specified in the
plan and/or procedures) amount of radioactivity has been collected on the sampling media.
This criterion will be demonstrated during this exercise at the Field Team Center by State
personnel. Three field teams will demonstrate the capability to report measurements and field
data pertaining to the measurement of airborne radioiodine and particulates to the field team
center coordinator (FTCC), dose assessment.
The State will coordinate with Federal resources as identified in the NRP, and other resources
(e.g. compacts, nuclear insurers, etc), if available.
Criterion 4.b.l: The field teams demonstrate the capability to make appropriate measurements
and to collect appropriate samples (e.g., food crops, milk, water, vegetation, and soil) to support
adequate assessments and protective action decision-making.
-
This criterion will be demonstrated during this exercise at the Field Team Center by State
personnel. Three field teams will demonstrate the capability to take measurements and samples,
at such times and locations as directed, to enable an adequate assessment of the ingestion
pathway and to support re-entry, relocation, and return decisions. When resources are available,
the use of aerial surveys and in-situ gamma measurement is appropriate.
-
The samples that will be taken for laboratory testing will be crops in season, milk, water,
vegetation, air and soil.
-
The State of Michigan will coordinate with Federal resources as identified in the NRP, and other
resources (e.g. compacts, nuclear insurers, etc), if available.
-
Criterion 4.c.l: The laboratory is capable of performing required radiological analyses to
support protective action decisions.
-
This criterion will demonstrate laboratory operations and procedures for measuring, analyzing,
preparing, preserving and receiving samples. This includes logging information, preventing
contamination of the lab during this exercise at the State DEQ Laboratory in Lansing, Michigan.
Samples will be pre-staged to match samples taken at the FTC.
-
47
The State will coordinate with Federal resources as identified in the NRP, and other resources
(e.g. compacts, nuclear insurers, etc.), if available.
EVALUATION AREA 5 - EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION AND PUBLIC
INFORMATION
Criterion 5.a.l: Activities associated with primary alerting and notification of the public are
completed in a timely manner following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency
officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. The initial instructional message to the
public must include as a minimum the elements required by current FEMA REP guidance.
The Monroe County Sheriff Department central dispatch is the primary activation point for the
public warning sirens. The Emergency Alert System is activated by Wayne County. To
demonstrate this criterion, the State will provide information to Monroe and Wayne Counties for
release in the Emergency Alert System messages. An interview with WJR radio station
personnel will be conducted by DHS following transmittal of EAS messages.
This criterion may be re-demonstrated as approved on a case-by-case basis by the Chair of the
Radiological Preparedness Coordinating Committee.
Criterion 5.a.3: Activities associated with FEMA approved exception areas (where applicable)
are completed within 45 minutes following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency
officials to noti@ the public of an emergency situation. Backup alert and notification of the
public is completed within 45 minutes following the detection by the O R 0 of a failure of the
primary alert and notification system.
The Fermi 2 Plant EPZ does not contain any DHS approved exception areas. If a siren failure
occurs, Monroe and Wayne counties EOCs will demonstrate actions to notify the public in areas
where siren coverage is not adequate.
Criterion 5.b.l: OROs provide accurate emergency information and instructions to the public
and the news media in a timely manner.
This will be demonstrated at the JPIC via dissemination of Emergency Alert System
announcements in coordination with the SEOC, Monroe, and Wayne counties EOC. All media
briefings will be conducted at the JPIC.
A public inquiry hotline will be operated by Monroe County during the exercise by personnel
based at the Monroe County Emergency Management Office. Trending is performed by the
Rumor Control Coordinator, who identifies trends and ensures appropriate information is
provided to the public inquiry operators and the JPIC for inclusion in press briefings.
This criterion may be re-demonstrated as approved on a case-by-case basis by the Chair of the
Radiological Preparedness Coordinating Committee.
EVALUATION AREA 6 - SUPPORT OPERATION/FACILITIES
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Criterion 6.a.l: The reception centerlemergency worker facility has appropriate space, adequate
resources, and trained personnel to provide monitoring, decontamination, and registration of
evacuees and/or emergency workers.
Monroe and Wayne Counties will each fi.11lydemonstrate separate public receptionl
decontamination centers out-of sequence from the exercise.
Personnel will not go through alert, mobilization, activation, or shift changes. State DEQ HP
personnel will provide assistance as requested during these demonstrations. The public reception
center will demonstrate 1/3 of the monitoring teams required to monitor 20% of the population
allocated to that facility within a 12 hour time period. Each team will monitor six individuals.
The State of Michigan Field Team Center will demonstrate emergency worker decontamination.
Monroe and Wayne Counties will not demonstrate the Emergency Worker Decontamination
Center.
This criterion may be re-demonstrated immediately for credit, at the discretion of the evaluator.
Criterion 6.b.l: The facility/ORO has adequate procedures and resources for the
accomplishment of monitoring and decontamination of emergency worker equipment including
vehicles.
The State of Michigan Field Team Center will also demonstrate this criterion. Emergency
vehicles will be monitored and decontaminated as appropriate.
Monroe and Wayne Counties will not demonstrate the Emergency Worker Decontamination
Center.
This criterion may be re-demonstrated immediately for credit, at the discretion of the evaluator.
Criterion 6.c.l: Managers of congregate care facilities demonstrate that the centers have
resources to provide services and accommodations consistent with American Red Cross planning
guidelines. Managers demonstrate the procedures to assure that evacuees have been monitored
for contamination and have been decontaminated as appropriate prior to entering congregate care
facilities.
Monroe and Wayne Counties will each hlly demonstrate a congregate care center out of
sequence with the exercise. This facility will be set up in advance of the demonstration.
Personnel manning the center will not go through alert, mobilization, activation, or shift changes.
This criterion may be re-demonstrated immediately for credit, at the discretion of the evaluator.
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-
Criterion 6.d.l: The facility/ORO has the appropriate space, adequate resources, and trained
personnel to provide transport, monitoring, decontamination, and medical services to
contaminated injured individuals.
-
This criterion will be demonstrated during the MS- 1 exercise on October 25, 2006
-
This criterion may be re-demonstrated immediately for credit, at the discretion of the evaluator.
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APPENDIX 4
EXERCISE SCENARIO
This appendix contains a summary of the simulated sequences of events that were used as the
basis for invoking emergency response actions by OROs in the Enrico Fermi 2 Nuclear Power
Plant REP Ingestion exercise on June 6 and 7,2006.
The full-participation exercise scenario was submitted by the State of Michigan and Detroit
Edison Company, and approved by DHS/CFO on May 3 1,2006.
During the exercise, controllers from the State of Michigan either gave or telephoned “inject
messages”, containing scenario events andor relevant data, to those persons or locations who
would normally receive notification of such events. These inject messages were the method used
for invoking response actions by OROs.
SCENARIO SUMMARY
FERMEX 2006 - EXERCISE DESCRIPTION
0730 Rx power / EDG 14 are in a Safety System Outage to repair a crushed sensing line. Tech
Spec 3.8.1 has been entered. CTG 11-1 is operable. Surveillance Requirement 3.8.1.1 has
been completed, offsite power is available and the breaker alignment is correct.
0745 Announce start of Exercise.
0750 Annunciator 5D5 “TBCCW Pumps D/P Hi/Lo”. 7D61 “Station Air Compressor Trouble”
(trip of N TBCCW pump). Expected actions: Send TB Rounds to investigate.
0755 TB rounds reports outboard pump motor bearing is very hot. Expected actions:
Operating pump trips. Simulator Control Room starts Standby Pump.
0810
Seismic event - 6D69. Expected actions: Send a person to D30-K800, Active Seismic
Central Recorder, to perform 23.612,”Seismic Monitoring” (RR H11-P831). Enter
AOP 20.000.01.
Seismic readings indicate 0.02g horizontal and vertical. Conditions are met for HU1,
Natural and Destructive Phenomena Affecting the Protected Area. There are no reports of
damage but several security proximity alarms come in. Expected actions: Shift
ManagedEmergency Director (SM/ED) declares UNUSUAL EVENT.
0825 Time expires for declaring HUl .
0850 Second seismic event - 6D69. Expected actions: Send a person to D30-K800, Active
Seismic Central Recorder, to perform 23.612,”Seismic Monitoring” (RR Hll-PS31).
Seismic readings indicate 0.09g horizontal and vertical. JMessage #6).
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SRV "E" opens (1 D61, "SRV OPEN") and will not close for five minutes. (Mini-scenario
40A). Expected actions: Enter AOP 20.000.25, "Failed Safety Relief Valve,"
Receive 2D82, "RE3 Torus Sump Level HiHi/LoLo". A leak in Torus has occurred with a
slow decrease in Torus level and respective increase in sump level. The leak fi-om the
Torus cannot be isolated therefore this reflects a Loss of Primary Containment. Expected
actions: Enter EOP 29.100.01, Sheet 2, Primary Containment Control, and Sheet 5,
Secondary Containment Control. Enter Tech Spec 3.6.1.1, Loss of Primary
Containment. The crew should initiate a normal reactor shutdown.
Conditions are met for HA1, Natural and Destructive Phenomena Affecting the Plant
Vital Area as indicated by the stuck open SRV and/or the leak fi-om the Torus resulting
form the earthquake. Expected actions: The SM/ED declares an ALERT based on
HA1. SM/ED makes decision to perform Assembly and Accountability (AAA)
(Message # 7).
SM/ED initiates ECOS [Messape 7A).
State Actions:
MSP Operations notified by plant.
MSP Operations notifies MSP/EMD and MDEQ/DWRPS.
SEOC activation begun.
MSP Operations notifies Monroe and Wayne Counties.
Activation of JPIC and FTC begun.
SEOC notifies DHS and Ontario.
Monroe County Actions:
Sheriff Dispatch notified by plant and MSP LEIN.
Sheriff Dispatch notifies Monroe and Wayne Counties.
Dispatch notifies EM & Chairperson.
EOC activation begun.
Wayne County Actions:
Sheriff Dispatch notified by plant and MSP LEIN.
Sheriff Dispatch notifies Monroe and Wayne Counties.
Dispatch notifies EM & Chairperson.
EOC activation begun.
0905 Monroe County Actions:
EOC activation underway.
Hotline opened to SEOC.
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Wayne County Actions:
EOC activation underway.
Hotline opened to SEOC.
0910 72C-3C fault - Loss of LPCI Valves (Restored power to 72C-F by shifting to 72F-5c).
(Mini-scenario - 40B).
State Actions:
SEOC Operational.
Governor may declare State of Emergency/Disaster.
Hotlines opened to plant and counties.
Plant instructed to terminate notifications to Monroe and Wayne Counties.
Notifications to counties via SEOC.
Monroe County Actions:
EOC operational.
Siren system and EAS station placed on standby.
WD & CCCs placed on standby.
Wayne County Actions:
EOC operational.
Siren system and EAS station placed on standby.
R/D & CCCs placed on standby.
0915 Fire in Division 2 Switchgear Room. (Mini-scenario - 40C)
0920
Loss of 65E power - 4160 Buses - due to fire. (Mini-scenario - 40C) Expected Action:
Enter AOP 20.300.653, Loss of Bus 65E.
State Actions:
Plant notifies SEOC within 15 minutes.
Notification to counties via SEOC.
If not done previously, declare State of Emergency/Disaster.
JPIC Actions:
JPIC activation begun. Utility personnel will not demonstrate A/N or facility
setup.
State, Monroe and Wayne Counties JPIC personnel pre-positioned.
0955 High Drywell pressure (>1.68#) due to LOCA inside containment. EDG 13 trips on high
53
differential electrical and will not run. Failure of LPCI valves, loss of Division 2 RHR.
The fault in Breaker 72C-3C prevents powering 72 CF Bus. Loss of 65F. Loss of Level
Control Instrumentation (5D115). HPCI fails to start. (Mini-scenario - 40D) Expected
actions: Enter EOP 29,100.01, sheet 1 and sheet 2 for RPV and Primary
Containment Control, SM/ED declares SITE AREA EMERGENCY based on FS1 due to loss.
JPIC Actions:
Communications initiated with SEOC.
JPIC operational.
FTC Actions:
Communications initiated with SEOC.
FTC operational.
Initial Prep and briefing.
Monitor and sample plume (4 teams).
Communicate w/FTC.
1010 Time expires for declaring FS 1
FTC Actions:
Initial PP surface samples & transfer.
Survey contour(s) points (Teams include FRMAC/RAP/staff).
1100 Leak worsens in containment to drive level down to <TAF. Large fuel failure starts.
Emergency Depressurization actions taken. Expected Action: S W E D declares
GENERAL EMERGENCY based on FG1- due to loss of Reactor Coolant System
and Primary Containment, and a Potential Loss of Reactor Clad. Initial PAR evacuate areas 1 and 2 based on plant status. (Message #lo)
State Actions:
Evaluates PAR.
Decides on a Protective Action Order (PAO).
Issues P A 0 to counties.
Requests federal assistance via DHS.
Issues hrther PAOs as needed.
Monroe County Actions:
Sound sirens.
Issues EAS message.
Implements PAO.
WD and CCCs activated.
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JPIC Actions:
Informed of GE and P A 0 by SEOC.
Informs media.
1 1 15 Time expires for declaring FGl .
1 125 CHRRMs read -1 3,000 R/hr.
1 130 Torus low pressure tap to Division 1 Torus level and pressure instruments breaks (T50R802A and T50-R804A). This causes these two readings to indicated "pegged high."
Large release enters Reactor Building. (Mini-scenario - 40E)
1135 Effluent Radiation monitors in alarm. Confirmed release through Div 1 SGTS.
1200 Direct an environmental sample to be performed. lMessage #11)
1230 Dose Calculations indicate exceeding a Protective Action guideline for Adult Thyroid
Dose beyond 5 miles. There are no dangerous travel conditions or a short controlled
release. Expected Action: Emergency Officer recommends a change in PAR to
evacuate areas 1,2,3, and 4 due to dose assessment calculations.
1245 If a change in PAR has not been developed - implement. [Messape #12)
13 15 Termination from exercise can occur when the following conditions are met: {Messape
#13)
Team(s) are dispatched to stop the release.
State EOC controller concurs with termination.
At least one environmental sample is collected, analyzed, and documented.
55