No.:

-
~-
SSINS No.: 6835
In 86-106
Supplement 2
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
WASHINGTON, DC 20555
March 18, 1987
1E INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 86-106, SUPPLEMENT 2:
FEEDWATER LINE BREAK
Addressees:
operating license or a
All nuclear power reactor facilities holding an
construction permit.
Purpose:
information to addressees about
XE Information Notice 86-106 provided general
piping that occurred on December 9,
the catastrophic failure of feedwater
and resulted in four fatalities.walls
1986, at Unit 2 of the Surry Power Station
about thinning of piping
Supplement 1 to that notice providedof information
feedwater piping. This supplementinteracwhich was the cause of the failure about
potentially generic systems
provides addressees with information
of large quantities of feedwater.
tion problems that were caused by release
provided for applicability
Recipients are expected to review the information
to preclude the occurappropriate,
if
to their facilities and consider actions,
contained in this information
rence of similar problems. However, suggestions
no specific action or
notice do not constitute NRC requirements; therefore,
written response is required.
Discussion:
Surry Power Station were operating 2at
On December 9, 1986, both units at the
to a main feedwater pump in Unit
full power when an 18-inch suction line
of
in the turbine building, large aquantities
failed catastrophically releasing,
Condensed steam saturated security
hot feedwater which flashed to steam.basement
approximately 50 feet from the
card reader in the turbine building
As
card reader system for the entire plant.
failed pipe and shorted out theopen
system.
doors controlled by the security
a result, key cards would not control
room were blocked open to provide
Controlled-access doors to the and management
personnel. Security personnel
access for operating, emergency,
entry of essential personnel based on
were posted at the doors and permitted after
the failure, the card reader
personal recognition. Twenty minutes
system was functioning normally.
and
control panel through an open conduit
Water also entered a fire protection
water
6E
of
discharge
the
in
shorted circuits in the panel. This resulted
the
system within minutes of failure ofof the
sprinkler heads in the fire suppression
sprinkler heads did provide coolingin the
feedwater piping. Actuation of the but
added to the quantity of water
atmosphere in the turbine building
27
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IN 86-106, Supplement 2
March 18, 1987
Page 2 of 3
outside the Unit 2 cable
turbine building basement. Water from tht sprinklerscable
tray room, leaked
tray room apparently flowed under the door into the
into the control
around foam fire seals in floor penetrations, and dripped beneath the cable
located
room. The control room serves Units 1 and 2 and is
tray rooms for these units.
the cable tray rooms.
A carbon dioxide fire suppression system is provided for
to control
adjacent
and
over
Water from sprinkler heads located directly
entered the
pipe
feedwater
failed
the
panels for this system and water from
a few
Within
conduits.
open
several
control panels through the ends of
protection
fire
of
shorting
pipe,
minutes after failure of the feedwater
storage tank to
control circuits caused the contents of the main carbon dioxide
without carbon dioxide
be emptied into the cable tray rooms leaving the station than air, entered the
in the event of fire. Carbon dioxide, which is heavier which were blocked
control room via stairwells and controlled-access doors
complained of shortness
open. Personnel on the Unit 2 side of the control room
of breath, dizziness, and nausea.
switchgear rooms
A halon fire suppression system is provided for thetheemergency
room. The halon
control
below
located
for Units 1 and 2. These rooms are
dioxide system was actuated.
system was actuated in the same way that the carbon floor
penetrations and from
Halon leaked into the Unit 1 computer room through
room. Halon haze was
the computer room into the Unit 1 side of the control
reported but did not hamper the performance of operators.
room when the card
An operator who was in the stairwell behind the control
of locked doors,
Because
readers failed experienced difficulty in breathing.
which
room
switchgear
a
he could not exit through the control room or through a cable tray room
was
contained halon. The other means of egress
control room heard him
which contained carbon dioxide. An operator in the
knocking and admitted him.
that improve the
The security communications system includes radio repeaters
used in the plant. A radio
clarity of reception of low-power hand-held radios
and approximately 5 feet from
repeater, located in the Unit 1 cable tray room
layer of ice as a result of
a carbon dioxide nozzle, was covered with a thick
performance of the radio
cooling from the discharge of carbon dioxide. The
in the need for
repeater was temporarily degraded and may have resulted
locations in order to
personnel using hand-held radios to move to other
communicate effectively.
cabinets and conduits for the
The licensee intends to seal and shield control
from water sources, as
carbon dioxide and halon fire suppression systems
systems. Penetrations
these
of
necessary, to prevent inadvertent actuation
have been sealed, as
rooms
switchgear
connecting the computer and emergency
control room. Additi..nal
necessary, to prevent leakage of halon into thewarranted.
actions to preclude system interactions may be
system interactions can be
Additional information about the Surry accident and
50-281/86-42 dated February 10,
found in NRC Inspection Reports 50-280/86-42 and
50-281 dated January 14,
1987, and in Licensee Event Report 86-020-01 in Docket
1987.
IN 86-106, Supplement 2
March , 1987
Page 3 of 3
is required by this information notice.
No specific action or written response
matter, please contact the Regional
If you have any questions about this
NRC regional office or this office.
Administrator of the appropriate
Drector
X
Emergency Preparedness
Division
and Engineering Response
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Technical Contact:
Roger Woodruff, IE
(301) 492-7205
Attachment:
Notices
List of Recently Issued IE Information
Z-
El
Atutacf4n a
IN sa-me, Supplemenit I
VAich Us. IN4
LIST IF RICtNTLY ISSME
It INF0'IOR11101N TICIS
1pigre"tl!4
mitts No.
Izu-IL.
S--Ilet
Potential for Nigh Radiation
Fields Following Loss at
water fro full pool
U-10 USp. 1 Feetar Line reak
of
Data
Issue
Issued to
2/24/87
V24197
A11 pr
1/13/I7
All p r nctur
facilities hblding
an tL or CU
nectar
facilities 1blding
an OL or CU except
Fort St. VMS.
All per nector
facilities bolding
an OL or CF
*7-U
/12317
poetntiul problems With
etal Clad Circuit Ireakars.
A7245
type
1lectric
General
*7-11
Enclosure of Vital tcuiment
Withil Deslnated vital
Areas
2/13/97
All po
U7-10
*otntiel for Water Namer
During Restart of Residual
ps
lust Remoa
2/1/7
All 014 facilities
bolding an OL er CU
eoergncy
67-OS
Diesel generator
Soo Cooling Design
ef lciency
2/s1/7
All power reactor
facilities bolding
0egraded Moter Leads In
D7-e
Limitorque COMotor
Operators
2/4/67
All powr reactor
facilities bolding
an OL or CP
67-07
Quality Central of Onsite
OevatarIn/Solidification
Operations by Outside
Contractors
2/3/17
All por reactor
fa ilities holding
an OL or CP
t7-06
Loss of Suction to LoaPressure Service Water
Systen Pepts Resulting freo
Less Of Siphon
1/30/17
All powr reactor
facilities holding
an OL or CP
97-05
Miswiring o a Westinghouse
Rod Control SySune
2/2/67
All Westinghouse
power reactor
facilities holding
an DL or CP
reactor
n
facilities holding
an eL or CU
an OL er CP
DL * Operating License
CP * Construction Permit
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20555
OFFICIAL BUSINESS
PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE. *300
St FEES PAMO
PSTAGE
"
I
WASM. D.C.
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