Congress and Environmental Policy

Congress and Environmental Policy
To Explain MC’s Behavior:
Focus on their Goals
• Reelection
• Power & prestige (& majority
status)
• Good public policy
Source: Richard Fenno,
Congressmen in Committees
Reelection
• Reelection is the dominant goal
– Without reelection, nothing else can be achieved
– Issues play out over years/decades, not single votes
– Seniority raises MCs to chair or ranking minority
member
– It is the path to power, prestige & good public
policy
Power, Prestige, Majority
• They care about power & prestige
– There are personal benefits
– There are good public policy benefits
• Being a member of the majority party (vs.
minority) is central to power & prestige
Good Public Policy
• MCs have policy goals
– They care about issues & have preferences
– They don’t care about everything, but almost all
are passionate about some issues
• MCs often rise as champions of specific
interests
– They must serve their core constituents
– These constituents may have strong
environmental policy preferences
MC’s Dilemma: Balancing Constituent,
Interest Groups & Personal Preferences
• Constituents want public goods
– Clean air, clean water, …
• Constituents want private goods
– Jobs (which may depend on environmental laws)
• Businesses want benefits
– Opportunities to dump waste into the air or water
in order to cut costs, increase profits, sometimes
save their businesses
Balancing Constituents & Interest
Groups
• Constituents more likely to win when they
are following issues
• Compare:
– High profile (salient) issues which catch the
public’s attention: Constituents win
– Low profile issues about which the public
knows little: Interests win
As Issue Salience Increases, a Legislator's Freedom of Action Decreases
Not on
Agenda
High
Freedom
Of
Legislator's
Action
On
Agenda
Low
Low
High
Attention (Salience ) to Issue by Voters
High
Klamath Water
Distribution
Ethanol
as Gas
Additive
Freedom
of
Lois Capps
Action
Fracking
in oil/gas
drilling
Gov’t
shutdown
Low
Low
High
Attention to Issue by Santa Barbara Voters
Apathetic Majority vs. Intense Minority
• This is a question of democratic theorists:
• Who should win: an apathetic majority or
an intense minority?
– Should local preferences prevail on Klamath
water or Santa Barbara oil drilling with
fracking?
– Fracking in South Dakota (where they want it)?
Federal Grazing Policy & Reelection
• Homestead Act (1862) gives settlers right to 160
acres
– Act works for Midwest farmers, not western ranchers
– Law drives ranchers to homestead a base ranch &
unofficially take over surrounding range lands
• Had the law fit the ranchers’ needs, we would
have private ownership of most western land
Earth, true color - NASA photo
Problem: Overgrazing Damage?
• Cattle eat selectively
– They eat the tasty plants first
– This changes the ecosystem
• Cattle drink huge amounts of water
– This harms competing species
• Cattle compact the soil
– 700-1,000 pounds destroys riparian areas
around creeks and lakes
The Environmentalists’ side
• They want ecological damage ended &
riparian areas repaired
• They claim that FS & BLM undercharge for
grazing & allow too many cattle on land
• They see low fees as subsidies for large,
corporate ranching operations
The Ranchers’ side
• They claim that grazing fees on public land
are lower than on private land because costs
are higher
– Private grazing land is improved by owners
– Public land is improved by lease-holders
• They claim that value of permits is
capitalized into price of ranches
– Cutting permits is cutting price of ranches
The Ranchers’ side
• They claim that ecosystems are not as degraded
as critics say
– They say they understand land better than scientists
– They live & work on it, and see its changes over
decades
Science v. Lay-Person Knowledge
• The Ranchers’ claim is typical of scientific disputes
– Non-scientists often believe they know more
– In some cases, they do know things that scientists miss
• Indigenous or Traditional Knowledge
– A study started by anthropologists
– Indigenous people learn about their environment
– Same type of disputes in many areas
• Cattle, fishing, North Slope Alaska ecosystems, ...
A History of Reform Efforts
• 1906: Forest Service sets up a grazing permit
system
– Initial fee is $.05 per AUM (animal unit month)
• AUM = 1 horse, 1 cow & calf, or 5 sheep
– Permits are transferable
– Ranchers resist until they realize that they can add
permit value to their ranch prices
First Reform Attempt
• 1919: House Appropriations Comm tries to raise
fees to pay for WWI
– Sen. Robert Stanfield (a rancher) resists
– He holds hearings across West to organize resistance
– He rallies western public opinion
• Eastern reformers counterattack
– Editorials in New York Times, Saturday Evening Post
• Ranchers win
– Same fight repeated in 1945 (see Layzer)
Ranchers won because:
• Grazing fees were a priority issue to them
– They paid attention
– It was on their agenda
– Their politicians responded
• Grazing fees were a trivial item outside the West
– Easterners saw newspaper items (maybe?)
– But they had no reason for caring
Environmental Disputes are often
won by Intense Locals
• People who live near centers of dispute care
intensely
– They demand action from their representatives
• People who live far away from disputes may
have opinions, but they do not care as much
– They give their representatives freedom of action
• Result: Politicians trade votes
– You help me on my issue; I help you on your issue
– Local interests win
High
Klamath Water
Distribution
Ethanol
as Gas
Additive
Freedom
of
Lois Capps
Action
Fracking
in oil/gas
drilling
Gov’t
shutdown
Low
Low
High
Salience of Issue to Santa Barbara Voters
Fracking in S.B.
High
Ethanol
as Gas
Additive
Freedom
of
Lois Capps
Action
Klamath
Water
Distribution
Gov’t
shutdown
Low
Low
High
Salience of Issue to Yreka Voters
Bureau of Land Management
• 1934: Congress passes Taylor Grazing Act
– Written by Edward Taylor, a western Forest Service
critic
– Establishes grazing fees on public domain land not in
National Forests
– Requires that regulations be set “in cooperation with
local associations of stockmen”
– Sec. Ickes requires that the Division hire “men of
practical experience,” who have resided in West for
at least 1 year
BLM: A Captured Agency
• Many gov’t agencies have authority to regulate
industries
– The BLM issues regulations for use of BLM land
• How many cattle per acre
• What is the price per AUM
• What provisions must ranchers make to protect riparian
areas or threatened species
• The groups being regulated are the agency’s
“clients”
Agency Capture
• When the clients control or heavily
influence the regulators, the agency is
“captured”
• When agencies are captured:
– The regulations favor their clients
– Public interests are minimized or ignored
Agency Capture
• An agency is captured when it seeks to help
the industry it is regulating at the expense of
the public
– It seeks to help clients increase profits or
income
– It sacrifices the public’s good for the clients’
interests
How Agencies are Captured
• Congressional legislation favoring clients
– BLM designed to favor local interests
• Political appointments
– Top bureaucrats are appointed from industry
groups & their allies
• Socialization
– Years surrounded by clients creates favoritism
How Agencies are Captured
• Congressional legislation favoring clients
– BLM designed to favor local interests
– 1934 Taylor Grazing Act required that
regulations be set “in cooperation with local
associations of stockmen”
– Fishing: Congress established as set of Fishery
Management Councils
• Agency staff, scientists, fish packers/wholesalers,
commercial fishers
• See “iron triangles” below
How Agencies are Captured
• Political appointments: top bureaucrats
appointed from industry groups & their allies
– 1934 TGA: Sec. Ickes requires hiring “men of
practical experience,” who have resided in West
for at least 1 year
– 1981: Reagan appoints James Watt Sec. of Interior
– Time: Ten worst cabinet secretaries
– Offshore oil leases
– BLM land sales, cheap leases
– Forced out of office in 1983
How Agencies are Captured
• Socialization: years with clients creates favoritism
• Bad influences:
– Lobbyists, free meals, small gifts, conferences in
exotic places
– Legislators’ aides pressuring regulators to do things
• Decent influences:
– You learn people’s problems & want to help
– Being a farmer or rancher is a tough job
– The drought is bankrupting farmers, ranchers, etc.
Agency Capture Examples
• Fisheries
– Fishery Management Councils
• Ranching
– Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA)
of 1976
• Farming
• All relatively low income, hard work, business
success & lives are at risk
– Perhaps sympathetic examples
Offshore Oil Drilling
Deepwater Horizon, April 20, 2010
http://www.eoearth.org/view/article/161185/
Agency Capture: Minerals Management Service
• MMS was under the influence
• They wrote industry-friendly rules
• They overlooked rules that were not followed
• They wanted to support the oil & gas industry
• Deep water oil drilling oversight in Gulf was
weak
− Inspectors were held in check
− Inspections were skipped
− Rules were waived
− William Freudenburg & Robert Gramling, Blowout in the Gulf (2010)
Agency Capture: Minerals Management Service
• Lobbyists, free meals, small gifts, conferences in
exotic places
• Legislators’ aides pressuring regulators to do
things
• Carrots and Sticks
─ Imagine yourself starting in this career
─ You are socialized to support the industry
─ When you rise to the top, you may be proindustry
Agency Capture: Can be Exaggerated
• Think of agency capture as a scale
─ Degrees of how captured a regulator or office is
─ Someone might ignore minor violations, but
enforce moderate & major ones
─ The MMS Gulf office may have been captured,
but not the Pacific office, …
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/01/us/coal-ash-spill-revealstransformation-of-north-carolina-agency.html?hpw&rref=us
Duke Energy and North Carolina Government:
Dan River Coal Ask Spill
Is this Agency Capture?
• Governor Patrick McCrory (R-NC):
−
−
−
−
−
Worked for Duke Energy for 28 years
Elected Charlotte City Council 1989; Mayor 1995
Elected Governor in 2012 by 55%-45% margin
Conservative Republican, but not Tea Party
Called for business-friendly reforms during campaign
Duke Energy and North Carolina Government
• “Current and former state regulators said the watchdog
agency, once among the most aggressive in the Southeast,
has been transformed under Gov. Pat McCrory into a
weak sentry that plays down science, has abandoned its
regulatory role and suffers from politicized decisionmaking.”
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/01/us/coa
l-ash-spill-reveals-transformation-of-northcarolina-agency.html?hpw&rref=us
Duke Energy and North Carolina Government
• “Last year, the environment agency’s budget for water
pollution programs was cut by 10.2 percent, a bipartisan
commission that approves regulations was reorganized to
include only Republican appointees, and the governor
vastly expanded the number of agency employees exempt
from civil service protections, to 179 from 24.”
• “Current and former agency employees said the treatment
of Duke was typical of the pro-industry bias now in place
under Governor McCrory, Mr. Skvarla and the General
Assembly.”
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/01/us/coa
l-ash-spill-reveals-transformation-of-northcarolina-agency.html?hpw&rref=us
A Captured Agency?
• North Carolina elected a small government, probusiness conservative
– Working with the legislature, he reformed the
environmental agency
• He wanted weaker oversight
• Weaker environmental regulation yields higher
risks of accidents
– There is a trade-off
Reforming Captured Agencies
• Deepwater Horizon put MMS in the spotlight
– Lax regulation & oversight led to disaster
– Congressional & news media showed problems
• President Obama reorganized MMS
– Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation,
and Enforcement (BOEMRE)
– Oil leasing given to Office of Natural Resources
Revenue (ONRR)
– Safety & Other functions split
• Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE) and the Bureau of
Ocean Energy Management (BOEM)
Klamath Water
Distribution
High
Freedom
of
Lois Capps
Action
Deepwater
Horizon
MMS
Low
Low
High
Salience of Issue to American Voters
Reform follows Disaster
• Dan River coal ash spill put turns the spotlight on:
– Gov. McCrory
– N. C. State Legislature
– Dept. of Environment and Natural Resources
• Lax regulation & oversight led to disaster
– Some steps to increase monitoring & enforcement will
follow
• If there are no electoral repercussions (someone
loses), regulation will remain weak in N.C.
Iron Triangles
Agency
Interest Groups
Subcommittee
An Iron Triangle is an alliance among a gov't agency, a
congressional committee or subcommittee, and interest groups
with the goal of controlling gov't policy within the agency's
jurisdiction for the mutual benefit of all
Iron Triangle Relationships
Interest Group - Congressional Committee
 Interest group gives electoral support to members of Congress
 Congress responds with favorable laws helping group
Congressional Committee - Agency
 Committee gives legislative support to agency
 Agency gives favorable action on constituency services
Government Agency - Interest Group
 Agency implements the laws in ways that help interest groups
 Interest groups support agency before congressional committee
Bureau of Land
Management
National Parks,
Recreation, and Public
Cattlemen’s
Lands Subcommittee of
Associations
Comm. on Nat.
Resources
An Iron Triangle is an alliance among a gov't agency, a
congressional committee or subcommittee, and interest groups
with the goal of controlling gov't policy within the agency's
jurisdiction for their mutual benefit
Iron Triangles vs. Issue Networks
Issue Network: A collection of people in and out
of government who interact on a policy issue
• When agreement among Triangle members does
not exist, outsiders can influence decisions
•A wider network of active players dominates
policy in most areas:
- Committee members
- Gov’t agency staff
- Interest groups
- Scientific experts, …
Iron Triangles in Political Science
• Iron triangles also called:
– Subgovernments, triple alliances, policy whirlpools,
subsystems, issue networks
– Closely related: issue advocacy coalitions (see Paul
Sabatier)
• See:
– “Issue networks”: Hugh Heclo, “Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment.” In
Anthony King, ed., The New American Political System (1978)
– “Issue Advocacy Coalitions”: Paul Sabatier, “Knowledge, Policy-oriented Learning, and
Policy Change: An Advocacy Coalition Framework.” Knowledge: Creation, Diffusions, and
Utilization 8 (1987): 649-92
– Paul Sabatier and Hank Jenkins-Smith, ed., Policy Change and Learning: An Advocacy
Coalition Approach (1993)
Congressional Committees
• The committee assignment process can produce
biased committees
–
–
–
–
MC’s are appointed by their party leaders
Leaders attempt to accommodate member preferences
MC’s often want committees that help reelection
They ask for committees with jurisdiction over issues
that interest their constituents
• Powerful committees are balanced by party,
region
• Lesser committees may be biased
House Resources Committee Membership by State, 2014
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
7
3 3
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
1
2
1
1
2
1
1
45% of Committee members
Are from the West
2
Natural Resources Committee - League of
Conservation Voter Scores 2013
50
45
43
40
36
35
30
25
20
15
12
10
5
0
Entire House
Natural Resources Committee
Data from www.LCV.org
Rocky Mountain West Members
Committee on Resources
U.S. House of Representatives
1324 Longworth House Office Building
Washington, D. C. 20515-6201
(202) 225-2761
http://resourcescommittee.house.gov
Rep. Richard Pombo, Former Chairman
Rep. Richard Pombo (R-CA 11). LCV Score in 2004: 0
“Co-founder of the San Joaquin County Citizen’s Land
Alliance. The Alliance is a coalition of farmers and other
property owners who advocate private property rights, and
fight attempts by government to strip these rights away from
citizens.”
Iron Triangles & Campaign Donations
• Client groups donate to representatives on the
committees that control their industries
– They are supporting their friends
– They are giving money to their political allies
– They hope to “buy time,” not to bribe
–
See Richard Hall & Frank Wayman, "Buying Time: Moneyed Interests and the Mobilization of Bias in
Congressional Committees." American Political Science Review, 84 (Sep '90):797-820
Livestock industry Donations in 2011-12 Cycle
$588,634
National Cattlemen's Beef Assoc.
368,993
National Pork Producers' Council
135,500
Texas & Southwestern Cattle Raisers
American Quarter Horse Assoc.
70,000
Texas Cattle Feeders Assoc.
63,050
39,700
Livestock Marketing Assoc.
27,000
American Sheep Industry Assoc.
0
100,000 200,000 300,000 400,000 500,000 600,000 700,000
Oil & Gas vs. Environmental Donations
Top Oil & Gas Contributors
Top Environmental Contributors
Koch Industries
$1,742,500
League of
Conservation Voters
Exxon Mobil
1,679,000
Sierra Club
456,751
Chesapeake Energy
1,208,000
114,725
Chevron
697,000
Valero Energy
661,000
Independent
Petroleum Assn
576,000
Haliburton Co
489,000
Marathon Petroleum
466,500
Devon Energy
444,500
Ocean Champions
Secure Energy for
America
Calif. League of
Conservation Voters
National Wildlife
Foundation Action
Fund
Environmental
Defense Action Fund
NW Sustainable
Resource PAC
Advanced Energy
Economy Institute
390,000
Defenders of
Wildlife
Occidental
Petroleum
Total
$8,353,500
Total
$460,618
35,000
27,914
23,766
23,624
16,000
13,400
1,500
$1,173,298
Source: www. Opensecrets.org
Everyone Does It: Rep. Lois Capps
Data from:
www.fec.gov
See also:
www.opense
crets.org
Iron Triangle Relationships
Interest Group - Congressional Committee
 Interest group gives electoral support to members of Congress
 Congress responds with favorable laws helping group
Congressional Committee - Agency
 Committee gives legislative support to agency
 Agency gives favorable action on constituency services
Government Agency - Interest Group
 Agency implements the laws in ways that help interest groups
 Interest groups support agency before congressional committee
Agencies in Iron Triangles
• Agencies get 2 types of benefits for cooperating
• Mission goals
– Forest Service: multiple goals
• Support ranching, timber, mining, tourism
• Safety oversight, fee collections,
• Manage national forests sustainably, …
– Broaden their missions
• Add land to national forests
• EPA would like to regulate greenhouse gas emissions
• NHTSA would like to regulate big truck fuel efficiency
Agencies in Iron Triangles
• Legislators and client groups can help agencies
achieve these goals
– Interest groups lobby to expand agencies’ missions
and to increase their budgets:
• There is a drought, let’s give BLM funds for a new program
to help ranchers
• Let’s not cut the BLM in the recession, they need the funds
to help ranchers
– Legislators give agencies more funds & create new
programs for them so that the legislators can gain
interest group favor (money & votes)
Agencies in Iron Triangles
• Survival goals
– Maintain or increase budgets
• Hire more inspectors
• Increase the research budget
• Give staff raises, nice offices, etc.
– Prevent Congress & President from breaking agency up
• Deepwater Horizon led to MMS being divided into different
agencies (MMS failure))
• Safety inspections now separate agency
• BOEM: Offshore leasing, collecting royalties, resource
evaluation, renewable energy
• BSEE: Safety & environmental oversight
Captured Agencies v. Iron Triangles
• Captured agencies are not necessarily parts of iron
triangles
– The two theories are different
• If you have an iron triangle, the agency has been
captured
– 3 allies: agency, client group, committee of legislators
• But you can have a captured agency without
congressional participation
– A client group pressures & captures an agency
– The relevant committees are not paying attention & are
not involved
Iron Triangles vs. Issue Networks
Issue Network: A collection of people in and out
of government who interact on a policy issue
• When agreement among Triangle members does
not exist, outsiders can influence decisions
•A wider network of active players dominates
policy in most areas:
- Committee members
- Gov’t agency staff
- Interest groups other than client groups
-e.g., environmental groups
- Scientific experts, …
Iron Triangles vs. Issue Networks
• Agencies are not necessarily captured or parts of
iron triangles
– “Sometimes the magic works; sometimes it doesn’t.”
– If the 3 parts of the triangle cooperate & outsiders
don’t break them up, it can work
– But that often fails to occur
• People have principles
• Outsiders intervene, …
• EPA is a good example of an independent set of
regulators
Iron Triangles vs. Issue Networks
• Example: Dam construction
– Iron triangle:
• Army Corps of Engineers
• House Interior & Insular Affairs Committee
• Clients benefiting from dams: farmers, developers,
construction firms, etc.
– Arthur Maass, Muddy Waters: The Army Engineers and the Nation's Rivers
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1951); see also A. Maass in American Political
Science Review.
– Late 1960s: Environmental movement arises
• Environmentalist representatives on Interior Committee
• Agreement breaks down; iron triangle becomes issue
network