IMPORTANT

IMPORTANT
THIS IS THE HANDOUT AND SYLLABUS USED IN THE PREVIOUS
ACADEMIC YEAR (2013-14)
SPECIFIC CONTENTS AND DETAILS LIKE TIMETABLING MAY CHANGE
IN 2014-15
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT THE LECTURER
PS4086
Origins and Evolution of Mindreading (Theory of Mind)
2013-2014
Module Controller:
Semester:
Class Hour:
Assessment:
Office Hours:
!
Juan-Carlos Gómez
2 (2013-2014)
Tuesdays, 11am-1pm, OLD LIBRARY
—Continuous assessment (25%): essay paper (maximum 2,000 words
excluding references) due on 14/04/2014 at 14:00pm.
—Examination (75%): one two-hour paper.
Thursday 3pm-4:30 pm, Room 2.55 (or any other time by previous
arrangement)
This advanced module analyses the development and evolution of Mindreading or
Theory of mind skills —the ability to respond to or understand the mental states of oneself and
others, which lies at the heart of many of the key cognitive achievements of humans. This ability
(or rather this set of abilities) is studied at the confluence of different disciplines in cognitive
science: biology, philosophy of mind, ethology, developmental and comparative/evolutionary
psychology, psychopathology, neuroscience... This module concentrates mainly on the
contributions of developmental and comparative psychology, but situating them in their wider
interdisciplinary context and exploring their implications for the understanding of atypical
cognition, specially autism. The course will discuss the current state of research in this area,
emphasizing both empirical and conceptual aspects and combining the evolutionary and
developmental approaches.
This is an advanced module and as such it follows a discussion seminar format in which
material (mainly journal articles) must be read by the students before the seminar and discussed
together under the lecturer’s guidance. In some sessions there will be introductory lectures that
may be followed by group discussion of target papers. Other sessions will entirely consist of
discussions of papers introduced by students. The key to the success of this module format and
your own learning is reading the papers before the sessions and actively participating in the
discussions with questions, ideas, and queries suggested by your reading.
The reading list consists of Core Readings and Further Readings. Core Readings are of
two types: Discussion Readings (the papers that will be presented and discussed in the seminars)
and Background Readings (essential papers to understand the state of the art and the significance
of the core readings material). Both Discussion and Background Core readings are expected to
be known and used in the assessments by students. In addition, in some sessions I will indicate
Further Reading references: these provide supplementary materials for those who wish to know
more about particular subjects, but they are not compulsory reading.
You will also find recommendations for books or reviews that provide more general
sources of information about the history of the debates or overviews of the current state of the
art in some of the key areas of the Module.
!
Sessions topics and their corresponding readings will be provided in a separate document.
ASSESSMENT
Continuous Assessment (25% of total mark) consists of an essay (maximum 2,000 words exclusing
references) whose topic will be provided by the 3rd week of semester. Deadline for submission is
14/04/2014 at 14:00pm.. In the 2-hour exam (75% of final mark) you will answer two questions out of
four.
MARKING CRITERIA
Senior Honours Continuous Assessments Grade Criteria Sheet
Grade……
Content
0-6.9
7
8-10
11-13
14-16
No evidence Minimal
Major omissions. Major theories/
Covers all the major
that
reference to
Use of a narrow ideas presented,
issues with use of a
appropriate
appropriate
range of sources. but use of a narrow range of appropriate
sources have sources OR
General reliance range of sources, and up-to-date
been used OR over-reliance on on secondary or particularly
primary sources.
copying* from other work (e.g. out-of-date
secondary sources Some independent
other sources close
material.
use of sources
(even if source paraphrasing*,
is cited)..
perhaps with
lack of
understanding of
the material).
17-20
Thorough and
detailed grasp of
the issues with
widespread use of
primary sources
and widespread
evidence of
independent use
of sources
Minimal and
Frequent errors Reference list
Referencing accurate, Thorough and
generally
both in the
broadly
though some stylistic proper
inaccurate use of content and style comprehensive, but errors in the reference referencing
referencing
of references.
frequent failure to list
throughout.
use appropriate
style in citing
references
Little
or
no
Many
Some
Occasional
Only minor errors. No substantive
Factual
accurate
substantive
substantive
substantive errors
errors, virtually
accuracy
material
errors
errors
no minor errors.
Much of the
Some material
Little material
No or very little
Relevance Little or no Most of the
material
material
material
irrelevant to the
irrelevant to the
material
relevant to the irrelevant to the irrelevant to the question
question
irrelevant to the
question
question
question
question
No
A
list
of
The
outlines
of
Some
development
For
the
most
part,
Argument or
Organisation
organisation of disjointed
an argument, but of an argument, but clear and well
central thesis well
and
material
material that
mostly a list of often disjointed
structured with the structured, well
does not amount material with no and some listing argument or central developed and
coherence
to a coherent
development of
thesis well developed sustained
argument or
ideas
throughout,
thesis
leading to wellargued
conclusion
Referencing
Missing
references and
referencing of
material not
cited in the
text
Precision of Absence of
expression scientific
precision in
the use of
terms and
concepts
General failure
to use terms and
define concepts
precisely
Some instances
of scientific
precision in the
use of terms and
concepts, but
predominant
sloppiness and
redundancy
Adequate precision General use of
in overall terms, precise scientific
but still widespread language with few
instances of
instances of
sloppiness and
sloppiness or
redundancy
redundancy
Clear analytic use
of language, with
precise use of
concepts and
negligible
redundancy of
expression.
Critical
evaluation
No valid
General lack of T r i v i a l o r Raises some issues
evaluation of evaluation
underspecified but displays some
evidence
criticisms (e.g. illogical reasoning
‘ n e e d m o r e or triviality
research’) and
i l l o g i c a l
reasoning
Identifies all the
main issues relating
to topic/evidence/
methodology. Shows
signs of independent
evaluation
Sound and
thorough data
evaluation.
Widespread
evidence of
original thought.
*In some cases, the nature and extent of plagiarism will not merely attract a failing grade, but will also require
referral to the Academic Disciplinary Process.
Avoiding Academic Misconduct (Plagiarism)
You should know very well by now the norms about plagiarism and the advice about how to
avoid it provided by the university. Please make sure you pay special consideration to this when
writing your assessments.
One of the golden rules to avoid plagiarism is to never use the strategy of copying and pasting
from other sources even if you are planning to rewrite the excerpts. Plagiarism will be detected
by Turnitin even if the original source is paraphrased. You must always write your own account
in your own words.
Links to University Policy and Guide to avoid academic misconduct:
http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/students/rules/academicpractice/
Feedback
Verbal Feedback on presentations and discussions
One of the main aims of SH seminar discussions is to allow and encourage students’ exploration
and discussion of their own critical views and ideas on the papers and topics discussed. I will
provide verbal feedback (sometimes in the form of questions or expansions upon suggested
ideas), by intervening in the discussion during the seminars. Please feel free to make use of the
Office Hours or book a meeting if you wish to have further feedback or explanations on your
presentation or class interventions.
Office hours
You can use my office hours (Thursdays 3-4:30 pm) or arrange meetings to seek feedback on
specific issues or problems emerged in class discussions or during your readings.
Written feedback on CA essays
After submission of your CA you will receive detailed individualized feedback on your piece of
work, in the form of a standard feedback form plus extensive annotations and comments on your
essay that you will be able to download from MMS. You will receive this feedback two weeks
after submission or earlier. Please read it carefully and if in doubt or in need of further
clarification, arrange a meeting with me.
Generic feedback on examination
After the exams have been marked, a Generic feedback document, explaining what was expected
in the answers and strengths and weaknesses of the actual answers will be made available on
Moodle. If in doubt or in need of further clarification, please contact me with your query and we
can discuss it by email or by arranging a meeting.
Office Hours
Every Thursday I will be available from 3pm to 4:30pm in my office (Room 2.55) for discussion
or queries about the module contents. If this is not suitable, you can either send me an email
(Jg5) with your query and/or arrange a meeting outside Office Hours.
STUDENT PRESENTATIONS
This module, as all SH modules, primarily relies upon supervised private study combined with
class discussion of the module readings. The main aim of the seminars is to discuss and analyze
the core readings set for the day. The discussion will be initiated with short presentations by
members of the class.
•You are expected to make your presentation using PowerPoint (please remember to use a big
enough font —minimum 20pt— to facilitate the reading from the back of the seminar room).
ALL students (not only those in charge of the presentation) are expected to have read the core
papers and come to the discussion with questions and remarks.
•All students are required to make at least one presentation during the course. Although the
presentation itself is not assessed, it is a requirement of the course. I can provide feedback on
the presentations if the PPTs are submitted to me after the presentation. You can also seek
feedback on a draft before the actual presentation. Failure to contribute a presentation will lead to
the issue of an Academic Alert and eventually failure in the module whatever the marks obtained
in the assessments.
•Paper presentations must not be uncritical summaries of the contents; rather, they must actively
direct the audience towards what you perceive as key contributions and potential points of
contention of the paper. Avoid general, unspecific criticisms, like “more participants would have
been desirable”.
• When several people are presenting on the same day, make sure that you coordinate your
presentations. Do not simply divide the papers and then work independently. The presentation
should address the core problem for discussion in a coherent way.
• Use overheads of graphics (results, tables, etc.) as an aid to your discussion and the class
discussion.
! The list of core papers may be complemented with further reading references. They provide
useful background information that may help you preparing a better presentation. It is also useful
that you consult other papers or book sections mentioned in the core readings (for example,
empirical studies that you think are crucial but may be insufficiently explained in the reading).
One of the things that will be more valued in the continuous assessment and in the marking of
the exams is your ability to go beyond the core readings: both in terms of providing your own
reflection upon their contents and providing connections with material from other papers.
! The exact length of a presentation may vary depending upon the length and complexity of a
paper, but you should expect to spend only between 5 and 10 minutes per paper. Never more than
10 mins. A maximum of four or five slides should be enough for most papers.
PS4086
Origins and Evolution of Mindreading (Theory of Mind)
2013-2014
Module Controller:
Semester:
Class Hour:
Assessment:
Office Hours:
!
Juan-Carlos Gómez
2 (2013-2014)
Tuesdays, 11am-1pm, OLD LIBRARY
—Continuous assessment (25%): essay paper (maximum 2,000 words
excluding references) due on 14/04/2014 at 14:00pm.
—Examination (75%): one two-hour paper.
Thursday 3pm-4:30 pm, Room 2.55 (or any other time by previous
arrangement)
OVERVIEW OF COURSE
[SESSIONS 1 TO 7]
SESSION 1 (28/1/14): Introductory Lecture: Mindreading: a comparative approach to its
development, evolution, and alterations.
This session will consist of an introductory Lecture in which the topic of the course will be
situated in its current context. I will introduce and discuss the notions of mental state, Theory of
mind, intentionality, modularity, domain specificity, etc. I will also start explaining the theoretical
models of Theory of mind, concentrating mainly on the developmental literature.
Background sources (not compulsory) useful for topics treated in this Session:
—Massimo Marraffa (2011). Theory of Mind, In Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. http://www.iep.utm.edu/
theomind/
—Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (http://plato.stanford.edu/), especially the following entries:
Mental Representation, Intentionality, Belief,,Folk Psychology, Modularity.
— Baron-Cohen, S., Tager-Flusberg, H. and Cohen, DJ, eds. (1993). Understanding other minds : perspectives from
autism / edited by Simon Baron-Cohen, Helen Tager-Flusberg and Donald J. Cohen (1993). Oxford : Oxford
University Press [RJ506.A9U6].
—Baron-Cohen, S., Tager-Flusberg, H. and Cohen, DJ, eds., (2000). Understanding other minds (2ndEd):
perspectives from developmental cognitive neuroscience. Oxford: O.U.P., 2000. RJ506.A9U6G00
—Baron-Cohen et al. (2013). Understanding Other Minds. 3rd Edition: Perspectives from developmental social
neuroscience. Oxford, OUP.[copies/access being processed by Library at the moment].
—Whiten, A. ed., Natural theories of mind: evolution, development and simulation Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991.
BF723.P48N2
—Doherty, M. Theory of mind : how children understand others' thoughts and feelings / Martin J. Doherty
[Electronic book]. Hove ; New York : Psychology Press, 2009.
SESSION 2 (4/2/14). Developmental Models of Mindreading and Key Current problems
[Lecture & Readings]
This session discusses the main developmental models of Theory of Mind: The “Theory theory”
models (defended by Wellman, Gopnik, and Perner among others), the “Modularity” model
(defended by Alan Leslie and Baron-Cohen among others), and the Simulation and Mirroring
models. We will discuss what was once considered to be the “litmus test” of theory of mind: the
understanding of false belief. We will conclude with an introduction to the beginnings of the
“infant False-Belief” revolution, which is currently at the cutting edge of ToM research, through
the discussion of two key papers.
The Core Background Readings for this session (compulsory) are:
—Kristine H. Onishi and Renee Baillargeon (2005) Do 15-Month-Old Infants Understand False
Beliefs?. Science VOL 308 8 APRIL 2005: 255-58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.1107621
Critical interpretations and reactions to Onishi and Baillargeon, 2005:
!
Have also a look at the following short commentaries on the above:
—Perner, J. and Ted Ruffman. Infants’Insight into the Mind: How Deep? Science 308 (2005). http://
dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.1111656
—Leslie, A. (2005). Developmental parallels in understanding minds and bodies. Trends in Cognitive
Sciences, 9(10), 459–462. http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1364661305002196
—Perner, J. (2005). Do infants really understand false belief?: Response to Leslie. Trends in Cognitive
Sciences, 9(10), 462–463. PDF
—Southgate, V., Senju, A., & Csibra, G. (2007). Action Anticipation Through Attribution of
False Belief in Two-Year-Olds." Psychological Science, 18 (7), 587- 592. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1111/j.1467-9280.2007.01944.x.
Further Reading (non-compulsory)
—Wellman, H. M., Cross, D., & Watson, J. (2001). Meta-analysis of theory-of-mind development: The truth about
false belief. Child Development, 72, 655–684. [http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-8624.00304/pdf]
—Scholl, B.J., & Leslie, A.M. (2001). Minds, modules, and meta-analysis. Child Development, 72, 696–701
[comment on Wellman et al., 2001].
—Alan M. Leslie, Ori Friedman and Tim P. German. Core mechanisms in ‘theory of mind’. TRENDS in
Cognitive Sciences Vol.8 No.12 December 2004. 528-33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2004.10.001.
SESSION 3 (11/2/14). False belief understanding in infants?
In this session we will discuss in depth the challenge of current cutting edge research on
possible early FB understanding in human infants: apparently successful attempts at
experimentally demonstrating false-belief understanding in infants under two years of age with
non-verbal methods.
The papers listed below will be presented for discussion by students. Each represents a
different method of non-verbal research.
Core Discussion Readings:
—Eighteen-month-old infants show false belief understanding in an active helping paradigm.
David Buttelmann, Malinda Carpenter, Michael Tomasello. Cognition 112 (2): Pages 337-342
(August 2009). doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2009.05.006
—Southgate, V.; Chevallier, C. & Csibra, G. (2010). Seventeen-month-olds appeal to false
beliefs to interpret others’ referential communication. Developmental Science 13:6 (2010), pp
907–912
—Kovács, A. M., Téglás, E., & Endress, A. D. (2010). The Social Sense: Susceptibility to
Others' Beliefs in Human Infants and Adults. Science, 330, 1830-1834. http://
www.sciencemag.org/content/330/6012/1830.full
—Southgate, Victoria and Vernetti, Angelina (2014) Belief-based action prediction in preverbal
infants. Cognition 130 (1), pp. 1-10. ISSN 0010-0277. http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/
article/pii/S0010027713001650
Further Reading:
A summary of the first wave of infant FB studies with a suggested explanation from the perspective of
Baillargeon and colls. can be found in:
Baillargeon, Scott and He (2010), False-belief understanding in infants. Trends in Cognitive
Science, 14 (3): 110-118. [PDF]
SESSION 4 (18/2/14). False-belief in infants: further studies and explanatory models.
In this session we discuss further infant FB studies, but this time with a focus on the theoretical
controversies that surround them. We start with another study from Baillargeon’s team that also
presents their theoretical position in depth, followed by an update of Perner’s objections to infant
FB, and a theoretical paper about implications for understanding the ToM system in adults.
Core Discussion Readings
—Scott and Baillargeon (2009), Which Penguin Is This? Attributing False Beliefs About Object
Identity at 18 Months, Child development. Vol 80: pp. 1172–1196, Get PDF (567K).
—J. Perner & J. Roessler (2012). From infants’ to children’s appreciation of belief. Trends in
Cognitive Sciences. Vol.16, No.10: 519-525. PDF 583 KB
— Apperly, I., & Butterfield, S. A. (2012). How to Construct a Minimal Theory of Mind. Mind
and Language, in press.
http://www.ianapperly.eclipse.co.uk/Butterfill%20Apperly%20Min%20ToM.pdf
SESSION 5 (25/2/14). Precursors of ToM in infancy: is Joint Attention mentalistic?
Independently of the debate about the origins of false-belief understanding addressed in the
previous session, a fertile and growing line of research in the last years has addressed the
development of other theory of mind skills in young infants, especially the set of skills known as
“Joint Attention” that emerge in human infants at the end of the first year of life. Here we will
concentrate on some aspects of Joint Attention, initially conceptualized as an ontogenetic and
maybe phylogenetic “precursor” to more complex ToM (e.g., false-belief). The three papers
address the issue of whether early joint attention behaviours reflect a mentalistic understanding
of the other.
Core Discussion Readings:
—Meltzoff, AN, Brooks, R. (2008) Self-Experience as a Mechanism for Learning About Others:
A Training Study in Social Cognition. Developmental Psychology (2008)., Vol. 44, No. 5, 1257–
1265 .
—Senju, A., Southgate, V., Snape, C., Leonard, M., & Csibra, G. (2011). Do 18-Month-Olds
Really Attribute Mental States to Others? A Critical Test. Psychological Science, 22(7), 878 –
880. http://brainmind.umin.jp/PDF/wt12/Senju2011PsycholSci.pdf
— Markus Paulus. How infants relate looker and object: evidence for a perceptual learning
account of gaze following in infancy. Developmental Science 14:6 (2011), pp 1301–1310 . Get
PDF (308K)
SESSION 6 (4/3/14). Evolutionary precursors: Joint Attention in non-human primates
Some (but not all) of the joint attention skills described in young human infants as early
manifestations of ToM have been discovered in non-human primates and other animals. One of
them —gaze following— seems to be evolutionarily very old and present in virtually all nonhuman primates. But does gaze following involve an understanding of mental states such as
Seeing or Attention? Or is it a primitive mechanism that only humans can interpret in mentalistic
terms?
Core Discussion Readings
—Hare, B., Call, J., Agnetta, B., & Tomasello, M. (2000). Chimpanzees know what conspecifics
do and do not see. Animal Behaviour, 59, 771-785. http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/anbe.1999.1377".
—Flombaum, J. I., & Santos, L. R. (2005). Rhesus Monkeys Attribute Perceptions to Others.
Current Biology, 15, 447–452. Rhesus Monkeys Attribute Perceptions to Others
— Brian Hare , Josep Call, Michael Tomasello (2006). Chimpanzees deceive a human
competitor by hiding. Cognition 101 (2006) 495–514. "PDF (2630 K).
—Hare, B., & Tomasello, M. (2004). Chimpanzees are more skillful in competitive than in cooperative
cognitive tasks. Animal Behaviour, 68, 571-581. doi:10.1016/j.anbehav.2003.11.011
Further reading:
—Povinelli and Eddy (1996): Read only Experiment 12 (pp.85-95) of “What young chimpanzees know
about seeing”. MONOGRAPHS OF THE SOCIETY FOR RESEARCH IN CHILD DEVELOPMENT Serial No.
247, Vol. 61, No. 3, 1996. [Electronic Version of whole monograph: JSTOR: What Young Chimpanzees
Know about Seeing]. Library link for hard copies: per BF1.C5M7;247
SESSION 7 (11/3/14). Evolutionary precursors: Knowledge and false belief.
More complex forms of Mind-reading involve the understanding of so-called “epistemic states”,
linked to how reality is represented rather than what is perceived. The readings in this section
comprise attempts at testing the understanding of knowledge and false-belief in non-human
primates, as well as a methodological and conceptual critique of the achievements and
interpretations so far.
Core Discussion Readings
—Hare, B., Call, J., & Tomasello, M. (2001). Do chimpanzees know what conspecifics know?
Animal Behaviour, 61, 139-151. http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/anbe.2000.1518
—Kaminski, J, Call, J., & Tomasello, M. (2008). Chimpanzees know what others know, but not
what they believe. Cognition, 109, 224-234. doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2008.08.010
—Marticorena, A. M. Ruiz, C. Mukerji, A. Goddu, & L. Santos (2010). Monkeys represent
others’ knowledge but not their beliefs. Developmental Science 14:6 (2011), pp 1406–1416.
Monkeys represent others' knowledge but not their beliefs ...
Further Reading
—Krachun, C., Carpenter, M., Call, J., & Tomasello, M. (2009)." A competitive nonverbal false belief task for
children and apes."Developmental Science, 12, 521–535. PAPER A competitive nonverbal false belief task for
children and apes.
[EASTER BREAK]
SESSIONS 8 TO 11, AFTER THE EASTER BREAK, WILL ADDRESS THE TOPIC OF
ATYPICAL THEORY OF MIND WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO AUTISM AND ITS
IMPLICATIONS FOR UNDERSTANDING THEORY OF MIND IN TYPICAL
DEVELOPMENT. THE READING LIST FOR THESE SESSIONS WILL BE
AVAILABLE SHORTLY.
PS4086 - Origins and Evolution of Mindreading (Theory of
Mind). 2013-2014
OVERVIEW OF COURSE —SESSIONS 8 TO 11
SESSION 8 (1/4/14). Controversies about animal and infant ToMs.
We will devote this session to review and consolidate the material discussed in the previous weeks,
using the following theoretical papers as a guide. Lecture plus General Discussion led by Lecturer.
Core Readings
—Povinelli, D. & Vonk, J. (2004). We Don’t Need a Microscope to Explore the Chimpanzee’s
Mind. Mind and Language, 19, 1-28. http://ulceet.com/uploads/Povinelli_Vonk_2004.pdf.
—Perner, J. (2008) Who took the Cog out of Cognitive Science1?— Mentalism in an Era of Anticognitivism. P.A. Frensch, et al. (Eds.), ICP—International Congress of Psychology—2008
Proceedings. Psychology Press. [Prepublication draft to be circulated by Lecturer with permission
of author].
— Gómez, J. C. (2008). The Evolution of Pretence: From Intentional Availability To Intentional
Non-Existence. Mind and Language, 23(5), 586–606. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.
1468-0017.2008.00353.x
Further Reading:
—Tomasello, M., Call, J., & Hare, B. (2003). Chimpanzees understand psychological states – the question is
which ones and to what extent. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 7(4), 153-160. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/
S1364-6613(03)00035-4
—Povinelli, D. J., & Vonk, J. (2003). Chimpanzee minds: suspiciously human? Trends in Cognitive Sciences,
7, 157-160. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S1364-6613%2803%2900053-6
SESSION 9 (8/4/14): ToM in Non-Western cultures and Deaf children
Core Discussion Readings
—Barrett, H. Clark ,Tanya Broesch, Rose M. Scott, Zijing He, Renée Baillargeon, Di Wu, Matthias
Bolz, Joseph Henrich, Peipei Setoh, Jianxin Wang and Stephen Laurence. (2013) Early false-belief
understanding in traditional non-Western societies, 20122654, published online 30 January
2013280, 2013. Proc. R. Soc. B . Full Text (PDF).
—Pyers, J. & Senghas, A. (2009). Language Promotes False-Belief Understanding: Evidence From
Learners of a New Sign Language. Psychological Science 2009 July ; 20(7): 805–812. doi:10.1111/j.
1467-9280.2009.02377.x. Full Text (PDF).
—M. Meristo, G. Morgan, A. Geraci, L. Iozzi, E. Hjelmquist, L. Surian and M. Siegal (2012).
Belief attribution in deaf and hearing infants. Developmental Science (2012), vol. 15: pp 633–640
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-7687.2012.01155.x. Get PDF (298K).
Further reading
—San Juan, V., & Astington, J. (2011). Bridging the gap between implicit and explicit understanding: How
language development promotes the processing and representation of false belief. British Journal of
Developmental Psychology, DOI:10.1111/j.2044-1835X.2011.02051.x.
—Jennie Pyers and Peter A. de Villiers (2013): Theory of Mind in Deaf Children: Illuminating the
relative roles of language and executive functioning in the development of social cognition. In
Baron-Cohen et al. (2013). Understanding Other Minds. 3rd Edition: Perspectives from
developmental social neuroscience. Oxford, OUP. [Soon available through the library].
SESSION 10 (15/4/14): Autism: the riddle of explicit and implicit Mindreading I.
Core Discussion Readings
—Leekam, S., Baron-Cohen, S., Perrett, D., Milders, M., & Brown, S. (1997). Eye-direction
detection: a dissociation between geometric and joint attention skills in autism. British Journal of
Developmental Psychology, 15(1), 77-95. AVAILABLE IN PRINTED VERSION IN MAIN
LIBRARY : per BF699.B8 !Vol. 15 1997; electronic copy will be made available].
—Scheeren, Anke M.; Marc de Rosnay, Hans M. Koot, and Sander Begeer (2013). Theory of mind
in high-functioning autism spectrum disorder. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry 54:6
(2013), pp 628–635. PDF(98K).
—Antonia Hamilton and Lauren Marsh (2013): Two Systems for Action Comprehension in Autism:
Mirroring and Mentalising. In Baron-Cohen et al. (2013). Understanding Other Minds. 3rd Ed:
Perspectives from developmental social neuroscience. OUP.[Soon available through library].
Further reading
— Gnanathusharan Rajendrana and Peter Mitchell (2007). Cognitive theories of autism. Developmental
Review 27 (2007) 224–260. Cognitive theories of autism - University of Edinburgh.
—Klin,A. et al. (2002). Defining and quantifying social phenotype in autism, Am J Psychiatry
159: 895-908., [http://ajp.psychiatryonline.org/data/Journals/AJP/3737/895.pdf]
— Klin, A., Jones, W., Schultz, R. and Volkmar, F. (2003) The enactive mind, or from actions to
cognition: lessons from autism. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London B, 358,
345-360. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2002.1202.
SESSION 11 (22/4/14): Autism: the riddle of explicit and implicit Mindreading II
Core Discussion Readings
—Klin, A. et al. Two-year-olds with autism orient to non-social contingencies
rather than biological motion. Nature ! 459, 257–261 (2009). http://
www.nature.com/nature/journal/v459/n7244/full/nature07868.html.
—W. Jones & A. Klin (2013). Attention to eyes is present but in decline in 2–6month-old infants later diagnosed with autism. Nature (2013) doi:10.1038/
nature12715.
http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/vaop/ncurrent/full/
nature12715.html
—Senju, A., Southgate, V., White, S., & Frith, U. (2009). Mindblind Eyes: An
Absence of Spontaneous Theory of Mind in Asperger Syndrome. Science 14
August 2009: Vol. 325 no. 5942 pp. 883-885. DOI: 10.1126/science.1176170.
http://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/2566/
—Senju et al. (2012). Absence of spontaneous action anticipation by false belief
attribution in children with autism spectrum disorder. Development and
Psychopathology 22 (2010), 353–360.
http://www.cbcd.bbk.ac.uk/people/
scientificstaff/vicky/hiddenballautism.