3 CANADA’S RESPONSE TO THE KOSOVAR SITUATION: AN ANALYSIS OF ACCOUNTS OF

Abu-Laban, B., Derwing, T. M., Mulder, M. & Northcott, H. (2001). Lessons
Learned: An Evaluation of Northern Alberta’s Experience with Kosovar Refugees (3
volumes). Edmonton, AB: The Prairie Centre of Excellence for Research on
Immigration and Integration.
3
CANADA’S RESPONSE TO THE KOSOVAR
SITUATION: AN ANALYSIS OF ACCOUNTS OF
OPERATION PARASOL1
Introduction
Key Stakeholders and the Nature of Their Involvement
The lead department for Operation Parasol was CIC; they coordinated the whole project
and were responsible for the processing of the documentation that allowed Kosovars to
enter the country. NHQ undertook all the initial planning and determined which other
government departments and agencies should be involved. CIC staff in the regions and at
the local level were also heavily involved in coordination, both at the sustainment sites
and in the settlement destination communities. DND, already in the Balkans at the time
of the evacuation, was responsible for providing the sustainment sites, preparing the
bases to receive the refugees, and ensuring that the physical operation of the sites went
smoothly. Health Canada was responsible for initial screening in Macedonia to
determine whether refugees were fit to fly; they organized more intensive medical
examinations on arrival to Canada; and they provided additional medical assessments and
met health care needs at the sustainment sites, along with the military. The Director
General of the Canadian Red Cross offered the services of that organization to coordinate
all the volunteers at the bases, while local and provincial agencies were called upon for
their specific areas of expertise; for example, the Multicultural Association of Fredericton
was responsible for education, including settlement issues and LINC classes.
Private Sponsors
CIC contacted the Canadian Council for Refugees (CCR) to discuss promotion strategies
for the private sponsorship program, in order to get more private sponsors involved. A 1800 number was set up to facilitate communications, and the Refugee Branch of CIC did
a lot of the work in coordinating the volunteers. The Minister made an appeal to
Canadian families to open their hearts and serve as sponsors; before long, there were
more would-be sponsors than there were refugees. An official in the Resettlement
Division indicated that the appeal itself “was not sufficiently clear ... we didn’t say, and
it’s very hard to say, ‘Don’t offer them your homes’.” Canadians were anxious to offer
their own basements, guest rooms, and summer cottages to the refugees, and did not
understand the need to foster independence by providing the Kosovars with their own
housing. Some of the SAHs were also unhappy with the appeal because it was decided
that refugees would be sent to “communities where services were available to support
their settlement integration—language training, interpreter services, and so on.” In the
past, private sponsorship has not been limited to large communities; refugees went to
wherever there were sponsors available.
There was some confusion regarding the use of the term sponsor versus host. An
official from the Integration Branch at CIC stated that “there was confusion and the
confusion was over a name. The sponsors of the Kosovar refugees who were not
responsible in any way for monetary support could and probably in hindsight should have
been called hosts. They were not doing what sponsors normally do …. This led to some
misunderstanding of responsibilities and rather than rely on existing host networks and
Abu-Laban, B., Derwing, T. M., Mulder, M. & Northcott, H. (2001). Lessons
Learned: An Evaluation of Northern Alberta’s Experience with Kosovar Refugees (3
volumes). Edmonton, AB: The Prairie Centre of Excellence for Research on
Immigration and Integration.
SPO coordinators, we unintentionally created a different type of sponsor. In the future,
when we are talking about hosts, we should use the word host. Hosts spend time with
newcomers, help them to integrate into the community. ” In the case of the Kosovar
refugees, CIC called for private sponsors, and in addition to coordinating calls from all
over the country at NHQ, the regional and local CIC offices were charged with finding
sponsors.
Family Reunification Program
The Refugee Branch of CIC started a family reunification program to bring Kosovars to
join relatives in Canada who were citizens, permanent residents or landed immigrants. A
phone hot-line and a fax line were set up to facilitate contact between families.
Procedures were established for a Relative Identification Form (RIF). If a family in
Canada knew of the location of family members in the Balkans, the information was
entered into a database. The information then went to security for a check, to CIC and
UNHCR staff on the ground in Macedonia and Albania, and to the Red Cross. An
extended definition of ‘family’ was employed: spouses, children, parents, grandparents,
siblings, aunts, uncles, and fiancés were all included. Although most of the contacts were
initiated by family in Canada, there were some instances of family members in
Macedonia and Albania who were able to trace their Canadian relatives and submit a RIF
to join them. This extended program of family reunification was available until July 9,
1999. After that date, only cases that were already in process were considered. The overriding consideration from the start was to try to keep families together. One measure of
the effectiveness of this policy is the fact that very few of the family reunification cases
repatriated.
Once KOF and KOS refugees entered Canada, they too could bring family
members over; however, family reunification in their cases was limited to spouses and
dependants. They had until September 9, 1999, to identify immediate relatives. The visa
officers were instructed to continue to work on open files until January 9, 2000. There
was considerable consternation amongst the Kosovars, who did not understand why the
criteria for family had changed. It seemed unfair to them that some people had been able
to bring in siblings, aunts, and uncles while others could not. The rationale was not
explained clearly enough for them to see that the decision had been made in a principled
manner.
Macedonia
Red Cross
The Red Cross was in charge of personal services, including recreation, religious
needs, family tracing on the Internet, and attention to “some of the more vulnerable
people in the camp.” They were also responsible for coordinating the other volunteers on
the base. A Red Cross staff member described the delineation of tasks as follows, “We
looked after the people. The military looked after the building. Immigration looked after
the process of putting people through into homes. We looked after their other needs.”
The Red Cross made a decision to treat the Kosovar refugees as guests: “As a matter of
fact we consciously chose [to refer to the Kosovars as guests] as a management team of
Abu-Laban, B., Derwing, T. M., Mulder, M. & Northcott, H. (2001). Lessons
Learned: An Evaluation of Northern Alberta’s Experience with Kosovar Refugees (3
volumes). Edmonton, AB: The Prairie Centre of Excellence for Research on
Immigration and Integration.
Red Cross people at the very beginning before people actually arrived. We said we are to
refer to these people as the visitors or the guests. That is what we presented to our
volunteers and we used that term, and other people who had responsibilities there used
that term also.”
Salvation Army
Seventy tonnes of clothing had been donated to CFB Gagetown for Operation Parasol.
Volunteers at the base sorted and packaged the clothing. The Salvation Army arranged
for the clothing depot at the base and set it up in a way that made it accessible to the
Kosovars. Initially they had a tent, but later on they were moved to a small building.
Because there was limited space in the building, and because the cashless thrift store was
very popular with the refugees, a system had to be set up to control access. Shoppers
were given colour-coded stickers, and, based on the colour of their sticker, people could
line up on designated days to enter the store. After 20 minutes, they would have to exit,
but they were free to line up and re-enter for another 20 minutes on that day as often as
they liked. Because there was not much to do on the base, many of the Kosovars viewed
the clothing depot as a diversion; they also seemed to find comfort in accumulating
things. A Salvation Army official stated: “When people have been though trauma, they
often put things around them—stuff that provides security. They [Kosovars] were very
much putting stuff around them ... it didn’t even matter if it fit them or not.” Although
the Salvation Army was meeting a clear need, they had some concerns about the effects
of having so many free things available to the Kosovars. “I was thinking, ‘Man, these
guys are going to be in for hard times once they have to go out on a set income, and
you’re not supposed to help them. They are not going to be able to get all this stuff’.”
There were some tensions among the refugees over who was allowed to come to
the store: “Some people wanted to take authority over the others about who could come
or not.” The Salvation Army did not always have access to interpreters on the base, so
they relied on young Kosovars who spoke good English to help them in the store. That
also caused some problems; on occasion, “some of the boys who were helping us were
manipulating others and not allowing some [refugees] in.” It was difficult when people
would line up when it was not their designated day. “We were trying to be fair to
everybody and to give everybody equal opportunity. So when the young people were at
the door, telling some of the older Kosovars that it was not their turn ... some did take
exception because it was a younger person speaking to an elder.”
Islamic Association of Fredericton
Members of the Islamic Association served as volunteers on the base, under the auspices
of the Red Cross; they knew that most of the Kosovars were Muslims, so they offered
their expertise. “We helped in holding prayers regularly—the five-time prayers in the
mosque. We helped in the kitchen ... we talked to them, serving food to older people,
taking care of anything they needed.” The Association also provided the military with a
list of foods that should not be served to Muslims, and they checked the weekly menus to
ensure that inappropriate foods were not included.
Family and Community Services
Abu-Laban, B., Derwing, T. M., Mulder, M. & Northcott, H. (2001). Lessons
Learned: An Evaluation of Northern Alberta’s Experience with Kosovar Refugees (3
volumes). Edmonton, AB: The Prairie Centre of Excellence for Research on
Immigration and Integration.
Family and Community Services social workers were brought to the sustainment site to
provide assistance to any refugees who were in distress. They were known on the base as
family support workers (FSW). One of the first things they did was to ensure that they
had access to two excellent interpreters and that these individuals were assigned to the
family support team on a regular basis. Other workers on the base (hospital personnel, the
military, and Red Cross) were supposed to refer any people who they observed as having
difficulties. However, as a representative from the department reports: “We received very
few referrals from the Red Cross.” In fact, according to the final report of the FSW, out
of 1100 references in 10 weeks, 6 came from Red Cross and 2 of those were for children
who had fallen out of bed. “There was tremendous frustration among those [volunteers]
who were being brought in by the Red Cross because they didn’t know what their jobs
were, what their roles were and what they were supposed to do. A lot of them thought
they were to be doing social work and some thought they were making friends .... I think
there was some resentment towards the social work group who were there in a
professional capacity.” According to the FSWs’ final report, they obtained referrals from
CIC, the Multicultural Association, the medical staff, military, interpreters, and
eventually, some refugees sought them out on their own. One of their main
accomplishments was developing a team approach with two respected interpreters early
on. This, combined with their visibility, walking around the camp, enabled them to be
accepted by the refugees, and to be strong advocates for them. Their success rate with the
problems brought to them by the refugees was very high. The approach taken was
unstructured, non-directive, flexible, and this allowed the team to respond to crises as
they arose.
Interpreters
Finding Albanian-speaking interpreters was a challenge because Canada does not have a
large Albanian community. People were recruited from across the country to serve at the
sustainment sites; many of these individuals continued to interpret for Kosovars when
they returned to their own cities. Although some of the people were superb interpreters,
there were some serious problems with others. First, because some of the Kosovars
understand Serbian, some Serbo-Croatians were hired to interpret. This caused
difficulties on two fronts: many Kosovars only speak Albanian and therefore could not
understand the interpreters, and second, people who had just been airlifted to Canada
because of a conflict with Serbs were not trusting of a Serbian interpreter. Another
related problem had to do with the linguistic proficiency of some of the interpreters. In
some cases, their grasp of English was insufficient; in others, people were hired because
they were of Albanian heritage, but actually had very little knowledge of Albanian.
Moreover, many of the interpreters lacked training. The role of an interpreter is to repeat,
as accurately and neutrally as possible, what has been said. There is no place for
inserting one’s own views, and yet there were reports of interpreters doing just that. For
example, as a member of one of the agencies on the base indicated: “We had an
interpreter scream at someone who was suicidal, ‘Are you a man, or what?’”
The interpreters had perhaps the most stressful role to play at the sustainment
sites. They worked very long hours, at what, under any circumstances, is a taxing job,
but added to that was the level of trauma experienced by some of the Kosovars. The
emotional burden on the interpreters was extreme.
Multicultural Association of Fredericton
Abu-Laban, B., Derwing, T. M., Mulder, M. & Northcott, H. (2001). Lessons
Learned: An Evaluation of Northern Alberta’s Experience with Kosovar Refugees (3
volumes). Edmonton, AB: The Prairie Centre of Excellence for Research on
Immigration and Integration.
The Multicultural Association is a settlement agency; their staff assumed that they would
be responsible for settlement activities at the base, but they expressed a great deal of
frustration because they felt that their roles were not clearly defined. Instead,
Multicultural staff, who were there for the whole time the Kosovars were present, tried to
work around the ambiguities and to provide assistance wherever they saw a need. As one
person put it, “I found that there was nothing that was really ours. Everything had to be
somebody else’s, yet everything came back to us in the end.”
They recruited interpreters from across the country and sponsors locally, they
helped CIC with their duties (for example, working in conjunction with CIC during
interviews and follow-up with families to complete the IMM8 forms (application for
landing)). They made presentations to the Kosovars on Canadian culture, they taught
ESL, and they worked with the local craft school to get activities in place for the
Kosovars. The older refugee women enjoyed knitting, so the Multicultural Association
arranged for donations of wool and other supplies.
Kosovar Village Council
The other significant body that played a role in the day-to-day operation of the base was
the Village Council. The CIC had heard from the health workers, the interpreters, and the
DND that there were certain individuals who seemed to have authority. A CIC
representative indicated that “we took it upon ourselves to gather up some of these
leaders. We had an initial meeting amongst ourselves first, and suggested that it might
not be a bad idea to get some of these people together and let them take an active role in
participation, and making rules and regulations ... So it just evolved from that.” A
Multicultural Association representative described the council as follows: “There were 10
men representing the Kosovar community, one from each hub, and the military,
Immigration, Red Cross and Multicultural. We talked about what was working and what
needed improvement. They could tell us what their needs were and give us suggestions
on how the camp could work better.” “Ultimately Immigration was in charge of what
was going on, but definitely the Village Council would give their input and let the rest of
us know what the people needed.” “They were listened to. They wanted to have an
Albanian school .... They created an Albanian school for grades 1-8. They had teachers
and the military helped them with the supplies that they needed and they created their
own school and maintained that .... They suggested a community garden that would give
people something to do and they could grow their own flowers or vegetables. The
military helped them with that to get them the land and the tools they needed and they
started a garden.” The Council also served as an information dissemination vehicle; for
example, there was a bear problem in the woods, so the Kosovars were advised through
the Council that they shouldn’t leave food outside.
A Red Cross spokesperson viewed the council this way: “Another thing we did ...
is that we had a village council which was chaired by Red Cross. We had people elected
from the group themselves. They elected their own representatives. It varied from eight
to nine people who met with us twice a week, with the military and CIC, and it was
chaired by the Red Cross. These people brought concerns from the guests to the table
and asked questions and they were given answers. We kept minutes and we went over
them every time. We looked at the issues and we resolved things and looked at what still
needed to be resolved.”
A Health Canada official commented on the role of the Village Council from a
psycho-social standpoint: “When you form any kind of committee to help with
Abu-Laban, B., Derwing, T. M., Mulder, M. & Northcott, H. (2001). Lessons
Learned: An Evaluation of Northern Alberta’s Experience with Kosovar Refugees (3
volumes). Edmonton, AB: The Prairie Centre of Excellence for Research on
Immigration and Integration.
scheduling, program policies and guidelines for a community, let them know ahead of
time the level of authority you are giving them. Do not use them to transmit rules and
regulations only, and do not co-opt them so they end up being enforcers. When that
happens you take away their capacity for empowerment. The importance of these
committees is that it is one more step in helping to restore and increase their own and
their community’s sense of safety, security, confidence, competence, control, power,
mastery and trust. That is our hidden agenda.”
Cooperation Among Groups
Any endeavour that involves several different organizations and hundreds of staff and
volunteers is bound to be incredibly complex. Both flexibility and organization are
required if the venture is to be successful. We asked each major stakeholder at Gagetown
about the roles of the other organizations and the level of cooperation that they
encountered. Most people interviewed were impressed that things went as well as they
did, despite certain errors in judgement or planning. The DND earned the admiration of
nearly everyone who was involved: “The military were marvelous!” CIC staff were
praised highly for their sense of fairness and their determination to keep families
together. The Multicultural Association, Family and Community Services and the
Salvation Army were highly respected as well. “The Multicultural Association were stars.
They knew exactly what they were doing. They brought in people who were
knowledgeable, skillful, had background, responded—they were just wonderful.”
The Red Cross, on the other hand, appeared to have been less effective. To be
sure, there were individuals working for the Red Cross who were singled out for praise;
on the whole, however, almost every other organization was dismayed by the poor
performance of the Red Cross volunteers. A DND representative said, “The Red Cross
volunteers had not volunteered much. It was hard to keep them in the kitchen for what
the Red Cross told them was their shift. When I needed them they weren’t there.” The
Salvation Army wanted to get some of their volunteers cleared to come onto the base, but
found that the regular rotation of Red Cross personnel caused problems for them: “There
were real delays ... the faxes were being lost. We had people waiting for three or four
weeks, trying to get clearance because of the delays that were created.” The Multicultural
Association was concerned about the controlling behaviour of some of the Red Cross
workers. “Since the Red Cross had gone through the organizational challenges of the last
few years, the success of this project was very, very important to them. The local
leadership had very young people. It might have been a different dynamic in different
sites, but this was very young leaders who tended to be very controlling .... I’m not
writing off the Red Cross, but it was really challenging to have some 21-year-old telling
all these people who have worked for 15 years with newcomers that if they want to deal
with newcomers they had to take off their MCF T- shirt and put on the Red Cross thing.”
“No respect was given to what we do.” An example of the controlling actions taken by
the Red Cross had to do with the knitting and crocheting supplies. The Red Cross made
the women turn in their wool and needles every night for fear they would hoard them.
“The biggest concern seemed to be control of the resource” rather than the well being of
the women. A couple of organizations commented on the fact that some of the volunteers
appeared to be there because they wanted to socialize with the refugees: “People wanted
to tutor for ulterior motives —like ‘I’ve seen this guy and now I don’t want to tutor
him—I would like to tutor this other guy’. The Kosovars were very popular that
summer—for good and for bad.”
Abu-Laban, B., Derwing, T. M., Mulder, M. & Northcott, H. (2001). Lessons
Learned: An Evaluation of Northern Alberta’s Experience with Kosovar Refugees (3
volumes). Edmonton, AB: The Prairie Centre of Excellence for Research on
Immigration and Integration.
A Health Canada official in Ottawa indicated that the Red Cross’ motivation in
getting involved with Operation Parasol was to get funding and to highlight their roles.
This resulted in a struggle for turf. “There were problems in Borden and problems in
Gagetown. The Red Cross person in charge at Gagetown wouldn’t even discuss or hear
about setting up programs for the children and adolescents. The request to introduce
activities for children had to be brought to the camp advisory council. There were turf
struggles between Red Cross staff and other agencies. Red Cross unduly influenced the
decisions of the Village Councils and basically decided what was going to happen. The
Red Cross does not have a sufficient volunteer base to take on a program like this; the
other part is, their volunteers are not trained for this level of service. Their style of
management is much too authoritarian—no flexibility. This was highlighted in Trenton
and Argonaut, especially in Windsor Park, where there were no games organized for the
kids for practically a month. I mean a formal program. They were approached I don’t
know how many times. And it was finally the FSW who had to ask Canadian Tire if they
could donate a basketball hoop and so on. So many things could have been organized but
their staff were overwhelmed.”
Representatives from CIC New Brunswick said of the Red Cross: “Their whole
modus operandi for being in this thing was to get as much good press as they could
because of all the bad blood publicity they were getting prior to this. We had a lot of
drag down battles with them because they were breaching security in relation to bringing
media people onto the base and not going through the proper channels. We had a lot of
problems with some of their volunteers fraternizing with the refugee population.” “We
would find that the Red Cross would do things like schedule some kind of outside
activity without working with the Multicultural Association to see if the language class
had arranged something. They didn’t seem to be working together, so situations
happened that really didn’t need to, and from what I could see, and I think I was objective
when I looked at it, the problems seemed to be with the Red Cross. They seemed to feel
their power being thwarted or something.”
The Post-Operation Report (POR) from the DND also indicated that getting good
publicity appeared to be an overriding issue for the Red Cross. “There must be a clear
understanding that not all agencies necessarily have the same aims and objectives. As the
operation progressed, it became clear that the Canadian Red Cross had a number of
objectives with respect to publicity and fund-raising that went well beyond the
requirements of the operation itself. While not directly involving the military, this did
lead to a number of potentially serious issues developing between Red Cross and CIC.
These issues were generally resolved by (1) clear understanding that CIC was the lead
agency, and (2) negotiation through the Camp Senior Planning Group” (p. 45; Phase 4
POR). “One concern expressed by a number of the staff, both military and civilian, was
the apparent disparity in media recognition given to the various agencies at Camp
Argonaut. In a number of media pieces published during the course of the operation the
overall slant of the article was that the Red Cross was singularly running the camp” (p.
46; Phase 4 POR). The imbalance in coverage was not appreciated. “The disparity in
media coverage for the three agencies (DND, CIC and Red Cross) may, in some respects,
be attributed to a deliberate media campaign emplaced by the Red Cross. While the
motives of the Red Cross cannot be accurately determined, the effect of disparate media
coverage can. The soldiers employed at Camp Argonaut felt overlooked, their
contribution to the success of the operation downplayed. While not a serious morale
concern (i.e., it did not affect the conduct of the operation), this was deemed to be a
“dissatisfier” for the troops” (p. 4; Phase 5 POR).
Abu-Laban, B., Derwing, T. M., Mulder, M. & Northcott, H. (2001). Lessons
Learned: An Evaluation of Northern Alberta’s Experience with Kosovar Refugees (3
volumes). Edmonton, AB: The Prairie Centre of Excellence for Research on
Immigration and Integration.
Generally the Red Cross found themselves able to work well with the other
groups and to accept the challenges as the were presented. Some focus group members
found the structure of the DND to be different than their own, “Working with the Military
I found really challenging because our style is different. They have much more rigid
views on treating people. Several of them had already worked overseas in humanitarian
peace keeping where they were dealing with refugees. They were much more rigid and
much firmer. ” However, the joint management of the CIC, DND, and Red Cross from
the operation centre proved to be a good way to work together, “The thing that saved us
was the operation centre that worked together, where the three main parties worked on a
regular basis and they were there all day every day making decisions on things that had to
be done.” Another Red Cross participant describes her working relationship with others
as follows: “We always got along with everyone, and we worked together. … Personally
I would not call it a stressful event at all”
Prairie Region
The Prairie Regional office for CIC encouraged local CIC managers to find out what
resources they would need to receive the Kosovars and assured them that the money
would be found. The local managers had a lot of discretion in deciding what course of
action would be taken; as a result, quite different approaches were implemented across
the Prairies. The same directives were thus interpreted and acted upon in very different
manners across the region. In Alberta, there was more contact with settlement agencies in
the early stages than in either Saskatchewan or Manitoba, although the settlement
agencies in Edmonton were in agreement that they should have been consulted sooner
than they were.
The local managers communicated with the provinces, but there were also
telephone conference calls from the region to disseminate information. The region was
also responsible for finding CIC staff to work at the sustainment sites: they sent between
17 to 20 people at a time, which had repercussions for the ongoing programs. All of the
staff across the Prairies worked extremely hard to meet the needs of the Kosovars, while
maintaining normal operations under reduced capacity. One of the spokespersons for the
region indicated that the sponsorship issue came to a head with the Kosovars. The
majority of the sponsors were inexperienced, and the people best versed in settlement
issues, the settlement agencies, were not engaged as partners from the beginning.
According to the CIC representative, “Given the initiatives that we want to undertake to
increase the capacity of communities and of private sponsors, we now need to take what
has happened and get people interested in the program.” When asked about the role of
the SPOs, the same representative said that although “they weren’t involved [in the
Kosovar program] .... [t]hese were probably one of the best-qualified groups to help
address the whole movement.”
Three representatives of settlement agencies from the Prairies (Edmonton was not
included at this meeting) were vocal about the failure of CIC to involve the SPOs from
the beginning of the Kosovar crisis. As one of them put it, “There was a fire and [CIC]
called the police department instead of the fire department .... We [the settlement
agencies] are the fire department. We can do the job. We smelled the smoke and we
went.” Another individual said “[CIC] chose to go around the settlement agencies that
existed and tried to create a parallel organization focused on the SAHs .... The
Abu-Laban, B., Derwing, T. M., Mulder, M. & Northcott, H. (2001). Lessons
Learned: An Evaluation of Northern Alberta’s Experience with Kosovar Refugees (3
volumes). Edmonton, AB: The Prairie Centre of Excellence for Research on
Immigration and Integration.
government looks at this [settlement] as a subcontracting sector. They need to appreciate
that we do the work we do, not because we are subcontractors, but because we have a
commitment that is larger than the subcontractor duty .... CIC betrayed the partnership.
We were ready.” It was the contention of this individual that CIC bureaucrats resent the
entrepreneurial freedom and the commitment of the settlement agencies. He/She noted
that SPOs and the government are often at loggerheads over refugee claimant cases,
among other things, and that an attempt to organize the SAHs could be a strategy for
counterbalancing the independence of the CCR. The third respondent indicated that “we
[a settlement agency] were like an engine idling while CIC set up a parallel organization
.... We were actually told by CIC to get as far away as we could from the sponsors.”
The Response of the Canadian Public
Several respondents indicated that one of the most interesting aspects of the Kosovar
project was the response of the Canadian public. They attributed Canada’s
overwhelmingly generous offers to a number of causes. First, there was a great deal of
media attention (sometimes called the CNN factor), which raised Canadians’ awareness
of the plight of the Kosovars. Second, some individuals indicated that they believed that
guilt played a role as well. Canada was bombing Yugoslavia, along with its NATO
partners, and was thus contributing to the worsening conditions faced by the Kosovars.
CIC Communications reported that, when the airlifts were announced, “[w]e had offers
of help for shelter, food, even breast milk.” Canadians recognized that these were “bona
fide refugees, pushed out of their country.” CIC staff across the country were swamped
with offers such as this one from the Edmonton office: “I remember a call from a man up
in northern Alberta. He had a little shed and he thought that it would be a nice place. It
didn’t have any electricity or water, but he thought it would be good. He was kind and
nice—but this was an example of the types of calls that came in all the time.” Not only
did people donate money and goods, but they also were eager to sponsor Kosovar
refugees when the Minister issued her appeal. CIC was in the position of having more
would-be sponsors than refugees; but many of the people who offered to help lived in
small centres and were disappointed when CIC decided to restrict settlement to larger
cities in order to ensure that the Kosovars would have access to ESL and other settlement
services.
The Uniqueness of the Kosovars versus Sierra Leone
The generous treatment of the Kosovars was questioned in some sectors, especially in
light of the fact that refugees from Sierra Leone, who were in equally dire straits, were
not given the same options. When asked why Kosovars received such extraordinary
treatment, a CIC official from the Integration Branch pointed out that the main difference
was the appeal from the UNHCR. “We received a request. This was a humanitarian
evacuation. This is completely different from our regular dealings in terms of helping
people out of refugee camps. This was a most unique request .... Once here and out of the
camps, Kosovars were treated similarly to all government assisted refugees. We used our
regular refugee programs to provide financial assistance to them. The one unusual effort
CIC made was to try and ensure that these refugees had access to interpretation, language
training and trauma assistance as quickly as possible. These are services normally
Abu-Laban, B., Derwing, T. M., Mulder, M. & Northcott, H. (2001). Lessons
Learned: An Evaluation of Northern Alberta’s Experience with Kosovar Refugees (3
volumes). Edmonton, AB: The Prairie Centre of Excellence for Research on
Immigration and Integration.
delivered through settlement programs. We injected more money into our settlement
agencies to try and make these services available for them more quickly.” Another CIC
spokesperson from the Refugee Branch agreed. “There was no appeal from UNHCR for
the refugees of Sierra Leone; for that reason, the Canadian government is using its
standard refugee programs to assist them.”
Challenges and Successes
All of the respondents felt that there were real strengths to the project, and representatives
of each agency or department were pleased with the commitment of the staff or
volunteers from their own organization. Operation Parasol, after all, achieved its mission.
The goal was to airlift 5,000 people to safety; in fact, more than 7,000 Kosovars came to
Canada in a very short period of time. The government departments and agencies
responsible for the operation of the airheads and the sustainment sites had mechanisms in
place when the Kosovars arrived, and the majority of the refugees felt that they had been
treated very well. There was an outpouring of support from the Canadian public the likes
of which hadn’t been seen since the arrival of the Vietnamese Boat People. These facts
alone suggest that the project was an unqualified success. However, arranging for such a
massive influx of people in so short a time was not without problems. We asked the
respondents to identify the challenges and successes they experienced, as well as any
recommendations they would have for the future, if a similar situation were to arise, and
for the existing refugee programs.
Challenges
a) National Challenges
The individuals from CIC who were interviewed in Ottawa were largely responsible for
planning. Some of their comments relate to the challenges they themselves experienced;
in other cases they discuss problems that occurred when their plans were implemented at
the sustainment sites or in the sponsoring communities. There were essentially four main
areas of concern: the lack of a plan; communication difficulties; lack of preparedness on
the part of Red Cross volunteers; and lack of training for interpreters and sponsors.
Lack of a plan
As one representative of CIC, Refugee Branch put it: “We never had an emergency
response plan—corporate memory is really important.” Another individual from the CIC
Refugee Branch indicated that some of the best resources hadn’t been tapped, presumably
because of the absence of an emergency response plan: “Another thing we could have
done better is we could use our SPOs that we use under the RAP program a lot more
effectively. We didn’t have the infrastructure in place to handle all the calls from wouldbe sponsors.” This same person felt that “we could have worked faster in the regions—
they could have hired a lot more people but they didn’t”; the local managers of CIC
centres, however, were scrambling, in part because there was no plan in place.
A representative of the Red Cross also noted that Operation Parasol was a
challenge because it was so different from other situations the organization had dealt
with: “Most of the disasters Red Cross responds to are ones such as Manitoba floods and
Abu-Laban, B., Derwing, T. M., Mulder, M. & Northcott, H. (2001). Lessons
Learned: An Evaluation of Northern Alberta’s Experience with Kosovar Refugees (3
volumes). Edmonton, AB: The Prairie Centre of Excellence for Research on
Immigration and Integration.
the Edmonton tornado, where the Red Cross’ role and response activities are defined
ahead of time in municipal plans. A different type of assistance was needed for this
operation, dealing with refugees coming to stay on Canadian bases, so different response
activities were required.”
Communication problems
Tied to this overarching difficulty were problems with communication. A respondent
from CIC, Integration Branch indicated that “the biggest challenge was communication—
you can’t do enough.” “We were dealing with the perception that we had treated this
group differently from any other group and being criticized a lot for that when we
thought it wasn’t the case. The information given to Kosovars, agencies and provinces
was accurate, but people believe what they want to believe—the Kosovars believed that
Canada is the land of milk and honey, a rather high expectation that we could not always
satisfy.” A representative of the Resettlement Branch of CIC also commented on
communication: “There were problems with sponsors because the appeal was not clear
enough and problems with the change in criteria for family reunification—the Kosovars
didn’t understand.” Persons from both the Refugee Branch at CIC and the Red Cross
indicated that there was insufficient information about the Kosovars. The former noted
that “a lot of religious assumptions were made,” while the latter pointed out that there
was not enough cultural information about the Kosovars to give to the Red Cross
volunteers. Communication with sponsors was an issue for CIC, Refugee Branch: “We
could be a lot better in terms of the information we provided to sponsors.” Another
individual from the same Branch had a similar concern: “Sponsors were disappointed
with repatriates—it should have been more clearly communicated that they might leave,
in order to manage people’s expectations.”
Unprepared volunteers
A third challenge had to do with the lack of preparedness of many of the people who
worked at the sustainment sites, especially members of the Red Cross. A spokesperson
for Health Canada stated that “Red Cross staff were not trained, they had an insufficient
volunteer base and a hierarchical management style which resulted in things not
happening—such as programs for kids. Our staff ended up providing stress management
to Red Cross, CIC, interpreters—we had a whole group of clients besides the refugees.”
Untrained volunteers, although well-meaning, caused problems, such as this one noted by
a staff person from CIC Resettlement: “Some volunteers on the bases were giving advice
such as don’t go to Saskatchewan or Quebec.” As a staff member at DND put it: “A lot of
the DND people were really scornful about the Red Cross, forgetting that they were
volunteers. The DND attitude is ‘We are used to doing it, therefore we can do it a lot
better than you can, so stay out of our way.’ It’s like five-year-olds helping unload the
dishwasher. They love to do it but an adult could do it in one tenth the time.”
Lack of training for interpreters and sponsors
There were other areas where a lack of training caused problems; neither the interpreters
nor the sponsors received adequate support. A CIC Integration Branch spokesperson
stated that “the sponsors didn’t get enough training, and some thought more was
expected of them.” The individual who coordinated the interpreters and translators at
CIC noted that “there was a problem with interpreters giving their opinions, particularly
around medical services—they didn’t receive any training.” A lack of training, problems
with communications and the fact that there was no emergency plan in place before the
Abu-Laban, B., Derwing, T. M., Mulder, M. & Northcott, H. (2001). Lessons
Learned: An Evaluation of Northern Alberta’s Experience with Kosovar Refugees (3
volumes). Edmonton, AB: The Prairie Centre of Excellence for Research on
Immigration and Integration.
appeal from UNHCR occurred may have contributed to another challenge cited by a
Resettlement Branch staff person, who said with regard to life at the sustainment sites: “I
think everyone wanted to do everything that could be done because they were in such
need. It might have created a false atmosphere or a false reality.”
b) Airhead and Sustainment Base Challenges
The rest of this section has to do with problems encountered at Gagetown.
The overwhelming concern on the part of several agencies and departments had to
do with the lack of professionalism exhibited by Red Cross volunteers. The only friction
noted consistently across organizations involved the Red Cross. Red Cross workers
indicated that they had difficulties working with the military and the interpreters; they felt
that the military were unbending in their approach to dealing with the refugees (however,
one Red Cross staff said the military were very flexible). They also noted that the
interpreters appeared to edit what they said, rather than giving an exact translation.
A representative from CIC, Fredericton indicated that there was a lot of friction
amongst personnel, which was attributed to the following: “Red Cross volunteers didn’t
know their roles—there was inappropriate fraternization; they were unable to identify
real settlement needs. Red Cross’s attitude was that the refugees were guests. Where do
they get off treating them as guests? It was a humanitarian evacuation. They came here
as refugees.” The respondents from the Salvation Army also noted problems with the Red
Cross: “Red Cross could have communicated better with the groups it was working
with—they had team meetings and did not tell us about them.” Family and Community
Services had similar experiences: “We didn’t feel as though we were part of the team—
we had problems with Red Cross. We had limited access to clients with problems—Red
Cross refused to refer—we probably missed a lot of people with needs because Red Cross
was taking over in roles they were not trained for.” A spokesperson from Health Canada
reported that the Red Cross volunteers “were trying to dissuade Kosovars from going to
certain parts of the country.” The focus group from the Multicultural Association of
Fredericton cited a power struggle between some CIC and Red Cross representatives as
being problematic; they found it very challenging to work in an environment where roles
were not clearly defined. They also found that the three-week rotation of CIC and Red
Cross staff caused difficulties for continuity of service, as did the family support workers.
The DND representatives indicated that it was awkward not knowing which was the lead
agency at the outset. Another principal concern was the lack of professionalism in Red
Cross volunteers.
There were several challenges that had to do with the Kosovars. The Red Cross
found their behaviour to be surprising at times: “Culturally it was a challenge; a very
patriarchal society. I think that we had to try and make them realize that there are certain
rules in our culture and if they are visiting Canada they must abide by [them].” They
were also caught unprepared to meet the demand when refugees hoarded goods such as
laundry soap and other personal items. The DND were concerned that the atmosphere
found at the sustainment sites would have an effect on the Kosovars’ expectations once
they were out in the real world: “We tried to bring people’s expectations down—we were
providing a much higher level of service than what they would get in the provinces.”
Sponsorship recruitment and matching were concerns for both CIC New
Brunswick and the Multicultural Association. CIC felt that “Ottawa made a big mistake
with the sponsorship recruitment program, contracting to World Vision—they didn’t
know the first thing about it. ” The focus group from Multicultural Association explained
that because the destining was done further into the operation, the training and settlement
Abu-Laban, B., Derwing, T. M., Mulder, M. & Northcott, H. (2001). Lessons
Learned: An Evaluation of Northern Alberta’s Experience with Kosovar Refugees (3
volumes). Edmonton, AB: The Prairie Centre of Excellence for Research on
Immigration and Integration.
staff from CIC that were on base earlier had been replaced by other CIC staff, and as a
result, “destining was done by two officers with no settlement background.” They felt
that there could have been much better matching of sponsors and refugees. The
spokespersons indicated that Kosovars were sometimes told things that were inaccurate
such as ‘No, you must go there or you will live in two separate towns’; ‘You will get a
job, no problem’; and ‘No problem, you can bring your relative to Canada’ when the
relative in question was ineligible.
The DND’s POR detailed a number of challenges. First, there was confusion over
fiscal responsibilities. “From initial deployment it was the understanding of both military
and CIC staffs within the Camp that CIC (as lead agency) were ultimately responsible for
meeting the costs of the humanitarian evacuation. Consequently, all capital expenditures,
regardless of organization, were processed through CIC for approval and authorization.
This caused a number of delays as CIC was not adequately staffed for this role. The issue
was further compounded in the Phase 5 close-out procedures. Following on from the
understanding of fiscal responsibilities, it was agreed that CIC were responsible for
disposal of all capital assets. This was questioned from the national level (NHQ), at
which time it was briefed that there was “a clear understanding “ between CIC and DND
that the agency/department that expended the funds was responsible for having
authorized the purchase and for asset disposal” (p. 20, Phase 4 POR). The DND would
have liked clarity on this issue at the outset of the operation, stating that central
coordination of expense would have simplified accounting for expenditures when the
operation was over. Another major challenge for the DND had to do with the division of
law enforcement responsibility at the base, which was divided among DND, CIC and the
RCMP. Although eventually this problem was resolved, at the beginning of the
operation, responsibilities of each agency were not clear. The Camp security policy was
“from the outside-in.” The concept was to control access by personnel outside the camp
rather than to limit the movement of the refugees residing inside the camp .... The policy
recognized that there was no legal basis to limit the movement of the refugee population
on or off site once initial Immigration processing had been completed .... Until that
occurred, military personnel monitored and reported movements but had no authority to
detain. Enforcement of Immigration Law was carried out by CIC Security, reinforced as
necessary by the RCMP” (p. 50, Phase 4 POR).
A challenge cited by several of the agencies at Gagetown was the limited access
to interpreters and the range in interpreting skills. There were not enough trained
interpreters who were fluent in both Albanian and English. The report of three
psychiatrists working within Operation Parasol identified a related problem: some
interpreters were refugees, “paid for their services, which set up a hierarchy within the
camp. We believed the refugee-interpreters may have found it difficult to maintain
confidentiality and neutrality.”
Finally, IOM’s greatest challenge had to do with the amount of luggage that the
Kosovars accumulated during their stay. When the refugees were transported to their
settlement cities, they wanted to take all the goods that they had accumulated at the
sustainment sites. Although eventually they were allowed to bring several bags, many
had to leave some of their belongings behind.
c) Regional Challenges
Within the Prairie region, a challenge for CIC had to do with communication outside the
organization, especially around the special needs status of the Kosovars; there was a
concern that their status had not been explained well to the public.
Abu-Laban, B., Derwing, T. M., Mulder, M. & Northcott, H. (2001). Lessons
Learned: An Evaluation of Northern Alberta’s Experience with Kosovar Refugees (3
volumes). Edmonton, AB: The Prairie Centre of Excellence for Research on
Immigration and Integration.
The representatives of three Prairie-based settlement agencies suggested that
“CIC should have involved the SPOs from the beginning, and that many of the problems
associated with the arrival of the Kosovars could have been avoided, had the settlement
agencies been put in charge.” In the end, most of the agencies were involved, but
because, in some instances, they were stepping in part way through, they had certain
restrictions put on them by CIC. For example, “CIC paid interpreters $19.00 an hour,
then, when they passed the responsibilities off on the SPOs, CIC said that the SPOs had
to pay $19.00 an hour, at an agency where no one makes that much.”
Successes
As is natural in any lessons learned document, there tends to be more focus on challenges
and related recommendations than on successes; however, in the case of Operation
Parasol, the number of things that went right far exceeds the number that went wrong,
judging from the evaluations of the Kosovars themselves. Although there are fewer
comments in this section than in the previous one, it is safe to say that representatives
from every participating agency and government department are extremely proud of their
own contributions. As the Associate Deputy Minister for CIC said: “There was an
incredible commitment on the part of staff and volunteers.”
a) National Successes
A spokesperson for the CIC, Refugee Branch summed up several successes achieved by
all the departments involved: “We did the whole operation with very few resources; we
revitalized the refugee program and moved 5000 people in 22 days.” A representative of
Health Canada gave kudos to CIC: “If you were going to give CIC a grade, it would be
close to an ‘A’ —they kept not only family but friends together—they had a very positive
attitude about dealing fairly with the Kosovars.” The notion of teamwork came up over
and over; among others, the Human Resource Branch of CIC stressed the cooperation of
the union; an individual from CIC Communications pointed out how well the government
departments worked together and a representative of CIC interpreters and translators
stated that “the whole team worked together. It had to come together so fast.”
In some instances, new resources were developed, for example, Information
Management in CIC now has a comprehensive box of emergency provisions for
technological set-up. CIC was pleased that “we gained a lot of people who had never
thought of sponsoring before” and Red Cross reported that “we gained some new
financial donors and corporate partners who donated goods to the operation and have
remained partners.”
The CCR conducted a workshop in December of 1999 in which they evaluated
the response to the Kosovar project. In the document summarizing the workshop, they
identified many successes, in which they emphasized the flexibility at all levels, the fast
mobilization of resources, and the political will to ensure a successful outcome.
b) Airhead and Sustainment Base Successes
The people who worked directly with the refugees at the airhead and at the sustainment
site shared the sentiments of the respondents from Ottawa. Every agency and department
found the experience to be a positive one, despite any problems that arose. The
evacuation itself went very well and was a model of efficiency and success. As a foreign
service officer for CIC said: “The evacuation went very well—we knew the people on
the ground and understood the conditions. With our evacuation nobody believed that we
Abu-Laban, B., Derwing, T. M., Mulder, M. & Northcott, H. (2001). Lessons
Learned: An Evaluation of Northern Alberta’s Experience with Kosovar Refugees (3
volumes). Edmonton, AB: The Prairie Centre of Excellence for Research on
Immigration and Integration.
could do a flight a day. It was unrealistic but we did it. We took the most people in the
shortest amount of time. We were the only country that did daily flights.” IOM was
pleased that none of those 22 flights was cancelled. A spokesperson for the UNHCR
recognized that “Canada now has the skills to expedite an evacuation if there is the
political will. ” This same individual also commented on the strength of the media that
contributed to the outpouring of support from the Canadian public.
Health Canada indicated that “everyone at the airhead worked well together—
CIC and health professionals. Under poor physical plant conditions we managed to deal
with every flight, with great success and exceptional flexibility.”
The groups that worked with the refugees at Gagetown were in agreement that
there were many positive aspects to Operation Parasol. Here is a sampling of their
comments. The Salvation Army indicated that “the successes were our interactions with
the Kosovars, the response from Canadians and the positive community response from
stores and volunteers. This experience broadened our view.” The focus group from CIC,
New Brunswick made these comments: “We did a pretty good job of keeping families
together. Overall, the operation was a success; the military at Gagetown were
tremendous. CIC came together as a department. People sacrificed but no one ever
complained or regretted it. It was such a positive experience for all of us.” Family and
Community Services New Brunswick cited the wonderful support from CIC, and
commented on how people in their organization worked together; they were pleased that
the refugees were all safe. A spokesperson for DND indicated that the time at Gagetown
was rewarding: “It was a positive experience for military staff; the refugees had high
quality treatment; there was good inter-agency cooperation and the response of the public
was great.” The DND POR cited the family support workers for their help to members of
the military; not only did they diffuse potentially difficult situations in camp generally,
but they were also “good de-stressors” for the military staff.
Participants from the Red Cross in Fredericton outlined a variety of successes. For
some success meant building the reputation of the Red Cross, “For me the success was
that Red Cross got to actually show others, the military and immigration, that we can do a
really good job,” and “I think that it was in this area where we got good publicity for the
Red Cross which is an organization that has taken a beating. So it is the other side of the
Red Cross. People knew that the Red Cross wasn’t just blood. That part was a big
success for Red Cross.” Another success was good teamwork and a common goal,
“Everybody was flexible enough to want it to work, and that was really good,” and “We
all had one common goal and that is what we put our sites on.”
c) Regional Successes
The responses at the regional level of CIC were similar to those expressed at the national
level: “We had flexibility; we did an amazing job;” “There was tremendous good will;”
“We had good communication with the province (Alberta).” Each respondent indicated
that the commitment on the part of employees was superb.
Recommendations
Many recommendations were made by the individuals we interviewed as well as in the
documentation we reviewed. In this section we will provide a synopsis of the information
we gathered. Although some of these recommendations are intended for consideration
Abu-Laban, B., Derwing, T. M., Mulder, M. & Northcott, H. (2001). Lessons
Learned: An Evaluation of Northern Alberta’s Experience with Kosovar Refugees (3
volumes). Edmonton, AB: The Prairie Centre of Excellence for Research on
Immigration and Integration.
when and if another emergency evacuation occurs, many have relevance for the ongoing
refugee programs currently offered by CIC and settlement agencies. The Kosovar project,
as the Prime Minister pointed out in the CIC publication, Visa (October, 1999), was a
tremendous accomplishment that entailed the enthusiasm and dedication of countless
numbers of people. The experience of these individuals could serve as a valuable
resource for future ventures. Although there is overlap in a few instances, we have
classified the recommendations into the following categories: Communication,
Information Management and Dissemination Recommendations; Involvement of Service
Providers; Training-Related Recommendations; Refugee Policy Recommendations;
Sustainment Site-Related Recommendations; and Sponsors-Related Recommendations.
1. Communication, Information Management & Dissemination Recommendations
In virtually every interview and final report the point was made that communication is
crucial, and that steps should be taken to improve connections within and between
stakeholders at all stages of the process. A representative of the CIC Refugee Branch
suggested that procedures be streamlined for temporary offices overseas, taking into
account the difficult conditions under which they operate. In the same vein, Information
Management at CIC suggested that there is a need to explore wireless communication for
overseas. The DND at Gagetown indicated that “a report from the field in Macedonia
would have been very helpful.” According to the DND POR, there had been a report
from Macedonia: “Personnel who had been in the Balkans provided information for a one
day orientation package for DND/CFB personnel at the camp.” However, there was also
other information that would have been useful; such as an indication of how many
women, toddlers and infants were coming, in order to stock up on appropriate supplies.
DND had not anticipated infants, and the Red Cross did not have enough time to order
feminine products.
Several organizations, including DND, Family and Community Services, the
psychiatrists, and the Multicultural Association of Fredericton recommended that there be
clear information from the beginning on the roles of the various organizations involved.
A plan, timelines, job descriptions, lines of communication and authority should be
spelled out. Several groups also commented on the need for planning for such an
operation; in the prairie region it was stressed that CIC should have a contingency plan
for a massive influx of refugees; the psychiatrists recommended that a set of
psychological principles be adopted and adhered to in the implementation of care for
refugees; and Health Canada indicated the need for clearer specification of the
information needed in medical records. Health Canada also recommended improved
communication between doctors at the airheads and on the bases. At sustainment sites,
the family support workers suggested that in the future, each person who works there be
debriefed; not only to benefit the individuals but also to provide information for future
endeavours. The Multicultural Association stressed that people working on the base must
be precise in what they tell the Kosovars about employment, and so forth. Although the
workers were likely trying to alleviate fears the refugees may have had by reassuring
them that they would find employment suitable to their skills, they ultimately caused
distress when it became apparent to the Kosovars that they had been misled.
Better communication across other constituencies was also recommended by the
Multicultural Association, who argued for clearer explanations for changes to family
reunification requirements to help refugees understand the policies of the government.
On a similar note, a CIC official in Ottawa indicated that a strategy should be developed
Abu-Laban, B., Derwing, T. M., Mulder, M. & Northcott, H. (2001). Lessons
Learned: An Evaluation of Northern Alberta’s Experience with Kosovar Refugees (3
volumes). Edmonton, AB: The Prairie Centre of Excellence for Research on
Immigration and Integration.
to more clearly inform the public in a way that they understand the status of refugees
such as the Kosovars. CIC New Brunswick suggested that there be more consultation
with the regions and that provinces be given more power in some of the decision making.
The CCR report outlined many similar recommendations regarding
communication. It also pointed to the benefits of using media to educate the general
public about refugee issues and suggested a public Thank-you, especially for sponsors
who did not receive Kosovars.
2. Involvement of Service Providers
Tied to the issue of clear terminology was the issue of the involvement of service
providers. There was general consensus that service providers, especially settlement
agency personnel, be involved from the very beginning if a project similar to Operation
Parasol arises. A representative of CIC Integration Branch stated it this way: “I would
reach out to service providers earlier. They could have helped find hosts quickly and
effectively. They could have also helped in seeking our sponsors in collaboration with the
normal channels.” Other staff at CIC also indicated that the service providers should have
been included sooner, but no one was as vocal about the need for the involvement of the
settlement agencies as the representatives from the agencies themselves. As one of them
said, “There is very little corporate memory in CIC—the staff is always changing. CIC
learned a lot, but the SPOs had to pick up the pieces. Use the best people to do the job.”
Health Canada also suggested assigning the best people to the project, rather than the first
people who happen to volunteer. Not only should the settlement agencies have been
utilized to a far greater degree at the sustainment sites, but they also should have been
tasked with the sponsoring arrangements at the outset. The Multicultural Association
recommended that settlement agencies should have been contacted to orient sponsors;
they could have recruited and matched sponsors and refugees. A spokesperson from CIC,
Refugee Branch, agreed: “The SPOs should take care of the training, get the new
sponsors and provide information; our biggest mistake was not using them this time.”
3. Training-Related Recommendations
There were many recommendations related to training of both staff and volunteers. The
family support workers suggested that first and foremost, experienced people be used.
Even then, comprehensive training is essential. An official from the CIC, Refugee Branch
stated that “we could set up training or procedures for managers on how to deal with
emergency or unusual situations.”
The spokespersons from Red Cross, Fredericton suggested that, in future, CIC
“give more lead time to recruit and train volunteers and to be sure that they can get their
shots and criminal records checks.” People from several organizations commented on the
need for training for the interpreters. A representative of CIC [interpreters and
translators] indicated that potential interpreters should be screened for bilingual language
proficiency, health and education levels and should then receive training. In both the final
report of the psychiatrists (Heber et al.) and the Health Canada interviews, it was
suggested that interpreters should be provided with debriefing and that ways be found to
help alleviate their stress, such as scheduling their time so that they can leave their work
periodically to be with their families.
4. Refugee Policy Recommendations
Abu-Laban, B., Derwing, T. M., Mulder, M. & Northcott, H. (2001). Lessons
Learned: An Evaluation of Northern Alberta’s Experience with Kosovar Refugees (3
volumes). Edmonton, AB: The Prairie Centre of Excellence for Research on
Immigration and Integration.
Given the unique nature of the Kosovar situation, several organizations took the
opportunity to make general recommendations regarding refugee policy. The
Multicultural Association, in reference to the practice of assessing refugee status
overseas, suggested that there be more flexibility in determining status when people
arrive in Canada. They indicated that CIC at a local level should be able to change the
status from a CR1 to a CR5, for example, if the situation warrants. They recommended a
general policy of starting with less and giving more as required; that is, one year of
support for all, followed by an assessment to determine if further support is necessary.
The settlement agency representatives indicated that they would like the federal
government to provide the same level of support to all refugees as was supplied to the
Kosovars.
The FSW had some recommendations regarding repatriation of the Kosovars.
First, if a similar situation arises again, they suggested a reconsideration of providing the
opportunity to repatriate, because they felt that, in the case of the Kosovars, their ability
to focus on settling was compromised by the two-year window to return to Kosova. If a
decision is made in future to offer repatriation, they recommended that refugees not be
sent home until they have been to their settlement communities, so that they are better
informed as to their choices.
The CCR recommended that several aspects of the Kosovar project be extended to
other parts of the settlement program, such as expediting refugees’ travel to Canada with
Minister’s permits, abolishing ROLF and keeping families together.
Finally, the psychiatric report (Heber et al.) suggested that an outcome study be
conducted to examine the Kosovars’ health and adaptation in Canada, in order to guide
policy in the case of future operations.
5. Sustainment Site-Related Recommendations
There were a number of diverse recommendations that dealt with the running of
sustainment sites; some referred specifically to refugees and some to the staff on site.
The FSW were concerned that the physical set-up of the camp did not allow for sufficient
privacy for the Kosovars; in future they recommend prefab or trailer housing. The
Salvation Army also felt that fewer people should be accommodated at any one site;
preferably under 1,000. Both the Islamic Association of Fredericton and the Salvation
Army suggested that refugees be provided with opportunities to work on the base as soon
as possible. The Islamic Association stated: “Give them skill improvement on the base,
for example, carpentry, and assign more responsibilities to them—people were spoon-fed
for too long.” The Salvation Army echoed this recommendation: “Establish some sort of
work roster to keep refugees occupied.” The high expectations the Kosovars had on
arrival in their settlement communities has been attributed to the unreal nature of the
sustainment site. Tied to this notion of raising expectations were the gifts that people
received. The Multicultural Association recommended that donations not be distributed
on the basis of ethnicity; all refugees should be treated equally, but bikes were donated
only to Kosovars. Finally, the Salvation Army recommended that people be allowed to
keep all the goods they are given; and that there be arrangements for more luggage rather
than forcing refugees to leave belongings behind.
The recommendations that related to the staff and volunteers at the sustainment
sites were as follows:
Abu-Laban, B., Derwing, T. M., Mulder, M. & Northcott, H. (2001). Lessons
Learned: An Evaluation of Northern Alberta’s Experience with Kosovar Refugees (3
volumes). Edmonton, AB: The Prairie Centre of Excellence for Research on
Immigration and Integration.
1. The DND indicated that military policy should be given dispensation to detain
refugees who want to leave camp rather than leaving that to the RCMP or the Ontario
Provincial Police.
2. The family support workers suggested ensuring more continuity of staff: “the threeweek rotation of staff from CIC and Red Cross made it difficult for the rest of the
agencies.”
3. Both Health Canada and the family support workers indicated that there should be a
mechanism for dealing with stress among staff: self-care should be built in to
scheduling and people should be sent home if they show signs of burnout.
4. The FSW advised that cultural brokers would have been useful on site.
5. The Multicultural Association suggested importing interpreters from the source
country and bringing English speakers from the ranks of the refugees early to use
them as interpreters on the base.
6. Finally, it was noted that medical and dental care provided by volunteers on base was
more than what was allowed in provinces; the Multicultural Association suggested
that in future, refugees should be given only emergency care to avoid problems later.
6. Sponsor-Related Recommendations
A CIC official from the Prairie region stated that one of the main outcomes of the
Kosovar project has been a heightening of awareness of the role of sponsors. This
individual suggested that CIC examine sponsorship in light of this experience; training
and debriefing, in particular, should be employed. CIC Resettlement staff echoed this
sentiment, urging that sponsors be trained and that they be made aware of all the
resources in the community at the disposal of the refugees. They also suggested that
there should be a system of sponsor accountability. The Multicultural Association
recommended that there be better matching of sponsors and refugees from the beginning,
(for instance, new sponsors should not be given difficult cases). Matching could be
accomplished by providing family profiles to the local CIC. Closer attention to matching
should be accompanied by training and support; a mentoring program with government
assistance was suggested. Health Canada indicated that CIC could hire social workers to
support sponsors and refugee families. Communication for sponsors was also stressed:
the Multicultural Association suggested that email be used extensively; they
recommended a chat room where inexperienced sponsors could raise issues with
experienced volunteers and they indicated that RAP binders and other information must
be distributed more widely.
The CCR report suggested that resources be found to establish and maintain a
national network of SAHs; they also advocated the development of a “communication
process to recognize and ensure the representation of all community players/provinces
(SAHs, SPOs, CIC, other organizations, the public)” (p. 5).
Summary
Abu-Laban, B., Derwing, T. M., Mulder, M. & Northcott, H. (2001). Lessons
Learned: An Evaluation of Northern Alberta’s Experience with Kosovar Refugees (3
volumes). Edmonton, AB: The Prairie Centre of Excellence for Research on
Immigration and Integration.
1. Individual interviews were conducted with representatives of CIC, Red Cross, DND,
CIDA, IOM, UNHCR and Health Canada and focus group discussions were carried
out with the Red Cross of Fredericton, the Multicultural Association of Fredericton,
CIC New Brunswick, the St. John Salvation Army, Family and Community Services
of New Brunswick (the FSW), the Fredericton Islamic Association, CIC Prairie
region staff and representatives of settlement agencies in the prairies (outside
Edmonton).
2. Final reports of organizations involved with Operation Parasol were reviewed.
3. Canada’s response to the UNHCR appeal was swift and unprecedented; over 5,000
Kosovars were airlifted to Canada, where they were sent to military bases, known as
sustainment sites.
4. A family reunification program was implemented, with a relaxed definition of eligible
family members.
5. CIC, DND and the Red Cross were the lead agencies in planning and implementing
the Kosovars’ stay at the sustainment sites.
6. The Minister of CIC made a public appeal for sponsors.
7. Sponsors were asked to provide many of the same services that are normally a part of
the JAS Program,but there was no financial obligation.
8. Refugees were assessed medically at the airheads, and then sent on to the sustainment
sites.
9. The Red Cross was responsible for coordinating personal services at the sites, which
were offered by their own volunteers and several other agencies at the Gagetown site,
including the Multicultural Association, the family support workers, the Salvation
Army and the Islamic Association of Fredericton.
10.
A Kosovar Village Council was established to involve Kosovars in decisionmaking and to disseminate information.
11. Generally, most groups on the sites worked well together, but the Red Cross was
singled out by other agencies and government departments for having a publicity
agenda. Red Cross volunteers were strongly criticized by other groups because of
their lack of training and professionalism.
12.
The Canadian public was generous in their support of the Kosovars.
13.
Agencies indicated many challenges and successes of Operation Parasol at the
planning level, in the implementation at the airheads and sustainment sites and at the
level of sponsors in settlement communities.
14.
Recommendations of the participating respondents and those found in the final
reports were identified.
Abu-Laban, B., Derwing, T. M., Mulder, M. & Northcott, H. (2001). Lessons
Learned: An Evaluation of Northern Alberta’s Experience with Kosovar Refugees (3
volumes). Edmonton, AB: The Prairie Centre of Excellence for Research on
Immigration and Integration.
References
Canadian Council for Refugees (1999). The Kosovar experience: Lessons learned workshop at the CCR
conference, December, 1999. (5 pages).
Canadian Red Cross (nd). Lessons learned. (1 page).
Citizenship and Immigration Canada (1999). Visa, special edition: Kosovo humanitarian evacuation:
Employee recognition. Vol. 2. (20 pages).
Engineer Support Regiment (1999). Engineer Support Regiment Operation Parasol post operation report
(POR). Canadian Forces Base Gagetown. (120 pages).
Emergency Services, Health Canada (nd). Psychosocial support to the Kosovars: Lessons learned for
community mental health. (5 pages).
Family Support Workers (1999). Final report. (13 pages).
Harwood, C. (1999). Report on the reception of refugees from Kosovo at the Trenton AMU and
Mountainview air base. (36 pages).
Heber, Pain & Schabas (nd). Final report on the Kosovar experience from Drs. Heber, Pain and Schabas
(psychiatrists). (9 pages).
Health Canada (nd). Psychosocial support to the Kosovars: Lessons learned for community mental health
(tran-script of an oral presentation). (14 pages).
Salvation Army (Saint John) (1999). Final report – Operation Parasol, Base Gagetown NB April, May,
June 1999. (3 pages).
Note
1.
Participants from individual interviews and at least one key person from each focus group were
contacted for their approval regarding substantive quotes. Several quotes by Red Cross participants have
been withdrawn at the request of the Red Cross in Fredericton, NB.
Abu-Laban, B., Derwing, T. M., Mulder, M. & Northcott, H. (2001). Lessons
Learned: An Evaluation of Northern Alberta’s Experience with Kosovar Refugees (3
volumes). Edmonton, AB: The Prairie Centre of Excellence for Research on
Immigration and Integration.
4 . PROFILE OF REFUGEE RESPONDENTS
This chapter focuses on demographic and social profiles of the refugee respondents. For
comparison purposes, the data have been classified by category of refugee, as well as by
sex, age, and education where applicable. Profile topics include general demographics for
the respondents and their families; the refugee-making experience; language;
employment; education; and religion.
Demographic Characteristics of Refugees
The average age for KOS, KOF and non-Kosovars, including respondents and their
children born prior to 1984, is 28, 24 and 25 years respectively. Given that refugees who
came to Canada under Operation Parasol were selected solely on the basis of need (for
other refugees age is a factor in the selection process), one would expect the average age
of Kosovars to be considerably higher than that of non-Kosovars. If we consider that the
average age of repatriated Kosovars is 32 and that 28% of the repatriates are over the age
of 45, compared with 11% of those that stayed in Canada (see Chapter 8), the difference
in average age of Kosovars and non-Kosovars is understood.
Males and females were equally represented in the Kosovar respondent group and
the CR3 portion of the non-Kosovar group. However, all of the non-Kosovar Joint
Assistant Sponsorship (JAS) respondents (N=4) were female. Many JAS refugees enter
Canada under the Women at Risk Program. It is uncommon for adult males without
disabilities to be classified as JAS. The treatment of the Kosovar refugees was very
unusual in that the entire group was accorded the most generous federal funding.
The KOS, KOF, and non-Kosovar respondents represented 52, 17 and 13 separate
families respectively. In all refugee categories the majority (60%) were currently married
and living with a spouse. For the Kosovars, over 99% fell into the categories of married
and living with spouse or never married; however, 18% of non-Kosovar respondents
reported being widowed, separated, divorced, or married with their spouse living in a
different location.
The average household size for Kosovars was four persons and is higher than for
non-Kosovars at three persons. The temporarily broadened definition of family for
Kosovar refugees and the Albanian cultural practice of the extended family living
together contributed to the larger household size for Kosovars. As well, non-Kosovars
have to demonstrate sufficient funds prior to becoming eligible to sponsor family
members.
The Refugee Making Experience
When respondents were asked why they decided to leave their home country, virtually all
of the Kosovars’ reasons were directly related to war. While the large majority of nonKosovars also presented reasons directly connected to war, 14% stated that they left
because of the economic situation or poor living conditions. While these reasons can also
Abu-Laban, B., Derwing, T. M., Mulder, M. & Northcott, H. (2001). Lessons
Learned: An Evaluation of Northern Alberta’s Experience with Kosovar Refugees (3
volumes). Edmonton, AB: The Prairie Centre of Excellence for Research on
Immigration and Integration.
be associated with war, the non-Kosovars cited conditions of chronic war rather than the
shorter reign of violence and destruction experienced by the Kosovars. Comments from
Kosovars outlining their reasons for leaving include: “Chased out of house by military
who said they would kill us if we did not leave.” “It was very dangerous so we must
leave our houses.” “Serbian police came and told us to leave our houses and they gave us
only five minutes to leave.” “Police did a massacre in our village. Our house was fired,
our property was destroyed.” The non-Kosovars also spoke of war (in places such as the
Balkans and Afghanistan). Some elaborated with comments such as: “Husband and
sister’s husband killed in front of us.” “I could not live a normal life; I could not go to
my house … somebody else is living there.” “Living conditions were very bad: no jobs,
no money, no freedom.” “Hundred things made us leaving our country. No jobs, no
future, nobody knows how will be tomorrow.”
Seventy-four percent of respondents fled their hometowns with members of their
family. Most of the KOSs (84%) stayed in a UNHCR refugee camp, as did half of the
KOFs and about one in ten of the non-Kosovars. The great majority of the Kosovars
reported that they had been assisted by the UNHCR, by international NGOs such as the
Red Cross, and by Albanians in Macedonia; they indicated that each of these groups had
been very helpful. The non-Kosovars, coming from countries such as Croatia or
Afghanistan, were less likely to report that they had been helped by the UNHCR or by
international NGOs.
Respondents were asked how long they had been away from their homes before
coming to Canada. This measure was used rather than that of time spent in a refugee
camp because it is more accurate in measuring the time of displacement. For most of the
KOS respondents, it took from three weeks to two months (on average 52 days) to come
to Canada. The KOF respondents tended to take longer, from one to six months (on
average 99 days), because the KOFs experienced delays while attempts were made to link
them with family members already in Canada. In sharp contrast, most of the nonKosovars took from one to ten years (on average 5 years) to come to Canada, and many
of them came via a country of temporary asylum.
The majority of the KOS respondents (64%) said that they had a choice of going
to a country other than Canada; however, fewer than one-quarter of the KOF and nonKosovar respondents said that they had a choice (21% and 23%, respectively). When
asked why they came to this country, most of the KOS group said that they liked Canada.
They referred to Canada in positive terms, describing it as peaceful and democratic, and
said that they would have a better future here. Typical comments included the following:
“Because we believed that here is much better than everywhere else.” “Peaceful country
and good place to get education.” “I wanted to be in a safe place and heard Canada was
safe.” “We knew that Canada is free country.” “Hospitable country, freedom,
democratic country, open with others.” In contrast, most of the KOF and non-Kosovar
groups mentioned family reunification as their reason for coming to Canada. Typical
comments included the following: “Because my wife and children were here.” “My
brother [came] here twenty years ago. I wanted to live in same city with him.” “Because
my sister was here.” “Because of my cousin who is living here for several years.”
Despite the reasons given for coming here, 74% of respondents indicated that they
knew little, if anything, about Canada before leaving their homes. Comments addressing
what they would have liked to have known before coming included: “I would like to
know what people they are, how will be their reception, what kind of climate has
Canada.” “I would have liked to know how big Canada is, and something about culture,
customs, educational system, etc.” “Opportunities for work, for education.” “I would
Abu-Laban, B., Derwing, T. M., Mulder, M. & Northcott, H. (2001). Lessons
Learned: An Evaluation of Northern Alberta’s Experience with Kosovar Refugees (3
volumes). Edmonton, AB: The Prairie Centre of Excellence for Research on
Immigration and Integration.
like to know more about history of Canada.” “About the weather.” “How Canadians
live.”
A large majority of the refugees came to Canada with family members (88% of
KOS, 84% of KOF, and 91% of non-Kosovars). Most came as nuclear families with a
spouse and one or more children or, in the case of younger persons, with parents, brothers
and sisters. Almost all left family members behind (90% of KOS, 96% of KOF, and 91%
of non-Kosovars), most commonly sisters, brothers, sisters-in-law, brothers-in-law,
parents and parents-in-law. Twenty-nine percent of Kosovar respondents reported having
family members come to Canada after them, compared with only 9% of non-Kosovars.
These differences reflect the differences in policy relating to family reunification. Until
mid-summer of 1999 Kosovars who came to Canada under Operation Parasol were
eligible to apply to bring relatives to Canada under an expedited family reunification
program carried out at no cost to the Kosovars in Canada. In contrast, non-Kosovars who
wish to bring relatives under family reunification experience a longer process, and they
must be financially responsible for their settlement, travel and processing costs. Given
that the non-Kosovars in our study arrived in Canada in 1999, it is unlikely that many
could have afforded to sponsor family members. Those relatives who did come to Canada
were mainly siblings and children.
Arrival in Canada and in Alberta
All respondents came to Canada in 1999 and subsequently settled in Alberta. Most of the
KOS refugees spent time on the military bases in eastern Canada before coming to
Alberta. All but five of the 109 KOS respondents arrived in Canada in May of 1999, and
came to Alberta in June and July of 1999; thus the average time between landing in
Canada and arriving in Alberta was about two months. The 25 KOF respondents arrived
in Canada from May to December of 1999 with the majority arriving in June and July.
All but one of these KOF respondents came directly to Alberta. A total of 22 nonKosovar respondents were interviewed, including 18 classified as CR3 and four as JAS.
These non-Kosovar respondents arrived in Canada throughout 1999, with most coming in
the first half of the year. Most came directly to Alberta.
Religion
When respondents were asked about religious affiliation, virtually all of the Kosovars
(98%) reported being Muslim; the remainder were Christian. When interviewers probed
further, the majority could not determine to which denomination of Islam they belonged.
The non-Kosovar group was comprised of both Christians (59%) and Muslims (41%),
with all respondents except one being able to name the denomination to which they
belonged. Within their northern Alberta community, 79% of Christians reported living
near a church, compared with 57% of Muslims who lived near a mosque. Of those
respondents who did attend a place of worship on a regular basis, the frequency of
attendance was similar, with 51% of Muslims and 58% of Christians attending monthly
or more frequently.
Abu-Laban, B., Derwing, T. M., Mulder, M. & Northcott, H. (2001). Lessons
Learned: An Evaluation of Northern Alberta’s Experience with Kosovar Refugees (3
volumes). Edmonton, AB: The Prairie Centre of Excellence for Research on
Immigration and Integration.
An interesting comparison is between Kosovar and non-Kosovar Muslims. While
60% of the Kosovars reported living near a mosque, many of the non-Kosovars lived
outside of larger centres; only two non-Kosovar respondents reported living near a
mosque. However, more non-Kosovars (89%) indicated that their religion was very
important to them personally, compared with 71% for Kosovars. Even though they lived
further from a mosque, 78% of non-Kosovars reported attending the mosque on a regular
basis compared with 33% of the Kosovar Muslims. To the Kosovar respondents, Islam is
a very strong part of their identity that serves to build cohesion within their group in the
same way that ethnicity and culture do. Being Muslim and Albanian contribute as much
to their sense of identity as being Orthodox and Serbian do to their oppressors. The theme
of Islam as identity also surfaced in the 1998 study The Settlement Experiences of
Refugees in Alberta and is best captured in an encounter with a respondent. Upon
discovering that an interviewer was Muslim, a young Bosnian girl asked what it meant to
be Muslim because she knew that her own people were dying for their religion, but she
did not understand why. From these two studies the data suggest that respondents from
the Balkan area perceive Islam as an identity, more so than they feel required to adhere to
the tenets of the faith. Sponsors and service providers also reported that Kosovars did not
conform to their expectations of orthodox Muslims.
Language
The first language of all Kosovars is Albanian. Sixty percent of the non-Kosovars
reported Serbo-Croatian as their first language, and another third spoke Farsi or Persian.
A large majority (87%) of respondents spoke more than one language, with the most
common additional languages being English, Serbo-Croatian, and Bosnian for the
Kosovars, and English and German for the non-Kosovars.
Respondents were asked to evaluate how well they understood, spoke, read and
wrote English both at the time of the interview and before coming to Canada. Each area
of evaluation was rated on a 4-point scale, where 1 represented not at all and 4 meant
very well. Only a small minority of all respondents (6%) reported being able to
understand spoken English well or very well prior to coming to Canada (Table 4.1).
Approximately one year later, at the time of interview, the understanding of English had
improved dramatically for all respondents, with 72% stating that they understood English
well or very well. When we examine comprehension level by age and sex, differences are
evident. At the time of the interview, 82% of males aged 16-44 reported understanding
spoken English well or very well compared with 73% of females of the same age group.
In the older age group (45 and over), significantly more males (61%) reported better
understanding than did females (27%).
When we examined speaking, reading and writing English, a higher percentage of
KOFs rate their ability as well or very well both prior to and after coming to Canada. The
non-Kosovars consistently reported lower speaking, reading, and writing skills in English
at the time of interview. Kosovar eligibility for four additional months of ESL training
not offered to non-Kosovars may be a factor in these findings. While the English
language abilities of all respondents improved greatly, a higher percentage of educated
respondents (i.e., with high school or more) reported understanding, speaking, reading
and/or writing English well or very well at the time of the interview.
Abu-Laban, B., Derwing, T. M., Mulder, M. & Northcott, H. (2001). Lessons
Learned: An Evaluation of Northern Alberta’s Experience with Kosovar Refugees (3
volumes). Edmonton, AB: The Prairie Centre of Excellence for Research on
Immigration and Integration.
Respondents who could understand, speak, read and/or write English well or very
well prior to coming to Canada were between the ages of 16 and 44. At the time of the
interview, the pattern of younger respondents reporting higher English skills remains, but
females aged 45+ are truly left behind. To learn why this group of respondents assessed
their English skills to be low, we examined ESL class enrolment. In fact, only 36% of
females aged 45+ attended ESL classes, and the number of individuals in this age group
is small (Table 4.2). Seven respondents in this age category were not attending or had not
attended ESL classes. Reasons for not studying ESL included the following: “I have five
little children.” “I was pregnant.” “I’m working.” “Because I was sick.” “Because I’m
old.”
Education
Respondents were asked about their highest level of education or training, their course of
studies in Canada, and their plans for obtaining further education and occupational goals.
Non-Kosovar respondents were the most educated group: 67% had completed high
school or more, compared with 55% of KOSs and 45% of KOFs (Table 4.3). This finding
is not surprising, given that the non-Kosovar respondents had to meet the requirements of
selection criteria to be eligible to come to Canada. Differences in educational attainment
are also apparent when we consider age and sex. While men aged 45+ were the most
educated (36% with postsecondary education), women in the same age category were by
far the least educated; only one respondent (9%) had postsecondary education.
Excluding high school students, only three respondents were attending or had
attended school for purposes other than ESL training in Canada. These students are/were
studying nursing assistance, day care providing and air cadet training. Furthermore, while
fewer non-Kosovars plan further education in Canada (64% of non-Kosovars, 82% of
KOS and 79% of KOF), the most striking differences appear when we look at age and
sex. A minority of females aged 45+ (46%) plan to further their education in Canada.
However, considering that 90% of this group is presently educated at a less than high
school level, a large minority planning further education suggests a shift in thinking, or
perhaps a perception of opportunities that did not exist in the home country. The most
common occupational goals mentioned by all respondents included computer
programmer, nurse, and teacher. Other frequently mentioned occupational goals across
all refugee categories included construction worker, medical doctor, bus/taxi/truck driver,
accountant, mechanic, business owner, baker/cook, engineer, seamstress/dressmaker,
salesperson, hairdresser, and economist.
Employment
Analysis of employment excludes respondents younger than 21 years of age. More than
half of the KOSs and a third of the KOFs held a paying job in Kosova before coming to
Canada (Table 4.4). Because of the difficult conditions of life during the previous
decade, many Kosovars were unable to enter the labour force. Those who held paying
jobs had worked as teachers, salespersons, accountants, and nurses, for example. Many
Abu-Laban, B., Derwing, T. M., Mulder, M. & Northcott, H. (2001). Lessons
Learned: An Evaluation of Northern Alberta’s Experience with Kosovar Refugees (3
volumes). Edmonton, AB: The Prairie Centre of Excellence for Research on
Immigration and Integration.
more non-Kosovars held jobs in their home country (76%) than had KOSs (56%) or
KOFs (35%). While the selection criteria for non-Kosovars may again be a factor in the
differences between Kosovars and non-Kosovars, a substantial difference between KOSs
and KOFs is also apparent. While this difference cannot be explained within the scope of
this study, a contributing factor may be the strong familial ties that exist in the Albanian
culture allowing for financial assistance to flow to respondents from family living abroad.
A majority of respondents with high school or more (72%) held jobs in their
country of origin compared with 24% of those with less than high school. Those
employed had typically worked in their occupation for several years; on average
respondents had worked in their primary occupation for more than ten years. Only two
females aged 45+ had been employed in their country of origin.
While the majority of respondents had not found employment in Canada at the
time of the interview, significantly more non-Kosovars (42%) and KOFs (41%) than
KOSs (25%) held jobs. A shorter timeframe for financial support may be a push factor
for non-Kosovars to seek employment and for their sponsors to assist them in doing so.
As well, strong family networking ties for the KOFs and those non-Kosovars who have
family in close proximity may also have positively affected the attainment of
employment. Kosovars were working in jobs such as: housekeeper, dishwasher, cook,
construction and assembly worker, research interviewer (for this study), courtesy clerk,
restaurant worker, and loading dock worker. Most of the Kosovars who were employed
had been working at their current job for less than six months (90%); most considered
their jobs to be temporary (80%); and most were working part-time (75%). About onethird of the part-time employees said that they were working part-time because they
could not find a full-time job. Very few were self-employed.
In contrast, the large majority of employed non-Kosovars had been working for
more than six months (90%) and they were more likely to be working full-time (68%) in
permanent positions (90%). With the exception of one respondent, who was employed as
an electrician, they were working in dead-end labouring positions, regardless of their
education or experience. While the results indicate that the non-Kosovars were more selfsufficient and independent than the Kosovars, they may have fewer possibilities to
progress further. Their stronger focus on employment and self-sufficiency may prove to
be a barrier to further education, improvement of English skills, recognition and
acceptance of educational degrees and certification, and employment that offers
opportunities for advancement and development. Age appears to be a negative factor both
in finding employment and in the short-term nature of employment. Only three
respondents (9%) aged 45+ are employed, none in full-time jobs, and all in temporary
positions.
Among those respondents who were not employed at the time of the interview,
about half of the Kosovars and three-quarters of the non-Kosovars were not looking for a
job. More males (68%) and females (50%) aged 45+ were seeking employment than their
younger counterparts. The most common reasons for not seeking a job included going to
school and being a homemaker.
Conclusion
While the age and sex variables do influence the level of success that newcomers achieve
in Canada, these variables are static. Language skills, education, and employment are
Abu-Laban, B., Derwing, T. M., Mulder, M. & Northcott, H. (2001). Lessons
Learned: An Evaluation of Northern Alberta’s Experience with Kosovar Refugees (3
volumes). Edmonton, AB: The Prairie Centre of Excellence for Research on
Immigration and Integration.
influenced by the resources available to, and the efforts made by the newcomer, however
factors outside of the refugees’ control include the policies of the receiving country, the
attitudes and reception of the receiving community, and services available to the
newcomer. The differing levels of support and services for Kosovars and non-Kosovars
influenced options available to the newcomers interviewed for this study.
With the exclusion of JAS respondents, the financial support for non-Kosovars
came solely from their sponsors, with an understanding that the refugees would be selfsupporting within one year. Because these respondents felt greater pressure to find
employment and become self-supporting quickly, they had fewer options to attend ESL
classes full-time or to obtain further education or job training.
All respondents self-assessed at low levels of English comprehension upon their
arrival in Canada. Results of the same assessment during the month before the interview
reveal that the Kosovars had better comprehension of spoken English even though they
were less educated than the non-Kosovars. Because of their longer term funding, a higher
percentage of Kosovars worked less, and more attended full-time ESL classes. In
addition, they were eligible for four months more ESL training than other refugees were.
In order to be privately sponsored, non-Kosovars had to meet selection criteria
based on their ability to settle in Canada, while Kosovars were selected on the basis of
their situation of need. It is thus not surprising that non-Kosovar respondents were more
highly educated and had higher rates of employment both in their home country and in
Canada. As well, a higher percentage of non-Kosovars held full-time permanent jobs. A
cursory examination of the data may lead one to surmise that non-Kosovars are in fact
more quickly independent and more successful than their Kosovar counterparts.
When we examine the type of employment that the employed respondents hold,
however, differences in refugee categories are not evident. The large majority are
working at dead-end, low paying jobs, with few possibilities for advancement, attainment
of transferable skills, or English language development, regardless of their education,
training, or skills from the home country. The very fact that a higher percentage of
Kosovars are working at part-time and temporary jobs may give them the advantage of
being able to attend ESL classes, work at having credentials recognized, and/or continue
their education or attend job skills training.
This is the frist time in Canada that two groups of refugees are settling under such
very different circumstances. It is beyond the scope of this study to determine if the
additional supports for Kosovars and the very warm welcome and continued support from
the Canadian public will translate into an easier integration and ultimately, greater
success. What may seem to be success at the end of one’s first year in Canada (selfsufficiency) may not translate into success in later years (continued improvement of
quality of life).
Summary
1. This chapter examines the demographic and social profiles of 109 KOS, 25 KOF and
22 non-Kosovar refugees. Themes for discussion include general demographics for
respondents; the refugee-making experience; religion; language; employment and
education.
Abu-Laban, B., Derwing, T. M., Mulder, M. & Northcott, H. (2001). Lessons
Learned: An Evaluation of Northern Alberta’s Experience with Kosovar Refugees (3
volumes). Edmonton, AB: The Prairie Centre of Excellence for Research on
Immigration and Integration.
2. The average age of the different groups of respondents ranges from 25 to 28 years.
When the ages of repatriated Kosovars are considered, the average age of Kosovars is
increases.
3. Males and females are equally represented in all refugee categories except the nonKosovar JAS, where all four respondents are female.
4. More Kosovars than non-Kosovars lived in UNHCR refugee camps and received
assistance from international aid organizations. All respondents described situations
of a short and intense war as reasons they left their home country but non-Kosovars
also described situations in which they endured war for a long time.
5. For Kosovars, the time between leaving home and arriving in Canada averaged 52
days compared with 5 years for non-Kosovars.
6. Kosovars have a higher percentage of intact families than non-Kosovars. Financial
support for family reunification for a period of time in 1999 made it easier to bring
Kosovar families together. CIC made a point of sending extended family groups of
Kosovars to the same city.
7. The majority of KOSs had a choice regarding which country to go to for asylum, but
KOF respondents came to be reunited with family already living in Canada. For nonKosovars Canada was the first country that accepted them as permanent residents.
8. Virtually all Kosovars report being Muslim but they were unable to define which
branch of Islam they are affiliated with. Being Muslim appears to be more a matter of
cultural identity than religious identification for Kosovars, and attendance at a place
of worship is of less importance than it is to non-Kosovar Muslims.
9. All respondents self-assessed low levels of comprehension of spoken English during
their first month in Canada. Although the non-Kosovars came with higher levels of
education, their assessment of their English comprehension in the month prior to their
interview was lower than that of Kosovars.
10. Kosovars were eligible for an additional four months of ESL training not available to
other refugees.
11. In all refugee categories, males aged 45+ have the highest levels of education, while
their female counterparts have the lowest levels of education. Non-Kosovars are more
educated than Kosovars.
12. Non-Kosovars had higher levels of employment both in their home country and in
Canada. They also had more permanent and full-time work.
13.
A large majority of respondents were employed at low-paid labouring positions
that did not reflect their education, credentials, skills or experience.
Abu-Laban, B., Derwing, T. M., Mulder, M. & Northcott, H. (2001). Lessons
Learned: An Evaluation of Northern Alberta’s Experience with Kosovar Refugees (3
volumes). Edmonton, AB: The Prairie Centre of Excellence for Research on
Immigration and Integration.
5 THE SETTLEMENT EXPERIENCE OF REFUGEES
Introduction
This chapter describes the settlement experience of Kosovar refugees with comparisons
to non-Kosovar refugees where appropriate. Questions were posed in face-to-face
interviews to respondents who were at least 16 years of age by the end of the year 2000.
All respondents answered questions about their settlement experience in northern
Alberta; their adjustment; their assessment of life in northern Alberta; community
supports available to them; and their plans for the future. All of the Kosovars were asked
about decisions to stay in Canada or to return to Kosova. In addition, the KOS refugees
were asked questions relating to their experiences on the military bases where they first
stayed upon their arrival.
Time at the Military Base in Canada
After arriving at one of the two airheads in Canada, 95% of the KOS refugees spent time
at one of several CFB sustainment sites located in Ontario and the Maritime provinces. A
large majority (76%) of the Kosovar refugees who eventually settled in northern Alberta
were placed at Gagetown, New Brunswick, while 13% stayed at Kingston, Ontario and
9% at Aldershot, Nova Scotia; the remainder were placed at either Trenton, Ontario or
Greenwood, Nova Scotia. This section includes data from 104 respondents who stayed at
sustainment sites in Canada.
Needs and Services Provided at Military Base
Respondents were asked to list their family’s most urgent needs upon arrival in Canada.
To contextualize this question, we must remember that although these respondents had
been refugees for only a couple of months many had been displaced within their home
country for a considerably longer period of time. As well, the urgency of their flight
meant they did not have time to prepare for the journey. Extreme crowding and very
limited resources in the refugee camp in Macedonia contributed to the condition of the
refugees on their arrival in Canada and, hence, their most pressing needs. Urgent needs
upon arrival in Canada tended to be the most basic, including clothing/shoes (66%), food
(59%), medical attention (51%), sleep/rest (45%), safety (34%), finding family members
(29%) and bathing (13%).
A variety of services were offered to refugees during their stay at CFB
sustainment sites. Respondents were asked which services they received and how helpful
those services were. The services most accessed were interpretation, physical health
care, and completion of forms, with 100%, 95% and 90% of respondents respectively
using these services, followed by orientation about Canada (88%), finding family
members (81%) and psychological support and ESL training (73%). In each area of
service more than 90% of respondents rated that service as being helpful or very helpful.
It became apparent to service providers very early on that within the Albanian culture
there is a reluctance to acknowledge the need for psychological support services or to
access them. Therefore at the military bases these services were often called family
Abu-Laban, B., Derwing, T. M., Mulder, M. & Northcott, H. (2001). Lessons
Learned: An Evaluation of Northern Alberta’s Experience with Kosovar Refugees (3
volumes). Edmonton, AB: The Prairie Centre of Excellence for Research on
Immigration and Integration.
support; the interviewers for this study were briefed on all the names used for
psychological support. From this we can assume that the access of the services reported is
most likely accurate.
Activities at the Military Base
While 91% of the respondents who stayed at a sustainment site indicated that Kosovars
were involved in organizing and planning what to do on the bases, only one-third
indicated their personal involvement. However, the personal involvement reported was of
an assisting nature rather than an organizational and planning role. The most prevalent
tasks listed were cleaning (23%), working in the kitchen (17%) and helping the Red
Cross (13%). Other roles included helping with activities, sports, school, library,
kindergarten, the teen centre, hairdressing and working with people in general.
Almost all respondents (95%) reported that they were able to choose how they
spent their free time on the base. The most common activities were engaging in sports,
walking to the village, watching TV and socializing. For example, respondents said the
following: “I played soccer a lot and walked with friends.” “We played basketball,
watched TV, walked.” “I walked with my friends and talked together about our
problems.” “We played soccer, walked in the city.” “I spent time standing and talking to
my friends. We were very happy when they brought us wool, knitting needles, crochet
hooks, so we knitted together.” “Made a lot of Canadian friends.”
Those KOS refugees who had younger children (born after 1984) were asked how
their children spent their leisure time on the military base. Parents responded that their
children played, socialized and engaged in sports and games. “They played there all the
time and I was very satisfied. My children were happy there. They had everything that
they needed.” “They had a good time there; played, walked.” “They were very happy
there because they were all together and all the time they played outside.” “Playing,
watching TV, in the room with games, walking.” “Red Cross celebrated children’s
birthday—it was the most exciting moments for them.” “Going in picnic with the
soldiers and the persons from Red Cross.” “There were about a thousand Kosovars, so
[we] found friends, played soccer, sang, had concerts.” Almost all of the parents reported
that they were very satisfied (61%) or somewhat satisfied (34%) with their children’s
leisure activities, while only 5% were dissatisfied.
Seventy-nine percent of parents with school-aged children reported that their
children attended school at the sustainment site. For those children who did attend school,
70% had Albanian-speaking teachers drawn from the refugee population. Most of the
parents reported that they were very satisfied (33%) or somewhat satisfied (60%), while
only 7% were dissatisfied with their children’s schooling.
During their time at the sustainment sites, respondents engaged in a number of
required activities. While some of these activities would normally take place prior to
arrival in Canada, others usually took place at reception houses with the assistance of
settlement staff. Upon arrival at the sustainment sites, the refugees’ most urgent needs
were addressed. Those needing immediate medical attention were attended to and basic
needs were provided. The processing of minister’s permits, applications for social
insurance numbers, and child tax credits were completed at the bases. Almost all
respondents found that the assistance they received in carrying out the required activities
was helpful or very helpful (98%). The variety and abundance of food was also found to
be helpful or very helpful (98%), followed by leisure activities (92%) and clothing
received (90%). Housing in barracks provided warmth and safety but little privacy with
Abu-Laban, B., Derwing, T. M., Mulder, M. & Northcott, H. (2001). Lessons
Learned: An Evaluation of Northern Alberta’s Experience with Kosovar Refugees (3
volumes). Edmonton, AB: The Prairie Centre of Excellence for Research on
Immigration and Integration.
multiple beds per sleeping room. While most respondents found the services to be helpful
or very helpful, housing ranked the lowest in terms of satisfaction at 82%. Overall,
virtually all reported that they were satisfied with their experience at the military base
(73% very satisfied, 26% somewhat satisfied).
Duration of Stay at the Military Base
Almost half (49%) of the respondents stated that the time spent at the military base was
just right. The remainder was almost equally divided in assessing the time as too short
(23%) or too long (28%). Those who said that the time spent on the base was just right
discussed the many friendships established there and the time they had to recover from
their experience: “There was good organization.” “We were in a safe place.” “We had a
good time there.” “I found some friends there.” “The time was necessary for making
decision where to go, for finding the sponsoring groups and apartments.” Persons who
felt that the time on the base was too short found it difficult to leave their newly
established community and made the following comments: “We were all together and we
had friends, so it was very hard for us to separate from them.” “We had really good time
in base. We made a lot of friends. I cannot forget that time.” “I wish I could stay more
because we’ve had nice time there.” “I was happy there. The soldiers were very friendly
and helpful.” Those who reported the time at the base as being too long referred to the
crowded sleeping conditions, the short-term nature of life at the base, and their eagerness
to resume their lives: “Living in a camp is not a normal life.” “It was hard to stay there.
I missed having my own place to live.” “We were curious for the new place we will go.”
One respondent reported experiencing mixed feelings that the time on the base was too
long and too short: “We met many friends that we may not see again” but “the barracks
were so crowded.”
Settling in Northern Alberta
Although the large majority of KOS refugees spent their first weeks in Canada at a
sustainment site on a military base, the KOF and non-Kosovar refugees came directly to
the cities in which they settled. The experience of several weeks at a sustainment site
provided the KOSs with a setting to form opinions and expectations of Canada prior to
settling in the new community. The extensive media coverage of the war, in conjunction
with Canada’s overwhelming acceptance of refugees from Kosova, created a very
different setting for the arrival of Kosovars compared with the arrival of the nonKosovars, who came virtually unannounced.
Assistance from Sponsors and/or Canadian Relatives
During their first month in Canada, 21% of the KOF respondents indicated that they were
helped mainly by relatives in Canada compared with 55% for non-Kosovars (Table 5.1).
The higher degree of assistance from relatives for non-Kosovars may be attributed in part
to the greater percentage of non-Kosovars living with relatives in Canada, where help
was readily available (55% of non-Kosovars, 33% of KOF). Almost half (46%) of the
KOF respondents reported being helped mainly by both Canadian relatives and
sponsors, compared with only 9% for non-Kosovars. Sponsors of some KOF families
Abu-Laban, B., Derwing, T. M., Mulder, M. & Northcott, H. (2001). Lessons
Learned: An Evaluation of Northern Alberta’s Experience with Kosovar Refugees (3
volumes). Edmonton, AB: The Prairie Centre of Excellence for Research on
Immigration and Integration.
indicated that the Canadian relatives required as much support as the refugees, and these
sponsors found themselves assisting the larger group.
Respondents were asked who assisted them in the month prior to the interview.
KOF refugees indicated that in the past month they continued to be helped mainly by
relatives in Canada (33%), by their sponsoring groups (29%), or by both (38%).
Compared with the first month in northern Alberta, assistance from the sponsoring group
had decreased and support from Canadian relatives had increased. Factors that may have
contributed to this shift in source of assistance include the strengthening of relationships
between newcomers and Canadian relatives, the increasing ability of the Canadian
relatives to assist newcomers, and sponsor fatigue. The evolution of assistance to nonKosovar refugees follows a different pattern. Respondents, who during their first month
in Canada, received assistance mainly from their sponsoring group or from a combination
of their sponsoring group and their Canadian relatives, were still being assisted by the
same people. After one year, all KOFs continued to be at least partially dependent on
Canadian relatives and/or sponsors for assistance while 18% of non-Kosovars reported
being self-sufficient.
Fewer than 5% of all respondents lived with their sponsoring group during their
first month in Canada. Due to a commitment from the local CIC to minimize change and
disruption to the KOS refugees, all were offered a permanent residence upon arrival and
none of these refugees lived with their sponsoring group. Thirty-three percent of the KOF
group and 55% of the non-Kosovars lived with Canadian relatives during their first
month in Canada. At the time of the survey, only KOFs were living with Canadian
relatives and the percentage had declined to 8%.
Refugees who had not initially lived with their Canadian relatives or sponsoring
group were asked about the frequency of their contact with this group during their first
month in northern Alberta and during the month prior to their interview. Most
respondents indicated meeting with the sponsoring group or Canadian relatives very
frequently during their first month in Alberta.1 At least one in three respondents reported
that they met daily with their sponsors or Canadian relatives during their first month in
northern Alberta (38% of KOS, 40% of KOF and 33% of non-Kosovars). By the month
prior to the survey, these contacts had diminished with only 9% of non-Kosovars, 6% of
KOS, and none of the KOF respondents meeting with their sponsors or Canadian
relatives on a daily basis. While many of the respondents maintained at least weekly
contact in the month prior to the survey (41% of KOS, 50% of KOF and non-Kosovars),
some respondents reported that they no longer met with their sponsors and/or Canadian
relatives (18% of KOS, 9% of KOF and 5% of non-Kosovars).
Sponsors and/or Canadian relatives met with respondents for a variety of reasons
to assist them in settling in their new environs. Respondents were asked about the reasons
for their contact with their sponsors and/or Canadian relatives and how helpful that
contact was both during their first month in their new community and for the month prior
to the study. During their first month, the large majority of respondents reported needing
assistance in all areas of settlement, with the exception of looking for a job, where only
63% of the Kosovars and 59% of non-Kosovars reported needing help (Table 5.2). Given
that many of these newcomers were unable to speak English or French at that time, it is to
be expected that very few would identify the need to look for a job. More interesting is
the finding that only 6% of the Kosovars and 27% of the non-Kosovars contacted their
sponsors or Canadian relatives regarding this matter.
Between the first month and the month prior to the interview, the need for
assistance diminished in most categories. Respondents moved to independence in a
Abu-Laban, B., Derwing, T. M., Mulder, M. & Northcott, H. (2001). Lessons
Learned: An Evaluation of Northern Alberta’s Experience with Kosovar Refugees (3
volumes). Edmonton, AB: The Prairie Centre of Excellence for Research on
Immigration and Integration.
number of areas but also noted that the nature of the help they needed had changed from
having their sponsors and/or Canadian relatives doing things for them to having them
become advisors and mentors. Although many respondents still required assistance in the
month prior to the interview, it must be noted that the need for assistance may have
moved from a consistent need to an occasional one. Variations in the nature of required
assistance between Kosovars and non-Kosovars are evident. In the month prior to the
study, non-Kosovars no longer required assistance with appointments with CIC, likely
because they no longer had reason to meet, while 80% of Kosovars still required
assistance in meeting with CIC. More Kosovars required assistance with appointments
with doctors and dentists (87% and 82%) than non-Kosovars (68% and 64%,
respectively). While these findings may indicate that fewer non-Kosovars needed
assistance in procuring medical and dental care, it may also mean that fewer were
accessing medical and dental care or that they were more independent than non-Kosovars
in seeking medical or dental attention.
During the first month there are few differences between KOS and KOF
respondents other than KOF respondents not requiring assistance in finding an
interpreter. In the month prior to the study, KOF respondents made less contact with their
sponsors and/or Canadian relatives in most categories of assistance. The percentage of
respondents requiring assistance in the month prior to the study diminished in most areas
but stayed the same for Kosovars for social activities and emotional support. In the month
prior to their interview, more Kosovars required assistance in looking for a job than
during their first month (76% and 63%, respectively).
During the course of their first year in Canada respondents increased in selfsufficiency. As their English language skills improved, they were able to access the
community directly and their contacts in the community helped them to build friendships
and contacts exclusive of their sponsors and/or Canadian relatives. This adjustment and
growth is consistently evident in the significantly decreased percentages of respondents
who made contact with sponsors and/or Canadian relatives for assistance in the last
month. The only exception is Kosovar respondents who sought assistance in finding a
job; the percentage tripled from 6% to 18%.
Satisfaction with the help received from sponsors and/or Canadian relatives is
consistently high, with a large majority of respondents rating the assistance as very
helpful in all categories of assistance. The percentage of respondents giving this high
rating ranges from 50% for finding an interpreter to 100% in numerous areas for nonKosovars and from 67% for finding a job, to 94% in helping with school for children for
the Kosovars. It is noteworthy that many of the non-Kosovar respondents live outside of
a major city and hence it may have been more difficult to find interpreters in these areas
of residence.
What Respondents Found Most Helpful
Most of the refugees responded when asked what they found to be most helpful (87% of
KOS, 96% of KOF and 100% of non-Kosovars), but relatively few responded when
asked what they found to be least helpful (22% of KOS, 28% of KOF and 23% of nonKosovars). The Kosovar respondents’ comments about what they found to be most
helpful included: “Filling in forms, registration in school, appointments with doctor,
knowing the city.” “Housing, health services, finding interpreters.” “They have brought
us many appliances, radio, TV, computer. They paid for internet for us for a whole year.”
“We were helped in everything.” “Visiting, clothing, and all that we needed.” “When I
Abu-Laban, B., Derwing, T. M., Mulder, M. & Northcott, H. (2001). Lessons
Learned: An Evaluation of Northern Alberta’s Experience with Kosovar Refugees (3
volumes). Edmonton, AB: The Prairie Centre of Excellence for Research on
Immigration and Integration.
had a surgery, my sponsor helped me at home and with children one week non-stop.”
“Orientation in the community, introducing with the people.” “Furniture for apartment.”
“To have someone to talk to when we were sad. They helped us in spirit to feel better.”
The non-Kosovar respondents were more likely to mention financial support as
most helpful: “They have supported us. We are dependent on them.” “Moral support,
financial support, they were there for us.” “They did everything for us.” “Getting us
here. They gave us everything.” “They subsidized us, found us an apartment, found us
jobs.” “They covered all expenses during the first year (apartment, school, food, clothes,
dentist, and for all living expenses).” “They were always available to me, visiting and
providing financial help.” “They helped us for everything. They paid us all the bills,
dental work, they brought us clothes. For Christmas they brought us a lot of stuff so they
made my kids feel very happy.”
What Respondents Found Least Helpful
Comments about what was least helpful were less frequent. Responses from Kosovars
included: “Appointment with dentists.” “They didn’t find a job for us.” “They could not
do more because they were busy with job, etc.” “Least helpful was about house
supplies.” “They didn’t help us to bring my brother here.” “I think they didn’t have any
reason to talk to me about my religion.” “They didn’t help us as other sponsors helped
other Albanians. They didn’t find us family doctor, they didn’t take me to dentist.” “They
didn’t visit us that much.” “We no longer see them. They don’t come to visit.”
Non-Kosovar refugees indicated: “At the beginning I did not know English, so
that all the help from my sponsors in orientation was not helpful because I did not
understand.” “Even though they were living far away from us they helped us as much as
they could. Maybe they should have visited us more often but I understand that they
couldn’t.” “Although the sponsors tried, they were not able to help me bring my family
to Canada.”
Stress and Feelings
The stress of change in almost every aspect of life is part of being a newcomer. While
immigrants have chosen and anticipated their course, refugees are not afforded the luxury
of choice, making the time of adjustment to the new environment a time of stress and
mixed emotions. Respondents were asked how stressful their lives were during their first
month in their new community and during the month prior to their interview. The
differences between Kosovars and non-Kosovars are striking. Seventy-six percent of
KOFs and 72% of KOSs reported that their life was somewhat or very stressful during
their first month, compared with only 27% of non-Kosovars (Figure 5.1). By the month
prior to the interview, these differences had levelled out, with the level of stress
decreasing for Kosovars and increasing for non-Kosovars: nearly half of all respondents
reported somewhat or very stressful lives (44% of KOS, 52% of KOF and 45% of nonKosovars).
Respondents were asked about their feelings of happiness and sadness during
their first and last months. More non-Kosovars (59%) reported feeling somewhat or very
happy during their first month in their new community compared with the Kosovars
(15% of KOS and 20% of KOF) (Figure 5.2). In the month prior to their interview, more
Kosovar respondents reported feeling somewhat or very happy (44% of KOS and 60% of
Abu-Laban, B., Derwing, T. M., Mulder, M. & Northcott, H. (2001). Lessons
Learned: An Evaluation of Northern Alberta’s Experience with Kosovar Refugees (3
volumes). Edmonton, AB: The Prairie Centre of Excellence for Research on
Immigration and Integration.
KOF) than did non-Kosovars (38%). Given that the Kosovars received a higher level of
support throughout their time in Canada, one might assume that their lives would be the
least stressful and happiest of all respondents. However, considering that they were
plucked directly out of the war without time to process and come to terms with what had
happened before coming to Canada, these findings are not surprising. It is also interesting
to note that the KOFs who had relatives to help them with their settlement reported
feeling the happiest but also the most stressed.
Uniqueness of the Kosovars
A minority of the respondents were aware of differences in the benefits and services
provided to Kosovar refugees entering under Operation Parasol compared with refugees
entering under other programs (36% of KOS, 24% of KOF and 21% of non-Kosovars).
When asked to describe the differences, Kosovar respondents typically responded with:
“Free health services for two years, no fee when we applied for landed status, two years’
financial support from the Federal Government.” “I heard that other refugees had one
year but we have two years’ government support.” One Kosovar mentioned that
“expenses [for other refugees] were not guaranteed from Canada for their return [to their
home country if they decided not to stay in Canada].” Another said: “We came quickly.
Other refugees must wait in refugee camps.” Non-Kosovar respondents noted that
“Kosovars got everything for free: furniture, doctor’s services, travelling. For us, it is not
free, we have to pay for our airplane tickets.” “They get two years of sponsorship. That’s
all I know.”
Recommendations for Improvement of Sponsorship Program
Respondents were asked how the sponsorship program could be more helpful to
newcomers. Approximately half (47%) of the KOS refugees, 40% of the KOF refugees
and 73% of the non-Kosovars offered suggestions. Sixty-one Kosovars provided a total
of 70 suggestions focussing mainly on more contact with sponsors (23%), more
information about life in Canada, how Canadians live and social customs (19%), more
assistance in finding employment (14%) and more financial support to newcomers in
terms of dollar amount and/or duration of coverage (10%). Suggestions from Kosovars
included: “If they visited us very often, because I needed to talk to somebody and to have
conversation. If they did that, I would be very happy and I would learn English faster.”
“Sponsoring groups should be bigger. They [sponsors] should have determined duties.”
“We don’t feel their engagement to help us about the job. The main thing is they should
try to find us a job, otherwise we are concerned about our future after two years.”
“Besides material and moral help, to be accepted by Canada in our former professions. I
propose giving the opportunity to the refugees to try to work in their profession will be
the best choice, work in one year can show at what level newcomers are at.” Sixteen nonKosovars responded with a total of 21 suggestions focussing on more assistance for
sponsoring relatives (25%), more financial support to newcomers in terms of dollar
amount and/or duration of coverage (25%), and more assistance in finding employment
(14%). Responses included: “I am thinking about sponsoring someone else in the future. I
think the Government should be more liberal in allowing that.” “Finding a job maybe,
but that would be too much to ask.”
Abu-Laban, B., Derwing, T. M., Mulder, M. & Northcott, H. (2001). Lessons
Learned: An Evaluation of Northern Alberta’s Experience with Kosovar Refugees (3
volumes). Edmonton, AB: The Prairie Centre of Excellence for Research on
Immigration and Integration.
Newcomers experience many differences between their life in Canada and in their
home country, with respect to culture, religion, parenting, gender roles and much more.
Respondents were asked if their sponsoring group and/or Canadian relatives had shown
any knowledge of or had given them any advice about these differences. The majority of
respondents (59% of KOS, 61% of KOF and 68% of non-Kosovars) indicated that their
sponsors or relatives were aware of differences and/or gave advice about these
differences. The knowledge and/or advice that respondents received follows several
themes. They are listed here in rank order: learning about life in general; personal rights;
being respectful; banking and education; religion; parenting styles; and learning English.
Regarding the knowledge that sponsors had and the advice that they gave, refugees
commented as follows: “They knew a little bit about us. They’ve advised us as much as
they could.” “They gave us advice how to behave in Canada.” “[They told us] to respect
each other and obey laws.” “Women have more freedom here than in my country.” “The
same rights for women and men.” “Men in Canada are supposed to do dishes and clean
houses.” “Kids have more freedom. They behave at school differently. Discipline at
school is not so tight as in my home country.” “They told us you’re not supposed to beat
your children here.” “We talked about our traditions and their traditions.” “They didn’t
know exactly about our culture and tradition. Some information that they had was wrong:
relation between husband and wife, parents and children, about clothing, about religion,
etc.” “They didn’t know too much about us but they showed respect for us. I appreciate
that.” “They were interested to know about our food, how we cook.”
Adjustment to Life in Northern Alberta
Respondents who had children under sixteen years of age (N=72) were asked about their
children’s adjustment to their new life in Canada. When asked to assess their progress on
a 4-point scale where 1 meant not at all adjusted and 4 meant very well adjusted, parents
felt overall that their children were adjusting well or very well (89% of KOS, 82% of
KOF, and 100% of non-Kosovars). About half of the parents reported that they were
concerned about their children’s future in Canada (54% of KOS, 46% of KOF, and 53%
of non-Kosovars). Specific concerns centred on education (N=19), future marriage
(N=6), retention of language, customs and traditions (N=4) and the behaviour/freedoms
of Canadian youth (N=4).
Using the same 4-point scale, respondents were asked about their own adjustment
to life in Canada. Again the majority said that they were adjusting well or very well
(84% of KOS, 83% of KOF and 78% of non-Kosovars). Fewer than half of the Kosovars
(44% of KOS, 42% of KOF) and two-thirds of the non-Kosovars (68%) expressed
concerns regarding their future. Concerns most common to all refugee categories
included employment (N=37) and education (N=21). The non-Kosovars were unique in
being concerned about family reunification (N=4).
Friends and Social Contacts
Virtually all respondents reported making new friends in Canada (97% of KOS, 100% of
KOF and 91% of non-Kosovars). Although respondents from each refugee category
reported making friends, a consistently larger percentage of Kosovars established
friendships (Table 5.3). The most striking differences are evident in friendships with
Abu-Laban, B., Derwing, T. M., Mulder, M. & Northcott, H. (2001). Lessons
Learned: An Evaluation of Northern Alberta’s Experience with Kosovar Refugees (3
volumes). Edmonton, AB: The Prairie Centre of Excellence for Research on
Immigration and Integration.
newcomers from one’s own culture (98% of Kosovars, 60% of non-Kosovars) followed
by friendships with neighbours (80% of Kosovars, 45% of non-Kosovars). When we
explored contact with various groups of people, excluding the workplace or school, we
found that Kosovars have more frequent contact with others. Between one and two thirds
of non-Kosovars never have contact with any of the groups other than their immediate
family or other relatives, while fewer than one third of Kosovars have no outside
contacts. As well, Kosovars consistently have more social contacts on a daily basis than
non-Kosovars, with the exception of the work category. It appears that the non-Kosovars
experience a higher degree of social isolation than the Kosovars, but it is not clear
whether this situation is voluntary.
Assessment of Life in Northern Alberta
Respondents were asked to give their opinions on a number of statements about their
community of residence, on a scale of 1 to 4 where 1 meant strongly disagree and 4
meant strongly agree. Statements addressed their location as being a good place to live,
having good job opportunities, being a good place to raise a family and being a friendly
and welcoming place. Kosovars consistently responded slightly more positively than nonKosovars. Respondents agreed or strongly agreed with the statements with a range for
Kosovars from 88% to 94% and for non-Kosovars from 82% to 87% with the exception
of ‘There are good job opportunities here for me.’ Seventy-one percent of Kosovars and
54% of non-Kosovars agreed or strongly agreed with this statement.
Parents of children born after 1984 were similarly asked for their opinions on
statements about whether schools in their community have good ESL programs, if they
encourage children to keep their cultural identity, and if the schools in their community
will help their children get to university or technical school. A large majority of all
respondents felt that the school in their community would help their children proceed to
postsecondary education (82% of Kosovars, 79% of non-Kosovars). However, a much
higher percentage of Kosovars compared to non-Kosovars agreed or strongly agreed
with the statements that the schools have good ESL (92% of Kosovars, 50% of nonKosovars), and that the schools encourage children to keep their identity (73% of
Kosovars, 50% of non-Kosovars).
Best Thing about Living in Northern Alberta
When asked “What is the best thing about living here?”, 132 Kosovars offered 210
responses and 21 non-Kosovars offered 35 responses. The most frequently listed best
thing was freedom/safety/peace with 29% of both Kosovar and non-Kosovar responses;
followed by education (26%), employment (15%) and friendly people, and parks and
recreation (both at 7%) for the Kosovars; and parks and recreation (14%), education
(11%) and employment, not crowded and a good country (all at 9%) for the nonKosovars. Remaining responses included multiculturalism, standard of living, ESL and
stores/shopping. Respondent comments included the following: “Life is organized. I am
not afraid for tomorrow.” “To know your rights and obligations.” “Safety without
problems, the others help without hesitation.” “Many cultures and histories of people
live here. “ “There are many opportunities for schooling and a better job if one knows
how to plan his or her life.” “The schools here have good program for my children.”
“High life standard, many opportunities to get education, job.” “Parks, green, swimming
Abu-Laban, B., Derwing, T. M., Mulder, M. & Northcott, H. (2001). Lessons
Learned: An Evaluation of Northern Alberta’s Experience with Kosovar Refugees (3
volumes). Edmonton, AB: The Prairie Centre of Excellence for Research on
Immigration and Integration.
pools, playgrounds, walking paths.” “You can be friends with all cultures.” “I like
stores—West Edmonton Mall.”
Worst Thing about Living in Northern Alberta
Regarding the question “What is the worst thing about living here?”, considerably fewer
respondents commented. Ninety Kosovars and 13 non-Kosovars listed 99 and 13 worst
things. For all respondents, the most prevalent answers related to the climate/mosquitoes
(25%) and living too far away from their home country (17%). Eighteen percent of
Kosovars listed lack of employment as being the worst thing. Other responses referred to
cost of education, learning English, adjusting to life, not owning a home, living on
government support, and drugs and alcohol being available to youth. Respondents’
comments included the following: “Summer time mosquitoes and long winters.” “It is
far away and cold … We are scattered everywhere in Canada.” “I am too far from my
children living in Kosova. I feel very worried about that.” “Finding a good job. I am
afraid about my future financial situation.” “If my children want to continue education
that is very expensive.” “The biggest problem for me is learning English. The reason is
that I am old and it goes slowly.” “Salaries are not enough. Canada does not accept
diploma.” “Isolated city from Edmonton, too far from medical centre. For intervention
we need to go to Edmonton.” “Place without perspective.”
Contacts with Community Agencies
The majority of the respondents (76%) were aware of local agencies which provide
settlement assistance to newcomers to Canada, and 93% of this group have accessed at
least one of these services. With the exception of psychological support (81%) and
finding employment (79%), satisfaction with services received was very high, with more
than 90% of users stating that the services were helpful or very helpful. A higher
percentage of KOS respondents accessed services in all areas except physical health,
where a higher percentage of KOFs sought assistance (64% of KOF, 42% of KOS and
0% of non-Kosovars) (Table 5.4). While lower percentages of non-Kosovars made
contact with SPOs in most areas of service, a slightly higher percentage of non-Kosovars
than KOFs sought service in the areas of ESL enrolment (73% of non-Kosovar, 71% of
KOF) and finding employment (11% of non-Kosovar, 7% of KOF). Differences in access
of services should, however, be explored by location of residence. First, just over one
third (35%) of respondents living outside of Edmonton were aware of local immigrant
serving agencies as opposed to 85% living in Edmonton. Of those who were aware of
local SPOs and living outside of Edmonton, fewer than half made contact with the SPOs
for assistance, with the exception of Language Benchmarks testing (50%) and ESL
enrolment (75%). Respondents living outside of Edmonton are in a variety of cities
offering a range of settlement services. While cities such as Calgary, Toronto and
Montreal offer many services to newcomers, Camrose and Fort McMurray offer very
limited services. However, differences in access may also be influenced by secondary
migration, where newcomers arriving in a second city have not had the support of
sponsors to link them to SPOs.
Abu-Laban, B., Derwing, T. M., Mulder, M. & Northcott, H. (2001). Lessons
Learned: An Evaluation of Northern Alberta’s Experience with Kosovar Refugees (3
volumes). Edmonton, AB: The Prairie Centre of Excellence for Research on
Immigration and Integration.
Staying in Canada or Returning to Kosova
Questions related to remaining in Canada or returning to Kosova were presented to
Kosovar respondents only. At the time of the survey, 28% of the KOSs and 40% of the
KOFs had received landed immigrant status in Canada. Almost all of the remainder (90%
of KOS and 80% of KOF) had applied for landed status. Since coming to Canada, very
few of the Kosovar respondents had visited Kosova to learn more about the situation
there (8% of KOS and 4% of KOF). Most who had not been back to Kosova for a visit
were planning to go (85% of KOS and 79% of KOF).
The majority of the Kosovars (79% of KOS and 76% of KOF) knew someone,
usually a friend, who had moved back to Kosova. That is, 57% had at least one friend
who had moved back to Kosova, while 24% had at least one relative who had moved
back. Of the respondents who knew people who had moved back to Kosova, 10% said
that they did not know why they had returned while the remainder presented 124 reasons
why acquaintances had gone back. The large majority of responses were related to pull
factors. The most commonly cited reason to return was to be with family or to take care
of relatives (24%); to return to jobs or business (20%); homesickness (15%); to return to
home and/or property (10%); or because they were too old and wanted to die at home
(10%). The remaining 21% of responses also related mainly to pull factors (Kosova
needed them, new freedom, to rebuild old life, economy was good in Kosova) and one
push factor (couldn’t find work in Canada). Respondents’ comments included: “Because
they left suddenly. They didn’t plan for it. When NATO left, people felt they were free so
they wanted to go back.” “Because we didn’t know anything about our parents even if
they were alive or not. Then my sister decided to go back to find them.” “They had a job
there.” “[Their houses were not destroyed] and they were asked to continue their jobs.”
“Some of them are teachers and went back to schools. Students went back to continue
studies.” “One of them was old and his son went with him because he had nobody else to
take care of him.” My father-in-law went back because he was 78 years old and he
wanted to go back in his country. Like every old person he wanted to die in his country.”
“All their life they dreamed about freedom so they wanted to go back and to feel that.”
“They were concerned about the job and their future in Canada. Also, they were so
nostalgic about their country and they moved back hopefully for better future in our
homeland.”
The respondents who knew people who had repatriated were asked if any of these
acquaintances now want to come back to Canada. While 40% did not know, of those
respondents who felt informed about this question, 83% stated that some of the
repatriates wanted to return to Canada. Responses as to why repatriates wanted to come
back focused mainly on the difficult situation that they found upon their return to Kosova
with 78% of the responses related to the situation in Kosova being bad in general, bad
economically, politically unstable, or unsafe. The remaining 22% of the responses
related to pull factors: “Canada is free, safe, and a good country.” Only nine responses
addressed why repatriates do not want to return to Canada, with more than half of these
related to having employment in Kosova.
Respondents use a variety of resources to find out what is happening in their
home country. An overwhelming majority of Kosovars use the telephone (95%), 78%
the media and 50% Albanian friends and contacts in Canada. Another 30% use email to
find out about the situation in Kosova. The non-Kosovar refugees rely primarily on the
telephone (68%), media (46%), and letter mail (18%) to find out about what is happening
in their country of origin. Fifty percent of the Kosovars and 81% of the non-Kosovars
Abu-Laban, B., Derwing, T. M., Mulder, M. & Northcott, H. (2001). Lessons
Learned: An Evaluation of Northern Alberta’s Experience with Kosovar Refugees (3
volumes). Edmonton, AB: The Prairie Centre of Excellence for Research on
Immigration and Integration.
said that they knew enough about what is happening in their country of origin to decide
whether to stay in Canada or to leave Canada. Older Kosovars, both male and female,
were somewhat less likely to feel that they had enough
information. Kosovar refugees
who indicated that they did not know enough about what was happening in Kosova were
asked what else they would like to know. Sixty-four persons offered 83 responses, the
most frequent focussing on a need to know more about everything in general (38%), the
political situation (30%), the economic situation (10%) and the future in Kosova (10%).
Plans for the future
The respondents were asked what they planned to do in their second year in Canada.
Table 5.5 shows that most of the Kosovars planned to prepare to apply for Canadian
citizenship, return to Kosova for a visit, go to school or college or university, find a job or
a better job, sponsor family members to come to Canada, and apply for a student loan.
Persons who already had professional or technical credentials indicated that they would
seek to have their credentials recognized. Very few said that they planned to move to
another city in Canada (7%) or to move back to Kosova (3%). The plans of the nonKosovars were similar except that they were less likely to plan a visit to their country of
origin and were more likely to plan to move to another city in Canada.
Almost all of the refugees said that they were planning to stay in Canada (88% of
Kosovars and 96% of non-Kosovars) with most of the remainder being undecided. Only
5% of the Kosovars and none of the non-Kosovars have made plans to leave Canada.
Reasons given by the six Kosovars who planned to leave included: “My husband wants
to go back after some years.” “I worry so much for my family there, if they were here I
would like to stay.” “I have a job in Kosova.” “I am homesick. ” Those who planned to
stay gave the following reasons: “Canada is a good country.” “I like this country. It is a
good place to live.” “Canada is a free country.” “Here it is safe. Have good school
programs.” “Good opportunities to get education and job.” “To get education, job - to
start new life.” “I have begun a new life; children are taking schools; employment
opportunity is high.” “It is quiet place.” “Here is good life.” “The people are very
friendly.” “It is a peaceful country, we can raise our children here in freedom.” “Living
there is very difficult. We don’t have house, property was gone.” “We don’t have
anything there because we lost our property which we had.” “Here is better life than in
Kosova.”
Final Comments from the Refugees
Respondents were invited to talk about any aspects of their experience as refugees that
may have been missed in their interview. Over half of the Kosovars (56%) and twothirds of the non-Kosovars (68%) offered comments.
Seventy-five Kosovars offered 118 comments, with the majority (62%) being
expressions of appreciation and gratitude to Canada, the Canadian government, the
Canadian people, sponsors, teachers, NGOs, and the military bases. Thirty-two percent of
the Kosovar responses pertained to general concerns about their future life in Canada, and
more specifically about employment, their children’s retention of the Albanian culture
and language, and family reunification. A small minority (7%) referred to bad memories
and not wanting to remember the past. Comments included: “I like to live here. We have
Abu-Laban, B., Derwing, T. M., Mulder, M. & Northcott, H. (2001). Lessons
Learned: An Evaluation of Northern Alberta’s Experience with Kosovar Refugees (3
volumes). Edmonton, AB: The Prairie Centre of Excellence for Research on
Immigration and Integration.
good opportunities for everything. We have adjusted very well here, so I don’t have
anything else to say, just I want to thank Canadian government and all people who helped
us.” “I want to thank all people who helped us, especially our children’s teachers.” “We
are very satisfied with life here. Government, sponsoring group and our relatives helped
us a lot. I would like to thank them all.” “UNHCR helped us a lot.” “I’d like to thank
Canadian Government, Red Cross, sponsoring groups and all Canadians who helped us a
lot.” “I can’t forget friends that I made in Military base. I can’t forget wonderful time
that we have had there. I appreciate the hospitality of Canadians, especially in Military
base.” “As we know, we came here suddenly because of war, but I’m surprised with the
hospitality of Canadians. They are so nice and they helped us a lot about school and
everything, that means to build a new life here.” “I would like our children once or twice
in a week to have study in their own language.” “I am very happy here. We have a good
life now but I worry for future because we are old and we cannot work.” “I think it is
very difficult to find a new way of life.” “CIC needs to keep their promise to help us
bring our other family members to Canada.” “Grande Prairie is a nice place to live but
it’s so far from the centre of information, from the schools and from health services.” “I
don’t like to remember the days in the camps in Macedonia. Those days there were a bad
experience.”
The majority (88%) of the 32 comments from15 non-Kosovar respondents
focused on concerns over a variety of topics. Concerns similar to those of the Kosovar
respondents included comments about the future, employment, and family reunification.
In contrast to the Kosovars, non-Kosovars suggested that the government speed up and
extend the process for coming to Canada, provide more funding for refugees and
sponsors, and reduce the cost of the entry visa. In their own words, non-Kosovar refugees
said: “We waited three years for the answer after we applied for coming to Canada. It is
too long. Also, it is difficult to find money to pay $970 for each adult for entry visa.” “It
was long time since we applied for coming to Canada … workers at Canadian Embassy
had very bad behaviour. After four years, finally they said, yes. Canada is very beautiful
country and we are very satisfied with life here. Now we are working and trying to make
better future for us.” “All of my family is scattered [over several countries]. It is so
expensive to call them and see how they are. They expect me to send them money. I have
no money. I cry everyday because I miss my family. Why can’t the Canadian government
bring my family to Canada?” “When refugees come to Canada they come with education
and experience, but once they get here they are considered uneducated and [considered
to] have no work experience or knowledge to work in Canada.” Some wished for better
English language skills. “We want to learn English—we tried to go to ESL when we
came but were told there was no room in the classes.”
Summary
1. Three-quarters of the KOS respondents lived at the Gagetown sustainment site. KOFs
and non-Kosovars went directly to their settlement location.
2. KOSs accessed a variety of services at the sustainment sites: interpretation, physical
health care, assistance with completion of forms, orientation, finding family
members, psychological support and ESL training. They consistently rated these
services positively.
Abu-Laban, B., Derwing, T. M., Mulder, M. & Northcott, H. (2001). Lessons
Learned: An Evaluation of Northern Alberta’s Experience with Kosovar Refugees (3
volumes). Edmonton, AB: The Prairie Centre of Excellence for Research on
Immigration and Integration.
3. At the sustainment sites, KOS respondents participated in required activities as well
as helping around the camp. They also relaxed and took time to rest and recover. Half
of these respondents felt that their time at the sustainment site was just right, while
the remaining 50% were evenly split in thinking the time was too long or too short.
4. Upon their arrival in northern Alberta, KOSs went directly to their new residences
while one-third of the KOFs and half of the non-Kosovars lived with their Canadian
relatives or sponsors. At the time of the interview almost all respondents were living
in their own residences.
5. Initially respondents depended heavily on their sponsors and one-third met with their
sponsors on a daily basis. During the month prior to their interviews fewer than 10%
were meeting with their sponsors on a daily basis. Not only did the frequency of
sponsor/refugee contact diminish, the nature of and reasons for contact changed.
6. During their first month in Canada, three-quarters of the Kosovar respondents said
their lives were stressful or very stressful compared with only one quarter of the nonKosovars. In the month prior to the interviews these figures had changed to
approximately 50% for all refugee categories. While Kosovars had become less
stressed, non-Kosovars became more stressed. Although fewer respondents reported
feeling somewhat or very sad, feelings of sadness followed similar patterns.
7. One in three KOSs and fewer than one in four KOFs and non-Kosovars were aware
of differences in benefits and services provided to Kosovar refugees who came under
Operation Parasol. Those who were aware of differences indicated that Kosovars
experienced increased support and services, and an expedited process in coming to
Canada.
8. Three-quarters of non-Kosovars and a large minority of Kosovars offered
recommendations for improvement to the sponsorship program. Kosovar
respondents’ suggestions focused on more frequent contact with sponsors, more
information about life in Canada, better assistance in finding employment, and lastly,
greater financial assistance. Non-Kosovars’ responses concentrated on greater
financial support and assistance in finding employment.
9. More than three-quarters of all respondents said that they themselves are adjusting
well or very well to life in Canada, but a higher proportion of parents felt that their
children are adjusting well or very well. Fewer than half of the Kosovars expressed
concerns about their future employment and education, while a majority of nonKosovars worried about those concerns and about family reunification. Parents were
apprehensive about their children’s education, future marriage, the retention of
language and customs, and how the freedoms of Canadian youth will effect their
children.
10. More than three out of four respondents were aware of local agencies that provide
settlement assistance to newcomers. The large majority of them accessed at least one
or more of these services. Satisfaction with the help they received was high but least
so in the areas of psychological support and finding employment.
Abu-Laban, B., Derwing, T. M., Mulder, M. & Northcott, H. (2001). Lessons
Learned: An Evaluation of Northern Alberta’s Experience with Kosovar Refugees (3
volumes). Edmonton, AB: The Prairie Centre of Excellence for Research on
Immigration and Integration.
11. More than three-quarters of the Kosovar respondents knew someone who had
repatriated. They attributed repatriations largely to pull factors: homesickness, family
reunification, jobs, homes, property, and a desire to grow old and die in one’s home
country. Most respondents think that the repatriates want to return to Canada.
12. Kosovar’s plans for their second year in Canada centre mainly on attaining selfsufficiency and independence. While many would like to return to Kosova for a visit,
very few plan to repatriate or to move to another city in Canada. Non-Kosovars
respondents were similar, but they were less likely to plan a visit to their home
country and more likely to plan a move to another city.
13. A majority of the Kosovars’ final comments focused on their expressions of gratitude
to Canada, it’s government, Canadians, many of whom assisted them, and one third
expressed concerns about their future in Canada. Non-Kosovars mainly focused on
concerns about their future, employment and family reunification.
Note
1.
For those families moving to Alberta after settling in another city in Canada, frequency of meeting
with sponsors pertains to their first month in Alberta.
Abu-Laban, B., Derwing, T. M., Mulder, M. & Northcott, H. (2001). Lessons
Learned: An Evaluation of Northern Alberta’s Experience with Kosovar Refugees (3
volumes). Edmonton, AB: The Prairie Centre of Excellence for Research on
Immigration and Integration.
6. REFUGEE SPONSORS
Introduction
One of the most critical roles in many successful settlement experiences is that of the
sponsoring group. All newcomers undergo considerable stress when they move to a new
country, but refugees, who have not chosen to leave their homelands but were forced out,
and who may have lost family and friends in addition to a way of life, are especially in
need of support on arrival. Different educational and health systems, government
agencies, laws, and daily customs, to say nothing of language barriers, all contribute to a
confusing and difficult maze that is best negotiated with a guide.
Types of Sponsorships
Sponsoring arrangements for refugees fall under the categories of government,
private, and JAS.
Government-assisted Refugees
Government-assisted refugees (GARs) are provided with a living allowance and
schooling opportunities from the federal government for up to a year. Settlement agencies
provide assistance and advice to GARs, helping them locate appropriate language
training if necessary and assisting with the integration process in general. The federal
government funds a host program, usually operated through settlement agencies, in which
volunteer hosts, who have been through a screening procedure, are matched with GARs
to assist them with social integration.
Private Sponsorship
In private sponsorship arrangements, non-profit organizations, such as churches or ethnic
groups, sign an agreement with the federal government indicating that they will be
financially responsible for a refugee or refugees for a specified period of time. In the
1970s when Canada received a large number of Vietnamese refugees, the government
allowed groups of at least five individuals to sponsor refugees, as long as they could
prove that they could provide financial support. Since that time, the federal government
has changed sponsorship procedures, and sponsorship must now go through a SAH.
Privately sponsored convention refugees classified as CR3s are judged to need a
settlement period of up to one year. Most of the privately sponsored refugees in Canada
come under this category: a SAH takes full financial responsibility for these individuals.
Joint Assistance Sponsorship
JAS is another sponsoring arrangement in which the federal government has financial
responsibility for the first part of the program and a SAH covers the rest. The amount of
government support is negotiated with the SAH, depending on the perceived needs of the
refugee group in question. Currently, for example, refugees from Sierra Leone are funded
by the federal government for the first four months in Canada and their sponsors are
Abu-Laban, B., Derwing, T. M., Mulder, M. & Northcott, H. (2001). Lessons
Learned: An Evaluation of Northern Alberta’s Experience with Kosovar Refugees (3
volumes). Edmonton, AB: The Prairie Centre of Excellence for Research on
Immigration and Integration.
responsible for the subsequent eight months. The experiences of the sponsors of nonKosovar refugees discussed in this study represent the typical CR3 and JAS situations in
Alberta.
Sponsorship of the Kosovars
In many respects the sponsorship of the Kosovars differed from previous sponsoring
arrangements in Canada. When the Kosovars arrived, an appeal for sponsors went out to
the Canadian public. This was the largest single group of refugees to enter the country
since the time of the Vietnamese Boat People. Once again, sponsorship groups were
formed, but they had to be associated with a SAH. The Kosovars were classified as
CR5s: special needs cases selected under Joint Assistance Sponsorship. Although
regulations concerning JAS refugees stipulate that they can receive up to two years of
settlement funding, depending on perceived need, it is usually the case that they are
funded for no more than a year (as is the case with the non-Kosovar JAS refugees who
participated in this study). Unlike previous agreements, the federal government chose to
take full financial responsibility for all the Kosovars for two full years, rather than
assessing needs on a case by case basis. Rather than asking settlement agencies to deal
directly with Kosovar refugees, the government decided to assign sponsors to each
refugee family, even those who had family members already living in Canada. Thus the
Kosovars are officially JAS refugees, but the federal government agreed to fully fund
their living expenses for two years, and covered some of the costs for medical and dental
needs, normally a provincial responsibility in the case of GARs, and the client’s or
sponsor’s responsibility in the case of the privately sponsored refugees. Another
difference in the treatment of the Kosovars had to do with subsidized housing. In the past,
there have been problems with housing costs for refugees in Alberta, because the federal
government does not usually exceed the limits of the provincial government’s Supports
for Financial Independence (social assistance). In the Kosovar case, however, subsidies
were granted in order to keep extended families in the same residential area.
In this chapter, we will consider the experiences of the sponsors of refugees in
northern Alberta between 1999-2000. We will make comparisons between those located
in the smaller centres of Grande Prairie, Ponoka and Camrose versus Edmonton;
experienced versus inexperienced individuals; and sponsors of Kosovars versus sponsors
of non-Kosovar refugees who are in the regular JAS program or who are privately
sponsored. The quantitative information is drawn from questionnaires that were
completed by members of sponsoring groups. (In some instances one person completed
the form on behalf of all members in the group; in other instances more than one person
from a single group completed the survey. For this reason, there are 110 responses to the
questionnaire although there were 119 participants representing 49 sponsoring groups.)
The qualitative information is taken from the focus group interviews; the sponsors
welcomed the opportunity to express their feelings about the sponsorship experience.
The Northern Alberta Experience
The staff in the CIC office in Edmonton were responsible for locating sponsors for the
Kosovars who were destined for either Grande Prairie or the Edmonton region within a
very short time period. Although experienced SAHs were sought, many of the
Abu-Laban, B., Derwing, T. M., Mulder, M. & Northcott, H. (2001). Lessons
Learned: An Evaluation of Northern Alberta’s Experience with Kosovar Refugees (3
volumes). Edmonton, AB: The Prairie Centre of Excellence for Research on
Immigration and Integration.
participants in the sponsoring organizations had not themselves been involved with
sponsorship arrangements in the past. In some instances the SAHs were national
organizations, such as World Vision. Given that they were already agreement holders,
CIC felt that they could depend on the national groups to provide orientation to the local
sponsors. In most instances, however, SAHs did not provide training to their members.
The non-Kosovars followed the same pattern as other CR3 and JAS refugees who have
been destined to Alberta in the past.
KOFs and KOSs
Kosovars who had relatives already living in Canada (KOFs) were sent to join their
family members directly. It is for this reason that several Kosovars were settled in
Grande Prairie, a small city in northern Alberta, even though the services in place were
minimal. It was decided that even KOFs would need the assistance of a sponsoring group,
given that all the Kosovars were classified as high need. Some Kosovars with no family
in Canada were also destined to Grande Prairie, but the majority were placed in the
Edmonton region.
CIC’s involvement in the settlement of Kosovar refugees differed somewhat from
their involvement with other refugees. Generally speaking, settlement agencies, such as
Catholic Social Services (CSS), arrange to meet government-sponsored refugees, take
them to a Reception House, help them to find accommodation, and orient them to the
community. In the case of the Kosovars, however, CIC staff met many of the refugees at
the airport, arranged for accommodation, and solicited contributions of goods from
organizations such as the Salvation Army. (Eventually, CIC relinquished some of these
tasks to others.) In effect, they took on a component of the traditional role of settlement
agencies and private sponsors. The sponsors’ primary responsibility was to facilitate
social integration through assistance in arranging for ESL and other types of education,
medical and dental appointments, banking, shopping and so on.
Sponsors
When asked how they became involved, 58% of respondents said that their church was
the impetus. Ten percent mentioned the media, and another 12% approached CIC,
presumably because of the media attention. Nine percent stated that non-governmental
agencies had contacted them directly, while 7% were requested to participate by relatives.
Two percent of the respondents indicated that the refugees they sponsored were their own
relatives.
Sixty percent of the people interviewed reported that this was their first
sponsoring experience. Of those who had sponsored refugees in the past, the majority
(60%) had been involved since 1989 or earlier. Many mentioned having sponsored
Vietnamese in the late 1970s and early 1980s. When we examined the sponsoring groups
further, we determined that all of the individuals matched with KOFs were sponsoring for
the first time. While 62% of those who sponsored KOSs had no previous experience, the
reverse was true for non-Kosovar sponsors, only 31% of whom were sponsoring for the
first time.
Sponsor Training
Abu-Laban, B., Derwing, T. M., Mulder, M. & Northcott, H. (2001). Lessons
Learned: An Evaluation of Northern Alberta’s Experience with Kosovar Refugees (3
volumes). Edmonton, AB: The Prairie Centre of Excellence for Research on
Immigration and Integration.
CIC Edmonton arranged a number of orientation sessions in which their staff, settlement
workers from CSS and the Mennonite Centre for Newcomers (MCN), representatives of
the Red Cross, and others provided information to the sponsors in Edmonton. One CIC
staff member also went to Grande Prairie to conduct an orientation session for the
sponsors there. Somewhat later, orientation sessions were organized in Edmonton
featuring speakers from the Centre for Survivors of Torture and Trauma.
The majority of respondents indicated that they had received orientation; over half
of the sponsoring groups had sent at least one representative to the orientation panel
sessions jointly conducted by CIC, CSS, and other service providers at the First
Presbyterian Church. Another 11% reported that they had received orientation from CIC;
in all but one instance, it was not clear whether the respondents meant the orientation
sessions at the First Presbyterian or separate sessions conducted solely by CIC, as was the
case in Grande Prairie. Nineteen percent of the respondents said that they had received
no training; these individuals were almost all sponsors of non-Kosovar refugees. Two
settlement agencies, the MCN and Focus Canada, provided additional sessions for
Mennonite and Ismaili sponsors, respectively. Three groups mentioned having attended a
Survivors of Torture and Trauma workshop on post-traumatic stress syndrome (PTSS).
One JAS sponsor recounted that her group relied on a Resettlement Assistance Program
Delivery Handbook (RAP) from CIC Refugee Branch for all information. “This
information wasn’t enough for me. We didn’t know enough about the refugees like from
where they came, do they speak English, and other things.” In only two cases did
sponsors report having received information from an umbrella SAH: “Our church office
from Ontario also sent information regarding the sponsoring process, but the information
was not specific to Kosovars.” “We relied heavily on Canadian Lutheran World Relief ...
in Vancouver.” The findings of the focus group interviews suggest that sponsoring
groups varied considerably in attendance at the orientation sessions; in some cases, all
members of the group attended, and in others only one or two went. “The post-traumatic
stress workshop was on a Wednesday and not all the people could get there because they
had to work. I was sick about not being there.” There were also discrepancies in terms of
how well those who did attend related the information to other members of the
sponsoring group: “We had as much information as one could possibly assimilate at any
one time, but the sponsors did not have time to pull themselves together.” “The training
was very thorough, CSS did a great job, but the majority of the sponsors were not at the
training sessions.”
In future, it may be preferable to hold ongoing training sessions rather than onetime orientations. Sponsoring groups should be asked to produce a dissemination plan
for information at training sessions and other resources so that all members receive
updates.
When asked how adequate or helpful the orientation was, the sponsors’ opinions
ranged from high praise to disappointment and frustration. On the whole, however,
sponsors realized that CIC and the settlement agencies were under severe constraints
themselves. Even though more than half of those who responded to the question
indicated that they had not received enough information (“The orientation session left me
with more questions than answers”), many recognized that no one in Alberta had access
to the specifics that the sponsors wanted. Several people mentioned that they had
received inaccurate information in the sessions, and were thus taken aback when the
refugee families arrived. Others said that, although they needed more information, they
could not have handled more in a single session: “I think that with any more training the
details would have gone in one ear and out the other.” How happy people were with the
Abu-Laban, B., Derwing, T. M., Mulder, M. & Northcott, H. (2001). Lessons
Learned: An Evaluation of Northern Alberta’s Experience with Kosovar Refugees (3
volumes). Edmonton, AB: The Prairie Centre of Excellence for Research on
Immigration and Integration.
training sessions depended on a number of variables, including the degree of trauma their
refugee families evidenced: “We were told at the beginning that the experience would be
intense, but I don’t think we knew what intense meant. I thought it would be intense for
the first few months and then we would come and go and develop an ongoing
relationship. I expected them to be functioning at that point.” The flexibility of
individuals within the sponsoring group also affected their perceptions of the orientation:
“I thought it was as well thought-out and planned as it could have been because there will
always be situations that happen that no one can plan for or train you for.” Experienced
sponsors were more likely than first-time groups to express positive views on the training
they received. An in-depth training program, delivered by settlement agencies and
involving experienced sponsors in a mentoring role, would be useful in the future. These
sessions should have accurate information specific to the refugee group in question and
should provide guidelines for the work of the sponsors.
First Month Experiences
We asked a number of questions regarding the sponsors’ involvement with the refugees
in their first month in the community to which they were sent. The numbers of people
from a single group who were directly involved with the families in the first month varied
greatly (0 to 30), but the most frequent response was seven group members. The contact
was relatively intense in the first month, given that 35% of sponsoring groups met with
the refugees daily, and 36% met with them between four and six times a week. Another
25% saw the families between one and three times a week. The remaining 4% of
respondents indicated that they met with their families less than once a week. In the case
of one CR3 sponsorship, no one in the sponsoring group met with the refugees. When
asked about the activities of the first month (Table 6.1), the majority of sponsoring
groups followed similar patterns. On average, 91% of the respondents said they were
satisfied or very satisfied with many of the activities; the only activity that was somewhat
less satisfying than the others was appointments with dentists: 16% expressed
dissatisfaction with this (satisfaction figures not reported in table). Some possible reasons
for this will be discussed later in the chapter. When the responses of sponsors of the nonKosovars and Kosovars were compared, a noticeable discrepancy was apparent in the
amount of involvement in help with job-seeking in the first month: 18% of those who
sponsored CR3 or JAS refugees versus 4% of the KOS sponsors, and 0% of the KOF
sponsors.
Table 6.2 indicates sponsors’ involvement in assisting refugees by location,
Edmonton versus other centres. Because many of them sponsored non-Kosovars, it is not
surprising that the degree of involvement is lower among sponsors outside of Edmonton.
In the focus group discussions, the sponsors were asked what decisions they had
made on behalf of the refugees. Almost all the sponsors of KOSs and KOFs indicated
that they had made initial decisions with regard to physicians, dentists and banks. Many
also reported that they had decided on accommodation, ESL programs for adults and
schools for the children. However, in most instances, the sponsors indicated that they
tried to lay out options to the families and let them make choices. In the case of KOFs,
the family members who were already here proffered their own advice on such matters.
The majority of sponsors indicated that the Kosovars were independent when it came to
making decisions and often changed from the original dentist, for example, because they
had learned through their community of someone else who was deemed to be preferable.
Abu-Laban, B., Derwing, T. M., Mulder, M. & Northcott, H. (2001). Lessons
Learned: An Evaluation of Northern Alberta’s Experience with Kosovar Refugees (3
volumes). Edmonton, AB: The Prairie Centre of Excellence for Research on
Immigration and Integration.
Several sponsors mentioned that on the advice of CIC they had arranged for a block on
long distance calls for the first three months.
In the focus group interviews two instances were referred to in which sponsors
appeared to have overstepped their bounds, imposing their will on matters of a deeply
personal nature. These were clearly rare occurrences.
Although some of the sponsors of the non-Kosovar refugees took the same role as
the KOS and KOF sponsors, others indicated that the refugees themselves made all their
own decisions. In one instance, a non-Kosovar sponsor indicated that CSS “did
everything.”
Group Member Involvement
When asked about the number of people in each group who stayed involved over the
period between the refugees’ arrival and the time of the interview (roughly a year) there
was a range of responses. Within the KOF and non-Kosovar sponsorship groups, 75%
and 67% of the respondents reported that at least half of the group was still involved,
respectively, whereas the majority of the KOS sponsors (55%) said that fewer than half
of their group members were still seeing the refugee families. Several sponsors shared the
sentiments of this individual: “There were a large number of helpers available at first, but
eventually it became a smaller core who specialized in particular areas of assistance, e.g.,
medical, education and recreation.” Others indicated that as the Kosovars became more
independent, their roles changed: “[There was] very heavy participation in the early
months; we’re still involved one year later – more social activities now.” There were also
responses such as the following: “Many people indicated an interest to begin with, but
were not interested in developing a relationship or being involved on a long-term basis.
Very quickly only two of us were involved, then only myself.” “All members of the
group welcomed the refugees at the airport. Only two continued with day to day
assistance.”
The KOS sponsor groups may have undergone more attrition, but as indicated in
Table 6.3, they started out with a greater percentage of large groups. The most notable
difference across sponsoring groups lies between those in Edmonton versus those in the
smaller centres, where one year after sponsorship began 57% of the groups had more than
five active members.
Despite the smaller numbers, in almost all instances (99%) the groups were still in
touch with their refugee families after a year and were still providing assistance of some
sort (Tables 6.1 and 6.2). As one might expect, the emphasis had shifted from immediate
tangible needs to emotional and social support. When we compared the different
sponsoring arrangements, it became clear that the activities of the sponsors of the nonKosovar refugees are somewhat different than those of the Kosovar sponsors. Most
notably, the areas of education (ESL and registration of the children in school), shopping,
filling out forms, and appointments with the doctor are considerably lower than in the
Kosovar case. This suggests that the non-Kosovar refugees are expected to be somewhat
more independent than the Kosovars at the same time in their initial settlement period in
Canada. Also, the sponsors of the non-Kosovar newcomers provided substantially more
help in terms of job-seeking than did the sponsors of the other groups. Several factors
may have contributed to this difference. The private and JAS sponsors of the nonKosovars were supporting the families financially until they could become independent;
for this reason there may have been more pressure on the refugees to find work in order
to be self-sufficient. Debt may have been another motivator for the non-Kosovar
Abu-Laban, B., Derwing, T. M., Mulder, M. & Northcott, H. (2001). Lessons
Learned: An Evaluation of Northern Alberta’s Experience with Kosovar Refugees (3
volumes). Edmonton, AB: The Prairie Centre of Excellence for Research on
Immigration and Integration.
refugees to find employment: unlike the Kosovars, they are obliged to reimburse the
federal government for their airfare to Canada, and those who came before February 2000
were required to pay the right of landing fee (ROLF) of $975. Furthermore, the nonKosovar refugees have typically spent long periods in refugee camps. By the time they
arrive in Canada, many of them have dealt with some of the trauma resulting from the
circumstances that forced them out of their homelands. For these individuals, getting on
with their lives is a top priority. The federal provision of an additional year of living
support for the Kosovars may also have influenced the lower figures for job-seeking in
the KOS/KOF sponsorship groups. Several sponsors indicated that they encouraged the
Kosovars to get as much ESL as possible before entering the labour market.
When we compared sponsors in Edmonton with sponsors in smaller centres in
terms of activities undertaken most recently, we found that although a higher percentage
of sponsors in smaller cities spent time talking with refugees, they had withdrawn
completely from services that are normally completed in the first year in private or JAS
sponsorship arrangements. Over a fifth of the sponsors in Edmonton were still
conducting orientation, making appointments with CIC and so on, after the refugees had
been in Canada for over a year.
Expectations
We asked the sponsors a series of questions about their own expectations of the refugees
and CIC, as well as their perceptions of the refugees’ expectations of them and of Canada
in general. The responses, which are detailed in the sections that follow, are indicative of
unwarranted assumptions made by both sponsors and refugees. Although it would be
impossible for CIC to anticipate every misconception, both sponsors and refugees would
have benefited from more information about their respective roles. For example, some
sponsors were disturbed by the fact that their families assumed they were on call at any
time of day or night. What they likely did not know was that this assumption on the part
of some of the Kosovars may have developed at the military bases, where there were
people on call to meet their needs 24 hours a day. Community settlement agency staff
routinely explain to their refugee clients that unless there is an absolute emergency, they
should call during office hours only. However, unless a sponsoring group undertook to
explain time boundaries to their families, the KOS refugees would have only their
experience at the military base to judge by.
Sponsors too, made faulty assumptions that caused problems for the refugee
families. In one case, for instance, a well-meaning sponsor encouraged a Kosovar father
to attend the birth of his and his wife’s child, despite their protests. In Kosova it is not
customary for the father to be in the delivery room. With cultural issues, it is difficult to
know what is universal and what is specific. In another instance, a sponsor imposed her
views on matters of birth control and portrayed them as the Canadian way even though
the Canadian way is, in fact, a matter of personal choice. The natural inclination is to
assume a shared value base; when values differ or one group has inadequate knowledge
regarding another, misunderstandings result. The focus group transcripts indicate that
over time the sponsors and the refugees made adjustments to each other, but much of the
confusion might have been alleviated had both groups had an understanding of the
boundaries of their roles and some basic awareness of each other’s cultural norms.
Moreover, it would have been useful for some of the inexperienced groups to be
given examples of the procedures followed by experienced, successful sponsors. Had the
responsibilities and various approaches to meeting those responsibilities been clarified
Abu-Laban, B., Derwing, T. M., Mulder, M. & Northcott, H. (2001). Lessons
Learned: An Evaluation of Northern Alberta’s Experience with Kosovar Refugees (3
volumes). Edmonton, AB: The Prairie Centre of Excellence for Research on
Immigration and Integration.
early on, perhaps some of the group dynamics and distribution of tasks would have been
better. For instance, one sponsor complained that her refugee family appeared to be
unable to plan in advance. There will always be circumstances requiring the assistance of
a sponsor that arise without warning, but a sponsorship group should be encouraged to
build in safeguards for such an eventuality in their own initial planning.
Sponsors’ Initial Expectations of Refugees
The sponsors were asked to comment on their initial expectations of the refugees and
whether those expectations were borne out. Their responses can be categorized
according to six themes:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Geographical location
Religion
Psychological well-being
Gender roles
Child rearing practices
Decisions to repatriate
In some instances, sponsors clearly assumed that Kosovars would behave in a
similar manner to themselves (e.g., child rearing practices and gender roles), whereas in
other cases, such as psychological well-being and religion, they expected differences.
The majority of sponsors found one or more of their expectations to be contrary to reality.
Sponsors of Kosovar refugees cited a number of expectations and consequent
surprises upon meeting the families. Several groups said that they thought the Kosovars
would be rural people, old-fashioned individuals with no English language skills. These
individuals were surprised that their families were modern, urban people and, in several
cases, at least one of the family members could speak English. “We expected the
language barrier to be very difficult but the time on the base getting very basic English
made all the difference in the world.” Interestingly, several people expected that all the
Kosovars would speak some English, and those groups who received families in which
no one had English were frustrated by the communication difficulties and the lack of
interpreters.
Sponsors were expecting devout Muslims. They were under the mistaken
impression that all the Kosovars would be teetotallers. As one individual noted “There
were misunderstandings about the consumption of alcohol. They say they’re going for
‘language lessons’ meaning they are going for a beer.” “They’re not actively religious.”
“Things were different from what we were told—shaking hands was no problem.”
(Sponsors reported that in some of the orientation sessions, they were given descriptions
of Islamic practices that in fact did not apply in the Kosovar case, e.g., they were told that
it is inappropriate for Muslim women to shake hands with strangers.)
Many of the sponsors expected the Kosovars to be psychologically traumatized.
In some instances, their expectations were accurate: “They didn’t leave their apartment
for a month.” More often, however, the sponsors expressed surprise at how well adjusted
their refugee families seemed: “We expected a lot of psychological stress. At the airport
we expected people getting off the plane in a weak and fragile state. Instead we found
five healthy adults.” “[We expected] them to be upset, but no.” “We expected them to
be less alert … The time on the military base was good for them.”
Kosovar society is very patriarchal, and some sponsors were thus expecting
clearly defined and distinct gender roles; in other cases, they were surprised by family
Abu-Laban, B., Derwing, T. M., Mulder, M. & Northcott, H. (2001). Lessons
Learned: An Evaluation of Northern Alberta’s Experience with Kosovar Refugees (3
volumes). Edmonton, AB: The Prairie Centre of Excellence for Research on
Immigration and Integration.
relations: “We had confusion on the gender issue. We tried to do things to show how
Canada is different.” A male sponsor said the following: “I took them food and told them
that I had made it. [The father] now tells me that he vacuums but I think he’s teasing
me.” “The daughter-in-law had to stay home to take care of in-law elders and as a result,
she did not go to ESL. She would have liked to go.”
Several sponsors commented on the behaviour of Kosovar children, and the
apparent reluctance on the part of their parents to discipline them. “Kids run the house.”
“Parents do not take responsibility for their kids.” “They believed that Canada was so
safe they didn’t have to supervise their children.” “I was surprised at how physically
violent some kids are.” The sponsors’ reaction to the children’s behaviour reflects a lack
of information regarding typical responses to conditions of war. Matters of discipline
vary from one culture to another: if sponsors have no access to information about
differing child-rearing practices, they tend to judge from the viewpoint of their own
backgrounds.
The sponsors were surprised at how quickly the Kosovars made decisions about
whether to stay in Canada or to return to Kosova. “We were surprised that they decided
within one week to stay in Canada.” “The family we sponsored did not want to come to
Canada. They never did try to settle.” “I expected they would stay. I wish they had
given Canada a try.” “The decision to go home was made almost immediately. ”
Virtually all of the sponsors of families who returned to Kosova expressed
disappointment. Some individuals commented on the high emotional investment they had
made; these individuals were quite hurt by the sudden return of the Kosovars.
There were no noticeable differences in expectations or surprises across
experienced and inexperienced sponsors of Kosovars; however, the sponsors of nonKosovars had fewer expectations overall, and less emotional involvement. This
difference may be partially attributed to the media attention given to the Kosovars and to
the orientation sessions many of the KOF and KOS sponsors received, at which some
inaccurate information was presented, especially with regard to religious practices and
cultural differences. It may also reflect the greater experience of non-Kosovar sponsors.
Refugees’ Expectations of Sponsors
Demands for Immediate Assistance
The majority of Kosovar sponsors felt that the Kosovars had unrealistic expectations;
both experienced and inexperienced sponsors had similar answer patterns. The sponsors
of non-Kosovar refugees, on the other hand, were much more likely to say that their
families had either no expectations or realistic expectations of what the sponsoring group
would do for them.
One of the expectations most often cited had to do with the sponsors being “on
call” at all times. “I was in bed at 11:40 p.m. when I got a phone call saying, ‘Could
you please come over, my friend caught some fish.’ I got up, got dressed and picked him
up to take him over to his friend’s house. His friend was cutting up the fish at midnight
and I had to wait for 30 minutes while they cleaned the fish. Then they asked, ‘We do
not have room in our fridge, so can you take it to yours?’ So, at about 1:00 a.m. after
putting the fish in my fridge and driving him home, I went to bed. There was no
comprehension that I get up at 5 or 6 a.m. This is what you go through!” “They were
pretty aggressive about their social requirements. They were almost aggressive or pushy
to have us take part.” “They expected us to be there every day.” “They expect services
like driving them to appointments even when it’s not an emergency.” “The refugees
Abu-Laban, B., Derwing, T. M., Mulder, M. & Northcott, H. (2001). Lessons
Learned: An Evaluation of Northern Alberta’s Experience with Kosovar Refugees (3
volumes). Edmonton, AB: The Prairie Centre of Excellence for Research on
Immigration and Integration.
expect us to be there immediately. If one of us cannot come, they will keep calling the
sponsoring group until someone is available. We are trying to get them to be more
independent and so we don’t always show up.” “It was too much. I was stressed out …
and later I became ill.” “Sometimes my presence was expected, but I live at one end of
the city and they live at the other. I have no car and take the bus. Bussing takes one hour.
Since talking on the phone is difficult because no one speaks English well enough, it is
difficult to plan in advance. They don’t seem to plan in advance at all.”
Money and Material Goods
Other unrealistic expectations had to do with the provision of material goods or money.
“They expect us to take care of everything. They were told at the military base that
sponsors are responsible for everything.” “They wanted everything new, including a new
house.” “One of our young women wants to continue her education and expected that her
education would be free of charge. They even expect their school supplies will be free.”
“Their expectations were totally unrealistic. No one could have lived up to their
expectations. I think this attitude was fostered at the military base. Somehow they were
under the impression that they would receive $20,000 in cash when they arrived in
Edmonton. They were given all kinds of stuff at the military base. They constantly kept
asking where the money was. They expected an upper middle class existence.” “There
were restrictions put on long distance calling. The refugees expected me to go to TELUS
and remove the restriction. They expected me to pay the $100 deposit. I am a single
mother on a restricted income and cannot possibly do this.”
Although some of the Kosovars’ expectations may well have developed at the
military bases, where they were provided with a lot of goods and services at no charge,
some of their expectations may have been the result of living in a communist country,
where education was completely free. A better understanding on the part of the sponsors
of the communist system could have helped them to feel less exasperated by the
Kosovars’ attitudes.
Because the Kosovars generally were in close contact with each other, they
tended to compare sponsors. Since some groups were in a position to provide their
families with many extra things, some of the other refugee families felt that they should
have the same amenities: “When one family got a bike, they all needed a bike.” “There
developed an idea of favouritism amongst the refugees and this ended up being a big
issue. ” To avoid this problem in the future, some guidelines could be drawn up regarding
provision of goods, prior to the arrival of the refugees. Some ongoing contact across
sponsor groups and with CIC would also be helpful.
Expectation of Expertise
Sponsors were also concerned that the Kosovars expected them to know everything. “We
were seen as the experts. They assumed we knew everything about what was going on.
As it turned out, sometimes the refugees would know more because they shared
information throughout the community.” “They expected solutions immediately. We
were supposed to find solutions overnight.” Had the refugees been given a clearer notion
of the role of the sponsoring groups, and the bureaucratic nature of organizations in
Canada, they may have been more understanding of the sponsors’ inability to answer all
their questions immediately.
Gender Roles
Not surprisingly, some Kosovars expected that gender roles in Canada would be similar
to their own. Some of the refugees were taken aback by the role of women, and in
Abu-Laban, B., Derwing, T. M., Mulder, M. & Northcott, H. (2001). Lessons
Learned: An Evaluation of Northern Alberta’s Experience with Kosovar Refugees (3
volumes). Edmonton, AB: The Prairie Centre of Excellence for Research on
Immigration and Integration.
particular, women sponsors. “They expected men to take care of everything and the
reality was that more women sponsors were involved in the day-to-day activities. It
became more acceptable after some time and the refugees got used to it.” “At first the
refugees didn’t understand why all these women were coming to help and not their
husbands.”
The Other Side
There were, of course, sponsors who felt that the refugees were very grateful and who
reported that they were not in the least demanding. “We were very respected; they looked
upon us as the owners and they were the welcomed guests.” “They were trying to adjust
to us as much as we were trying to adjust to them.” “Initially, I don’t think they had
expectations when they first arrived … I think they were surprised at the amount of
support they got here.” “Our [refugee] group has been incredibly thankful for every
single thing that we have done.” “They were grateful and overwhelmed by what
strangers were willing to do for them.” “I know exactly what their expectations are, but I
always feel that they are not demanding or anything like that.”
Refugees’ Expectations of Life in Canada
Land of Plenty
The sponsors’ perceptions of the refugees’ expectations of life in Canada were very
similar to their views on the expectations placed on sponsors. The majority indicated that
the refugees had misunderstandings of what life would be like in this country. “Because
the refugees were offered so much by the government they expected more. They expected
that all the education would be provided, including postsecondary education. They were
upset about having to pay fees at school and didn’t realize that we [Canadians] pay these
fees as well.” “They still expect that everything will be paid for, for instance, education.”
“They think they’ll get government assistance in the third year.” “They believed that all
the medical problems they had would be fixed in Canada in two weeks.” “There was an
attitude that this is the land of opportunity. They thought that there would be a job, but
didn’t realize the impact of the language barrier.” Several of the KOS and KOF sponsors
indicated that they feel the government is partially responsible for the perceived
unrealistic expectations. When asked, 74% indicated that they were aware of the
differences between the Kosovar benefits and services, and those provided to other
refugees. Most were able to elaborate with examples, such as two years of funding,
dental and medical benefits, fast-track entry into Canada, free transportation and
subsidized housing.
A number of individuals indicated that the refugees had been given
misinformation on the military bases that led them to believe that they were entitled to
more benefits than they actually received. The fact that several medical and dental
procedures were started at the military bases (e.g., root canals) surely led some Kosovars
to think that they would be completed as soon as they arrived in Alberta.
Some people felt that the Kosovars made poor judgements in spending:
“Kosovars do not have realistic expectations. They believed that they would have jobs,
big houses and cars. Then the first thing they spent money on was a computer.”
Computers may seem frivolous to some sponsors, but for many of the Kosovars, email is
an essential link to family and friends who are still living in extremely difficult conditions
in Kosova. Clearly, guidelines for both sponsors and refugees would be very helpful in
the future.
Abu-Laban, B., Derwing, T. M., Mulder, M. & Northcott, H. (2001). Lessons
Learned: An Evaluation of Northern Alberta’s Experience with Kosovar Refugees (3
volumes). Edmonton, AB: The Prairie Centre of Excellence for Research on
Immigration and Integration.
Most of the non-Kosovar sponsors felt that the refugees had no expectations of
Canada before they arrived; however, in one instance a sponsor expressed a sentiment
similar to that of the KOS and KOF sponsors. “He came from being poor and often
hungry, to what seems to him like a land of plenty, and it wasn’t immediately obvious
that the plenty isn’t just out there to take, that you have to work and earn it. We actually
had interesting situations with people giving them [children] so many things that they
stopped valuing them and inadvertently destroyed them. They would say, ‘Oh, it doesn’t
matter if these shoes are wrecked. People will give me more.’ So we had to stop giving
them things.”
Freedom
Two other themes emerged in the discussion of refugee expectations of Canada. One had
to do with personal freedom. “[The head of our family] made the statement that in
Canada you have the freedom to make something of yourself or the freedom to fail. On
Christmas Eve I was driving our family back home and he turned to me and said, ‘I’m not
sure that I can say this properly, but for the very first time in my life I understand what
freedom really means.’ I asked him what he meant. He explained that were no police on
the street, the people were moving freely, and he could come and go as he wanted … He
said, ‘If I am sick I can go to the hospital right now. It is such a relief not to live in a
police state.’ He was telling me how blessed we are.” Another sponsor quoted the head of
a Kosovar family, who said, “Now that I am in Canada I can sleep at night. I know that I
am safe.”
Multiculturalism
The other factor that came out of the discussions of refugee expectations was tied to
Canada’s multicultural nature. The refugees evinced both positive and negative reactions
in the perceptions of the sponsors. “The sponsors took the refugees to Heritage Days.
They were surprised that so many cultures were living together and not fighting.” Some
sponsors commented that the Kosovars were quite astonished at the diverse nature of
their ESL classes, and that people who were so different could get along.
A few sponsors indicated that they were surprised by the negative comments the
refugees made about others, based on difference. “I must say, I was constantly amazed—
even though they had been through all kinds of tensions of that kind—to see them
judging people by their names. You don’t know people, but you don’t want to talk to
them because of their names.” “Good God, I had to listen to tirades about Chinese
people, making fun of someone else’s accent. I don’t know why that surprised me that
much, but I would expect anyone to know that there are lots of different kinds of people
in this country. ” The expectation on the part of some of the sponsors that Kosovars,
particularly the KOSs, would know about the degree of diversity in Canada is somewhat
naïve. The Kosovars had no intention of leaving their own country until just a few
months before they arrived in Alberta. Not only had they not planned to leave, but they
had few choices in deciding where they would go during the airlifts. Canada’s
multicultural nature and approach to integration are quite distinct from those of many
European countries, and must be surprising to many newcomers.
Sponsor’s Expectations of Citizenship and Immigration Canada
The participants were asked how adequate federal government support to the sponsors
was. Their answers can be classified into six main categories, presented here in rank
order:
Abu-Laban, B., Derwing, T. M., Mulder, M. & Northcott, H. (2001). Lessons
Learned: An Evaluation of Northern Alberta’s Experience with Kosovar Refugees (3
volumes). Edmonton, AB: The Prairie Centre of Excellence for Research on
Immigration and Integration.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
There was a need for more clarity/information/follow-up.
All support was helpful.
There were not enough interpreters; interpreters were not adequate.
The government should have paid for all dental /medical expenses.
There was no support; red tape and delays.
Sponsors do not need help; it is enough to provide financial support to the refugees.
Need for More Clarity/Information
Both experienced and inexperienced sponsors reported that they were frustrated at not
having sufficient information, or at having been supplied with incorrect information. This
ongoing problem involved nearly every aspect of the initial settlement experience. “CIC
could never tell us when the refugees were coming. Why not? They were in charge. Is
this a random universe?” “At the workshops it appeared that the government was not that
prepared. They had handouts but not that many details.” “CIC should be more helpful …
CIC stopped answering the telephones directly and a person had to navigate the voice
mail system. There was no human being to talk to.” “The initial explanation by CIC
regarding medical and dental assistance did not stay the same.” “I heard about the TB
rumour. It would have been nice if CIC had sent out a circular about what to do.” CIC
could have done some more in the follow-up.” “We missed doing their income tax. We
didn’t realize that it needed to be done until the government threatened to withhold the
child tax benefit.” “The medical information was in sealed envelopes. They didn’t share
this information with us. There needs to be some follow-up on the medical
requirements.” “We need to know not only medical situations but also psychological
difficulties. We were told not to ask questions, yet this information is critical.” “CIC was
like a revolving door. As a result there was no ongoing person with whom you could
talk.”
Some of the frustration felt by the sponsors could have been avoided had there
been clear direction from the beginning on the interim federal health agreement and other
matters decided by CIC National Headquarters (NHQ). Some of the information that
sponsors needed was contained within the RAP binder, but the dissemination of the
contents of the binder varied greatly from one group to the next.
Support was Helpful
Although several people expressed frustrations at the lack of information when they
needed it, many people felt that CIC did an excellent job. Experienced sponsors,
especially, were pleased with the support of the CIC office. “CIC was very gracious.”
“The CIC contact was very responsible and available. They were very responsive to our
requests and were very patient.” “The CIC staff were very polite, patient and respectful to
the refugees.” “We didn’t expect the amount of support we got compared to our
experiences before.” “CIC was available any time, any place. They gave us a list of
names and phone numbers that we could contact.” “X went beyond the CIC mandate.
She made some instant decisions.” “I was constantly amazed at how much the
government supported us. I expected them to be like they were before, when we had to
figure everything out on our own, but no. Every time I called they were really helpful
with all the information we needed.” “I was amazed with the government. They were
real public servants, not some mini-dictators like they can be.”
Abu-Laban, B., Derwing, T. M., Mulder, M. & Northcott, H. (2001). Lessons
Learned: An Evaluation of Northern Alberta’s Experience with Kosovar Refugees (3
volumes). Edmonton, AB: The Prairie Centre of Excellence for Research on
Immigration and Integration.
Problems with Interpreters
A range of problems was cited with reference to interpreters. In addition to there not
being enough English/Albanian bilinguals available, some sponsors had concerns
regarding the quality of the interpretation. Furthermore, the Kosovars were sometimes
unwilling to talk to Serbian interpreters. “We would have liked to have more access to
interpreters. We needed them so badly and they were run off their feet.” “When we
finally had some interpreters and knew their schedule, the government got rid of them
and hired two new people who didn’t know what was going on.” “We were not sure if X
was interpreting or telling us his own ideas.” “The interpreter told us that X had a lot of
counselling in the Maritimes. From the manner in which this information was presented it
seemed that the problems had been resolved. Instead he still has memory loss … The
family did not expect him to work, but we had to learn this gradually. Had we known
some of this information we would not have been so judgmental.” “The interpreters were
an issue. Serbian interpreters were used. Our family would not talk with X because they
thought she was Serbian.”
There was a natural constraint in terms of the availability of appropriate
interpreters; however those individuals who volunteered to interpret should have been
given guidelines from the outset. In addition, it would have been helpful to the local CIC
personnel to have had information from the bases as to which families had members with
good English skills. Interpreters could then have been dispatched on the basis of greatest
need.
Dental and Medical Expenses
A recurring theme throughout the focus group interviews had to do with dissatisfaction
with the handling of dental and medical expenses. There was a great deal of confusion
over the coverage; the federal government indicated that the Kosovars’ dental and
medical needs would be paid for, but it is the responsibility of the provincial government
to administer health care. The communication regarding federal involvement was not
clear at the outset, which caused problems for health care providers, the provincial
government, sponsoring groups, and the refugees themselves. “We were told that
refugees would be offered the same Alberta Health Care as Albertans. One of the
refugees went to physiotherapy and met the criteria for receiving ongoing treatment. The
government never did pay the bill.” “The hospital finance department did not know
about the interim health agreement.” “There was a gap in communication about the
medical information. There were some things that should have been addressed
immediately and we didn’t find out about it until they returned. A root canal was started
at the military base but was not finished. The government did not pay for root canals
once they were off the base. There was no follow-through.” “The father had all his teeth
pulled out when he was at the military base. After he was living in Edmonton the dentist
applied to the government to get dentures. The government turned down this request.
Finally the dentist got approval for temporary dentures. What are temporary dentures? He
had been in Canada for a year and just received the dentures about three weeks ago.” “It
wasn’t clear how much [dental support] was covered. And who could have guessed that
almost every single one of them would come with dental problems.”
One of the most contentious problems for the sponsors was the handling of the
medical and dental health of the Kosovars. Had policies concerning the provision of care
been decided upon and disseminated to all relevant parties early on, a great many
misunderstandings could have been avoided. The medical records given to the refugees in
a sealed envelope should have been flagged if they were urgent; and sponsors who
Abu-Laban, B., Derwing, T. M., Mulder, M. & Northcott, H. (2001). Lessons
Learned: An Evaluation of Northern Alberta’s Experience with Kosovar Refugees (3
volumes). Edmonton, AB: The Prairie Centre of Excellence for Research on
Immigration and Integration.
received refugees who had serious medical problems should have been advised of their
status, without divulging the exact nature of the condition (to maintain some privacy).
No Support Provided
A few individuals, primarily but not exclusively sponsors of non-Kosovars, indicated that
they did not receive any support from the government: “We were on our own.” “I did not
receive any support.” “We received no support from the government but we relied on our
SAH.” One group indicated that they had no expectations of help as sponsors, but that
they want the government to do more in terms of bringing refugees to Canada. “If there
is a group that gets more media attention, they also seem to get government support,
whereas, in Africa, in Rwanda in particular, we see a forgotten nation. Terrible atrocities
took place there. There are still Rwandan children dying in refugee camps in Kenya but
there is no official government program in place for them.”
No Need to Help Sponsors
Some respondents thought that the role of CIC was simply to provide financial support to
the refugees; they felt that there was no need to assist the sponsoring groups: “The
government was very generous in the money provided.” “The government doesn’t need
to help sponsors. The government is already helping bring refugees here.”
When we explored whether there were differences in perceptions of government
support to sponsors depending on previous experience, we found the majority of those
who spoke of red tape and a lack of support were sponsors of non-Kosovars, who indeed,
did get less support from CIC than the sponsors of Kosovars. Although both experienced
and inexperienced sponsors called for more clarity in the information provided by CIC, it
was primarily the experienced sponsors who felt that CIC was helpful.
What Sponsors Would Have Liked to Have Known
As noted earlier, many sponsors indicated that they would have liked more clarity on the
federal and provincial governments’ regulations regarding medical and dental support
and other government requirements (e.g., income tax). Most of the other topics suggested
here, though, had to do with the refugees themselves and information on what a
sponsorship commitment would entail.
Information about Refugees
Several people expressed a desire for more information about the families who were sent
to Alberta: “We would have liked to have had a family profile—something more than
names, dates and gender. Sometimes we asked questions which resulted in a torrent of
tears and I felt bad and didn’t know what to do. This was traumatic for both the sponsor
and the refugee.” Some indication of the psychological state of the refugees was
mentioned by sponsors whose families had relatively severe distress: “We should have
known more about suicide as part of post traumatic stress.” “There was no assessment
that some of these refugees had special needs and that they would need a lot more care.”
Other sponsors felt that the information they received in the orientation sessions
could have been organized differently: “We received information that could have been
handled later, such as schooling for the children. What we needed to learn about was the
day-to-day things, the making of appointments for health care, communicating with them,
knowing what money the refugees were going to get, and following the list of things one
was supposed to do.” Sponsors reiterated the need for accurate cultural information, and
Abu-Laban, B., Derwing, T. M., Mulder, M. & Northcott, H. (2001). Lessons
Learned: An Evaluation of Northern Alberta’s Experience with Kosovar Refugees (3
volumes). Edmonton, AB: The Prairie Centre of Excellence for Research on
Immigration and Integration.
some indicated that they would have liked to have had a little information on the
Albanian language to help them communicate in the first few weeks.
For those sponsors whose refugee families repatriated, there were other concerns:
“I did not know about the opportunity for them to return to Kosova. That would have
changed my level of emotional involvement.” “I would have liked to have information as
to what the situation in Kosova was really like at the end of July, 1999. We had no idea
how to advise them about what they were going back to. The refugees decided [in the
absence of this] information which might have influenced their decision to go back.” The
sponsors who took their Kosovar families to the airport for repatriation would have liked
information on what they could or could not take back with them. In addition, there were
concerns about the government payments, which were cut back in the last month, if the
refugees had decided to return. Sponsors felt they needed specific guidance or, at the very
least, a heads-up on these issues.
One sponsoring group of a KOF family indicated that they would have liked to
have been apprised of what happened at the military base at Gagetown. “I would have
liked to know what our [refugee] family missed out on. I didn’t realize that some families
had stayed there for two months.”
Information Regarding the Sponsoring Experience
Given that there were many people involved in the Kosovar project who had not
sponsored refugees in the past, there was a perceived need for more support, and more
information at the outset regarding the mechanics of sponsoring. “They could have
mentioned it’s really a full-time job.” “We should have been advised to work as a larger
group from the beginning.” “It would have been nice to have a manager for the sponsor
group. If this had been formulated before the refugees came then it would have been
easier.” Closely related to this need for information on the sponsoring experience was a
desire for follow-up from CIC. “A regularly scheduled follow-up from CIC would have
been most helpful.”
Will Sponsors Participate in Sponsorship Arrangements in the Future?
Despite the heavy time commitment and the frustrations felt by many of the sponsors,
only 17% said that they would not participate in sponsoring arrangements again. Sixtytwo percent stated that they would be willing to sponsor refugees without hesitation, and
another 17% said they would consider it after a period of a few years. The remaining 4%
either did not know, or indicated that it was not their decision, but that of their church to
make.
Sponsors’ Suggestions for Future Refugee Initiatives
Although the majority of sponsors expressed willingness to be involved in sponsorship
arrangements in the future, they had several suggestions for the federal government. The
most commonly mentioned recommendations, in rank order, are:
1. Provide the same level of support for all refugees as was given to the Kosovars.
2. Develop strategies for integrating refugees into the labour market.
3. Develop a sponsorship training program, and build follow-up into all sponsorships.
4. Eliminate long delays in the sponsorship process for non-Kosovar refugees.
5. Provide more support in the areas of medical and dental treatment.
Abu-Laban, B., Derwing, T. M., Mulder, M. & Northcott, H. (2001). Lessons
Learned: An Evaluation of Northern Alberta’s Experience with Kosovar Refugees (3
volumes). Edmonton, AB: The Prairie Centre of Excellence for Research on
Immigration and Integration.
6. Provide specific information about the refugees to sponsors (e.g., psychological
profiles).
Other suggestions for improvements tended to be quite specific, such as ensuring
that refugees are housed in the same area as the sponsoring church; simplifying the forms
that refugees are required to complete, and utilizing more interpreters.
Level of Support
Many of the experienced sponsors suggested that all refugees should enjoy the same level
of support as was provided to the Kosovars. They noted that they had considerably more
energy to devote to helping refugees without the worry of fund-raising. “It is my
understanding that this is the first time that the Canadian government did not make the
sponsorship group make a financial commitment. I think that helped the sponsorship
program. I think it removed a barrier by not having to come up with $1500 or more a
month … I think more people would be willing to sponsor newcomers if the federal
government decreased the financial commitment [for sponsors] … What we have been
able to give to our refugee family is much more important than the money.” “I think that
getting the money from the federal government gives the family more control and a
feeling of independence. They are not financially connected to those people who are
trying to help them.”
Not everyone agreed with the level of support provided to the Kosovars. A
minority voiced concerns such as the following: “Too many resources were thrown at
them. Too many people involved. It’s like sending a school bus to pick up two people.”
“I think we are giving them too much money to start with and they don’t want to work
until two years is up.”
Integration of Refugees into the Labour Market
Some sponsors expressed concern over the problem of finding suitable jobs for refugees,
echoing calls from settlement agencies, academics, and the popular media for the federal
government to address this issue. In some instances, they specified the case of
professionals, who have great difficulty re-entering their previous occupations: “The
refugees need to have their credentials recognized. To have credentials evaluated is time
consuming and expensive.” Others felt that the Kosovars, in particular, expected to get
good jobs right away, and did not want to alter their expectations just in order to work:
“They see only the result, not the process, like being a janitor first and moving on to be a
manager. They want to begin in Canada by being a manager.” A few sponsors felt that
refugees should “work for the money they are receiving” and that they should “do
community service jobs.” The motivation to work was also discussed: “When a refugee
earns money his or her cheque is reduced for that amount over 25%. [Support cheques are
reduced by the amount earned that exceeds 25% of the total amount of support allocated
in a given month.] This is a de-motivator. If the government expects refugees to become
independent, it has to do something about this current policy. Perhaps it could reduce the
amount over 25% by only half for each dollar earned. The refugees would gain Canadian
job experience and most refugees would work anyway because of job satisfaction.”
Rather than simply change policies, some sponsors advocated a direct
involvement of CIC in program delivery: “There needs to be more strategy in the
transition from learning English to job readiness and employment …. CIC should
contribute to this transition. They could help with filling job applications, preparing
refugees for job interviews, advising them about job opportunities, offering job
experience and providing some training projects.” One individual commented on the
Abu-Laban, B., Derwing, T. M., Mulder, M. & Northcott, H. (2001). Lessons
Learned: An Evaluation of Northern Alberta’s Experience with Kosovar Refugees (3
volumes). Edmonton, AB: The Prairie Centre of Excellence for Research on
Immigration and Integration.
complexity of the issues: “Monetary support from the government is very important to
allow more people to participate in the sponsoring of refugees (JAS). Somehow the
financial model needs to change, though, so that there is a real incentive for the refugees
to enter the workforce faster. How to do that may be very difficult.” As another sponsor
put it, “the sponsors need more help with employment issues and the refugees need an
employment sponsorship that includes counselling about employment.”
Sponsorship Training Programs
There were two types of comments on sponsorship training, the first of which came
primarily from individuals who had no previous experience. It was suggested that the
sponsor group should have a core group of about 5 or 6 members. “I think we could have
used a larger group.” “A regular debriefing is good every so many months.” “Debriefing
is necessary—The one all-day session I attended (PTSS) was good. It was good to be
with other sponsors and hear about their activities.” On the whole, sponsors were
appreciative of the orientation that they received, but would have liked more help. They
also wanted easy access to someone at CIC who could answer their questions
immediately. Several people indicated that they felt the need for follow-up from CIC.
The other concern came from a sponsoring group of a non-Kosovar refugee:
“Sponsorships should be more serious. Sometimes the sponsorship is on paper only. The
sponsoring group should take it seriously and expect to do something. Paper
sponsorships are not a good idea because the sponsors are really legally responsible and if
something goes wrong they will have to help but they are not ready or willing to.” The
problem of private sponsors who abdicate their responsibility is one that may not be
completely unavoidable, but ongoing follow-up on the part of the government might
encourage sponsors to take their responsibilities seriously.
Elimination of Delays in the Sponsorship Process
Several experienced sponsors who had been involved with either private or JAS programs
in the past commented that the length of time it takes to get a refugee family here from a
refugee camp overseas is unreasonably long. Having seen the speed with which
Operation Parasol was conducted, these sponsors recognized that it is possible to
accelerate the process.
Support for Medical and Dental Treatment
This theme emerged at several points in the focus group interviews. In general, the
sponsors were in agreement that medical and dental treatment should be made available
in the settlement period, with few restrictions, even if there are procedures involved that
are not ordinarily covered: “If procedures are initiated at the military bases (e.g., medical
or dental treatments) they should be flagged so that follow-up can be done. ” There
appeared to be an assumption that the procedures carried out at the bases were done by
military personnel, but in fact, much of the dental work was done by volunteer dentists,
who offered their services at the sustainment sites. If similar circumstances arise in the
future, it might be preferable to treat only those who need immediate care and wait until
the refugees have reached their final destination before initiating work that is not urgent.
Any procedures that are started but not completed at a base should certainly be treated
with alacrity on arrival at the final destination.
The sponsors also felt that the communication around health care provision
needed to be improved: “Health, welfare and education are basically a provincial affair.
These people, however, were wards of the federal government. They should be treated as
Abu-Laban, B., Derwing, T. M., Mulder, M. & Northcott, H. (2001). Lessons
Learned: An Evaluation of Northern Alberta’s Experience with Kosovar Refugees (3
volumes). Edmonton, AB: The Prairie Centre of Excellence for Research on
Immigration and Integration.
if they were military personnel. That was one of the problems with the medical forms.
They didn’t fit the provincial norms.” In future, the terms of the federal government
interim health agreement should be communicated to all stakeholders, prior to the arrival
of the refugees.
Specific Information on Refugees
This theme also came up in several places throughout the interviews with sponsors of
KOSs and KOFs. The sponsors felt that they did not get sufficient information on the
refugee families they were helping. They wanted information not only on the
background of the Kosovars, but about the specific people who were put in their care,
especially where such information could advise their actions in assisting the refugee
family. They were most anxious to have medical and psychological information.
Sponsors’ Recommendations
As might be expected, the 119 sponsors who participated in this study held disparate
views on nearly every issue; in fact, they sometimes expressed assessments that were
diametrically opposed. What they share, however, is a concern for refugees, and a desire
to help newcomers integrate successfully into Canadian society. Although several people
expressed frustration with various aspects of the sponsorship process, the majority of
them were willing to consider sponsorship again. The Kosovar project was unique in
many respects. Because it is customary to focus on problems, the lessons learned
identified by the sponsors are heavily weighted to addressing the difficulties they faced.
However, there were differences in the government’s approach to handling the Kosovars
that were very positive as well. These included the broadening of the definition of
family, the practice of keeping family together both in the sustainment sites and in the
cities to which they were eventually destined, the rescinding of the ROLF, the subsidy of
housing costs, and the speed with which the government acted. Many of the experienced
sponsors noted that the local CIC staff in Edmonton did their utmost to be of assistance.
Summary
1. Sponsors of Kosovars were asked to provide social integration, but, unlike the
case of non-Kosovar sponsors, were not asked to provide any financial support.
2. The majority of the sponsors of Kosovars had no previous experience.
3. CIC, in conjunction with CSS and other service agencies, provided sponsor
orientation sessions, although not all sponsors attended.
4. Sponsors of Kosovars found their role to be onerous, particularly in terms of
emotional investment and demands on their time.
5. Sponsors of Kosovars would have liked more opportunity to debrief and to
have contact with other, experienced sponsors.
Abu-Laban, B., Derwing, T. M., Mulder, M. & Northcott, H. (2001). Lessons
Learned: An Evaluation of Northern Alberta’s Experience with Kosovar Refugees (3
volumes). Edmonton, AB: The Prairie Centre of Excellence for Research on
Immigration and Integration.
6. Some of the sponsors’ initial expectations of the Kosovars were at odds with
reality.
7. Many of the sponsors of the Kosovars felt that the refugees had unrealistic
expectations of them and of life in Canada.
8. Sponsors expressed a need for more information about refugees and the sponsoring experience.
9. The majority of sponsors interviewed stated that they would consider
sponsoring in the future.
7. SERVICE PROVIDERS’ EXPERIENCE WITH KOSOVARS 1
Introduction
The arrival in Alberta of a large number of Kosovars in the summer of 1999 required
immediate action, especially on the part of many SPOs that routinely deal with
newcomers. The focus for this component of the study is on those agencies that provide
services designed specifically for newcomers, and on those that provide services to the
larger public, including newcomers. In addition to administering a short questionnaire,
we conducted focus group and individual interviews with staff from five settlement
agencies (two in Grande Prairie); instructors representing three adult ESL institutions;
ESL teachers from an elementary school, a junior high, and a high school; two
mainstream agencies in Edmonton (Canadian Red Cross and Salvation Army); a group of
Albanian-English interpreters; a dentist; and representatives of the federal and provincial
governments. In total, 60 service providers from 16 organizations participated in 20 focus
group discussions representing 23 programs offered to Kosovar refugees.
The questions addressed to the participants focused on planning needs, channels
of communication, training needs, the uniqueness of the Kosovar group, and
recommendations for future efforts. The participants’ responses have been grouped
according to these categories. The common themes are summarized at the end of the
chapter.
Planning
When the respondents were asked whether or not their agencies were involved in the
planning process for the Kosovars, 44% said that they were not, yet 77% reported that
they were actively involved immediately upon the arrival of the refugees. Half the
participants felt that they had had enough preparation time. The Kosovars who were
served by the organizations represented in the focus groups were generally referred by
CIC, sponsors, and other agencies, in that order. Seventy percent of the agencies also
served sponsors through the delivery of orientation sessions and general communications.
Only 30% of the representatives indicated that they received immediate funding for the
services they were asked to provide; of those, 86% said that the funding was sufficient.
Abu-Laban, B., Derwing, T. M., Mulder, M. & Northcott, H. (2001). Lessons
Learned: An Evaluation of Northern Alberta’s Experience with Kosovar Refugees (3
volumes). Edmonton, AB: The Prairie Centre of Excellence for Research on
Immigration and Integration.
Government Perspectives
Several of the staff in the local CIC office and representatives of Alberta Learning, the
lead provincial Ministry on issues of immigration, were interviewed. It should be noted
that the general funding of immigrant-serving agencies in Alberta is unlike that of the rest
of the country. The two levels of government co-fund the ESL assessment centres in
Calgary and Edmonton; they also jointly fund settlement agencies across the province.
Although the provincial government said that the local CIC did their utmost to include
them in their planning, the province was not consulted initially regarding the number of
Kosovars to be sent to Alberta, nor were they consulted regarding the demands on the
resources of the settlement agencies, many of which were intensely involved with making
arrangements for the Kosovars. However, representatives of Alberta Learning were
contacted regularly by the CIC Regional and Edmonton offices on a number of other
matters.
The staff in the CIC office in Edmonton indicated that they had to adjust very
quickly to an influx of Kosovars; a decision was made locally to do whatever seemed
appropriate and to do it immediately. The local office received little direction from NHQ
and the Regional office until fairly late in the process. Even when daily conference calls
were initiated, many of the specific aspects of the pressing issues facing the Kosovars
could not be addressed by NHQ or the Regional office. It was the understanding of the
local CIC staff that the Kosovars would be treated like other private sponsorships. Local
CIC thought that it was not necessary to involve the SPO community in this initial phase
of the project. “They [the Kosovars] received some essential services at the sustainment
sites. It was to be the role of the sponsors to provide the remaining support. The SPO role
was much later in the process. Similar to others in the RAP stream, they don’t provide
assistance for some time. ” The CIC staff reported that they wanted to rely on established
SAHs: “We needed as many seasoned sponsors as we could get.”
CIC invited the Edmonton branch of the Canadian Red Cross to handle media
relations. A meeting was called by CIC to discuss the imminent arrival of the Kosovars.
Several representatives from the settlement community had been invited, but the meeting
was announced in the media as being open to the public; consequently, a large number of
willing would-be sponsors came, only to be told that they could not stay. It was decided
that a committee be established to keep the settlement community informed. The
Edmonton/Kosovo Refugee Coordinating Group was to serve as a planning forum;
however, the settlement agencies viewed the meetings as a one-way dissemination
vehicle for CIC for the first several weeks. Only later did they feel that they had input
into the meetings.
Settlement Agencies’ Perspectives
Once the Kosovars started to arrive, the CIC office recognized the need to include the
settlement community in order to prepare for these refugees; they contacted CSS because
it is the lead agency in Edmonton for reception and early settlement assistance. They also
arranged to hire an individual to serve as a liaison between CIC and CSS. From the
standpoint of CSS staff, their involvement in the planning process was too little, too late.
They were initially informed that their services would not be required, given that all the
Kosovars would have sponsors. As a representative of CSS said: “We got a mixed
message from the federal government representatives about our and other settlement
agencies’ role in the resettlement of Kosovar refugees. We were told that this was going
Abu-Laban, B., Derwing, T. M., Mulder, M. & Northcott, H. (2001). Lessons
Learned: An Evaluation of Northern Alberta’s Experience with Kosovar Refugees (3
volumes). Edmonton, AB: The Prairie Centre of Excellence for Research on
Immigration and Integration.
to be a separate initiative and that the Kosovars were going to be assisted by private
sponsors who would take care of everything. The federal government representatives’
initial response was that this special movement and initiative was not going to affect our
agency at all. This was not the way it turned out. In fact, very quickly we became
involved, however unintentionally, in several aspects. During those first few weeks our
agency received between 200-250 calls a week from the community, from concerned
citizens and potential sponsors. We spent a lot of time answering calls, responding to the
community’s strong expression of concern and willingness to help. We were explaining
what sponsorship means, what government-assisted sponsorship means, what settlement
plans mean, potential ways of helping, etc. In many ways we were doing the work of the
government, explaining the program and its intent. A government hotline was eventually
set up, but there were some difficulties with that and we continued to receive and handle
information calls.” Eventually, CSS was asked to locate accommodation, to find
interpreters, and to coordinate the sponsorships. The CSS representatives reported that
they did not have enough lead time for the sponsorships: they estimated that they needed
a month, but they had a week to get everything organized. The other large settlement
agency in Edmonton, the MCN, was not approached by CIC for its expertise, other than
to assist in orientation sessions.
The MCN staff’s assessment of the initial planning was that they should have
been involved from the beginning, since they were delivering services from the start
(obtaining clothing for the refugees, developing programs for children, and participating
in workshops for sponsors). The participants from a very small settlement agency,
Edmonton Immigrant Services Association (EISA), also felt that they should have been
contacted; their concern was that they have very few clients and the Kosovars would add
to their client base.
The agencies in Grande Prairie felt that they had been included in the planning
process from the outset. They were pleased to have had the opportunity to receive
Kosovars in their community and felt that the communications with CIC Edmonton were
very helpful.
Planning in Mainstream Agencies (Red Cross and Salvation Army)
The Edmonton branch of the Canadian Red Cross was contacted early in the process,
once it was known that Kosovars were coming to northern Alberta. CIC felt it would be
inappropriate for their own office to deal directly with the media. Since the Red Cross
had been coordinating many responsibilities on the bases, including media at one stage, it
seemed a logical choice for the local CIC to invite the Edmonton branch of the Red Cross
to take on the media relations role, despite the Red Cross’s lack of experience dealing
with newcomers or sponsors.
Like the Red Cross, the Salvation Army is not ordinarily involved with the
immediate settlement of newcomers, but in this instance they were asked to provide
goods, such as bedding, for the Kosovars’ accommodations. The representative
interviewed indicated that the Salvation Army workers did not need much information for
their role, but that earlier consultation that allowed them to have a voice would have been
appreciated.
ESL Teachers’ Perspectives
Abu-Laban, B., Derwing, T. M., Mulder, M. & Northcott, H. (2001). Lessons
Learned: An Evaluation of Northern Alberta’s Experience with Kosovar Refugees (3
volumes). Edmonton, AB: The Prairie Centre of Excellence for Research on
Immigration and Integration.
The K-12 ESL teachers were drawn from an elementary school, a junior high and a high
school, each of which had a high concentration of Kosovar children. The teachers of
ESL to adults represented three programs that Kosovars attended (Norquest, New Home
and Sacred Heart). In each instance, they indicated that they received little or no warning
that the Kosovars were coming; they also indicated that this situation is the norm for
them. They never know far in advance who will be registering in their classes. It is also
not unusual for them to receive refugee students who have been through trauma, so, in
many respects, it was business as usual for the ESL teachers.
The Perspectives of Interpreters and a Dental Care Provider
Two of the three interpreters interviewed had been at military bases and one worked in
Edmonton only. Their responses to questions about planning referred to their experiences
at the sustainment sites. Initially they found it very difficult because no one “really knew
what we were doing,” but “after the first ten days, everything went smoothly.”
The dentist we interviewed had received several Kosovar clients. She did not feel
that there was any need to be included in the early stages of the planning, but she was
concerned that once the Kosovars had arrived and were accessing health services, there
was not enough information concerning the benefit plan.
Channels of Communication
Communication was a central concern in all the interviews with service providers. There
was a general appreciation of the difficulties posed by the sudden course of events, and
several people commented on the efforts of individuals across the board to make the best
of challenging circumstances; however, there were numerous suggestions for improved
communications in the future.
Government Perspectives
As mentioned above, the local CIC felt compelled to make decisions in the absence of
policy direction from NHQ or the Regional office, because they wanted to respond to the
needs of the Kosovars as quickly as possible. They recognized that, since many of the
sponsors were inexperienced, they would need to provide orientation sessions: CIC, CSS,
MCN, and Red Cross, in cooperation with the First Presbyterian Church, developed
three-hour panel presentations for sponsors that they delivered several times. In these
sessions they discussed cultural background information about the Kosovars as well as
the responsibilities of the sponsoring groups. One of the CIC staff members also flew to
Grande Prairie to conduct an orientation workshop there.
The CIC, Edmonton tried to keep in touch with the key players; they recognized
that there were gaps in the information, but they too had difficulty getting the answers
they needed. The cultural background information with which they had been provided
was not completely accurate, and clarification on the federal interim health plan was
delayed.
From the perspective of the provincial government representatives, “there was a
real gap in communication with the regional CIC office. We were ‘in the loop,’ whereas
the local CIC office was not.” “The federal government was doing the conference calls
Abu-Laban, B., Derwing, T. M., Mulder, M. & Northcott, H. (2001). Lessons
Learned: An Evaluation of Northern Alberta’s Experience with Kosovar Refugees (3
volumes). Edmonton, AB: The Prairie Centre of Excellence for Research on
Immigration and Integration.
with the provinces so we would have the information but the local CIC delivery office
was not in on the conference calls so they didn’t have the information.” The provincial
government indicated that although they were consulted regularly, they felt that the
federal government should have had more resources such as fact sheets, checklists and so
on, particularly with regard to the federal health plan. Although the federal government
took responsibility for many of the health care needs of the Kosovars, it is at the
provincial level that the care was implemented. There was conflicting information for
some period of time; practitioners could not get a clear answer about which costs the
federal government would cover. In addition to a lack of guidance on the nature of the
plan, the provincial government noted that the Kosovar profiles with health information
arrived late, and that there was a lack of consistency in the level of detail in the files.
Communication from the Settlement Agencies’ Perspective
One of the key concerns of the representative from CSS regarding channels of
communication had to do with knowing in advance how many people would be coming,
and what psychological state the newcomers would be in, that is, how many people were
suffering from the effects of torture or trauma. They were told that the refugees received
thorough physical and psychological examinations, yet relevant information was not
passed on to the coordinators or the sponsors.
In addition, CSS commented on communication with the refugees; they indicated
that the Kosovars had been given information and orientation at the sustainment sites that
seemed overly general and thus prone to misinterpretation upon settlement in the
community. The Kosovars told settlement workers at CSS that they had received two
hours of orientation to Canada each day at the military bases where they heard that (a)
they would receive very large cheques upon arrival in Edmonton, (b) all their expenses
would be covered, and (c) they could become Canadians in three years’ time (at that point
the Kosovars were not landed immigrants; one can become a Canadian three years after
gaining landed status). The confusion around eligibility for citizenship subsided later
when Kosovars were informed that half of their time in Canada under a Minister’s Permit
would count towards the residency time needed to become a citizen. However, when the
Kosovars came to Edmonton and found that circumstances were not what they had
expected, they thought that the interpreters either at the sustainment site or in Edmonton
had lied to them. Some of these misunderstandings could have been avoided if the
information given to the Kosovars had been more precise and if they had received written
summaries of the orientations in Albanian.
The representatives from the MCN pointed to the need for accurate cultural
background information, improved communication around health care, and training for
sponsors. They indicated that CIC had invited them to attend the Edmonton/Kosovo
Refugee Coordinating Group, and through it each of the participating agencies identified
needs and proposed distribution of tasks; however, they felt that they had not been
consulted in terms of what they perceived the needs to be.
The participants from the programs in Grande Prairie both indicated that the lines
of communication with CIC were very good. They felt that they were well informed
throughout the process.
Red Cross and the Salvation Army
Abu-Laban, B., Derwing, T. M., Mulder, M. & Northcott, H. (2001). Lessons
Learned: An Evaluation of Northern Alberta’s Experience with Kosovar Refugees (3
volumes). Edmonton, AB: The Prairie Centre of Excellence for Research on
Immigration and Integration.
The Red Cross and the Salvation Army had ongoing contact with CIC through the
Edmonton/Kosovo Refugee Coordinating Group. Representatives from both
organizations felt that they had the information they needed to make their contributions to
the project.
ESL Teachers
In each instance, CIC contacted the directors of the ESL programs at the adult institutions
to give them advance notice of the arrival of the Kosovars. Some of the ESL teachers
expressed a need for more background information on the Kosovars, particularly with
regard to the effects of psychological trauma. They indicated that some of the information
provided to the sponsors (for example, how to access interpreters) would have been
useful to them as well. The teachers in the K-12 system were unaware of any contact
between CIC and the school principals. They were on their own in determining the needs
of the Kosovar children.
Interpreters and Dentist
The interpreters were registered with CIC and were contacted through that connection.
Their main concern regarding channels of communication had to do with information
given to the Kosovars. It was their contention that more cultural and legal information
about Canada should have been presented in the ESL lessons provided to the refugees at
the sustainment sites. They also suggested that in future, information be provided in
written form in the refugees’ first language, in order to prevent some misunderstandings.
The dentist indicated that the Kosovars came to her clinic because they had heard
through word of mouth that she speaks Serbo-Croatian. She had no official notification of
their arrival. Once the refugees started to receive dental care, however, the dentist
received information regarding dental benefits from the MCN. She did not hear directly
from CIC until March of 2000, when a letter arrived concerning refugee benefits. “The
letter was not clear regarding the time frame for this coverage. In order to clarify this (for
example, if the coverage was for a fiscal year or a calendar year), our office made three
separate phone calls on three separate occasions to the 1-800 number mentioned in the
letter. On each occasion our office received different information. CIC did not have a
consistent interpretation on the directive. This caused a lot of confusion and
misunderstanding.”
Training Needs
Government Perspectives
The staff from CIC, Edmonton were in agreement that there needs to be more training for
sponsors. They mentioned that a training package had been developed at NHQ. From the
standpoint of CIC, it is the contracted responsibility of the SAHs to conduct sponsor
training, using the materials developed by CIC. CIC indicated that they had supplied each
sponsoring group, including the sponsors of KOSs and KOFs, with a RAP binder, which
provides information on what to do in the first few weeks of a sponsoring arrangement.
When asked whether there is a need for training of agencies that serve the general public,
Abu-Laban, B., Derwing, T. M., Mulder, M. & Northcott, H. (2001). Lessons
Learned: An Evaluation of Northern Alberta’s Experience with Kosovar Refugees (3
volumes). Edmonton, AB: The Prairie Centre of Excellence for Research on
Immigration and Integration.
such as health care providers, educators, and small business associations, one CIC staff
member indicated that there is not as much a need for training as there is for general
awareness of the circumstances of refugees and immigrants. This is a role for settlement
agencies, supported financially by CIC.
The respondents from the provincial government felt very strongly that sponsors
need training. Many of the sponsors did not know about the services available to
refugees. “We need some basic system in place where sponsors can learn about the
situations they will be facing.”
The provincial representatives also stated that “training is key for agencies that
serve the public.” One example of the type of resource that could be developed is a
manual for health care practitioners who will be working with newcomers, particularly
refugees.
Settlement Agency Viewpoints
The liaison staff person funded by CIC to work at CSS arranged for the majority of the
sponsor orientations. Her recommendations around training included arranging for more
training in general, and having more accurate cultural background information, better
communication, and group meetings for sponsors. She suggested that more funding be
allotted for sponsor training and that immigrant-serving agencies receive more financial
resources to carry out their work.
The orientation sessions for sponsors in Edmonton were in groups of 60 to 80.
The staff at CSS were of the opinion that this type of orientation cannot answer specific
questions, nor be responsive to specific informational needs of those attending. As a
result, the orientation session was not sufficient, yet there was no time to conduct further
sessions. One way of addressing this gap would be to bring the sponsors together on a
regular basis to allow for the sharing of experiences and answering questions as they
arose. They also feel that more ‘hands-on’ training sessions should be developed which
employ techniques such as role-play. When asked about training for mainstream service
providers, CSS staff indicated that health practitioners and landlords would benefit from
precise information relevant to their interactions with refugees.
Representatives from the MCN advocated strongly for sponsor training,
particularly with regard to boundary-setting: “Some invaded the refugees’ homes. Some
refugees felt like children again.” One individual noted that inexperienced sponsors
received no support from the SAHs. Another staff person commented that mainstream
agencies need to learn more about the experiences of refugees, and that “training is
especially needed for social workers who are known for retraumatising newcomers.” The
representative from the EISA also suggested that sponsors need training.
The settlement workers in Grande Prairie echoed the sentiments of those in
Edmonton that sponsors need training. In addition, they stressed the need for better
dissemination of information within sponsor groups.
Red Cross; Salvation Army; ESL Teachers; Interpreters
The Red Cross representatives maintained that settlement agencies should provide
training to sponsors and public agencies to insure that misunderstandings are kept to a
minimum. Some of the ESL instructors thought that sponsors should have received some
guidelines on their roles vis-à-vis the ESL programs. They reported that some sponsors
Abu-Laban, B., Derwing, T. M., Mulder, M. & Northcott, H. (2001). Lessons
Learned: An Evaluation of Northern Alberta’s Experience with Kosovar Refugees (3
volumes). Edmonton, AB: The Prairie Centre of Excellence for Research on
Immigration and Integration.
caused problems because they wanted to meet with teachers on a daily basis to review the
progress of the Kosovars they were sponsoring.
The interpreters, in reference to the stressful nature of their jobs, recommended
that training be provided for interpreters who work with refugees; they also indicated that
they would have liked an opportunity to debrief.
Uniqueness of the Kosovars
The situation of the airlift of refugees to Canada is unprecedented. From the time the
decision was made to initiate Operation Parasol, the Kosovars have received differential
treatment. Each of the service provider groups was asked to comment from their
perspectives on the experiences of the Kosovars versus those of other refugees.
Government
One of the first differences between the Kosovars and other refugees who have come to
Alberta was their initial reluctance to come. The refugees had to be convinced that
Alberta was a good place to live; many would have preferred to remain close to
Gagetown.
The local CIC determined that, aside from the KOFs who had relatives in Grande
Prairie, the Kosovars designated for northern Alberta would resettle in Edmonton where
there was ready availability of services, such as ESL and interpreters, and the Centre of
Survivors of Trauma and Torture. This decision caused some concern in smaller
communities where there were experienced private sponsors; however, in retrospect, the
CIC staff believed that the Kosovars resettled better than they would have, had they been
distributed across several smaller cities. Given the fact that Kosovars have large size
families and the close-knit relations among them, CIC staff believed that it was good to
keep them together as much as possible.
There were many other differences in the federal government’s treatment of the
Kosovars and other refugees, some of which were widely publicized in the media. The
Kosovars were not loaned transportation money or damage deposits; instead, the
government footed the bill. Neither were they required to pay the right of landing fee
(this fee has since been eliminated for all refugees). In Edmonton, the local CIC
subsidized housing in parts of the city where refugees are not ordinarily placed, in an
effort to keep family groups together. They also paid for utilities in some instances. The
health care arrangements for the Kosovars differed from those of other refugees in that
they were more extensive. The most obvious difference, however, was the classification
of a whole group of people as CR5s—the special needs category for refugees. In the
past, this classification has been decided on a case by case basis. As CR5s, the Kosovars
received two years of living support. The local CIC found this arrangement was difficult
for the community to understand. It was a challenging task to educate the SPOs about the
difference between this particular group and other refugee groups.
The CIC staff were acutely aware of another unique feature of the Kosovars’
experience. Most refugees who enter Canada have spent years in a refugee camp, or, as
refugee claimants, they have mentally prepared themselves for some time to leave their
own countries. The Kosovars came directly from a war-torn situation and had very little
time to assess their options. “They didn’t have that period to grieve and to really figure
Abu-Laban, B., Derwing, T. M., Mulder, M. & Northcott, H. (2001). Lessons
Learned: An Evaluation of Northern Alberta’s Experience with Kosovar Refugees (3
volumes). Edmonton, AB: The Prairie Centre of Excellence for Research on
Immigration and Integration.
out ‘Ok, this is my life reality now. I have to live it; I have to plan how I am going to
survive and make it work for me’.” “Other refugees [who have been in camps] have
unloaded some of their pain and now accept that they must make a new start.”
Finally, the Kosovars’ situation is distinct from that of any other refugee group in
that they had the opportunity to make exploratory visits back to their homeland to
determine whether or not to stay in Canada permanently. Giving people the choice to go
back to Kosova “is asking a heck of a lot of people.” “I don’t agree with the exploratory
visits; they’re not ready.” “It was physically impossible for them to stay. They
[Kosovars] didn’t sleep. They wandered. They were just obsessed with getting on that
plane and leaving.”
The participants from Alberta Learning noted many of the same differences in the
treatment of the Kosovars compared with that of other refugees; the health care issues
had the greatest impact from their standpoint. They also applauded CIC’s level of
consultation with the province regarding the Kosovars. They recommended that the
province have the same degree of involvement in all refugee situations (currently the
province is not consulted with regard to non-Kosovar refugees).
Settlement Agencies
Each of the settlement agency focus group discussions evoked a list of differences in the
treatment of the Kosovars similar to those highlighted in the CIC interview above. One
participant also addressed the fact that such a large number of sponsors had to be found in
such a short period of time. Although many people came forward, there was insufficient
time and resources to train them adequately.
There have since been negative consequences for agencies whose responsibility it
is to attract sponsors for new refugees. “The sponsorship program in Canada took a
heavy, heavy blow, because sponsors were put in the position of having to respond to
something the system didn’t allow for. There was no opportunity to recruit and train
sponsors. Suddenly we heard the Minister of Immigration making announcements on the
news asking Canadians to open their homes. We were pulling our hair out because this is
a very complex and difficult cross-cultural situation and there must be proper training and
support in place. The government really put us in a position where we were getting
requests from across the country from potential volunteers that we couldn’t possibly
respond to in an organized manner and couldn’t adequately deal with in terms of training
and support. And guess what? Two years later, can we find sponsors for Sierra Leone?
No. Why? Because the sponsors had such a terrible experience with the Kosovar
sponsorships. They’ve been burned out; they have poisoned relationships and they are not
going to offer their voluntary services and their money again. I know that money was not
involved in a big way, but some of the families that left Canada left huge phone bills
behind when they went back, and the churches had to pick up those phone bills …. It
really had a very negative impact on the sponsorship program across Canada.”
Red Cross and the Salvation Army
Neither the Red Cross nor the Salvation Army is ordinarily involved in refugee
settlement support, and therefore they could not comment on differences between the
Kosovar situation and that of other refugees.
ESL Teachers
Abu-Laban, B., Derwing, T. M., Mulder, M. & Northcott, H. (2001). Lessons
Learned: An Evaluation of Northern Alberta’s Experience with Kosovar Refugees (3
volumes). Edmonton, AB: The Prairie Centre of Excellence for Research on
Immigration and Integration.
The K-12 teachers were not aware of any differences in the treatment of Kosovar and
other refugee children within the school system. The adult ESL teachers noted that a
SAH Centre was established for the Kosovars, and special classes were established solely
for Kosovar students. A LINC class, levels 1-3, was established, with some full-time and
some part-time students, as well as children over the age of 10. Unlike other federally
funded ESL programs, the Kosovars were allowed to be absent a lot—“it was almost like
a drop-in.” The SAH Centre was created because other LINC programs have strict
attendance policies, and the Kosovars had to have medical appointments, making their
attendance sporadic. “I have mixed feelings about the SAH Centre. It’s nice that a new
group has a place to go, but do it for everybody. Don’t give all this preferential treatment.
” The fact that Kosovars had more benefits than other newcomers sometimes caused
problems in ESL classes. The teachers indicated that they would have liked to have had
an explanation for the Kosovars’ blanket CR5 status to explain to other students the
discrepancy in levels of financial support and English language training (the Kosovars
were eligible for four months more ESL than other refugees).
Recommendations for Future Efforts
Government
The Edmonton CIC staff had several recommendations for future efforts. The experience
with the Kosovars has pointed to a need for clear policy direction and communications
with regard to health care benefits and procedures under the interim federal health plan.
For example, NHQ couriered medical files of Kosovars to local CIC offices in some
cases, and in other cases the refugees brought them from Gagetown themselves. Late in
the process the sponsors were made aware that the refugees and their medical files should
have been referred to the doctors. Policies and procedures concerning family
reunification were clear from the beginning, however, the decisions were made on a caseby-case basis causing confusion for everyone involved.
The CIC respondents also pointed to the need for training for sponsors that is
specific to the refugee group being brought in. They emphasized the need for accurate
cultural profiles and suggested that if there are similar airlifts in the future, the staff at the
sustainment sites could develop a package of information prior to the dispersal of
refugees across the country. The extremely strong family ties in the Kosovar population
were cited as an example of the information that would have been useful to have in
advance.
The exploratory visits should be curtailed, or at the very least, delayed; the timing
was not right psychologically for many of the Kosovars, who had not had a chance to
adjust to their new circumstances. Some of the Kosovars who undertook exploratory
visits had to work under the table to find the money to travel. In effect, this encouraged
misuse of this policy.
The CIC staff were not completely sure that the unique treatment received by the
Kosovars should have been so different from other refugee groups. Although they readily
acknowledged the unique circumstances of the Kosovars, especially the lack of time to
adjust, they were not convinced that all of the extra benefits have made an appreciable
difference to successful settlement.
Abu-Laban, B., Derwing, T. M., Mulder, M. & Northcott, H. (2001). Lessons
Learned: An Evaluation of Northern Alberta’s Experience with Kosovar Refugees (3
volumes). Edmonton, AB: The Prairie Centre of Excellence for Research on
Immigration and Integration.
The Alberta government recommended training for sponsors, clear direction with
regard to the federal interim health care plan and billing procedures, and increased
consultation with the province in the settlement of all refugees. They were very pleased
that CIC had invited a high degree of involvement from the provincial government in the
Kosovar situation. The provincial representatives also indicated that they support longer
term assistance from the federal government. “Because the federal government is saying
that refugees are selected not on the basis of settlement but based on potential, then we
really want the refugees to succeed. We need to provide all the support that we can
through refugee programs.”
If similar situations arise in the future, with a large number of refugees arriving at
once, the government of Alberta would like to be consulted regarding the role of the
settlement agencies that they fund jointly with CIC. Related to this, the representatives
suggested that, in future, there be a plan in place to manage the media response to an
airlift and to calls for volunteer sponsors. An open invitation to all Canadians is likely to
overwhelm the settlement system and encourages disappointment among those potential
volunteers who are turned away.
Settlement Agencies
CSS recommended that if a similar large scale resettlement project occurs in the future,
there needs to be coordination among all the stakeholders: all three levels of government,
the appropriate NGOs such as the Red Cross, settlement agencies and SAHs.
Stakeholders should have access to comprehensive and accurate information about the
historical and cultural background of the refugees.
CSS indicated that the procedures and cooperation in the Edmonton area were far
better than the experiences of their counterparts in other areas of the country. “We had
good cooperation and collaboration with the local CIC. For example, the local CIC
recognized our experience in securing housing for refugees and approved funding for one
of our employees to begin this task immediately. In all cases we worked with individual
sponsoring groups, and this experience saved everyone a lot of time and frustration.”
With regard to the two years of funding, CSS recommended that there be
incentives to encourage people to become independent. “The refugees should be
encouraged to start looking for work, not be penalized when they do earn money.”
CSS, in commenting on training for sponsors, suggested that there should be two
orientation sessions, one for sponsors alone, and one with both the refugees and sponsors.
They also suggested more extensive training for sponsors, which could be conducted by
settlement agencies who have the appropriate and necessary knowledge of sponsorship
and settlement.
Representatives from the MCN also stressed the need for comprehensive training
of sponsors. They were particularly concerned that boundary-setting be emphasized.
They suggested that there be improved screening of potential sponsors, given the
importance of identifying people who have an understanding of the effects of trauma.
A representative of MCN suggested that if there are going to be other airlifts,
there should be communication with the NGOs on-site in the region of conflict to obtain
accurate information regarding the refugees’ needs. There should also be a partnership
with the settlement agencies in Canada. “We in the NGO community often feel that
although we are involved in the consultation, we are not listened to. When we talk about
ways in which the sponsorship program needs to be supported, it doesn’t happen …. I do
Abu-Laban, B., Derwing, T. M., Mulder, M. & Northcott, H. (2001). Lessons
Learned: An Evaluation of Northern Alberta’s Experience with Kosovar Refugees (3
volumes). Edmonton, AB: The Prairie Centre of Excellence for Research on
Immigration and Integration.
wish that there would be more of a culture of openness to actually take us more
seriously.”
Both agencies in Grande Prairie recommended sponsor training programs and
better dissemination of information within sponsoring groups. Both felt that the two year
funding period should be re-examined; one individual suggested that the funding in the
second year should be allotted on condition of “some sort of work experience” to
encourage self-reliance. Another representative concluded that the two years of support
invites people to learn helplessness.
Red Cross and the Salvation Army
The Red Cross representatives recommended that refugees be given a more realistic view
of Canada. “Refugees need to know the cost of things; some of them had the impression
that most things here are either free or very cheap, like long distance telephone costs. The
information needs to be fed to them more gradually and thoroughly.” They also felt that
the funding of the refugees should be considered on a case-by-case basis, according to
needs.
The Salvation Army’s recommendation for future large-scale initiatives like
Operation Parasol has to do with coordination of efforts on the part of NGOs. One of the
respondents had spent several weeks in Kosova, and in other conflict sites. He was struck
by the difference in humanitarian support. “There needs to be a coordinated effort about
the appeal money coming from around the world. At the moment, the NGOs are let loose
on that, and what happens is that some parts of the country get all and others get nothing.
We need to coordinate how that money is utilized. There must be a coordinated effort
with appealing for money—the UN should do it. When you think about it, it’s probably
big business that supports most of the NGOs, because they want to start new industries in
these countries.”
ESL Teachers
The teachers at New Home suggested that in future situations, the media be less involved.
“Refugees don’t need all that exposure. They want to be settled and left alone.” They
also indicated that there be special summer ESL programs developed for teenagers; this
age group appeared to be left out of the ESL planning. The teachers were concerned
about the inequitable treatment of the Kosovars as compared to other refugees; they
recommended that all refugees receive the same benefits.
Norquest, the institution charged with establishing the SAH Centre, recommended
that if a similar situation arises in the future, any special assistance should be set up
immediately. “The Canadian government responded very quickly, but not quickly
enough. The Kosovars themselves said that if the [SAH] Centre downtown was set up
even three weeks before, it would have been a lot better …. If there were something
already in place it would have been easier. The Kosovars were very troubled.” Norquest
representatives also commented on the need for sponsor training.
Sacred Heart ESL teachers recommended training for sponsors and they indicated
that GARs should have sponsors just as the Kosovars did. The K-12 teachers had few
recommendations for future efforts, but they stressed the importance of ESL. They also
indicated that it would be helpful if refugee parents were given information about the
school system here.
Abu-Laban, B., Derwing, T. M., Mulder, M. & Northcott, H. (2001). Lessons
Learned: An Evaluation of Northern Alberta’s Experience with Kosovar Refugees (3
volumes). Edmonton, AB: The Prairie Centre of Excellence for Research on
Immigration and Integration.
Interpreters and Dentist
The interpreters recommended that the two year funding be re-examined. They felt that
the Kosovars were discouraged from working because of the regulation that they would
be docked for any monies over 25% of their living allowance.
The dentist recommended that there be more communication between CIC and
the dental profession. She also recommended that the coverage allowed by the federal
interim health plan be revisited. There is no provision for preventative care, such as teeth
cleaning. She advocated increasing the annual amount for basic care from $400 to
between $800 - $1,000 in order to ensure that refugees get the dental care they need.
Summary
Planning Needs as Perceived by Service Providers
1. There was very little time to plan; decisions had to be made locally.
2. CIC Edmonton was under the impression that the Kosovars’ settlement would be like
that of other privately-sponsored refugees.
3. Not all stakeholders were included from the beginning, most notably settlement
agencies, which were besieged by calls from the start.
Communication Needs
4. Not enough information about the cultural and psychological background of the
Kosovars was provided.
5. Refugees arrived in Edmonton with many misconceptions based on information they
had received at the sustainment sites.
6. The details of the federal interim health care plan were not clear enough for
straightforward implementation.
Training Needs Perceived by Service Providers
7. There was an assumption that SAHs would train sponsors.
8. All service providers indicated a need for more extensive sponsor training, to be
provided by settlement agencies.
9. Interpreters felt they needed training for working with refugees and debriefing.
Uniqueness of Kosovars from Service Providers’ Perspectives
10. Kosovars were classified as CR5s (high risk, two-years of funding) as a group rather
than on a case-by-case basis.
11. Kosovars were not required to pay the ROLF, transportation fees or damage deposits.
12. Kosovars had housing and utilities subsidized.
13. Kosovars had more extensive health benefits than other refugees.
14. The Kosovar family groups were kept together.
15. Kosovars spent little or no time in a refugee camp.
Abu-Laban, B., Derwing, T. M., Mulder, M. & Northcott, H. (2001). Lessons
Learned: An Evaluation of Northern Alberta’s Experience with Kosovar Refugees (3
volumes). Edmonton, AB: The Prairie Centre of Excellence for Research on
Immigration and Integration.
16. Kosovars spent an average of two months in sustainment centres.
17. Kosovars were allowed to repatriate at Canada’s expense.
18. Kosovars had the opportunity to make exploratory visits to Kosova.
19. Kosovars received more ESL than non-Kosovars and were provided with separate
ESL programming.
Recommendations from Service Providers for Future Large Scale Admissions of Refugees
20. Implement clear policy directions and procedures (e.g., federal health plan).
21. Implement extensive training for sponsors.
22. Delay exploratory visits.
23. Consult all stakeholders from the beginning.
24. Encourage work experience for refugees.
25. Examine the two-year funding period.
26. Provide more precise information to refugees.
27. Clearly define funding for service agencies.
1.
Note
Substantive quotations in this chapter have been approved by the respective respondents.
Abu-Laban, B., Derwing, T. M., Mulder, M. & Northcott, H. (2001). Lessons
Learned: An Evaluation of Northern Alberta’s Experience with Kosovar Refugees (3
volumes). Edmonton, AB: The Prairie Centre of Excellence for Research on
Immigration and Integration.
8. KOSOVAR REPATRIATES
Introduction
In the spring of 1999, the UNHCR appealed to a large number of countries to provide
temporary protection for the Kosovar refugees who were displaced into Macedonia. Most
European countries plus Australia were prepared to provide asylum to these refugees, on
the understanding that they would be sent back to their country of origin once it became
safe to do so. This, in general, was the UNHCR’s strategy. However, certain other
countries, notably Canada and the United States, while in agreement with the larger
political goal of repatriation, chose to resettle the Kosovar refugees on a permanent basis,
while recognizing that these refugees might opt to forfeit their right to permanent
resettlement and voluntarily return to Kosova.
This chapter tells the story of those Kosovar refugees who first resettled in
northern Alberta but then decided to return to Kosova. For several reasons, it is rare in
refugee studies to locate and interview refugees who returned to their homeland. First,
such research is very expensive. Second, researchers may encounter difficulties in
conducting interviews in a devastated area where addresses are hard to find and life is not
entirely back to normal. Third, repatriates in their countries of origin are technically no
longer refugees, a reminder of how the term refugee is socially (and politically)
constructed. Nevertheless, the decision to interview repatriated Kosovars in the context of
this study was influenced by two important considerations.
The first consideration favouring the decision to proceed with such interviews
was that one of the Albanian-speaking interviewers for this project, a Kosovar refugee
who resettled in northern Alberta, happened to be visiting relatives in the area and was
willing to interview repatriated Kosovars. The second consideration favouring the
extension of interviews into Kosova was more germane to the policy relevance of this
study. Specifically, what were the repatriates’ motivations for returning to Kosova? Was
it because of push or pull factors? Did they feel they made the right decision? What might
the policy implications of a misguided decision be? And, now that they have forfeited
their residence status in Canada, what do they say about returning to Canada? Thus, apart
from the possibility of making a scholarly contribution through these interviews, the
research team reasoned that policy-makers who sponsored this study might be interested
in having first-hand information about the attitudes and motivations of the Kosovar
repatriates.
International Context of Repatriation
When NATO intervened against Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic’s security
forces in Kosova, it was emphasized that the primary objective was to safeguard the
return of hundreds of thousands of refugees to Kosova. Ironically, the war against
Serbian security forces initially accelerated the displacement of ethnic Albanians, but the
tide was reversed by the end of the war. To quote Roger Winter, Executive Director of
the US Committee for Refugees:
Once NATO bombing began on March 24 [1999], Serbian
Abu-Laban, B., Derwing, T. M., Mulder, M. & Northcott, H. (2001). Lessons
Learned: An Evaluation of Northern Alberta’s Experience with Kosovar Refugees (3
volumes). Edmonton, AB: The Prairie Centre of Excellence for Research on
Immigration and Integration.
security forces violently uprooted hundreds of thousands of
ethnic Albanians. By the end of May, about 1.4 million Kosovars
had been uprooted, including 442,000 in Albania, 250,000 in
Macedonia, more than 600,000 displaced within Kosovo, and
more than 67,000 displaced into Montenegro.1
Between May 4 and 26, 1999, the airlifts of Kosovar refugees to Canada took place.
However, after 78 days of NATO bombing, a cease-fire agreement was reached
on June 10, 1999, following which NATO peacekeeping troops promptly entered
Kosova. This ushered the return of the overwhelming majority of Kosovar refugees,
including 550,000 sheltered temporarily in Macedonia and Albania and 115,000
dislocated into Bosnia, Germany, Turkey and other countries.2 Thus, the objective of the
war was achieved, even though the ultimate Kosova question remains unanswered.
The Kosovar Repatriates from Northern Alberta: General Characteristics
According to CIC records, a total of 120 Kosovar refugees who were resettled in northern
Alberta decided to return to Kosova. This section focuses on the general characteristics of
this entire group of repatriates, while subsequent sections in this chapter are based
primarily on the results of interviews conducted in Kosova with a sample of the
repatriated Kosovars.
The information available on the total group of repatriates is rather limited.
However, a few facts gleaned from CIC records and from telephone calls made by one of
the interviewers to selected contacts/informants in Kosova will provide some useful
background information. This information will also be useful in assessing the
representativeness of the sample of the Kosovars selected for interview.
A large majority of the Kosovar repatriates (N=101; 92%) were former residents
of Edmonton and the remainder (N=10; 8%) were former residents of Grande Prairie. In
terms of sex and age distribution, 64 (53%) were male and 56 (47%) were female. Using
age calculations for 2000, 58 (48%) of them were 25 years of age or younger, 52 (43%)
between the ages of 26 and 65, and 10 (8%) were 65 years of age or older. On average,
the repatriates were slightly older than the non-repatriates (average age of 32 and 25
years, respectively). This age difference is further illustrated by the fact that 28% of the
repatriates and only 11% of the non-repatriates were 45 years of age or older.
Eighty-seven of the 120 Kosovar repatriates were eligible for interview as they
were 16 years of age or older, and the remainder (N=33) were ineligible for interview as
they were 15 years of age or younger. Disregarding the one case for which information is
unavailable, virtually all of the eligible repatriates arrived in Canada in May 1999.
Information on the dates of return to Kosova is available for 79 of the 87 individuals. Of
the 79, the large majority (N=68; 86%) repatriated between July 26 and November 10,
1999, and the balance (N=11; 14%) repatriated between April 10 and May 20, 2000. A
closer examination of the data shows that the decision to repatriate tended to be made
rather quickly, and more specifically within the first 3-4 months of resettlement.
Two observations need to be made at this point. First, the quickness of the
decision to return to Kosova should not come as a surprise because of the stir that
accompanied the entry of NATO troops into Kosova in the summer of 1999, and the
simultaneous withdrawal of the Serbian security forces from that region. Indeed, for
Abu-Laban, B., Derwing, T. M., Mulder, M. & Northcott, H. (2001). Lessons
Learned: An Evaluation of Northern Alberta’s Experience with Kosovar Refugees (3
volumes). Edmonton, AB: The Prairie Centre of Excellence for Research on
Immigration and Integration.
hundreds of thousands of dislocated Kosovars, peace had finally arrived and it was time
to go back. Second, despite the fact that Kosovar refugees everywhere were naturally
excited and ready to return to their home country, it is remarkable that only a minority
(34%) of those resettled in northern Alberta decided to repatriate.
As a result of our explorations in early 2001, we were able to locate the addresses
of 70 Kosovar repatriates. Of these, 32 (46%) were residing in Perlepnice, 23 (33%) in
Pristina, 6 (9%) in Malisheva, 5 (7%) in Glogovc, and 4 (6%) in Zhiti. We were unable to
locate the addresses of the remaining 17 repatriated adults.
For practical considerations, only 30 Kosovar repatriates were interviewed. This
sample represents 43% of the Kosovar repatriates whose addresses were known. Under
the circumstances, a non-probability or convenience sample was the most feasible option
available. However, the interviewer was instructed to ensure representativeness in terms
of age, sex, family membership and geographical location, subject to the overriding
consideration of the interviewer’s personal safety.
As reported in Chapter 2, essentially the same interview schedule used with the
Kosovar refugees in northern Alberta was also used with the sample of Kosovar
repatriates, modified slightly to suit the new situation (for a copy of the interview
schedule used with repatriates, see Volume 2, Part I of this report). The results from the
interviews in Kosova are discussed below.
Demographic Characteristics of the Sample
The distribution by sex is representative of the larger repatriate group. Seventeen (57%)
of the respondents were male and 13 (43%) were female. They were almost equally
divided between the age groups 16-34 (N=14; 47%) and 35-54 (N=13; 43%), and the
remainder (N=3; 10%) were 55 years of age or older. In terms of education, one
respondent had no schooling, 9 (30%) completed 8 years of schooling, 2 (7%) completed
9-11 years of schooling (no high school diploma), 16 (53%) completed 12-14 years of
schooling (with high school diploma), and 2 (7%) graduated from university.
Since most of the repatriated Kosovars were located in Pristina and Perlepnice, 11
(37%) of the respondents were drawn from each of these two cities, for a total of 22
(73%); 4 (13%) were drawn from Glogovc, and 2 respondents (7%) from each of
Malisheva and Zhiti. Twenty-nine of the respondents arrived in Canada during the period
May 5-19, 1999, and one arrived shortly thereafter, on June 27. Also, twenty-nine of the
respondents were classified as KOS and only one as KOF, suggesting that the presence of
relatives in Canada may have dampened the desire to repatriate.
The majority of the respondents (19; 63%) were married, while the remainder
(N=11) had never been married. All but four of the married respondents had children and
none of them gave birth to a child while in Canada. Of the 15 respondents who had
children, three had one child, five had two children, three had three children, three had
four children, and one had five children. About four out of 10 children were 16 years of
age or older. Seven respondents came to Canada with 1 to 3 siblings, and seven came
with one or both parents. Although many of the respondents came to Canada with
children and other close relatives, they nevertheless left behind in Kosova many equally
close relatives (children, parents, siblings, sisters-/brothers-in-law, mothers-/fathers-inlaw, and so forth).
Abu-Laban, B., Derwing, T. M., Mulder, M. & Northcott, H. (2001). Lessons
Learned: An Evaluation of Northern Alberta’s Experience with Kosovar Refugees (3
volumes). Edmonton, AB: The Prairie Centre of Excellence for Research on
Immigration and Integration.
Leaving the Country of Origin and Coming to Canada
When asked why they decided to leave their home country, a small majority of the
respondents (N=16; 53%) attributed their departure to war, terror and violence, and the
remainder (N=14) said that they were forced to leave. Twenty-one respondents (72%)
escaped from their hometown with other members of their family; and 19 said that they
had left family members behind when they were fleeing their hometown.
The average length of time between leaving their homes and coming to Canada
was 24 days for the repatriates, compared to 60 days for the non-repatriates. This
suggests that the repatriates were the most reluctant to leave their home in the first place.
All but one of the respondents stayed at a UNHCR refugee camp. In terms of help
received, all of them acknowledged that they had received services provided by both the
UNHCR and the Red Cross, and they rated these services very positively. In addition,
100% of the repatriates reported that they received help from their compatriot (Albanian)
community in Macedonia.
In response to a question about whether or not the respondents had a choice of
going to a country other than Canada, a small majority (N=16) said yes and the remainder
(N=14) stated that they had no choice. Reflecting on why they came to Canada, a large
minority (N=10; 33%) said they were attracted to Canada because it was “peaceful and/or
democratic.” Other reasons for coming to Canada were also given but in each case they
were selected by only one or two respondents: “Canada is the best/liked Canada.” “Prior
knowledge of Canada.” “English/French language.” “Home not safe.” “Didn’t have
choice.” A plurality of the respondents (N=13; 43%) selected the category “ other family
members decided.”
The following question was asked of all the interviewees: How much did you
know about Canada before leaving Kosova? Clearly, prior to their coming to Canada, the
overwhelming majority of the Kosovar repatriates (95%) had no or very little knowledge
about their new country of resettlement. Probing further into this area, the respondents
said that they would have liked to have known the following before coming to Canada:
‘people/culture’ (N=10), ‘education system’ (N=6), ‘civil/refugee rights’ (N=3), ‘life in
general’ (N=3), ‘weather/temperature’ (N=1), and ‘everything’ (N=6). Significantly,
this response pattern is common to all the Kosovar refugees resettled in northern Alberta.
The Repatriates’ Experience on the Military Bases in Canada
Needs and Services Provided
The military bases where the respondents first lived when they came to Canada were
Aldershot (55%), Gagetown (38%), and Kingston (7%). Their most urgent needs when
they arrived in Canada (in descending order of mention) were ‘sleep/rest’ (83%),
‘medical attention’ (72%), ‘clothing’ (66%), ‘safety’ (52%), ‘finding family members’
(24%), and ‘food’ (3%). The survey results show that the services which the respondents
received at the military base more than covered their stated needs. Specifically, the
services received (in addition to such basic amenities as clothing, food, and shelter)
included the following (in rank order): physical health services (100%), psychological
support services (100%), interpretation (100%), orientation (learning about Canada)
Abu-Laban, B., Derwing, T. M., Mulder, M. & Northcott, H. (2001). Lessons
Learned: An Evaluation of Northern Alberta’s Experience with Kosovar Refugees (3
volumes). Edmonton, AB: The Prairie Centre of Excellence for Research on
Immigration and Integration.
(100%), filling in forms (such as Social Insurance and Child Tax Benefit) (96%), English
language training (93%), and finding and contacting family members (54%). The
respondents were asked to rate these services on a 4-point scale where 1 meant not at all
helpful and 4 meant very helpful. Almost all of the respondents found some of these
services very helpful: physical health services, interpretation, filling in forms, and finding
and contacting family members. Eighty-five percent of the respondents found English
language training very helpful, and 76% of them rated psychological support services as
very helpful, with the remainder finding the services helpful. In other words, none of the
respondents found the services unhelpful.
Pastime Activities and Children’s Schooling
The results further indicate that the adults could engage in a variety of activities of their
own choosing during their free time. Popular pastime activities on the military base were
walking to the village, sports, watching TV, caring for family, chess, reading/writing, and
resting.
When the respondents’ children were not attending school on the military base,
the children tended to play and socialize and engage in sports and games. Virtually all the
parents were very satisfied or at least somewhat satisfied with their children’s schooling
and leisure time activities on the base.
Duration of Stay at the Military Base
The military base experiences of the Kosovar refugees who remained in northern Alberta
(the non-repatriates) on the one hand, and the Kosovar repatriates on the other, were
essentially the same, except for responses to the following question: Regarding the time
you spent at the military base, was it too long, just right or too short? Among the
Kosovar refugees who remained in northern Alberta, 49% stated that the time spent at the
military base was just right, 23% felt it was too short, and 28% thought that the time
spent at the military base was too long. In contrast, among the Kosovar repatriates, 62%
stated that the time at the military base was too long and 38% thought that it was just
right. Interestingly, none of the repatriates thought that the time spent at the military base
was too short.
Important as these differences in response patterns are, there were even more
significant differences between the two groups of Kosovars in how they responded to the
question: Why was the time you spent at the military base too long? Among the nonrepatriates, frequently mentioned reasons included: “The barracks were so crowded.”
“Living in a camp is not a normal life.” “It was hard to stay there.” “I missed having my
own place to live.” “We were curious for the new place we will go.” In contrast, nearly 6
out of 10 Kosovar repatriates gave reasons indicating that they were worried about
homeland and/or family. “I was worried about Kosova.” “I was worried for my
hometown.” “I thought about my fatherland.” “Because I was worried for my daughter.”
“I missed my son.” And “I was worried about my relatives in Kosova.” The remainder
of the respondents gave such reasons as “sad/confused,” “life at the military base was
difficult,” and “missed home. ” It may be that the repatriates’ sentiments, as expressed
in the way they articulated the reasons for considering the time spent at the military base
to be too long, were a precursor to their decision to return to their home country.
Turning now to the just right category, the repatriates’ two most frequently
mentioned reasons for considering the time spent at the military base to be just right were
Abu-Laban, B., Derwing, T. M., Mulder, M. & Northcott, H. (2001). Lessons
Learned: An Evaluation of Northern Alberta’s Experience with Kosovar Refugees (3
volumes). Edmonton, AB: The Prairie Centre of Excellence for Research on
Immigration and Integration.
“feeling of security” (40%) and “life was well organized” (30%). Other less frequently
mentioned reasons were “had good time,” “spiritual state better,” and “together with
people. ” These reasons are not unlike the ones mentioned by the non-repatriated
Kosovars in northern Alberta (see Chapter 5).
In an attempt to obtain an overall assessment of the respondents’ experiences at
the military base, the following question was asked: Overall, how satisfied or dissatisfied
were you with your experience at the military base? Four response categories ranged
from 1 very satisfied to 4 very dissatisfied. A majority of the respondents (N=18; 62%)
were very satisfied, 35% were somewhat satisfied, and only one respondent was very
dissatisfied. Clearly, the Kosovar repatriates had very positive experiences at the military
bases and Canada’s decision to settle them temporarily there can not in any way be
considered a factor in their decision to repatriate.
Parenthetically, it may be noted that although the majority of repatriated Kosovars
were temporarily settled at CFB Aldershot and not CFB Gagetown where most of the
non-repatriated Kosovars were temporarily settled, the difference in location between the
two groups did not seem to have influenced their experiences on the base.
Settling in Northern Alberta
After spending an average of two months on the military base, the Kosovar repatriates
under study along with other selected Kosovar refugees were destined to northern Alberta
for resettlement. Chapter 5 provides an overview of the non-repatriates’ settlement
experiences in Edmonton and Grande Prairie. This section provides a parallel overview
of the repatriates’ settlement experience. Comparisons between the two groups are made
where differences are significant or may give a hint about factors influencing the decision
to repatriate.
Assistance Received
Like other Kosovar refugees, the repatriates received assistance largely from their
sponsors; however, the one respondent classified as KOF lived with and received
assistance from relatives in Canada. None of the KOSs lived with their sponsors. In the
first month of resettlement, about 90% of the respondents reported that they met with
their sponsoring group 4 to 6 times a week and 10% met with their sponsoring group 1 to
3 times a week. Table 8.1 shows the types of assistance sponsors provided to the
respondents. The table also shows that in the majority of cases, 90-to 100% of the
respondents evaluated these contacts to be very helpful. The one service which was not
highly required or needed in the first month in northern Alberta was ‘looking for a job,’
and in the limited number of cases where it was provided, the respondents did not feel
that the sponsoring groups’ efforts in this area were particularly helpful. Significantly
fewer repatriates than non-repatriates found their contact with sponsors or relatives to be
very helpful in areas of social activities (40% of repatriates, 74% of non-repatriates), and
comforting when sad or lonely (21% of repatriates, 72% of non-repatriates) as shown in a
comparison of Tables 5.2 and 8.1. Although the repatriates appreciated the tangible
services they received while in Canada, their emotional ties to Kosova were so strong that
they were less able to take comfort from the psychological assistance offered.
Abu-Laban, B., Derwing, T. M., Mulder, M. & Northcott, H. (2001). Lessons
Learned: An Evaluation of Northern Alberta’s Experience with Kosovar Refugees (3
volumes). Edmonton, AB: The Prairie Centre of Excellence for Research on
Immigration and Integration.
Stress Level and Feelings of Sadness
Repatriates were asked to respond to the following question using a 4-point scale: During
your first month in (Edmonton/Grande Prairie), how stressful was your life? It will be
observed from Figure 8.1 that all of the respondents agreed that their lives were
somewhat or very stressful. In contrast, about three-quarters of the non-repatriates in
northern Alberta felt that their lives were somewhat or very stressful (see Figure 5.1). The
high degree of stress and sadness among the repatriates during their first month in
Edmonton or Grande Prairie was probably a factor in their decision to repatriate.
It is interesting to note that stress among the Kosovar repatriates did not subside
in Kosova. Figure 8.1 reveals that during the month preceding the interview, 86%
reported that their lives were somewhat or very stressful. On the other hand, a much
smaller percentage of the repatriates (7%) reported that during the past month they were
somewhat or very sad. Although repatriates experienced high levels of stress during the
month prior to the interview, the repatriation process proved to be beneficial to their
psychological state.
Uniqueness of the Kosovars
In response to the question: Do you know of any differences in the benefits or services to
Kosovar refugees compared to refugees coming to Canada from other countries?, nearly
half of the respondents (47%) said yes. All of the respondents who were aware of such
differences correctly noted that the Kosovar refugees had two years of government
support, compared to only one year of support for the other refugee groups.
Recommendations for Improvement of Sponsorship Program
One of the goals of this study was to evaluate the sponsorship program and make
suggestions about how it could be improved. Accordingly, the Kosovar repatriates were
asked how the sponsorship program could be made more helpful to newcomers. Twenty
two of the 30 respondents (73%) offered comments and suggestions. Although the
numbers are small, it may be interesting to report the results. Of those who responded, 8
(36%) felt that everything was fine, 10 (46%) emphasized the need for more assistance in
finding employment, two respondents suggested that there was need for more information
about life in Canada, how Canadians live and social customs, one respondent underlined
the need for more financial support to newcomers, and one respondent emphasized the
need for help with education.
As noted in Chapter 5, newcomers experience many social and cultural
differences between life in Canada and in Kosova. Accordingly, the Kosovar repatriates
were asked if their sponsoring group and/or Canadian relatives had shown any knowledge
of or had given them any advice about these differences. The majority of the respondents
(77%) indicated that their sponsors were aware of differences and gave them advice. The
advice received revolved largely around “personal rights” (39%) and “taught us about
life” (30%). Other areas of advice mentioned by one or two respondents included
“religion,” “be respectful,” “education and banking,” and “everything.”
Adjustment to Life in Northern Alberta
Abu-Laban, B., Derwing, T. M., Mulder, M. & Northcott, H. (2001). Lessons
Learned: An Evaluation of Northern Alberta’s Experience with Kosovar Refugees (3
volumes). Edmonton, AB: The Prairie Centre of Excellence for Research on
Immigration and Integration.
The repatriates who had children under sixteen years of age were asked to respond on a
4-point scale: Overall, how well had your children been adjusting to their new life in
Canada? Twelve parents answered the question. Two parents felt that their children had
not adjusted and ten parents felt that their children were well adjusted.
Friends and Social Contacts
Virtually all the respondents (29 out of 30) reported making new friends in Canada.
These friends came largely from the ranks of other Kosovar refugees, sponsoring groups,
and neighbours. To a much lesser degree, the new friends came from the ranks of people
they met at school or of other immigrants from a different culture. A very small number
of respondents indicated that the new friends were people they met at work or other
Canadian friends, not including their sponsors. It is clear that the repatriated Kosovars
were not a socially isolated group.
Assessment of Life in Northern Alberta
The respondents were asked to give their opinions on a number of statements about their
community of residence (Edmonton or Grande Prairie) on a 4-point scale ranging from 1
to 4 where 1 meant strongly disagree and 4 meant strongly agree. The statements
addressed (a) the location being a good place in which to live, (b) having good job
opportunities, (c) being a good place in which to raise a family, and (d) being a friendly
and welcoming place. One hundred percent of the respondents strongly agreed with the
first and second statement, 93% strongly agreed and 7% agreed with the third statement,
and 100% agreed with the fourth statement. Clearly, the respondents were very satisfied
with the city to which they were destined for resettlement in Alberta.
Parents of children born after 1984 were similarly asked for their opinions on a
statement whether schools in their community had good ESL programs. Without
exception, all such parents strongly agreed with the statement.
Best and Worst Thing about Living in Northern Alberta
Two separate questions were asked: What was the best thing about living there [in
northern Alberta]? and What was the worst thing about living there? The answers to the
first question singled out ‘English language/ESL’ (43%), ‘employment’ (40%),
‘education’ (13%), and ‘freedom/safety/peace’ (3%). The order of these responses is
quite different from the one noted for the non-repatriates who selected
‘freedom/safety/peace’ first, followed by ‘education’ and ‘employment’ (see Chapter 5).
With reference to the worst thing about living in northern Alberta, 37% of the
repatriates selected ‘learning English,’ followed by ‘lack of employment’ (33%) and ‘too
far from Kosova’ (30%). Again, the non-repatriates’ ordering of the worst things were
slightly different: ‘climate/mosquitoes’ (25%), ‘lack of employment’ (18%), and ‘too far
from Kosova’ (17%), ‘other responses’ (40%) (see Chapter 5).
Contacts with Community Agencies
Abu-Laban, B., Derwing, T. M., Mulder, M. & Northcott, H. (2001). Lessons
Learned: An Evaluation of Northern Alberta’s Experience with Kosovar Refugees (3
volumes). Edmonton, AB: The Prairie Centre of Excellence for Research on
Immigration and Integration.
Only a minority of the repatriates (N=10; 33%) were aware of any local agencies in
Edmonton or Grande Prairie that provided settlement assistance to newcomers, and all of
these respondents contacted one or more agencies for assistance. Assistance was accessed
in the following areas: Language Benchmark testing (N=10), interpretation and
translation services (N=9), ESL enrolment (N=8), enrolling children in schools (N=2),
and finding missing family members (N=1). Without exception, the respondents rated the
assistance received as very helpful on a 4-point scale.
With particular reference to ESL or LINC, 14 (47%) of the respondents indicated
that they had taken courses in Canada and the remainder said they did not take such
courses. When those who had not taken ESL courses were asked why, 10 (63%) of the
respondents said that they were planning to return to Kosova and the remaining six gave
various answers including they needed to rest, were caring for children, or else they knew
English.
When asked about other areas of assistance such as applying for landed immigrant
status, physical health needs, psychological support services, finding employment,
education/funding, food, and clothing, none of the respondents sought help in any of
these areas from immigrant serving agencies.
Kosova After Northern Alberta
Location in Kosova and Future Plans
The large majority of respondents (93%) stated that they were living in the
city/village/area in which they lived before the war, and 89% were living in the same
house. Those who changed location, i.e., were living neither in former city/village of
residence nor in the same house, attributed the change to the fact that their houses burned
down. When asked whether they were planning to stay in Kosova, 73% (N=22) said yes,
and 27% (N=8) said no. Significantly, in response to a follow-up question: Where are
you planning to go?, all those that said no were planning to return to Canada.
Date of Repatriation
Twenty-three respondents returned to Kosova in 1999 and seven in the spring of 2000. In
the former year, two repatriated on July 1, four on August 2, and seventeen on September
3. Of those who repatriated in 2000, two did so on April 4 and five on May 5. It is clear
that the decision to repatriate tended to be taken rather early in the period of resettlement.
Also, judging from these statistics, it appears that repatriation, in general, was a family
rather than an individual act.
Employment in Kosova
The repatriates’ employment history shows that, before coming to Canada, 10 out of 17
males (59%) and only one out of 13 females (8%) were employed in Kosova. Three of
the men worked as economists, three as salesman, and only one person was employed in
each of the following occupations: professor, teacher, market controller, and worker. The
only female who worked in Kosova before coming to Canada worked as a clerk. In terms
of tenure, five respondents spent 10 or less years in their primary occupations, four spent
11 to 20 years, and two spent more than 20 years (range of 3 to 33 years).
Abu-Laban, B., Derwing, T. M., Mulder, M. & Northcott, H. (2001). Lessons
Learned: An Evaluation of Northern Alberta’s Experience with Kosovar Refugees (3
volumes). Edmonton, AB: The Prairie Centre of Excellence for Research on
Immigration and Integration.
Against this backdrop, a number of questions may be raised. How successful were
these respondents in securing employment after returning to Kosova? Were they able to
return to the jobs they left behind (or find new ones)? Is the picture of their employment
after repatriation the same as before the war?
In response to a question about current employment, eight respondents (6 males
and 2 females) stated that they were employed in Kosova: two as teachers, one as a
salesman, and one as an interpreter (information missing on four). Of the currently
employed respondents, five returned to the same workplace they were in before the war
and three found new employment. When asked why they did not return to the same
workplace, one respondent stated that the firm closed, one stated that she was not
employed before the war, and one wanted to change professions. These results indicate
that about 73% of the respondents who were gainfully employed before the war were also
employed after repatriation. Thus, it can be said that, in terms of employment, there were
some disappointed repatriates.
Reasons for Repatriation
Table 8.2 provides information on the reasons for repatriation. It will be observed that
about 27% of the respondents said that the war was over/Kosova was free/it was safe to
return. Another 30% were motivated by love of their homeland where their roots were.
About 17% were prompted to return to Kosova by homesickness and nostalgia, and 13%
were motivated by desire for family reunification. Other less frequently mentioned
reasons included family/parents decided,resume work/school, and I was worried (I was
waiting for landed status but I could not get it). It is interesting that women, more often
than men, tended to state as reasons for repatriation “war was over and “cultural roots
are in Kosova.”
The following is a sample of the reasons given in the respondents’ own words:
“The war was over.” “Because the war was interrupted.” “I thought in Kosova is peace.”
“Because we thought it is safe.” “Because I like my country.” “I love my country.”
“Because I spent all my life in Kosova and I wanted to spend the rest of my life there.”
“Nostalgia for my town.” “Because here are our roots.” “Because Kosova is our
country.” “I was homesick.” “In Kosova were my parents and my sister.” “Because one
of my sons was in Kosova.” “Because Kosova was free and my son was there.” “I was
lonely and I felt sad for my sister and friends.” “Because here are our family.” “My
parents decided.” “Because it was family decision.” “My daughter wanted to learn in
her own language.” “Because of employment and children’s schooling.” Significantly,
all of the reasons given indicate that pull rather than push factors were at work in the
decision to repatriate.
In response to a relevant question, none of the respondents returned to Kosova for
an exploratory visit before making the decision to repatriate. However, they proactively
sought information about the situation in Kosova from various sources: telephone
contacts with friends/family (93%), radio/television (37%), Internet (27%), and
newspapers (7%).
The respondents were also asked whether they received enough information to
make a good decision. A large majority (76%) said that they did not receive enough
information and the remainder felt that they did. When asked what they would like to
have known, 50% said they would have liked to receive more information about
Abu-Laban, B., Derwing, T. M., Mulder, M. & Northcott, H. (2001). Lessons
Learned: An Evaluation of Northern Alberta’s Experience with Kosovar Refugees (3
volumes). Edmonton, AB: The Prairie Centre of Excellence for Research on
Immigration and Integration.
security/safety, 41% would have liked more information about employment, and 9%
would have liked to receive more information about life conditions/standards in Kosova.
When asked about whether or not they were satisfied with the decision to
repatriate, 53% (N=16) of the respondents said they were not satisfied. Why so? Eight
respondents were not satisfied because living conditions were difficult/insecure/unsafe,
three said they were worried about the future, three were not satisfied because of
unemployment, and two respondents said they were not satisfied because education was
expensive. The repatriates’ verbatim responses included: “It was not as we thought.”
“Life conditions are not normal.” “I am excited because we are uncertain.” “Because I
don’t have a job and I am not safe.” “Life is difficult for my family.” “I am afraid about
my future.” “I do not have a job and life is not safe.” “Education is too expensive and
life is not safe.” For these respondents, the homeland did not live up to its hoped-for
promise.
In contrast to the above, the ones who said they were satisfied with their decision
to repatriate justified their position by saying they were in their own country/back to their
roots (N=9; 69%); or because they had a job (N=2; 15%); or because they were reunited
with their family (N=2; 15%). A sample of their responses included: “I live again in my
country.” “I am again with my family in my country.” “Because here are my roots.”
“Because we are in birthplace.” “Because I have a job.” “Because I returned to my
previous job.”
Parenthetically, it is worth noting that nearly eight out of ten Kosovar respondents
in northern Alberta knew of friends or relatives who had moved back to Kosova. The
perceived reasons for repatriation given by these respondents, as reported in Chapter 5,
are not unlike the above noted reasons given by the repatriates themselves. Also, nonrepatriates knew that many of the repatriates would like to return to Canada, again for
reasons that are not unlike those given by the repatriates themselves. These results
indicate that the communication networks are unfettered both within the Kosovar
community in northern Alberta and between that community and the home country.
Finally, the interviews were concluded with the following question: Is there
anything else about your experiences as a refugee, before or after coming to Canada, that
you want to talk about? More than one response to the question was allowed. Virtually all
the responses revolved around Canada. Among the responses were: “Thank the Canadian
government” (N=21). “Want to return to Canada” (N=7). “Happy with hospitality in
Canada” (N=2). “Greetings to all” (N=2). “Good education system in Canada” (N=1).
Two responses, both of which relating to the situation in Kosova, were on the negative
side, one expressing “disappointment with security” and the second expressing “worry
about the future.”
The following comments are typical of the responses of many respondents:
“Thank you very much for your help.” “My family is grateful to the Canadian authorities
and sponsors too.” “I thank the Canadian government for keeping us safely and for
helping us to return to our country.” “Thank you, you did a lot for us.” “Thank you for
your care.” “Thank you and farewell dear friends.” “Thank you, I wish all the best for
you.” “I would like to thank the Canadian authorities for being generous.” “I would like
to return to Canada.” “Our wish is to return to Canada.” “I am disappointed and I would
like to return to Canada.”
Interview Assessment
Abu-Laban, B., Derwing, T. M., Mulder, M. & Northcott, H. (2001). Lessons
Learned: An Evaluation of Northern Alberta’s Experience with Kosovar Refugees (3
volumes). Edmonton, AB: The Prairie Centre of Excellence for Research on
Immigration and Integration.
All of the interviews were conducted in the respondents’ homes. At the conclusion of
each interview, the interviewer was instructed to record her personal assessment in terms
of the ease or difficulty with which the interview was completed. Available assessments
indicate that 21 interviews were somewhat easy and six were somewhat difficult to
conduct. In response to a question about why the interview was difficult to conduct, the
interviewer stated that in three cases the interview was conducted by candle light and in
the remaining three cases a family member had just died.
Summary and Conclusions
1. This chapter examines the results of interviews with Kosovar refugees who first
resettled in northern Alberta and then decided to return to Kosova. A sample of 30
repatriates was selected and all interviews were conducted in Kosova. The interview
schedule used with this sample is a slightly modified version of the one used with the
Kosovar refugees in northern Alberta. The purpose of this component of the study is
to gain first-hand knowledge of the context and process of repatriation and any policy
implications for Canada’s refugee resettlement program.
2. Like the Kosovar refugees who remained in northern Alberta, the Kosovar repatriates
experienced the stress of war in Kosova, displacement into Macedonia, life in refugee
camps, airlifts from Macedonia to Canada, initial settlement in military bases in
Canada, and finally relocation to northern Alberta for permanent resettlement.
3. About one-half of the Kosovar repatriates had a choice of going to another country
but decided to come to Canada, and the other half had no choice.
4. Generally speaking, the settlement experiences of the Kosovar repatriates at the
military bases, where they spent an average of two months, and with the sponsors in
the city to which they were destined (Edmonton or Grande Prairie) were uniformly
positive. Such positive experiences could not have fuelled the desire to return to
Kosova.
5. The decision to repatriate tended to be made within the first three months of
resettlement. This decision is strongly associated with: (1) a high level of selfreported stress and feelings of sadness; (2) sentiments reflecting a high degree of
disquiet about the homeland and relatives in Kosova.
6. According to the repatriates’ self-reports, the decision to repatriate was motivated
largely by sentiments of kinship, nationalism, and a belief that peace returned to
Kosova. Significantly, all of the reasons given by the respondents indicate that pull
rather than push factors were at work in the decision to repatriate.
7. A majority of the repatriates felt that they did not receive sufficient information from
friends/relatives in Kosova or from the mass media for making an informed decision
about repatriation, nor were they satisfied with the decision to repatriate. And while 7
out of 10 repatriates plan to stay in Kosova, the balance would like to return to
Canada due to unfulfilled hopes in the country of origin.
Abu-Laban, B., Derwing, T. M., Mulder, M. & Northcott, H. (2001). Lessons
Learned: An Evaluation of Northern Alberta’s Experience with Kosovar Refugees (3
volumes). Edmonton, AB: The Prairie Centre of Excellence for Research on
Immigration and Integration.
8. Because the repatriates opted to forfeit their right to landed immigrant status in
Canada, there is no special provision in Canada’s immigration policy which would
allow them to return to Canada at will. A policy change in this area is an option for
Canada to consider.
9. Unlike the Kosovars who chose to remain in Canada, the repatriates’ plan was to
return to Kosova. For this reason, although they accessed some settlement services,
they were intent on leaving as soon as possible.
1.
2.
Notes
Roger Winter, “The Year in Review.” In World Refugee Survey 2000. Immigration and Refugee
Services of America 2000, p.17.
World Refugee Survey 2000, p.13.
Abu-Laban, B., Derwing, T. M., Mulder, M. & Northcott, H. (2001). Lessons
Learned: An Evaluation of Northern Alberta’s Experience with Kosovar Refugees (3
volumes). Edmonton, AB: The Prairie Centre of Excellence for Research on
Immigration and Integration.
9 LESSONS LEARNED AND POLICY
RECOMMENDATIONS
Introduction
This study has generated a wealth of information about the Kosovar refugees before and
after coming to Canada; Operation Parasol, the Kosovars’ initial settlement at military
bases in eastern Canada, and their subsequent resettlement in northern Alberta; and the
roles and activities of key players in the entire operation. This concluding chapter draws
on our research to determine the lessons learned and to make policy recommendations.
For supportive evidence concerning any of the lessons learned and/or recommendations,
the reader should refer to the related sections of the report.
In making our assessments, we were guided by a series of questions: Should a
similar international situation arise in the future, how should Canada respond? What
should be avoided? What procedures and activities should be modified? And what new
measures should be taken? The focus of this chapter is on what worked and what didn’t
work, successes and challenges, and the factors influencing these outcomes.
Many recommendations offered by the respondents or gleaned from official
documents are presented in the report. Excellent as they are, not all of these
recommendations are taken up in this final chapter. What follows are broad, substantive
issues, addressed as lessons learned and/or policy recommendations, which merit special
attention in the future.
1.
Operation Parasol and Future Operations
Perhaps the most important lesson learned from Operation Parasol is that in an
emergency situation of the type faced in Macedonia, Canada now has a trackrecord of success and, therefore, can be confident that it can undertake a
successful large-scale evacuation operation in order to provide refugees with
protection.
By any standard, Operation Parasol was an outstanding success. Given the challenges
involved in such an operation, no other country in the world as distant from Macedonia as
Canada is, was prepared to confront the challenge and undertake a similar mass
evacuation operation in such a short time period. CIC must be given full credit for the
speed and excellence with which it mobilized its resources to deal with the situation. But
it is important to remember that the success of Operation Parasol was contingent on at
least three additional conditions.
The first condition influencing the success of this operation was the high level of
cooperation among a large number of individuals and organizations in situ, including
CIC—the lead agency for Operation Parasol, DND, the UNHCR, and the IOM. In the
absence of such cooperation, the daily airlifts over a three-week period would not have
been possible, or at least would not have run as smoothly.
The second condition influencing success involved the Canadian public,
politicians, and the media. The unreserved openness of the Canadian public to respond
positively to the plight of the Kosovar refugees and to resettle as many of them as
Abu-Laban, B., Derwing, T. M., Mulder, M. & Northcott, H. (2001). Lessons
Learned: An Evaluation of Northern Alberta’s Experience with Kosovar Refugees (3
volumes). Edmonton, AB: The Prairie Centre of Excellence for Research on
Immigration and Integration.
possible in Canada, and the presence of a sustained political will to proceed with the
airlifts and ensure operational success were remarkable. Canadians’ attitudes toward the
Kosovar refugees, at the both the governmental and non-governmental levels, were
undoubtedly nourished by sympathetic media coverage of their dire situation in
Macedonia and other neighbouring countries of first asylum.
A third critically important condition for success was the readiness of the military
bases in Canada to provide temporary housing, sustenance and social support for
thousands of Kosovar refugees, pending the finalization of sponsorship arrangements in
selected cities of resettlement across Canada. Despite some challenges faced at the
military bases (to be addressed later) as well as the initial reservations about using
military sites to accommodate refugees fleeing the ravages of civil war, the Kosovar
refugees’ experiences at these sites were very positive. Teamwork and inter-agency
cooperation at airhead and sustainment sites, coupled with the outpouring of professional
volunteer and community support, contributed to the success of this venture.
The efficiency and effectiveness of the Canadian military, along with its
streamlined organization of the sustainment sites, renders DND an indispensable partner
in any future international operation similar to Parasol.
2.
Role Clarity for Participating Agencies at the Military Base
The roles (including duties, obligations and expectations) of all participating
agencies involved in the operation of the sustainment sites must be clearly defined
and publicized and must come under one ultimate authority, namely, the lead
agency for Operation Parasol.
The results from this study strongly indicate that one key organization, in this case the
Red Cross, misconstrued its role and authority. This unfortunate situation resulted not
only in undermining the morale of other key players and volunteers at the military bases,
but also in operational inefficiencies.
3.
Higher Standards for Selection and Performance of Volunteers at the
Military Base
Volunteers must be screened and carefully selected, their roles (including duties,
obligations and expectations) clearly defined and communicated, and their
activities at the military base closely monitored.
According to our respondents, there were difficulties and problems created at the
sustainment sites by volunteers who were neither experienced nor trained, and who
lacked appropriate direction. These volunteers were viewed as well-meaning people, but
they simply did not understand their role. The following examples illustrate this point:
some volunteers came with the expectation of developing friendships and ‘taking care’ of
Kosovars; they often gave advice that was in contravention of information given by
experienced professionals; some volunteers misadvised Kosovar refugees that they would
Abu-Laban, B., Derwing, T. M., Mulder, M. & Northcott, H. (2001). Lessons
Learned: An Evaluation of Northern Alberta’s Experience with Kosovar Refugees (3
volumes). Edmonton, AB: The Prairie Centre of Excellence for Research on
Immigration and Integration.
get a certain sum of money in their new community, that they could bring their family
members, or that they need not go to a specific city of resettlement. Simply and bluntly
put, there is no room for such assistance in a delicately balanced situation.
It may not be easy to recruit a large cadre of well-trained and experienced
volunteers on short notice. In such a case, the less-trained or the inexperienced volunteers
should be quickly identified and provided with pre-service training or, at the very least,
orientation to their new role and what is expected of them. Above all, they should come
under the direction of strong professional leaders on-site.
4.
Higher Standards for Selection and Performance of Interpreters at the
Military Base
Interpreters must be screened and carefully selected by professionals who are
fluent in the refugees’ language (in this case Albanian), and their performance
and activities at the military base should be closely monitored.
Our respondents reported a number of misunderstandings and problems created at the
sustainment sites by interpreters who lacked linguistic proficiency in Albanian and/or
English. In some cases, the interpreters acted in contravention to their mandate by
treating the Kosovar refugees with disrespect or by adding their own views into the
translation.
5.
Family Reunification
The emphasis given to family reunification in the context of Operation Parasol,
characterized by a relaxed definition of family members, has had far reaching
positive effects on the well being and integration of Kosovar refugees.
CIC’s highly concentrated effort to keep Kosovar families together on their journey to
Canada is unprecedented and most praiseworthy. The effort began with selection in the
refugee camps in Macedonia, continued with the airlifts to Canada, with the choice of a
sustainment site for initial settlement, and later with the choice of the city of resettlement
as well as the choice of community within that city where refugees would be placed.
What were the effects of this emphasis on family reunification?
Findings from our study show that Kosovar refugees who were settled in
communities with extended family members reported higher levels of happiness and
lower levels of stress than their non-Kosovar counterparts during the initial period of
settlement. This is understandable because the Kosovar refugees depend on family
networks for support and companionship as they settle in Canada. Also, our study shows
that the rate of secondary migration is much lower among Kosovar refugees; that family
reunification is mentioned by Kosovar repatriates as one of the reasons for returning to
Kosova; and that after one year of settlement, the non-Kosovar refugees are preoccupied
with issues of family reunification, whereas the Kosovar refugees are largely focussing
their attention on settlement and integration. These are powerful results emphasizing the
importance of family reunification.
Abu-Laban, B., Derwing, T. M., Mulder, M. & Northcott, H. (2001). Lessons
Learned: An Evaluation of Northern Alberta’s Experience with Kosovar Refugees (3
volumes). Edmonton, AB: The Prairie Centre of Excellence for Research on
Immigration and Integration.
6.
Consultation with the Province of Alberta
Regular consultation between CIC officers and the province of Alberta as was the
case in the context of Operation Parasol, increases respect and admiration within
the provincial government.
Available evidence indicates that representatives of the Alberta government were very
pleased with the regular consultations they had with CIC personnel regarding plans and
developments concerning the Kosovar refugees. If regularized, CIC’s consultative
approach could be of great benefit to both the federal and provincial governments.
7.
The Absence of an Emergency Response Plan
The consensus is that CIC was highly successful in implementing the government’s
decision to accept thousands of Kosovar refugees over a very short period of time, and on
short notice. CIC’s efforts and planning activities concentrated on many fronts including
the selection and processing of refugees in Macedonia, the airlifts, the airheads and
sustainment sites, and the relocation of the refugees to cities of resettlement across
Canada. A great deal of detailed work and countless contacts occurred with regional
offices, provincial governments, refugee sponsors and service providers. In the time that
was available, CIC’s work was admirable and all staff members must be credited with
pulling off one of the most difficult and complex operations in recent memory.
The above observations notwithstanding, there is recognition within CIC, coupled
with evidence derived from this study, that an emergency response plan is required. It
could ensure greater consistency across regions in CIC’s (and also sponsors’) treatment
of refugees. For example, in northern Alberta, CIC personnel decided not to settle
Kosovars in settlement houses, but rather to settle them directly in their own rented
accommodation. This decision proved to be beneficial as it helped to minimize disruption
to the settling families. Best regional practices could be integrated into a CIC national
emergency response plan in order to provide advice on a number of issues at all phases of
response. Two such issues, addressed below, relate to communication and to management
of expectations.
8.
Communication
An orderly, timely, open and authoritative communication plan developed by CIC
on a wide range of issues could have alleviated misperception and/or
misunderstanding of CIC’s decisions and expectations concerning the treatment
of Kosovar refugees.
There was no dispute whatsoever over the government’s decision to resettle Kosovar
refugees in Canada. However, some of the details associated with this decision were not
well understood due to the absence of clarification to the general public, and service
providers, as well as to the refugee community already in Canada. For example: (1) the
Abu-Laban, B., Derwing, T. M., Mulder, M. & Northcott, H. (2001). Lessons
Learned: An Evaluation of Northern Alberta’s Experience with Kosovar Refugees (3
volumes). Edmonton, AB: The Prairie Centre of Excellence for Research on
Immigration and Integration.
decision to fund the Kosovar refugees for two years (which was perceived to be invidious
and lacking in justification), without making it clear to the public and the SPO
community the special needs status of these refugees; (2) the decision to make a public
appeal for sponsorship of the Kosovar refugees without clearly outlining the requirements
and responsibilities of sponsorship; (3) the decision to change the criteria for family
reunification was not well understood, particularly by the Kosovar refugees themselves.
In addition, there was a need to disseminate to sponsors, service providers, volunteers,
CIC personnel, etc. more information about the Kosovar refugees, their culture, religion
and customs. Such information would have been helpful to all concerned.
Potentially, more and better communication in the future, as an integral
component of an emergency response plan, would avert some of the above noted
problems at the sustainment sites, and among sponsors and service providers in cities of
resettlement. In other words, steps should be taken to improve connections within and
between stakeholders at all stages of the process.
9.
Management of Expectations
Unrealistic or inflated expectations are likely to emerge on the part of
newcomers, in the absence of consistent and accurate information, provided in
counselling sessions, concerning the conditions of their settlement in Canada.
Counselling should take place prior to the newcomers’ arrival and during their
initial time in Canada.
The results of this study indicate that the Kosovars came to reflect a wide range of
unrealistic or inflated expectations. It is possible that the outpouring of generosity and
support to the Kosovars at the sustainment sites erroneously shaped their expectations
about what they would receive in the communities of resettlement. Also, their
expectations of sponsors were often incorrect and unrealistic, as were their expectations
regarding free education and dental care.
The lesson learned here is not unrelated to the above noted issues of information
dissemination and communication. Unrealistic or inflated expectations should be
corrected and dealt with promptly and professionally.
10.
Refugee Sponsors
A positive aspect of the Kosovar experience was the generosity of Canadians, many
hundreds of whom offered to sponsor refugees, even though they had no previous
experience in doing so. There are two lessons to be learned with respect to sponsors.
In Canada there remains a strong under-utilized resource of potential sponsors who are
eager to assist refugees.
Sponsors need ongoing support and skill-set building in the form of training, mentoring,
and debriefing.
Abu-Laban, B., Derwing, T. M., Mulder, M. & Northcott, H. (2001). Lessons
Learned: An Evaluation of Northern Alberta’s Experience with Kosovar Refugees (3
volumes). Edmonton, AB: The Prairie Centre of Excellence for Research on
Immigration and Integration.
With regard to the first lesson, it is imperative that, in the future, appeals for
assistance from the Canadian public be carefully worded in order to avoid disappointment
and frustration from those whose help is not accepted.
With regard to the second lesson, when new sponsors are recruited, a training
model is required in which settlement agency staff provide ongoing training with a
cultural awareness component (specific to the refugees in question) and an overview of
the responsibilities of a sponsoring group. Included in this instruction should be
information on structures and organizational schemata (term of office, roles, size of
group, etc.) that have proved successful for sponsoring groups in the past. The training
program should also include a component for SAHs so they in turn will be able to
provide mentorship and ongoing support to the sponsors under their umbrella. Debriefing
is essential for helping new sponsors understand the boundaries of their roles, for
allowing a forum for ongoing questions and learning, and for providing them with
guidance.
Because sponsoring is a volunteer activity, it may be perceived as an area in
which the government cannot place requirements on the participants. However,
sponsoring is a privilege as well as a service. If an organization or group is willing to
sponsor refugees, their members should be prepared to take training and follow
guidelines and procedures pertaining to their role.
To facilitate sponsors’ access to information, the RAP binder and all other
sponsor documentation should be made available on the CIC web site. Email and a
sponsor chat room would certainly make communication easier and would ensure that
information is disseminated to sponsors with Internet access.
Another recommendation for distribution of relevant information has to do with
existing resources that have been used successfully elsewhere. In the case of Operation
Parasol, the DND personnel stationed in the Balkans had valuable insights into the
cultural background of the Kosovars; however, very little of their information was shared
with the settlement destinations. Another example of a resource that would have been
welcomed by sponsors is the Albanian/English phrase book that was widely used at the
sustainment sites. Communication links across venues are required to share useful
information.
11.
Service Providers
A recommendation that came out of every sector involved in this study has to do with the
deployment of SPOs. It is important not to underestimate the networking capacity of the
settlement agencies. Despite the absence of a centralized national organization, settlement
services program staff from across the country have the skills and expertise to work with
refugees. In any future endeavours, it would be wise to follow the advice of several of
the respondents: “Use the best people for the job”. Settlement agency staff are the best
qualified people to work with refugees, whether it is in sustainment sites or in destination
communities.
Given the skills and knowledge that already exist in settlement agencies, it would
be expedient for CIC to first, develop training capacity among the service providers and
second, to fund the SPOs to deliver sponsor training programs.
Abu-Laban, B., Derwing, T. M., Mulder, M. & Northcott, H. (2001). Lessons
Learned: An Evaluation of Northern Alberta’s Experience with Kosovar Refugees (3
volumes). Edmonton, AB: The Prairie Centre of Excellence for Research on
Immigration and Integration.
12.
Repatriation
The Kosovars’ opportunity to repatriate at the government’s expense is one that is not
open to many refugees, but we have learned from their experiences of moving back to
Kosova. Kosovars were put in the very difficult position of having to decide whether they
wanted to repatriate or to stay in Canada. For many, the fact that they had had no time to
grieve or to come to terms with their circumstances made it almost impossible to resist
going back. Of those who repatriated, a significant minority would now like to return to
Canada. In the case of another mass evacuation, perhaps refugees should be allowed to
return to their home country without giving up their Minister’s permits for a limited
period of time. If they choose to come back to Canada within the specified time period,
they should be given the option of applying for a travel loan.
13.
Canadian Refugee Policies
13.1 Large-scale Influx
Everyone who was involved in Operation Parasol learned a great deal in a very short
period of time. It was widely acknowledged that the success of the project was in large
part attributable to the employees in the government departments involved: they were
dedicated, flexible, and innovative. The lessons of this operation should not be lost. We
recommend that a manual be developed for future operations based on this and other
final reports. The manual should have guidelines for the lead agency, presumably CIC, at
national, regional and local levels, indicating responsibilities of each branch, departments
to be reached for support, training required for staff, and most importantly, a step by step
set of procedures. For example, this manual should include clear directions on the
implementation of the interim federal health agreement and billing procedures to avoid
confusion and delay in the provision of health services. The DND and Health Canada
have very detailed documentation outlining their roles; these will be invaluable if another
large-scale evacuation takes place. CIC should have a similar reference.
Related to the recommendation regarding the utilization of the SPOs, the
importance of using the best people for the job means that turnover at sustainment sites
and in local offices should be minimized. It also means that the most highly trained and
skilled staff should be available to train, mentor and supervise those who are working
outside of their area of expertise. There should be continuity in CIC personnel involved
in a project like Operation Parasol at all levels.
One of the lessons learned, as mentioned above, had to do with the unrealistic
expectations with regard to goods and services that many Kosovars held when they
arrived in their settlement locations. At Gagetown, New Brunswick, Kosovars were not
only fully provided for, but also had many luxuries, such as free access to long distance
telephones and 24-hour access to volunteers on call to meet their every need. Services at
sustainment sites should provide for the specialized and urgent needs of the incoming
refugees, but at the same time focus on preparing the refugees for their new communities
with attention and services that are somewhat reflective of life in the new community. In
addition, refugees would benefit from receiving printed information in their own
Abu-Laban, B., Derwing, T. M., Mulder, M. & Northcott, H. (2001). Lessons
Learned: An Evaluation of Northern Alberta’s Experience with Kosovar Refugees (3
volumes). Edmonton, AB: The Prairie Centre of Excellence for Research on
Immigration and Integration.
languages about their roles and what they should be able to expect in terms of their
sponsors, the government and the settlement community.
Another lesson learned at the sustainment sites was the value in using an
approach of health and well-being rather than one of illness (post-traumatic stress
disorder (PTSD) model). This approach encouraged and assisted refugees to draw from
their own resources of health and experience and continue on with their new life in
Canada. The support the Kosovars received was culturally appropriate and beneficial.
Future endeavours should continue to invite newcomers to participate in decision-making
at the sustainment sites to ensure that service is culturally sensitive.
In any situation where there are many people who do not speak the same
language, interpreters play a crucial role. Not only should they be linguistically
proficient in both of the languages in question, but also they should be trained to ensure
that their presentation of information is neutral. Finally, interpreters and other
individuals working with refugees should never be drawn from the ethnic group that
forms the opposing side of the conflict. Trust is at the heart of successful interpretation; if
it is jeopardized, both the interpreter and the refugee are put in a very awkward position.
13.2. Standard Refugee Programs
Although in many respects, Kosovars accessed the same services as other refugees to
Canada, it is clear from this report that they also received treatment that was distinct. A
review of the unique aspects of the Kosovar settlement situation is called for to determine
whether there are changes that could be made to existing programs. Two suggestions
have emerged in this study from a number of sources. First, given the alacrity with which
the Canadian government acted, there is a call for expedited processing of refugees in
other parts of the world. Second, the commitment CIC made to keeping families
together, and the broadening of the definition of family were remarkable; these had
clearly positive effects on the settlement experience of Kosovars. Significantly, fewer
KOFs (16%) than KOSs (40%) repatriated. Furthermore, there have been lower rates of
secondary migration among Kosovars compared to individuals who have come to Alberta
through normal channels: GARs, JAS or privately sponsored refugees. The success of the
decision to keep families together suggests that CIC should explore ways of facilitating
faster and more extensive family reunification for other refugees.
The earlier recommendation to create documentation dealing with expectations of
refugees in mass evacuations should be extended to all refugees and should be available
in their first languages.
In current refugee programs, most GAR and JAS refugees are classified overseas.
The flexibility shown in Operation Parasol should be extended by making it possible to
reclassify refugee status in Canada. It is recommended that initially individuals be
funded for up to one year, and then reassessed and reclassified based on settlement
progress.
We recommend that CIC conduct a longitudinal study of the refugees to determine
what a reasonable definition of “successful integration” should be and how best to
encourage the appropriate steps to achieve it. The Kosovars were admitted to Canada
without screening for education levels, age, occupation, or linguistic knowledge, and yet
their self-assessed language skills are higher than those of refugees who met selection
criteria to come to Canada. The extra four months of ESL would certainly have
contributed to their scores. If the Kosovars eventually find themselves in a better
position in the labour market because of stronger language skills, for instance, their
Abu-Laban, B., Derwing, T. M., Mulder, M. & Northcott, H. (2001). Lessons
Learned: An Evaluation of Northern Alberta’s Experience with Kosovar Refugees (3
volumes). Edmonton, AB: The Prairie Centre of Excellence for Research on
Immigration and Integration.
ultimate attainment in terms of integration may be greater. A longitudinal study should
also focus on different characteristics of refugees to determine what types of programs
would be of most assistance to various segments of the population (e.g., older people).
Finally, CIC should collaborate with HRDC, provincial governments,
professional bodies and unions to find ways to help refugees enter the labour market at a
level commensurate with their skills. Consistent with previous studies, the refugees in this
study were either unemployed or underemployed to a greater degree than their Canadianborn counterparts. The barriers to employment are well known; strategies to overcome
those barriers should be put into place.
Abu-Laban, B., Derwing, T. M., Mulder, M. & Northcott, H. (2001). Lessons
Learned: An Evaluation of Northern Alberta’s Experience with Kosovar Refugees (3
volumes). Edmonton, AB: The Prairie Centre of Excellence for Research on
Immigration and Integration.
GLOSSARY
CCR
Canadian Council for Refugees
CFB
Canadian Forces Base
CIC
Citizenship and Immigration Canada
CIDA
Canadian International Development Agency
CRC
Canadian Red Cross
CR3
Refugees who are fully sponsored by a group
CR5
Special needs refugees
CSS
Catholic Social Services
DND
Department of National Defense
EISA
Edmonton Immigrant Services Association
ESL
English as a Second Language
FSW
Family Support Workers
GAR
Government Assisted Refugee
HEP
Humanitarian Evacuation Program
HRDC
Human Resources Development Canada
IFH
Interim Federal Health program
IOM
International Organisation for Migration
JAS
Joint Assistance Sponsorship involving the government and the
sponsoring group.
KOF
Kosovar refugees who were “fast-tracked” by the Canadian
authorities to be reunited with relatives already in Canada.
KOS
Kosovar refugees who boarded emergency airlifts from
Macedonia and were to be temporarily settled at selected military bases in Canada
Kosova
Kosovars’ designation of their homeland (English:
Kosovo).
Abu-Laban, B., Derwing, T. M., Mulder, M. & Northcott, H. (2001). Lessons
Learned: An Evaluation of Northern Alberta’s Experience with Kosovar Refugees (3
volumes). Edmonton, AB: The Prairie Centre of Excellence for Research on
Immigration and Integration.
LINC
Language Instruction for Newcomers to Canada (Levels 15)
MCN
Mennonite Centre for Newcomers
NATO
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO
Non-Governmental Organization
NHQ
National Headquarters [of CIC]
Operation Parasol
Emergency airlifts of (KOS) Kosovar refugees who were to
be settled temporarily at selected military bases in Canada,
carried out between May 4-26, 1999.
PCERII
Prairie Centre of Excellence for Research on Immigration
and Integration
PRL
Population Research Laboratory, University of Alberta
PTSD
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
PTSS
Post-Traumatic Stress Syndrome
RAP
Resettlement Assistance Program
RCMP
Royal Canadian Mounted Police
RIF
Relative Identification Form
ROLF
Right of Landing Fee
SAH
Sponsorship Agreement Holder
SPO
Service-Providing Organization
TB
Tuberculosis
TELUS
A Canadian telecommunication company
UNHCR
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees