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Power Markets People Market Policy Framework
Market Policy Framework Implementation “Quick Hits” Reliable Power Reliable Markets Reliable People Background Reliable Power Reliable Markets Reliable People Why “Quick Hits”? • On June 6, 2005 the Alberta Department of Energy (DOE) released a policy documenting their recommendations for refinements to the current framework for the Alberta wholesale electricity market, focusing on addressing shortterm and long-term adequacy of supply and other interrelated wholesale market issues. • “Quick Hits” were identified as areas of the policy that could be implemented in a reasonable amount of time, having an immediate effect on either the visibility of available supply, or the credibility, stability, or undue volatility of the pool price 3 Main “Quick Hit” Changes to Market Operations • The following four areas were identified for “Quick Hits” • Merit Order Stabilizers • Payments to Suppliers on the Margin • Treatment of Imports/Exports • Reconstitution of Pool Price for TMR Energy 4 What you will learn today… • This session will cover relevant participant changes in the ETS and in ADaMS. • Must offer/Maximum Capability • Available Capability and Acceptable Operational Reasons (AOR) • Energy Restatements for AOR • Price Restatements/ T-2 • Process for long lead time energy • Imports/Exports • Payments to generators on the margin • Purpose of Dispatch Down Service • Purpose of TMR Reference Price • Use of Dispatch Down Service and Reference Price in dispatching the Energy Market Merit Order 5 Merit Order Stabilizers • Offers and Bids • Restatements • Outage Scheduling • Dispatch of Long Lead Time Energy • Short Term Adequacy Assessment 6 Must Offer Maximum Capability Available Capability Acceptable Operational Reason Must Offer/ Maximum Capability • Generating Assets and imports must offer their Maximum Capability • Maximum capability for generating assets means the maximum quantity (MW) that the generating asset is physically capable of providing under optimal operating conditions for that asset while complying with all applicable ISO rules and terms and conditions of the ISO tariff. • Maximum capability for imports it is the available capability 8 Must Offer/ Maximum Capability • Where can maximum capability be found? At the bottom right corner of the energy market submission/restatement page in the ETS. • How is the maximum capability changed? Only the AESO can change this value • Maximum capability is a static number, should only change if there is a physical change to the unit, i.e. upgrade 9 Must Offer/ Maximum Capability Price restatement area 10 Must Offer/Available Capability • Available capability (AC) means: • For a generating asset the maximum quantity (MW) that the generating asset is physically capable of providing during each settlement interval of the trading day • For an import source asset, the maximum quantity (MW) that the importer is prepared to provide during each settlement interval of the trading day • For an export sink asset, the maximum quantity (MW) that the exporter is prepared to consume during each settlement interval of the trading day • For a bid, the maximum quantity (MW), after accounting for any restatements to the asset’s availability to which the asset may receive an energy market dispatch in real time 11 Must Offer/Available Capability • All source assets will have their available capability set to the maximum capability of the asset as per the value in the ETS • All source assets must offer all of their available capability unless they have an acceptable operational reason • The acceptable operational reason must be provided with the restatement 12 Must Offer/Acceptable Operational Reason • A circumstance … which if it operated could reasonably be expected to affect the safety of the generating asset, the environment, personnel working at the generating asset or the public • Re-positioning an asset …due to the need to meet a dispatch…to serve the stand-by ancillary service market • Re-position…to manage physical or operational constraints (includes constraints associated with interconnections) • Force majeure • Exempt energy (solely produced & consumed on site) 13 Offers, Bids and Restatements Offers Old Offer Structure New Offer Structure -Offer might not equal maximum capability -Offer must equal maximum capability -TDE submitted separate from the offer -Available Capability submitted as part of the offer -Outage Scheduling in TDE section of the ETS for all periods -Outage Scheduling for the forecast scheduling period happens through the offer -TDE/ SSE no longer applies 15 Offers cont… • Two parts to the offer: 1. Must offer component Maximum Capability (pricing of all of these MW) 2. Available Capability Declaration where it is not equal to the Maximum Capability 16 Mandatory Energy Restatements (a) • ISO Rules 3.5.3.2 a) • Changing the level of available capability of an asset for an acceptable operational reason. • This may occur at any time during the trading day. $/MWh MW $/MWh MW $/MWh MW 999.99 400 999.99 400 999.99 400 500 350 500 350 500 350 250 225 250 225 250 225 100 175 100 175 100 175 50 150 50 150 50 150 10 120 10 120 10 120 0 100 0 100 0 100 300MW 340MW 170MW Maximum Capability remains at 400 MW regardless of the restatement 17 Mandatory Energy Restatements (a) • Energy Restatements require an “AOR” per ISO Rule 3.5.3.2 Acknowledgment message 18 Mandatory Energy Restatements (b) • Energy Restatement ISO Rule 3.5.3.2b • New version of Old “Locking Restatement” • Cannot be used for economic reasons, require an acceptable AOR • A participant must submit a revised offer re-distributing the quantity (MW) within the offer blocks if a) the asset cannot comply with the current offer b) a price restatement can no longer be used c) an energy restatement under a) does not represent the asset’s operating state. (i.e. cannot simply restate the available capability) • No limit on the number per day 19 Mandatory Energy Restatements (b) • Current time is 8:33 20 Voluntary Price Restatements • ISO Rules 3.5.3.3 • Price Restatement: Changing the price and/or the quantity (MW) of an operating block of the asset. • This may only occur prior to two hours before the start of the settlement interval $/MWh MW $/MWh MW 999.99 400 999.99 400 500 350 500 300 250 225 250 225 100 175 100 176 50 150 75.50 175 10 120 10 150 0 100 0 120 Maximum Capability remains at 400 MW regardless of the restatement 21 Restatements Energy restatem Area (a) Price restatement area and Energy restatement area (b) 22 Application of Restatement of AC to the Merit Order $/MWh MW 999.99 400 500 350 250 225 100 175 50 150 10 120 0 100 This portion of the offer WILL NOT appear on the Energy Market Merit Order Available Capability = 325 MW This portion of the offer appears on the Energy Market Merit Order Maximum Capability = 400 23 Implementation of Offers • AESO will implement changes in manner prescribed • “When a generating asset has been issued both an ancillary service dispatch and an energy market dispatch for the same period, the ISO will deduct the quantity of MW in such ancillary service dispatch from the available capability of such asset for the purposes of determining the quantity of MW of the energy market dispatch.” • Participant will no longer be required to restate energy for AS • AESO will auto-adjust and re-dispatch energy to correct level 24 Implementation of Offers Example: Maximum Capability = 400MW SR Dispatch Level = 50MW SUPG Dispatch Level = 25MW Available Capability = 300MW Therefore, Maximum Energy Dispatch Level = 225MW 25 Bids • Same application of restatements as offers • Intra-Alberta load may restate for any reason, however if they are not going to comply with their bid, they must restate 26 Rule 3.7 Standing Offers and Bids • Must offer obligation impacts • Standing offer/bid is the default • AC will default to the submitted outage schedule • Move bid default provision of rule 3.9 to rule 3.7 27 Outage Scheduling • As per the ISO Operating Policies and Procedures, available capability will be used for the purposes of outage scheduling. • For the duration of the forecast scheduling period (< 7 days), all available capability information must be entered through the Energy Submission section of the ETS. • For all periods past the forecast scheduling period (> 7days), all available capability information must be entered through the Outage Scheduling section of the ETS. 28 Long Lead Time Energy Dispatch of Long Lead Time Energy • All pool participants must submit operating constraints for each generation asset including the Initial Start-up time (hr). (Rule 3.5.3.4) • Initial Start-up time reflects, in hours, the time required by the generating asset to synchronize to the AIES from its off-line state. • As per ISO Rule 5.1, the AESO will make use of this information for the purpose of determining supply adequacy. 30 Long Lead Time Energy Dispatch May submit start time May withdraw start time 9:00 am Must comply 3:00 pm 5:00 pm T-2 T • Generator Initial Start-up time: 8 hours (cold start) – Submitted in ETS – Provision for warm or hot starts prior to T-2 • Start time: 5:00 pm – Submitted in ADaMS 31 Dispatch of Long Lead Time Energy 32 Dispatch of Long Lead Time Energy cont… 33 Dispatch of Long Lead Time Energy cont… • ISO Rule 6.3.5 requires that pool participants, with a lead time greater than 1 hour, declare to the AESO the time of day at which they intend to be synchronized to the AIES. • Participants must submit a start time that reflects the physical condition of the generating asset, and must ‘make sense’ given the initial start up time constraint that they have submitted to us • Participants with an Initial Start-up time less than 2 hours must submit a start time at least two hours prior to the start of the settlement interval. • Participants may withdraw a start time no later than two hours prior to the start of the settlement interval. 34 Dispatch of Long Lead Time Energy cont… For example: -The current time is 13:05. -Gen 1 has an 4 hour initial start-up time. -ETS Initial Start-up Time: 4 hours Essentially, Gen 1 energy offer would be filtered out of the real-time energy merit order and the STA Assessment until they give the AESO their intention to start. -Intention to start: If Gen 1 intends to come on line at 17:05, they would enter at a start-up time record at or before 13:05. (at least 4 hours prior to when they expect to come online) -Gen 1 would log into ADaMS at 13:05 and enter a Start time of 17:05. -Gen 1 energy would appear in the energy market merit order at 17:05. -In merit energy for Gen 1 would be dispatched at 17:05. 35 5.0 – Adequacy and Price Forecasting • Providing forecast daily and weekly adequacy assessments • Providing short term forecast system marginal prices • Move rule 5.4 Equal Price Offers or Bids from Scheduling to Dispatching Rules (Rule 6.3.4) 36 Short Term Adequacy Assessment • ISO Rule 5.1 “An adequacy assessment will be prepared by the ISO for each settlement interval for the trading day and for the 6 remaining days of the forecast scheduling period on the day preceding that trading day.” • Updates: every 5 Min for current day; every hour for the 6 remaining days 37 6.6 Pool Participant Non-Compliance… • Must comply rules • Will be considered in non-compliance when dispatch is declined • Tolerance levels remain unchanged • Compliance Rules (Rule 12) continues to apply 38 Imports/Exports Treatment of Imports/Exports • “Must comply” • Importers & Exporters are committed to volumes by T-2 • Inability to procure transmission is an acceptable operational reason – If total imports in merit order is less than ATC, all should submit e-tags or they are in non-compliance – If total imports in merit order is greater than ATC, expect tie-line to be full • Dispatch process should remain relatively unchanged compared to today • Not able to set pool price 40 Addressing the Impacts of TMR Transmission Must Run (TMR) • means a generator is constrained on to operate at a minimum specified MW output level in order to maintain system security 42 Impact of TMR Today TMR Unit 100 MW $200 Gen 8 100 MW $77 Gen 7 75 MW $65 Gen 6 25 MW $50 Gen 5 75 MW $47 Gen 4 50 MW $45 Gen 3 25 MW $32 Gen 2 50 MW $28 • If TMR had not been dispatched, then we would “Unconstrained have required additional ” price energy dispatched in the merit order SMP • If the price is artificially depressed, then the correct price signal is not being sent to the market and may delay generation investment Gen 1 100 MW $20 43 Dispatch Down Service (DDS) • Create market so that generators will offer a price to voluntarily dispatch down • Dispatch down the DDS by out of merit TMR amount, when system marginal price is less or equal to the reference price. • Reference price • Cannot set SMP • Calculated by 12.5 * Gas Price • Costs allocated to suppliers (generators & imports) by metered volumes “financial pro rata” 44 Dispatch Down Service (DDS) • Not intended to compete with the energy market • Provide an opportunity for a generator who is dispatched down to recover opportunity costs • Not a market intended to provide long term source of funding for generators – should disappear with elimination of transmission constraints 45 Conditions for DDS Dispatch • SMP is less than or equal to the reference price • Source asset has been issued a TMR dispatch or directive • TMR quantity is greater than constrained down quantity • E.g. if 300 MW is constrained down in KEG area, and 100 MW of TMR is dispatched, then no DDS is dispatched 46 DDS Quantity Calculation • DDS Quantity to be dispatched (MW) is the lesser of: • DDS (MW) = out of merit TMR – Constrained Down • DDS cannot be less than zero • Eligible DDS offer quantity 47 DDS Quantity Example • 100 MW out of merit TMR in Rainbow Area • 20 MW constrained down in Fort McMurray • 70 MW of eligible DDS offered DDS is the lesser of: 100 MW (TMR) – 20 MW (constrained down) = 80 MW Or 70 MW 48 Dispatch Example at Time T TMR Unit 100 MW $200 Gen 8 100 MW $77 Gen 7 75 MW $65 Gen 6 25 MW $50 • TMR is not dispatched on SMP • Gen 2 and Gen 4 offer DDS Gen 5 75 MW $47 Gen 4 50 MW $45 Gen 3 25 MW $32 Gen 2 50 MW $28 Gen 1 100 MW $20 49 Dispatch Example at Time T TMR Unit 100 MW $200 • TMR is dispatched “on” Gen 8 100 MW $77 Gen 7 75 MW $65 SMP Gen 6 25 MW $50 Gen 5 75 MW $47 Gen 4 50 MW $45 Gen 3 25 MW $32 Gen 2 50 MW $28 Gen 1 100 MW $20 Today’s Dispatch Level • 100 MW of “extra” generation dispatched • Rather than dispatching off Gen 6 and Gen 7, the DDS is dispatched down by 100 MW • Gen 2 and Gen 4 dispatched down 50 Effect of Reference Price • Reference price as “proxy” for TMR TMR Unit 100 MW $200 Gen 8 100 MW $77 Gen 7 75 MW $65 Gen 6 25 MW $50 Gen 5 75 MW $47 Gen 4 50 MW $45 Gen 3 25 MW $32 Gen 2 50 MW $28 Gen 1 100 MW $20 • Offers dispatched for TMR face no dispatch risk in energy market, since they have an Ancillary Service dispatch Reference Price SMP Today’s Dispatch Level • Without reference price, TMR Unit pricing incentives change, to affect price without risk – effectively market power mitigation 51 Dispatch Example at Time T+30min • Load increases by 100 MW TMR Unit 100 MW $200 Gen 8 100 MW $77 Gen 7 75 MW $65 Gen 6 25 MW $50 Gen 5 75 MW $47 Gen 4 50 MW $45 Gen 3 25 MW $32 Gen 2 50 MW $28 Gen 1 100 MW $20 • Last dispatched unit is Gen 7 Reference Price SMP (Same as today’s dispatch level) • Next unit in merit order is Gen 8 • Gen 8 is above reference price • Before dispatching units above reference price, DDS units are dispatched up • Gen 2 and Gen 4 dispatched up 52 DDS Offers • Any participant with a dispatchable source asset may offer DDS • One DDS block associated to each dispatchable source asset (Rule 3.5.1 a)) • DDS block of a DDS offer must be flexible (Rule 3.5.5.1 d)) • Offers submitted any time prior to T-2 (Rule 3.5.2 d)) • DDS offer quantity must not be less than 10 MW (Rule 3.5.5.1 a)) • DDS offer must not exceed Available Capability minus minimum stable generation (Rule 3.5.5.1 b), additional rules on submitting DDS offers within 3.5.5.1) • DDS offer price is equal to zero or a negative value (Rule 3.9 c)) 53 DDS “New Submission” 54 Dispatching DDS (Rule 3.5.3.5 c) & 6.3.6.4) • DDS Merit order is dispatched from lowest to highest DDS price (taking into account the eligibility of the DDS offer) • For every DDS dispatch: • ISO will deduct the quantity from the Energy Market offer in ascending order starting with the lowest priced block of the source asset • The asset will then receive a corresponding Energy Market dispatch • DDS is not dispatched when the Pool Price is above the Reference Price 55 Dispatching DDS (cont’d) DDS Merit Order DDS Offer Price Source D -5 MW 100 • SMP is $50 • If dispatched: Source A paid 50+-60= 0 Source C Source B Source A -20 20 -40 50 -60 40 Source B paid 50 +-40=$10 Source C paid 50 +-20=$30 Source D paid 50+-5=$45 56 Mandatory DDS Energy Restatements (Rule 3.5.5.2) • Within 2 hours before the start of any settlement interval • Only for an Acceptable Operational Reason (AOR) • Current Time: 7:30 am in example below 57 Voluntary DDS Price Restatements (Rule 3.5.5.3) •Only permitted prior to two hours before the start of any settlement interval •Restatement of price, quantity, or both •Current Time: 7:40 am in example below 58 Implementation of Offers (inclusion of DDS) • When a source asset has been issued a DDS dispatch, the ISO will deduct the quantity of MW in such DDS dispatch from the in merit amount in the source asset’s offer for the purposes of determining the quantity of MW of the energy market dispatch. The ISO will deduct such quantity from the offer in ascending order starting with the lowest priced block of such source asset 59 Implementation of offers (cont’d) Example: Maximum Capability = 400MW Available Capability = 300MW Current dispatch level in energy market = 200 MW Minimum stable generation level = 100 MW DDS offer = 50 MW (max DDS offer participant can enter is 200 MW: 300-100) Therefore the asset will be: DDS dispatched on for 50 MW Energy market dispatch for 150 MW 60 Real-time “Snapshot” of Adams 61 Dispatch compliance • A market participant must comply with a DDS dispatch • If a participant does not comply with a DDS Dispatch, the non-compliance will be flagged in the energy market, therefore dispatch compliance is monitored in the Energy Market, subject to ISO Rules 6.6 and 12 62 DDS payment (Rule 8.1.3) • DDS payment on dispatch • DDS payment equals DDS price ($) x DDS quantity (MW) x DDS time (min) divided by 60 minutes • DDS Price is the system marginal price plus the DDS offer price 63 DDS Charge (Rule 8.1.4) • DDS charge allocated to all source assets • A participant that has generated (generators & imports) during a settlement interval will receive a charge for DDS • DDS charge calculated by: energy production (MWh) divided by the sum of all energy production (MWh) multiplied by the sum of all DDS payments • DDS payment – Rule 8.1.3 (see previous slide) 64 Payments to Suppliers on the Margin Payments to Suppliers on the margin • Intent is to decrease the incentive for non-compliance with a dispatch • Often participants respond based on forecast pool price as opposed to SMP • If the participant believes the price will be lower than their offer price, they may not immediately respond • Guarantees that they will be paid their offer price for the time that they are running 66 Payment to Suppliers on the Margin • ISO Rule 8.1.2 • When a pool participant’s asset has been dispatched for a portion of the settlement interval where their offer price is greater than pool price for that settlement interval, they may qualify for an energy production uplift payment. • Pool Participants will receive the difference between their offer price and the pool price for MWh produced from offer blocks dispatched above pool price. • ISO Rule 8.2.3 • Settlement charges for payments to suppliers on the margin will be applied to all load based on their proportion of total load within the settlement interval. 67 Payment to Suppliers on the Margin cont… • On a Monthly basis, payments and charges will be applied against the pool participant’s invoice 68 New 8.1.2 Payment to Suppliers on the Margin • Alignment of Settlement & Dispatch • Eligible to receive production uplift if: – Operating block receives an energy market dispatch; and – Offer price is greater than pool price; and – Energy production (MWh) is greater than the sum of the dispatched energy (MWh) of all blocks below such operating block 69 Eligibility • Dispatched up to $250/MWh during the hour • Pool price = $150/MWh • Meter Volumes = 187 MWh – 187 MWh > 175 MWh Gen A Offer Block $/MWh MW 6 999.99 400 5 500 350 4 250 225 3 100 175 2 50 150 1 10 120 0 0 100 70 New 8.1.2 Payment to Suppliers on the Margin • If meter volumes are < the amount dispatched, then they receive uplift for all the additional meter volumes provided • If meter volumes are > the amount dispatched, then they receive uplift only up to the dispatched amount 71 Formula Definitions A = energy production (MWh) B = sum of dispatched energy from previously dispatched blocks C = dispatched energy of the eligible block D = offer price “dispatched energy” = minutes dispatched x volume dispatched 72 Multiple Block Eligibility Gen A Offer Marginal Prices: Block $/MWh MW $55 for 50 minutes 6 999.99 400 $100 for 8 minutes 5 500 350 $250 for 2 minutes 4 250 225 Pool Price: $67.50 3 100 175 Dispatched Energy = 155.83 MWh 2 50 150 1 10 120 Meter Volumes: 155 MWh 0 0 100 Eligible Not Eligible 73 Multiple Block Eligibility Gen A Offer A = 155 MWh (Meter volumes) $/MWh MW B = 154.17 MWh (Previous block) 999.99 400 500 350 250 225 100 175 D = $250/MWh 50 150 Dispatch minutes: 2 min 10 120 Pool price: $67.50 0 100 C = 155.83 MWh (Dispatch energy) D C B 74 Rule 8.1.2 b) i) • If (A minus B) is less than or equal to [(C minus B) • (155 – 154.17) < (155.83 – 154.17) • .83 < 1.66 • Metered volumes are within expected dispatch; calculation based on actual metered volumes • Then energy production uplift = (A minus B) multiplied by (D minus pool price) • Energy production uplift = (155 – 154.17) x ($250 – $67.50) • Energy production uplift = $151.48 75 Multiple Block Eligibility Gen A Offer A = 155 MWh $/MWh MW B = 150 MWh 999.99 400 500 350 250 225 100 175 50 150 10 120 0 100 C = 154.17 MWh D = $100/MWh Dispatch minutes: 8 min + 2 min = 10 min Pool price: $67.50 D C B 76 Rule 8.1.2 b) ii) • If (A minus B) is greater than [(C minus B) • (155 – 150) > (154.17 – 150) • 5 > 4.17 • Metered volumes are higher than expected dispatch; calculation limited to dispatch • Then energy production uplift = (C minus B) multiplied by (D minus pool price) Energy production uplift = (154.17 – 150) x ($100 – $67.50) Energy production uplift = $135.53 77 8.2.3 Settlement for Suppliers on the Margin • As per policy paper, allocated to energy consumption in the hours it was paid Energy production uplift share in $ = (sum of all energy production uplifts) multiplied by the pool participant’s energy consumption divided by sum of all pool participant’s energy consumption 78 8.2.3 Settlement for Suppliers on the Margin Sum of Energy Production Uplift: $151.48 + $135.53 Pool Participant’s energy consumption: 100 MWh Total energy consumption: 8000 MWh Energy production uplift share charge = $287.01 x 100 MWh / 8000 MWh = $3.59 79 Implementation Plan • Quick Hits Rules and System changes effective Dec. 3, 2007 • Outage to systems in morning (10:15 am) • Extension of gate close • Participants able to enter in DDS offers on Dec 3 for effective Dec 4, 2007 00:00 hrs • Further details to follow through web posting and weekly stakeholder email 80 ETS Sandbox • The AESO offers an electronic training environment for participants to become familiar with AESO systems both pro-actively and on a regular basis. • A specific digital certificate is required to access the training environment. • Contact Nicole Boulet at [email protected] to gain access to the training digital certificate and the web location of this environment. 81 Questions? Market Services Customer Service Ruppa Minhas Mary-Beth Hansen 539-2589 539-2599 [email protected] [email protected] Doug Simpson Marina Jagbandhansingh 539-2494 539-2587 [email protected] [email protected] Nicole Boulet 539-2634 [email protected] 82 83