―INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, NATIONAL INTERESTS AND FOREIGN POLICY MAKING IN THE MIDDLE EAST‖

―INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
NATIONAL INTERESTS AND FOREIGN
POLICY MAKING IN THE MIDDLE EAST‖
SAMEH M. ABOUL-ENEIN
BA (American University in Cairo), MSc (SOAS, University of London)
Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the
Requirements of the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
IN
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
THE UNIVERSITY OF LONDON
& THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF LONDON
April Edition
2011
Table of Contents
Pages
Abstract
Acknowledgments
Declaration
Chapter One
Introductory Chapter
-
Research Objectives
-
International relations Theories and Schools of
1-42
Foreign Policy analysis
-
Research Framework
-
Foreign Policy in the Middle East
-
Chapter outlines
-
Detailed Chapter Endnotes
Chapter Two
Presidential Foreign Policy and decision making process:
-
Introduction
-
Foreign Policy-making in the Middle East
-
The "Leadership" approach in Foreign Policy and
43-120
Political institutions.
Political Culture and the Nature of decision
making in Egypt
-
Conclusions
-
Chapter Endnotes
Chapter Three
121-222
The Dynamics of Egypt's Foreign Policy in the 1970s: External &
Internal factors
-
Introduction
-
Foreign Policy Re-Orientation from East to West
-
The Indicators of Shifts in Foreign-Policy
-
The Policy of Economic Liberalisation
-
The Foreign-Aid Concept in Foreign Policy
-
The Conservative Arab Connection and the
Media Factor
-
Conclusions
-
Detailed Chapter Endnotes
Chapter Four
223-261
Concluding Chapter: A decade of Foreign Policy Shifts in the Middle
East – Egypt from Ostracism to Reintegration into the Arab World
- Primacy of National Interests in Inter-Arab Relations
- The Dynamics of Arab States‘ Regional Foreign Policies and the Rise
of New Power Centres
- Egypt's Regional Foreign Policy Objectives and Regional
Developments Contributing to the Arab-Egyptian Rapprochement with
Egypt.
- Factors Contributing to Arab-Egyptian Rapprochement:
A Moderate Position on Arab-Israeli Conflict, Perceived Regional
Threats and Economic Constraints
- Conclusion
- Detailed Chapter Endnotes
Bibliography
262-287
Primary Sources and documents used.
288
Appendix 1
Interview with Dr. Abdel Aziz Hegazy
Ex Prime Minister of Egypt
289
Appendix 2
Interview with Dr. Ali Lotfy
Ex Prime Minister of Egypt
298
Chapter Five
307-366
Foreign Policy, Nuclear Non-Proliferation and a nuclear Free Middle –
East
-
Nuclear Disarmament
-
The NPT- a secure Future
-
A Nuclear-Free Zone in the Middle East
-
Missile Test Freeze in the Middle East
-
Working Paper by Egypt to 3rd Prep Com (May 2009)
-
A Roadmap to Disarmament
-
A Missile Flight Test Ban
-
Multilateral Dialogue
-
The Importance of Verification and Transparency
-
Practical Steps Toward a Nuclear Free Zzone
-
The 2010 NPT and Time-bound Nuclear Disarmament
Chapter Six
Foreign Policy and Nuclear Disarmament (Further Academic Research)
Appendix 1
Challenges for the Non-Proliferation Regime and the Middle East
Appendix 2
The Roadmap to Total Nuclear Disarmament
Appendix 3
The missile regime: verification, test bans and free zones
Appendix 4
The 2010 NPT Review and the Middle East: Challenges & Opportunities
Appendix 5
Creating a WMD Free Zone in the Middle East and relevant agreements
Appendix 6
Preventing Nuclear Prolilferation in the Middle East
Appendix 7
Towards a verified nuclear weapon free zone in the Middle East
Appendix 8
A real opportunity for a Nucear-Weapons-Free Zone in the Middle East
Appendix 9
NPT 2010-The Beginning of a New Constructive Cycle
Appendix 10
NPT 2010-2015: The Way Forward/ Carnegie Endowment
Abstract
A proper analysis of the foreign policies of the Middle Eastern
countries should accept that it is a part of the general situation in the
developing world. In this sense, the foreign policy process cannot be
separated from the domestic social structure or the domestic political
process in these Arab Countries. These countries are also a part and
parcel of a world system. They are greatly affected by international
stratification. It is thus important to see how external constraints and
global structures (e.g. relations with major powers and the International
Financial Institutions) affect their foreign policy-making process and
international behavior.
Foreign policy restructuring entails a major alteration or break-up
in the orientation of an actor in favor of establishing a new set of
commitments and alliances both on the international and regional levels.
It is more than a change in tactics or instruments of policy
implementation; it also goes beyond the fluctuations and oscillations
which are characteristic of the foreign policy behavior of many
developing countries. It involves a basic reconsideration of an actor's
perceptions of the global or regional system and of the country's role
within that framework. Indicators of the restructuring of foreign policy
orientation include patterns of diplomatic, economic, military and
cultural relations between the country and the outside world.
The research addresses the question of the ways in which the
leadership's interaction with the internal and external environment
produced the complex phenomena of certain foreign policy acts at certain
historical periods under specific circumstances. The salience of economic
considerations in the formulation of Egypt's foreign policy in the 1970's
may be best understood not only through an examination of the economic
constraints of that period, but also by analyzing the political
underpinnings and strings that were attached to them and how the
leadership's role, personality and perceptions interacted with these
internal and external variables resulting in the adoption of certain
regional and global policies.
The perseverance of Egypt on the issue of nuclear nonproliferation and the question of a nuclear free zone in the Middle East,
reflects a confirmation of Sadat‘s pragmatic approach to Foreign Policy
and the unique position hold in the region. The issue of nuclear
disarmament is sensitive in the Middle East, and Egypt‘s place of
leadership, not to mention its dialogue with Israel and the West, is key to
the advancement of a non-nuclear strategy.
Acknowledgements
I am grateful to my supervisor, Professor Michael Nimier, for his
valuable support, as well as to all those who supported my research at
the American University Of London including other members of the
examination committee Professor Stephen Hathrill and Dr. S.E.Grimes .
I am also indebted to many at the School of Oriental and African Studies,
University of London who supported my MSC/M. Phil/ Ph.d programs
over the years especially Professor P.J.Vatikiotis , Dr. Charles Tripp and
Dr. David Taylor
My Special thanks goes to my former boss, the ex-Foreign Minister of
Egypt, H.E. Ahmed Maher as he nominated me to the academia to
complete this effort (attached is H.E.'s recommendation letter in this
respect.
I would like to express my appreciation also to the Former Permanent
Representative of Egypt to the UN in Geneva, H.E. Naela Gabr, and the
Former Ambassador of Egypt to the UK, H.E.Gehad Madi, for their
generous support and sincere encouragement, which over the years 20022009 allowed me to accomplish this achievement .
I dedicate this to my dear dad and mum, to my family, Randa, Samer and
Rana to whom I owe my gratitude, for all their patience and continuous
support over this long process which accompanied my full-time
Diplomatic career.
To all my dear friends and colleagues who have given me valuable
insights, helpful analysis and precious thought.
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER
This research will be basically an attempt to establish the
importance of domestic economic constraints as a major factor that
shaped Egypt‘s foreign policy during the 1970‘s. The research will
investigate the presence of a correlation, if any, between domestic
economic constraints and Egypt‘s foreign policy in the 1970‘s. It will
investigate if the worsening economic conditions in Egypt coincided with
any particular shifts in its foreign policy particularly as the launching of
the economic liberalization open door policy, which was not atomistic
policy shift but rather a major foreign policy act for attracting foreign
capital , investments and assistance and to make better use of the entire
sources of income in Egypt , become associated with other regional and
international shifts that Egypt undertook during the 1970‘s.
The research will address in this context the question whether the
deteriorating domestic economy in Egypt combined with increasing
economic ties with external donors has resulted in the evolution of a
foreign policy that seek to maximize the beneficial rewards of external
relations through a rapprochement with Arab Gulf conservative states,
the west and beginning of the peace process with Israel which yielded
economic and military aid as well as investments from regional donors,
western donors and international financial institutions in return.
The research will approach the correlation between domestic
economic constraints and foreign policy in Egypt by examining how the
role of the leadership and his perceptions of the surrounding external and
internal environment contributed to a certain understanding of the
deteriorating economic conditions in Egypt and the selection of a specific
open door policy orientation to tackle it, and how his interaction with his
capacity as the prime decision maker resulted in the major shifts in
Egypt‘s foreign policy regionally and internationally.
The general assumption in this research of the foreign policies of
Middle Eastern states and particularly Egypt is that in contrast to the
1950‘s and 1960‘s, when the Arab states tended to frame their foreign
policies in terms of ideological goals as Arab unity, the liberation of
Palestine and anti-imperialism------the 1970‘s has seen a triumph of
―real politic‖ over ideology in the middle east region. This new
pragmatism was best reflected in the issue-oriented basis of the foreign
policies of many Arab states.
A new phenomenon of ―MUTUAL INTERESTS DIPLOMACY‖
occurred as inter-Arab relations become pragmatic with tangible
national interests prevailing over ideological considerations. The 1960‘s
conflict between Nasserism and Baathism over the ideological supremacy
and leadership of the Arab system has eased. Egypt‘s relations with its
Arab neighbours became increasingly governed by the exchange of
benefits and interests and a greater flexibility leading to the development
of working relationships across previously ideological divisions emerged.
The Foreign policies of key Arab states became preoccupied with
the attempt to achieve economic security and welfare for their masses
and gave priority to the process of confronting their domestic economic
crisis in the 1970‘s .
However, despite that Arab states have been studied from many
angles and several researches have dealt with Arab governments and
politics, history and political evolution, ideologies and intellectual trends,
inter-Arab relations and the super powers policies in the Middle East --------------- only very few tackled the issue of Arab states‘ foreign policies
or how these states view the world and their role in a political economy
context. With only a few exceptions, the existing literature is of a
descriptive
or
prescriptive
nature,
conceptualization in foreign policy analysis.
rarely
linked
to
recent
Most of it belongs to the tradition of diplomatic history or
commentary on current affairs (1). There is almost no treatment in
existing books of how foreign policy is actually formulated and
implemented in the Middle East and how economic factors contribute to
the foreign policy making process.
This research is certainly not an attempt to fill the gap that already
exists in the field of foreign policy analysis in the Middle East; however,
it is a modest project to address the economic factors affecting the
foreign policy of a key Arab state as Egypt.
A persistent controversy in the study of international relations is
the relative potency of internal and external factors as determinants of
the actions and interactions of states.
A one extreme are the analysts who claim that foreign policy or
relations of states are primarily a response to circumstances located
abroad. Supporters of this view claim that, international systems and
situations impose requirements on individual states that limit the degree
to which factors internal to them can be influential. Accordingly, it
assumes that all states and the individuals responsible for formulating
their foreign policy similarly approach the problem of adapting to the
challenges posed by the world beyond their borders. The leaders who
make foreign policy decisions, the type of governments they head, the
characteristics of their societies, and the internal economic and political
conditions of the state they represent are unimportant(2) .
The core of this view rests on the premise that the nature of super
powers relations is the primary factor influencing the foreign policy of
states. Hans Morgenthau and George Modelski are two proponents of
this ―Great Power‖ approach. In this classic work, POLITICS AMONG
NATIONS, Morgenthau advocated foreign policy as a function of eastwest conflict.
The main weakness of this approach is its neglect of domestic
sources of foreign policy. Moreover it implies that developing states as
those of the Middle East lack purposeful foreign policies of their own (3).
Accordingly, the foreign policy of these states become affected and reacts
only to external forces and situations not to any internal stimuli. This
approach does not account for the specific features of Middle Eastern
states as their underdevelopment, their low level of political
institutionalization and the role of leaderships in foreign policy decisions.
At the other extreme are the analysts who claim that the external
behaviour of states arise primarily out of efforts to satisfy domestic
needs. An underlying assumption of several studies of this approach in
foreign policy is that the government structure of a state is crucial to an
understanding of both the nature and process of domestic and foreign
policy.
Thus, the internal structure of a state is viewed as crucial to the
functioning of its external behaviour. In short, domestic needs and
pressures in states form their foreign policies and relations. James
Rosenau in his major work LINKAGE POLITICS recognized the great
complexity of national systems and rightly emphasized the need for the
student of national politics and the student of foreign policy to work
together despite a previous tendency towards mutual ignorance and
incomprehension (4).
Rosenau was the first noted pioneer to introduce the term
―LINKAGE POLITICS‖ within the discipline of political science and in
foreign policy analysis. Implicit in the linkage concept, as expounded by
him is the notion that there exists a continuous interaction between the
international and domestic milieu (5). Later, Rosenau developed the
hypothesis that economic and political development often determine the
ways in which foreign policies of states are shaped by their internal needs
such as sustaining a charismatic leadership, the need for elite identity
and prestige, and the need to direct attention away from domestic
problems-------objectives and strategies often used by many governments
in developing countries as those of the middle east region (6).
Rosenau also claims that there exists attributes of national
societies that affect greatly a states foreign policy. He says that the
essential patterns, defined behaviourally are interaction patterns of
individuals and groups within the state; the four structures being
physical, political, economic and social. Other advocates of this
approach are Dessouki and Korany in their work THE FOREIGN
POLICIES OF ARAB STATES where they recognized that the foreign
policies of middle eastern states cannot be separated from their internal
composition, and suggest, to understand foreign policy making in that
region, on must open what they termed the ―BLACK BOX‖ of domestic
political and economic factors in the society.
However, a major drawback in this approach is that it
concentrates in depth and in too much detail on the domestic variables
affecting foreign policy in developing countries, while neglecting that
they are a part of an international political and economic system which
affect to a certain extent their foreign policy formulation as well.
Divorcing the analysis of foreign policy making in the Middle East from
their foreign environment can only lead to erroneous and misleading
conclusions. Given their low degree of political institutionalization, their
political and social instability, the general structure of their international
economic relations, and most importantly, their dependence upon the
outside world for several issues from food to armaments, Middle Eastern
states are highly susceptible to external influences.
Recognizing and acknowledging the importance and validity of
these two previous schools in the analysis of foreign policy, this research
however, views foreign policy as a phenomena that occurs in an arena
where the mutual impact of both domestic and international
developments interact.
International developments tend to have their domestic outcomes
and / or correlates and vice versa, and in order for domestic and
international developments to lead to certain foreign policy behaviour,
such developments have to be understood or interpreted in a certain way
by the state elites, pressure groups and/ or political leadership.
With this understanding in perspective, several approaches become
relevant to this research and to its attempt to examine Egypt‘s foreign
policy during the 1970‘s from apolitical economy point of view. Among
these approaches are the dependency perspective and the new
development literature, and the decision-making approaches to foreign
policy analysis.
Dependency theorists assumed among several arguments, that
economic changes rather than being an isolated mechanistic process, is
part of the general societal process and reflects the roles different groups
have at the national and international level. Two assumptions followed
(a) that the objective of the perspective becomes the study of the
interaction between economics and politics in developing countries, (b)
states sovereignty and barriers become analytical concepts rather than
barriers and the separation between domestic and foreign policies of
developing countries become a fiction. Moreover, it recognizes that there
are local groups that depend on the existing system and that they are
connected to external forces.
Similarly the new literature on development puts emphasis on
domestic sources of foreign policy and on how the process of
modernization and social change affect the external behaviour of
developing
countries
(7).
The
resource
factor
is
underlined,
distinguishing between size factors (absolute amount of available
resources) and modernizations factors (the ability to mobilize, control
and use these resources). The more modernized states thus have a greater
capacity to act in the international system.
This new body of literature focuses basically on three foreign
policy objectives of developing countries (a) defence of the state‘s
independence against perceived threats (b) mobilization of external
resources for the state‘s development (an element very
relevant to
Egypt‘s diplomacy during the 1970‘s) ,
(c) The achievement of objectives related to domestic politics, e.g.,
isolating one‘s political opponent from their foreign supporters, lending
legitimacy domestic political demands and creating symbols of
nationalism and national unity (8).
An equal important element in the new literature is the emphasis
on the political economy of an actor‘s position in the global stratification
system. In this context inequality becomes a core focus, for developing
countries exist in a world order characterized by inequality between
states at the levels of socio-economic development, military capability,
political stability and prestige. This results in the penetration of
developing countries‘ decision making process from the outside, with
external actors participating authoritatively in the allocation of resources
and the determination of national goals. Much has been researched
elsewhere on the role of the IMF, IBRD, international private banks,
multinational corporations and bilateral foreign economic and military
aid in this regard (9).
This perspective has two main drawbacks for any analysis of the
linkage between the global system and the foreign policies of states. The
first is that it is much more concerned with the general patterns of
national underdevelopment than with the systematic analysis of a
dependent country‘s foreign policy. The second is the perspective‘s
tendency to lump together all developing societies together regardless of
the variations that exist among them. In short we need to sort out the
general and the specific features of each region to reach any concrete
analysis.
However, the dependency perspective can provide us with three
advantages as far as the research of foreign policy in the Middle East is
concerned. First it emphasizes the role of domestic structural factors that
account for foreign policy better than just accentuating psychological or
ideological or idiosyncratic factors. Second, it is a dynamic perspective
that emphasizes both the role of social change in a global context and the
linkage between the different levels of analysis—from the global to the
sub national. Third, it pushed aside the rigid discipline boundaries to
emphasize the close relationship between political, economic, historical,
and sociological phenomena.
Moreover, many development scholars conceptualized foreign
policy primarily as a process or an activity whose main objective is the
mobilization of external resources for the sake of societal development.
Students of Egypt‘s foreign policy for instance, cannot escape this
conclusion. Egypt‘s rapprochement with the United States and the
initiation of the peace process with Israel in the mid 1970‘s were
motivated by economic troubles in Egypt and the desire to attract foreign
investments and capital. For other states in the Middle East as Syria and
Iraq issues of Arab nationalism, unity threat perceptions and regional
security considerations remained the paramount factors in their foreign
policy during the 1970‘s. (10).
On the other side of foreign policy analysis, Graham T. Allison
suggested a new scheme to analyze foreign policy decision-making. He
presented three models (11): the organizational process model, the
bureaucratic politics model and the rational actor model.
The organizational process model depicts the government as a
loosely coordinated group of semi dependent organizations over which
the leader maybe able to exercise partial control.
Since the only way of acting is through standardized operational
procedures, government behaviour is observed as the output of large
groups functioning according to their own standard patterns of behaviour
rather than as a deliberate choice of a leader.
This model cannot serve our purpose in this research as the
governments in the Middle East do not include organizational hierarchies
that are as highly complex as those of developed countries. The less
complex as those of developed countries. The less complex and
differentiated the organizational hierarchies, the less coherent they are in
acting on information. In these circumstances, the leaders of Middle
Eastern states are less likely to experience the constraints of this model.
Organization standardized fashion; it is some times distorted and
suppressed. The lack points for the collection of information. There is less
systematic action taken on information in its route through the
governmental hierarchy, which makes this model not very operational in
explaining the nature of foreign policy making in the Middle East.
The bureaucratic politics model assumes that government
behaviour can be interpreted as a result of political manoeuvring along
regularized channels among persons positioned hierarchically within the
government.
It doesn‘t deal with procedure of bureaucratic organization but on
the interaction of those who lead the organizations. The leaders are
unequal and the assumption is that the outcome of the bargaining is
determined by the power, skill, and position of the politicians concerned.
This model fails to fulfil the analysis of Middle Eastern foreign
politics are known to have low level of political and social
institutionalizations and leaders of bureaucratic organizations are not
differentiated on the basis of the power of their organizations. This makes
loose coalitions dependent on the interaction of the moment rather than
on the pre-existing structures. Moreover, it underestimates the
president‘s influences as he becomes just another player which is not the
case in the middle east and particularly in Egypt as well (12)
However, this model maybe utilized in this research as it opens for
us what has been earlier identified as the ―BLACK BOX‖ of domestic
affairs. It emphasizes a dynamic factor inherent in the decision making
process, which is, the politics of policy making. It raises the importance
of groups despite its limited conception of politics that is confined to the
state. The model could be more useful if state-society links were
examined, i.e., the links between bureaucrats or state elites as in the case
of Egypt in the 1970‘s, and the different domestic and external forces.
Also if the model can allow for analyzing whether pressure groups,
economic interests or less mass media has influences over the decision
process, it may become more relevant to the objectives of this research.
The rational actor model begins with the assumption that the
government is the actor. Action, Allison maintains, is based on some
purpose as it arises out of a well-formulated intention to meet some clear
cut demand and this action is a calculated response to some strategic
problem. Compared to the two previous models it is more helpful, but by
itself not sufficient to explain the foreign policy of middle eastern states
as Egypt.
It fails to take into account certain important variables, such as
the internal and external environment. It also doesn‘t pay attention to the
idiosyncratic qualities of those involved in the foreign policy process,
which is of prime importance in any Middle Eastern states (13).
However ,even though it yet remains to be determined , the
importance of personalized foreign policy making must be recognized n
this research of the Middle East and Egypt. This stems from the fact that
the leaders in the Middle East are not encumbered by a complex and
coherent set of organizations which can narrow their options. Leaders
are not usually contradicted by other officials and they are the prime
decision makers of policies (14).
The leadership approach to the study of international relations
views foreign policy as a function of the impulses and idiosyncrasies of a
single leader as it becomes a matter of personal taste and individual
choice. As E.SHILLS wrote in 1962 foreign policy become a policy of
―public relations whose objectives are to improve the image of the state,
enhance the popularity of the leader and divert attention from domestic
troubles to illusory and external victories‖ (15).
There are several criticisms of this view. First, it makes foreign
policy appear to be an erratic, irrational activity not subject to systematic
analysis. Second it ignores the domestic, regional and global context
within which foreign policy is formulated and implemented. Third, it
underestimates the fact that because of their interest in political survival,
most leaders downplay eccentricities that run counter to dominant
attitudes, public mood and political realities.
Moreover, by basing its advance on detailed answers to complex
psychological questions related to the decision makers perceptions, stress
and coping, this model becomes rather complicated when tackling the
Issue of data accessibility in the Middle East as both tools used by this
model, i.e., interviews and content analysis, are subject to subjectivity,
deception campaigns and camouflage presentations.
However, despite its drawbacks this leadership approach to
foreign policy analysis has been dominant in analyzing developing and
Middle Eastern states foreign policy because it coincides with the
characteristics of the political systems in the Middle East region. With a
few checks on the leader‘s powers, this personalized form of leadership
extends itself into foreign policy. The relevance of this approach becomes
evident because the principle decision maker in the Middle East seems to
be able to operate with few domestic constraints on his foreign policy
actions.
Many scholars examining the politics of developing societies have
emphasized this personalized foreign policy making process. Among them
was a study by W.SOTT THOMSON on the foreign policy of Ghana
(1957-1966) in which the idiosyncratic qualities of the leader were
overemphasized in the formatting of foreign policy. But he failed to draw
a connection between the internal and external environment in which the
leader operated (16). Another scholar I.W.ZARTMAN in his book
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES IN NEW AFRICA concluded that good
relations amongst African states were based firmly on personal
friendship of leaders (17). In addition a leading foreign policy analyst
R.SYNDER suggested three variables to determine policy decision maker
(b) information and communication network available to the decision
maker (c) the psychology and motivations of the decision maker.
However this model had its limitations because the numbers of variables
were overwhelming and developing states lacked the same level of
organizational complexity and structural differentiation that would
facilitate such a model.
Moreover, MICHAEL BRECHER constructed a leading model of
the foreign policy process in Israel explained in detail in his book,
DECISIONS IN ISRAEL‘S FOREIGN POLICY, in which he presented a
model that encompassed the ―operational environment‖ , the
communications network , the decision making elite and the
psychological environment.
However, this model had its short comings as well because
Brecher relayed on single frequency count of articulated elite images
(19). Additionally, it should be noted that it remains debatable whether
public statements of government officials are the source of policy
decisions or a product of them.
In the final analysis, the proponents of this approach view
decision-making as basically personalized because of the absence of
pressure groups, party system and the ignorance of legislatures and
ineffectiveness of policy planning units at foreign offices. Again this
doesn‘t apply to all states in the Middle East as they vary among
themselves from less to more developed political systems as will become
more evident in our case study of Egypt.
As is evident, major contributors to the foreign policy literature
have provided students of international relations with useful theoretical
frameworks that have increased our awareness of how decision making
process occurs in developed countries. However many of these
approaches are of limited use in analyzing the foreign policy of states in
the Middle East region. It may be true that all apply to some degree, but
none is applicable to every state as under every circumstance situations
change such a way that one model may apply in one circumstance but not
in another. The relative lack of sophisticated and crucial data required to
utilize these frameworks in the Middle East also complicates the use of
these tools.
Another reason for the limited applicability seems to lie in the
diverse nature between the political setting of developing states and the
developed states.
In developing societies the leadership is known to exercise only
partial control over decisions since the society is composed of units that
posses considerable discretion as power is shard by the legislature,
bureaucracy, interest groups and other organizations that limit the choice
open to a leader consequently, in making a decision a leader is limited by
laws and by extensive consultation with other executive and legislative
bodies. In contrast, in many Middle Eastern countries during the 1970‘s
political leaderships largely were able to exercise total control over other
sectors of the society including the legislature, bureaucracy, political
parties, mass media and interest groups (20).
This difference in internal structures makes the application of
individual approaches to the analysis of foreign policy in the Middle
Eastern region inadequate especially as they fail to establish a link in
their proposed analytical constructs between the international behaviour
of these states and the socio-psychological domestic variables that
constitute the essence of their distinct identities. Most relevant literature
even when they view foreign policy as a product of internal as well as
external forces they tend to examine those variables affecting foreign
policy in isolation and not in a related manner. Variables responsible for
certain policy outcomes as geopolitical factors, historical, and cultural
backgrounds, industrial, economic or military capabilities are only
identified but not analyzed in one coherent framework for the purpose of
operational zing the concepts and producing sound explanations for
foreign policy in the Middle East. Many attempts have fallen short of
explaining how internal and external variables interact to produce
certain policy outcomes.
Factors that might provide possible explanations for particular
kinds of behaviour are sometimes ignored, including the role of history,
ideology, political elites, the values and perceptions of the leadership, the
impact of outside powers in the Middle East region and the influence of
foreign aid (21).
It may well be that in the Middle Eastern states foreign policy
decision making is dominated by the personal stature and the roles
played by the individual national leaders. However, this does not mean
that the analysis of foreign policy making should be limited to the study of
leadership while other variables are ignored. Instead of asking whether
the idiosyncratic factors are more important than these variables, one
needs to see how some of these internal and external variables interact
with the leaders idiosyncrasies. Among the internal variables are
historical traditions, the degree of modernization and politicization,
economic and military capabilities, political structures, elites, pressure
groups and the nature of the leadership. Among the external variables
are the global system, the regional system and the political and economic
factors associated with them.
Since there are no generally accepted criteria for the evaluation of
foreign policy in the Middle East, initial efforts and prospects of
theorizing may be improved if each research, this being one, developed
its own set of requirement and a particular framework to examine the
foreign policy of individual states under study---Egypt being the case
here---- utilizing from other approaches what suits the theoretical
concerns of each research.
Such frameworks are likely to prove more fruitful than those which
begin with general preconceptions and theories and seek to force all
research into a highly structured mould. Thus it seems, at this stage at
least, to assume that the success of this research will depend on the use of
a flexibly defined framework for our single case Egypt, particularly as
This research is tackling a new theme namely the importance of
economic factors in shaping Egypt‘s foreign policy in the 1970‘s. Similar
studies on other countries may lead eventually to a comparative analysis
of foreign policy in the Middle East.
Thus in its investigation and analysis of Egypt‘s foreign policy in
the 1970‘s , the research will tackle basically how the leadership‘s
interaction with the internal and external environment produced the
complex phenomena of certain foreign policy acts at certain historical
periods under specific circumstances. The salience of economic factors in
the formulation of Egypt‘s foreign policy in the 1970‘s may be best
understood not through an examination of the economic constraints of
that period, but also by analyzing the political underpinnings and that
were attached to them and how the leadership‘s role, personality and
perceptions interacted with these internal and external variables
resulting in the adoption of certain regional and global policies.
Despites the fact that in many Middle Eastern countries the
political system is characterized by the concentration of political power
in the hands of a principle decision maker, however, this leadership
should not be examined in isolation. Rather a systemic analysis will be
attempted to focus our attention on the complex nature of foreign policy
Making and implementation in Egypt. In particular this attempt for a
detailed reconstruction of the foreign policy process will incorporate in
its investigation a multiplicity of external and internal variables
emanating from the operational environment‘s interaction with the
leader‘s personality perceptions and aspirations during the 1970‘s.
Thus, the objectives of this research will be threefold. First, it aims
to reconstruct, as objectively as possible and in much detail as possible
the impact of the economic factors on the foreign policy activities that
culminated in Sadat‘s choice of certain policies as the open door
economic liberalization policy and the peace process with Israel which
was associated with a rapprochement with the U.S. It is hoped that a
systematic reconstruction of the foreign policy making process in Egypt
will enrich our capacity to comprehend those policies themselves.
Secondly, the research will explore the political setting of such decisions
by delineating several aspects of the decisions which must examined.
These include the external and internal setting, as well as the
psychological dimension of the principle decision maker--- primarily his
perceptions of the environment which led him to select certain policy
options than others.
Thirdly, by presenting a research framework to analyse the foreign
policy of Egypt and the primacy of economic objectives in its orientation
during the 1970‘s, it is hoped to shed some light on the foreign policymaking process in other Middle Eastern states in which the economic
factors has been neglected and the interaction process between leaders
and their surrounding environment hasn‘t been examined in depth.
This research will examine Egypt as its case study for its analysis
of the correlation between domestic economic constraints and foreign
policy, and the argument and hypothesis of this dissertation will be
summarized in the next few paragraphs. This will be followed by an
explanation of the contents of chapters that constitute this research and
the primary as well as the secondary sources that will be utilized.
Limitations on this research will also be identified and methods for
solving them shall be introduced.
In 1970‘s ideological and political considerations wee over
shadowed by more immediate concerns as JOHN WATERBURY
concluded in his book EGYPT UNDER NASSER AND SADAT where he
acknowledged that the primacy of economics has become undisputed in
Egypt as of the mid 1970‘s.
On one side Egypt‘s late president ANWAR EL SADAT
inaugurated in 1974 the open door economic policy as a conclusion
derived by him and a certain segment of the state bourgeoisie from the
way they read and tended to interpret the domestic crisis of the importsubstitution economy and the external realities of the oil boom in
neighbouring Arab Gulf states, and the internationalization of the
production process and the labour market on the global level (22).
These domestic, regional, and international shifts were mediated
through the leader and the dominant coalition in ways designed to uphold
their social power against challengers who stood to benefit from
alternative patterns of policy and state activity.
Infitah thus can be characterized as a policy shift developed by a
segment of the Egyptian stated bourgeoisie and the political leadership in
order to maintain the state‘s statist role under changing domestic,
regional and international conditions. According to this shift, the state
changed its role to that of an intermediary role between local capital and
international capital. While remaining firmly in control, the state actually
favoured opening the economy to foreign investments and capital through
joint ventures and this eventually paved the way to a rapprochement with
the conservative Arab Gulf states and the U.S.
On the other side, the open door economic policy was motivated by
foreign policy objectives and motivations.
To effect the necessary economic changes and to make use of the
―entire‖ sources of income that were available in the region at the time
(oil revenues, labour remittances, tourism, and trade including transit
through the Suez Canal), it was necessary to introduce radical foreign
policy changes (23). Basically if foreign investments were needed, Egypt
had to abandon Nasserism and it regional quest for leadership to
establish warm links with previous Arab Gulf foes. Similarly the state of
war with Israel had to be ended and in bringing this about, the U.S with
its special connection with Israel, had to play the major role. This was
the crux of Sadat‘s foreign policy in the 1970‘s.
Thus in Sadat‘s perception, Egyptian development was to be
stimulated through external (Arab and Foreign /U.S) capital and
expertise and the U.S. should become a full partner in any settlement
between Egypt and Israel. Peace to Egypt‘s political leadership was
basically a foreign policy solution to its economic and social problems
and a means of creating an economically of creating an economically
stable and investment attractive environment and for allocating resources
back to development under a whole new strategy of economic
liberalization linked to a process of rapprochement with the west and the
abandonment of the socialist modes of economic development as well as
distancing itself from the soviet union. Sadat‘s strategy concerning the
U.S. was designed to outbid Israel and secure U.S support in the peace
negotiations and to obtain U.S military and economic aid at an
increasing rate, was the case which evolved through out the 1970‘s as
Egypt and Israel become the two major recipients of bilateral aid from
the U.S. AID…. A policy which became known as the dividends of peace
in the Middle East.
Little has been written on the role of external factors in the
formulation of the open door economic liberalization policy. But when a
leadership and the ruling elite decide to pursue a development strategy
based on foreign aid and capital, it follows that all necessary steps will
be taken to attract and reassure its creditors. In the case of Egypt, the
initial regulations that were introduced in law 43 of the open door policy,
offered fertile grounds for external factors to play amore crucial role in
affecting policy orientations of the leadership. Western donors, the World
Bank, the IMF, private banks and the oil – producing Arab states have all
played a role in influencing Egypt‘s foreign policy in the 1970‘s (24).
The study of Sadat‘s code of beliefs and perceptions is of extreme
importance for this research as well. Sadat believed in the importance of
close economic and strategic links with western countries, particularly
with the U.S. Anti-imperialism, solidarity and Arab nationalism became
of secondary importance in the leadership‘s view as they were thought to
be out- dated and of no immediate benefit to Egypt‘s troubles. Sadat
thought highly of the western models of political, economic and social
life. He was convinced that the only way out or Egypt‘s problems was
through the adoption of the liberal economic model of development and
capital investments and assistance from abroad. Politically, the U.S held
the key to peace in the Middle East, 99% of the cards of the game as he
frequently states. Sadat believed that the U.S was the only country
capable of influencing Israel.
Sadat‘s relations with the USSR on the other side has deteriorated
severely in the wake of the expulsion of the soviet officers and experts
from Egypt in 1972 and the undertaking of a massive operation against
communists in Egypt to end any support to soviet presence in Egypt.
Sadat‘s view of the superpowers were reinforced by his desire to
cement his relations with oil-rich conservative Arab states, again as he
perceived, were a vital source of economic aid badly needed in Egypt.
This research will analyze to what degree the nature of the
decision making process has affected Egypt‘s foreign policy and its
economic orientation during the 1970‘s. It will investigate whether and
how was foreign policy the domaine prive of the president and his close
associates to the extent that decisions were to a large degree centralized
personalized limiting the role of institutions. The influence of different
individuals upon the process depended not on their position in the cabinet
or the bureaucracy or the presidency, but rather on their personal
relations and access to the president (25). Three foreign ministers
successively resigned during 1977-1979 in protest over Sadat‘s policies
during the peace process with Israel.
It has been argued and expressed elsewhere that the formulation of
foreign policy in Egypt was strictly the prerogative and sole
responsibility of the chief executive. The extent to which the executive was
guided by the council of his principal associates including the minister of
foreign affairs was a matter of the leadership‘s personal choice (26). The
personal memoirs of two foreign ministers of the historical period under
study have also supported this argument. Both Ismail Fahmy and Ibrahim
Kamel concluded in their books that the participation of the subordinate
state organs, such as the legislature, foreign ministry, cabinet, and other
institutions in the decision making process, took the form of information
and advice in the pre-decisional stage and implementation in the postdecisional stage.
In most cases of foreign policy acts, however, they clearly
indicated that the decision itself rested strictly wit the leader. On the level
of foreign policy theory others have suggested similar lines for the study
of developing states (27).
However, this might apply to certain foreign policy decisions in the
1970‘s, but certainly not to all, as the choice of particular economic
policies was not a preference that the leadership took in vacuum. We
should not overstate the importance of personal attributes, for despite the
low level of political institutionalization, the leadership was not entirely
free to indulge its biases and idiosyncrasies. Domestic conditions
including the internal balance of pressure groups and the mass
population‘s demands resulting from economic constraints and hardship
had a considerable impact on the decisions of the leadership. Especially
as the ―bread riots‖ of 1977 demonstrated the urgency of taking
decisions to face the realities of underdevelopment, limited resources and
social unrest, economic factors occupied a crucial role
in the
determination of his foreign policy priorities and objectives. The open
door policy and the liberalization attempts that followed were introduced
and directed to the task of mobilizing external resources to ease the
growing population- resource gap. In the evolution and implementation
of this policy a special relation was established between the state and the
bourgeoisie interests. This new bourgeoisie succeeded in constructing a
network of pressure groups within the state and a whole new social class
was born that constituted strong pressure groups that affected certainly
the leadership‘s economic policies choices as they has vested interests in
the execution of particular ones than others.
Other structural conditions both at the regional and global level
determined the environment in which the leadership operated and which
were utilized by him to promote Egypt‘s economic welfare as will be
explained in the chapters section.
This research will attempt to present an examination and analysis
that proves beyond doubt the primacy of economics as a shaper of
Egypt‘s foreign policy in the 1970‘s. Egypt‘s foreign policy objectives as
they were articulated and acted upon by Sadat served this purpose,
among others of course, as the termination of war with Israel was viewed
in a cost/ benefit analysis as an economic rewarding act that would
facilitate the rapprochement with the West and to attract economic,
financial and military support from the U.S.
It should also be noted that Egypt, unlike many other Middle
Eastern states, is to a certain extent an organizationally developed and
intellectually diversified society. Consequently the leader had to assume
the various roles of arbiter, mediator, and lobbyist at one time or
another. It will be investigated how this nature of the society and system
has resulted in the foreign policy process becoming one that is closest to
a ―leader-staff group‖ or the ―presidential centre‖ type during the
1970‘s (28). These characteristics will be spelt in detail in the next
section.
This research intends to tackle the hypothesis under investigation
in three chapters in addition to the introductory chapter.
Chapter Two will examine the structure, nature and role of the
leadership in Egypt‘s politics and foreign policy decision making during
the 1970‘s. Whether the formulation of foreign policy was or wasn‘t the
prerogative and sole responsibility of the president, will be analyzed
through the examination of the following:
I. (a) The president‘s self image, i. e, Sadat‘s perceptions, values ,
personal characteristics, identity, social background and his vision of
himself as a maker of history and ―father‖ of all Egyptians.
(b) The president‘s decision-style, i.e., the structure of the presidency
the president‘s relation with advisors/staff, the president‘s information
sources and how her relies on them, and Sadat‘s particular ―electric
shocks‖ decision making style. Were decisions in the final analysis the
outcome of ―leadership-style based primarily on a ―leadership as an
institution‖ or was decision-style based primarily on a ―leader-staff
relationship‖ (29).
(c) The president‘s powers as indicated in the constitution of the Arab
Republic of Egypt, 1971.
(d) The impact of a, b, c on Sadat‘s foreign policy decisions and
situations he faced during the 1970‘s.
II.Limitations/constraints on the president‘s foreign policy decisions
(a) The sheer weight of the technical organizations and expertise in
various organs of the state that advise the president.
(b) Pressure groups--- the military establishment, new bourgeoisie of the
open door policy, bureaucrats of Nasser‘s socialist experiment and the
public sector beneficiaries.
( c) Pressures from the public opinion and low income masses as those
demonstrated in the 1977 food riots had certainly an impact on Sadat‘s
decision to launch peace with Israel.
(d) Egyptian expatriates in the Arab world.
Chapter Three will examine the interaction of the leadership with the
domestic economic and political environment and how it contributed to
the choice of the open door economic liberalizations policy by analyzing
the following themes:
(a) First the chapter will establish the facts of the deteriorating economic
situation in Egypt, and then will attempt to analyze its political
underpinnings. Egypt faced a severe economic crisis in the 1970‘s with a
chronic balance of payments deficits, shortages in the basic commodities
needed, mounting external debt, high unemployment and inflation rates
and an infrastructure that badly needed rebuilding. Egypt was facing a
growing population-resource gap as resources were not enough and
capital investments and financial support was badly needed.
(b)Domestically the failure of Nasser‘s developmental socialist model
which relied heavily on the managers and technocrats and how it
contributed to a desperate economic situation that prompted the shift to a
more open liberal economic policy. Given the higher rewards that would
be obtained by managers and technocrats from private business,
compared with those offered by public enterprises in a poor society with
egalitarian ideals, the experiment was bound to depart from its socialist
ideals and to witness an eventual embourgeoisement of the system.
This transformation in economic policy can not be isolated from its
political environment. Nationally there was the development of powerful
professional and entrepreneurial elite for who, particularly since the oil
boom, the public bureaucracies was no longer the only channel for social
promotion. The bourgeoisie constructed a network of pressure groups
within the state apparatus and in the ruling party as well as in the
people‘s assembly (Egypt‘s parliament).
The state eventually became more linked to the bourgeoisie interests. As
privatization penetrated the ruling party emerged which was more
committed to and an effective proponent of the open door policy and
closer links with the west. Even the military establishment became more
involved with the west through the increasing size of military aid,
training and cooperation programmes with Egypt during the 1970‘s.
(c) The political implications of why various economic options were
chosen by Sadat are crucial to understand, explain and analyze why such
policies were taken. Economic constraints and developmental policies
were meaningful in so far as they referred to a particular set of political
ambitions, visions, and interests of the leadership.
On one side, Sadat had in mind that he would never surrender the state‘s
power of control over the economy, for its political authority rested on
that control. The leadership made a point through out the 1970‘s to
persist constantly before the public by holding the prospect of social
disharmony and political breakdown if it was forced to abandon its role
as provider of economic security.
On the other side, Sadat during the 1970‘s made an effort from his
side to form alliances with several corporate associations in the business
community and among middle – class professionals. His own positive
attitude towards ties with the Arab Gulf states and the U.S facilitated the
emergence of this free enterprise and private sector ideology.
(D) This section will examine the interaction of the leadership with the
external environment at both the regional and international level, and
how the choice of the open door economic liberalization policy was
associated with external policy choices. The following themes are to be
examined :(1) Regionally the oil boom that took place in many Arab
countries following the war of October 1973 stimulated a growing
perception in the leadership that Egypt might be able to benefit from
some of these sudden wealth as a means of solving some of its chronic
economic problems. Arab aid as well as an increasing volume of
remittances sent from the Egyptians working in the oil exporting
countries was apparently too strong a temptation for the capital-hungry
Egypt to brush aside. The utilization of such resources required
important policy changes on the part of Egypt that involved above all a
reconsideration of her previous radical principles, both as a guiding
orientation for the country‘s development and as a sought after outlook
for the entire region. (2)For the Egyptian leadership external finance was
badly needed and required and a political element had been added so
that the message to the masses was that the stability of the country
depended to a large extent on the influx of foreign capital whether in the
form of assistance of investment.
On the international political scene this economic dimension
forced itself on the foreign policy behaviour of Egypt and we witnessed a
more peace-seeking policy and closer ties with the U.S and western
countries and this became known as peace for aid in the Middle East. As
a result Egypt began to receive massive aid from the U.S during the
1970‘s. Egypt‘s international position to the super powers facilitated the
achievement of Sadat‘s economic objectives, as the U.S could hardly
leave Egypt alone to mind the difficult problems of its ―own site‖ and to
look after its external dilemma of imbalance between people and
resources without providing a hand of help. The U.S., which became a
full partner in the peace process, continuously attempted to maintain the
peace process and strengthen it by providing aid to both Egypt and
Israel. The increase in the size of U.S economic and military assistance
coincided with the shift in Egypt‘s foreign policy. The political
underpinnings of the aid programmes to Egypt was articulated in the
1981 A.I.D (Agency for International Development) document as follows:
―Our high level of aid to Egypt is premised on the belief that Egypt‘s
peace initiatives are crucial to that objective and that these efforts must
be supported by a growing economy‖ (30). The size of U.S assistance
increased substantially in the late 1970‘s to replace Arab funds that were
withdrawn because of Egypt‘s signing the peace treaty with Israel and to
keep Egypt‘s peace momentum by meeting its broad needs through the
provision of food aid, economic aid to improve its infrastructure, its
social services and technical assistance for agricultural and industrial
projects, as well as loans to support Egypt‘s balance of payments
difficulties.
(c)Thus Sadat‘s rationale of infitah aspired to combine Egyptian human
resources with Arab capital and western know-how for the benefit of
Egyptian development and as a result there evolved three major Egyptian
Connections in the 1970‘s: the Arab conservative connection during the
early 1970‘s, the U.S connection from 1974, and the Israeli connection
from the mid 1970‘s.
Chapter Four: The concluding chapter on a decade of Foreign Policy
shifts in the Middle East (1970's and 1980's) will highlight the following
themes:
(a) The rise of pragmatic issue oriented Foreign Policy behaviour and
the primacy of national interest in inter-Arab relations.
(b) The dynamics of Arab States regional Foreign policies in the posCamp David era and the rise of neco power centres (e.g. Syria, Iraq and
Saudi Arabia).
(c)
Egypt's
regional
Foreign
policy
objectives
and
regional
developments contributing to the Arab States rapprochement with Egypt.
(d) The Arab-Egyptian rapprochement reflected a moderate position to
the Arab-Israeli conflict. It is a result of perceived regional threats, a
strategic imbalance vis-à-vis Israel and growing economic constraints.
This research is going to utilize both primary and secondary sources.
Primary sources will include interviews with foreign policy makers that
participated or observed decsions during the 1970‘s at the Egyptian
presidency, ministry of foreign affairs and at the people‘s assembly. Texts
of speeches by Sadat will be used as well as the constitution of the Arab
Republic of Egypt and Egyptian / Arab newspapers published during the
1970‘s.
Moreover, memoirs of those who participated in the foreign policy
making process in the 1970‘s as previous foreign ministers Ismail Fahmy,
Ibrahim Kamel, Kamal Hassan Ali will be utilized as well as the memoirs
of Sadat‘s National security advisor Hafez Ismail and those of the
prominent Egyptian writer/journalist Hassanain Heikal, in addition to
Sadat‘s own autobiography and any other autobiographies written on
him. Any other official documents as law 43 of the open door policy and
the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel will be examined.
Secondary sources will consist of three types of literature. One group
deals with the entire field of study and includes literature on the nature of
international relations, theories of foreign policy and decision making
process and previous studies on the foreign policies of developing states.
The second group of sources includes studies on the political economic
and social development of the Middle East and any relevant literature to
the foreign policy behaviour of Arab states. Finally, the third group will
include periodicals and books on Egypt‘s domestic, regional and
international politics in the 1970‘s and the few studies that have
encountered Egypt‘s foreign policy from different angles during the last
two decades.
Among these are studies by Salwa Gomma THE EGYPTIAN
DIPLOMACY IN THE 1970‘S : A STUDY INTO THE ROLE OF
LEADERSHIP, by Gamal Zahran EGYPT‘S FOREIGN POLICY FROM
1970 TO 1981. And by Hafez Ismail EGYPT‘S NATIONAL SECURITY
and other cited in the bibliography.
This study acknowledges from the beginning that there are a few
limitations to research attempts in the Middle East and particularly in the
field of foreign policy and decision making as access to reliable data is
difficult to obtain. Although interviews with figures may assist in
obtaining first hand information, one must also be aware of the
fundamental problem of bias and subjectivity in regard to primary as well
as secondary data.
However, to obtain a balanced and objective view, a research
needs to consult a wider range of sources, which is the intent of this
research, in order to be able to provide an insight into the complex
nature of foreign policy making and implementation not only in Egypt but
in the Middle East as well. To overcome some of the conceptual
difficulties in political science research, the advice of Richard Synder, a
prominent pioneer in the study of foreign policy decision making, can be
useful. Synder suggested that it is worthwhile for the scholar to let the
dust settle before tackling outstanding events (31). Hopefully enough time
has now passed since the issues under examination were decided and
sufficient information concerning them are available for an objective
study that utilizes a flexible frame work to achieve this goal.
To conclude these preliminary observations, this study is certainly
not an attempt to fill the gap that already exists in the field, but its
primary objective is to evaluate the salience of economics in the
formulation of Egypt‘s foreign policy during the 1970‘s through a
research framework meant to explain the dynamics of foreign policy
process and the role leadership exercised in formulating major decisions
of the 1970‘s.
END NOTES
1. Ali Dessouki, The Foreign Policies of Arab State (Boulder
Westview Press, 1991),p.1
2. Charles Kegley, World Politics: Trend and Transformation
(London: MacMillan, 1989),p.37
3. Bahgat Korany, How Foreign Policy Decisions are made in the
Third World (Boulder:Westview, 1986),p.9
4. Peter Calvert, The Foreign Policy of New States (Sussex: The
Harvester Press, 1986),p.10
5. James Rosenau,eds,Linkage Politics (New York: Free Press, 1969).
6. James Rosenau, ― pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy‖ in
Approaches to Comparative and International Policies, eds. Barry
Farrel (Evanston: North-western University Press, 1966), p.185
7. Dessouki, p.30
8. Franklin Weinstein, ―The use of Foreign Policy in Indonesia: An
Approach to the analysis of Foreign Policy in Less Developed
Countries, ―World Politics 24 (1972), pp.356-382.
9. Dessouki, p.10
10.Ibid, p.11
11.Shaheen Ayubi, Nasser and Sadat: Decision Making and Foreign
Policy 1970-1972: New Hampshire: Longwood Academic, 1992),
pp.30-33
12.Korany, p.55
13.Ayubi, p.33
14.Ibid, p.33-34
15.Quoted in Franklin Weinstein,Indonesian Foreign Policy and the
dilemma dependence (Ithaca,N.Y: Cornell University Press,1976),
p,21
16.W.Scott. Thomson, Ghan‘s Foreign Policy 1957-1966, (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1969).
17.Ayubi, p.25
18.R.Synder et al , Foreign Policy decision-making (New York: The
Free Press, 1962) p.365
19.J.C.Hurewitz, ―Review of Michael Brecher‘s The Foreign Policy
system of Israel‖, American Political Science Review, p.67:2(June
1973), 706-707
20.Ayubi, pp.9-17
21.Roland Mclaurin et al, Foreign Policy making in the Middle East
(New York:Praeger Publishers,197), pp.281-288
22.Nazih Ayubi, The State and Public Policies in Egypt since Sadat
(Reading: Ithaca Press, 1991). P.299
23.I bid, p.300
24.Ali Dessouki, ―Policy-making in Egypt: A case study of the opendoor economic policy‖, social problems,28,4 (198), pp.410-416
25.Dessouki, p.168
26.Boutrous Ghali, ―The Foreign Policy of Egypt‖ in Foreign policy
in a world of change, eds, J.E Black and K.W. Thomson, (New
York: Harper and Row, 1963),p.320
27.Joseph Frankel, The Making of Foreign Policy: An analysis of
decision-making (London: Oxford University Press, 1963) p.5-6
28.Charles F. Hermann, ―Decision Structure and Process Influence
on Foreign Policy‖ in Maurice A. East et al, why Nations Act:
Theoretical perspectives for comparative Foreign Policy studies
(London: Sage Publications, 1978),pp.80-83
29.Richard L.Merritt, Foreign Policy analysis (London, Lexington,
1975),pp.119-122
30.Dessouki, p141
31.Synder, p345.
CHAPTER TWO
PRESIDENTIAL FOREIGN POLICY
AND DECISION MAKING PROCESS
This research will be basically on attempt to establish the salience
of economic considerations as a major factor that shaped Egypt‘s foreign
policy during the 1970‘s. It will investigate the deteriorating economic
conditions in Egypt caused any particular shifts in its foreign policy. The
research will approach the correlation between economic considerations
and foreign policy by examining the role of presidential leadership in the
1970‘s and how Sadat‘s perceptions of the surrounding external and
internal environment contributed to a certain understanding of the
economic conditions in Egypt and of the best policies to tackle it.
The objectives of this research will thus be threefold. First, it aims to
reconstruct, as objectively as possible and in much detail as possible the
impact of economic considerations on the foreign policy choices that
culminated in Sadat‘s choice of certain policies such as the making of
peace with Israel. It is hoped that a systematic reconstruction of the
Foreign policy making process in Egypt will enrich our capacity to
comprehend those policies themselves. Secondly, the research will
explore the political setting of such decisions by delineating several
aspects of the decisions which must be examined.
These include the external and internal setting, as well as their
interaction with the psychological dimension of the environment which
led him to select certain policy options than others. Thirdly, by presenting
a research framework to analyse the foreign policy of Egypt and the
primacy of economic considerations in its formulation, it is hoped to shed
some light on the foreign policy making process in other Middle Eastern
countries.
The economy of Egypt during the early part of the 1970‘s faced
serious difficulties. Over the years, Egypt‘s economic growth and per
capita income had been retarded by a scarcity of basic raw materials, a
scarcity of non agricultural currency-earning commodities, the rapidly
increasing population, the slow pace of economic development, the high
unemployment and the rapidly spiralling inflation rate.
Egypt faced serious balance-of-payments problems. The deficit in the
balance-of-payments negatively affected any attempts to improve the
standard of living, the level of capital savings on investment for general
economic and social development. With the Suez Canal closed, the Sinai
oil fields still under Israel occupation, tourism at an all-time-low because
of the war situation, and large military expenditure, the Egyptian
economy faced a severe crisis.
Most importantly, major military spending required additional
sacrifices in other sectors of the economy and in social development and
planning. Faced with this situation, Sadat realized that the ―no war, no
peace‖ situation in the Middle East could not continue indefinitely. The
political stalemate was proving too burdensome on the Egyptian
economy.
Sadat thus began to execute a foreign policy that seeks to maximize
the beneficial rewards of external relations. As internal development
became increasingly important, Sadat began to subordinate foreign
policy to the task of development. In effect, foreign policy became geared
to an outward-looking economic policy at home and abroad to provide
all guarantees for funds invested in development, and to one of acquiring
extensive foreign economic aid and investment.
Because such aid had to come from the West particularly the U.S
and the conservative oil-rich Arab states, Egypt‘s foreign policy under
Sadat reflected these new imperatives and involved dramatic initiatives
such as the signing of the peace treaty and establishing diplomatic
relations with Israel, the dismantling of the special relationship with the
Soviet Union with the abrogation of the 1971 treaty of friendship, and the
development of a close relation with the U.S.
To comprehend how Sadat came to formulate and execute such a
foreign policy orientation, it is essential to examine first the foreign
policy decision-making process under Sadat.
Thus, this chapter will be concerned basically with the nature of
foreign policy making in Egypt during the 1970‘s. The central theme is
that Egypt‘s Foreign Policy during this period can be best approached
through a ―leadership‖ perspective. This approach emphasizes the
central role of the then President of Egypt, Anwar Al-Sadat (1970-1981)
as an individual and of his office, the ―institution‖ of the presidency in
the making of major foreign policy decisions.
The hypothesis is that foreign policy under Sadat was
characterized by the control of a single decision-maker, the President,
who made decisions alone without prior consultation with any political
institutions or personalities, other than a small number of subordinate
advisors appointed by the President. Sadat had the ability to respond
quickly to events and to make unconventional and bold decisions, such as
his visit to Jerusalem in November 1977, without consulting any of the
political institutions theoretically and organizationally involved in the
formulation of Egypt‘s foreign policy.
He relied on direct
leader-to-leader diplomacy and frequently
used presidential emissaries in foreign policy assignments (not
necessarily career diplomats). The Foreign Minister had a limited role in
the pre-decision stage. On the contrary, his major role came in the postdecision stage when he was charged with implementing and executing
that which had already been decided. Sadat remained throughout the
1970‘s as the primary source of authority, initiative and decision in the
formulation of foreign policy.
To develop this hypothesis, four main issues are addressed in this
chapter. The first is an examination of the role of Sadat as and
―individual‖ i.e. his personal characteristics and self-image. The second
issue is the political structure of the State, the role of the presidency and
the working of the various institutions involved in the Foreign Policy
process, their responsibilities and actual role vis-à-vis the President in
the Making of decisions.
The third issue is the political culture within which the State
institutions operate and within which the Foreign Policy of Egypt is
made. The fourth is the distinctiveness of economic factors in the foreign
policy making process in Egypt during the 1970‘s.
As discussed earlier in the introductory chapter, there are those
who believe in the importance of the individual in the making of history,
and hence the importance of studying the characteristics of those persons
who lead countries. [1]
According to this view, kings and presidents are the sources of
foreign policy. War and peace become a matter of personal choice and
individual policy. Foreign policy is perceived not simply and primarily as
an activity designed to achieve national or social goals, but as an activity
designed to achieve popularity for a leader, to improve the image of the
State and to divert attention from domestic troubles to external affairs.
There are several criticisms of this view. First, it makes both
political and economic policies appear to be erratic and irrational
activities not subject to systematic analysis. Second, it ignores the
domestic, regional and global context within which policy is formulated
and implemented. There are certain systemic constraints that most
leaders will not, or cannot usually challenge. Third, it ignores the fact
that because of their interest in political survival, most leaders downplay
eccentricities that run counter to dominant attitudes, public mood and
political realities.
Rightly, it has been argued that only those idiosyncrasies that
neither challenge prevailing values nor threaten a regime‘s stability are
likely to be expressed in foreign policy [2].
On the other side, there are those who believe that the role of the
individual is limited by the social/political/economic environment and the
institutions that surround him [3]. The advocates of this analysis believe
that leaders‘ decisions are a reflection of the interaction of their
characteristics and those of the environment.
Thus, in their view the study of the characteristics of the leaders only
diverts the research from the legal, institutional and social factors that
limit their ability to make decisions. This trend concentrates on the study
of the institutions within which decisions are made, or in consultation
with which decisions are made, or the interactions which result in the
making of decisions by leaders.
For the purpose of this study, it would be a mistake not to dismiss
out of hand both these types of leadership role since they complement one
another and their use will enrich our understanding of the realities of
Foreign Policy making in Egypt.
The examination of the interaction of the leader, as an individual,
and leadership as a complex of institutions and beliefs will enable us to
fully comprehend the complexities of the process of decision-making in
foreign policy in a Middle Eastern state such as Egypt which is relatively
organizationally institutionally and intellectually developed. Individual
leaders in the Middle East, like Sadat of Egypt, were, in fact, directly
involved in the formation and implementation of major decisions, but this
process took place within a particular social and institutional context.
The analysis outlined in this chapter, while emphasizing the role of
idiosyncratic variables in the foreign policy of Egypt, will also examine
how the political structure and culture of the State encouraged Sadat‘s
role in policy making.
However, before moving on to analyze presidential foreign policy
making under Sadat, a brief examination of Nasser‘s foreign policy
making legacy may be appropriate. Sadat inherited those main features
of Nasser‘s rule and the highly personalized system he devised.
Nasser felt that he himself had been drawn into a historical role,
whether by choice or accident and that he was determined to play it in
order to carry out his country‘s goals. He wrote in his autobiography, the
philosophy of the Revolution:
―Within the Arab circle there is a role wandering aimlessly in
search of a hero. Here is the role; here are the lines and here is the stage.
We alone by virtue of our place can perform the role. [4] Implicit in this
was Nasser‘s conception of a double role: that of an Arab leader and an
Arab state which, according to him, was to lead the Arabs to unity.[5] As
an individual, Nasser believed that he embodied the aspirations of the
Egyptians and reflected their will and hence saw no need for their
political representation. Nasser believed that he was the linchpin of the
Egyptian political system. He asserted his right to interfere in all areas of
national, political, social economic and cultural life in Egypt.
Nasser, as Chief Executive exercised virtually complete control over the
conduct of foreign policy. His dominance over the foreign policy making
process coincided with the emergence of his charisma. The major catalyst
responsible for the rise of Nasser‘s charismatic leadership was his
defiance of the west, the rejection of the Baghdad Pact, the rise of
nonalignment, the purchase of Soviet weapons (which broke the western
monopoly on arms in the Middle East) and the nationalization of the Suez
Canal-which contributed to the charismatic process. Nasser‘s victories in
the realm of foreign policy were received by the masses as heroic and
exceptional and they came to look upon him not as a mere leader, but as
a saviour of his people.
Encouraged by Suez success, the arms deal with the communist
bloc, and his defiance of all western efforts to destroy him, he came to
regard himself as a leader on the international stage of a group of states
with a great history and strong ties of language, culture and religion.
Nasser became so confident of his popularity and ability to deal
with adverse situations that he frequently made his decisions without
consulting anyone. Moreover, he became aware of his hold over the
masses, to which he frequently announced his decisions. They, in turn,
took his speeches as prophetic utterances. Sensing his power, he warned
his opponents that if he faced opposition from them he would take the
matter to the people who would take care of them. In other words, Nasser
utilized foreign policy as a legitimising device for his regime.
The growth of Nasser‘s charisma went hand-in-hand with his
attainment of the status of principal decision-maker. As far as his
relationship with other political institutions in Egypt, Nasser‘s political
dominance and hegemony over the political structure were reflected in
the 1956, 1958 and 1964 constitutions which gave him sweeping powers
to make the Cabinet and legislature totally subordinate to him. He was
not only the President, but also the Prime Minister and the head of the
National congress and Supreme Executive Committee of the Arab
Socialist Union.
His functions included appointing and dismissing the VicePresident and Cabinet Ministers, dissolving Parliament, concluding
treaties and declaring wars and proclaiming a state of emergency.
Although Nasser attempted to institutionalize his regime by limited
participation in the political process through various structures, such as
the Liberation Rally, National Union and the Arab Socialist Union,
participation in all three was limited by presidential decree. The role of
various institutions in the actual policy-making process therefore
remained minima, since they were not allocated any powers to make
formal decisions. [6]
The National Assembly, Egypt‘s legislature was the creation of
Nasser and entirely dependent upon him. It never really provided
effective political leadership or opposition. In assessing its activity, it
may be noted that while the National Assembly asserted its influence in
some areas of Government policy, in others its influence remained
virtually nonexistent and was merely a rubber stamp. Matters pertaining
to health, problems of supply and prices, higher education and the budget
were frequently discussed, but the National Assembly‘s exposure to
politically sensitive matters were restricted.[7]
Like the National Assembly, the Arab Socialist Union (ASU)
Egypt‘s sole political party, was for the most part completely dominated
by the executive branch. [8] It served the purpose of mobilizing the
masses for the leadership and never became an institution that influenced
the politics of Nasser. Those who ran the Government also ran the ASU.
At the top of its organizational pyramid stood the Executive Committee,
which comprised members of the executive branch (trusted free officers of
July 1952 such as Baghdadi, Mohiddin, Sadat, Sahfei, Hussein and
Amer).
The organization lacked any substantive function because the
leadership dominated from the top, leaving the masses only the right to
applaud and approve. The influence of the ASU on policy as a whole
remained minimal; its influence on foreign policy was virtually nonexistent. Mostly Nasser made his decisions and then informed the ASU
about them.
The Cabinet consisted of the Prime Minister, Deputy Premiers and
Ministers who were appointed as heads of their administrative
departments by the Presidents. Basically, the Cabinet consisted of two
types of individuals: the old Nasserite allies (free offices who participated
in July 1952) and the ―technocrats‖ who were civilians that had
supported the revolution at its inception.
Nasser‘s Cabinet was an administrative and technocratic body
selected by him. While individual Cabinet Ministers could exert some
influence on the President in matters relating to their own departments,
Collectively the Cabinet was not effective in influencing brad policy
maters in foreign policy and defence. [9]
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was primarily involved in routine
administrative transactions and the implementation of foreign policy
decisions already arrived by Nasser. The Foreign Ministry did not exert a
major influence over Nasser when it came to making foreign policy
decisions. Moreover, Nasser had a tendency to gather information from
sources outside the ministry and relied on opinions of some of the old
Free Officers. This in itself contributed to the structural weakness of the
Foreign Ministry. [10]
However, the influence of Foreign Minister Mahmoud Fawzi was
not totally limited. On matters pertaining to the UN, Nasser greatly
valued his judgement. But on important issues such as Soviet-Egyptian
relation and Egypt‘s relations with other major powers, Nasser took
direct charge of making decisions.
As Foreign Ministers under Nasser, Mahmoud Fawzi had little to
do with policy. He was an aide rather than an advisor to Nasser. But
when Nasser decided on a policy in international affairs, Fawzi
implemented it with admirable skill. ―Nasser acts and Fawzi makes it
legal‖. [11].
The only section that processed a limited capacity to influence
decisions was Nasser‘s inner circle, which consisted of the old
Revolutionary command council officers who occupied key positions
throughout the government machinery.
By 1967, the numbered inner circle had dwindled considerably.
[12] Of the original eleven, only Sadat and Shafei remained. Both had
survived because Nasser considered them ―yes men‖ and no threat to hm.
There were also a number of Nasser‘s ―strong men‖ in the system. These
consisted of Sha‘rawi Guma (Minister of Interior and Secret Police),
Sami Sharaf (Director of President‘s Bureau) and Amin Huwaydi
(Minister of State in charge of the Central Intelligence Service).
Having presented briefly foreign policy decision making under
Nasser, the research will then focus in depth on Presidential foreign
policy making under Sadat according to the framework presented earlier
in the chapter.
Sadat as President
The personal characteristics of Sadat can be examined on tow
levels. The first involves an examination of his self-image, how he saw his
identity and his role in the making of history, and, in particular, how he
viewed his role as President and his relationship with his people.
The second is through the examination of his decision-making
style, which depended to a large extent on his response to the reports
presented to him by state institutions, and his relationship with his
advisors and assistants.
Sadat put Egypt before the Arabs. This was very evident in his
speeches and press conferences, where he repeatedly used the terms
―Egyptian Nationalism‖ and the ―Egyptian Nation‖. Symbolically, he
signalled his performance by changing the name of the Republic from the
United Arab Republic to the Arab Republic of Egypt. [13] In his
autobiography, he wrote:
―Our cultural depths are there; our cultural roots are alive, as
vigorous as ever after more than 7000 years. Those who are surprised by
what we do cannot dimply understand this fact. They cannot grasp the
real nature of a people who are working for a modern civilization
comparable to the one they erected thousands of years ago. [14]
Sadat viewed Egypt as a country of ancient civilization and of a
history of 7000 years, which had witnessed the establishment of the first
state and government that history, had known. He said in his address to
the ―Arts and Generation Conference‖ held in Cairo on the 31 st of
January 1975:
It is Egypt which is really proud of its cultural heritage and ancient
civilization along 7000 years of history that has enriched human
civilization with endless contributions that has had and remains to have
deep and fruitful effects in all aspects.‖[15]
The idea of civilization and authenticity were basic to Sadat‘s
thinking of his Egyptian nationality as he clearly demonstrated in his
speech in the welcome banquet for the French President Valery Giscard
d‘Estaing on 27 of January, 1975:
―You know that Egypt made for humanity the greatest civilization
that it knew in its history. It presented to it intellectual and scientific
achievements without which the present great process in science and
technology wouldn‘t have been possible. Civilization came as an
Egyptian creation and due to its achievements in medicine, architecture
and arts. It is not then strange that one civilization meets another, as
Egypt and France form the bridge through which European civilization
met the Egyptian civilization in its different forms‖[16].
Sadat believed in the ability of the individual to orchestrate
change. He mentioned several times in his autobiography, that his
holding of the presidential post was a destiny:
―I, Anwar El-Sadat, a peasant born and brought up on the banks of
the Nile-where man first witnessed the dawn of time- this is the story of
my life, which is at the same time the story of Egypt since 1918- for so
destiny has decreed. The events of my life have coincided with those
which Egypt has lived during that period. I therefore tell my story in full,
not merely as the President of Egypt, but as an Egyptian whose life has
been intimately bound up with that of Egypt‖ [17].
Sadat wrote of himself and Egypt in the epilogue of his
autobiography, a clear indication of his self-image and how it reflectedin his view- upon the political history of Egypt. He wrote;
―This is not the story of the Arab-Israeli conflict or of the
liberation of Egypt from British occupation, or of the achievements and
short-comings of the 1952 Revolution. It may be all this and more; but it
is mainly the story of a search for identity-my own and that of Egypt.
They are one and the same thing, because since childhood I have
identified myself with my country- the land and the people.‖[18]
According to Sadat, destiny has drawn for him a specific and
calculated role to make a difference in history. Speaking about his role as
maker of Egypt‘s history, Sadat wrote in his autobiography.
―I could have never known then that I would grow up to take part,
with a number of my colleagues, in changing the course of history- that I
myself one day would cross that awesome wall and sit on the very chair
on which King Fuad, and subsequently King Farouk, had sat.‖[19] He
added on his role in the formation of the Free Officers movement which
led the 1952 Revolution, ―I decided to start with own positions as officers
in the Egyptian Army. I worked hard during our long conversations to
open my colleagues‘ eyes to the realities of the situation in general and
the position of the British in particular. I discussed our ancient history,
picking out relevant incidents and situations and contrasting them with
current events, current problems, and current tragedies. My big room in
the officers mess came to be dubbed ―The National Assembly‖ [20].
Sadat viewed Egypt as a village, his village ―Mit-Abu-al-Kum‖
where he was the father, the mayor and the guardian of the village‘s
families. He expressed this on several occasions, among them, his
interview to the Egyptian T.V. on his 59th birthday on December 25, 1978,
as he said:
I will now concentrate on the greater ―Mit-Abu-al-Kum‖, which is
Egypt. This year operations will be starting in the greater Mit-Abu-alKum‖ for the prevalence of peace, the establishment of democracy and
the attainment of prosperity‖ [21]
Sadat announced several times that he did not consider himself to
be a politician, and preferred to be called ―the father of the nation‖ or
the ―guardian of the Egyptian Family‖ than to be addressed as
President. [22]
The characteristics of the typical Egyptian family which Sadat
portrayed to the masses and media was one where the father was the sole
decision-maker with whom other members of the family rarely disagreed
or criticizes. On the same occasion of his 59th birthday, he said:
―As I have said time and again, the Egyptian people constitute on
big family comprising all those who live on the land of Egypt. It has its
values, its dignity, and its responsibilities and takes on the form of which
circumstances call for. So when we wish to establish democracy, this
family, essentially Egyptian, takes on different forms when people holding
the ―same views‖ come together and form parties or contribute with their
views‖.[23]
Sadat usually addressed the nation in his speeches as ―my sons
and daughters‖ and considered criticisms of his policies unacceptable,
according to the traditions and customs of the Egyptian Family which he
believed he headed. He viewed the Egyptian political system fro his own
perspective as that of a classical father‘s role in his family.
A five-year survey of the opening sentences of Sadat‘s speeches fro
1973 until 1978 revealed that his typical opening statement was ―In the
name of God, sons and daughters of Egypt‖ [24]
Sadat also strengthened his familial ties to power- a kind of tribal
ethos characterized by marriages. His children married into the families
of Sayed Marei (Speaker of the People‘s Assembly) and of Osman Ahmed
Osman (the most influential Egyptian businessman, contractor and
government minister of the time [25].
The sources of information and the way it is presented to and
received by the President is also very important in examining decisionmaking in Egypt‘s foreign policy during the 1970‘s. Some policy maker
gives great attention to details, while others only examine the headlines.
Usually the way a leader demands information to be presented, and the
way he uses it, reflect his view of himself. Because Sadat viewed himself
as a maker of history, he did not like searching for details of information
and only focused on the main lines of the reports presented to him. The
former Editor-in-Chief of the daily Egyptian Al-Ahram, Muhammad
Hasanayn Heykal, who was a prominent political figure during Nasser‘s
era and the early years of Sadat‘s era, wrote in his book on Sadat:
―I remember once that I saw Sadat‘s Secretary Fawzy Abd-alHafez coming towards him with a pile of files when I was with him on the
yacht at the Qanater rest house, and Sadat shouted at him while he was
still on the steps of the Yacht ―take all this load of files back, I don‘t need
to read them.‖[26]
Similarly, the former Secretary General of the ASU, Abdel-Salam
al-Sayyat said ―Sadat could not bear long discussions with his top
officials. He always used to avoid discussing the details of any topic
either out of his ignorance or because he did not want to or was not
ready to discuss it‖ [27].
Sadat also depended to a great extent on the opinions of other
prominent politicians fro other parts of the world, more than he listened
to his own Foreign Ministers, whom he considered as staff rather than
advisors. According to former Foreign Minster, Ismail Fahmy [28].
Kissinger presented to Sadat and himself during this second visit to
Aswan in 1975, and Israel framework for peace that seemed innocent, but
was in fact an agreement to end war. Fahmy added that, as usual, Sadat
looked at it and gave his approval and then passed it on to him ―I drew
his attention to the fact that this plan means the ending of war with Israel.
Here Sadat looked at Kissinger and said: ―Henry, I thought you were my
friend, this really does end the war situation.‖ [29] Fahmy concludes
―Sadat din not depend on his advisors as her neither trusted them nor
admired their analysis and views.‖ [30]
Sadat even appointed a former German Finance Minister called
Alex Moller, as a Senior Economic Advisor to the President. Sadat highly
appreciated the recommendations which Moller presented.
Those included the formation of an advisory and planning unit at
the presidency to prepare guidelines for economic policies and to
supervise their implementation. [31]
Sadat saw himself as more experienced than his advisors and
believed that they were the ones who should learn from his experience
and leadership. The former U.S. President Jimmy Carter wrote of Sadat
at Camp David, ―Sadat wanted to formulate and make Egypt‘s decisions
alone and never wanted any of his assistants to attend talks with him
during discussions with me. He used to look uncomfortable when any of
them joined us.‖[32]
Even Jihan Sadat. In her autobiography, wrote ―few people knew
beforehand of Anwar‘s intention to visit Jerusalem. I was one of them‖.
She added commenting on Sadat‘s announcement of the initiative in the
Egyptian Peoples Assembly ―the members of Parliament seemed stunned,
as if they too couldn‘t believe their ears. How could any one of them so
quickly absorb such a dramatic and visionary idea?‖[33]
Sadat himself wrote, ―we have been calling for the return of our
land but refusing to ask it of those who are occupying it. I have decided to
go to the Israelis directly, what other choice do I have? [34]
Thus, it seems that Sadat displayed an intense belief that a leader
was expected and destined to play a major role in shaping the course of
the historical development of a nation. Due to the fact that Sadat was a
part of a society that had a history of traditional patrimonial rule, he was
to a great extent affected by it. Since his early childhood, Sadat
considered the function of a leader to be to personally guide and shape
the destiny of his nation. Detailed accounts of Sadat‘s early beginnings in
his village show that Sadat was very much aware of the political turmoil
that engulfed Egypt at that time. Recalling his early years, Sadat
described how he absorbed impressions of British imperialism through
the folk tales and ballads of the hero Zahran of ―Denshway‖ in his battle
against the British. To Sadat, Zahran was hanged by the British for his
courage, pride, and heroism. ―I often saw Sahran and lived his heroism
in dream and reverie‖ wrote Sadat, and added ―I wished I were
Zahran‖. [35] There were other leaders whom Sadat admired for their
bravery and leadership in the political struggle against the British
occupation of Egypt. Among them were prominent Egyptian politicians
such as Mustafa Kamil, Adham Al-Sharquai and Saad Zaglul.
From the time of his assumption of power in October 1970, Sadat
was an enigma who surprised not only the Arabs, but the world with a
series of controversial decisions. The elimination of the Ali Sabri group
in May 1971, the expulsion of the Soviet advisors in July 1972, the
October 1973 war and the historical visit to Jerusalem in November
1977, were a few examples of such decisions.
Sadat seemed to employ three strategies in pursuing his goals and
taking his decisions. These consisted of ―electric shock diplomacy‖,
giving his opponents a false impression of his capabilities in order to
stride from a position of strength, and then the pursuit of goals through a
comprehensive approach using diplomatic, political, military and
economic means. Sadat often utilized the phrase ―electric shock‖ to
explain his unpredictable (to others) decisions that came suddenly with
the intention of bringing about a change in the previous political climate.
A second tactic Sadat used many times was the strategy of lying low to
outwit his opponents by encouraging them to underestimate him and his
capabilities.
During Nasser‘s rule, Sadat never disagreed with anything Nasser
proposed. Nasser often referred to him as ―Colonel yes-yes‖ [36] Sadat
performed the remarkable feat of cloaking his ambitions and his peasant
shrewdness by playing innocent; thereby evading Nasser‘s suspicions and
preventing his own liquidation. Indeed, Sadat‘s calculated policy of
conformism to Nasser bore fruit when he was chosen as vice-president.
The third feature of his style was personalization. He spoke of ―my
people‖, ―my initiative‖ and he viewed relations between States as a
function of the relations between leaders. In many speeches he referred to
other leaders as personal friends of his.
On the occasion of the 26th anniversary of the 23rd July Revolution
in 1978, he said:
―In the light of my deep friendship with President Carter, I can
assure you that President Carter has come up with an unprecedented
action since the days of Dulles and Rogers. He is a man of morals and
principles. [37]
The Presidency and other political institutions
The office of the President, the presidency, had a prominent role
under Sadat. As a prominent scholar of Egyptian politics, Nazih Ayubi,
argued, Egypt is a presidential State; owing to political, cultural and
legal traditions, the President is the dominant political and governmental
authority in Egypt. [38]. An important policy decision or project must
normally pass through the institution of the presidency to have the
blessing of the President before it can proceed with a reasonable
prospect of success. The 1971 Constitution of Egypt gave the President
the full right to execute foreign policy and Law 29 of 1972 gave the
President the authority to make presidential decrees. The presidency
derives its importance from being the office of the President.
The presidency, as an institution, plays a very important role in the
foreign policy decision making process as it is the contact point between
all information and consultative bodies on one hand, and the President
on the other. Its importance is also derived from being the institution that
briefs the President on all matters, and provides him with all the
information and assessments necessary for the making of any decisions.
The presidency, as an organizational structure through which the
President executes his political responsibilities and constitutional rights
in making the policies of Egypt, took its final form in 1958. The offices of
advisors for political, economic and scientific affairs were introduced
then.
Furthermore, the office of internal affairs began to take
responsibility for public relations between the presidency and the public,
responding to people‘s questions regarding policy matters. The office of
the President‘s Press secretary was abolished after the State Information
Bureau and the Middle East Press Association were formed. [39] Also,
offices for Arab, African, Asian, European and American Affairs were
introduced. In doing so, a certain sensitivity was created between the
institution of the Presidency and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs since the
latter considered these offices as competitors, paralleling their own work
and repeating the same specializations. It may be said that these offices
reflected Nasser‘s policies and his vision of Egypt‘s Arab, African and
Islamic roles. These offices became unofficial channels through which
quick and direct contacts were made avoiding the routine channels of the
Ministry
of
Foreign
Affairs.
These
offices
reflected
Egypt‘s
―revolutionary‖ connections with liberation movements in African, Arab
and Asian countries, while the Ministry of Foreign Affairs remained the
official face of the State. [40]
During the period 1961 – 1971 all specialized offices were
abolished except the African and Arab offices and the Arab one merged
with the office of the Secretary of Information as it was relevant to
Nasser‘s foreign policy orientation and to the preoccupation and zeal of
the era. All reports were handed to the President‘s Secretary for
Information and the President‘s instructions and comments on reports
were delivered through him as well. The appointment of the Special
Personal Representative of the President was introduced in 1964 as a
consequence of the Arab Summit meeting, and of Nasser‘s preference to
convey messages to and from other Arab leaders through them rather
than his Foreign Minister. [41]
Under Sadat, the organizational structure of the institution of the
Presidency underwent two stages of development. The first stage was a
result of Sadat‘s decree ―2402‖ in 1971 which divided the Presidency
into several main departments: The Office responsibilities for the affairs
of the United Arab Republic; the personal Secretariat of the President,
responsible for all protocol and transfer arrangements for the President;
the Minister of Presidency Affairs, who was the contact point between the
Cabinet, the different Ministries and the President and was entrusted with
the responsibility of briefing the President on all the Cabinet‘s affairs as
well as recommendations; the Offices of his special advisors, such as the
military advisor, the economic affairs advisor and the political affairs
advisor. [42]
The second stage began in 1973 with Sadat‘s decree ―434‖ by
which he formed the National Security Council and appointed Hafez
Ismail as his advisor for National Security Affairs. This stage marked a
new stage in the importance of the Presidency in foreign policy
formulation as this new Council began to convene and discuss issues
raised by the President. The role of such a Council had been envisaged in
the 1971 Constitution as one of presenting advice to the President with
respect to issues related to Egyptian national security. Sadat had created
it since he admired the role played by the advisor who occupied this post
in the U.S. political system. Members of the Council included the
President, the National Security Advisor, the Prime Minister, the Foreign
Minister, the Minister of Defence and Interior and the Secretary General
of the Arab Socialist Union, as well as a few of the Presidency officials
according to the topic being discussed. A survey of the dates and issues
discussed in these Council meetings revealed the following: - [43]
The Council met one week before the October war on 30/9/1973 to
discuss the different domestic regional and international issues related to
the decision of launching a war against Israel.
The Council met five times during the Lebanese crisis and the
Libyan-backed coup in the Sudan (28/3/1976, 15/4/1976, 26/6/1976,
4/7/1976, and 29/9/1976).
The Council met twice before Sadat announced his initiative to
visit Jerusalem in November 1977 (30/9/77 and 5/11/77)
The Council met five times after Sadat‘s visit to Jerusalem
(23/12/1977, 16/1/1978, 25/3/1978, 26/7/78,1/8/78).The review of these
meetings revealed that they came as a response to Sadat‘s call for more
consultation, as he began to feel the repercussions of his peace initiative
domestically, regionally and internationally. The meetings were devoted
to assessing the developments in Egypt‘s foreign relations after the visit
to Jerusalem, and to discuss the papers and documents that Egypt was to
present at the Summit meetings at Camp David. After the signing of the
Camp David Accord in 1978, the Council did not meet until the death of
Sadat in October 1981.
The convening of both the Council‘s Sessions of 1977 in the time
that Sadat prepared for his decision to visit Jerusalem accounts for the
role played by the Council towards this major initiative. There was
mention in both meetings of the difficulties in the process of the Geneva
Peace Conference and the suggestion of the necessity of presenting a new
outlet. As two of the members of the Council indicated, Sadat attempted
both in a direct and indirect way to set the stage and the environment
within the Council for his initiative, especially as the second meeting took
place only 4 days before his initiative to visit Jerusalem.
Kamal Hassan Ali who was Head of the Intelligence Service then,
member of the Council and later Foreign Minister under Sadat, said in
an interview in the Egyptian Magazine, Rose-al youssef:
―Sadat‘s initiative to visit Jerusalem was presented- in the
Council‘s meeting two weeks before it happened – as an idea that he was
willing to travel to Israel to stop bloodshed and to save the lives of
Egypt‘s sons. The issue wasn‘t presented as a topic for discussion, or for
consultation, or to listen to opinions on it, as this meeting was not
scheduled to discuss this issue but other issues.‖ [44]
Similarly, Dr. Mustafa Khalil- First Secretary of the Central
Committee of the ASU, a member of the Council and later Prime Minister
under Sadat, said in an interview with the daily Egyptian newspaper, AlAhram:
― It was no surprise to us for Sadat to announce his decision to
visit Jerusalem as his idea was discussed in the Council when Sadat
presented it as a clear idea for discussion on his arrival from his visit to
Romania which took place during the 29th and 30th of October, 1977.‖
―The idea was discussed in the two meetings of the Council, and
even more Sadat presented to the members of the Council during its
discussion a draft of the Peace agreement that Israel had prepared for
peace between Egypt and Israel. And after the presentation of the idea, it
appeared that there were supporters while others had reservations, but
the majority clearly were in favour. No date was set to announce it but we
left it to him to set the appropriate time and date. And as a result he
announced it in the People‘s Assembly later. But, generally Sadat is the
one who made this initiative.‖ [45]
Despite the presence of discrepancies between the tow accounts as
the first suggested that Sadat‘s decision was only implicitly mentioned
while the latter stated that it was absolutely explicitly presented to the
Council, nevertheless the significance of these meetings is how they
demonstrate that Sadat did attempt whether directly or indirectly to set
the stage for his decision during them.
It should be noted that in addition to the permanent members of the
Council, Hassan al-Tohamy, Deputy Prime Minister at the Presidency,
attended the two meetings that followed Sadat‘s visit to Jerusalem as he
was involved in the secret preliminary negotiations in Morocco with
Moshe Dayan- Israel‘s then Foreign Minister- Which set the stage for
Sadat‘s visit to Jerusalem. This was a symbol of how the institution of the
Presidency and its members played and important role in Sadat‘s
decision to make a breakthrough in the Arab-Israeli conflict, especially if
this role is compared to that of Egypt‘s then Foreign Minister, Ismail
Fahmy.
Sadat barely asked for his opinion and when he did, ignored it,
accepting his resignation before leaving for Jerusalem, while the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs itself was not involved at all in Sadat‘s decision.
Thus, the role of the National Security Council was not derived
from its composition of the heads of the most powerful institutions in
Egypt at the time, but because it was fulfilling the objectives designed for
it by Sadat as a major source of support and legitimating. Its approval of
any of his decisions was considered by him as an approval from the
heads of all Egypt‘s decision-making bodies. It was basically a tool to
support and execute Sadat‘s decisions in the very critical period of
1977/1978. Sadat later lost interest in the Council.
As a result of this, it stopped functioning, especially after the National
Security Advisor; Hafez Ismail was removed from that post and appointed
Ambassador of Egypt to the Soviet Union. It was significant that no-one
replaced him for the rest of the 1970‘s. In the final analysis, the Council
was a part of the institution of the Presidency and was not a source of
policy options and decisions, despite the fact that it consisted of the heads
of the major institutions which were theoretically involved in the
decision-making process of Egypt‘s foreign policy.
Theoretically the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Wizarat alkharijiyya) is the institution responsible for the formulation and
implementation of the foreign policy of Egypt. It presents to the President
the information, reports and recommendations regarding the different
options and choices with respect to the foreign relations of Egypt,
whether of a political or economic nature.
In the Cabinet, the Minister of Foreign Affairs is entrusted with the
planning of foreign policy of Egypt, but within the general guidelines set
by the Cabinet. However, this role was limited by the authorities given to
Sadat in the execution of foreign relations by the 1971 Constitution and
was overshadowed by Sadat‘s decision-making style and the role of his
office.
According to the organizational structure and general working
manifesto of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it is guided by the following
principles: the President is the highest decision maker in foreign policy,
the Foreign Minister is the President on day-to-day routine issues; the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs relations of Egypt in coordination with other
relevant institutions. [46] Thus in theory, the Ministry and Minister of
Foreign Affairs should play a significant role in the pre and postimplementation stages of any political or economic decision in the sphere
of Foreign policy, even if it is related indirectly to Egypt‘s foreign
relations.
However, the role of the Ministry was overshadowed by Sadat and
the Foreign Minister acted mainly as a presidential advisor. The Minister
did not attend all the President‘s meetings with foreign officials. e.g.,
some of the most crucial sessions in the Egyptians-Israeli negotiations
were confined to Sadat only during the Camp David process in 1978.
Even earlier, in November 1973 and January 1974, when former U.S.
Secretary of State Kissinger visited Egypt, he primarily conferred with
Sadat alone. Messages were exchanged directly between the President
and other countries without the knowledge of the Ministry and Egyptian
Ambassadors in foreign capitals were not even informed about the many
visits by Sadat‘s presidential envoys. e.g., visits by the head of Sadat‘s
Political Bureau, Ashraf Marwan to many aftermath of the October 1973
war. [47]
The role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was overshadowed by
Sadat‘s decision-making style. Sadat usually took a decision then
followed this with a discussion of the various ways of tackling any
problems that might arise from it. As a result, his decisions omitted the
pre-decision stage of examining an issue, preparing for it a presenting a
comprehensive study fro the concerned political institutions. He said in a
speech in November 1976:
―I don‘t tackle all the issues that will face us because I don‘t want
to control all thinking in these aspects. I believe that my style in work is
to take the decision then begins the real practice, through which real
problems arise and appropriate solutions are found. Only then solutions
become real and not hypothetical or taken from books that have no
relation what so ever with our circumstances. [48]
Thus, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was left basically to deal wit
routine transactions and day-to-day decisions already made by the
President. One of the Foreign Ministers who served and resigned under
Sadat said, ―Sadat‘s style of decision-making minimized the role of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.‖ According to Ibrahim Kamel, Sadat
considered his personal contacts with Presidents and politicians in other
countries more effective than the official diplomatic channels. This
resulted in making the Foreign Minister more of a counsellor on
technical matters rather than a formulator and director of foreign
policies.[49] In many instances both the Ambassadors and the Embassies
they headed did not know of the details of contacts between Sadat and the
leaders of the countries to which they were accredited. As a result of this
presidential type of foreign policy execution, three successive Foreign
Ministers resigned during the initiating of the peace process with Israel
in 1977/78, namely, Foreign Minister Ismail Fahmy, Minister of State for
Foreign Affairs Mohamed Riad and Foreign Minister Ibrahim Kamel.
The basic cause underlying their resignations was Sadat‘s
unilateral decision-making style. He did not consult them on his peace
initiative, and when he later asked for their views during the Camp David
talks, he disregarded and ignored them completely. Both Foreign
Ministers have cited numerous examples of this attitude in their memoirs
of that period. They have accentuated Sadat‘s view of himself as a maker
of history who thought that he was driven by destiny to carry out a
strategy which was beyond the understanding of normal politicians and
their bureaucratic institutions.
In the final analysis, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs became a tool
to execute and implement Sadat‘s decisions in Foreign policy. Its rule
was minimized to the collection and categorization of information and of
handling technical issues, as signing agreements, political declarations,
exchange of letters and official correspondence with other countries.
Sadat basically depend on the style of personal representatives working
secretly far from diplomatic channels which weakened the role of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its Embassies abroad.
In the sphere of economic policy making during the 1970‘s, Sadat
directed and planned the economic strategy, while the Minister of
Economy was responsible for dealing with the details of policies, their
implementation and supervision in accordance with regulations, laws and
presidential decrees setting these policies.
The Ministry of Economy, ―Wizarat Al-Iqtisad‖ was rather more
involved in preparing the technical aspects of economic policies that
were made by a political decision, reflecting Sadat‘s vision of the
deteriorating economic conditions in Egypt and how to tackle them
directly through a policy of opening Egypt up economically- What
became to be known later as the ―infitah‖.
The way in which policy was developed and implemented from
Sadat down to the Ministry of Economy, can best be illustrated with an
example. The October Working Paper, which was the first signal of the
shift to a liberal economic policy, was issued by Sadat in April 1974 and
contained ideas that had been worked out by Ministers of Economic
Ministers advised him on what should go into the document to reflect the
ideas of ―infitah‖. Similarly, the first Deputy Prime Minister, and later
Prime Minister, Abdel Aziz Hegazy, drew up the 1974 economic
linearization document, namely the Foreign Investment Law 43,in the
period of after the October Working Paper was announced and issued
[50]. Thus if the President was identified as the source of economic
strategy, then Ministers of economy were the main source of detailed
policy, and hence, their choice was usually based on both technical skills
and political loyalty.
As far as economic policy laws were concerned, Sadat issued a
number of decrees that surpassed the condition of ―essentiality‖ that was
set in the Constitution (Article 198) thus overriding the condition
permitting him to issue them (Article 147). [51] Because such laws were
issued one or two days before the convening of the People‘s Assembly
and others were not that important, there was no need to issue them
quickly. One of these was Sadat‘s decree Number ―50‖ for 1976
regarding immunities and privileges for the ―Arab Industrial
Organization‖ which was opposed by some members of the Assembly
because of the absence of the ―essentiality‖ condition that was a
prerequisite in the Constitution. [52]
During the first constitutional period of the Assembly (1971-1976),
Sadat issued 97 decrees that mostly dealt with the details of the new
economic policies of the ―infitah‖. [53] This is a mere reflection of the
degree of his involvement in the decision-making process.
Similarly, in pursuing his executive role, Sadat made many
ministerial changes in the economic team mostly connected with the
implementation of the open-door economic policy, e.g, the Cabinet
change in 16/5/1975 in which he appointed Mamdouh Salem as Prime
Minister instead of Dr. Abdel –Aziz was to contain the problem
associated with the new economic policies and the need to hasten its
linearization form constraints.
Sadat said in this respect, ―when I found slowness and
bureaucracy I changed the Government, I brought Mamdouh, who today
gets rid of all the red tape and constraints that hamper the liberalization
of the economy. [54]
Other example of Sadat‘s interference in the very technical and
implementation details of economic policies e.g., the ―Salhia Project‖ ,
which was under the direct jurisdiction of Sadat, but was very
controversial as it did not fall within the economic priorities set by the
Government.[55] Similarly, was Sadat‘s intervention in the merger of the
public sector company ―the Egyptian Battery Company‖ with a British
investment company ―Chloride‖, which resulted in the use of the
―Chloride‖ label for Egyptian Batteries, but was reported to have caused
great losses for the public sector company.[56]
Moreover, there was also the ―Pyramids Tourist Project‖, which
the President approved, then cancelled, resulting in great losses for
Egypt. [57] Sadat also met tens of bankers, investors encouraging their
investment and his personal willingness to solve their problems.
The complexity of the decision-making process within the Ministry
of Economy and between Ministers with economic responsibilities and
with the other related bodies in the Government, meant that Ministers
spent much of their time dealing with details of administration, rather
than with policy and its implementation.
Ministers became more involved in conflicts as vested interests
inside and outside Government during the period of the open-door policy
began to clash. Moreover, Cabinets and Ministers of Economy were
appointed or dismissed depending on their success or failure to
implement or support economic liberalization. The very high turnover of
Ministers and Cabinets which resulted from this is indicated by the 16
Government reshuffles that occurred between 1970 and 1980. During this
time Cabinets lasted seven and a half months and Ministers of Economy
and Planning for 18 months in the average. [58] This reinforces the view
that Ministers of Economy were not responsible for the making of
economic policies, but rather for implementing them during their short
term in office. They looked to the President for decisions and directions,
while the President did not delegate his powers to them in order to direct
the process of infitah in the manner and pace he wanted.
Despite that the 1971 Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt
gives the main responsibility for conducting Foreign Policy to the
President, nevertheless, it gives the Council of Ministers ―Majlis alWuzara‖ the authority to assist the President in shaping and formulating
the Government‘s policies in the economic and political spheres.
Specifically, articles 153,156,157 of the Constitution state that the
Cabinet has several responsibilities among which are; sharing with the
President the planning of public policies and the supervision of its
implementation according to the prevailing laws and presidential
decrees, the supervision of all Ministries‘ and Ministers‘ responsibilities
and the coordination between them, the drafting of laws and decrees,
drafting of the budget with the relevant Ministers, the signing of loans
and its provisions [59].
A review of a sample of the Cabinet‘s meeting over two years
(October 1973-September 1975) revealed: [60] (a) that the Cabinet met
five times every two months on average; (b) domestic issues dominated
the agenda, foreign policy issues were discussed only when the Foreign
Minister addressed the Cabinet on an important issue, or if the Ministers
were being informed of a major policy decision (c) the Cabinet never took
any decisions regarding foreign policy, but only reviewed the latest
developments or a report on a visit by the President or the Foreign
Minister to a number of countries. Usually Sadat used to notify or
address the Council of Ministers to brief it on a recent visit or major
decision he had already taken in foreign policy.
Thus, in practice, the Cabinet had no significant role in foreign
policy decisions. However, the Cabinet had a more prominent role in the
discussion of Egypt‘s economy, especially when the economic team direct
of the Cabinet was in direct contact with Sadat and under his direct
supervision during the formulation of economic policies.
It was the People‘s Assembly ―Majlis al-Shaab‖ which was the
main venue in which Sadat declared his policies.
Sadat‘s view of the role of the Assembly was indicated in his
address to the People‘s Assembly in February 1975, where he said;
―I have accustomed you, even in the toughest hours to face the
challenges confronting us with truth and openness, and to find our right
way through discussion and dialogue until we reach a clear
understanding or the responsibilities of each stage that we pass through,
which enables us to achieve a common objective and though that ensures
that we set our policies on common understanding.‖[61]
In another speech to the Assembly in March 1975, he said:
―It was my intention after God‘s will, to come to you, whatever the
results of what we have been trying in Aswan for the last few weeks. As
you all know and followed, we were trying to put the step-by-step policy
toward peace under a real test. It was my duty in my opinion to put in
front of you and the nation all the documents.‖ [62]
The Constitution has no article identifying a role for the Assembly
in the making of foreign policy decisions. Articles 86-136 of the 1971
Constitution have given the People‘s Assembly ―Majlis-Al-Shaab‖
several responsibilities as it is the main legislative authority. Among
these are the planning of the public policies, the State‘s economic
development plan, the supervision and follow-up of the authorities of the
executive.
The Cabinet is also responsible before the Assembly, and the
Assembly has the authority to withdraw confidence from it, as well as
from any Minister or from the Prime Minister. [63]
However, Sadat used it as a venue for announcing his major
domestic and foreign policies, such as his decision of the ―Manabir‖ and
the cancelling of the ASU on the 11th of November, 1976, his declaration
on the 8th of November 1977 of his willingness to visit the Knesset in
Israel. [64] The role of the specialized committees in the Assembly was
limited to one of supporting presidential decisions. Thus, the Arab affairs
Committee and the Economic Affairs Committee basically endorsed or
ratified or made statements in support of previously announced decisions.
E.g., the Assembly ratified the Egyptian-Soviet friendship agreement in
June 1971 and agreed on its cancellation in March 1976. [65] The
assembly, thus, limited neither the Cabinet‘s nor the President‘s powers.
However, the Assembly‘s importance to Sadat increased even more
as it underwent new political and structural changes by the introduction
of a controlled multi-party system in the mid 70‘s, under which there
were limitations on party activity imposed by the law of political parties.
It was Sadat‘s October Paper of 1974 that stimulated the debate on
the ASU and on it‘s restructuring. Arguing that the majority had rejected
a single party, it opted for platforms ―Manabir‖ within the ASU. Three
platforms were formed, representing the left, right and centre of the ASU
[66].
The left came to be associated with the ASU members who were
Nasserite, led by Khaled Muhi Al-Din. The businessmen of the open-door
policy, and was led by Mustafa Kamel Murad. The majority of the ASU
members identified themselves with the centre, led by Mamdouh Salem.
Following the elections in 1976, Sadat converted the platforms into
political parties. The outcome of the elections in terms of the distribution
of seats in the Peoples Assembly was a majority of 295 out of 342 seats
for Hizb Misr, 34 seats for Independents, 10 seats for the Liberal
Socialist party and 3 seats for the NPUP, Tagamu [67].
The significance of these numbers is that they reflected the control
of the Government party in the Assembly, and thus their control of the
decision-making process under the directions of Sadat and the institution
of the Presidency. It should also be noted that the timing of the shift to the
Manabir and then to the multi-party system and the convening of
Assembly elections, all coincided with the
move to economic
liberalization of the economy, we well as the improvement of relations
with the US and the West and the beginning of the peace process with
Israel.
Sadat further changed the political map of Egypt during the
1870‘s. [68] The Arab Socialist party of Egypt became the National
Democratic party (NDP), and Sadat assumed its leadership after his
brother in law Mahmoud Abu-Wafia, who held the post of Secretary
General of the party until February 1977.
In addition, another opposition party was given permission
(Socialist Labour Party) to function within the new multi-party system in
the wake of the failure of the Government to keep the Tagamu‘ party a
loyal opposition party in the Assembly. Sadat called on a former leader of
Misr al-Fatah party and the ex-minister of land reform, Ibrahim Shukry,
to head the new party with Sadat‘s brother-in-law as Vice President of
the party to maintain his influence.
As a prominent scholar of the political parties in Egypt,
Hinnebusch argued: In social comparison there was little to distinguish
the new SLP from the ruling party. The LSP‘s largely middle and upper
middle class membership, made up of professionals , state employees and
even a contingent of rural notables was little different from the ruling
NDP.‖[69]
In this political environment that was characterized by state
created political parties, the new Wafd party formed under the leadership
of the pre-1952 politician Fouad Sirag al-Din, in February of 1978 and
gained wide popularity. In accordance wit his policy of dominating the
political scene, Sadat reused the old Nasserite law that prohibited all
those who had held posts during the monarchy from engaging in politics,
in an attempt to limit the influence of Sirag al-Din. However, the party
itself in May 1978.
In the 1979 elections of the Assembly, the National Democratic
party under Sadat won 295 seats out of 342 giving it again the absolute
majority, while independents won 10 seats, Liberal Socialists won 3,
Tagmu‘ won no seats and the Socialist Labour party won 34 seats. The
New Wafd was absent as it was still dissolved. [70]
It is thus evident that the NDP under the leadership of Sadat was the
major political party in Egyptian politics during the period here, thus
ensuring Sadat‘s strong grip of both the People‘s Assembly and the
political system on the whole.
3.
Political Culture
The political culture within which the decision-making process
occurred in Egypt is also very significant to the understanding of foreignmaking under Sadat.
The making characteristics of the political culture that prevailed in
the 1970‘s, was the absence of political competitiveness, centralization of
power, emphasis on mobilization rather than participation, and
supremacy of the executive over the legislative branch. Political power
and government functioning have been characterized by personalityoriented executive control. Sadat saw himself as the lawmaker and chief
executive. The structure and work of the political system under Sadat
gave him a free hand in the conduct of Foreign Policy. Sadat was not
accountable to either the press, opposition parties, or a strong
Parliament.
The salient features of Egyptian political life under Nasser
continued as before. The concentration of power lay in the hands of Sadat
with the entire upper echelon of the political hierarchy dependent on
their direct relations with him. He personally chose the vice-president,
prime minister and principal cabinet ministers, and his criteria for
selection were the degree of confidence he had in their loyalty and their
compatibility with his policies. Their term in office was determined by
their ability to remain in the President‘s good graces. Given the highly
centralized nature of leadership, political figures with an independent
power base didn‘t emerge, particularly after the Sabri affairs. Prominent
personalities functioned basically as presidential aides whose positions
depend on their usefulness to Sadat.
Sadat, like Nasser, controlled the balance of power among the
upper echelon of the system, many of whom were members of his Cabinet.
[71]
Under the 1971 constitution, strong executive powers were granted
to the President. The President was the Head of Government and
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and the internal security
forces. He determined the general policy over the State and supervised its
execution. While in theory the three main branches (the executive,
legislature and judiciary) were separate and independent, the President
and his office dominated the other of Government. [72]
Sadat‘s own legitimacy and acceptance by the public as a leader
was derived from three events: the corrective movement of May 1971,
where the previous centres of power under Nasser were ousted, the
expulsion of Soviet advisors in July 1972 and the war against Israel in
1973. Soon after this, and to gain more support fro the masses, Sadat
began to emphasize the importance of moving Egypt to the rule of law or
what he preferred to call a State of institutions ―dawlat al-muassasat‖
with such an orientation in mind, Sadat began to lift censorship, to
reform courts and the judicial system and to establish the rule of law,
―dawlat al-qanun‖.
Prominent politicians who had aligned themselves from the beginning
with Sadat included Hussein al-Shafei, the second surviving senior Free
officer; Sayed Marei who later become the Speaker of the Assembly and
Mahmoud Fawzi, a senior statesman and diplomat who became Foreign
Minister. [73] The other faction was headed by Ali Sabri and included
the Interior Minister, the Information Minister, the Minister of
Presidential Affairs, war Minister and several other party leaders.
The differences between the two factions were basically ideological
[74]. Sabri‘s group was identified with the lines Nasserism had taken in
the 1960‘s; internally, the state control of the economy, heavy
industrialization, state socialism, the prevalence of the Arab Socialist
Union over all other power centres.
In the foreign policy, they stood for militancy towards Israel and a
close alliance with the U.S.S.R. Their removal was considered a setback
for the USSR. Sadat was known by contrast to have strong reservations
about all these policies. Prominent Sadat supporters, like Fawzi, argued
for a diplomatic opening to the West on the grounds that Egypt‘s
isolation from the West had only reduced her policy options. Similarly,
Marei had clashed with leftists in the 1960‘s over his solicitude for the
rights of landlords, and was as much in favour of economic liberalization
as Sadat.
To a great extent, the socio-economic and political course that
Egypt took in Sadat‘s era was the outcome of this struggle and reflected
the views and perceptions of Sadat, and its implementation by his
supporters. Just as the removal of the Sabri group was considered a
setback for Soviet influence in Egypt, the expulsion of the Soviet advisors
signalled the end of an era in Egypt‘s foreign relations.
Sadat began to build up his credibility, first by responding to the
resentment expressed by the political elite and army chiefs over the
manner and role of the Soviet advisors responsible for training the
Egyptian soldiers and the dissatisfaction over the quality of the Soviet
military role, by expelling over 20,000 Soviet advisors in July 1972. With
the 1973 October war, Sadat was able to gain the support of the masses
as he became a political hero in his own rights and thus moved out of
Nasser‘s shadow. Sadat presented the war to the masses as a national
economic necessity.
In his autobiography, Sadat explained how on the 30th of
September 1973, he convened the National Security Council and asked
the Council to give him its view of the situation. After having a lengthy
discussion, some members called for war, others were hesitant. He
specially pointed out that the Minister of Supply said that available food
supplies were insufficient for a long-drawn out battle.
He wrote that he told them then, ―now that you‘ve said this, let me
tell you that our economy had fallen below zero. We have commitments
which we should, but cannot meet by the end of the year. In three months
time, by say, 1974, we shant‘t have enough bread in the pantry; I cannot
ask the Arabs for a single dollar more; they say they have been paying us
the aid in lieu of the lost canal revenue, although we didn‘t, or wouldn‘t
fight.‖[75]
Sadat added, ―When I had informed them of the reality of the
situation, I concluded the meeting. As top officials, they had to be
adequately informed. The following day, I signed the war order.‖ [76]
In less than a year from 1973, Sadat began to establish his own
vision of both the political and economic systems, which he presented in
the ―October Working Paper‖ in April 1974.
In this document, Sadat outlined the future of the whole region in
which Egypt would provide the manpower and the oil-producing
countries would provide the capital to establish joint-ventures on the
basis of a liberal economy.
Sadat‘s perception of Egypt‘s economic capabilities during the
1970‘s was a crucial factor in his foreign policy decision of visiting
Jerusalem to make peace with Israel. He viewed the State of the Egyptian
economy as being ―below the zero level‖ and believed it to have been in
a terrible condition.
Sadat‘s appreciation of economic priorities came as a result of his
understanding of Egypt‘s economic situation and its persistence in light
of the military expenditure burden which extracted capital and affected
development efforts which already had started to deteriorate since the
mid 1960‘s. Sadat felt that he moved in a frame of very limited resources
which could not cope with the increasing population problems, and hence
felt that he had to bring in a form of change to close this resource-need
gap.
The argument that Sadat presented to the masses was that the
deterioration in economic conditions during the 1960‘s and the
population explosion, which was associated with a severe lack of
resources to meet it, required massive capital imports and the translation
from a centrally controlled to a free market economy.
His reading of the economic situation was demonstrated in his
explanation of Nasser‘s legacy in his autobiography, as he viewed the
economic legacy that Nasser left him as even in a poorer shape than the
political. He wrote:
―We had with crass stupidity, copied the Soviet pattern of socialism,
although we lacked the necessary resources, technical capabilities, and
capital. In 1961 the re-nationalization measures were taken and an
economic takeoff could have taken place, based on the public sector as
well as a healthier promoted private sector. However, our socialism
began to be tinged in practise with Marxism. Any free enterprise system
came to be regarded as odious capitalism and the private sector as
synonymous with exploitation and robbery‖. Sadat criticized how the
State was expected not only to undertake economic planning but to
provide the citizens with food, work, housing and education. The state
was expected to provide citizens with everything they needed without
their having to make any positive effort at all. ―It was that shrinking back
from active individual enterprise‖ he said that ―marked the beginning of
our abysmal economic collapse‖ [77].
The priority of the issue of development after the October 1973 was
presented by Sadat in his major policy paper ―The October Working
Paper‖ in 1974. In it Sadat called for the October war to be the last of
wars so as to decrease the negative impact of the military expenditure
burden on development efforts.
He said ―development for us is a matter of life or death and thus
we have to liberate our land without the waste of our limited resources.‖
[78] The paper also mentioned that the military burden had decreased
the rate of growth from 6.7% (1956-1960) to less than 5% in the early
1970‘s.
Sadat began to make a connection between the deterioration of the
Egyptian economy and the previous wars Egypt had fought on one side,
and between the improvement in economic conditions and the policy of
peace in the Middle East on the other.
Jihan Sadat wrote in her autobiography on Sadat‘s view of this
connection:
―Our economy was in desperate financial straits with no end in sights.
The four wars we had fought with Israel had already cost Egypt billions
of pounds. Yet, because of the continuing threat from Israel, Anwar was
forced to continue spending one third of our annual budget on defence
instead of on services for our people. The cost of wars had been even
higher in human terms. Someone had to do something to stop this
catastrophe spiral, to take the first step toward a solution. It did not
surprise me that it would be my husband.‖[79]
Sadat explained his view of the negative impact of the war situation
with Israel in an interview in April 1975:
―I am a man who just came out of a war which has drained me
economically. While companies in Kuwait have reserves of millions,
image Egypt‘s reserves of foreign capital transferred from 1974 budget to
1975 was 30 thousand pounds only. Imagine that Egypt which was the
richest of Arab countries, of 36 million people, has a budget of three
billion and its reserve of currency is only 30,000 pounds‖[80] He added
in the same interview that Egypt‘s sufferings had not been random, but
had been a result of seven years of economic drainage. He accentuated
how Israel received financial and material assistance and cheques every
month while Egypt used to spend from its limited resources on the armed
forces and still was obliged to provide free education and jobs for all
graduates at the same time.
Sadat believed that the only way out of this economic crisis was
through the adoption of a liberal economic policy to attract foreign
investment and to make Egypt more credible as a recipient of economic
assistance. In his address to the People‘s Assembly in February 1975, he
said:
―The crossing (the crossing of the Suez Canal in the 1973 October war)
has transferred us to a new stage, a stage of liberation, construction and
development‖. Sadat‘s October paper tackled the new challenges that
faced Egypt after the war. ―I have introduced the policy of economicopenness ―Infitah‖ as a comprehensive policy to develop our domestic
resources that will help us to progress.
We will attract foreign capital and investments, provide what may
encourage it, and double its effect. Acknowledging however, that the
prime responsibility for development lies completely with us.‖[81]
Jehan Sadat wrote in this context that Sadat was being torn apart
by the misery in Egypt and wanted to build new schools, hospitals and to
establish new industrial centres and jobs. The economic policy of infitah
would bring new profits to Egypt from foreign investments [82] Sadat‘s
understanding of the open-door economic policy was articulated in two
main points in the ―October Working Paper‖ of 1974. The first was that
it was essential to get rid of all the negative aspects of the Egyptian
economic experiment. Then to reform the public sector and set the
circumstance to encourage the private sector and to support its activities.
The second was to underline the real need for external resources to
develop and strengthen the economy through the attraction of Arab oil
surpluses and the encouragement of foreign investment in Egypt [83].
The basic economic objectives presented by Sadat were (a) a shift
to a market economy in the hope of attracting foreign capital investments,
(b) a greater determination to strike a balance between industrial and
agricultural development, (c) a decision to revitalize the existing public
sector by promoting keener competition from an enlarged private sector
[84].
In another address to the People‘s Assembly in 1975, Sadat said:
―By the open- door policy we mean support to the public sector and to its
development by liberating it from bureaucratic strangles and raising its
production levels. We look to the private sector as one of the main
components of our economy which we have to encourage, develop and
direct towards the objectives of our plans for development.‖ He also
added that, ―the external resources of finance must target our aim of
increasing national productivity according to the priorities set in our
plan. [85]
Consequently, economic considerations came to play a significant
role in setting the objectives of Sadat‘s foreign policy as he viewed the
role of foreign policy as being one of mobilizing external resources to
bridge the gap between resources and needs. The pressure of the
population explosion on the economy and the breakdown of services in
urban
areas and their continued underdevelopment in rural areas,
became eventually sources of general disquiet and insecurity, as became
evident in the outbreak of massive food riots in Cairo and some other
parts of Egypt in January 1977.
The challenges arising from what came to be known as the ‗food
riots‘ of January 1977, played a significant role in further affecting the
political culture of the 1970‘s. [86]
The story was that in response to tremendous pressures from the
International Monetary Fund, the government decided to cut half the
country‘s 553 million subsidy (Egyptian pounds) to several basic
commodities including wheat, oil, butter, sugar and many other items that
were basic to the low- income and poor masses in Egypt. As a result,
riots erupted in Cairo and other cities, and the only way to retain control
was to call on the army for the first time since 1952. Nevertheless, the
government was forced to retreat from its decision to cut the food
subsidies as the prices of all basic commodities rose and the riots
expanded to other cities in Egypt.
Sadat used this event to underline the urgency of resolving the
burdensome external conflict if Egypt was to concentrate on tackling of
pressing economic and social problems at home. As a consequence of the
food riots Sadat chose clearly Egypt‘s disengagement from the ArabIsraeli conflict by visiting Jerusalem in 1977. [87] On the other side he
began to encourage a further development of the open- door economic
policy Both were connected to Sadat‘s conception of how to tackle
Egypt‘s economic problems. Both were necessary, in his view, to achieve
economic recovery and pave the way to the economic, administrative,
educational and human resource development of Egypt. [88]
To effect the necessary economic changes and to make use of the
income sources that were available in the region at the time (oil
revenues, labour remittances, tourism and trade, including transit
through the Suez Canal), Sadat saw that it was essential to introduce
racial foreign policy changes.
If foreign investments were needed, Egypt had to abandon
Nasserism and its regional guest for leadership in order to establish close
links with previous Arab Gulf foes. Similarly, the state of war and boycott
of Israel had to be ended, and in bringing this about, the US, with its
relation with Israel, had to play the major role. This was the crux of
Sadat‘s policy in the 1970s. Peace, in Sadat‘s view was the other side of
the same coin that included the open- door economic liberalization
policy. Peace was thus, in his own reading, of Egypt‘s political reality, a
foreign policy solution to the country‘s economic and social problems.
[89]
Sadat considered the adversarial relationship with the U.S. during
the sixties to be temporary and limited. His dominant view was that the
U.S. championed the cause of freedom and supported liberation
movements. But this was undermined by the U.S. total support to Israel in
everything that took place in the region and assistance in the form of
weapons, funds and international political support. [90]
From the beginning of his presidency Sadat attempted to send out
friendly feelers to the U.S. First, he modified the broad parameters of
Nasser‘s anti- imperialist campaign which had been directed against the
U.S.
Then he moved on to improve relations with the U.S. and diplomatic
relations was restored and President Richard Nixon was received in
Cairo in 1974. The U.S. was increasingly involved in the first and second
disengagement talks with Israel as well as in the Geneva peace
conference in 1973.
Then by undoing the socialist orientation under Nasser he tried to
convince the U.S. that he was different from Nasser. Sadat was of the
opinion that no major difference or problems existed between Egypt and
the U.S. He bore no grudges against the U.S. except for the U.S. attitude
towards Israel. [91]
He believed that Israel‘s strategy was based on creating a rift between
the U.S. and Egypt and that Nasser had failed to realize this. Indeed by
worsening relations with the U.S., Nasser had given Israel a better
chance of success. Sadat didn‘t want to commit the same mistake. He
would make efforts to improve the relationship.
Sadat‘s strategy vis-a -vis Israel took general forms. It called for a
military offensive, which would have a limited objective, to break the
political stalemate, followed by a diplomatic offensive designed to give
expression to the newly acquired Arab leverage. The strategy involved (a)
the resumption of an all- out war, involving the total military capacity in
a concentrated offensive effort, (b) coordination of the fighting with the
Syrians, (c) a sharp turn towards the U.S. after the maximum military
aid had been secured from the Soviet Union, (d) the use of oil to give
weight to the diplomatic offensive,
(e) the calling for a peace conference at which Arab representatives
would negotiate with the Israelis under the auspices of the U.N. [92] (f)
Then, Egypt‘s development was to be stimulated through external (Arab
and Foreign/ U.S.) capital and expertise and the U.S. should become a
full partner in any settlement between Egypt and Israel. Peace to Sadat
was a foreign policy solution aimed at creating an economically stable
and investment attractive environment.
It was intended to allocate resources back to development under a new
strategy of economic liberalization linked to a process of rapprochement
with the West, and implied the abandonment of the socialist modes of
economic development, as well as a distinct break with the Soviet Union.
Sadat‘s strategy concerning the U.S. was designed to outbid Israel and
secure U.S. support in the peace negotiations and to obtain U.S. Military
and economic aid at an increasing rate. This was the situation which
evolved through out the 1970‘s Egypt and Israel became the two major
recipients of bilateral aid from the ―U.S. Aid‖ programme.
Thus, as it seems a distinctive economic environment surrounded
economic decisions or those decisions were economic factors were of
importance during the 70‘s. Lobbies and interest groups specially geared
to economic questions became more mobilized and active in affecting the
decision- maker. Moreover, the role the economic team at the Cabinet
and the specialized committees at the People‘s Assembly played all
suggest – as will be presented in the following paragraphs – that when it
came to economic issues presidential decision- making was some what
mitigated.
As far as economic decisions were concerned several players were
involved in the decision – making process. The Assembly had a role in the
making of the economic policy through the passing of laws and their
discussion, amendment or ratification.
Nevertheless, the Assembly did not have the initiative to present laws
since the executive authority made all the economic laws during the
process of moving towards the policy of economic liberalization, e.g., law
43 of 1974 (the main ―infitah‖ law) and its amendment 32 of 1977 (main
law opening Egypt for foreign investment and international companies)
[93] Law 43 practically faced no opposition when presented by the
Cabinet, and the Assembly ratified it within three weeks from the date of
its presentation.
However, it ran into some opposition during its amendment in 1977, and
the discussions lasted for eight sessions. However, it could not prevent
the privileges granted to foreign investments in the law, due to increased
pressure from both the specialised Committee in the Assembly and by the
new infitah groups who benefited from the new economic policies. [94]
What should be noted, however, it‘s the important role played by the
specialized Economic Committees in the Assembly such as the Committee
for Planning, the Budget Committee and the Economic Affairs
Committee.
These studied the law drafts presented by the Cabinet, discussed them
and then presented them with recommendations, usually of support, to the
Assembly. They thus played an important role in supporting the
government‘s policies which reflected the President‘s choices and
reading of the economic problems and his view of the best policies to
tackle them successfully.
According to the internal regulations of the Assembly Articles 37 – 44,
these Committees examine and study projects, discuss them with the
Government, can call on officials directly to collect any information, and
then present its report to the Assembly. [95]
The analysis of their role revealed that they played a vital role in support
of the government. This took the form of support before the government
presented a draft as the Committee would set the stage and provide the
right environment for its acceptance in the Assembly.
For example, the Committee for planning and budget examined some of
the public sector companies that were losing and recommended in its
report and in its response to the 1974 budget to sell 49% the companies‘
shares to the private sector or to open investment for capital and
financing to the public sector from the private sector. [96] Later, in a few
months, the Government presented a draft law to dismantle public
companies and the law came into effect in 1975.
Similarly, the joint Economic and Legislative Committee supported the
government when the Assembly was considering the draft law that was
presented by the government as amendment of law 43 of the open- door
policy. [97] The Committee, which was headed by Dr. Mohamed Ibrahim
Al- Dakrury demanded not only amending it but cancelling the whole
law. [98] It also amended the law for banking and credit to facilitate the
revisions of foreign banks‘ accounts.
The head of these Committees played a significant role in passing and
approving laws presented the Government, and, as a result, their choice
was of special importance as it was expected to affect the role of the
Assembly in the choice of economic policy. For that reason the Speaker
of the Assembly had the authority to choose the leaders of these two
Committees. [99] The leadership of the Committee was held by five
personalities over 11 years (1970 – 1981).
Dr. Al Dakrury was an advisor to Sadat before his appointment as head
of the Committee, and was later appointed as Chairman of the Egyptian
International Bank. Also, Mr. Ahmed Fouad, was Chairman of ―Banque
Misir‖ before his appointment as head of the Committee, and was later
appointed as Chairman of Egypt/ Romania Bank.
Despite the shared responsibility of the whole Cabinet, the Financial and
Economic Affairs team at the Cabinet the one that had the burden of
planning and choices of alternative economic policies and in the latter
stage of implementation as well.
A supreme committee within the Cabinet formed of the Prime Minister
and his deputies, examine draft laws submitted by different Ministries to
make sure whether it conforms to the general policy lines. After, the
Committee agreement it is presented to the whole Cabinet, but still the
economic team is very important in preparing the draft and passing it
through supreme committee.
These teams included the Ministers of Industry, Agriculture, Tourism,
and Transportation, in addition to other basic Ministries as Planning,
Finance, Economy and Welfare.
It can be argued that the periods in which the economic team enjoyed
larger room for manoeuvrability in taking decisions was when they had
direct contacts with Sadat and were entrusted with important issues
during that sensitive period of economic transition in Egypt. In other
words their authority was derived from of that Sadat and that can be
demonstrated by an example.
Dr. Abdel- Aziz Hegazy was appointed as Deputy Prime Minister and
Minister of Finance, Economic and External Trade in Sadat‘s own first
Cabinet, formed in 27/3/1973. His economic team included Dr. Al- Sayed
Hegab- Allah Al- Sayed as Minister of Planning, Dr. Ismail Sabri
Abdullah as Minister of State for Planning.
The appointment of Dr. Hegazy in this post strengthened the relations
and contacts between Sadat and the economic team as Sadat was
preparing for the October 1973 war. This appointment continued until
the formation of Sadat‘s second Cabinet in 26/4/1974 in which Hegazy
became the first Deputy to the Prime Minister giving him more power and
freedom of movement for the economic team. Sadat‘s third move was to
appoint Hegazy as Prime Minister in the Cabinets formed on 25/9/1974
with the prime responsibility of implementing Infitah.
Other examples of the same nature is the economic team which Dr. Abdel
Menen Al- Qisony headed in 9/11/76 when appointed Deputy Prime
Minister for Financial and Economic Affairs. He was not himself in
charge of any Ministry in his team, but only led them. This team enjoyed
a large degree of manoeuvrability in economic policy- making as
there was direct contact with the Prime Minister, the Cabinet and the
President. He was responsible for attracting foreign investment and
capital in a period of pressures from the IMF.
Sadat also faced during the period of the open- door policy a
number of influential economic groups comprising those who had been
negatively affected by the Nasserite nationalization of property and by the
land reforms. Some of the new big landlords who benefited from the
infitah laws, selling desert land for agricultural purposed for extremely
cheap prices, some of the leaders of the public sector who benefited from
their status and had aspirations and ambitions of making more profit
outside it, and, finally, the Egyptian expatriates in the oil- rich Gulf
States, began to demand changes in the system of economic planning and
management in favour of a more liberal outward looking economy.
A close interrelation between senior officials and the new changes
in economic policy began to occur, an example of which can be drawn
from the U.S. Aid annual report on Egypt which stated;
―If there is a lesson to be drawn from the experience with policy
reform in agriculture that might help with policy dialogue in other
sectors, it is the importance of dedication to the cause of reform on the
part of key senior officials in the sector. The two sectors of the economy
where reform initiatives have had impressive success over the past few
years, agriculture and tourism, both had committed and bold leadership.
[100]
The influence of the Infitah groups began to increase within the political
system and in the government itself, as their interests ambitions coincided
with many state bureaucrats and governmental officials during the
process of economic liberalization in the mid 1970‘s.
An example of such new groups was the American Egyptian
Chamber of Commerce which was a new interest group formed in Egypt
in 1975 in association with the open-door policy with the objective of
promoting Egyptian-U.S. Economic Cooperation especially with regards
to American investments.
The chamber included a number of big businessmen from the two
countries whose recommendations were presented to the decision maker
through the economic team at the Cabinet to take it into consideration
when setting and planning economic policies. The reports on the
meetings of the chamber during the mid 1970‘s (1976-1978) revealed that
the topics discussed were related to policy matters more than issues of
implementation and investment problems in Egypt.[101]
The Egyptian side gave a lot of attention to these meetings on the
highest level. Sadat gave it personal attention, as did the government
economic team which were keen to announce their immediate response to
the demands of foreign investors and their immediate response to the
demands of foreign investors and their full cooperation to remove any
barriers. An example of this special attention was reflected in the
amendment of Law 43 of 1974 of the open-door policy by Law 32 of
1977which was issued after the chamber‘s report of august 1977 on
investments and the problems it faces in Egypt.[102]
The chamber of became an interest group as it began to have more
contacts with the economic team at the cabinet and with Sadat and as its
demands coincided with those of the new economic policies of Egypt. In
addition to which its members represented influential personalities in
business, banking and industry in both countries.
Similarly, the establishment of the Association of Egyptian
Businessmen in 1977 was of significance as an interest group since its
formation was connected mainly to Egypt‘s new open-door policy, and its
stated objective was:
―The association seeks to support the open-door economic policy
and to have an impact on the decision-maker so that businessmen can
have a positive role in formulating economic policy.‖ [103]
The main factor that gave the association more weight is its
independent financing and its large budget which makes it quite
independent of Government control, as its main financing came from the
large membership fees of its member, as well as from its branch
committees (Egyptian-French, Egyptian-Canadian, Egyptian-British
Committees).
On examination of the board list, as well as the members list, it
became clear that it was formed of businessmen active in the open-door
policy. They were chairmen of companies, banks, public sector firms, and
export-import business activity.
Among the members were ex-Ministers, especially from the
economic team, as Dr. Hegazy, Mr. Abdel-Rahman El-Shazly, Minister of
Internal Trade and welfare in Hegazy‘s Cabinet. [104]
In addition, a number of other directors of public sector
companies, were given honorary membership by the association. Among
them was engineer Adel-Gazareen chairman of ―Nasr Car Company‖
who became later Vice-Chairman of the association.
The association was formed in 1977 by Abdel-Rahman El-Shazly
on the basis of the special associations law of the Ministry of Social
Affairs. [105] They had strong contacts with the President and Minsters
and had an impact on them.e.g, the association played a role in the
formulation of the regulations of the Commercial Syndicate, broker
works, allowing exporters to keep their hard currency revenues, and tax
exemptions for a period of time for new commercial activity.[106]
In the new Peoples‘ Assembly‘s formed after the 1976 elections, some
businessmen were elected as independents, as well as on lists of the
ruling party, Hizb Misr. The debate in the 1976 Assembly elections
between the nominees of the three newly formed Minabir (platforms)
representing the left, right and centre of the ASU was on issues of infitah,
the future of the public sector and the determination of the living
conditions.[107]
On the other side, Sadat allowed the Chambers of Commerce to be in
charge of the National Development Banks that made available cheap
credit to provincial businessmen who led the local organisation of the
ruling party. New inter- Chamber Federations were formed among
related syndicates in the health and technical professions. These, in turn,
were encouraged to collaborate with the private sector in establishing
their own profit- making enterprises.
Sadat also built a good relationship with the private sector by allowing
the organization of a powerful new constituency for the businessmen
through the creation of a huge syndicate for commercial employees to
facilitate their business activities in Egypt, coordinate their demands and
present them to the decision maker. The Commercial Syndicate was
formed mostly of those connected with private banks, previous public
sector employees and new joint venture firms. During the 1970‘s
―interchangeability‖ between the public and private sectors became a
familiar pattern and in the process more technocrats tied their futures to
that of the private sector.
The development of new open- door policy were determined to a large
extents by the personal links that had developed between a public sector
and an emerging private sector (both local and foreign) able to present
the technocrats with alternative opportunities and better prospects for
their careers.
These linkages certainly acquired particular importance and
influence on the policy formulation during the 1970‘s and was facilitated
by the flow of capital from the Gulf countries both as investments and as
remittances of Egyptians working there until 1977 ( Sadat‘s visit to
Jerusalem) and later by the flow of U.S. aid and investments in the
second half of the 1970‘s. [108] Sadat appeared to be personally in
favour of an increasing role for the free enterprise and private sector as
this was a part of his broader strategy of paving the way for closer
economic ties with the western countries, as well as promoting a peaceful
settlement to the Arab- Israeli conflict.
In the final analysis, several conclusions regarding the nature of
decision- making in Egypt‘s Foreign Policy during Sadat‘s period of rule
(1970 – 1981) can be made here.
Sadat‘s decision to visit Jerusalem in November 1977 was taken
and implemented on a very limited scale according to what Sadat himself
said, about discussing the initiative with his Foreign Minister Ismail
Fahmy only. Sadat has also accentuated in most of his speeches and
interviews following his visit the solo nature of this decision. This was
confirmed by a number of other officials as they were stunned when
hearing Sadat‘s initiative in the People‘s Assembly. Among them was Dr.
Boutrous Boutrous Ghali, Minister of State at the Cabinet then, who said
―I did not know of it despite the fact that I was Minister of State at the
Cabinet since October 13, 1977 and was completely surprised‖ [109]
Similarly, Osman Ahmed Osman said in his memoirs, that on the
return of Sadat from talks with President Hafez al- Assad of Syria
immediately after his initiative, he, Mamdouh Salem the Prime Minister,
Hosni Mubarak the Vice President , Mohamed Hamed Mahmoud the
Secretary of Misr Party and Hassan Kamel the Head of the President‘s
office tried to convince Sadat to postpone his visit to Jerusalem as none
of them believed that Sadat would really do it [110].
To let two people only know before such a strategic, historical and
sustentative decision was announced in his address to the People‘s
Assembly on 8/11/77, namely Hassan Tohamy the Deputy Prime Minister,
even knowing the preparatory role of eh first and the almost negligible
role of the second in the pre-decision stage, makes us understand the
degree of centralization of decision at the hands of Sadat.
Moreover, Sadat‘s choice of Tohamy at the Presidency to handle the
direct negotiations that took place in Morocco with Moshe Dayan,
Israel‘s Foreign Minister before the initiative, confirms the importance
the important role of the institution of the Presidency to Sadat as it
provided support in the implementation of his decisions, and reflects his
dependence on the closest of his confidants in the Presidency rather on
any person outside his most trusted and chosen staff.[111]
Moreover, this indicates also that the role of the foreign office was
a very weak one in Sadat‘s initiative as it was limited to Sadat‘s ―letting
Fahmy know‖ of what he was thinking and had already decided. Sadat
seems to never have intended to consult him in the first place as became
evident once he mentioned it and Fahmy objected, he never discussed it
later with him, letting Fahmy think that Sadat had abandoned the idea.
Sadat did not, but on the contrary ignored the main catalyst of Foreign
Policy, his Foreign Minister. And as a result Fahmy resigned as well as
Mohamed Riad, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs as he did know and
was not involved as well.[112]
Sadat used the Foreign Office in the post-decision period in the
implementation of his initiative and later in the peace process.
Thus, the formulation of Foreign Policy in the 1970‘s was more or
less strictly the prerogative and sole responsibility of the Chief executive.
The extent to which the top executive consulted the council of his
personal associates including the Minister of Foreign Affairs was a
matter of personal choice/decision. Sadat‘s monopoly over foreign affairs
tended to be total, as participation of the subordinate state organs, such
as legislature, Foreign Ministry, Cabinet took the form of information
and advice in the pre-decisional stage and implementation in the postdecisional stage. In the end Egypt‘s foreign policy accurately reflected
Sadat‘s view.[113] Those who disagreed, resigned, as indicated earlier.
Despite the presence of several political and economic institutions,
as well as political parties in Egypt during the 1970‘s all of them were
characterized by a weakness in their role in the decision-making process
in the field of Foreign Policy, in spite of the responsibilities and
authorities given to them theoretically in 1971 constitution as well as the
multi-party system law. There was a decision making structure, but Sadat
was the focal point of decisions and his assistants were in his view more
staff employees than advisors. The role played by several political
institutions in supporting and endorsing his decisions, gave the President
great freedom of manoeuvre.
Similarly, the role of other institutions was equally weak as none of
them knew of Sadat‘s intentions before their announcement officially. But
its roe only came in the post-decision stage ,e.g., the Assembly was used
as a vehicle to legitimize the initiative and mobilize the masses to support
it.
The only institution that had a role, but only a minimal one was the
National Security Council. Despite the fact that it did not take any
positive roe in the pre-decision stage, however, Sadat mentioned the idea
of visiting Jerusalem in his meeting with the Council on 30/9/1977 when
secret meetings between Israel and Egypt had already taken place in
Morocco. And also in the second meeting on 5/11/1977 after Sadat came
back from Romania where the issue of visiting Jerusalem became
crystallized.
It is likely that Sadat called these two meetings and especially the
second to let the Council know indirectly of the problems in the path to
the Geneva Peace Conference and of the possibilities of going to Israel
directly to seek peace and break the deadlock.
Thus, it seems that the presidential nature of the decision making
process has affected Egypt‘s foreign policy and its economic orientation
during the 1970‘s. Foreign policy was the domain privy of the president
and his close associates to the extent that decisions were to a large
degree centralized and personalized, limiting the role of institutions. The
influence of different individuals upon the process depended not on their
position in the cabinet or the bureaucracy or the presidency.
However, this might apply to certain foreign policy decisions in the
1970‘s. but certainly not to all, as the choice of particular economic
policies was not a preference that Sadat took in vacuum. We should not
overstate the importance of personal attributes, for despite the weak role
of the political institutions, Sadat was not entirely free to indulge his
biases and idiosyncrasies. Domestic conditions including the internal
balance of pressure groups and the mass population‘s demands resulting
from economic constraints and hardship had a considerable impact on
the decisions of Sadat.
Especially as the ―break riots‖ of 1977 demonstrated the urgency of
taking decisions to face the realities of underdevelopment, limited
resources and social unrest, economic factors occupied a crucial role in
the determination of his foreign policy priorities and objectives. The open
door policy and the liberalization attempts that followed were introduced
and directed to the task of mobilizing external resources to ease the
growing population- resource gap.
Sadat attempted to connect the process of improving the economic
situation to the foreign policy of Egypt, particularly that of making peace
wit Israel. As a result, the dividends of peace began to flow in the form of
massive economic assistance from the US-AID programme to Egypt and
Israel, in the wake of their signing of the peace treaty and their
establishment of full diplomatic relations. (The size and development of
the US-Aid to Egypt and its political under pinning will be dealt within
the following chapters.
The next chapter will examine the interaction of Sadat with the
domestic economic environment and how it contributed to the choice of
the peace policy with Israel.
(a)First the chapter will establish the facts of the deteriorating
economic situation in Egypt, then will attempt to analyze its political
underpinnings. Egypt faced a severe economic crisis in the 1970‘s with a
chronic balance of payments deficits, shortages in the basic commodities
needed, mounting external debt, high unemployment and inflation rates
and an infrastructure that badly needed rebuilding.
Egypt was facing a growing population- resource gap as resources were
not enough and capital investments and financial support was badly
needed.
(b)Domestically the failure of Nasser‘s developmental socialist model
which relied heavily on the managers and technocrats and how it
contributed to a desperate economic situation that prompted the shift to a
more open liberal economic policy. Given the higher rewards that would
be obtained by managers and technocrats from private bossiness,
compared with those offered by public enterprises in a poor society with
egalitarian ideals, the experiment was bound to depart from its socialist
ideals and to witness an eventual liberalization of the system.
(c)This transformation in economic policy can not be isolated from its
political environment. Nationally there was the development of a
powerful professional and entrepreneurial elite for whom, particularly
since the oil boom, the public bureaucracies was no longer the only
channel for social promotion. ―The Infitahin‖ constructed a network of
pressure groups within the state apparatus and in the ruling party as well
as in the people‘s assembly.
The state eventually became more linked to the Infitah interests. As
privatization penetrated the ruling party and the alliance wit the new
bourgeoisie grew, a new ruling party emerged which was more
committed to and an effective proponent of the open door policy and of
closer links with the west.
Even the military establishment became more involved wit the west
through the increasing size of military aid, training and cooperation
programmes with Egypt during the 1970‘s.
(d)The political implications of why various economic options were
chosen by Sadat are crucial to understand, explain and analyze why such
policies were taken. Economic constraints and developmental policies
were meaningful in so far as they referred to a particular set of political
ambitions, visions, and interests of the leadership.
On one side, Sadat had in mind that he would never surrender the
state‘s power of control over the economy, for its political authority
rested on that control. The leadership made a point through out the
1970‘s to persist constantly before the public by holding the prospect of
social disharmony and political breakdown if it was forced to abandon its
role as provider of economic security.
On the other side, Sadat during the 1970‘s made an effort to form
alliances with several corporate associations in the business community
and among middle –class professionals. His own positive attitude
towards the idea of allowing a new capitalist class to emerge and to have
closer ties with the Arab Gulf states and U.S. facilitated the emergence of
this free enterprise and private sector ideology.
The following chapter will examine the interaction of Sadat with the
external economic environment at both the regional and international
level, and how the choice of the peace policy with Israel was associated
with these external economic considerations.
(a)Regionally the oil boom that took place in many Arab Countries
following the war of October 1973 stimulated a growing perception in
Sadat‘s mind that Egypt might be able to benefit from some of these
sudden wealth as a means of solving some of its chronic economic
problems. Arab aid as well as an increasing volume of remittances sent
from the Egyptians working in the oil exporting countries was apparently
too strong a temptation for the capital-hungry Egypt to brush aside. The
utilization of such resources required important policy changes on the
part of Egypt that involved above all a reconsideration of her previous
radical principles, both as guiding orientation for the country‘s
development and as a sought after outlook for the entire region.
In Sadat‘s view external finance was badly needed and required
and political element had been added so that the message to the masses
was that the stability of the country depended to a large extent on the
influx of foreign capital whether in the form of assistance or investment .
On the international political scene this economic dimension forced itself
on the foreign policy behaviours of Egypt and we witnessed a more
peace-seeking policy and closer ties with the U.S and western countries
and this became known as ―peace for aid‖ in the Middle East. As a result
Egypt began to receive massive aid from the U.S. during the 1970‘s.
Egypt‘s international position to the super powers facilitated the
achievement of Sadat‘s economic objectives, as the U.S. could hardly
leave Egypt alone to mind the difficult problems of its ―own site‖ and to
look after its external dilemma of imbalance between people and
resources without providing a hand of help.
The U.S. which became a full partner in the peace process, continuously
attempted to maintain the peace process and strengthen it by providing
aid to both Egypt and Israel. The increase in the size of U.S. economic
and military assistance coincided with the shift in Egypt‘s foreign policy.
The political underpinnings of the aid programmes to Egypt was
articulated in the 1981 A.I.D (Agency for International Development)
document as follows: ―our high level of aid to Egypt is promised on the
belief that Egypt‘s peace initiatives are crucial to that objective and that
these efforts must be supported by a growing economy.‖
The size of U.S assistance increased substantially in the late 1970‘s
to replace Arab funds that were withdrawn because of Egypt‘s signing
the peace treaty with Israel and to keep Egypt‘s peace momentum by
meeting its broad needs through the provision of food aid, economic aid
to improve its infrastructure, its social services and technical assistance
for agricultural and industrial projects, as well as loans to support
Egypt‘s balance of payments difficulties.
( c)Thus Sadat‘s rationale of Infitah aspired to combine Egyptian human
resources with Arab capital and western know-how for the benefit of
Egyptian development and as a result there evolved three major Egyptian
connections in the 1970‘s: the Arab conservative connection during the
early 1970‘s , the U.S. connection form 1974, and the Israeli connection
from the mid 1970‘s.
END NOTES
1. Margaret Hermann, ―Effects of Personal Characteristics of
Political leaders on Foreign Policy‖ in Maurice A. East, Stephen
A. Salmor and Charles Hermann, Why Nations Act (Beverely Hills,
California: Sage Publications, 1978),pp. 49-68. And Margaret
Hermann, ―Explaining Foreign Policy Behaviour using the
Personal Characteristics of Political Leaders‖, International
Studies Quarterly, Volume 24, March 1980, pp.7-47
2. ‗Ali. H. Dessouki The Foreign Policies of Arab States. (Boulder:
Westview Press, 1991), p.8-9.
3. Richard Rose and, Azza Sulayman , eds. Presidents and Prime
Ministers. (Washington, D.C: American Institute for Public Policy
Research, 1981).
4. Gamal Abdel Nasser The Philosophy of the Revolution. (Buffalo,
N.Y: Economica Books, 1959) p.87
5. I bid, p. 87-88
6. Ashraf Marwan, Former advisor at the Presidency, under
President Anwar Al-Sadat. London, 10 February, 1994.
7. Shaheen Ayubi. Nasser and Sadat: Decision making and foreign
policy (1970-1972). Long wood Academic (long wood Academic
Wakefield: New Hampshire, 1992). P. 127-130
8. I bid, p. 127-130.
9. Heykal Hasanin‘ Sphinx and Commissar (London: Collins Sons,
1978), p.714.
10.Abdel-Megid Farid. Nasser: The Final Years (London: Icatha
Press, 1994), p.2.
11.Interview with former Minister of Foreign Affairs Mahmud Fawzi
Majalat Al-Diblumasi, [In Arabic], July 1992, Cairo, Egypt.
12.The RCC consisted of eleven officers. After Nasser‘s removal of
General Mohamed Naguib during 1954, the remaining ten were:
Abd Al-Hakeem Amer, Salah Salim, Kamal Ed-Din Hussein,
Hassan Ibrahim, Abdel-Latif Baghdadi, Anwar Al-Sadat, Khalid
Mohyiddin, Zakaria Mohyddin and Hussein Shafei.
13.Salwa S. Jum‘a Al-Diblumasiyya al-Misriyya Fi al-Sab‘inat:
Dirasa Fi Dur Al-Za‘ama.[In Arabic] (Centre of Arab Unity
Studies: Beirut, 1988), pp. 67-74.
14.Anwar Al-Sadat. In search of Identity: An autobiography. (New
York: Harper and Rau, 1978), p[.313
15.Sadat‘s address to Seminar on Art and Generations on 31 January
1975, in, Speeches and Interviews by President Anwar al-Sadat
January – June 1975, State Information Services, Cairo, Egypt, p.
75.
16.I bid, p. 56.
17.Anwar al-Sadat. In Search of Identity: an Autobiography. (New
York: Harper and Row, 1978), p.1.
18.Sadat: Autobiography, Op. Cit. p. 314.
19.I bid, p.7.
20.I bid, p. 17-18
21.Sadat‘s Interview with Egyptian National T.V. on the occasion of
this 59th Birthday, December 25, 1978, in, Speeches and Interviews
by President Anwar al-Sadat July- December 1978, State
Information Service, Cairo Egypt, p. 276.
22.Nabil Raghib. Sadat: Ra‘id Harakat Al-Islah Al-Fikri. [In Arabic]
(Cairo: Dar Al-Ma‘arif, 1975), p.97 and p. 205.
23.Sadat‘s Interview with Egyptian T.V, 25 Dec. 1978, Op-Cit, p.276.
24.Sadat began his speeches on many occasion by ―In the name of
God, Sons and Daughters‖, among them, his address on the
occasion of the creation of the youth organization on 24 July,
1973; his speech delivered at the University of Alexandria on 26
July, 1978; his speech to the popular rally held by the Democratic
National Party in Minufiyya on 22 August, 1978, and several
others can be cited, from, Speeches and Interviews by President
Anwar Al-Sadat, 1973-1978, State Information Service, Cairo,
Egypt.
25.P.J. Vatikiiotis. The History of Modern Egypt (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1989), p.424.
26.Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal. Kharif Al-Ghadab:Qisat Bidayt Wa
Nihayt, Asr al-Sadat. [In Arabic] (Publication and Distribution:
Beirut, 1983), p.105.
27.Jum‘a Op.Cit, p.79.
28.Ismail Fahmy, a distinguished career diplomat who headed
Egypt‘s diplomatic mission in the UN in New York, had been
Ambassador to Vienna and represented Egypt in several
international organizations and conferences.
29.Ismail Fahmy, Negotiating For Peace in the Middle East
(Baltimere: John Hopkins University Press, 1983), p.115.
30.I bid, p.13.
31.Paul Rivlin, The Dynamics of Economic Policy Making in Egypt
(New York: Praeger Publishers, 1985) p.16.
32.Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith (New York: Bantam Books, 1982)
p.342.
33.Jihan Sadat. A woman of Egypt, (Simon and Schuster: New York,
1987), p. 367 and p.372.
34.I bid, p.371.
35.Sadat: Autobiography, Op. Cit, p.6.
36.Jon Kimche, ―The Riddle of Sadat‖, Midstream, 20:4 (April 1973),
p.12 – 13.
37.Sadat Speeches July – December 1978, Op. Cit, p.41.
38.Jamal Zahran, Siyasat Misr al-Kharijiyyah [In Arabic] (Cairo:
Madbuli Press, 1983), p. 223 – 224.
39.Structure and organization of the presidency, The Archives of the
Presidency, Kubri al-Qubba, Cairo, Egypt.
40. Ashraf Marwan, Op. Cit.
41.Previous Source.
42.The Archives of the Presidency, Op. Cit.
43.Al-Ahram Archives, Ijtima‘at Majlis Al-Amn Al-Qawmi, [In
Arabic], Al-Ahram, Cairo, Egypt.
44.Interview with former Head of Intelligence service under Sadat in
the Egyptian weekly Rose Al-Yusif ―Hiwar Ma‘ Kamal Hassan
Ali‖, 26 April 1982, Cairo, Egypt. [In Arabic].
45.Interview with former Secretary of Central Committee of the ASU,
Foreign Minister and Prime Minister under Sadat in the Egyptian
daily newspaper Al-Ahram, ―Hadith Ma‘ Mustafa Khalil‖, 14
November 1982, Cairo, Egypt. [In Arabic].
46. Dalyl Tanzym Wa Akhtsasat Wazarat Al-Kharjyh Al-Masryh.
Wazarat Al-Kharjyh, 1962.
47.Former Advisor at the Presidency, Op. Cit.
48.―Kalimat al-Sadat Lil-Umma‖ [In Arabic] Al-Ahram, 12
November 1976, al-Ahram Archives, Cairo , Egypt.
49.Muhammad I. Kamil. Al-Salam al-Da‘I fi Itifaqiyyat Camp David.
(al-Saudia: Dar-Nashr al-Saudi, 1982), p.179, p. 608).
50.Rivlin, Op.Cit, p.14-15.
51.Al-Dustur, Op.Cit.
52.Madh btit al-Jalsah al-Thamaniyya Wal-Thamanin, al-Fasl alTashri‘; al-Thani, Dawr al-Inigad al‘Aadi fi 25/8/1977. (Majlis alSha‘ab: Amant al-Alaqat al-Kharijiyah Wal-‗Ammah, Cairo,
1977), 25/8/1977 issue.
53.Taqrir Injazat Majlis al-Sha‘ab 1971 – 1976 (Majlis al-Sha‘ab:
Amanit al-‗Alaqat Al-Khariyiyyah Wasl-‗Ammah, Cairo, 1976),
p.11.
54.Fuad Mursi, Hazat al-Infitah al-Iqtisadi (Beirut: Dar Al-Wahda
Lil-Nashr, 1975), p.75
55.Malaf gadiat Al-Salihiyyah, Al-Ahram al-Iqtisadi, Number 688, 22
March 1982.
56.Hadith Lil-Mudir al-Sabiq Lil-Sharika Al-‗Amah Li-L-Batariyyat‖,
Al –Ahali, 15/1/1983.
57.Al-Ahram 27/12/78,6/3/78, 19/5/78, and Al-Akhbar on 28/1/78,
4/2/78, 19/5/78, and Al-Jumhuriyyah 3/3/78.
58.Rivlin, Op.Cit, p.19.
59.al-Jaridah al-Rasmiyyah –al – Dusture al-Da‘im li-Misr (Cairo, 11
September, 1971).
60.Ijtma‘t Majlys Al-Wizara, Archives of the Cabinet ―Ri‘asat alWizarah‖ [In Arabic], Cairo, Egypt
61.Sadat Speeches January – June 1975, Op. Cit, p.79.
62.I bid, p.141.
63.Al-Dustur, Op. Cit.
64.Zahran, Op.Cit, p.200-201.
65.I bid, p.200 -201.
66.I bid, p.87.
67.I bid, p.88.
68.Former Advisor at the presidency, Op. Cit.
69.Hinnebusch, Egyptian politics under Sadat: The post-populist
Development of an authoritarian-Modernizing State. (London:
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1988), p.41-42.
70.Jawdat Jamil Bahiat. The impact of External and Internal factors
on Economic orientation: The case of Egypt. (Florida University
Press, 1991), p.90-92.
71.I bid, pp. 87-91.
72.Dustur 1971, Op. Cit.
73.R. Hinnebusch, Op. Cit., p. 167.
74.I bid, p.42.
75.Sadat: Autobiography, Op. Cit, p. 245 -246.
76.I bid, p. 246.
77.Sadat: Autobiography, Op. Cit, p. 213.
78.Anwar al-Sadat. Waragat ‗Amal Uktubar. [In Arabic], Central
Committee of the ASU, April 1974, Cairo, Egypt.
79.Jihan Sadat, Op. Cit, p. 368.
80.Sadat‘s interview with the editor of the daily Kuwaiti newspaper
Al-Siyasa, on 12 April 1975 in, Speeches and Interviews by
President Anwar al-Sadat January – June 1975. State Information
Service, Cairo, Egypt. July 1975, p. 177 – 178.
81.I bid, p. 79.
82.Jihan Sadat, Op. Cit, p. 368.
83. Waragat ‗Amal Uktubar, Op. Cit.
84.Vatikiotis, Op. Cit, p. 430.
85.Sadat Speeches January – June 1975, Op. Cit, p.80.
86.Ashraf Marwan, Op. Cit.
87.I bid
88.Vatikiotis, Op. Cit, p. 416.
89.Nazih Ayubi, The State and Public Policies in Egypt since Sadat
(Reading: Ithaca press, 1991). (299-300).
90. Anwar al-Sadat ―Where Egypt Stands‖, Foreign Affairs, 51:1
(October 1972), p. 108.
91.Interview with Sadat in the American Programme ―Face the
Nations‖, CBS, 10 January 1971, as quoted in Raphael Israeli The
public Diary of Sadat, Parts 1-3. Leiden : E.J. Brill, 1978), p.2122.
92.Speeches and Interviews by President Anwar al-Sadat. 1971, 1972,
1973, State Information Service, Cairo, Egypt. Other sources on
the logic of Sadat‘s foreign policy include his autobiography, and
Raymond w. Baker Egypt‘s Uncertain Revolution under Nasir and
Sadat. (Princeton: University Publications, 1978).
93.‗Ali H. Disuki eds. Tatawr Al-Dimugratiyyah Fi Misr.[In Arabic]
(Cairo: Nahadit Al-Sha‘b Press, 1986) p. 96 -98.
94.(People‘s Assembly Hansards) Madbatah al- Jalsah al-Rabi‘a
Wal-Arba‘in, al-Fasl al-Tishra‘i: al-Thani, D‘ar al-In‘igad al-‗Adi
al-Thani fi 11/5/1977 (Majlis Al-Sha‘ab: Amanit Al-‗Alaqat AlKharijiya Wal-‗Ammah, Cairo) 11 May 1977 issue (in Arabic).
95.Al-La‘ihah al-Dakhiliyyah Li-Majlis al-Sha‘ab, 1979, [In Arabic].
(Majlis Al-Sha‘ab, Amanit Al‘Alaqat Al-Khariyiya Wal-‗Ammah,
Cairo, 1979), Articles 37 – 44.
96.Taqrir Tatawwr al-Qita‘ Al-‗Am ―Lajnat al-Khittah al‘‘Am WalMuazanat‖ (Majlis al-Sha‘ab: Amanit al-‗Alaqat al-Kharijiya
Wal-‗Amah, Cairo, 1975).
97.Madbatah al-Jalsah al-Rabi‘a Wal-Arb‘ayyn. Op. Cit.
98.Madbatah Majlis Al-Sha‘ab. Al-Fasl Al-Tashri‘ Al-Thani, alIniqad al-Adi, Al-Thani Fi 27/11/1977 (Majlis al-Sha‘ab: Amanit
al-‗Alaqat al-Kharijiyya Wasl-Amah, Cairo, 1977), 27/11/1977
issue.
99.Al-La‘inhah al-Dakhiliyyah Li-Majlis al-Sha‘ab, al-Maddah 3738. 1979 [In Arabic].
100.
U.S. Aid Annual Report on Egypt, U.S. Embassy, Cairo,
Egypt, 1981 p.5.
101.
Disuki, Op. Cit, p. 103 and 113.
102.
I bid p. 104 – 105.
103.
Annual Report of the Egyptian Businessmen Association
(EBA), 1983 Edition, Cairo, Egypt. P. 5, See Also, Monthly Reports
of the Association, 1977 – 1978.
104.
Engineer Hassan al-Shafei, Head of tax and customs
Committee and Vice-Chairman of the Association: Cairo, October
1993.
105.
Annual Report of EBA, Op. Cit .p. 6.
106.
Vice Chairman of EBA, Op. Cit.
107.
Jaridat al-Ahram Li-‗Am 1976, Al-Ahram Archives, Cairo,
Egypt.
108.
Vice Chairman of EBA, Op. Cit.
109.
Interview with Dr. Boutrus Ghali, Al-Akhbar on 19
November 1981, and an article by him ―Asrar Lam Tunshar ‗an
Rihlat al-Salam‖ in Majalat Uktubar, 25 April 1982, p. 16 – 18.
110.
Osman A. Osman. Safhit Min Tajrubati (al-Maktab al-Misri
al-Hadith, Cairo, Egypt, 1981), p. 409 – 413.
111.
Ashraf Marwan, Op. Cit.
112.
Mahmud, Riad. Al Bahth ‗an al-Salam Wa-l-Sira‘ fi al-Sharq
al-Awsat 1948 – 1978. (Beirut: al-Mu‘asasah al-Arabiyyah Li-lNashr, 1981), p. 538.
113.
Ashraf Marwan, Op. Cit.
CHAPTER THREE
THE DYNAMICS OF EGYPT'S
FOREIGN POLICY IN THE 1970s:
EXTERNAL & INTERNAL FACTORS
(I) INTRODUCTION
A proper analysis of the foreign policies of Arab countries should
accept that it is a part of the general situation in developing world. In the
developing world. In this sense, the foreign policy process cannot be
separated from the domestic social structure or the domestic political
process in these Arab countries. These countries are also a part and
parcel of a world system. They are greatly affected by international
stratification. It is thus important to see how external constraints and
global structures (e.g. relations with big powers and the International
Monetary Fund) affect their foreign policy-making process and
international behaviour.
Some scholars perceive foreign policy primarily as a process or an
activity whose main objective is the mobilisation of external resources for
the sake of societal development. Students of Egypt‘s open-door ―infitah
policy‖, his rapprochement with the US and peace with Israel were
motivated by economic troubles at home and a desire to attract foreign
investments and capital.
In the 1970‘s, Egypt restructured its foreign policy orientation, and
this restructuring reflected a partial trade-off between economic and
political-military objectives as perceived by Egypt‘s primary decisionmaker, President Anwar Al-Sadat.
Foreign policy restructuring entails a major alteration or break-up
in the orientation of an actor in favour of establishing a new set of
commitments and alliances both on the international and regional levels.
It is more than a change in tactics or instruments of policy
implementation; it also goes beyond the fluctuations and oscillations
which are characteristic of the foreign policy behaviour of many
developing countries. It involves a basic reconsideration of an actor‘s
perceptions of the global or regional system and of the country‘s role
within that framework. Indicators of the restructuring of foreign policy
orientation include patterns of diplomatic, economic, military, and
cultural relations between the country and the outside world. (1)
In the 1970‘s Sadat managed to change the name of Egypt (from
the United Arab Republic to the Arab Republic of Egypt), its flag, and its
national anthem. Economically, Egypt moved away from Nasser‘s Arab
socialism and centralised economy to a more liberalized economy
encouraging private foreign and Arab capital. As a part of Egypt‘s
rapprochement with the West Egypt‘s one-party political system (the
Arab Socialist Union), which had existed since 1953, was gradually
replaced by a form of controlled political pluralism in the 1970‘s
(Minabir in the people‘s assembly, then a limited number of political
parties: El-Tagmah, El-Watany, and El-Amal).
At the regional level, it changed its alliances in 1971-1973 and
forged a close relation with pro-Western, conservative oil-producing
states, particularly Saudi-Arabia, and moved away from more radical
Arab countries as Algeria, Libya, Iraq, Yemen and Syria. At the global
level, Egypt moved from an essentially pro-Soviet position until the early
1970‘s that included the granting of naval land air facilities to a virtual
strategic relationship with the United States by the end of the 1970‘s. (2)
Studies of foreign policy restructure or alliance switching show
that change occurs for various reasons: security considerations,
economic pressures, perceptions of gross external dependency and
asymmetrical vulnerabilities, ideological disputes, change of strategy,
and nationalism.
In Egypt‘s case, there are three crucial variables to be
considered.(3). The first concerns relations between the superpowers. In
breaking with one superpower, the timing for the small country is
essential. The alternate superpower has to be both able and willing to
assume the role instead. Egypt shifted alliances in the early 1970‘s from
the Soviet Union to the U.S.
A second variable is the personality traits of the leadership.(4). This
variable is particularly important in developing countries, as Egypt was
characterised by low political institutionalisation, lack of democratic
institutions and an absence of proper decision-making bodies in the
1970‘s. We should not, however, overstate the importance of personal
attributes, for leaders do not act in a vacuum, and they are not entirely
free to indulge their biases and idiosyncrasies. They are affected by a set
of external as well as internal factors in making their decisions.
The third variable is the domestic conditions, including the internal
balance of political groups, the degree of political stability, and the
economic conditions that are particularly important for their impact on
foreign policy. The Egyptian case in the 1970‘s is an example of the
primacy of economics in foreign policy formulation and orientation.(5)
The analysis will underline therefore issues such as the role of
domestic economic factors in foreign policy change, the perception of
foreign policy as resource mobilisation activity, the strain resulting from
the divergence between role conceptions developed in the 1950s and
1960s, and the new domestic, regional and international environment
that Egypt had to deal with in the 1970‘s. Furthermore, it will examine
the dilemma of maintaining a balance between reliance on foreign aid
assistance, and the protection of the country‘s independent role on both
the regional and international scene.
Thus, two basic premises will be guiding the analysis in this
chapter:
(a) The foreign policy moves and processes of Egypt cannot be explained
without taking as a basis this country‘s whole ―societal context‖ (i.e. its
domestic, economic and social conditions), given the tendency in the
literature analysing this era to explain Egypt‘s policy moves as mainly a
reflection of Sadat‘s personality and choices(i.e. psychological
reductionism). Thus, the societal context needs to be re-emphasised here.
(b) This societal context is part of, and penetrated by, a wider global one:
the world system wit its ―super-actor‖ whether they are national (the
USA and the USSR), or international (the IMF and the World Bank), or
regional (conservative versus radical Arab countries).
The impact of external factors on policy-making of developing countries
is crucial and consequently has to be integrated in the analysis.(6). Egypt
on its part internalised the dichotomy of the international system between
the ―free world‖ and the ―communist camp‖. Change at the global level
in this case manifested itself in Egypt‘s rapprochement with the West
(and/or its regional allies as Saudi Arabia) and estrangement from the
East (and/ or its regional allies as Libya).
II)
EGYPT‘S FOREIGN POLICY RE-ORIENTATION
FROM EAST TO WEST
Foreign policy orientation is a state‘s general attitudes and
commitments towards the external environment. It is its fundamental
strategy for accomplishing its domestic and external objectives and
aspirations. The analysis of Egypt‘s orientation will address questions
as: What were the country‘s general foreign policy objectives? How do
we explain their adaptation by the leadership (Sadat)? How do
orientations change and what are the sources of change?
President Sadat assumed office in October 1970 under
circumstances that obliged him to emphasise continuity with him to
emphasise continuity with his predecessor‘s policies. Gamal Abdel
Nasser‘s sudden death left a legacy that restrained Sadat‘s freedom to
deviate from Nasser‘s domestic and foreign policies. In a meeting of the
Arab Socialist Union on November 23 July, 1971, Sadat presented a tenpoint program for national action that included ―working for Arab unity,
playing a role in the Non-aligned movement and in the Third World
revolutionary movement‖ (7). Sadat said:
Egypt believes that there is no way out for African, developing and small
third world countries to avoid the cold war except by adhering to
nonalignment‖(8).
In an essay entitled ―Where Egypt Stands,‖ published in Foreign
Affairs periodical in 1972, Sadat reiterated again the basic tenets of
Nasser‘s foreign policy: Nonalignment and Arab unity‖(9).
Sadat lived in Nasser‘s shadow until 1973, when he acquired legitimacy
in his own right through successes of the Egyptian army in the 1973
October War against Israel. The new legitimacy allowed him to pursue
domestic and foreign policies different from Nasser‘s.
Egyptian general foreign policy objectives in the 1970‘s, as
articulated and acted upon by Sadat. Were as follows:(10)
(1) The restoration, preferably by negotiation, of Egyptian territories
occupied by Israel since 1967;
(2) The termination of the war with Israel, as the economic costs had
become unbearable;
(3) The improvement of relations with Washington, as the United States
was the only country that could influence Israel. In this respect Sadat
said in a speech on 22 July, 1972:
―Israel cannot think or act without a prior green light from the
US‖.(11)
(4) The rejuvenation and modernisation of the economy through the
import of modern Western technology, foreign and Arab private capital
and investments; and finally,
(5) The modification of Egypt‘s global and regional policies in order to
better pursue these objectives.
In the view of Dr. Abdel-Aziz Hegazy, the Prime Minister of Egypt in
1974, Sadat‘s interests concentrated on three issues*:
----------------------------*My
Questionnaire and Interview with Dr. Abdel-Aziz Hegazy, former Prime Minster of
Egypt in 1974, Cairo, 25.3.2000.
―(1) The return of land through negotiations. Sadat was a believer
of peace through negotiations with the participation of the U.S. as a
leading power with good relations with Israel (defends the security of
Israel and believes in the role of Egypt in the stability of the regions), (2)
the return of Egyptian relations with the Arabs and the world at large, (3)
the immediate development of the deteriorating economy.‖
During the 1960‘s and until the early 1970‘s, Egypt was the
cornerstone of Soviet Middle Eastern policy, and Egyptian-Soviet
relations were thought of as a model of cooperation between the Soviet
Union and a non-Communist developing country. In this respect Sadat
said:
―The US and Israel are orchestrating a campaign in the region against
our close friendship with the Soviet Union‖ (12).
Ironically, since 1967 Soviet influence and prestige have
correlated adversely with the fortunes of Egypt. The 1967 defeat greatly
enhanced the Soviet presence as Egypt began to rebuild its army
destroyed badly by Israel, and the successes of 1973 contributed to its
waning as Sadat became more focused on making peace with Israel
through U.S. medication.
In the 1970‘s era, Egyptian-Soviet relations were primarily
characterised by mutual mistrust and hostility. (13). Disagreement
between the two countries covered a broad range of issues: politicaldiplomatic (renewed relations wit the United States as a means of
resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict); military (armament, compensation
for arms lost in the 1973 war, and Egypt‘s decision in 1975 to diversify
its sources of arms supply); and economic (rescheduling of Egypt‘s Soviet
debt).
Sadat‘s relations with the Soviet Union were strained most of the
time. In May 1971, he removed from office Ali Sabri‘s group that was
perceived as the pro-Moscow group (as explained earlier in chapter one).
The Soviet was so worried that they rushed a high level delegation to
Cairo to sign a friendship and cooperation treaty wit Egypt. Sadat found
the timing inappropriate because the treaty would appear to be a
reaction of the purge of ―Soviet friends‖. He suggested postponing it till
the celebrations of July two months later, but the Soviets insisted in an
attempt to keep their influence and presence in Egypt, and the treaty was
signed on May 27,1971, less than two weeks after the purge of this group.
Also, on July 19,1971, a communist coup in Sudan was crushed
with Egyptian help. Against Soviet advice to recognise the new regime,
Sadat ordered the Egyptian air force to transport to Khartoum a
Sudanese paratroops brigade that was stationed in Egypt. The brigade
was instrumental in the countercoup of 22-23 July (14). The Soviet Union
also obviously mistrusted Sadat‘s intentions and his attempts to build
bridges with Saudi Arabia and the United States. Sadat commented on
this, stating that :
―The U.S. is not with us but it no longer works against us now.
We will build our relations from now on, on a balanced
approach towards the two super powers. I am a nationalist Egyptian and
Egypt does not follow the US or the Soviet Union‖(15).
In July 1972, Sadat asked the Soviet military officers and experts to leave
Egypt for good. According to Sadat, it was a matter of upholding
Egyptian independence and sovereignty. On that occasion he said:
― The Soviet thought at one time that they had
Egypt in their pocket, and the world has come
think of the Soviet Union as our guardian. I
wanted to tell the Russians that the will of Egypt
was entirely Egyptian; I wanted to tell the whole
world that we are always our master. Whoever
wished to talk to us should come over and do it,
rather than approach the Soviet Union‖(16).
As early as November 1973, it seemed that Sadat was ready to put
the U.S. option into effect. He saw that the Soviet Union could provide
limited help in the pursue of a peaceful resolution of the Arab-Israeli
conflict. The Soviets officially co-chaired the Geneva conference held in
December 1973 with the United States, but Hassanin Heikal, Chief editor
of the Al-Ahram newspaper then (a close confidant of Sadat in the early
1970‘s) reports that ―they were relegated to the role of spectators‖(17).
The Soviets felt uneasy about the developing Egyptians-U.S.
relations. They did not like Henry Kissinger‘s (U.S. Secretary of State
then) monopoly, with Egyptian consent, of the negotiation process, which
resulted in the first disengagement agreement between Egyptians and
Israeli forces on January 20,1974.
Diplomatic relations between Egypt and the United States were
resumed in March 1974, followed by Richard Nixon‘s visit in June (18).
In its aftermath, the Soviet Union expressed grave concern towards the
Egyptians/U.S. rapprochement, and Egypt‘s Foreign Minister then,
Ismail Fahmy, was dispatched to Moscow to discuss the future of SovietEgyptian relations.
Egyptian-Soviet relations suffered another setback in August 1976,
when the Soviet Union supported Libya in its dispute which surfaced in
1977 with Egypt. In July 1977 three Soviet technicians were reportedly
killed during an Egyptian-Libyan border clash. This resulted in
condemnation from Moscow and Egyptian counter charges of Soviet
involvement in Libya. In December 1977, in the aftermath of Sadat‘s visit
to Israel, the Soviet consulates in Alexandria, Port Said, and Aswan were
closed (19).
The Soviet Union opposed Egypt‘s new peaceful policy towards
Israel claiming that it would not lead to a comprehensive peace in the
area which was also basically in line with the critical positions of other
Arab countries against Sadat‘s peace initiative as Syria, Iraq and Algeria
who were Pro-Soviet. Sadat, however, proceeded with his plans and
began to ask for a more active U.S. role in the making of peace in the
Middle East, hand in hand with Egypt as a full partner.
The military dimension of the Egyptian-Soviet rift was also very
complex. It included problems of arms supplies, economic costs of the
weapons, and interpersonal conflicts between Egyptian and Soviet
officers. First there was the problem of Soviet reluctance to respond to
Egyptian demands for arms.
Lt. General Saad Al-Shazly, chief of staff of Egyptian forces (1971-1973),
stated:
― As a monopoly supplier the Soviets could and
did control their release of arms to us: the
weapons, the amounts, and their dates of delivery‖.(20).
Throughout 1971 and 1972, little in the way of arms reached Egypt. In
the aftermath of October 1973, the problem surfaced again. Egypt
requested Soviet compensation for arms lost in the war, as the US
compensated Israel and the Soviet Union had done for Syria. For months
to follow Egypt‘s requests were met with rejection. In April 1975 Sadat
declared:
― I have requested from the Soviet Union a postponement of
Debt payments as they did with Syria‖ (21).
Sadat continued in 1975 and 1976 to declare that if the Soviet Union
continued to ignore Egypt‘s demands and took no notice of its economic
situation and inability to make immediate payments for its arm
purchases, he would have to do something about it (22). Sadat was also
critical of the Soviet massive armament of Libya, whose relations with
Egypt began deteriorating as of the mid 1970‘s.
He perceived this as an avenue of Soviet penetration in the area
and a potential threat to Egypt. Kamal Hassan Ali, Head of Intelligence
in 1977 states:
― Relations with Libya deteriorated to the maximum
when it attacked with Soviet weapons an Egyptians
military border unit along the Egyptian/Libyan borders
in 2/7/1977‖ (23).
Another dimension of the military rift was the result of
interpersonal conflicts between Egyptian and Soviet officers before 1972,
which left a complicated legacy throughout the 1970‘s between Egyptian
and Soviet officers.
Saad Al-Shazly, who worked closely with senior Soviet officers,
said:
―The Russians have many qualities, but concern for human
feelings are not among them. They are brusque, harsh, frequently
arrogant and usually unwilling to believe that anyone has
anything to teach them‖ (24).
That obviously created a lot of problems wit Egyptian officers.
Soviet facilities in Egypt presented another touchy issue for the Egyptian
military. The Soviets had exclusive control over a number of airfields in
several ports-Alexandria, Port Said, and Al-Salloum (near the Libyan
border) (25). During the years 1974 to 1976 Sadat continually reminded
his people of the Soviet legacy in Egypt.
He played on the sentiments of the military by reminding them that
―bases‖ were a breach of Egyptian sovereignty, and news and media
commentators followed in his footsteps emphasising the theme that the
liberation of Egypt from Soviet influence and domination was a matter of
national security.
A third dimension of military relations was financial. Although the
famous 1955 arms deal was largely a barter agreement, hard currency
was increasingly the required medium of payment for Soviet weapons and
personnel.
In a December 1971 interview, Sadat told Arnaud de Borchgave of
Newsweek that:
―all the Soviet officers and men are paid in hard currency,
not in Egyptian money. We are paying through the nose for
the maintenance of these Soviet Sam crews in Egypt‖(26).
By the mid 1970‘s, Shazly said that:
―the Soviet Union was demanding payment in full and
hard currency for all new equipment‖.(27)
Sadat was to cite this frequently in his speeches to show that the
Soviet were not the true friends of Egypt they claimed to be, as they were
trying to corner and pressurise Egypt.(28)
In December 1975 Egypt‘s non-military debt to the Soviet Union
was $4 billion: its military debt totalled 57 billion (29). Despite repeated
requests, the Soviet Union refused to reschedule the debt. In response, on
December 14, 1975, Sadat announced that Egypt would not sign the trade
protocol with the Soviet Union for 1976.
Economic and trade relations similarly decreased during this
period. Economic aid agreements with Egypt declined from $1 billion in
1955-1964 to $440 million in 1965-1975, and then to zero in 19751979.(30)Trade relations also declined after Egypt‘s cotton embargo, and
its refusal to maintain the large trade surplus used to service its debt. The
Soviet share of Egyptian exports fell from 50% in 1970-1975 to less than
15% in 1975 . Egyptian imports from the Soviet Union also dropped from
about 25% of Egypt‘s total imports to around 10% during the same
period (31).
The culmination of these events was on March 14, 1976, when
Sadat, in a speech to the Egyptian Parliament, unilaterally abrogated the
Soviet-Egyptian Friendship treaty signed in May of 1971.He gave five
reasons for his action (32):
―(1) the Soviet Union showed no desire for peace in the
middle East: (2) the Soviet Union opposed Egypt‘s new
economic policy: (3) the Soviet Union not only refused to
reschedule Egypt‘s debts but also demanded interest on
its military debts: (4) the Soviet Union refused to overhaul
Egyptian aircrafts and pressured other Eastern bloc countries
and India to do so: and finally (5) the Soviet Union had
previously a hand in Ali Sabri‘s pro-Moscow group plot to
overthrow Sadat in 1970.‖
In August 1977 Sadat suspended cotton exports to the Soviet Union
and two months later announced that debt repayments would be
suspended for ten years beginning January 1978 (33)
This move brought Egypt closer to the U.S. On this issue, U.S.
President Gerald Ford sent a secret message to Sadat on the 19 th of
March 1976. The original document states:
―I want to convey to you my admiration for the action you took in
your address to the People‘s assembly on March 14, with respect to the
Soviet Friendship treaty. My Government and the American people have
viewed this as a courageous assertion of the self-respect and dignity and
non-aligned course of the Egyptian nation. You can count on our strong
support. The policy of moderation that you have pursued, with us,
through so many difficult periods in recent years will, I am convinced,
continue to bear fruit. I look forward to redoubling our joint efforts for a
just peace in the Middle-East‖ (34).
By 1979 a few Soviet technicians and a limited volume of trade were the
remnants of a once flourishing relationship. In the political crisis of
September 1981, when the Soviet embassy in Cairo was accused of
helping some Egyptian communist elements and indulging in spying
activities, most of those technicians were ordered to leave the country as
well (35). Then the Egyptian-Soviet relations came almost to a complete
halt.
The Egyptian experience with the Soviet Union shows that a developing
country can still manoeuvre to maximise its opportunities within the
global context; however, it is impossible to eliminate the constraints
attached. Despite that Egypt established close military and economic
cooperation with the Soviet in the 1960‘s and early 1970‘s, it was still
very constrained in the type of weapons it could receive and by limits on
their use even in its own bases.
It can be argued from the analysis of Egyptian-Soviet relations and from
the review of Sadat‘s speeches in 1972 & 1973 that the departure of
Soviet experts in 1972- in his mind-was a necessary prerequisite for
launching the October War of 1973, a step towards re-established
diplomatic relations with the U.S. in 1974, and hence fro paving the way
for Egypt‘s two major policy shifts later, namely; a) the move towards a
market economy in 1974 and; b) Sadat‘s visit to Jerusalem in 1977 and
the making of peace with Israel.
Sadat‘s decision to seek better relations with the United States was
influenced by political hostility towards the Soviets, and by his belief that
the United States would help solve Egypt‘s pressing economic
problems.(36) Sadat was a pragmatist, realist with little attachment to
grand revolutionary ideologies as Nasser.
East-West détente in the early 1970‘s gave him the chance he looked for.
Sadat saw détente and explained it to the Egyptians as the alliance
between the two superpowers and their agreement on international
issues. The Arabic word used to describe détente, ―wifaq‖, is actually the
equivalent of ―entente‖. Sadat stated:
― The world has headed towards a state of ‗wifaq‘,
What I can explain as ‗Infitah‘.(37)
In 1971 and 1972 Sadat viewed the delay in Soviet arms deliveries as a
pressure on Egypt. He saw in it an agreement between the two
superpowers to prevent a new major war in the area, and interpreted the
inclusion in the U.S. Soviet summit communiqué of May 1972 of the
expression ―military relaxation‖ in reference to the Middle East as
justification for his suspicious.(38) .This made the shift from one
superpower to another less difficult, especially that he was convinced that
the U.S. was the only power which had leverage over Israel to make
concessions to withdraw fro Arab occupied territories.
In Sadat‘s speeches on the Soviet Union one detects a feeling of
frustration. Sadat spoke of the many promises that were given and never
fulfilled, the many messages from Cairo that were unanswered.(39)
Sadat described the Soviets as ―crude and tasteless
People‖(40).
By the late 1970‘s, Sadat became a publicly avowed anti-Soviet; he
cautioned the United States against underestimating the Soviet and
pointed out that U.S. influence in the region was on the wane.(41).
Sadat volunteered the services of the Egyptian army and territory to
combat the Soviet threat. Egyptian officials began to speak of the Soviet
encirclement of the Middle East through surrogate states with the
objective of establishing and overthrowing moderate pro-Western Arab
regimes, particularly Egypt. In September 1981, Egypt‘s Minister of
Defence stated:
―Egypt is now in a very critical situation because
of the threats surrounding it on the West and from
the South‖.(42).
Sadat‘s strategy concerning the United States was designed to achieve
three objectives: first, to attempt to partially outbid Israel and secure
U.S. support in the peace negotiation; second, to obtain U.S. military and
economic aid at an increasing rate; and third, to assure pro-Western
Arab governments that their opposition to Egypt‘s relationships with
Israel would lead nowhere, and that Egypt remained the centrepiece in
U.S. strategy in the region.
Following the 1973, war, Sadat‘s Egypt changed dominant partners and
was reintegrated into the Western system but constraints remained. We
have only to look at Egypt‘s dependence on U.S. food and wheat
shipments, the 1.3$ billion in annual U.S. aid during the 1970‘s, the U.S.Egyptian growing military ties, and the borrowing facilities on the
international market that Egypt would not have access to without the help
of the United States, to comprehend such constraints.
As early as November 1973, in his first meeting with Henry Kissinger,
Sadat talked about common strategy between Egypt and the U.S. to
remove Soviet influence for the Middle East. He expanded his strategic
vision to encompass a local triangular in the Middle East, an axis of the
three predominant anti-Communist powers: Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the
Shah‘s Iran.(43).
Sadat believed in the importance of close economic and strategic links
with Western countries, particularly with the United States. Antiimperialism, Afro-Asian solidarity, and similar clichés were out of date
and n longer useful to Egypt in his view.
Sadat was attracted to the American way of life, the luxury of consumer
society, and the capitalist path of development. Politically, the United
States held ―the key to peace in the area,‖99% of the cards of eh game,‖
he frequently stated. He said in a speech I 1977:
―without the help of the U.S. in every stage, peace
can not be achieved in this region. The U.S. controls
99% of the cards and therefore we have to seek its
assistance in every step‖.(44).
This was because the United States was the only country that could exert
influence on Israel. Sadat‘s view of the superpowers was reinforced by
his desire to cement his relations with oil-rich conservative Arab
countries, whom he perceived as a vital source of economic aid.
III. The indicators of the shift in Egypt‘s Foreign Policy
The shift in Egypt‘s relation with the two blocs for the period 1971-1981
can be measured by three indicatorsa) international agreements in four
issue-areas,(b)number and level of official visits, and (c) Egypt‘s volume
of imports from the USA and the USSR 1974-1978.
a) Number and distribution of Egypt‘s agreements with the two blocs:
TABLE 1: Egypt‘s Agreements with the Two Blocs in Four Issue-Areas
1971-1981.(45).
Year
Diplomatic
Military
Cultural
Economic
Total
1971
3
1
1
2
7
1972
2
1
-
1
4
1973
3
-
-
-
3
1974
2
-
-
7
9
1975
1
5
2
9
17
1976
3
3
-
16
22
1977
2
7
-
18
27
1978
1
3
-
2
6
1979
2
6
1
3
12
1980
1
5
-
-
6
1981
1
7
-
3
11
TOTAL
21
38
4
61
124
TABLE 2: Distribution of Agreements with the Two Blocs according to
Issue-area, 1971-1981.(46).
Issue Area Diplomatic
Military
Cultural
Economic
Total
4
23
2
40
69
-
3
-
7
10
4
26
2
47
79
Countries
USA and
Major
Western
Countries
Soviet
Union and
Major
Countries
Total in
each
issue-area
TABLE 3: Distribution of International Agreements with Each Bloc by
Year: 1971-1981.(47)
Country
USA and Major
USSR and Major
Total
Year
Western
Socialist
Countries
Countries
1971
1
4
5
1972
6
1
7
1973
1
-
1
1974
6
2
8
1975
12
1
13
1976
11
1
12
1977
14
1
15
1978
2
-
2
1979
3
-
3
1980
5
-
5
1981
8
-
8
TOTAL
69
10
79
The evolution of both the number and direction of these
agreements is clear. The great majority of agreements are in issue-areas
very sensitive to a developing country: economic (60% of the total) and
military (33%), which together accounted for more than 90% of the total.
As for the direction of these agreements, it is striking by its
imbalance. At the beginning of the 11-year period, the ratio of the
socialist to the Western countries was 4:1. By the end of the period,
Western countries had not only caught up with the socialist ones but also
greatly surpassed them with a ratio of 8:0 in their favour.
b) High-level official visits to and from Egypt.
A simple weighting scheme has been devised and runs as follows:
Head of State: King, President, Gulf States Sheikh‘s, 1st Secretary of the
Communist Party, Chancellor (3)
Vice-President, Prime Minister or Head of Government, Chief of the
Arab Socialist Union, Chairman of the Supreme Soviet (2)
Vice-Prime Minister, Defence Minister, Minister of the Economy,
Secretary of State, Foreign Minister (1)
TABLE 4: Number and level of Visits with the Two Blocs 1971-1981.(48)
Country
East
West
Grand
Total
Year
1971
No
From
To
Total
Egypt
Egypt
From
To
Total
Egypt
Egypt
2
2
4
2
2
4
8
Value
4
4
8
2
2
4
12
1972 No
4
3
7
-
-
-
7
Value
10
5
15
-
-
-
15
1973 No
1
-
1
1
1
2
3
Value
2
-
2
1
1
2
4
1974 No
1
3
4
5
5
10
14
Value
1
5
6
9
5
14
20
1975 No
-
1
1
5
7
12
13
Value
-
1
1
9
13
22
23
1976 No
2
-
2
-
5
5
7
Value
2
-
2
-
12
12
14
1977 No
2
1
3
5
4
9
12
Value
4
3
7
7
11
18
25
1978 No
1
-
1
12
6
18
19
Value
3
-
3
31
11
42
45
1979 No
-
1
1
3
3
6
7
Value
-
3
3
8
7
15
18
1980 No
2
-
2
7
1
8
10
Value
3
-
3
13
3
16
19
1981 No
-
-
-
3
2
5
5
Value
-
-
-
9
4
13
13
Total No
10
11
26
43
36
79
105
Value
29
12
50
89
69
158
208
The data about visits confirm the same trend of Egypt‘s
reintegration within the Western system. At the beginning of the 11-year
period, the number of the exchange of visits with the East and the West
was equal. But the level of the personalities exchanging these visits
between Egypt and Socialist countries was much higher than those
between Egypt and the West, by a ratio of 2:1. At the end of the period,
however, the situation had been reversed.
Thus the comparison between Egypt‘s exchange of visits (both
number and level) with East and West show the increasing influence of
contacts with the West: ratio for number is 0:5, and for level is 0:13-in
favour of the West.
The trade data go in the same direction.
c) Egypt‘s Imports from the USA and the USSR: (49)
TABLE 5: Distribution of Egyptian Imports between the USSR and the
USA, 1974-1978 (millions of US dollars)
Year
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
USSR
209
232
191,3
270,8
279,9
USA
289
581
624,2
688,1
1 247,6
Partner
Without taking into consideration the decrease in Egypt‘s imports
from the Soviet Union in 1976 because of the tension over debts
explained earlier, the general trend was a slow rise between 1974 and
1978:44%. The trend for the USA however was more than seven times
that increase in the same period: 321%. This trend of increasing imports
from the USA was an integral part of increasing integration in the
Western system. Research by various Egyptian economists confirms both
the evolution of the data and their significance.(50).
A Closer look at the tables indicates another important point: the
timing for the manifestation of the change. For both the agreements and
the visits, the big change in favour of the West started around the year
1974 and accelerated afterwards. Thus in 1973, the East-West visit ratio
as far as number was concerned was 1:2, 1974: 4:10, 1975: 1:12. As for
the visits‘ level the East-West ratio was 2:2 for 1973, 6:14 for 1974, and
1:22 for 1975.
Taking into account the time-lag between visits and the conclusion
of agreements, the trend for agreements is the same: the East-West was
0:1 in 1973, 2:6 in 1974, 1:12 in 1975, 1:11 in 1976, 1:14 in 1977.
The year 1974 was the year of the adoption of the Infitah economic
policy, and the year 1977 was the year of the surprising visit to Jerusalem
by President Sadat when both Egypt and Israel were still officially at
war. Is there a link between these two events? This brings us to the
explanation of the policy change.
IV
WHY THE SHIFT TO THE ―INFITAH‖ ECONOMIC POLICY
Egypt faced a severe economic crisis in the 1970‘s with a chronic
balance of payments deficit, shortages in the basic commodities needed,
mounting external debt, high unemployment and inflation rates and an
infrastructure that badly needed rebuilding. Egypt was facing a growing
population-resource gap as resources were not enough and capital
investments and financial support was badly needed.
There were three major economic problems that become
increasingly acute in 1970‘s. First, the economy experienced widening
financial disequilibria. The twin balance of payments (current account)
and budget deficits averaged 10 and 23 percent of GDP respectively,
Second, economic growth was achieved at the cost of increased
vulnerability, resulting from an over-reliance on oil as the engine of
growth. While oil accounted for less than 3 percent of GDP, 11 percent of
exports and less than 1 percent, 59 percent and 20 percent, respectively,
in the fiscal year 1982. Consequently, non-oil exports declined: cotton
export dropped by over 50 percent in constant prices over the 1974-81
period; textiles by 40% and manufacturing exports, as a whole, by 46
percent. Third, pervasive distortions in the Egyptian economy became
increasingly serious impediments to economic growth (51).
Sadat in this respect stated:
―Egypt now is facing great problems in its economic system (52)
Population growth has had an adverse impact and has limited
Egypt‘s developmental efforts. Total population in 1975, according to the
―UN Demographic Yearbook of 1975‖, was 37.5 million. It became 42
million in 1980 and 45 million in 1983. The population was increasing
during (1975-1985) by 1 million every ten months. The population growth
between 1966-1976 was about 65,000 persons each month, or 2,141
everyday and one very 41 seconds. The population explosion has
aggravated unemployment problems, increased the dependency ratio,
augmented rural migration to urban centres, and led to the diversion of
resources from investment to consumption needs. (53). Egypt was a prime
example of the structural imbalance between population and material
resources in the 1970‘s. Population was increasing at a rate far beyond
the growth in arable cropped land, far beyond educational and industrial
development.(54).In the 1970‘s Egypt had to use its limited hard currency
to import foodstuffs. This made the country more dependent on the
outside world and more vulnerable to the fluctuations of world food
market prices. The extent and consequence of food dependency was a
major policy concern in Egypt during this period.
Economic factors increasingly began to play a crucial role in the
determination of Egypt‘s foreign policy objectives.(55). In the 1970‘s
Egyptian debts increased by a yearly average of 28%, compared with the
13% in the 1960‘s. (56).
By 1980, inflation was running at nearly 30% a year, debts reached a
total of $17 billion, and the GNP per capita was $580. Unemployment
rose from 153 thousand in 1971 (1.8 % of labour force) to 209, thousand
in 1974 (2.3 %), 850, thousand in 1976 (7,7 % of labour force) to 2011
thousand in 1986 ( 14,7%) (57). By 1981 Egypt received $2.2 billion in
Western aid, of which half came from the United States.(58).
In his own reading of the economic factors and considerations that
affected the decision maker (Sadat) in the 1970‘s, Dr. Abel-Aziz Hegazy,
the Prime Minister of Egypt in 1974 stated*:
―There were many economic factors that affected Sadat‘s decision,
namely: (1) the need to finance the military needs and security, (2) the
need to continue the economic development of Egypt at reasonable rates
of growth, (3) to keep the philosophy of social justice and continue the
aid programmes already implemented, (4) to carry on the policy of full
employment through the appointment of graduated (university and
intermediate schools), (5)to develop a training programme which can
introduce professional and technology expertise, (6) to keep the budget
deficit and the balance of trade and payments at a minimum, (7) to keep
inflation at a minimum through control of prices and (8) a balanced
monetary policy with the minimum use of loans (especially foreign) and
government bonds or notes‖.
-----------------------* My questionnaire and interview with Dr. Abdel-Aziz Hegazy, former Prime Minister of
Egypt in 1974, Cairo, 25.03.2000.
Sadat‘s decision to launch the open-door policy and then make peace
with Israel was motivated by economic considerations; the need to
redirect defence expenditures (37% of the GNP in 1977) to re-invest it in
the economy, to encourage foreign and Arab private capital, and to pave
the way for more U.S. aid. Even before this step, Sadat Arab policy and
his forging of a Cairo-Riyadh alliance had also been predicated on
expected economic gains.
On this issue Sadat said:
―I want from our Arab brothers an economic plan for
Egypt as the Marshal plan (59).
Domestically the failure of Nasser‘s development socialist model
which relied heavily on the managers and technocrats contributed to a
desperate economic situation that prompted the shift to a more open
liberal economic policy. (60). Given the higher reward that would be
obtained by managers and technocrats from private business, compared
with those offered by public enterprises in a poor society with egalitarian
ideals, the experiment was bound to depart from its socialist ideals and to
witness an eventual liberalisation of the system.
Sadat‘s understanding of the open-door economic policy was
articulated in two main points in the ―October Working Paper‖ of 1974
(61): The first was that it was essential to get rid of all the negative
aspects of the Egyptian economic experiment, then to reform the public
sector and set the circumstances to encourage the private sector and to
support its activities.
The second was to underline the real need for external resources
to
develop and strengthen the economy through the attraction of Arab oil
surpluses and the encouragement of foreign investment in Egypt.
The basic economic objectives of Infitah as presented by Sadat were
(62): (a) a shift to a market economy in the hope of attracting foreign
capital investments, (b), a greater determination to strike the balance
between industrial and agricultural development, (c), a decision to
revitalise the existing public sector, (d) to secure finance and credit the
international markets with IMF‘S approval.
In 1974 Sadat inaugurated Al-Infitah, the open door economic policy, to
lure foreign investment into Egypt. He justified the Infitah on the
following grounds, (1) the failure of Nasser‘s socialist experience; (2) the
need to utilise Arab capital available from the oil-producing Gulf
countries: and (3) the international context of détente between the two
super powers (63). From an economic standpoint, the two essential
purposes of infitah were, first, to attract export-oriented foreign
enterprises by the establishment of duty-free zones, and second, to attract
foreign capital through a liberal investment policy. However, the ultimate
goal of the policy was to set the stage for the development of the Egyptian
economy through joint ventures and projects bringing together Egyptian
labour, Arab capital, and Western technology and management expertise
(64).
Dr. Abdel-Aziz Hegazy comments on the open-door policy stating
that* ―It was a must. The motives behind it were totally national and
essential‖.
This transformation in economic policy can not be isolated from its
political environment. Nationally there was the development of powerful
professional and entrepreneurial elite for whom, particularly since the oil
boom, the public bureaucracies were no longer the only channel for
social promotion. ―The Infitah‖ constructed a network of pressure
groups within the state apparatus and in the ruling party as well as in the
people‘s assembly (65). This network consisted of bureaucrats and high
officials, who used their positions, in cooperation, with old capitalists
who were the remains of the pre-1952 era, and the relatives of many
politicians as well as some members of the people‘s assembly, to push
forward their interests. The state and its law makers affect it by Sadat‘s
economic choices, his close ties with the U.S., and the pressures and
interests of this network within the system, began to legislate laws that
served the purposes of the new Infitah. This was largely supported by the
U.S., the West, and the I.M.F. in the name of a drive towards
liberalisation and privatisation (66).
The state then eventually became more linked to the Infitah interests.
In his official letter of assigning Dr. Abdel Aziz Hegazy as Prime Minister
to form the new government in 1974, Sadat stated:
--------------------------*My questionnaire and interview with Dr. Abdel-Aziz Hegazy, former Prime Minister of
Egypt in 1974
―The government has to implement completely and fully all the policy of
Infitah by giving all necessary facilities, confidence, and contacts for all
those who are willing to participate and cooperate with us.‖ (67)
Dr. Hegazy, who was the Prime Minister who launched the open-door
policy in 1974, said to me on this issue*:
―The objectives of the open-door policy in 1974 was (1) to diversify the
relations with the world at large instead of depending on the East, (2) to
make use of surplus funds available in the oil producing countries, (3) to
make use of the technology developments taking place in the West, (4) to
promote foreign direct investment at large, (5) to create a climate and
legal framework to bring back Egyptian capital abroad.‖
As privatisation penetrated the ruling party and the alliance with
the new Infitah, a new ruling part emerged which was more committed to,
and an effective proponent of, the open-door policy, and closer ties with
the West (68). Even the military establishment became more involved
with the West through the increasing size of military aid, training and
cooperation programs between Egypt and the U.S. during the 1970‘s
(69).
The political implications of why various economic options were
chosen by Sadat are crucial to understand, explain and analyses why
such policies were taken.
-----------------------* My questionnaire and interview with Dr. Abdel-Aziz Hegazy, former Prime Minister of
Egypt in 1974
Economic constraints and developmental policies were meaningful in so
far as they preferred to particular set of political ambitions, visions and
interests of the leadership.
On one side, Sadat had in mind that he would never surrender the
state‘s power of control over the economy, for its political authority
rested on that control. The leadership made a point throughout the
1970‘s to persist constantly before the public, by holding the prospect of
social disharmony and political breakdown, if it was forced to abandon
its role as provider of economic security.
On the other side, Sadat made an effort during the 1970‘s to form
alliances with several corporate associations in the business community
and among middle-class professionals (70). According to a prominent
study by the Egyptian economist Adel Hussein the following could be
counted among the prominent businessmen in 1976 :( 71)
―Two ex-premiers, twenty –two ex-ministers, dozens of exchairmen of public enterprises, under-secretaries of state and
governors…Most of the big deals were done by these people‖.
Other researchers on Egypt as Ayubi add this point that: (72)
―…One of the officials of the General Investment Authority was
found to hold the following posts in foreign business, in addition to his
public one: member of the board of directors of Bank Misr-Iran, member
of the board of the Egyptian-American Bank and delegate member of the
Abu Dhabi Investment Company. Using the network of contacts and
officials normally started their own so-called trade agencies, importexport firms, or consultation bureaus.
Quite frequently… these officials cannot wait until they retire or
resign from their jobs, but will start to engage themselves in private
business of the same nature (e.g. competing) as that of their public office,
sometimes exploiting the facilities and personnel of the public for the
promotion of their personal projects in Egypt or outside it.
Sadat‘s own positive attitude toward the idea of the allowing this
new capitalist class to emerge and to encourage it to have closer ties with
the Arab Gulf states and the U.S. facilitated the emergence of this free
enterprise and private sector ideology and society in Egypt by the mid
1970‘s.
Dr. Abdel-Aziz Hegazy elaborated on this by stating that*:
―Because of Infitah, the new class of entrepreneurs whether the old, those
returning from the Gulf, those Egyptians who immigrated in the past,
some of the leaders who worked in the public sector, succeeded to make
relations with the upper echelon of government and banks.‖
-----------------------------* My questionnaire and interview with Dr. Abdel-Aziz Hegazy, former Prime Minister of
Egypt in 1974
The oil boom that took place in many of the Arab Gulf countries
following the war of October, 1973, also stimulated a growing perception
in Sadat‘s mind that Egypt might be able to benefit from some of this
sudden wealth as a means of solving some of its chronic economic
problems (73). Arab aid as well as an increasing volume of remittances
sent from Egyptians working in the oil exporting countries was
apparently too strong a temptation for the capital-hungry Egypt to brush
aside (74).
The utilisation of Arab resources required important policy
changes on the part of Egypt that involved above all a reconsideration of
its previous Pan-Arab, revolutionary, socialist principles, both as a
guiding orientation for the country‘s development and as a sought after
outlook for the entire region. Thus was the choice of the Infitah policy to
attract Arab capital. Sadat said:
―We are opening–up the door to Arab and Foreign capital. All
sorts of incentives and facilities will be given to that end‖ (75).
In Sadat‘s view external finance was badly needed and required.
He added a political element, so that the message to the masses was that
the stability of the country depended to a large extent on the influx of
Arab and foreign capital, whether in the form of assistance or investment.
On the international political scene this economic dimension forced itself
on the foreign policy behaviour of Egypt and we witnessed Cairo
distancing itself from Moscow. Then, it began to re-establish close ties
with the U.S. and to seek peace with Israel.
These policies led to what became known as ―peace for aid‖ in the
Middle East. As a result, Egypt began to receive massive aid from the
U.S. during the1970‘s (76).
Dr. Abdel-Aziz Hegazy said in this respect*: ―U.S. aid started to
flow from the beginning of 1974 after the launching of the Infitah policy‖.
Undoubtedly it helped to finance during the 1970‘s the following:
- military aid of $1.2 billion annually,
- food aid $500 million annually,
- Intermediary commodities and Infrastructure of $ 500 million
annually
Egypt‘s strategic regional importance and international position to the
super powers facilitated the achievement of Sadat‘s economic objectives,
as the U.S. could hardly leave Egypt alone to mind the difficult problems
of its ―own site‖, and to look after its dilemma of imbalance between
people and resources without providing a hand of help.
This was
particularly true after Sadat also became so public in his attack on the
Soviet Union in many of his speeches.
Boutrous Ghali, State Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1977 and later
Secretary General of the U.N. stated that:
―Sadat hated the Soviets and the countries in their domain, and
wanted Egypt to get rid of them for good.‖(77).
-----------------------------* My questionnaire and interview with Dr. Abdel-Aziz Hegazy, former Prime Minister of
Egypt in 1974
The U.S., which became a full partner in the peace process,
continuously attempted to maintain the peace process and strengthen it
by providing aid to both Egypt and Israel (78). The increase in the size of
U.S. economic and military assistance coincided with Egypt‘s two major
shifts in policies namely; the open-door policy and the making of peace
with Israel.
The political underpinnings of the aid programmes to Egypt were
articulated in the 1981 A.I.D. (Agency for International Development)
document as follows:
―Our high level of aid to Egypt is premised on the belief that these
efforts must be supported by a vigorous and growing economy‖ (79).
The size of U.S. assistance increased substantially in the late
1970‘s to support Sadat‘s efforts to liberate the economy through the
open-door policy and to keep Egypt‘s peace momentum by meeting its
broad needs through the provision of food aid, economic aid to improve
its infrastructure and its social services, and technical assistance for
agricultural and industrial projects, as well as loans to support Egypt‘s
balance of payments difficulties.
Sadat‘s rationale of Infitah in 1974 aspired to combine Egyptian
human resources with Arab capital and Western know-how for the benefit
of Egyptian development (80).
A result there evolved three major
Egyptian connections in the 1970‘s: the Arab connection from 1974, and
the Israeli and U.S. connection from 1977.
What are of interest to us here is how Infitah was partly motivated
by foreign policy considerations and what its impact on them was.
Divorcing the analysis of policy-making processes in developing
countries from their foreign environment can only lead to erroneous and
misleading conclusions.
Given their low degree of political
institutionalisation, their high level of political and social instability, the
general structure of their dependence upon the outside world for almost
everything from food to armaments to large sums of aid (as the U.S. aid
to Egypt), developing countries are highly susceptible to external
influences. And Egypt is no exception to this.
The role of external factors in the formulation of the Infitah policy
is important as these factors greatly influenced Egyptian officials, and
they may become ingrained in the logic of any ―open-door‖ policy.
When ruling elite decides to pursue a development strategy based on
foreign aid and capital, it follows, that all necessary steps will be taken to
attract and reassure its creditors. And the more dependent it is on others,
the more vulnerable a country becomes to their pressure.
This is
especially true in developing countries whose leadership fails to produce
coherent development strategies.
In the case of Egypt, the initial vagueness of the Infitah goals, and the
lack of consensus on its content among the ruling elite, allowed external
factors to play a more crucial role. The break away from the Soviet
Union, the closer ties to the U.S. and the surprise visit to Jerusalem
contributed to this process of growing economic dependency.
An
Egyptian economist has measured the growing dependency of the
Egyptian economy vis-à-vis the outside world in the period from 1973 to
1980 using multiple indicators as follows: (81)
Indicator
Year
1973
1980
Imported wheat to total wheat consumption (%)
54.0
70.0
Trade balance deficit to GDP (%)
-404.3
2607.3
Trade deficit to GDP (%)
10.2
16.5
Exports (incl. petroleum) ‗coverage‘ of imports
63.7
50.8
63.7
17.7
Foreign-financed to total investments (%)
31.0
48.0
Outstanding foreign debts in Egyptian pounds
2.1
17.0
Foreign debt to GDP (%)
52.0
106.0
Debt servicing to total exports (%)
16.2
21.4
(%)
Exports (excl. petroleum) ‗coverage of imports
(%)
billion
The role of the IMF in Egypt‘s open-door policy and move towards the
Western economic and monetary system was also significant.
The IMF is well known for its policy of economic orthodoxy. It links its
policy of credit to the implementation of a set of measures spelled out in a
letter of intent by the government asking for credit. Since the majority of
developing countries have a great need for credit, their margin of choice
is indeed very limited. They thus have to accept the ‗advice‘ of the IMF.
The IMF is not only a financial organisation among others, but it is the
keystone of a whole international monetary system.
―…Its power is made possible not only by the enormous resources
which it controls…but more significantly as a result of its function as an
international credit agency. All of the major sources of credit in the
developed capitalist world, whether private lenders, governments, or
multilateral institutions such as the World Bank group, will refuse to lend
to a country which persists in defying IMF ―advice‖. The real importance
of the IMF lies in the authority delegated to it by the governments and
capital market of the entire capitalist world.‖ (82).
A developing country is thus not only interested in having the IMF
loan, but wants also to guarantee its support in negotiating with other
capital sources. Consequently, the underdeveloped country ends by
giving in to the IMF ‗reform‘ or stabilisation arrangements linked to the
loan.
The relationship between Egypt and the IMF which intensified in
the second half of the 70‘s, as a result of the liberation of the economy
and the balance of payment problems the country faced, further explains
the role external factors played in Egypt‘s policy choices. It was very
different from the relationship between the international organisation
and some other developing countries during the same period largely due
to the role of the United Stated and the Gulf Arab States, especially Saudi
Arabia being one of the main share holders and permanent members of
the Fund.
Egypt sought links with the IMF in the 1970‘s motivated by its need to
secure finance on the international markets, by acquiring the IMF‘s seal
of approval which would provide access to official and private sector
loans. In the Egyptian case the setting of targets for the conditionality
variables such as the money supply, budgetary controls, exchange and
trade liberalisation became intense domestic political matters.
The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the
oil-producing Arab states have all played a role in influencing Egypt‘s
economic policy in the 1970‘s (83). The crux of the matter is that for two
years (1975 and 1976) international finance institutions and Arab and
Western creditors pressured Egypt to make its economy more acceptable
and accessible to the world capitalist market by curbing subsides and
devaluing the Egyptian pound.
For two years Egyptian officials resisted, mainly because the subsides
and the currency supports were what allowed the lower middle and lower
classes to maintain an already low standard of living. By the fall of 1976,
oil-producing Arab states joined the United States and the IMF in
pressing Egypt for additional fundamental changes (84). They refused to
give Egypt more than a limited amount of money until the government
agreed to the ―reforms‖ proposed by the IMF. Egypt‘s requests for loans
from the IMF and United States private banks were delayed in the face of
a $1.25 billion deficit for the second half of 1976 (85). Western countries
provided short-term loans to finance their exports to Egypt, but the big
money needed to meet debt obligations and the balance-of-payment
deficit was not forthcoming (86).
Sadat‘s resort to the IMF was also part of his move to reinstitute
Egypt in the world market, which came at a time of severe crisis. Egypt
faces world inflation and recession with a complete dependence on the
international capital, not only for investment in development projects, but
also in its day to day food needs for the masses. By the end of 1976, Egypt
was already suffering from a mounting debt problem which was a result
of the continuous rise in its import bill. Drop in economic aid from the
Soviet bloc without adequate compensation aid from the West yet or from
the Gulf oil countries also contributed to the budget, balance of payments
and debt-service crisis (87).
Under such circumstances, the only source of cash for Sadat has
been the private Western banks, which were forced by the decline in
domestic investment opportunities because of the world recession, to seek
outlets of their capital in needy developing countries. Reliance on these
short-term high interest loans from private international banks left Egypt
vulnerable to the demands of the international monetary institutions to
restructure the Egyptian economy and its economic institutions, which
consequently led to the opening up of the country to further foreign
involvement.
Here the IMF came the play its critical role motivated by the
conviction of the U.S and Saudis that a mechanism was needed to wrench
the Egyptian economy; no matter how painfully; into a position where
investment opportunities become irresistible thus guaranteeing the
success of the Open Door Policy. In March 1976, the IMF agreed ―in
principle‖ to a loan of $300 million for balance of payments adjustment
of the next three years. (88). Officials were dispatched to Cairo to help
formulate economic policies, including the elimination of production
controls, and decentralisation of public sector institutions, and expansion
of the currency market at a devalued rather than official rate. The IMF
also pushed for sharp reductions in subsidies and a complete float of the
pound, which would raise still higher the cost of import necessities as
well as luxuries.
The direct reduction of subsidies on a number of goods resulted in
price rises of 16% for sugar, 31% for petrol, 12% for cigarettes and 46%
for cooking gas. (89). the new measures were followed by widespread
and serious riots in January 1977. According to press reports 73 people
were killed, 800 injured, and 2000 arrested (90). Hassan/in Heikal in his
analysis of the riots stated:
―18 and 19 January 1997 was larger and more dangerous
than what was made public. It was the highest condemnation, by the
middle class in Egypt and the classes below it and above it, of the social
conditions that resulted from Infitah.
If it was not curbed by the army it would have spread to all over Egypt.
(91).‖
Following the 1977 riots, the price rises were withdrawn as they
were the most serious experience in Egypt since the 1952 revolution, and
posed a major threat to its social and political stability. The militant
response of thousands of Egyptian workers and students accentuated the
economic and political contradictions of the Sadat regime, and the
international monetary institutions, faced with the spectre of political and
economic chaos is this pivotal country, backed off to formulate new
policies.
The economic decisions were then immediately suspended, a
curfew was imposed in Egypt, and the army was called in to maintain the
law and order. The January riots underline the political explosiveness of
the subsidy issue. Immediately after the riots, they United States the oilproducing Arab states came to the rescue of Egypt.
For the Egyptians external finance was urgently required, and a
political element had been added so that the stability of the country
depended on such an inflow. The Sadat regime was obviously shaken by
the militancy of the popular opposition to the subsidy cuts.
Paradoxically enough the riots did have the effect of securing from
the IMF and other lenders cash to meet the 1977 needs. The IMF offered
$137 million on softer terms. (92). The US quickly shifted $190 million
from development loans to immediate food commodity imports in order to
share the crisis with Sadat and to show him that it was a friend in a real
hour of need (93).
Egypt, however, had later to give in to the IMF ―advice‖, and send to socalled letter of intent (June 1978) explicating the bases of Egypt‘s
Stabilisation Agreement, and in return for which the IMF accorded Egypt
$720 million of support over a 3-year period:
―The elements of the structural reform programme were: a) to eliminate
cost-price distortions, b) to encourage agriculture, c) to cut down
subsidies and d) to authorise public enterprises to hire and fire workers.
The essence of the structural reform programme was to redefine national
priorities and to entrust to the market the function of allocating resources
and the distribution of the social product‖ (94).
Within this ―reform‖ or ―stabilisation‖ framework, Egypt had to
liberalise exchange rates and import controls, even if this meant the
purchase of certain classes of commodities regarded as non-essential to
development, e.g. luxury consumer goods. Thus Egypt carried out the
―advice‖ of less carefully husbanding its foreign exchange earnings even
at a time when the country was already suffering from a shortage of
foreign exchange.
What was important was to provide the suitable
habitat for the attraction and promotion of foreign investment and openup and liberalise the economy at the expense of national industries.
The relationship of Egypt with the IMF reflected a series of
economic and political factors.
Firstly between 1976 and 1980, the
source of Egypt‘s limited external account was mainly oil, tourism, Suez
Canal revenues and Egypt‘s labour force remittances. Its need for IMF
aid and seal of approval reflected Egypt‘s economically vulnerable
situation. Secondly, Egypt was in the fortunate position of having close
relations with the oil rich states some of whom had a direct interest in its
political and social stability. Having moved away from an interventionist
radical policy towards the Arab world and having started a liberalisation
of its domestic economy, Egypt became a more attractive partner for
some of the oil rich states, particularly Saudi Arabia in the 1970‘s.
Thirdly, its international position vis-à-vis Israel meant that the United
States had political reasons for providing economic support under
certain circumstances whether directly or through such institutions as the
IMF. Those were all factors that gave Egypt a special position among
the nations that applied for assistance from the IMF during the 1970‘s.
But at the same time made it vulnerable to external pressures that
affected its policy choices.
Despite all the aid and loans coming, the economy of Egypt
continued during the 1970‘s to face serious difficulties.
By the mid
1970‘s, Egypt‘s economic growth and per capita income remained to be
retarded by a scarcity of basic raw materials, a scarcity of non
agricultural
current-earning
commodities,
a
rapidly
increasing
population, the slow pace of economic development, the high
unemployment and the rapidly rising inflation rate.
With the Suez Canal closed till mid 1975, the Sinai oil fields still
under Israeli occupation, tourism at an all-time-low because of the still
official war situation with Israel, and large military expenditure, the
Egyptian economy continued to face a severe crisis .Most importantly, the
continuation of high military spending required additional sacrifices in
other sectors of the economy and in social development and planning.
Faced with this situation, Sadat began to announce that the ‖nowar-no-peace‖ situation in the Middle East could not continue
indefinitely as the political stalemate was proving too burdensome on the
Egyptian economy.
Egypt‘s foreign policy under Sadat reflected these imperatives and
thus involved dramatic initiatives such as his decision to visit Jerusalem
in November 1977, then later to sign a peace treaty, and to establish
diplomatic relations with Israel.
Sadat‘s perception of Egypt‘s economic capabilities during the
1970‘s was a crucial factor in his foreign policy decision of visiting
Jerusalem to make peace with Israel. He viewed the sate of the Egyptian
economy as being ―below the zero level‖ and believed it to be in a
terrible condition. Sadat appreciated the economic situation, and its
persistence, in light of the military expenditure burden which extracted
capital and effected development efforts which already had started to
deteriorate since the mid 1960‘s. Sadat felt that he moved in a frame of
very limited resources which could not cope with the increasing
population problems, and hence felt that he had to bring in a form of
change to close this resource-need gap.
The argument that Sadat presented to the masses was that the
deterioration in economic conditions during the 1960‘s and the
population explosion, which was associated with a severe lack of
resources to meet it, required massive capital imports and the transition
from a centrally controlled to a free market economy (95).
The priority of the issue of peace and development after the
October 1973 war was presented by Sadat as he called for the October
war to be the last of wars so as to decrease the negative impact of the
military expenditure burden on development efforts. Sadat said:
―Development for us is a matter of life or death and thus we have
to liberate our land without the waste of our limited resources‖ (96).
The October 1974 paper also mentioned that the military burden
had slowed the rate of growth from 6.7% (1956-1960) to less than 5% in
the early 1970‘s (97).
Consequently, economic considerations came to play a significant
role in setting the objectives of Sadat‘s foreign policy as being one of
mobilising external resources to bridge the gap between resources and
needs. The pressure of the population explosion on the economy and the
breakdown
of
services
in
urban
areas
and
their
continued
underdevelopment in rural areas, became eventually sources of general
disquiet and insecurity, as became evident in the outbreak of massive
food riots in Cairo and some other parts of Egypt in January 1977. (98).
Sadat uses this event to underline the urgency of resolving the
burdensome external conflict if Egypt was to concentrate on the tackling
of pressing economic and social problems at home. After the food riots
Sadat chose clearly Egypt‘s disengagement from the Arab-Israeli conflict
by visiting Jerusalem in November 1977. This policy shift was coupled
with a further development of the open-door economic policy. Both were
connected to Sadat‘s conception of how to tackle Egypt‘s economic
problems. Both were necessary, in his view, to achieve economic
recovery and pave the way to the economic, administrative, educational
and human resource development of Egypt.
The state of war and boycott of Israel had to be ended, and in
bringing this about, the U.S., with its special relation with Israel, had to
play the major role. Peace was thus, in Sadat‘s own reading of Egypt‘s
political reality, a foreign policy solution to the country‘s economic and
social problems.
In the view of Dr. Abdel-Aziz Hegazy: ―Peace undoubtedly helped
to implement the Infitah Policy.‖
From the beginning of his presidency, Sadat attempted to send out
friendly feelers to the U.S. First, he modified the broad parameters of
Nasser‘s anti-imperialist campaign which had been directed against the
U.S. Then he moved away from the Soviet Union and improved his
relations with the U.S.
-----------------------------* My questionnaire and interview with Dr. Abdel-Aziz Hegazy, former Prime Minister of
Egypt in 1974
In November 1973, Osama El Baz, who became Sadat‘s advisor,
presented a paper of ―Henry Kissinger‖ that included an analysis of
Kissinger‘s background, his thoughts, and suggestions on how to deal
with him to make peace in the region. Among the points in this document
to Sadat were the following:
―1) Make sure to him from the beginning that being Jewish doesn‘t affect
our attitude and relations with him.
2) What guarantees can the U.S. give for Israeli withdrawal from Sinai in
return for Egypt‘s peace.
3) To emphasise to him Egypt‘s ability to change the Arab position
towards the U.S., and to cooperate with the U.S. to put an end to the
troublesome Middle East (99).‖
Then by undoing the socialist orientation under Nasser,
Sadat tried to convince the U.S. that he was different from Nasser. Sadat
was of the opinion that no major differences or problems existed between
Egypt and the U.S. (100). He bore no grudges against the U.S. except for
the U.S. attitude towards Israel.
He believed that Israel‘s strategy was based on creating a rift
between the U.S. and Egypt and that Nasser had failed to realise this.
Indeed by worsening relations with the U.S., Nasser had given Israel a
better chance of success. Sadat did not want to commit the same mistake.
He thus made huge efforts to improve the relationship through his
extensive contacts with Henry Kissinger. Kissinger states in his book
Diplomacy:
―The original motive for President Sadat‘s rapprochement with Israel
was almost certainly to undermine the West‘s image of Arab bellicosity
and to place Israel on the psychological defensive. Sadat tried to drive a
wedge between his adversary and its friends (101).‖
Also in this context, Sadat told Kissinger in their meeting in Cairo on 7 th
November 1973 after the October War:
―You are a strategist and so am I. The future is not Israel‘s
withdrawal only to the line of 22 October 1973, but the whole future
depends on one question: Can we become friends? If we can, then there is
a lot we can do. I want us to be friends. If Egypt becomes your friend,
then the whole region is opened to you. I really don‘t want you to make
the same mistake of not understanding my initiative of getting the Soviets
out in July last year (1972). It carried a message that I was your friend.
But the U.S. thought it was a manoeuvre (102)‖.
Thus it seems that Sadat‘s strategy vis-à-vis Israel took several
forms: it called for a military offensive, which would have a limited
objective, to break the political stalemate, followed by a diplomatic
offensive designed to give expression to the newly acquired Arab
leverage.
The strategy involved (a) the resumption of a limited war, involving the
total military capacity in a concentrated offensive effort, (b) coordination
of the fighting with the Syrians, (c) a sharp turn towards the U.S. after the
maximum military aid had been secured from the Soviet Union, (d) the
use of oil to give weight to the diplomatic offensive, (e) the calling for a
peace conference at which Arab Representatives would negotiate with the
Israelis under the auspices of the U.S., (f) then Egypt‘s development was
to be stimulated through external (Arab and foreign U.S.) capital and
expertise, (g) and the U.S. should become a full partner in any settlement
between Egypt and Israel.
Peace to Sadat was a foreign policy solution aimed at creating an
economically stable and investment attractive environment. It was
intended to allocate resources back to development under a new strategy
of economic liberalisation linked to a process of rapprochement with the
West, and implied the abandonment of the socialist mode of economic
development, as well as a distinct break with the Soviet Union.
Sadat‘s strategy concerning the U.S. was designed to outbid Israel
and secure U.S. support in the peace negotiations and to obtain U.S.
military and economic aid at an increasing rate.
Kissinger stated to the then famous American journalist Joseph
Kraft about the outcome of his first meeting after the 1973 war with Sadat
on the 7th of November 1973:
―Sadat promised a new strategic relation with the U.S. that would
involve full U.S.-Egyptian cooperation in the Middle East and Africa.
Sadat hoped that the U.S. would help regain Sinai‖ (103).
This was the situation which evolved throughout the 1970‘s as
Egypt and Israel became the two major recipients of bilateral aid from
the ―U.S. Aid‖ programme.
Thus, the impact of economic factors can be summarised as
follows; first, Egypt‘s limited resources put a constraint on Egypt‘s
foreign policy and encouraged it to reach a modus vivendi with
conservative rich Arab States, the U.S. and later with Israel. Second, the
economic troubles made Egypt more dependent on foreign aid and
therefore more vulnerable to external influence in its conduct of its
foreign policy.
V) THE U.S. PENETRATION OF EGYPT’S POLICY-MAKING
SYSTEM.
As a ―needy‖ partner in a complex of asymmetrical relations,
Egypt‘s policy-maker felt the growing weight of the external partner;
whether this external partner was a foreign government or a financial
organisation.
Either as an initiator or accelerator in the economical and
political change carried out by Egypt, the U.S. contribution has been a
major one. The Americans sensed the economic-political linkage quite
early and realized that for the potential foreign policy change of Egypt
not to be a tactical temporary move, it had to be based on a change in the
model of development adopted and consequently in the economic
measures to be carried out to implement it.
During his shuttle diplomacy following the 1973 War, Kissinger
said that the social-economic change away from the state socialist
bureaucratic system in Egypt could be the beginning of a process of
―coordination of structures‖ between Egypt and the U.S. and the
formation of ―real common interests‖ of the type that could prevail for
long in America‘s relations with Egypt. He envisaged that his shift would
be possible if Sadat instituted a new economic social regime, a return to a
market economy, and a stabilisation of Egypt‘s deteriorating standard of
living. To help the outflanking of the existing bureaucratic system and
the establishment of a competitive liberalised economy, Egypt needed
Western technology, economic guarantees, as well as good credit from
the West.
The change would eventually affect Egypt‘s relations with Israel,
Kissinger believed. But the ―coordination of structures‖ would first
consolidate U.S. – Egyptian links. Kissinger said that:
―….An Egypt with close links to the U.S. would be an asset to both
the U.S. and Israel. An American-oriented Egypt would be good for
Israel too, because Israel‘s survival and security were fundamental to
U.S. policy and Egypt would have to abide by this fact of life, if it did not
accept it already….‖ (104).
Consequently, if Israel is amenable to Egypt:
―….the profile of the conflict would consequently be lowered and
Cairo could concentrate more easily on solving its domestic problems
with American help, Syria would then have to decide whether to maintain
the high profile of the conflict and risk losing Egypt‘s support, or to
accept interim agreements in the Golan with Egyptian and American
help, perhaps in exchange for decreasing Soviet influence in Damascus‖
(105).
Egyptian-U.S. ―coordination of structures‖ was to be based in the
merits of the open-door development model to meet Egypt‘s needs.
Egyptian policy-makers realised that – given the prevailing ideological
debate on development models at the global level – they can count on
U.S. support as long as they stick to the open-door policy. Egypt topped
the list of aid receivers from the U.S. during the 1970‘s.
Moreover, the U.S. became of great help in discussions between Egypt
and the international financial instructions, e.g. the IMF and the World
Bank.
The main aim of U.S. aid was political. It was presented as a
reward for Egypt‘s pursuit of peace with Israel and was connected to its
development. It is of significance to state here that priority in the first
years of aid was given to the area of the Suez Canal to remove from the
Canal the war remains and rebuild the three cities (Suez, Ismailia, Port
Said) that were destroyed in the war, and at the same time to give
credibility to the peace process to the masses both in Egypt and in Israel
(106).
Moreover, the aid‘s objective was to make sure the Soviet Union
does not regain its economic and political position in Egypt after the
expulsion of Soviet experts in 1972, and to support the open-door policy,
which was a major strategic shift in Egypt‘s economy (107).
The main objectives of U.S. aid diplomacy to Egypt in the 1970‘s
were as follows (108):
1 – The corner-stone of the U.S. Middle East policy is a stable
Egypt with good relations with the U.S.
2 – Egypt‘s commitment to the Camp David peace accords was
essential, in addition to its support of peace in the Middle East, and its
encouragement of Arabs to join the peace process.
3 – Egypt was expected to play a role against radical countries in
the Middle East that are supported by the Soviet Union, countries which
destabilise the Middle East and Africa.
4 – Giving the U.S. access to military facilities in Egypt that would
support and facilitate an U.S. role in the Gulf when needed.
5 – A change in Egypt‘s economic policy towards a market
economy, in addition to proceeding with the economic stabilisation
program
supported
by
the
international
monetary
institutions,
particularly the IMF.
These objectives were coupled with a large dividend that became
known as the dividend of peace, i.e. ―U.S. aid‖.
After the signature of the peace accords with Israel, Sadat
immediately called on 27 March 1979, in his first speech in Cairo in front
of the American Chamber of Commerce after the accords, the American
companies to take part in the ―dividends of peace‖ by investing directly
in Egypt and to make the best out of the new positive investment
environment available in Egypt (109).
In the 1970‘s, the United States made a dramatic return to Egypt
and the Arab world. U.S. diplomacy became capable of containing, outmanoeuvring, and sometimes expelling Soviet influence from the region.
Even with ―radical‖ Arab states of the 1970‘s such as Algeria or Syria,
the United States succeeded to maintain commercial and economic
relations.
However, the big success story became Egypt. In 1970 there were no
diplomatic relations between the two countries; they were resumed in
March 1974. Within four to five years, Egypt developed special relations
with the United States. Since 1978, the United States has become a ―full
partner‖ in Egyptian-Israeli relations, the major supplier of arms, and
the primary donor of economic assistance to Egypt (110).
Some even claim that Sadat presented the U.S. in August 1981 with
a letter containing an offer of an Egyptian military base that can be used
by U.S. military troops. Ras Banas Base was to be renovated to be a
launching point for American troops in the Middle East. It is claimed
also that Sadat offered the services of refuelling, transfer and joint
military manoeuvres to U.S. troops (111).
In the first three years of Sadat‘s rule, 1970-1973, the United
States continued its policy of total support to Israel.
The Israeli
occupation seemed stable and the Arab states appeared incapable of
launching a new war. The United States, on the other hand, was busy
ending its involvement in Vietnam, opening new inroads to China, and
inaugurating a decade of détente.
In February 1971, Sadat proposed opening the Suez Canal and
signing a peace treaty with Israel, but nothing much came from this
proposal. The expulsion of Soviet advisors from Egypt in July 1972
provided a new opportunity for the United States. It seems that EgyptianU.S. contacts were initiated at that time.
Heikal reports that talks were conducted through two channels, the
diplomatic channel of foreign ministries and also a quiet one suggested
by Nixon – the U.S. Central Intelligence agency (CIA).(112). In addition,
a third avenue was provided by Saudi Arabia, whose dignitaries
communicated messages between Washington and Cairo.
All efforts, however, including Egyptian National Security Advisor
Hafez Ismail‘s visit to the United States in 1973, led nowhere. It took the
war of 1973 to finally bring the seriousness of the situation to
Washington‘s attention. It became clear that Egypt and the Arabs could
act and take the initiative; they could coordinate an attack and regain
some of the land Israel occupied in 1967 war. The use of oil as a weapon
also showed that U.S. interests in the region could be threatened.
Though his famous ―shuttle diplomacy‖, Kissinger monopolised
the indirect negotiation process that took place after the war, resulting in
the first disengagement agreements between Egypt, Syria, and Israel in
1974. Esmat Abdel Magid, Foreign Minister of Egypt until 1991, stated
in this respects that:
―Henry Kissinger was keen to keep the U.N. and the U.S.S.R. out
of any discussions in the region on peace in the Middle East. He invented
the shuttle diplomacy to have a direct and close relationship with Sadat.
A relation that became instrumental later in the disengagement
agreements‖ (113).
The oil embargo was lifted, and in June 1975 the Suez Canal was
re-opened. Egypt signed the second Sinai agreement in September 1975,
a step that created a rift in the Arab world because of the failure of Syria
and Israel to achieve a similar agreement. In 1977-1978 Sadat became
more emphatic about the importance of the U.S. role. The United States
was not just a mediator, but a full partner in the peace process. Thus,
Sadat, out of his belief that the U.S. controlled 99% of the cards in the
region, began to concentrate on American public opinion; he spent
endless hours with media people, senators and congressmen, and leaders
of the Jewish community in the U.S. And he did make and impact on
them. One is tempted to argue that one of the targets of his visit to
Jerusalem in 1977 was not only the Israelis but equally the American
people.
On the impact of the visit, Ishak Shamir, Head of Knesset, Foreign
Minister and ex Prime Minister of Israel said:
―The sudden drama, the Charm and Charisma of Sadat‘s
personality, made the Israeli public look to him for hope that friendship
and good neighbourhood would prevail between Israel and its Arab
neighbours after years of enmity‖.
He added:
―The Israeli public and mass media all lost their nerves and the
newspapers came with headlines welcoming Sadat. Some of the public
wept in delight and in hope for peace to come. 19th of November was the
dawn of a new era in the Middle East (114).
Also Mustafa Khalil, Foreign Minister and Prime Minister of Egypt in
1978 who joined Sadat in his trip to Jerusalem said:
―Sadat‘s trip to Jerusalem succeeded in capturing the imagination
of the Americans and contributed to a positive change of the American
public opinion in favour of Egypt in the Arab-Israeli conflict (115).
The visit was a media event, and exercise in television diplomacy,
and Sadat captured the imagination of millions in the West. He definitely
improved the image of Egypt and its leadership and its chances of
regaining the land occupied by Israel in 1967. U.S.-Egyptian relations
became closely related to the negotiations with Israel. U.S. President
Jimmy Carter‘s decision to take an active role in 1978 resulted in the
signing of the Camp David framework and the Egyptian-Israeli treaty in
1979. The treaty opened the door for much closer economic and military
relations between the U.S. and Egypt. Moshe Dayan, Minister of Defence
and Foreign Minister of Israel in 1977 said in this respect:
―Jimmy Carter called Prime Minister Begin on the same day he
made his first address to the Knesset to congratulate him and to ask him
to start peaceful negotiations with the Arabs.
He invited Begin
immediately the following month to Washington for that purpose (116).
The penetration of Egypt‘s policy-making also manifested itself in
the developing military cooperation between the two countries that took
various forms; arms supplies, transfer of military technology, prevision of
military facilities, and joint training and manoeuvres. In 1975, Sadat
emphasised the need to diversify Egypt‘s sources of arms. Egypt acquired
some British and French jet fighters, helicopters, then air-to-surface
missiles, and U.S. arms began to come slowly and gradually. (117). In
1975, after the signature of the second disengagement agreement, Egypt
bought six C-130 Transport airplanes. In the summer of 1977, fourteen
additional C-130s were provided. Military relations developed at an
unprecedented rate after Sadat‘s visit to Jerusalem. Arms sales from the
United States to Egypt jumped from $68.4 million in 1976 to $937.3
million in 1978. (118). Egypt was offered further U.S. military credits,
making the United States Egypt‘s major arms supplier. Dr. Abdel-Aziz
Hegazy stated in this respects that*: ―U.S military aid to Egypt was very
significant.‖
Military relations between Egypt and the United States also
included the licensing and co-production of arms. After the collapse of
the Arab-Military Industrial Organisation in October 1979, Egypt and
the United States agreed to cooperate in the manufacturing and
assembling of armoured vehicles and electronic equipment. As another
form of cooperation, it was suggested Egypt could offer the U.S.
―temporary limited access‖ to airfields near Cairo (Cairo West) and in
Ras Banes on the Red Sea.
-----------------------------* My questionnaire and interview with Dr. Abdel-Aziz Hegazy, former Prime Minister of
Egypt in 1974
Though separated from the Gulf by Saudi Arabia, Ras Banes was still a
strategic point in relation to the Suez Canal and the Mediterranean. It is
all the more important as more oil is shipped through Saudi Arabia by
pipeline, and up to the Red Sea, through the Suez Canal to the
Mediterranean. (119). Moshe Dayan also states that:
―Israel suggested to the U.S. in 1978 to build an airbase in Sinai in
the site that was evacuated by Israel. He added that Carter tried to
convince the Egyptians but Sadat preferred to take back the bases to
Egypt‖ (120).
The United States hoped to convince Sadat to sign an agreement
making the Ras Banes base available to the U.S. army. U.S. Secretary of
State Alexander Haig discussed this during his visit to the region in April
1981, but with no success. (121). Egypt resisted the idea of signing a
formal agreement with the United States guaranteeing access to military
facilities. (122). Sadat‘s formal position was that Egypt would make the
facilities available to the United States in response to a request by any
member of the Arab League.
The United States and Egypt also collaborated in joint training and
manoeuvres. On January 1, 1980, two U.S. AWACS (Airborne Warning
and Control System) planes flew to Qena Air Base in upper Egypt with
250 air force personnel to ―practise contingencies‖ such as directing
fighter bombers to targets. (123). It was acknowledged that the exercise
was aimed in part as a response to events in Iran and Afghanistan.
Another objective was to test the capability of the planes to use the Qena
base. In July 1980, five C-141s and twenty-eight C-5s air lifted
equipment, supplies, and some U.S. air force personnel to Cairo West Air
Base. (124). Also in July a squadron of twelve F-4E Phantom fighter
bombers landed in Cairo West after a non-stop thirteen-hour flight. The
squadron spent three months in operation ―Proud Phantom,‖ which
involved air combat exercises with the Egyptian air force. (125).
In November, U.S. rapid deployment forces – including
approximately 1,400 troops and eight A-7 tactical ground-support planes,
participated in a two-week exercise in Egypt. The exercises, called
―Bright Star‖ gave the rapid deployment forces their first taste of duty in
Middle Eastern deserts and brought to attention a number of problems in
both operations and equipment. (126). Similar exercises were conducted
in 1981 and 1983. ―Bright Star‖ remains to be conducted until now.
This military connection was coupled with an increasing aid
package to Egypt in the 1970‘s. The total size of U.S. economic aid to
Egypt (1946-1980) totalled $7.2 billion, most of which ($6.8 billion or
94%) was given in the late 1970‘s. the increase in economic aid
coincided with and encouraged the shift in Egypt‘s domestic and foreign
policies.
The aid package covered a broad range of needs: (127)
Food, infrastructure improvement, the upgrading of social services,
technical assistance, agricultural and industrial projects, and loans to
help Egypt‘s balance of payment. This last item, called general economic
support, is the largest single item of aid.
From 1975 to 1980, it amounted to $3.2 billion, or 47% of total U.S. aid
to Egypt, and included commodity-import programs and payment for PL
480 food-for-peace shipments. Payments for food are another major item.
Wheat and flour deliveries amounted to nearly $1.22 billion between
1975 and 1980, about 20% of the total aid. Food aid allowed Egypt to
keep wheat prices low and maintain its massive food subsidy program. It
also released government resources for other activities. Another major
item (about $1.05 billion in 1975-1980) covered infrastructure projects,
power, communications, urban water and sewerage, and transportation.
A third item, commodity deliveries, amounted to $1.7 billion in the 19751980 period. This money was spent to import U.S. made machinery, spare
parts, buses, tractors, and raw materials for industry.
A fourth item was the U.S. financial aid to Egypt whose details are
as follows: (128).
YEAR
1975
1978
1979
1980
1981
$million
371.9
933.7
1.061.1
1.205.1
1.182.6
U.S.-Egyptian relations have thus changed drastically since 1973
from no diplomatic relations to a very close political, economic and a
military relation of a strategic dimension.
At the same time there was a decrease in Egypt‘s military
expenditures as a part of its attempt to reinvest its budgetary resources in
the economy and in the context of its new drive towards peace. These
figures show the trend:
a) Decline in Egypt‘s Military expenditure from the budget
sources (129)
1974
36.5% of GNP
1979
13.1% of GNP
1980
6.5% of GNP
1985
5.8% of GNP
b) At the same time there was an increase in domestic investments
from budgetary sources: (130)
1975
12% of GNP
1980
25% of GNP
A good example of the process of penetration of Egypt‘s policy-making
system is what a prominent American official, heavily involved in
Egyptian affairs, revealed on how Washington has used maximum
resources to translate Egyptian-U.S. ―coordination of structures‖ into
operational policy. Donald Brown, Director of the U.S. Agency for
International Development until 1980, and qualified in some Cairo
quarters as the nearest to a head of a shadow cabinet, affirmed:
―The changes in the economy are part of a broader political
evolution away from a posture combining intense inward nationalism,
pan-Arabism and considerable interdependence with the Soviet Bloc
towards a more internationalist outlook and a deliberate move towards
closer political and economic relationships with the Western industrial
nations.‖ (131).
Brown confirms that the change could not have taken place without
U.S. assistance which involved commitments of 6.5 billion dollars in the
five year period 1975-1980. The result was that U.S. economic assistance
became involved in virtually every key sector of the Egyptian economy
from military hardware to foodstuffs to the development of the sewage
and sanitary wastewater system.
Moreover, he adds, American businessmen, government officials
and advisers have substantially influenced investment legislation and
regulations affecting the investment climate. Economic opening had to
lead to a political opening toward Israel so that Infitah development
model could prove successful. (132).
The attempt in this chapter was to conceptualise foreign policy as a
set involving a number of variables at different levels of analysis (global,
societal, and individual). The choice among the variables that were
emphasised
was
question
of
―more…and…less‖
rather
than
―either…or‖, a question of relative potency rather than of mutual
exclusiveness.
VI) THE ―CONSERVATIVE‖ ARAB CONNECTION
The rise and fall of the Saudi-Egyptian axis an the 1970‘s
Egypt‘s Arab policy in the 1970‘s has been primarily motivated by
two objectives: the need for a good Arab consensus to reach a
comprehensive solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the need to
generate massive economic and financial aid.
Egyptian tactics and
positions during the 1970‘s have changed over the years in pursuing
these two objectives.
In the early 1970‘s Sadat ridiculed the distinction between
revolutionary and conservative Arab Sates; the real criterion should be a
country‘s position toward the Arab effort against Israel. ―Egypt
measures each Arab country by its relation and orientation to the
Palestinian resistance.‖ Sadat stated on October 15, 1972 (133). He
started to build a broad Arab front by reconciling differences between
Arab regimes, advocating non-intervention in each other‘s internal
affairs, and emphasising the need for Arab solidarity (134). To achieve
this, Sadat paid many visits to various Arab countries. Then with the
1973 war and the oil embargo that followed inter-Arab politics witnessed
a major change.
The result of the 1973 oil embargo had been one of the speediest
and most impressive capital accumulations for a few Arab Gulf countries.
As the Middle East entered the petro-dollar era, an Egypt under
economic strain, expected substantial and continuing access to the
growing riches of the Gulf oil States.
In exchange, a Saudi regime acutely conscious of the multifaceted,
political and even military threat of the ―revolutionary‖ camp of Nasser,
now looked forward to relief from such pressures. It expected from Cairo
abandonment of the following;
a) its previous radical policies, b) its
close ties to the Communist World, s) its promotion of Socialism within
the Arab World, d) and its other policies and practices that were
subversive to the status quo in the conservative Arab Camp.
Saudi Arabia wanted Egypt also to restrain radicals in Syria, Iraq,
and the PLO. One story relates that President Richard Nixon urged
Saudi Arabia in mid-June 1972 to pressure Egypt to get rid of the Soviet
presence as a precondition to an active U.S. role in the making of peace
in the Middle East (135).
What resulted in its aftermath was a Cairo-Riyadh axis, based on a
trade-off between Egyptian capabilities and Saudi capital (136). The
Saudi-Egyptian entente was considerably strengthened also in 1973 when
King Faisal employed the oil weapon to provide crucial economic
support to Sadat.
This close Egyptian-Saudi alliance constituted an
important development in inter-Arab relations, as it linked the military
and politically strongest Arab country to the leading Arab financial
power. This axis emerged as the leading force in the Arab system of
1973-1977.
Ismail Fahmy, Foreign Minister of Egypt in 1973 stated that:
―This alliance became very strong as it combined by 1976 Egypt‘s
powers with Saudi richness‖ (137).
Before the end of 1977, Gulf petro-dollars to Egypt amounted to
some £15 billion. This axis was also bolstered by a military-security
partnership that would procure advanced Western weapons and
encourage local military production through the formation of the 1975
Arab Military Industrial Organisation (138).
This closer Egyptian-Saudi alliance developed even at a time when
the first public rift between Egypt and Syria began. It was centred
around Egypt‘s second disengagement treaty and its acceptance of
Kissinger‘s step-by-step approach. The Saudi‘s had no problem with that
yet. The failure of this axis to pressure the U.S. to achieve a
comprehensive peace, and later with Sadat‘s visit to Jerusalem brought
an early end to it. However, Saudi Arabia remained to have ties with
Egypt despite Sadat‘s visit to Jerusalem in 1977.
Indeed, Saudi Arabia agreed to represent Egyptian interests in
Iraq, Syria and South Yemen after the severing of diplomatic relations in
the wake of Egypt‘s signing of a peace treaty with Israel in 1979 (139).
Egypt was also expelled from the Arab League and its relations with the
Arabs came almost to a complete halt in 1979-80 as shown in the
following figures. This Arab boycott gave further impetus to closer ties
with the U.S., Israel and to further liberalisation of the Egyptian
economy. Thus Egypt made a full shift by 1981 in its foreign policy
orientation as compared to the early 1970‘s.
Decline in number of Egyptian-Arab Economic Agreements
1971-
1981
1971
1974
1977
1981
Sudan
0
1
4
1
Kuwait
1
2
2
0
Emirates
0
2
0
0
Saudia
0
0
1
0
Jordan
1
0
2
0
Syria
0
1
0
0
Arab League Archives (1971-81) Economic Department, Cairo.
DECLINE IN EGYPTIAN / ARAB MINISTERS OF DEFENCE
MEETINGS 1972-1979
1971
1974
1977
1979
Sudan
7
0
0
0
Syria
1
2
0
0
Libya
3
0
0
0
Saudia
1
0
0
0
Kuwait
1
0
0
0
Oman
0
0
0
1
Emirates
0
0
0
0
Somalia
0
0
0
0
A review of Al-Ahram newspaper 1971-1980 (on microfilm).
Al-Ahram Research Centre, Cairo.
DECLINE
IN
NUMBER
OF
EGYPTIAN
/
ARAB
CIVILIAN
MINISTERIAL MEETINGS
1971
1974
1977
1979
Libya
11
1
1
0
Sudan
9
5
5
0
Saudia
5
4
3
0
Syria
11
2
0
0
Kuwait
2
4
2
0
Emirates
0
0
2
0
Somalia
5
0
0
1
Jordan
1
0
0
0
Oman
0
0
0
0
According to a review of Al-Ahram newspaper 1971-1980 (on microfilm)
Al-Ahram Research Centre, Cairo.
DECLINE IN NUMBER OF EGYPTIAN / ARAB SUMMITS
1971-1980
1971
1974
1977
1980
Libya
11
1
1
0
Syria
9
5
5
0
Sudan
5
4
3
0
Saudia
11
2
0
0
Kuwait
2
4
2
0
Emirates
0
0
2
0
Jordan
5
0
0
1
Somalia
1
0
0
0
Oman
0
0
0
0
According to a review of Al-Ahram Newspaper 1971-1980 (on
microfilm).
Al-Ahram Research Centre, Cairo.
Parallel to this decline in Egyptian-Arab contacts, there was an
increase in the number of Egyptian-Israeli meetings between the years
1977-1980.
1977
1978
1979
1980
7
18
56
81
Review of Al-Ahram Newspaper 1977-1980 (microfilm).
Al-Ahram Research Centre, Cairo.
VII. The marketing of Egypt‘s policy choices in the Egyptian
media: (140)
The period of 1974-1977 witnessed a lot of focusing in the press
and media on the graveness of the economic problems that Egypt was
undergoing. It was portrayed that the entire infrastructure was falling
down: the telephone systems, the roads, the bridges, and the wastewater
systems. And that they all needed a major renovation and building.
The theme accentuated was that all services were neglected because of
the war with Israel and because the country‘s budget was directed to
that.
The bad infrastructure and services needed large sums of capital to
revitalise and to re-build.
The argument presented to the public was that to get out of the economic
bottleneck Egypt had to do two things: 1) end the war with Israel and 2)
open the economy to the world for investments.
When Sadat then visited Jerusalem, the public was already prepared for
the connection between peace and prosperity.
My review of about 50 articles in Al-Ahram newspaper written during the
month after the Jerusalem November 1977 visit confirms this. The themes
included:
1) The military expenditure with its economic burden would be cut down
after peace with Israel is achieved.
2) The military would play a role in solving Egypt‘s economic problems.
3) Peace will attract foreign investments to save Egypt‘s deteriorating
economy.
4) Egypt has spent $40 billion and 100 thousand soldiers for the sake of
the Arabs and the Palestinian question and that was enough.
5) Sadat even announced after the signing of the treaty with Israel that
1980 was the year of prosperity for Egypt.
This was supported in the media by a severe attack on the Arabs as of
1975, portraying that Egypt‘s role as defender of the Arab Cause has led
to an economic catastrophe in Egypt while the Arabs watched and
became petro-billionaires as a result of Egypt‘s 1973 War and the oil
embargo.
On the role of the media in Sadat‘s decisions, Dr. Abdel-Aziz Hegazy
remarks that: ―Sadat‘s approval of the publication of more journals and
daily and weekly magazines, in addition to allowing more conferences
and round tables to be held and shown on TV, brought the academics,
professionals and business people at large to participate in the promotion
of national policies‖.
-----------------------------* My questionnaire and interview with Dr. Abdel-Aziz Hegazy, former Prime Minister of
Egypt in 1974
VIII. Conclusions and Summary of Findings
Having established the theme of ―presidential foreign policy in
Egypt‖ in the previous chapter, this chapter has examined the two major
foreign policy decisions that Sadat made during his rule of Egypt in the
1970‘s.
Namely, the decision to move from a ―command-centralised
economy‖ that was developed under the quasi-socialist experiment of
Nasser, to a liberal-model capitalist economy or what came to be known
as the ―Infitah‖ open-door market economy policy.
The second major shift was Sadat‘s decision to end the state of war
with Israel and launch a major peace initiative in the Middle East, by
choosing to visit Jerusalem in November 1977.
These two major foreign policy shifts were associated with a
drastic move of Egypt‘s alignments from the Soviet Union, and the
Eastern block which superseded in the 1960‘s and early 1970‘s, to a very
close relationship with the United States and the Western world by the
end of the 1970‘s. This was also associated with an increasing U.S.
military aid package and relationship with Egypt.
With the signing of the Sinai disengagement agreement between
Egypt and Israel in 1974, a significant change took place regarding
Egypt‘s relations with respect to the Soviet Union and the United States.
Sadat chose and alignment with the U.S. as opposed to his predecessor,
Gamal Abdel Nasser.
Politically, the U.S. held the key to making peace in the Middle
East, ―99% of the cards of the game‖ as Sadat frequently stated. Sadat
believed that the U.S. was the only country capable of influencing Israel
to withdraw from Sinai. On the other side, Sadat‘s relations with the
USSR deteriorated severely in the wake of the expulsion of Soviet officers
and experts in 1972, and the undertaking of the massive operation
against communists to end any support to Soviet presence in Egypt.
This chapter attempted to establish how both external and internal
factors contributed to the primacy of economics as a shaper of Egypt‘s
foreign policy in the 1970‘s. Egypt‘s foreign policy objectives as they
were articulated and acted upon by Sadat served this purpose. Sadat
viewed making peace with Israel, in a cost/benefit analysis as an
economic rewarding act that would facilitate the rapprochement with the
West and to attract economic, financial, and military support from the
U.S.
The research has approached this correlation between economic
considerations and foreign policy by examining the role of presidential
leadership in the 1970‘s, and how Sadat‘s perception of the surrounding
external and internal environment of Egypt contributed to a certain
understanding of the economic conditions in Egypt, and the best way to
tackle it in his view through his two major policy decisions of economic
liberalisation and peace with Israel.
These shifts towards the West brought Egypt in close ranks
regionally with the conservative Gulf Arab countries, while putting it at
odds with the radical Arab group that comprised at the 1970‘s, LibyaSyria-Iraq-Algeria-Yemen. However, by 1979, and the conclusion of the
peace agreement with Israel, Egypt became totally boycotted by the Arab
world and its membership in the Arab League, the Organisation of
Islamic Conference and the Non-Aligned movement was suspended, a
high price for Sadat‘s bold foreign policy moves.
The U.S. was quickly to fill that financial gap caused by the
withdrawal of Arab economic and financial support to Egypt. The U.S.
aid to Egypt became a major reward to Egypt‘s new foreign policy of
opening-up to the West and Israel, politically as well as in economic
terms. This became termed as the ―dividend of peace‖.
Egypt faced a severe economic crisis in the early 1970‘s and
foreign investment was badly needed to get out of the ―bottle neck‖ as
Sadat called it.
If foreign investments were needed, Egypt had to abandon
Nasserism, establish links with the Arab Gulf countries, end the state of
war with Israel and come closer to the U.S. and the West.
This was the crux of Sadat‘s foreign policy in the 1970‘s *. Peace
in Sadat‘s reading of Egypt‘s political reality, was a foreign policy
solution to Egypt‘s economic and social problems.
It was a means of creating an economically stable and investment
attractive environment, and for allocating resources to development
under a strategy of economic liberalisation, linked to a process of
rapprochement with the West, the abandonment of the socialist economic
model, distancing itself from the Soviet Union and strengthening relations
with the U.S.
To effect the necessary economic changes and to make use of the
income sources that were available in the region at the time (oil,
revenues, labour remittances, tourism, trade, including transit through
the Suez Canal), Sadat saw it was essential to introduce radical foreign
policy changes. Peace, in Sadat‘s view was the other side of the same
coin that included the open-door economic liberalisation policy.
Sadat, the prime decision-maker, thus began to execute a foreign
policy that seeks to maximise the beneficial rewards of external relations.
As internal development became increasingly important, Sadat began to
subordinate foreign policy to the task of development.
Sadat‘s perception of Egypt‘s economic capabilities during the
1970‘s was a crucial capabilities during the 1970‘s was a crucial factor
in his foreign policy decision to visit Jerusalem in 1977 to make peace
with Israel.
-----------------------------* My discussion with Dr. Nazli Mowad, Head of Political Research Centre, Cairo University,
March 2000 .
Sadat appreciated the priority of the economic situation in Egypt in
light of the heavy military expenditure burden which extracted capital
and affected the development efforts which already had started to
deteriorate since the mid 1960‘s.
Sadat made a connection in his views, between the deterioration of
the Egyptian economy and the previous wars (1948, 1956, 1967, 1973)
Egypt had fought on one side, and between the improvement of economic
conditions in the policy of peace in the Middle East on the other side *.
Sadat believed that the only way out of this economic crisis was
through the adoption of a liberal economic policy to attract foreign
investment, and to make Egypt more credible as a recipient of economic
assistance.
Consequently, economic considerations came to play a significant
role in setting the objectives of Sadat‘s foreign policy as he viewed the
role of foreign policy as being one of mobilising external resources to
bridge the gap between domestic resources and needs.
Sadat‘s conception of how to tackle Egypt‘s economic problem
were two fold. On the one side and as a consequence of the 1977 food
riots, Sadat chose to disengage Egypt from the Arab-Israeli conflict by
visiting Jerusalem, on the other hand, he began to encourage a further
development of the open-door policy.
-----------------------------* My discussions with Dr. Osama El-Ghazaly Harb, Head of Al-Ahram Research Centre,
Editor of El-Syassa El-Dawlya, Cairo, June 1999.
* My discussions with Dr. Osama El-Ghazaly, Cairo, June 1999.
The concern for Egypt‘s economic situation has been given
prominent attention by the leadership in power in the 1970‘s. At various
periods under Sadat, the economy experienced stages of severe crisis and
these crises, he felt, could only be resolved by large amounts of external
assistance. Assistance, here was for the purpose of satisfying major
economic needs, such as food and living needs.
This was essential and had a clear effect on Egypt‘s orientation
towards the U.S. Economic conditions were already very bad in the early
1970‘s. A housing gap was present in both urban and rural areas,
sanitary conditions in homes were lacking, and the lack of clean portable
water was widespread in the rural areas. In addition, the educational
system was unable to accommodate for all those eligible for school.
Moreover, all basic economic indicators of inflation, unemployment and
growth were deteriorating.
Sadat‘s economic preferences were not taken in vacuum. Domestic
conditions including the internal balance of pressure groups and the
mass population‘s demands resulting from economic constraints and
hardship had a considerable impact on decisions of Sadat. Especially as
the ―bread riots‖ of January 1977 demonstrated the urgency of taking
decisions to face realities of underdevelopment, limited resources and
social unrest, economic factors occupied a crucial role in the
determination of Sadat‘s foreign policy priorities and objectives. The
open-door policy and the liberalisation attempts that followed were
introduced to the task of mobilising external resources to ease the
growing population resource gap.
In the evolution of this policy, a new class evolved, to be named
―the infitahiin‖, who succeeded in constructing a network of pressure
groups in the society and within the state, in a way that affected certainly
the leadership‘s economic policies as it had vested interests in the
execution of particular ones than others.
Sadat felt that he could only derive the amount of economic and
military assistance required by forming a close alignment with the U.S.
Internal security was a major concern for Sadat. The 1977 bread riots
are an example of such domestic outbreaks that made Sadat realise that
the development of a strong military force was mandatory. The U.S. was
a major ally in this respect as well.
Thus Egyptian foreign policy has faced the important task of
mobilising external resources to ease the growing population resources
gap *. Because of its important strategic political position and role,
Egypt has successfully managed to find aid to bail the country out, but
this was a tragic success, as it proved the failure of Egypt‘s
developmental plans and its increasing reliance on the outside world.
The Egyptians record in the 1970‘s demonstrates the tensions that
have resulted from several factors: a limited resource base combined
with an attempt to pursue an activist foreign policy that was hindered by
increasing economic troubles at home. Economic difficulties contributed
to the evolution of a restrained and vulnerable foreign policy.
-----------------------------* Discussions with Dr. Nazli Mowad, Head of Political Research Centre, Cairo University.
The failure of the government‘s development efforts to meet the needs of
the country‘s population resulted in the deterioration of the economy and
the potential instability.
This led the Egyptian leadership increasingly to seek external help
to resolve the country‘s difficult economic situation. The era of
revolutionary zeal and Arab nationalism (1955-1970), which had
witnessed the ascendancy of Egypt and a number of other developing
countries in international politics, was gradually replaced by more sober
behaviour in the 1970‘s. One important factor was the limited success of
development plans and the subsequent surfacing of serious internal social
and economic problems that put constraints on foreign policy
orientations of these revolutionary States. In Egypt, ideological and
political considerations were overshadowed by more immediate
economic concerns, as John Waterbury wrote in his book on Egypt, ―the
primacy of economics has become undisputed in Egypt of 1975‖. Thus,
the balance between external and domestic concerns was greatly affected
by Egypt‘s poor economic performance in the face of an ever-expanding
population.
On the eve of Sadat‘s 1977 visit to Jerusalem, Ismail Fahmy
resigned as Egypt‘s Foreign Minister. When asked why President Sadat
had decided on his ―sacred mission‖ to Jerusalem, Fahmy‘s answer was
both simple and categorical: ―Media attraction, television mania‖, he
affirmed. (141) According to this view Sadat was a free agent in his
decisions.
When the same question was directed at Mr. Hassan El-Thouhami,
who was the first high Egyptian official to meet Moshe Dyan secretly in
Morocco in August 1977, his answer was different but still emphasised
the same psychological level. ―It was me who suggested to the
President…‖ Go and confront the people of Israel‘ I proposed to him‖,
the President accepted. (142). Here again, the assumption is that the
decision maker can chose alone or be advised by his close aides, but he is
still a free agent capable of choosing among many other alternatives.
Also along the same lines, Dr. Abdel-Aziz Hegazy says that *:
―Foreign policy had been and still is the responsibility of the head of
state and an inner circle of the president which includes the ministers of
Foreign Affairs, Defence, Internal Security, Head of Parliament and
Information.‖ He adds, ―Sadat concentrated on strategy and policies
rather than interfering in details. He trusted those who worked with him
at the upper level only. Sadat had the full responsibility for foreign affairs
as he made the 1973 war decision, he then accepted U.N. resolutions to
stop the war, then decided to go to Jerusalem and led the negotiations
himself in Camp David. Sadat informed (not consulted) the following
bodies of his decision: the National Security Council, the inner circle of
Prime Minister and Ministers, the committee of foreign affairs in
parliament – to give legitimacy and credibility to these decisions.‖ This
approach, which emphasises the primacy of the personality variables in
determining political behaviour, however falls short of explaining
Egypt‘s policy shifts in the 1970‘s as explained earlier.
-----------------------------* My questionnaire and interview with Dr. Abdel-Aziz Hegazy, former Prime Minister of
Egypt in 1974
It is not that the personality dispositions and the leader‘s
perceptions and beliefs are not irrelevant to decision making. They
obviously are relevant, especially so in a political system with
personalised political authority patterns as Sadat‘s Egypt was. The fault
with the psycho logistic explanation is that it is more of a tautology than
an explanation. In politics we need to beyond the functionalist‘s logic,
and regard the leader‘s personality as an intermediary variable and
analyse it in conjunction with situation variables.
The situational variables that were of concern here were Egypt‘s
presence in a highly stratified international and regional system and the
consolidation of national groups that accelerated Egypt‘s re-integration
in this system of dependency relationships. At the methodological level,
the analysis was thus an attempt both to bring to global and regional
factors in a country‘s policy-making process, and also to link them with
national-societal factors, to emphasise the inter-connectedness of the
three levels.
Thus are factors behind Egypt‘s foreign policy shifts in the 1970‘s
can be summarised as follows:
a) Factors related to the economic circumstances that were
deteriorating, and the leader‘s perception that the only
way out was to liberate the economy and end the No
War-No Peace situation.
b) Factors related to the military circumstances as Egypt‘s
military expenditure was an economic burden. Also there
was fear in 1977 the Israel may launch another preemptive war against Arab armies to destroy their
capability for the next 10 years, especially after the
Likud party came to power and the new cabinet formed
in Israel resembled a ―war cabinet‖ because it had the
largest number of generals among them as Moshe Dayan
and Ariel Sharon.
c) The Arab factor, which was basically the inability of
Arab countries to draw a common effective policy
towards Israel. Sadat was frustrated with Arab disunity.
d) The feeling that Syria was not enthusiastic about an
early resumption of the Geneva Peace Conference, and
because of the rift that occurred with Egypt after the
second disengagement agreement.
e) The need to take bold steps to encourage the U.S. to
become the sponsor and the full partner in the making of
the peace in the Middle East.
The political system of the 1970‘s, characterised by an almost free hand
of Sadat in the conduct of foreign policy, supremacy of the executive over
the legislative and lack of political competitiveness contributed to this
Egyptian foreign policy system and choices.
Sadat was also not accountable to either free press, opposition
parties or a strong parliament. He controlled both the mass media and
the legislature and mobilised their support for his objectives, perceptions
and choices.
Thus to conclude this chapter, Egypt‘s foreign policy seems to have been
shaped in the 1970‘s by 1) the value and perceptions of Sadat (as
discussed in the last chapter), 2) its domestic and economic conditions
and 3) the regional and global environments in which they existed.
END NOTES
1-
K.J. Holsti, Why Nations Realign: Foreign Policy Restructuring in
the Post-War World, (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1982).
2-
Bahgat Korany and Ali E. Hallam Dessouki, The Foreign Policies
of The Arab States, (Cairo: The American University in Cairo press,
1984), p. 119.
3-
Ismail Ali Zahran, Al-Syasa Al- Lharijiyyah Lmisr, (In Arabic)
(Cairo: Madbuli Press, 1983), pp.63, 143, 158, 164.
4-
Dale W. Burkat, President Sadat‘s Operational Code and
Egyptian Foreign Policy Decision Making,(Ottowa: Carleton University
Press, 1980), pp. 4-12.
5-
John Waterbury, ―Egypt: The Wages of Dependency‖, in
A.L.Udovictch (ed), The Middle East: Oil, Politics and Hope, (Lexington,
Mass.: Lexington Books, 1976), p.293.
6-
K.J. Holsti, International Politics, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice-Hall, 1977),p.109.
7-
Anwar Al-Sadat, ―Barnamij Al-Amal Al-Watani‖, Programme of
National Action presented by Anwar Al-Sadat to the Second Congress of
the ASU, Al-Muatamr Al-Qwami Al-Thani Fi Dawr Al-Iniqad Al-Awal Fi
23.7.71, (Cairo, State Information Service, 1971).
8-
Speeches and Interview by Sadat. Speech on 20.4.1977, p.417,
Vol. 4 Speeches, (Cairo, State Information Service, 1977)
9-
Anwar Al-Sadat, ―Where Egypt Stands‖, Foreign Affairs 51, 1
(1972), pp. 144-153.
10-
Mohamed Hafez Ismail, Amn Misr Al-Qawmi Fi Asr Al-Tahadiiat,
(Cairo: Al-Ahram Centre for Translation and Publication, 1987).
Speeches and Interviews by Anwar Al-Sadat, 1970-1977, (Cairo,
State Information Service).
11-
Speeches and Interviews by Anwar Al-Sadat, Speech on 22.7.72,
p.300, Vol. 2 of Speeches, (Cairo, State of Information Service, 1972).
12-
Speeches and Interview by Anwar Al-Sadat, Speech on 14.5.72, p.
230, Vol.2 of Speeches, (Cairo, State of Information Service, 1972).
13-
Karen Dawisha, Soviet Foreign Policy towards Egypt, (New York:
St. Martin‘s Press, 1979), pp. 54-82.
14-
Jon D. Glassman, Arms for the Arabs: The Soviet Union and War
in the Middle East, (Baltimore, Md.: John Hopkins University Press,
1975),p.90.
15-
Speeches and Interviews by Anwar Al-Sadat, Speech on 27.5.73, p.
183, Vol 3 of Speeches, (Cairo, State Information Service, 1973).
16-
Anwar Al-Sadat, Speech on 22 July 1972, printed in Al-Ahram, 23
July 1972.
17-
Mohamed H. Heikal, The Sphinx and the Comissar, (New York:
Harper and Row, 1978), p. 219.
18-
Mohamed Hassanin Heikal, ―Awasf Al-Harb wa Awasf Al-
Salam‖,Vol.2 (Cairo: Dar Al-Shourouq, 1996), p. 237-292.
19-
Korany, op-cit, p.136-137.
20-
Saad El-Shazly, The Crossing of the Suez, (San Francisco:
American Mideast Research, 1980), p. 49.
21-
Speeches and Interviews by Anwar Al-Sadat, Speech on 14.2.1975,
p. 177, vol. 5 of Speeches, (Cairo, State Information Service, 1975).
22-
Speeches and Interviews by Anwar Al-Sadat, Vol 5, 1975 and vol. 6
1976, (Cairo, State Information service, 1975-1976).
23-
Kamal Hassan Ali, Mashawir Al Aomr: Asrar Wa Khafia Sabeen
Aam mn Amr Misr Fi Al Harb Wa Al Mokhabarat wa Al-Syasa, (Cairo:
Dar-Sharaouq, 1994), pp. 381-382.
24-
El Shazly, op.cit, p. 50.
25-
Ammon Sella, Soviet Political and Military conduct in the Middle
East, (London: Macmillan, 1981), p. 31.
26-
Newsweek, 9 April 1973, p.46
27-
El-Shazly, op.cit, p. 70.
28-
Speeches and Interviews by Anwaar Al-Sadat, (Cairo Sate
Information Service, 1972-1974).
29-
Nadia Mahmud Moustafa, ―Syasat Tabaaya Al-Mawarad: Al-
Siyasa Al-Kharajiyyah Li Misr Ahd Anwar Al-Sadat‖,(Cairo: Egyptian
Al-Nahda Publication, 1987), p. 293.
30-
Communist Aid Activities in Non-communist Less Developed
Countries, 1979, (Washington D.C.: Foreign National Centre, 1980), p.
7.
31-
Alan H. Smith, ―The Influence of Trade on Soviet Relations with
the Middle East‖, in A. Dawisha and Karen Dawisha (eds). The Soviet
Union and the Middle East,(London: Heinemann Educational Books,
1982), pp. 110-111.
32-
Speeches and Interviews by Anwar Al-Sadat. (Cairo, State
Information Service, 1976).
33-
Moustafa, Ibid. p. 293.
34-
Copy of original letter addressed to Sadat from U.S. President
Gerald Ford on 19 March 1976.
35-
Mohamed H. Heikal, Khraif Al-Ghaddeb: Qisat Bidayt Wa Nihayt,
Asr Al-Sadat, (in Arabic), (Cairo: Al-Ahram Publication and Translation
Centre, 1980), pp. 394-396.
36-
David Hirst and Irene Beeson, Sadat, (London: Faber and Faber,
1981), p. 132.
37-
Speeches and Interviews by Sadat. Interview on 11.2.1972, p. 63,
vol. 2, (Cairo, State Information service, 1972).
38-
G. Treverton, Crisis Management and the Super Powers in the
Middle East, (England: Gower Publishing Company, 1981), pp. 44-88.
39-
Speeches and Interviews by Sadat. Speech on 13.7.1972. (Cairo,
State Information Service, 1972) and in Sadat‘s: In Search of Identity,
p.313.
-Also Dr. Wahid Rafaat, Al Istratigya Al Soviatyya Fi Al-Sharg AlAwsat, Al Syasaa – Al-Dawlya, July 1974, pp. 506-528.
40-
Time, 2 January 1978, p. 19.
41-
Sadat‘s Interview with Joseph Kraft in the Los Angeles Times, 14
April 1980.
42-
Interview with Field Marshal Abu Gazala in Armed Forces Journal
International, September 1981, p. 49.
43-
Edward Sheehan, The Arabs, Israelis and Kissinger: A Secret
History of American Diplomacy in the Middle East, (New York: Reader‘s
Digest Press, 1976), p. 89.
44-
Sadat‘s Speech on 17.2.1977, vol. v, p. 236. Interview with El-
Hawadeth, 15.8.1975 (Beirut).
-
Dr. Hassan Nafah, Misr Wa Al-Seraa Al-Arabi Al-Israili, (Beirut:
Marqaz Dirassat Al-Wahda Al-Arabia, 1986), p. 67.
-
Zharan, op.cit, p. 347.
45-
Compiled from data in Al-Ahram Archives, Central Bank of Egypt,
National Bank of Egypt, Ministry of Trade – Cairo, 1970-1981
publications.
46-
Ibid.
47-
Salwa Gomma, Al-Diplomesyya Al-Misrya Fi Al Sabyyinat.
(Beirut:Marqaz Dirassat Al-Wahida Al-Arabia, 1988), p. 167.
48-
Data compiled from the following sources: Ministry of Foreign
Affairs Archives, Archives of the presidency, Al-Ahram Archives, Cairo,
1970-1981 publications.
49-
Data compiled from Ministry of International Cooperation,
balance sheets of imports from U.S.A. and U.S.S.R., 1974-1978.
50-
Adel Hussain, Al-Iqtisad Al-Misri Min Al-Istiqilal – Il Al-Tabaaya,
(Cairo: Dar – Al Mostaqbal Al-Arabi, 1982).
- Bahgat Korany Egypt‘s Dependent Development, Patterns of
Inter-Arab Politics and the Making of the Camp David Agreements,
(California: Middle East Studies Association, 1984).
51-
Egypt‘s Economic Performance and Economic Re-adjustment with
Growth, IMF Report on Egypt, 1981, p.2. Earl L. Sullivan eds. The
Impact of Development Assistance on Egypt,(Cairo: The Cairo Papers in
Social Sciences, AUC Press, 1984), pp. 1-16.
52-
Interview with Sadat. Al-Ahram, 8.6.1976 and 29.9.1976.
53-
Al-Ahram Al-Iqtisadi, 1 May 1977, pp. 8-9.
54-
Robert Marbo and Samir Radwan, The Industrialisation of Egypt,
(Oxford: Clarenton Press, 1976), pp. 32-33.
55-
Amr ezz El-Rajal. Al-Amn Al-Iqtisadi wa Al-Syassa Al-Arabia L
Misr. Al-Syasa—Al-Dawlya, October 1977, pp. 24-32.
56-
Dr. Saad Al-Din Ibrahim Eds. Misr Fi Robaa Qarn (1952-1977)
Dirasat Fi Al-Tanmya, (Beirut: Centre of Arab Development, 1981), pp.
528-532.
57-
Ramzi Zaki, Azmat Misr Al-Iqtisadiyya, (Cairo: Madbuli, 1983),
pp. 255-270 and Ramzy Zaki, Moshkalat Al-Bitala Fi Misr: Al-Hagm, AlAsbab, Shorout Al-Khoroog Minha, Mijalat Al-Yasar, No. 48, February
1994, p. 24.
58-
Report of the U.S. Agency for International Development, Cairo,
Egypt, February 1981.
-Adel Hussein, Al Iqtisad Al Misri Min Al-Istiqilal Ila Al-Tabaayya,
(Cairo – Dar Al-Mostaqbal Al-Arabi, 1982), pp.189-190.
59-
Interview With Sadat. Al-Ahram 30.6.1976 and 13.12.1976.
60-
Address of H.E. Engineer Mohamed Abdel-Wahab, Minister of
Industry of Egypt, ―Background of Egypt‘s Programme of privatisation
and Structural Adjustment‖. (London: Conference on Trade and
Investment in Egypt, July 1992).
61-
Anwar Al-Sadat. Waraqat Uktubir. The October Working Paper
presented by President Anwar Al-Sadat , April 1974. (Cairo: State
Information Service, 1974).
62-
Speeches and Interviews by Anwar Al-Sadat, Vol. 4, (Cairo, State
information Service, 1974)
63-
Ibid.
64-
J.Waterbury, op.cit., pp. 415-416.
65-
Adel Ghonaeim, Al-Namuzaj Al-Misri Li Ra‘smaliyyat Al Dawla
Al-Tabaa,(Cairo: Dar Al-Mustaqbal Al-Arabi, 1986), pp. 1-5.
66-
Ibid., pp.1-2.
67-
Document: Sadat‘s letter of assignment to Dr. Adel Aziz Hegazy,
Prime Minister in 1974, stating the duties of his new government.
68-
Kate Gillespie, The Tripartite Relationship; Government, Foreign
Investors and local Investors During Egypt‘s Economic Opening, (New
York: Praeger , 1984) , p. 112.
69-
Ibrahim Korawan, ―Egypt and the Western Alliance: The Politics
of Westomania‖ in Steven L.Speigal (ed.),The Middle East and the
Western Alliance, (London: George Alka and Unwin, 1982), pp. 174-175.
- Gabriel Ben-Dor, ―Egypt‖ in: Kolodziej and Harkavy, eds.,
Security Policies of Developing Countries,(New York: Praeger, 1982),
pp. 179-180.
- Michael Brzoska and Thomas Ohlson Eds., Arms Transfers to the
Third Worlds 1971-1985, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 18.
70-
Heikal. Kharif Al-Ghadab, pp. 177-184.
- Mustafa Kamel El-Sayyad eds. Haqiqat Al-Taadadia Al-Siasyya Fi
Misr: Dirasaat Fi Al-Tahwol Al-Raasmalii, (Cairo: Madbouli Press,
1996), pp. 35-42.
71-
Adel Hussein, Al Iqtisad Al Misri, 2 Volumes
72-
Nazih N.M. Ayubi, Implementation Capability and Political
Feasibility of the Open Door Policy in Egypt in Malcom Kerr and Sayed
Yassin (eds). Rich and poor States in the middle East, 1982, p.172.
73-
Speech by Anwar Al-Sadat on 27.7.1974, Vol. 4 of his speeches, pp.
517-529, (Cairo, State Information Service, 1974).
74-
Hassan Abo-Talab, Ilaqat Misr Al-Arabiah 1970-1981, (Beirut:
Arab Unity Studies Centre, 1998), p. 60.
- Ahmed Youssof and Ahmed (eds), Conference on the ―Foreign
Policy of Egypt in a changing World‖ (Organised by Centre of Political
Studies, University of Cairo, 2nd Annual Conference of the Centre, 1990),
pp. 612-617.
75-
Sadat‘s speech pm 27.7.1974, Vol. 4, p.524.
76-
Michael Stone. Head of U.S. Aid Programme in Egypt in the 1980s.
Paper presented to the Cairo Symposium on the Impact of Development
Assistance on Egypt, December 11, 1983.
77-
Boutros Ghali, ―Tariq Misr Ila Al-Quds: Qisat Al-Siraa Mn Agl
Al-Salam Fi Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, (Cairo: Al-Ahram Centre for Translation
and Publications), p. 44.
78-
Adnan El-Sayed Hussein, Asr Al-Taswyya Siyasat Camp David wa
Abaaduha Al-Aqlimya wa Al-Dawiya, (Beirut: Dar El-Nafaas, 1990), p.
183.
79-
Quoted in Saad Eddin Ibrahim, ―Super Poers in the Arab World‖,
Washington Quarterly 4,3 (Summer 1981), pp. 88-89
80-
John Waterbury, The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat: The Political
Economy of Two Regimes, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press,
1983), pp. 124-127.
- Gouda Abdel Khalek, R. Tignor (eds.), The Political Economy of
Income Distribution in Egypt (Holmes and Meir, New York, 1982), pp.
58-87.
81-
Ramzi Zaki (1983), p. 269.
82-
Cheryl Payer, The Debt Trap, The International Monetary Fund
and the Third World, (New York: Monthly Review Press, 9174).
83-
Ali E. Hillal Dessoki, ―Policy-Making in Egypt: A Case Study of
the Open-Door Economic Policy‖, Social Problems 28, 4 (1981), pp.
410-416.
84- Korany and Dessouki (eds.) op.cit., p. 125.
85-
Ibid., p. 125-126. Same theme in Adel Hussein, Al-Iqtisad Al-Misri
(2 volumes).
86-
Anwar Abdel-Malek, ―The Occulation of Egypt‖, Arab Studies
Quarterly, Vol. 1, No. 3, Summer 1979, pp. 177-199.
-
Galal Amin ―External factors in the Re-orientation of Egypt‘s
Economic Policy‖, in Malcolm H. Kerr and S. Yassin (eds.) Rich and
Poor States in the Middle East (Boulder: Westview Press, 1982).
87-
Adel Hussein, op.cit., pp.155-255.
-
Osman Hamed, Egypt‘s Open-Door Policy: An Attempt at
Economic Integration in the Middle East.
International Journal of
Middle East Studies, Vol. 13, No.1, 1981., pp. 4-6.
-
J. Waterbury, op.cit., p. 416
88-
Stork Joe, ―The Crisis in Egypt: Bailing out Sadat ‖MERIP
Reports, No. 56, 1977, p.9.
89-
K. Ikram, Egypt: Economic Management in a Period of Transition
(Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1980), p.323.
90-
Financial Times, London, January 18, 1977, p.22.
91-
Hassanin Heikal, Awasf Al-Harb wa Awasf Al-Salam (Cairo: Dar
Al-Shouroq, 1996), pp.309-311.
92-
Stork Joe, op.cit, p.10.
93-
M.Weinbaum, ―Politics and Development‖, Middle East Journal
(Autumn 1983), p.683.
94-
Gouda Abdel-Khlaek, ―Looking Outside or Turning Northwest?
On the Meaning and External Dimensions of Egypt‘s Infitah‖, Journal of
Social Problems, 1981.
95-
Speeches by Anwar Al-Sadat, Vol. 4, (Cairo, State Information
Service, 1974).
96-
Anwar Al-Sadat, Warqat Amal Uktubar, Central Committee of the
ASU, April 1974, Cairo.
97-
Ibid.
98-
Nadia Moustafa, op.cit., p.281.
99-
document: Letter presented to President Sadat from Osama El Baz
regarding Kissinger and how to deal with him on his first visit to Cairo
on 6.11.1973.
100- Copy of Document: Sadat‘s letter to U.S. President Ford on 20
March 1976 in response to President Ford‘s letter.
101- Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Touchstone, 1995).
Kissinger mentioned Sadat at least six times in this major study on
diplomacy, especially p. 284 in this issue.
102- Sadat, In Search of Identity, p. 387.
-
Mohamed Hassanin Heikal, Uktubir 73: Al Selah wa Al-Syasa
(Cairo: Centre for Publication and Translation, 1993), pp. 675-676.
-
Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, Sequel to White House Years,
Vol. 2 (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1982), pp. 636-639.
103- Heikal, Uktubir 73, p. 680.
104- Sholoma Aronson, Conflict and Bargaining in the Middle East: An
Israeli Perspective (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1978),
pp. 199-200.
105- Ibid. pp. 199-200.
106- Soheir Morsy, U.S. Aid to Egypt: An Illustration and Account of
U.S. Foreign Assistance. Political Arab Studies Quarterly, vol. 8, No. 4,
p. 365.
107- Michael stone, op.cit., pp. 5-9.
108- Mahmoud Al-Marghy, Misr Ala Maadat Al-Congras Al- Amiriqi:
Nas Almahdar Alty Naqash Fiha Al-Congres Qadyyat Al Mawonat wa
Al-Syasat Al-Masriah. Al-Ahaly Newspaper, 21.12.1988.
109- Jacabus T. Severiens, Foreign Investment in Egypt, What are the
Dividends of Peace. Middle East Review, vol. 12, no.2).
110- Marvin G. Weinbaum, Dependent Development and U.S. Economic
Aid to Egypt. International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 18,
1986), pp. 125-126.
111- Hermann Frederick Eits, ―The U.S. and Egypt‖, in William
Quandt The Middle East: 10 Years After Camp David (Cairo: Al Ahram
Publication and Translation, 1989), pp. 168-170.
-
John Waterbury, The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat: The Political
Economy of Two Regimes (Princeton: Princeton University press, 1983),
p.156.
-
Interview with Anwar Sadat in International Herald Tribune, 30
May 1979. As indicated in Dr. Zeinab Abdel-Azim ―Al Syassa Al-Misrya
Tigah Al-Walyyat Al-Mutahida 1981-1991‖ (Beirut: Centre of Arab
Unity Studies, 1997), p. 106.
112- Mohamed Hassanain Heikal, The Road to Ramadan (Glasgow:
William Collins and Co., 1975), p. 202.
113- Esmat Abdel Magid, Zaman Al-Inksar Wa Al-Intisar (Beirut: Dar
Al Naher, 1998), p. 108.
114- Ishak Shamir, Muzakrat Ishak Shamir (Amman: Dar Al Galil,
1994), pp. 121-122.
115- Interview with Mustafa Khalil, Prime Minister of Egypt in 1978.
Al-Gizira Arab TV Network, 26 February 2000.
116- Moshe Dayan, Ana, Wa Camp David (Amman: Dar El-Galil,
1987), p. 29.
117- Abdel-Razaq Al-Fares, Al-Selah Wa Al-Khobz: Al-Infaq Al-Asqry
Fi Al-Watan Al-Arabi (1970-1990), (Beirut: Arab Unity Studies Centre,
1993), pp.160-166.
118- Ibrahim Karawan, pp. 174-175.
119- Christopher Madison, ―U.S. Reducing Act in the Middle East‖,
National Journal, 28, November 1981, p. 2107.
120- Moshe Dayan, p. 193.
121- Korany and Dessouki, op.cit. p. 140.
122- Newsweek, 23 March 1981, p. 35.
123- Joe Struk, ―The Carter Doctrine and U.S. bases in the Middle
East‖, MERIP Reports 90 (1980), p. 8.
124- Wall Street Journal, 9 January 1980 and the Washington Post, 9
January 1980.
125- Korany and Dessouki, op.cit., p. 141.
126- Newsweek, 29 December 1980, p. 23.
127- Salwa Gomaa, p. 169.
-
U.S. Agency for International Development, Cairo, February 1981.
-
Statistics of Ministry of International Cooperation, Cairo.
-
Hala Soudi, Al Mustafa Al-Amriqia Wa Al-Syasa Al-Kharajiya Al-
Misrya 1970-1984 (Cairo: Centre of Political Research and Studies,
1988), p.7.
128- Adnan Hussein, p. 183.
129- SIPRI Reports 1974-1985.
130- Central Bank of Egypt Yearly Reports on the Economy 1975, 1981,
Cairo.
131- Donald Brown, Egypt and the U.S.: Collaborators in Economic
Development, Middle East Journal, 35, pp. 3-15.
132- Galal Amin, The Opening to Israel (paper presented to the 5th
Annual Congress of Egyptian Economists, Cairo).
133- Speeches and Interviews by Anwar Al-Sadat, Vol. 2, 1972.
134- Kerr, ―Rich and Poor‖, pp. 28-30 and Dawisha, Egypt,
pp.146,200.
135- New York Times, 24 July 1972.
136- Paul Jabber, Oil, Arms and Regional Diplomacy, in Kerr and
Yassin, op.cit, pp. 430-439.
137- Ismail Fahmy, Al-Tafawod Min Agl Al-Salam Fi Al-Sharq AlAwsat (Cairo: Madbouli, 1985), p. 171.
138- Christian Science Monitor, 8 February 1978.
139- Ali Dessouki, the Foreign Policy of Egypt, in Korany and Dessouki
eds., p. 143.
140- Al Ahram 25.11.1977 to 31.12.1977, articles by Dr. Ali Lutfy, Dr.
Mustafa El Said, Saad Mohamed Ahmed, Mustafa Kamel (all were
ministers of economy, ex-ministers or became ministers).
-
Al Ahram 3.3.1978, 18.3.1978 and 21.4.1978 articles by Tawfiq Al-
Hakim.
-
Hassan Nafa, Misr Wa Al-Saraa Al-Arabi Al-Israili, pp. 84-87
(Beirut: Centre of Arab unity Studies, 1986).
-
Saad Al-Din Ibrahim, Orobat Misr: Hawar Al-Sabinaat, Dirasat
Tahlilia (Cairo: Centre of Strategic Studies, 1978).
141- Bahgat Korany, Interview with Ismail Fahmy, Foreign Minister of
Egypt, Cairo, February and April 1980.
142- Bahgat Korany, Interview with Hassan El-Touhamy, Vice Prime
Minister and Special Advisor to Sadat, Cairo, May 1980.
CHAPTER FOUR
A DECADE OF FOREIGN POLICY SHIFTS
IN THE MIDDLE EAST:
EGYPT FROM OSTRACISM TO
REINTEGRATION INTO THE ARAB WORLD
In contrast to the 1950‘s and 1960‘s, when the Arab States tended to
frame their foreign Policies in terms of ideological goals as Arab unity,
the liberation of Palestine and anti- imperialism – the 1970‘s and 1980‘s
have seen a triumph of ―real politic‖ over ideology and of tactics over
strategy. The new pragmatism is best reflected in the issue – oriented
basis of the present alliances in the Arab Middle East. The 1960‘s
conflict between Nasserism and Baathism over the ideological supremacy
and leadership of the Arab system has eased. The last two decades
witnessed a declining importance of ideology to the leadership of several
key Arab States such as Egypt, Syria and Iraq(1).
The Foreign Policy behaviour of these states became preoccupied
with serious territorial, military, security and economic considerations.
Arab Foreign Policies in the late seventies and early eighties became
more pragmatic, with tangible national interests prevailing over
ideological considerations. Greater flexibility provided a broader range
of options for policy-makers and led to the development of working
relationships
across
previously
ideological
differences.
The
predominance of national interest considerations as physical survival,
economic well-being and freedom of action were evident in the regional
foreign Policy behaviour of key Arab States s Egypt, Syria Iraq and Saudi
Arabia. (2) The modifications that did occur stemmed largely from the
decline in the primacy of pan-Arab sentiments among political elites and
the public alike.
The most obvious manifestation of this trend was a sharp reduction
in pressures for political union.
Emphasis was placed instead on
functional co-operation between the Arab States through the formation of
diplomatic common fronts, military alliances and economic co-operation.
The new pragmatism is closely related to the processes of the Arab
states‘ Foreign Policy adaptation (coping with a changing regional or
international environment), transformation (response to a radical change
in one ingredient or several of a state‘s situation) or restructuring of
orientation ( a fundamental change in the state‘s objectives and strategy).
(3) With the rise of pragmatism in regional Arab foreign policies, the
pattern of politics became determined basically by each individual state‘s
geo-strategic situation, its economic-social-political environment and its
national aspirations. Thus, whenever an Arab state felt less threatened
by its regional environment, it pursued a more active Foreign Policy both
regionally and internationally in an attempt to have more influence in
determining the direction of Arab regional politics. But, whenever the
regional environment appeared threatening and hostile, it would opt for a
more cautious and less active posture and be more concerned with its
national interest and security.
There has been then a latent tension in the orientation of the Arab
state‘s foreign policies between the norm of pan-Arabism and the
interests of each state, between role conception and role performance.
There is a growing discrepancy between the pan-Arab belief
system and state behaviour based on ―raison d‘etat‖. Thus, there is a
difference between the sources of a state‘s particular policy, which are in
many cases specific national interests, and the justification of that policy
in pan-Arab terms.
In the analysis of Arab pragmatism, the role of oil wealth and its
political and psychological impact cannot be overlooked. Oil has created
a new set of values, attitudes, loyalties and allegiances. Almost all the
Arab states have become ―oil States‖ either directly through the
possession of oil or indirectly through remittances and financial
assistance. As a consequence changes took place in the basis of power in
the Arab regional system.
These changes affected the position of
individual states and the pattern of relations within the system. With
regard to the basis of power, there was a marked increase in the
importance of economic capabilities as evidenced by the rise of Saudi
Arabia‘s financial power. The large surplus of capital that developed in
the region led the key Arab States as Syria and Iraq to turn increasingly
to the wealthy oil-producing States in the Gulf, and particularly Saudi
Arabia, for assistance. The result was the rise of economic aid as a new
instrument of influence in inter-Arab relations.
The rapprochement between the Arab states and Egypt occurred
basically due to the development of this trend of modernity in the foreign
policies of the Arab States, each of which emphasised its national
interests in a pragmatic character.
The Arab states have given primacy to their relationship with
Egypt with a correspondingly diminished adherence to the previous Arab
consensus to boycott Egypt in the Baghdad Arab Summits of 1978 and
1979. What caused the shift in actual fact were (a) Israel‘s invasion of
Lebanon and the fear of another Arab military setback, (b) the Iranian
threat to the Arab Gulf security and the fear of the export of religious
revolution to the region, (c) the Arab States perception of the presence of
a strategic imbalance in favour of Israel and the threat of a more
hegemonist military policy in the region.
The pressure of Egypt‘s new moderate policy pursued through (a)
its promotion of bilateral social, economic and political relations with the
Arab states, (b) its maintenance of a cold peace with Israel, and (c) its
adoption of a mutual interests diplomacy with other regional powers – all
contributed to an end to its ostracism in the Arab world. Parallel with
the change in Egypt‘s policies, a number of developments in the Middle
East – the Iran-Iraq conflict, the rift between Syria and the Palestine
Liberation Organisation, and the new moderate Arab position towards
the Arab-Israeli dispute as reflected in the PLO/Jordanian quest for
peace – created fertile conditions for Egypt‘s reintegration into the Arab
fold.
Arab states‘ national interests perpetuated their need for an
Egyptian support to counter balance the destabilising factors in the
region.
The analysis of the foreign policy behaviour of each Arab state is
divided into an examination of its role conception (general strategy and
objectives) and its role performance (actual behaviour).(4)
This
difference between the objectives of a foreign policy and its actual
realisation is the result of the presence of constraints on the capabilities
of each major actor in the Middle East (e.g. Syria, Iraq and Saudi
Arabia).
The foreign policy behaviour of each state is the concrete actions,
positions and decisions that it takes or adopts in the conduct of foreign
policy.
Foreign policy behaviour is the concrete expression of
orientation in specific acts related to a state‘s national interests.(5) Arab
foreign policies is primarily regional in orientation.
This regional
emphasis is the result of two factors. First, small or medium powers are
usually regionally oriented. Second, the Arab-Israeli conflict, the IranIraq war and the Lebanese Civil war are perceived as all-Arab problems.
Egypt‘s position in the Arab world has been to a certain extent
undermined since its foreign policy act of signing the Camp David accord
with Israel. Its historic role as the champion of the Arab and Palestinian
cause has been attacked by all Arab States since it began the peace
process with Israel and the U.S. in 1977. Seventeen Arab States met in
Baghdad in 1978 and 1979 and decided to boycott Egypt politically and
economically. All Arab States – excluding Oman, Sudan, and Somalia –
broke their diplomatic relations with Egypt, suspended its membership
from the Arab League and later from the Islamic conference
organisation.(6) By concluding a separate piece with Israel, Egypt has in
the view of these 17 Arab States broken the traditional ties of
brotherhood and unity of purpose.
Despite this official Arab boycott, by movement for Egypt‘s total
isolation did not achieve its objectives. Egypt‘s position in the Arab
world was not so much undermined due to basically the failure of any
other single Arab State to fill the political and strategic vacuum created
by Egypt‘s absence. The late 1970s witnessed the emergence of new
regional powers such as Syria, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. However, the
rapid developments in the inter-Arab system developed constraints on
their potential leadership role and eventually accelerated the
rapprochement with Egypt.
As Egypt‘s president Anwar-El-Sadat was assassinated, the
Egyptian foreign policy was not content with the isolation it faced in the
Arab world. Egypt‘s foreign policy was in a critical situation because of
the aggressive Israeli behaviour in the region. The Israeli actions put a
dramatically different light on Egypt‘s peace treaty.
The seemed to
confirm that Israel had to make peace with Egypt as a tactic to neutralise
its most powerful neighbour.(7) Syria and Iraq argued that Egypt had
betrayed the Arab cause and that it was other Arab nations that would
pay the price.
By contrast to Egypt, Syria‘s foreign policy began to gain more
credibility and support among the Arab States. Syria has opposed the
Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, and alongside with Libya, Algeria, the
PLO, and the People‘s Democratic Republic of Yemen – formed the
steadfastness rejectionist front in 1979 to co-ordinate their foreign
policies to isolate Egypt and build a nationalist Arab front to champion
Palestinian rights.(8) Syria stood firmly against the U.S. and Israeli
presence in Lebanon.
When Israel demanded that Syria withdraw its surface-to-air
missiles from Lebanon‘s Bekaa Valley and Washington sent special
envoys as Mr. Philip Habib to defuse the crisis, Syria refused claiming it
was the guardian of Arab security.(9) Then after the assassination of
Beshir Gemayel on September 14, 1982, Israel sought to carry out the
prime political objective of its invasion by turning the government of his
brother and successor, Amin Gemayel, into an Israeli puppet.(10) The
Syrian national interests and the prime importance of Lebanon in its
strategy caused it to resist the Israeli ambitions by all means.
Furthermore, Syria was not interested in giving Israel a political
victory by the implementation of the May 17, 1983 withdrawal pact
between Lebanon and Israel. President Hafiz-El-Assad opposed the
agreement and contributed to its failure to prevent an Israeli domination
over Lebanon. (11)The strong resistance of the Shiites in the South of
Lebanon against the Israeli forces gave Syria even more Arab support
because it was the major source of financial and military assistance to
the Shiites forces.(12) In the absence of an Egyptian regional foreign
policy in the late 1970‘s and early 1980‘s, Syria‘s strategy in the region
attempted to play a central, pivotal and leading role in the region.
The single most important item of Syria‘s foreign policy agenda
has been the return of the Golan Heights. President Hafiz-El-Assad is
convinced that Israel will never willingly negotiate a return of the Golan
Heights because of their strategic importance to Israel‘s northern region
and its national water carrier (an expectation confirmed by Israel‘s
annexation of the territory).(13)
Consequently the Syrian foreign policy has been directed to reject
any peace initiatives which disregard its national interests, e.g. Sinai II,
the Camp David accord and for a time the Saudi Arabian Fahd peace
plan. Syria has considered these agreements as potential settlements
which will ultimately leave Syria alone to negotiate the Golan Heights
after other Arab governments have resolved their territorial disputes with
Israel.
Before the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, Syria‘s position in
Lebanon, Syria‘s assets within the PLO, and its claim to defend the
Palestinian national cause, gave it formidable leverage over the PLO.
Syria provided the PLO with invaluable support in Lebanon, facilitating
supplies of weapons and at times defending PLO interests against its
Lebanese rivals. Syrian support was at a cost. It was determined to play
a prominent role in Arab politics. Influence over the PLO would ensure a
voice in inter-Arab decisions and an ability to prevent other Arab States
from co-ordinating a response to the Arab Israeli dispute that ignores
Syrian interests. By keeping PLO Chairman Mr. Yasser Arafat close,
Syria‘s objective was to play a key role in formulating any strategy of
confrontation or co-existence with Israel.(14)
However, several developments affecting Syria‘s regional foreign
policy has occurred during 1979-1983. These developments have caused
constraints on Syria‘s leadership attempt in the Arab region during
Egypt‘s isolation. In Lebanon, Israel‘s military success has undermined
Syria‘s position in the Arab world. In 1982, Lebanon became partitioned
into three major sections – the Maronite area, the Israeli occupied south
and a small Syrian enclave in the North East.(15) Syria‘s involvement in
Lebanon has weakened the Palestinian and leftist forces and opened the
door for the Israel-Maronite connection and the spread of Israeli power
in Lebanon.
Politically the danger still existed that Christian forces would
formalise their grip on the country and implement a peace treaty with
Israel. In the strategic contest with Israel, Syria since 1982 has become
in no position to lead the Arab struggle against Israel. It has substantial
ground forces tied up in Lebanon, its air force suffered losses in combat
with Israel in June 1982 and it has major internal-security concerns such
as the militant sunni uprising in Hama in 1982 – all which produced
constraints on its ability to play a leading regional role.
Syria‘s backing of a revolt by Palestinian radicals against PLO
moderates led by Arafat damaged Syrian – Palestinian solidarity and
committed Arab military, physical and economic power to a conflict far
from the Israeli front. Syria‘s interests in Lebanon are bound up with the
future of the Palestinians and the disposition of the Golan Heights.
Syria‘s pulling of forces out of Lebanon is linked to its interests of
regaining the Golan and settling the Palestinian dilemma. Thus, the
foreign policy behaviour of Syria will then continue to focus primarily on
Lebanon rather than regional Arab policies until an eventual
achievement of its national interests is foreseen.
Syria‘s forging and open association with the Islamic government
of Iran strained its relations with Iraq, the Arab Gulf States and
contributed to the further polarisation of intra-Arab politics. Syria‘s
support to Iran in the Gulf war (in return for cheap and often free oil
supplies) has brought negative reaction from the Gulf States.
The question of cutting off aid to Syria has been raised at the Gulf
co-operation council meeting as early as 1981.
The Syrian-Iranian
alliance has undermined Syria‘s claims of Arab nationalism and
solidarity.
Syria‘s foreign policy has been preoccupied with limiting the
prospects of any Iraqi regional hegemony after Egypt‘s isolation in 1979.
The Syrian attempt to drain directly and indirectly Iraq‘s economic,
social and military capabilities to achieve its narrow ―raison d‘état‖ in
ending any competition for regional leadership, has further weakened its
position in the Arab world.
Iraq was one of the main leaders of the movement to punish Egypt
for the peace treaty.
It was the instrumental in co-ordinating a
comprehensive Arab response to isolate Egypt. It participated in the
Tripoli conference in 1977 that set the stage for the formation of the
steadfastness front. Iraq organised the Baghdad summit meetings of Arab
heads of state in November 1978 and April 1979 to co-ordinate steps
against Egypt.(16) Iraq utilised the Camp David agreements to capitalise
on Egyptian isolation which became the basic element of Iraq‘s regional
foreign policy until the eruption of the war with Iran in September 1980.
Iraq offered the Gulf States its protection against the Iranian
revolution in 1979, and in February 1980 President Saddam Hussein
announced an eight-point programme for regional solidarity.
The programme called for a renunciation of armed force among
Arab countries to resolve disputes, a call for joint resolution of disputes
within the framework of Arab joint action, respect fort mutual sovereignty
and traditional integrity and nonalignment.(17) Although these principles
were similar to those in the Arab league charter, Iraq formed them as
part of a diplomatic initiative designed to promote Iraq‘s regional
leadership during Egypt‘s isolation.
In the eleventh Arab summit in Amman in December 1980,
President Saddam Hussein succeeded in convincing the participants to
establish an Arab development fund that would make low interest loans
available to six underprivileged Arab States (Mauritania, Djibouti,
Somalia, Sudan and the two Yemens). This manoeuvre put Iraq in the
position of benefactor and visible proponent of pan-Arabism. Through
moderation, prudent use of the economic power of oil and the
championship of various Arab causes, Iraq endeavoured to establish
itself as the Commanding Arab state. Moreover the threat of the export of
the Iranian revolution gave Iraq an important stabilising role in the Gulf
region. The new impact of the Iranian example as manifested in the
seizure of the Grande Mosque in Mecca by a group of Islamic
fundamentalists (Sunni) and by Shiia riots in eastern Saudi provinces in
November and December 1979, gave Iraq an opportunity of a more
active foreign policy in the Arab Gulf region.
However, the escalation of the war has compromised this effort
significantly. The war has seriously distracted Iraq from its leadership
attempt, undermined its economy and caused it to be dependent on
conservative Arab States as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and other Gulf States.
Figures on direct loans to Iraq during the first five years of the war range
from $25 billion to $60 Billion. Jordan and Saudi Arabia in particular to
have provided transit rights for goods including vital military equipment
assisted Iraq to fulfil its oil contracts and lent it considerable diplomatic
support regionally and internationally.(18)
The enmity between Iraq and Syria has undermined Iraq‘s regional
role. The rivalry with Syria is both geo-politically and ideologically
based. The rivalry has taken several forms, from interference in each
other‘s internal affairs to a contest for the leadership of both the Baathist
political movement and the Arab region. The Syrian support to Iran in
the war has accelerated the early rapprochement with Egypt in 1980-81.
The Egyptian-Syrian defeat in the 1967 war with Israel facilitated
the rise of a Saudi Arabian regional power. The 1967 defeat eventually
led to (a) the end of the attempt by Nasserism and Baathism to dominate
Arab regional politics, (b) A weightier role for the conservative wealthy
Arab Gulf States particularly Saudi Arabia. Since the oil boom of 1973
saw the transfer of massive financial resources to Saudi Arabia, that
country has become an important and influential actor in the Middle
East. It has promoted its Arab policy in the absence of Egypt to become
an effective mediator in the settling of disputes in the region.
The Saudi Arabian foreign policy has been instrumental in solving
Arab crisis in such as mediating between Syria and Jordan in their
border tension in 1980 and facilitating a return to the status quo in
Lebanon in summer 1981.(19)
Saudi Arabia‘s growing role in regional politics and its growing
stake in international economic issues served to increase the sense of
urgency that Saudi leaders felt for reaching an Arab-Israeli peace
settlement. Saudi Arabia‘s foreign policy accentuated the peace treaty
between Israel and Egypt as an Israeli victory to split the Arab world and
deny Egyptian military support to the Arab cause. Thus during the period
1979-1981 Saudi foreign policy followed the Arab consensus against the
Camp David accord.
But, with Egypt‘s continuing absence and Saudi Arabia‘s new
influential status as a major oil power, the Saudi foreign policy believed
it was up to them to break the deadlock.(20) In 1981, Saudi Arabia took
the major political initiative of the Fahd Peace Plan that was presented
to the Arab summit in November 1981. Arab consensus on the Fahd plan
was later achieved at the next Arab summit which was held in Fez in
September 1982.
Lacking only Libya‘s participation, the summit
formulated an eight-point peace plan which emphasised the Palestinian
right to a state, while at the same time recognising the right of all states
in the area to live in peace. While admittedly not explicit on the question
of Israel‘s sovereignty, the plan clearly implied Israel‘s right to exist.(21)
Saudi Arabia‘s attempt was to provide an alternative and more
comprehensive basis for a regional settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict
which would gain Arab support and provide it with a more influential
foreign policy in the region.
Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia continued to pay for the Arab deterrent
the forces (Syrian), which meant a political support for Syria‘s foreign
policy objectives in Lebanon - basically preventing partition, opposing
Israel‘s Expansion and Supporting Palestinian forces until 1982. The
Saudi Support guaranteed that Syria would not attempt to destabilise the
Saudi regime, encourage Muslim fundamentalists, favour completely
Iran‘s position in the Gulf dispute, and most important not to oppose the
Saudi peace initiative. Thus, Saudi Arabia has followed its traditional
policy of counter balancing different forces to as to maximise its own
influence and freedom of action.
However, as a result of the Iran-Iraq conflict Saudi Arabia‘s
foreign policy became principally concerned with the security of the
Arabian Peninsula. After Iraq became preoccupied with its war as early
as 1981, Saudi Arabia‘s foreign policy stepped up its efforts to forge
closer co-operation and co-ordination of economic, military and security
policies to defend the Gulf region against the Iranian threats. The
culmination of these efforts was the creation of the Gulf co-operation
council in Winter 1981. (22)
With the eruption of the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979, the
regional Saudi environment appeared more threatening and hostile
causing it to pot for a more cautious and less active foreign policy. Saudi
Arabia‘s foreign policy became increasingly preoccupied with countering
the threat posed by the new regime in Iran.
This became clear when the Ayatollahs were trying to export their
revolution across the Gulf and had an interest in reviving the old Iranian
claims to Bahrain.(23) Concerned with its vulnerability, Saudi Arabia‘s
foreign policy was less able to devote attention and energies to exert
more pressure to isolate Egypt. On the contrary, these new developments
in the Gulf revived the importance of Egypt as a strategic counterbalance to Iran‘s threats as a supporter of any regional Gulf security
arrangement. The Gulf war became a catalyst in the reorientation of Gulf
States‘ policies towards Egypt.
Facing a degree of isolation in the Arab world and a rise of new
regional power centres, the Egyptian foreign policy began to formulate a
new policy aiming at breaking the Arab boycott. Egypt, since president
Hosni Mubarak‘s rule, has sought readmission into the Arab family
without breaking its treaty ties with Israel. The resolution of this difficult
formula seemed an impossible task for a period of time due to the
presence of many obstacles as Israel‘s aggressive policies and the
emerging regional role of Syria, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Thus, Egypt was
either to maintain normalisation of relations with Israel at the cost of
political isolation in the Arab world or to return to the Arab fold at the
risk of liquidating the gains from the peace treaty.
However, with both the positive steps taken by the Egyptian
foreign policy towards the Arab region, and the regional developments in
the Middle East, Egypt was able to proceed with this combination of
peace with Israel and reconciliation with the Arab states.
Since 1981, Egypt‘s regional foreign policy has been
crystallised around two broad policy goals: (a) maintaining a cold peace
with Israel (b) reconciling Egypt and the rest of the Arab world through
an eventual rapprochement on bilateral levels.
Egypt‘s normalisation process with Israel has been almost
completely halted since the invasion of Lebanon in 1982.(24) Egypt‘s
Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, Kamal Hassan Ali,
summed up the situation in late 1984 as ―Official Egypt is implementing
all the provisions under the peace treaty. As regards implementation at
the popular level, the frustration felt as a result of Israeli practices in
Lebanon – the invasion and the massacres – greatly affected the Egyptian
people‖.(25)
In practise that policy meant that Egypt made an effort to fulfil to
the letter all the agreements with Israel which were dependent upon
direct government action only – meaning maintaining peace at an official
level, but slowing down the normalisation process.(26) Egypt‘s foreign
policy seemed to be comfortable with a ―Cold Peace‖ level of relations.
Such a low profile was an asset in Egypt‘s efforts to reintegrate in the
Arab system. Egypt was strongly critical of Israel‘s policy on three major
issues: its continued occupation of South Lebanon, its over increasing
settlements in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and its stance over the
Taba dispute.(27) Israel‘s position and conduct in these matters were the
subject of ceaseless Egyptian remonstrations as well as warnings to
Israel voiced by officials and much more strongly by the media. The
Cairo media depicted Israel since the invasion of Lebanon as a
treacherous entity for whom peace was a mere camouflage to conceal its
aggressive nature: ―Expansion in the Arab lands was a million times
more important than peace to Israel‖.(28) This content of the Egyptian
media scarcely differed from what was appearing in moderate Arab
countries as Jordan and Saudi Arabia.
Apart from deliveries of Egyptian oil to Israel, there has been no
major development in trade. The volume of Israeli exports to Egypt
during the fiscal year 1984-1985 was one-third of that in 1981-1982. (29)
There were rarely any Egyptian tourists to Israel and cultural exchanges
were frozen. Israel‘s behaviour in the region gave Egypt reasonable
cause for distancing itself by halting the normalisation process and by
such actions as severing diplomatic relations with El Salvador and Costa
Rica due to the transfer of their Embassies to Jerusalem.(30) These
postures facilitated the process of rapprochement between the Arab states
and Egypt.
Egypt had to project a more pro-Arab image on its policies to
bring Cairo closer to the positions adopted by the other Arab
governments. There have been significant foreign policy changes in
Egypt‘s Arab policies. These changes have created a more pragmatic
balance in Egypt‘s foreign relations by showing a greater appreciation
for the Arab nationalist sensitivities of both domestic opposition and
other Arab governments. President Hosni Mubarak has expressed
concern for the excesses in wealth and corruption associated with the
influx of foreign aid and investment, has displayed less enthusiasm for the
ideas of a closer strategic relationship with the U.S. and the Western
Block. Egyptian foreign policy advisers and newspaper editors refrained
from verbal attacks on Arab leaders even if Egypt was criticised by them.
Egypt opted for a quiet diplomacy demonstrating on many occasions that
it could be as zealous about Arab causes as its detractors.
The ―League of Islamic and Arab Peoples‖ which was established by the
late president Anwar-El-Sadat as an alternative to the Arab league was
abolished. President Hosni Mubarak announced that the league has
―fulfilled its purpose and the reasons for its establishment have
ended‖.(31) These actions increased the credentials of Egypt among the
moderate Arab states. Egypt‘s regional policy has initiated a variety of
symbolic acts in the early 1980‘s to ease Egypt‘s isolation in the Arab
world. These include Mubarak‘s meeting with King Fahd at the funeral of
the late Saudi King Khalid, relieving PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat
following his eviction from Lebanon, establishing a liaison office in
Beirut, supplying arms to Iraq as early as 1982, and re-establishing
cordial relations with Jordan.
The success of Egypt‘s multilateral Arab diplomacy was facilitated
to a large extent by developments in the Middle East. The Israeli invasion
of Lebanon in 1982, the Iran-Iraq dispute, the Iranian threats to Gulf
security, the Syrian-PLO rift and the Jordan/Palestinian peace
framework – all were reasons for the rapprochement with Egypt.
From the outset, Israeli policy has out a strain upon the EgyptianIsraeli treaty. The outcome of the diplomacy leading to the 1979 peace
treaty clearly signalled Israel‘s limited view of the goals sought: the
absence of a linkage relating the peace treaty to the Camp David
framework on the Palestinian question was major evidence of this.(32)
Further evidence of this was the Israeli minimalist interpretation of the
meaning of autonomy for the Palestinians.
Even more concrete evidence of strain upon Egyptian-Israeli
relations had to do with Israel‘s settlements on the West Bank. Likud
rushed ahead with its accelerated settlement policy, with the result that
during 1977-1984, settlements increased from 36 to 100 and settlers from
5,000 to over 30,000. But Israel‘s provocations were not limited to
interpretations of the peace treaty.(33) Israel formally annexed
Jerusalem as its capital on April 18, 1980. This was followed by the
Israeli air-raid on Iraq and its bombing of the Osirak nuclear research
facility on June 8, 1981. Then there was more on December 14, 1981,
when Israel had declared the annexation of the Syrian Golan Heights
putting it under Israeli civil law and administration. Israel also extended
its support for the ―Free Lebanon‖ that Saad Haddad proclaimed in the
strip of land along Israel‘s northern border. (34)
These actions by Israel and its invasion of Lebanon in June,
1982 created a diplomatic opportunity for Egypt in three aspects. The
first was a degree of verbal criticism equal to or even stronger than that
of most other Arab states. The second was action within the treaty itself,
namely the freezing of the normalisation process. The third was an
international manoeuvre to contain the conflict. Egypt – as an albeit –
Ostracised Arab state, joined with France – as the former league of
national mandatory power in Lebanon, to call for a cease-fire and an
Israeli withdrawal.(35)
This had the effect of evidencing a new set of Egyptian Arab
credentials to its Arab partners, and of drawing Egypt closer to the Arab
state system. A major reason for this is that if Egypt had been condemned
for having abandoned the Arab cause, no Arab state including Syria or
Iraq, put the Lebanese and Palestinian cause before its own. Meanwhile,
Egypt extended humanitarian, medical and diplomatic support to the
PLO during the Israeli invasion.(36)
This support became more evident with the internal dispute at the
end of 1983 between Yasser Arafat and the Abu Musa factions of the
PLO. Egypt rallied to the support of Arafat against the Syrian –
supported Abu Musa factions. Egyptian military ships aided Arafat‘s
withdrawal from Tripoli, an action followed by Arafat‘s visit to Cairo in
December 1983. The rapprochement with the PLO represented the most
potent legitimising factor available to Egypt for overcoming alienation
from the Arab state system.
The Iran-Iraq conflict that began in September 1980, gave Egypt‘s
foreign policy an opportunity to prove its pro-Arab image and its support
of Arab claims. Egypt began to form an image as a power capable of
aiding and protecting Arab states. By providing military aid to Iraq,
Egypt was in conformity with the charter of the Arab league, which
provides that Arab countries should aid each other when one of their
member states is the victim of an outside aggressor. Egypt‘s more proArab role in the war was a clear evidence of its abiding to the Arab
causes.
This was even more evident, as Egypt argued, if contrasted to the
Syrian role which was in support of the aggressor – Iran and not the
Arab-Iraq. Egypt was thus more in conformity with the league‘s charter
than Syria. The Egyptian role took two main forms: direct and indirect
military assistance.(37) Egypt‘s direct military assistance took the form
of provision of ammunition, Soviet military spare parts, military
equipment, technical and training personnel, military advisers and
assessment teams. It occasionally sent the assessment teams to help
analyse the situation and predict the direction of future offences.
Indirectly it allowed selective emigration of certain crucial professions
needed by the Iraqi military effort. Egypt tolerated the volunteering of
Egyptians in Iraq to serve in the Iraqi forces. It provided agricultural and
oil labour to man vital segments of Iraq‘s economy and thus feeing
Iraqi‘s to fight at the military front.
The reliance on massive military support from Egypt necessitated
frequent contacts between both at military and political levels. While only
stopping short of formal resumption of diplomatic relations, the
rapprochement affected a wide range of areas: strategic, political,
economic, cultural and religious. The signal for the shift was given by
President Saddam Hussein in early December 1982, when he declared
that Iraq was looking forward to Egypt‘s resumption of its natural
influential role in the pan-Arab movement. This was followed by a
continuous increase in the intensity of bilateral visits between political,
economic and cultural delegations.
In August 1983, the two countries signed a treaty for economic
and commercial co-operation providing for an increase in the volume of
trade between them.(38) Another sign of improving relations were the
recurrent references by officials and the press in both countries to yet
another Egyptian-Iraqi bond – the large community of Egyptian workers
in Iraq estimated to be two million. These workers have come to be the
back bone of Iraq‘s economy during its war with Iran. Thus, the new
relations were being based on pragmatic considerations that serve the
national interests of both states. Although Iraq was the main force behind
the Arab boycott in 1979, the threatening situation to the Gulf security
has made Egypt‘s isolation irrelevant. Egypt‘s military support was
directly needed in the war and its political support was needed to endorse
Iraq‘s claims in the international community and especially in the West
and the U.S.
Moreover, the Gulf states had urgent need for Egypt‘s return to the
Arab fold. Iraq‘s poor performance in the war caused security fears to
the Gulf states: should Iraq be defeated and the regime be replaced by
either an Islamic fundamentalist or a more radical Baathist regime, this
would greatly increase the Gulf states vulnerability. Thus, Arab Gulf
states valued more having Egypt involved in Gulf affairs as a stabilising
force. Egypt was still the only Arab country that can effectively help in
facing the regional challenges to the Gulf security. Egyptian officials
emphasised that Egypt remains the Arabs‘ military most credible force
and that it is always ready and capable of supporting other Arab states.
Egypt‘s approach to the issue of Gulf security encompasses three
major factors:(39) the First is that Gulf security is a part of Egypt‘s
national security and constitutes a threat to the eastern wing of the Arab
world. The Gulf is threatened by the impact of the Iranian revolution and
the dispute between Iraq and Iran. Hence threats to Gulf stability are
crucial to Egypt and it is most likely, that Egypt cannot tolerate a major
Iraqi defeat and the collapse of the Iraqi regime because it would
drastically destabilise the Gulf regime. The second factor is that the Gulf
security is seen primarily as an Arab responsibility and Egypt is capable
of establishing a deterring force to shoulder the protection of the Arab
Gulf. The third factor is that the oil security is an immediate economic
concern to Egypt because large quantities of oil passes through SuezMediterranean pipelines (SUMED) that stretch in Egyptian territory from
the Red Sea to the Mediterranean.
In addition to these major factors, Egypt‘s foreign policy has
perceived Gulf security and Egypt‘s role in the Iran-Iraq conflict as an
effective means of reinstituting its position and rehabilitating its image in
the Arab world. The national interests of the Arab Gulf states were an
eye-opener to the importance of Egypt‘s role in the region. By 19831984, most Arab Gulf states recognised the necessity of having an
Egyptian link to establish a credible deterrent to the potential Iranian
threat.
The Syrian/PLO rift was another development in the Middle East
that contributed to the rapprochement between the Arab states and Egypt.
Since the attempt by Syria to demolish the PLO in Lebanon, to undermine
Yasser Arafat‘s position and to support the factions led by Abu Musa in
1982-1983, Egypt has provided support to the PLO forces under siege.
There was a strong government and popular (as represented by the
opposition parties) support to the PLO in Lebanon.
Egypt‘s assistance to Arafat at a time when Syria contributed to
the fragmentation of the PLO gave Egypt a credible Arab nationalist
image. Arafat‘s tilt towards Egypt was accelerated by the Syrian hostility
in Lebanon and the Saudi passive position toward it. In such
circumstances, Egypt was the major balancing factor that PLO‘s interests
needed promptly. Given the symbolic nature of the Palestinian cause for
the Arab collective, the legitimisation involved in Egypt‘s return to the
Arab fold without renouncing the peace treaty with Israel, must be seen
as one of the most important consequences of the Lebanese war and the
Syrian/PLO rift.
Thus, with Syria letting him down, the PLO chairman had no other
option by to join the peace process with Jordan. Jordan had resumed its
diplomatic relations with Egypt in September 1984. King Hussein has
championed the Arab move for reconciliation with Egypt because of his
perception that a closer relationship with Cairo offers not only some
protection for his regime in the event that he may have to negotiate with
Israel over the West Bank, but also against the possible depredations of
other Arab states against his regime.
Another primary rationale for the Jordanian rapprochement with
Egypt was a desire to counter balances Syria‘s regional influence.
Egyptian support would enable Jordan to follow a policy opposed to
Syria's view - and at times even to defy the Syrians – as for example with
the convening of the PLO National Council in Amman in 1984 and in the
support of Iraq in the Gulf war. King Hussein wishes in conjunction with
Egypt to mobilise Arab state support for an international peace
conference to deal with the Arab-Israeli conflict.
The PLO shift towards Jordan was coupled with a warming up of
relations with Egypt to balance the Syrian pressure which attempted to
control the organisation and eliminate its Chairman Yasser Arafat. The
Palestinian National Council meeting in November 1984 in Amman not
only sanctioned in Arafat‘s visit to Cairo in late 1983, but also called the
Arab states to restore diplomatic relations with Egypt.(40) The PLO
began consultations with King Hussein to work out a joint peace
initiative.
The presence of over a million Palestinians in Jordan, King
Hussein‘s access to the West Bank, the loss of independence in Lebanon
and the U.S. recognition of King Hussein‘s centrality in negotiations
were important incentives for Arafat to co-operate with Jordan. The two
parties worked endlessly to unify their positions and finally concluded a
―Common Framework for Peace in the Middle East‖ on February 11th,
1985.
This was a high point for the Egyptian diplomacy: Egypt-PLO
contacts became a matter of daily basis during the negotiations on the
agreement. The movement towards negotiations has presented Egypt with
the opportunity to move away from the formula of autonomy talks related
to Camp David, and to link its Arab policy to its peace efforts in the
Middle East. The PLO/Jordanian agreement provided Egypt with a new
avenue in Arab politics. Now, two of the main parties involved in the
Arab-Israeli conflict have chosen the peaceful solution adopted by the
Egyptian diplomacy. Egypt then began to convince the U.S. and the
Western European countries to accept the idea of talking to a join
Palestinian-Jordanian delegation. The delegation was received in
France, Italy and the EEC announced its willingness to receive it.(41)
In the final analysis, Egypt‘s new moderate policy towards the
Arab Israeli conflict, its regional Arab Foreign policy, together with the
convergence of events in the Middle East contributed to Egypt‘s
reintegration into the Arab fold. The Arab region witnessed a deemphasis of the Egyptian-Israeli peace process as key Arab states
became preoccupied with regional instability and the maintenance of
security. Iraq being dependant on the financial assistance of the Gulf
states and on the technical and military assistance of Egypt was in no
position to prevent Egypt‘s reintegration. Saudi Arabia and the Gulf
states needed Egypt as a counter weight to the Syrian backed Iranian
threats to their security.
The Syrian attempt to diminish the PLO provided Egypt with the
opportunity to rally publicly its support to the PLO during the 1982
Israeli invasion and in the period after that. These had the effect of
legitimising
Egypt‘s
reintegration
and
the
achievement
of
a
rapprochement that serves the national interests of the concerned Arab
states.
Egypt‘s promotion of a moderate policy towards the Arab-Israeli
conflict and the peace process in the Middle East, has been linked to its
relations with the U.S. during the 1970‘s and 1980‘s. Egypt‘s foreign
policy has appreciated since the late 1970‘s that if a comprehensive
peace was to come to the Middle East it could only occur with an
American Commitment that would in turn bring Israel along. Egypt‘s
strategic role as a force of stabilisation was similarly appreciated by the
U.S. especially after the series of dramatic events that occurred in the
late 1970‘s and early 1980‘s.
The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, armed conflict in the horn
of Africa, closer ties between South Yemen and the Soviet Union, the
signing of a friendship treaty between the Soviet Union and Syria, the
presence of Soviet military facilities in Libya and South Yemen, political
turmoil in the Arab world in the post-Camp David era, the victory of the
Iranian revolution and its impact on the Arab Gulf stability and the IranIraq war – all were factors that accentuated Egypt‘s vital role as a
moderate regional power capable of countering any destabilising
forces.(42)
The U.S. which was a full partner in the Egyptian-Israeli peace
treaty, has continuously attempted to maintain and strengthen the peace
process by providing aid to Egypt and Israel. The increase in the size of
U.S. economic and military assistance coincided with the shift in Egypt‘s
foreign policy. The political underpinnings of the aid programmes to
Egypt were articulated in the 1981 A.I.D. (Agency for International
Development) document as follows:
―Our high level of aid to Egypt is premised on the belief that
Egypt‘s peace initiatives are crucial to that objective and that these
efforts must be supported by a growing economy.‖(43)
U.S. assistance given to Egypt was designed to replace Arab funds
withdrawn because of the Camp David accord and to strengthen Egypt‘s
moderate peace policy. The aid covers a broad range of basic needs:
food, infrastructure improvement, the updating of social services,
technical assistance, agricultural and industrial projects and loans to
support Egypt‘s balance-of-payments difficulties. Egypt‘s national
interests since the late 1970‘s have been defined primarily in terms of
economic development through Western technology and investment. The
primacy of economic concerns alongside an advocation of stability and
peace became the corner stones of Egypt‘s foreign policy behaviour.
Thus, both the U.S. and Egypt had a common aspiration for promoting
peace and stability in the Middle East.
The positive Arab attitude towards Egypt has been a part of a
whole new Arab strategy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict. All of the
Arab countries have come to accept a peaceful settlement with Israel in
the Fez summit. While recognising the right of all states in the area to
live in peace, the Fahd peace plan clearly implied Israel‘s right to exist.
Later on, several meetings between Arab officials and Israelis took
place. In 1986, Israel‘s Prime Minister Peres met with King Hassan of
Morocco in Ifran. The summit which was publicly acknowledged was not
criticised except by Libya and Syria. Similarly, the meeting that was held
between PLO officials and an Israeli delegation in Romania in 1986 –
was publicly announced and weakly criticised by the Arab capitals.
The Mubarak – Peres meeting in Alexandria in 1986 was only
attacked by Syria and Libya. Otherwise other Arab countries took a very
moderate position. This was all in contrast to the Arab strong refusal of
late President Anwar-El-Sadat‘s visit to Israel in 1977. Egypt did not
send back its Ambassador to Tel-Aviv except after the three conditions
demanded from Israel was met. These were (a) Israel‘s withdrawal from
Lebanon (b) the solution of the Taba dispute, and (c) progress in the
Middle East peace process. Egypt‘s demands to return its Ambassador to
Tel-Aviv strengthened Egypt‘s Arab credentials. The moderate Arab
position towards Israel has become more explicit in inter-Arab politics as
Jordan and the PLO joined Egypt in the quest for a peaceful settlement
for the Arab-Israeli conflict.
The Egyptian isolation in the Arab world after the signing of the
1979 peace treaty can be analysed as a part of the continuous
competition in the balance of power between the main poles and centres
of the Arab system. It can be viewed as an extension of the power-politics
game in the Middle East region. With Egypt‘s leadership absent after the
end of Nasserism and the wave of Arab Nationalism, new power centres
rose in the region especially after the speedy influx of petro-power in the
Gulf region.
Saudi Arabia appeared as a new financial effective power in the
region and it attempted to make the best gains out of Egypt‘s absence –
basically by playing a larger-mostly mediator – a role in Arab politics.
Iraq attempted to capitalise on Egypt‘s absence by producing a
programme for regional solidarity to promote its leadership. Similarly,
Syria adopted a radical line and promoted its image as the sole defender
of Arab causes in contrast to Egypt‘s moderate peace politics. Thus, the
Saudi, Syrian and Iraqi vetoes on Egypt‘s return to the Arab community
for a period of time, can be explained basically as a part of the
interchange of power centres in the region. They would not accept again
an Egyptian leadership centre to be the base of the Arab world.
But as a result of the regional developments in the 1980‘s, a new
phenomenon of ―mutual interests policies‖ has occurred. The relations
among the different Arab states is no more governed only by common
causes, aspirations and the call for Arab nationalism. Arab relations in
the 1980‘s became more pragmatic with tangible national interests
prevailing over ideological considerations. Inter-Arab relations are
governed by the exchange of benefits and interests and a greater
flexibility leading to the development of working relationships across
previously ideological divisions.
A de-emphasis on ideology and the predominance of national
interest considerations became more evident. For example, despite the
absence of any diplomatic relations, Iraq has had very close co-operation
with Egypt which provided it with military, technical, economical and
political support in return for an end to Iraq‘s boycott of Egypt.
Similarly, the PLO after its eviction form Lebanon has sought Egyptian
support in face of Syrian pressures to control the organisation. Egypt in
return gained the PLO support to the peace process. Egypt‘s restoration
of relations with Jordan was in accordance with the plan of achieving
peace in the region. The Gulf states have increased consultations with
Egypt to secure a strategic depth against Iranian threats and to counter
the Syrian support to Iran.
During the period 1982-1986 Egyptian-Arab co-operation
achieved substantive progress despite the official boycott. There was a
resumption of Cairo‘s airlines with almost all the Arab states, and the
volume of Egypt‘s trade with other Arab states was reported to have
increased by 100% over 1978-1979 in 1984.(44) Egyptian mass media
began to accentuate that formal relations were becoming irrelevant with
the multiplicity of contacts with Arab capitals. The growth of bilateral
relations and ties through the various Egyptian ―interests sections‖ in
the Arab states hardly fell short of the customary diplomatic ties. There
was an extensive exchange of visits in late 1984 with Jordan as it
restored its diplomatic relations on September 25th 1984.
Egypt‘s foreign policy succeeded to regain membership in both the
Islamic conference organisation and the non-aligned movement in 1984
with the Arab consensus. PLO Chairman Arafat headed a high level
delegation to Egypt in October 1985, declaring PLO‘s official restoration
of contacts with Egypt. Egypt had just prior to the visit announced that it
considered the second part of the Camp David accord regarding the
autonomy of the Palestinians dead. By the end of 1985 Egypt had
received many high-level officials from Jordan, Iraq, PLO, Algeria,
Tunisia and the Yemen Arab republic.
During 1986 the Egyptian-Arab relations became very active.
Egyptian information Minister – Safwat El Sherif visited the United Arab
Emirates for a week to discuss different aspects of co-operation. Dr Atef
Ebeid, Egyptian Minister of State for Administrative Development visited
Kuwait to arrange for the Kuwaiti Chamber of Commerce visit to Cairo.
In December 1986, Egypt received a Saudi business delegation followed
by a military delegation headed by the Saudi defence Minister‘s
Counsellor. President Hosni Mubarak was invited to the fifth summit
meeting of the Islamic Conference organisation in Kuwait in January
1987. Finally, a delegation representing the Egyptian opposition parties
visited both Lebanon and Syria in late 1986 and early 1987 in an attempt
to find a settlement for the Lebanese conflict. This gradual improvement
in the Arab-Egyptian relations culminated in the resumption of full
diplomatic relations after an Arab consensus to end the boycott in the
November 1987 Arab summit in the Jordanian capital Amman.
The most significant outcome of the Amman Arab summit is that it
highlighted the greater pragmatism and moderation of Arab foreign
policies towards the conflict with Israel. The acceptance by the Arab
states than an Arab state – Egypt – can negotiate and sign a peace treaty
with Israel, and still remain a member of the Arab community as well as
retrieve a role in regional Arab affairs, is a clear manifestation of the
new pragmatic trend.( 45) The Amman summit reflected the changes that
have occurred in the Arab regional system over the 1970‘s and the
1980‘s. The impact of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, Israel‘s invasion
of Lebanon and the Gulf war has been the introduction of a moderate
collective Arab consensus vis-à-vis Israel. The radical Arab stand under
the leadership of Egypt‘s Nasser is no longer present, and the absence of
any alternative credible successor in the region has freed the regional
policies of individual Arab states.
Arab foreign policies have been reformulated to pursue their own
respective regional and external policies while at the same time
safeguarding their national interest regarding security and economic
survival. For instance, the fall in oil revenues over recent years has had a
widespread impact on inter-Arab relations. Reacting to reduced
revenues, oil-producing Arab states had to redirect their investment to
domestic development plans.(46) This, in turn, introduced constraints on
the foreign policies of these states resulting in a reordering of national
priorities to be in favour of their state national interests and a
moderation in regional policy.
This convinced several Arab states to reject the confrontation policy with
Israel and opt for a policy of peaceful co-existence.
In practical terms Egypt‘s return to the Arab fold is a reflection of
the change in the Arab state‘s position towards Israel, the economic
constraints due to the end of the oil boom and as a result of the threats
they perceive to their security.(47) Egypt‘s reintegration in the Arab
community has proceeded with an Arab understanding that Egypt of the
fifties and sixties is not that of today. It is appreciated that Egypt is
unlikely to wish to dictate a collective Arab policy.
Egypt‘s domestic pressures and challenges ranging from economic
difficulties (demographic profusion, diminishing food production and
water resources and rising consumption of natural resources) and
destabilising forces (e.g. Militant Islamic groups) tend to infuse on its
foreign policy a necessity for minimising attempts for regional
leadership. Egypt‘s Arab policy will continue to pursue a balanced
approach to inter-Arab relations, to maximise its own respective national
interest regarding economic development and how Arab states can
contribute to it in the 1990‘s.
Another
major
cause
for
the
rapprochement was the Arab state‘s perception of the presence of a
strategic imbalance in favour of Israel in the absence of Egypt.
The peace treaty between Egypt and Israel in 1979, the failure to
establish the Eastern Front 1978-1980, and the Iran-Iraq war since 1980
– all assisted in the creation of a context for Israel‘s powerful and
superior position versus the Arab states. The Arab states perception was
that quantitatively, the strategic arms balance in the region enables
Israel to defeat any single or combined Arab military effort.
Israel has a flourishing arms industry, while the Arab attempt to
build a joint Arab organisation for military industrialisation was
paralysed after the Camp David accord. Israel‘s military strength is
further enhanced by the supply of the most sophisticated and modern U.S.
military technology. This strategic threat has not only alarmed the Arab
front-line states but also the Arab Gulf states as Israeli planes violated
Saudi Arabian territorial space on their way to bomb the Iraqi nuclear
factory in June 1981. (48)
Moreover, the Arab regional disagreements and conflicts have
been perceived strategically as a situation that can provide Israel with
convenient channels for interference and penetration. Conflicts among
Arab regimes (political, economic, and military) and conflicts within
these regimes (ethnic, religious, political) provide a flexible ground for a
deeper fragmentation in the Arab world. (49) Lebanon, Sudan, Iraq and
Libya are a few examples of Arab states involved in civil or regional
disputes.
This continuous drain in the late 1970's and early 1980's of Arab
financial, economic, human and military capabilities has accentuated the
importance of correcting the declining status of Arab power vis-à-vis
Israel. Egypt‘s reintegration into the Arab Fold can be viewed then as an
acknowledgement on the part of the Arab leaders of the necessity of reestablishing a strategic balance with Israel that would serve the purpose
of maintaining peace and stability in the Middle East region.
NOTES
1. Tarek Ismael. International Relations of the Contemporary Middle
East. (Syracuse: Syracuse university press, 1986), p.37
2. Ali Dessouki. The Foreign Policies of Arab States. (Egypt: The
American University in Cairo press, 1984), p.44-45.
3. I. Bid. P.328
4. I. Bid, p.12
5. I. Bid, p.16
6. Fouad Ajami,‖The Foreign Policy of Egypt in the post – Sadat
era‖. (Foreign Affairs, Spring 1982), p.215-216.
7. George Ball, ―Egypt: Where to go From Here‖. (The Arab
Economist, Winter 1982), p.7.
8. Robert S. Jordan, ―Egypt‘s Dilemma‖. (Middle East Review,
December 1984), pp94-100.
9. John Bonivillan, ―Egypt‘s new role in the Peace Process‖. (The
Middle East Magazine, 1984), p66.
10. Osama Faqih, ―Arab links: Egypt‘s neighbours come calling‖.
(Middle East Economic Digest, April 1983), p.147.
11. Robert S. Jordan. P.96-97.
12. I. Bid, p.97.
13. Sami G. Hajjar. The Middle East From Transition to
Development. (Leiden: E.J Brill, 1985), p.129.
14. Robert O. Freedman. The Middle East since Camp David
(Boulder: Westview press, 1984), p.197-198.
15. I. Bid, p.137-139.
16. Robert O. Freedman. The Middle East: After the Israeli invasion
of Lebanon. (Syracuse: Syracuse university Press, 1986), p.172173.
17. I. Bid, p.173.
18. I. Bid, p.188.
19. Mark A. Bruzensky. Security in the Middle East: Regional Change
and Great Power Strategies. (Boulder: Westview press, 1987),
p.26.
20. Willard A. Beling. Middle East peace Plans. (London: Croom
Helm, 1986), p.59-60.
21. Adeed Dawisha, ―Comprehensive Peace in the Middle East and
the Comprehension of Arab Politics‖. (Middle East Journal, winter
1983), p.50-51.
22. Paul A. Juredini. Beyond Camp David: Emerging Alignments and
Leaders in the Middle East. (New York: Syracuse University press,
1981), p.47.
23. Alan R. Taylor. The Arab Balance of Power. (New York: Syracuse
University press, 1982), p.92.
24. Samir Khaled, ―U.S. – Egyptian Relations‖. (American-Arab
Affairs, winter 1983), p.48-49.
25. I. Bid, p.50.
26. I. Bid, p.51.
27. Miles Kahler, ―Spirit of Camp David: Five Years Later‖. (U.S.
News and World Report, November 1983), p.74.
28. Mahmoud Riad, ―Egypt and the Arabs‖. (The Middle East, June
1982), p.17.
29. Anne Joyce, ―The peace Process in the Middle East‖. (AmericanArab Affairs, Spring 1985), p.18.
30. Mark A. Bruzensky. P.129.
31.John Yemma, ―Can Egypt‘s new shepherd restore the Arab fold?‖
(The Christian Science Monitor, October 1982), pp.37-41.
32. Robert O. Freedman. The Middle East: After the Israeli Invasion
of Lebanon, p.330.
33. Helena Cobban, ―Beyond Camp David‖. (Foreign Policy, summer
1982/1983), pp.74-79.
34.Robert O. Freedman. The Middle East Since Camp David, p.135136.
35. Robert O. Freedman. The Middle East: After the Israeli Invasion
of Lebanon, p.185.
36. I. Bid, p.336.
37. Hafeez Malik. International Security in Southwest Asia. (New
York: Praeger Publishers, 1984), p.146.
38. Anne Joyce, p.18.
39. Hafeez Malik, p.145-146.
40. Ali Bessouki, p.196-210.
41. Martin Kramer, ―Inter-Arab relations: Egypt and other Arab
states‖. (Middle East Contemporary Survey, 1984), p.207.
42. Hafeez Malik, p.144.
43. Ali Dessouki, p.141.
44. Daniel Dishon, ―The Arab Republic of Egypt‖. (Middle East
Contemporary Survey, 1984), p.94.
45. P.J. Vatikiotis, ―Arab politics and Security‖. (Global Affairs, Fall
1988), p.100.
46. I. Bid, p.103
47. I. Bid, p.110
48. Hafeez Malik, p.50.
49. I. Bid, p.50.51.
Bibliography
Abdel-Azim, Zeinab.
Al Syassa Al-Misrya Tigah Al- Walyyat Al-
Mutahida 1981-1991. Beirut: Centre of Arab Unity studies, 1997.
Abdel-Khalek, Gouda. ―Looking Outside of Turning Northwest? On
the Meaning and External Dimensions of Egypt‘s Infitah‖,
Journal of Social Problems, 1981.
Abdel Khalek, Gouda. Tignor R. (eds), The Political Economy of
Income Distribution in Egypt. Holmes and Meir, New York, 1982.
Abdel Magid, Esmat. Zaman Al-Inksar Wa al-Intisar. Beirut: Dar El
Naher, 1998.
Abdel-Malek, Anwar.
―The Occulation of Egypt‖, Arab Studies
Quarterly, Vol. 1, No.3, Summer 1979, pp. 177-199.
Abo-Talab, Hassan. Ilaqat Mist Al-Arabiah 1970-1981. Beirut: Arab
Unity Studies Centre, 1998.
Address of H.E. Engineer Mohamed Abdel-Wahab, Minister of
Industry of Egypt, ―Background of Egypt‘s Programme of
Privatisation and Structural Adjustment‖.
London: Conference on Trade and Investment in Egypt, July 1992.
Al-Ahram 27/12/78, 6/3/78, 19/5/78, and Al-Akhbar on 28/1/78,
4/2/78, 19/5/78, and Al-Jumhuriyyah 3/3/78.
Al-Ahram Al-Iqtisadi, 1 May 1977, pp. 8-9.
Al-Ahram Archives, Ijtima‘at Majlis Al-Amn Al-Qawmi, (In Arabic),
Al-Ahram, Cairo, Egypt.
Al-Ahram 25.11.1977 to 31.12.1977, articles by Dr. Ali Lutfy, Dr.
Mustafa Al Said, Saad Mohamed Ahmed, Mustafa Kamel (all were
ministers of economy, ex-ministers or became ministers).
Al-Ahram 3.3.1978, 18.3.1978 and 21.4.1978 articles by Tawfiq AlHakim.
Al-Fares, Abdel-Razaq. Al-Selah Wa Al-Khobz: Al-Infaq Al-Asqry Fi
Al-Watan Al-Arabi (1970-1990). Beirut: Arab Unity Studies Centre,
1993.
Al-Jaridah al-Rasmiyyah –al-Dustur al-Da‘im li-Misr (Cairo, 11
September, 1971).
Al-La‘ihah al-Dakhiliyyah li-Majlis al-Sha‘ab, al-Maaddah 37-38.
1979 (In Arabic).
Al-La‘ihah al-Dakhiliyyah Li-Majlis al-Sha‘ab, 1979, (In Arabic).
Majlis Al-Sha‘ab, Amanit Al-Alaqat Al-Kharijyya Wal-‗Ammah,
Cairo, 1979, Articles 37-44.
Al-Marghy, Mahmoud. Misr Ala Maadat Al-Congras Al-Amiriqi: Nas
Almahdar Alty Naqash Fiha Al-Congres Qadyyat Al Mawonat wa AlSiyasat Al-Masriah. Al-Ahaly Newspaper, 21.12.1988.
Al-Shafei, Hassan. Head of Tax and Customs Committee and ViceChairman of the Association: Cairo, October 1993.
Ali, Kamal Hassan. Mashawir AlAomr: Asrar Wa Khafia Sabeen
Aammn Amr Misr Fi Al Harb Wa Al Mokhabarat wa Al-Syasa.
Cairo: Dar El-Sharaouq, 1994.
Al-Sadat, Anwar.
―Barnamij Al-amal Al-Watani‖, Programme of
national Action presented by Anwar Al-Sadat to the Second Congress
of the ASU, Al-Muatamr Al-Qwami Al-Thani Fi Dawr Al-Iniqad AlAwal Fi 23.7.71,
Cairo, State Information Service, 1971.
Al-Sadat, Anwar. Waraqat Uktubir. The October Working Paper
presented by President Anwar Al-Sadat, April 1974.
Cairo: State Information Service, 1974.
Al-Sadat, Anwar.
Waraqat ‗Amal Uktubar. (In Arabic), Central
Committee of the ASU, April 1974, Cairo, Egypt.
Al-Sadat, Anwar. ―Where Egypt Stands‖, Foreign Affairs 51, 1. 1972,
pp. 144-153.
Al-Sadat, Anwar. ―Where Egypt Stands‖, Foreign Affairs, 51:1
(October 1972), p. 108.
Al-Sadat, Anwar. Warqat Amal Uktubar, Central Committee of the
ASU, April 1974, Cairo.
Al-Sadat, Anwar. In Search of Identity: An Autobiography. New
York: Harper and Rau, 1978.
Al-Sadat, Anwar address to Seminar on Art and Generations on 31
January 1975, in Speeches and Interviews by President Anwar AlSadat January-June 1975, State Information Service, Cairo, Egypt.
Ajami, Fouad. ―The Foreign Policy of Egypt in the Post-Sadat Era‖.
Foreign Affairs, Spring, 1982.
Amin, Galal.
The Opening to Israel (paper presented to the 5th
Annual Congress of Egyptian Economists, Cairo).
Amin, Galal.
―External Factors in the Re-orientation of Egypt‘s
Economic policy‖, in Malcolm H. Kerr and S. Yassin (eds.) Rich and
Poor States in the Middle East. Boulder: Westview Press, 1982.
Annual Report of the Egyptian Businessmen Association (EBA), 1983
Edition, Cairo, Egypt, p. 5, See Also, Monthly Reports of the
Association, 1977-1978.
Anwar Al-Sadat, Speech on 22 July 1972, printed in Al-Ahram, 23
July 1972.
Aronson, Sholoma. Conflict and Bargaining in the Middle East: An
Israeli Perspective.
Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1978.
Ashraf, Marwan. Former Adviser at the Presidency, under President
Anwar Al-Sadat. London, 10 February, 1994.
Ayubi, Shahee.
Nasser and Sadat: Decision making and foreign
policy (1970-1972). Longwood academic Wakefield: New Hampshire,
1992.
Ayubi, Shaheen. Nasser and Sadat: decision Making and Foreign
Policy 1970-1972. New Hampshire: Longwood Academic, 1992.
Ayubi, Nazih. The State and Public Policies in Egypt since Sadat.
Reading: Ithaca Press, 1991.
Ayubi, Nazih. The State and Public Policies in Egypt since Sadat.
Reading: Ithaca press, 1991.
Ayubi, Nazih
N.M. Implementation Capability and
Political
Feasibility of the Open Door Policy in Egypt in Malcolm Kerr and
Sayed Yassin (efds).
Rich and Poor States in the Middle East.
Bahjat, Jawdat Jamil. The Impact of External and Internal Factors on
Economic Orientation: The case of Egypt. Florida University Press,
1991.
Ball, George. ―Egypt: where to go from Here‖ The Arab Economist,
Winter 1982.
Beling, Willard A. Middle East Peace Plans. London: Croom Helm,
1986.
Ben-Dor, Gabriel. ―Egypt‖ in: Kolodziej and Harkavy, eds., Security
Policies of Developing Countries. New York: Praeger, 1982,
Bonivillan, John. ―Egypt‘s new role in the Peace Process‖. The
Middle East Magazine, 1984.
Brown, Donald.
Egypt and the U.S.: Collaborators in Economic
Development, Middle East Journal, 35, pp. 3-15.
Bruzensky, Mark A. Security in the Middle East: Regional Change and
Great Power Strategies. Boulder: West View Press, 1987.
Brzoska, Michael. Eds., Arms Transfers to the Third Worlds 19711985. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987.
Burkat, Dale.
President Sadat‘s Operational Code and Egyptian
Foreign Policy Decision Making. Ottawa: Carleton University Press,
1980.
Calvert, Peter.
The Foreign Policy of New States.
Sussex: The
Harvester Press, 1986.
Carter, Jimmy.
p.342.
Keeping Faith (New York: Bantan Books, 1982)
Central Bank of Egypt Yearly Reports on the Economy 1975, 1981,
Cairo.
Christian Science Monitor, 8 February 1978.
Cobban, Helena. ―Beyond Camp David‖. Foreign Policy, Summer
1982/1983.
Communist Aid Activities in Non-Communist Less Developed
Countries, 1979, (Washington D.C.: Foreign National Centre, 1980),
p. 7.
Complied from data in Al-Ahram Archives, Central Bank of Egypt,
National Bank of Egypt, Ministry of Trade – Cairo, 1970-1981
publications.
Copy of original letter addressed to Sadat from U.S. President Gerald
Ford on 19 March 1976.
Data complied from the following sources: Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Archives, Archives of the Presidency, Al-Ahram Archives, Cairo,
1970-1981 publications.
Data complied from Ministry of International Cooperation, balance
sheets of imports from U.S.A. and U.S.S.R., 1974-1978.
Dalyl Tnzym Wa Akhtsasat Wazart Al-Kharjyh Al-Masryh. Wazart AlKharjyh, 1962.
Dawisha, Adeed. ―Comprehensive Peace in the Middle East and the
Comprehension of Arab Policies‖. Middle East Journal, Winter 1983.
Dawisha, Karen. Soviet Foreign Policy Towards Egypt. New York:
St.Martin‘s Press, 1979.
Dessouki, Ali. Policy-making in Egypt: A case Study of the OpenDoor Economic Policy. Social problems, 28, 4 (198), pp. 410-416.
Dessouki, Ali. The Foreign Policies of Arab States. Boulder: West
View Press, 1991.
Dessouki, Ali. Eds Tatawur Al-Dimugratiyyah Fi Misr. (In Arabic).
(Cairo: Nahadit Al-Sha‘b Press, 1986) p. 96-98.
Dessouki, Ali.
The Foreign Policies of Arab States. Egypt: The
American University in Cairo Press, 1984.
Dessouki, Ali E. Hillal. ―Policy-Making in Egypt: A case study of the
Open-door Economic policy‖ Social Problems 28, 4 (1981), pp. 410416.
Dishon, Daniel.
―The Arab Republic of Egypt‖.
Middle East
Contemporary Survey, 1984.
Document: Sadat‘s letter of assignment to Dr. Adel Aziz Hegazy,
Prime Minister in 1974, stating the duties of his new government.
Document: Letter presented to President Sadat from Osama El Baz
regarding Kissinger and how to deal with him in his first visit to Cairo
on 6.11.1973.
Document Letter: Sadat‘s letter to U.S. President Ford on 20 March
1976 in response to President Ford‘s letter.
East, Maurice A. Stephen A. Salmor and Charles Hermann. Why
Nations Act Beverly Hills,
California: Sage Publications, 1978.
East, Maurice A. et al. Why Nations Act: Theoretical Perspectives for
Comparative Foreign Policy Studies, London: Sage Publications,
1978.
Egypt‘s Economic Performance and Economic Re-Adjustment with
Growth, IMF Report on Egypt, 1981, p. 2 Earl L. Sullivan eds. The
Impact of Development Assistance on Egypt.
(Cairo: The Cairo Papers in Social Sciences, AUC Press, 1984),
pp. 1-16.
El-Rajal, Amr ezz. Al-Amn Al-Iqtisadi Wa Al-Syassa Al-Arabia L.
Misr. Al-Siasa-Al-Dawlya, October 1997, pp. 24-32.
El-Sayyad, Mustafa Kamel. Hiqiqat Al-Taadadia Al-Siasyaa Fi Misr:
Dirassat Fi Al-Tahwol Al-Raasmalii. Cairo: Madbouli Press, 1996.
Fagih, Osama.
―Arab Links: Egypt‘s neighbours come calling‖
Middle East Economic Digest, April 1983.
Fahmy, Ismail. Al-Tafawod Min Agl Al-Salam Fi Al-Sharq Al- Awsat.
Cairo: Madbouli, 1985.
Fahmy, Ismail. Negotiating for Peace in the Middle East Baltimere:
John Hopkins University Press, 1983.
Farid, Abdel –Megid.
Nasser: The Final Years (London: Ithaca
Press, 1994).
Farre, Barry eds.
Approaches to comparative and International
Politics.
Evanston: North-western University Press, 1966.
Financial Times, London, January 18, 1977, p. 22.
Frankel, Joseph.
The Making of Foreign Policy: An Analysis of
decision-making.
London: Oxford University Press, 1963.
Freedman, Robert O. The Middle East: After the Israeli Invasion of
Lebanon.
Syracus: Syracus University Press, 1986
Freedman, Robert O. The Middle East Since Camp David.
Boulder: West View Press, 1984.
Ghali, Boutros. ―Tariq Misr Ila Al-Quds: Qisat Al-Siraa Mn Agl AlSalam Fi Al-Sharq Al-Awsat‖. Cairo: Al-Ahram Centre for
Translation and Publications.
Ghonaeim, Adel. Al-Namuzaj al-Misri Li Ra‘smaliyyat Al-Dawla AlTabaa. Cairo: Dar Al-Mustaqbal Al-Arabi, 1986.
Glassman, Jon D. Arms for the Arabs: The Soviet Union and War in
the Middle East. Baltimore, Md.: John Hopkins University Press,
1975.
Gillespie, Kate. The Tripartite Relationship: Government, Foreign
Investors and Local Investors During Egypt‘s Economic Opening.
New York: Praeger, 1984.
Gomma, Salwa. Al-Diblomasyya Al-Misrya Fi Al Sabyyinat. Beirut:
Marqaz Dirassat Al-Wahida Al-arabia, 1988.
Hadith bil- Mudir Al-Sabiq bil-Shariaa Al-‗Amah Li-1-Batariyya, AlAhali, 15/1/1983.
Hajjar, Sami G. The Middle East From Transition to Development.
Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1985.
Heikal, Mohamed Hassanin: Sphinx and Commissar. London: Collins
Sons, 1978.
Heikal, Mohamed Hassanin. Uktubir 73: Al Selah wa Al-Syasa.
Cairo: Centre for Publication and Translation, 1993.
Hamed, Osman. Egypt‘s Open-Door Policy: An Attempt at Economic
Integration in the Middle East. International Journal of Middle East
Studies, Vol. 13, No. 1, 1981, pp. 4-6.
Hermann, Margaret. ―Explaining Foreign Policy Behaviour using
the Personal Characteristics of Political Leaders‖, International
Studies Quarterly, Volume 24, March 1980, pp. 7-47.
Heikal, Mohammad Hasanayn. Kharif Al-Ghadab: Qisat Bidayt Wa
Nihayt, Asr al-Sadat.
(In Arabic) Publication and Distribution Company: Beirut, 1983.
Heikal, Mohammad. Kharif Al-Ghaddeb: Qisat Bidayt Wa Nihayt,
Asr Al-Sadat.
(In Arabic).
Cairo: Al-Ahram Publication and
Translation Centre, 1980.
Heikal, Mohammad Hassanain. The Road to Ramadan. Glasgow:
William Collins and Co., 1975.
Hinnebusch, R. Egyptian Politics under Sadat: The post-populist
Development of an authoritarian-Modernizing State.
(London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1988), p. 41-42.
Hirst, David. Sadat. London: Faber and Faber, 1981.
Holsti, K. J. International Politics. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: PrenticeHall, 1977.
Holsti, K.J. Why Nations Realign: Foreign Policy Restructuring in
the Post-War World. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1982.
Hurewitz,J.C. ―Review of Michael Brecher‘s. The Foreign Policy
System of Israel‖.
American Political Science Review, 67:2 June 1973, 706-707.
Hussein, Adel. Al Iqtisad Misri, 2 Volumes.
Hussein, Adel. Al-Iqtisad Al-Misri Min Al-Istiqilal Ila Al-Tabaayya.
Cairo – Dar Al-Mostqbal Al-Arabi, 1982.
Hussein, Adnan El-Sayed.
Asr Al-Taswyya Siyasat Camp David
Abaaduha Al-Aqlimya wa Al-Dawiya.
Beirut: Dar El-Nafaas, 1990.
Ibrahim, Saad Al-Din.
Eds.
Misr Fi Robaa Qarn
(1952-1977)
Dirasat Fi Al-Tanmya.
Beirut: Centre of Arab Development, 1981.
Ibrahim, Saad Al-Din. Orobat Misr: Hawar Al-Sabinaat, Dirasat
Tahlilia.
Cairo: Centre of Strategic Studies, 1978.
Ijtma‘t Majlys Al-Wizara, Archives of the Cabinet ―Ri‘asat alWizarah‖ (In Arabic), Cairo, Egypt.
Interview with field Marshall Abu Gazala in Armed Forces Journal
International, September 1981, p. 49.
Interview with Dr. Boutros Ghali, Al-Akhbar on 19 November 1981, and
an article by him ―Asrar Lama Tunshar‘an Rihlat al-Salam‖ in Majalat
Uktubar, 25 April 1982, p. 16-18.
Interview with Sadat in the American Programme ―Face the Nation‖,
CBS, 10 January 1971, as quoted in Raphael Israeli The public Diary of
Sadat, Parts 1-3.
Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1978, p.21-22.
Interview with Sadat. Al-Ahram, 8.6.1976 and 19.9.1976.
Interview with Al-Sadat, Anwar Egyptian National T.V on the occasion of
his 59th Birthday, December 25, 1978, in, Speeches and Interviews by
President Anwar Al-Sadat July-December 1978, State Information
Service, Cairo, Egypt.
Interview with Sadat. Al-Ahram 30.6.1976 and 13.12.1976.
Interview with former Head of Intelligence service under Sadat in the
Egyptian weekly Rose Al-Yusif ―Hiwar Ma‘ Kamal Hassan Ali‖, 26 April
1982, Cairo, Egypt. [In Arabic].
Interview with Mustafa Khalil, Prime Minister of Egypt in 1978. AlGizira Arab TV Network, 26 February 2000.
Interview with former Secretary of Central Committee of the ASU,
Foreign Minister and Prime Ministers under Sadat in the Egyptian daily
newspaper Al-Ahram. ―Hadith Ma‘ Mustafa Khalil‖, 14
November 1982, Cairo, Egypt. [In Arabic]
Interview with former Minister of Foreign Affairs Mahmud Fawzi
Majalat Al-Diblomasi, [In Arabic]
July 1992, Cairo, Egypt.
Ismail, Mohammed Hafez, Amn Misr Al-Qawmi Fi Al-Tahadiiat. Cairo:
Al-Ahram Centre for Translation and Publication, 1987.
Ismael, Tarek. International Relations of the Contemporary Middle East.
Syracuse:
Syracuse University Press, 1986.
Jaridat alAhram Li-‗Am 1976, Al-Ahram Archives, Cairo, Egypt.
Jordan, Robert S. ―Egypt‘s Dilemma‖ Middle East Review, December
1984.
Joe, Stork. ―The Crisis in Egypt: Bailing out Sadat‖ MERIP Reports, No.
56, 1977, p.9.
Joyce, Anne. ―The Peace Process in the Middle East‖. American-Arab
Affairs.
Spring 1985.
Jum‘a, Salwa S. Al-Diblumasiyya al-Misriyya Fi al-Sab‘inat: Dirasa Fi
Dur Al-Zaama. [In Arabic].
Centre for the Arab Unity Studies: Beirut, 1988.
Juredini, Paul A. Beyond Camp David: Emerging Alignments and
Leaders in the Middle East. New York: Syracuse University Press, 1981.
Kahler, Miles. ―Spirit of Camp David: Five Years Later‖. U.S. News and
World Report, November 1983.
―Kalimat al-Sadat Lil-Umma‖ [In Arabic] Al-Ahram, 12 November
1976, al-Ahram Archives, Cairo, Egypt.
Kamil Muhammad I. Al-Salam al-Da‘ fi Itifaqiyyat Camp David.
(al-Saudia: dar-Nashr al-Saudi, 1982),p. 179, p. 608.
Kegley, Charles. World Politics: Trend and Transformation. London:
Macmillan, 1989.
Khaled, Samir. ―U.S. – Egyptian Relations‖. American-Arab Affairs,
Winter 1983.
K.Ikram. Egypt: Economic Management in a Period of Transition.
Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1980.
Kimche, Jon. ―The Riddle of Sadat‖, Midstream, 20:4 (April 1973), p.
12-13.
Kissinger, Henry. Diplomacy (New York: Touchstone, 1995).
Kissinger, Henry. Years of Upheaval, Sequel to White House Years. Vol.
2. Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1982.
Korany, Bahgat. Interview with Ismail Fahmy, Foreign Minister of Egypt,
Cairo,
February and April 1980.
Korany, Bahgat. Egypt‘s Dependant Development, Patterns of Inter-Arab
Politics and the Making of the Camp David Agreements.
California: Middle East Studies associations, 1984.
Korany, Bahgat. How Foreign Policy Decisions are made in the Third
World.
Boulder: West view, 1986.
Korany, Bahgat. Interview with Hassan El-Touhamy, Vice Prime
Minister and Special Advisor to Sadat, Cairo, May 1980.
Korany, Bahgat.The Foreign Policy of Arab States. Cairo: The American
University in Cairo Press, 1984.
Korawan, Ibrahim. ―Egypt and the Western Alliance: The Politics of
Westomania‖ in Steven L. Spiegel (ed.), The Middle East and Western
Alliance. London: George Alka and Unwin, 1982.
Krammer, Martin. ―Inter-Arab Relations: Egypt and other Arab States.‖
Middle East Contemporary Survey, 1984.
Madbatah Majlis Al-Sha‘ab. Al-Fasl Al-Tashri‘ Al-Thani, al- In‘iqad alAadi, Al-Thany Fi 27/11/1977
(Majilis al Sha‘ab: Amanit al-alaqat al-kharijyya Wal – ‗Aamah,
Cairo, 1977), 27/11/1977 issue.
Mahmud, Riad, Al Bahth ‗an al-Salam Wa-l-Sira‘ fi al‘Sharq al-Awsat
1948-1978.
(Beirut: al-Mu‘asasah al-Arabiyyah Li-l-Nashr, 1981), p.538.
Madhbyit al-Jalsah as-Thamaniyya Wal-Thamanin, al_Fasl al-Tashri‘I,
al-Thani, Dawr al-Iniqad al‘Aadi fi 25/8/1997. (Majlis as-Sha‘ab:
Amanit al-Alaqat al-Kharijitah Wal-Aomah, Cairo, 1977), 25/8/1977
issue.
Madison, Christopher. ―U.S. Reducing Act in the Middle East‖, National
Journal, 28, November 1981, p.2107.
Malaf Qadiat Al-Salihiyyah, Al-Ahram al-Iqtisadi, Number 688, 22
March 1982.
Malik, Hafeez. International Security in South West Asia. New York:
Preager Publishers, 1984.
Mclaurin, Roland et al. Foreign Policy making in the Middle East. New
York:
Praeger Publishers, 1979, pp.281-288.
Merritt, Richard L. Foreign Policy Analysis. London: Lexington, 1975.
Morsy, Soheir. U.S. Aid to Egypt: An Illustration and Account of U.S.
Foreign Assistance. Political Arab Studies Quarterly, Col. 8, No. 4,
p.365.
Moustafa, Nadia Mahmud. ―Syasat Tabaaya Al-Mawarad: Al-Siyasa AlKharijiyyah Li Misr Fi Ahd Anwar Al-Sadat‖, Cairo: Egyptian Al-Nahda
Publication, 1987.
Mursi, Fuad. Hazat al-Infitah al-Iqtisadi. Beirut: Dar Al-wahda bilNashr, 1975.
Nafah, Hassan. Misr Wa Al-Seraa Al-Arabi Al Isarili. Beirut: Marqaz
Dirassat Al-Wahda Al-Arabia, 1986.
Nafah, Hassan. Misr Wa Al-Seraa Al-Arabi Al Israili, pp. 84-87. Beirut:
Centre for Arab Unity Studies, 1986.
Nasser, Gamal Abdel. The Philosophy of the Revolution. Buffalo, N.Y:
Economica Books, 1959.
New York Times, 24 July 1972.
Newsweek, 23 March 1981, p. 35.
Newsweek, 9 April 1972, p. 46.
Newsweek, 29 December 1980, p. 23.
Osman A. Osman. Safhit Min Tajrubati (al-Maktub al-Misri al-Hadith,
(Cairo, Egypt, 1981), p 409-413.
Payer, Cheryl. The Debt Trap, The International Monetary Fund and the
Third World. New York: Monthly Reviews Press, 1974.
(People‘s Assembly Hansards) Madoatah al-Jalsah al-Rabi‘a WalArba‘in, al-Fasl al-Tishra‘I, al-Thani, D oar al-In‘iqad al-‗Aadi al –
Thani fi 11/5/1977 (Majlis Al-Sha‘ab: Amanit Al-‗Alaqay Al-Kharijiyya
Wal-‗Ammah,
Cairo 11 May 1977 issue (in Arabic).
Quandt, William. The Middle East: 10 Years After Camp David. Cairo:
Al Ahram Publication and Translation, 1989.
Quoted in Saad Edding Ibrahim, ―Super Powers in the Arab World‖,
Washington Quarterly 4,3 (Summer 1981), pp. 88-89.
Radwan, Samir. The Industrialisation of Egypt. Oxford: Clarenton Press,
1976.
Rafaat, Wahid Al Istratigya Al Soviatyya Fi Al-Sharq Al-Aosat, Al Syassa
– Al-Dawla, July 1974, pp. 506-528.
Raghib, Nabil. Sadat: Ra‘id Harakat Al-Fikri. [In Arabic]. Cairo: Dar
Al-Ma‘arif, 1975.
Report of the U.S. Agency for International Development, Cairo, Egypt,
February 1981.
Riad, Mahmoud. ―Egypt and The Arabs.‖ The Middle East, June 1982.
Rivlin, Paul. The Dynamics of Economic Policy Making in Egypt
New York: Praeger Publishers, 1985.
Rosenau, James eds. Linkage Politics. New York: Free Press, 1969
Sadat‘s interview with the editor of the daily Kuwaiti newspaper AlSiyasa, on 12 April 1975 in, Speeches and Interviews by President Anwar
al-Sadat January – June 1975. State Information Service.
Cairo, Egypt. July 1975, p. 177-178.
Sadat‘s Interview with Joseph Kraft in the Los Angeles Times,
14 April 1980.
Sadat, Jihan. A Woman of Egypt, (Simon and Schuster: New York, 1987),
p. 367 and p. 372.
Sadat‘s Speech on 17.2.1977, Vol. V, p. 236. Interview with El-Hawadeth,
15.8.1975 (Beirut).
Sella, Ammon. Soviet Political and Military Conduct in the Middle East.
London:
Macmillan, 1981.
Severiens, Jacabus T. Foreign Investment in Egypt, What are the
Dividends of Peace. Middle East Review, Vol. 12, No. 2.
Shamir, Ishak. Muzakarat Ishak Samir. Amman: Dar Al Galil, 1994.
Sheehan, Edward. The Arabs, Israelis and Kissinger: A Secret History of
American Diplomacy in the Middle East, New York: Reader‘s Digest
Press, 1976.
SIPRI Reports 1974-1985.
Speeches and Interviews by President Anwar Al-Sadat, 1973-1978,
State Information Service, Cairo, Egypt.
Speeches and Interviews by President Anwar Al-Sadat. 1971, 1972, 1973,
State Information Service, Cairo, Egypt. Other sources on the logic of
Sadat‘s foreign policy include his autobiography and Raymond W. Baker
Egypt‘s Uncertain Revolution under Nasir and Sadat.
Princeton: University Publications, 1978.
Smith, Alan H. ―The Influence of Trade on Soviet Relations with the
Middle East‖, in A. Dawisha and Karen Dawisha (eds). The Soviet Union
and the Middle East. London: Heinemann Educational Books, 1982.
Soudi, Hala. Al Musadat Al-Amriqa Wa Al-Syasa Al-Kharijiya Al-Misrya
1970-1984.
Cairo: Centre of Political Research and Studies, 1988 p.7.
Speech by Anwar Al-Sadat on 27.7.1974, Vol. 4 of his speeches, pp. 517529, (Cairo, State Information Service, 1974).
Speeches and Interviews by Anwar Al-Sadat, Vol. 4, (Cairo, State
Information Service, 1974).
Speeches and Interviews by Anwar Al-Sadat, Speech on 22.7.72, p. 300,
Vol. 2 of Speeches, (Cairo, State Information Service, 1972).
Speeches and Interviews by Anwar Al-Sadat, Speech on 14.5.72, p. 230,
Vol. 2 of Speeches, (Cairo, State Information Service, 1972).
Speeches and Interviews by Anwar Al-Sadat, Speech on 27.5.73, p. 183,
Vol. 3 of Speeches, (Cairo, State Information Service, 1973).
Speeches and Interviews by Anwar Al-Sadat, Speech on 14.2.1975, p.
177, Vol. 5 of Speeches, (Cairo, State Information Service, 1975).
Speeches and Interviews by Anwar Al-Sadat, Vol. 5, 1975 and Vol. 6,
1976,
(Cairo, State Information Service, 1975-1976).
Speeches and Interviews by Anwar Al-Sadat, Vol.2, 1972.
Speeches and Interviews by Anwar Al-Sadat, (Cairo State Information
Service.
(1972-1974).
Speeches and Interviews by Anwar Al-Sadat. Cairo, State Information
Service, 1976.
Speeches and Interviews by Sadat. Interview on 11.2.1972, p. 63, Vol. 2,
Cairo, State Information Service, 1972.
Speeches and Interviews by Sadat. Speech in 13.7.1972. (Cairo, State
Information Service, 1972) and in Sadat‘s: In Search of Identity,p.313.
Stone, Michael. Head of U.S. Aid Programme in Egypt in the 1980s.
Paper presented to the Cairo Symposium on the Impact of Development
Assistance on Egypt.
Cairo: December 11, 1983.
Structure and organisation of the presidency, The Archives of the
Presidency, Kubri al-Qubba, Cairo, Egypt.
Struk, Joe. ―The Carter Doctrine and U.S. bases in the Middle East‖,
MERIP Reports 90 (1980), p. 8.
Sulayman, Azza. Eds. Presidents and Prime Ministers. Washington, D.C:
American Institute for Public Policy Research, 1981.
Sydner, R. et al. Foreign Policy decision-making. New York: The Free
Press, 1962.
Taqrir Tatawwir al-Qoita‘ Al-Amn ―Lajnat al-khittah al‘Amn WalMuazanat‖ (Majlis al-Sha‘ab: Amanit al-Alaqat al-kharikyya Wal‗Aomah, Cairo, 1975.
Taylor, Alan R. The Arab Balance of Power. New York: Syracuse
University Press, 1982.
Thomson, K.W eds. Foreign Policy in a world of change. New York:
Harper and Row, 1963.
Thomson, W. Scott. Ghana‘s Foreign Policy 1957-1966. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1969.
Time, 2 January 1978, p. 19.
Treverton, G. Crisis Management and the Super Powers in the Middle
East. England: Gower Publishing Company, 1981.
U.S. Agency for International Development, Cairo, February 1981.
U.S. Aid Annual Report on Egypt, U.S. Embassy, Cairo Egypt, 1981 p. 5.
Vatikiotis P.J. ―Arab Politics and Security‖. Global Affairs, Fall 1988.
Vatikiotis, P.J. The History of Modern Egypt. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1989.
Wall Street Journal, 9 January 1980 and the Washington Post, 9 January
1980.
Waterbury, John. ―Egypt: The Wages of Dependency‖. In A.L.Udovitch
(ed.), The Middle East: Oil, Politics and Hope. Lexington, Mass.:
Lexington Books, 1976.
Waterbury, John. The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat: The Political Economy
of Two Regimes. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983.
Waterbury, John. The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat: The Political Economy
of Two Regimes. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1983.
Weinstein, Franklin. ―The Use of Foreign policy in Indonesia: An
Approach to the Analysis of Foreign Policy in Less Developed
Countries.‖
World Politics, 1972, pp. 356-382.
Weinbaum, Marvin G. ―Dependant Development and U.S. Economic Aid
to Egypt‖. International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 18, 1986),
pp. 125-126.
Weinstein, Franklin. Indonesian Foreign Policy and the dilemma
dependence.
Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1976.
Weinbaum, M. ―Politics and Development‖, Middle East Journal
(Autumn 1983), p. 683.
Yemma, John. ―Can Egypt‘s New Shepherd Restore the Arab Fold?‖ The
Christian Science Monitor, October 1982.
Youssof, Ahmed. Conference on the ―Foreign Policy of Egypt in a
Changing World‖ (Organised by Centre of Political Studies, University
of Cairo, 2nd Annual Conference of the Centre, 1990).
Zahran, Ismail. Al-Syasa Al-Kharijiyyah [In Arabic] Cairo: Madbuli
Press, 1983.
Zahran, Jamal. Siyasat Misr al-Kharirjiyyah [In Arabic]. Cairo: Madbuli
Press, 1983, p. 223 – 224.
Zaki, Ramzi. Azmat Misr Al-Iqtisadiyya, (Cairo: Madbuli, 1983), pp. 255270 and Ramzy Zaki, Moshkalat Al-Bitala Fi Misr: Al-Hagm, Al-Asbab,
Shorout Al-Khoroog Minha, Mijalat Al-Yasar, No. 48,
February 1994, p. 24.
Primary Sources and Documents Used:
1.Speeches and Interviews of Sadat 1970-1981, State Information
Service, Cairo.
2.Letters exchanged between Sadat and other politicians and leaders
around the world.
3.Camp David Accords, Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel, official
statements of opposition parties and statement of Mustafa Khalil, Prime
Minister and Foreign Minister on this occasion in Parliament.
4.First and Second Disengagement Agreements.
5.Statistics from Ministry of Trade and International Cooperation 19701981.
6.All State Information Bureau/Service publications of the period.
7.Ministry of Foreign Affairs archives.
8.Presidency archives.
9.People‘s Assembly archives.
10.Al Ahram publications, newspaper and research centre.
11.Published interviews with many Egyptian and Foreign leaders who
participated in the events of the 1970s.
12.My interviews and questionnaire.
13.Memoirs and Politicians (Egyptians, Israelis, and Americans) who
took party in events during 1970-1981 period.
14. Discussions with policy makers, role takers, Ministers, ex-officials
and specialists during my positions abroad in London and Geneva.
Appendix One
Interview with Dr.Abdel Aziz Hegazy
Ex Prime Minister of Egypt
Appendix Two
Interview with Dr.Ali Lotfy
Ex Prime Minister of Egypt
CHAPTER FIVE
FOREING POLICY, NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION AND A NUCLEAR FREE
MIDDLE – EAST
Foreign Policy , Nuclear Non-Proliferation and a Nuclear-Free Middle
East
I would like now to address the subject of nuclear non-proliferation and
the question of a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East. I believe the
perseverance of Egypt on this issue reflects a continuation of Sadat‘s
pragmatic approach to foreign policy and the unique position Egypt
holds in the region. The issue of nuclear disarmament is particularly
sensitive in the Middle East, and Egypt‘s place of leadership – not to
mention its dialogue with Israel and the west – is key to the advancement
of a non-nuclear strategy.
Nuclear Disarmament
More than sixty years after the introduction of nuclear weapons and
ballistic missiles during the Second World War, we see an everincreasing complexity and competitiveness in the military and strategic
arenas.
Nuclear weapons and missiles, which played a central role
during the Cold War, have not lost their prominence; powerful political
forces maintain that nuclear deterrence remains a cornerstone of
national security for the foreseeable future, despite a growing movement
to eliminate nuclear arsenals. In 2002, the United States asserted that its
nuclear weapons would continue to play a ‗critical role‘ because they
possess unique properties‘.
But the tide has been slowly shifting. On 28 May, 2010, Ambassador
Libran Cabactulan – Permanent Representative of the Philippines and
president of the eighth review conference of the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty (NPT) – announced its successful conclusion after
four weeks of intense negotiations. At the conference, the 189 states
party to the treaty reached a hard-won consensus on the adoption of a
final document that reviews treaty implementation and endorses future
actions aimed at its strengthening. The conference demonstrated that
despite differences among treaty members on a wide range of core issues
relating to the global non-proliferation regime, a near universal
consensus on the central importance and value of the NPT can be forged.
The Non-Proliferation Treaty: The Foundation for a More Secure Future
Most analysts and practitioners would agree that the 1968 NonProliferation Treaty must be the starting point for constructive
discussions on the subject of nuclear disarmament. The most recent
review of the NPT took place in 2010, and while some warned in the
lead-up to the conference of the possible collapse of the treaty,
preparatory meetings suggested that efforts would be made to strengthen
the treaty and achieve its universality. Ultimately, this turned out to be
the case. Despite its detractors, the reality is that in many important
ways, the treaty has been a great success. Although India, Israel, and
Pakistan have refused to sign, and North Korea withdrew in 2003, its
membership is the widest of any arms control treaty. Key successes have
included South Africa‘s historic decision to dismantle its nuclear
weapons and join the treaty, and the decisions by Belarus, Kazakhstan,
and Ukraine to transfer nuclear weapons back to Russia after they
seceded from the Soviet Union. The NPT was indefinitely extended in
1995, leading some to assert that despite some stalling on disarmament
by the nuclear powers, the NPT has been the most successful arms
control treaty ever negotiated.
I will discuss the 2010 NPT in further detail at the end of this chapter –
its adoption is key to the furtherance of the non-nuclear agenda and it
bears looking closely at what the conference did, and did not, achieve.
A Nuclear-Free Zone in the Middle East
The magnitude of the Middle East‘s role in a nuclear-free regime needs
little emphasis – even those who would not count themselves as scholars
of international relations recognize the region as one of paramount
importance.
Egypt‘s leadership role is extremely important to the nuclear
disarmament agenda.
The region needs an internally-shepherded
dialogue for it to have any hope of finding its way forward, and the
international community needs the reassurance of that has shown
leadership and a willingness to engage in diplomacy a pivotal country –
as Egypt.
The agreement on non-proliferation should actually be easy to achieve, at
least theoretically. The goal of a nuclear-weapons-free zone or, more
generally, a weapons-of-mass-destruction-free zone in the Middle East,
has been repeatedly endorsed by all states in the region, as well as the
international community, at the highest diplomatic levels. A plethora of
resolutions on the subject are adopted annually by the UN General
Assembly and the IAEA General Conference, among other fora, but
practically, these seem to disappear into the wilderness; despite the wide
support for establishing such a zone in the Middle East, no practical
steps towards its fulfilment had been taken prior to 2010.
In 1995, there had seemed to be some hope. The strategic importance of
the Middle East was emphasised by a resolution adopted at the that
year‘s NPT Review and Extension Conference that formed an important
part of a package of decisions to indefinitely extend and strengthen the
NPT. But, as too often happens, the good intentions never evolved into
concrete action and it was consigned to the backyard of laudable, but
ultimately untenable, resolutions.
Missile test freeze in the Middle East
Which is not to say that the intervening years have not seen some
attempts at reviving the process. There is considerable literature on
creating a nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ) or WMD-free zone in the
Middle East. Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak initiated the call for
establishment of a WMD-free zone in April 1990. His proposal had three
main components.
The prohibition of all weapons of mass destruction—nuclear, chemical
and biological—in all states of the Middle East.
All states in the region should provide assurances toward the full
implementation of this goal, in an equal and reciprocal manner to fulfill
this end.
Establishment of proper verification measures and modalities to ensure
the compliance of all states of the region without exception. 1
This was soon followed by a report from the UN Secretary-General on
the ‗Establishment of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Region of the
Middle East‘.1 This proposal also suggested that a freeze on additional
deployments of ballistic missiles could ease tensions in the region. The
authors of the report wrote, ‗As a starting point for discussions, it would
be desirable to consider a complete suspension by all States in the region
of domestic production and of imports of missiles beyond a certain
range.‘
2
The authors admit that small-scale violations of the
production and import freeze may occur, but argue that even a relatively
simple verification scheme would be enough to detect substantial
violations that could be considered militarily significant.
In May 1991, US President George HW Bush announced a Middle East
arms control initiative that included a ‗freeze on the acquisition,
production, and testing of surface-to surface missiles by states in the
region‖.3
However, selling of arms against the backdrop of this
proposal did not give it the required credibility. It is argued that renewed
emphasis of in this area would be viewed with a fair degree of scepticism.
However, agreement and implementation of guidelines could have some
impact on the states in this region. 4
In 1995, the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review and Extension Conference
agreed a special resolution on the Middle East, to which the 2000 NonProliferation Treaty Review Conference re-confirmed its commitment.
The resolution focused on achieving the following objectives:
The establishment of a nuclear weapon-weapon-free zone in the Middle
East;
The accession to the NPT by states in the region that have not yet done
so; and
The placement of all nuclear facilities in the Middle East under full-scope
IAEA safeguards.5
The establishment of an NWFZ in the Middle East would be a first step,
to be followed by a zone free of all WMD and their delivery systems.6
These, however, focus on banning the ordnance to be carried by missile
delivery systems, not the delivery systems themselves.
There is a
substantial range of weapons and systems that must be addressed when
talking about weapons-free zones, and I will outline these issues in detail
in the next passage.
Although there exists a range of literature on a WMD-free zone or a
NWFZ in the Middle East, including studies recently published in the
region,7 there is currently no specific literature on a missile-free zone in
the Middle-East. It is clear, however, from the proposals relating to a
WMD- or nuclear-weapon-free zone, that many see a link between missile
control and the creation of such a zone in the Middle East. One analyst
has suggested that it might be possible to draw precedents from the INF
Treaty for the Middle East as it relates to verifying a missile ban or freeze
as a step toward a WMDFZ.8
The INF Treaty eliminated all
intermediate-range missiles (defined as those having ranges between
1,000 and 5,500km) and shorter-range systems (defined as having ranges
between 500 and 1,000km). Only ballistic and cruise missiles fired from
ground launchers are included.
A revised, tailored regional INF
agreement would have the advantage of already having been adhered to
in practice.
In 2009, frustrated by the process‘s stagnation, Egypt submitted a
working paper to the NPT Preparatory Committee, outlining what it saw
as the primary concerns and conditions for establishing the nuclear-free
zone.
Working Paper Submitted by Egypt in the NPT 3rd Preparatory
Committee (PrepCom) (May 2009) on the Implementation of the 1995
Resolution and 2000 Outcome on the Middle East
1. Egypt recalls that the third session of the Preparatory Committee has
been mandated and tasked, among other things to:
(a) Consider specific matters of substance relating to the implementation
of the Treaty and the decisions and resolution on the Middle East
adopted in 1995, and the outcomes of subsequent review conferences;
(b) Consider principles, objectives and ways to promote full
implementation of the Treaty, as well as its universality, and to make
16.3&4 73 recommendations thereon to the Review Conference; and
(c) At its third and, as appropriate, fourth sessions, the PrepCom, taking
into account the deliberations and results of its previous sessions should
make every effort to produce a consensus report containing
recommendations to the Review Conference.
2. Egypt submitted substantive working papers on the issue of the
implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East at the first and
second sessions of the Preparatory Committee (NPT/CONF.2010/
PC.I/WP.13 and NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/WP.20), containing substantive
recommendations on concrete measures relating to the implementation of
the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East.
3. Egypt calls upon the third session of the Preparatory Committee to
produce a report adopted by consensus that will contain among its
recommendations to the 2010 Review Conference the above referred to
recommendations, as well as the following:
(a) The Conference reconfirms the unequivocal commitment to the
principles and objectives of the resolution on the Middle East adopted by
the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. The Conference further
notes with regret that since the adoption of the resolution on the Middle
East and the decision on the extension of the Treaty, no progress has
taken place on the implementation of the resolution. The States parties
renew their resolve to undertake, individually and collectively, all
necessary measures aimed at the prompt implementation of the
resolution, including the accession by Israel to the Treaty as soon as
possible, and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under full scope of
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, as well as the
establishment of the nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East;
(b) The Conference reaffirms the importance of the early realization of
universal adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons, and calls upon Israel to promptly accede to the Treaty and
place all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards;
(c) The Conference stresses the importance of strict adherence by all
States parties to their obligations and commitments under the Treaty, and
reaffirms that any supply arrangement for the transfer of source or
special fissionable material or equipment or material especially designed
or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable
material to Israel, should require, as a necessary precondition, Israel‘s
accession to the Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon State and the placement
of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards;
(d) The Conference calls for the convening by 2011 of an international
conference to launch negotiations with participation of all States of the
Middle East on an internationally and effectively verifiable treaty for the
establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East;
(e) The Conference further requests IAEA to prepare background
documentation for the above-mentioned conference regarding the
modalities for verification of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle
East, based upon the work previously undertaken by the Agency relating
to the establishment of the zone, and the implementation of similar
international agreements establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones in
other regions;
(f) The Conference calls upon States parties to disclose in their national
reports on the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East, all
information available to them on the nature and scope of Israeli nuclear
facilities and activities, including information pertaining to previous
nuclear transfers to Israel;
(g) The Conference decides to establish a standing committee to follow
up in the intersessional period progress achieved in the implementation
of the resolution on the Middle East and to conduct consultations with
States of the region in that regard, as well as to undertake necessary
preparations for the convening of the international conference on the
establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. The
committee will be composed of the Chairman and Bureau of the
Conference and the three sponsors of the 1995 resolution.
Furthermore, Egypt calls for a recommendation for the establishment of
a subsidiary body to Main Committee II of the 2010 Review Conference
exclusively mandated with the formulation of a follow-up mechanism for
implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East
The steps leading to the creation of a nuclear-weapons-free zone will
likely require intrusive inspection regimes and conversation about
nuclear disarmament between officials and experts from both nuclear-
weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states is needed. It has been
some time since any such discussion has been had, so it is crucial that
any opportunity to facilitate it is utilized.
The particulars of establishing such a zone in the Middle East will
necessarily look to the precedents set in Latin America and the
Caribbean (established by the Treaty of Tlatelolco), the South Pacific
(Treaty of Rarotonga), Southeast Asia (Treaty of Bangkok), and Africa
(Treaty of Pelindaba).
Each of these has had a basic outline of
progression, consisting of:
a pre-negotiation phase, outlining principles and preferences that assist
common understanding of the zone‘s parameters;
negotiation of a treaty text
setting agreed verification models and the role of the IAEA;
entry into force (signing and ratifying);
institution-building and additional accessions;
step-by-step implementation of all treaty commitments, followed by
maturity of the treaty and regime normalization and entry into assumed
‗normal behaviour‘.
The region‘s special status was recognized in the 1995 NPT Review and
Extension Conference‘s Resolution on the Middle East, as well as in the
Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference. Insofar as it
pertains to the NPT, its universality, and its review cycle, the Resolution
on the Middle East focused on achieving the following clear objectives:
• The establishment of a nuclear-weapon–free zone in the Middle East.
• The accession to the NPT by states in the region that have not yet done
so.
• The placement of all nuclear facilities in the Middle East under
fullscope IAEA safeguards.
The establishment of a nuclear-weapon–free zone in the Middle East is a
first step toward creating an effectively verifiable zone in the Middle East
that would be free of all weapons of mass destruction—nuclear, chemical,
and biological weapons and their delivery systems. Egyptian President
Hosni Mubarak‘s initiative calls for the establishment of such a zone in
the Middle East. It has three main components:
• The prohibition of all weapons of mass destruction—nuclear,
biological, and chemical—in all states of the Middle East.
• All states in the region should provide assurances toward the full
implementation of this goal, in an equal and reciprocal manner to fulfill
this end.
• Establishing proper verification measures and modalities to ensure the
compliance of all states of the region without exception.
Until now, the Middle East nuclear-weapon-free zone has been stuck at
the first stage – partly as a result of many participatory states‘ low
expectations – and has not progressed through any of the substantive
stages conducive to establishing the zone. Serious engagement in good
faith by Israel is, of course, a key issue.
This is no small factor in negotiations. The mention of Israel in the NPT
2010 final document was difficult for the United States to accept, even
though the reference simply pointed out that Israel is the only state in the
region that is not party to the NPT. The US was joined by other allies in
fighting to keep Israel from being specifically named. It is almost certain
that adherence to this omission would have been an insurmountable
obstacle to a final consensus on the Middle East issue. Ultimately, the
US and its allies relented, and to strategic ends: by allowing the
reference to Israel, the United States effectively put Iran in the position of
being the only potential spoiler in the final hours of the conference. The
US has shown its commitment to the process by agreeing to an
organizational role in the 2012 conference, including the task of securing
Israel‘s attendance and participation.
The question of Israeli compliance goes beyond semantics or the
particulars of whose name appears where. The obvious issues related to
regional tensions are compounded by the generally held belief that Israel
is, in fact, a nuclear state. It is widely believed that Israel is operating a
plutonium-production reactor at its facility in Dimona, and that its
capabilities may extend to tritium production. Although Israel has stated
that it will join a regional nuclear weapon-free zone once all states in the
Middle East establish peace, it will be important that it takes a significant
step in the denuclearization process at a fairly early point in the
implementation phase. This would help to convey to all states in the
region that the enterprise is legitimate, particularly if the step were
undertaken with IAEA oversight. Any hope of seeing the Middle East
establish itself as a weapons-free zone depends on Israel taking
significant steps in the denuclearization process, which could include the
dismantlement of facilities at Dimona, disclosure of information on stocks
of special fissionable material and the placement of the facilities under
IAEA safeguards prior to destruction.
Alternatively, the reactor at
Dimona could, in theory, be modified for power production by linking it
to the electricity generating system and its fuel subsequently safeguarded
by the IAEA.
I should say here that in the context of the political morass that is the
Arab-Israeli legacy – one of tension at the best of times and war at the
worst – credit should be given to Egypt and its Arab League partners for
their willingness to temper their legitimate ambitions in the negotiations
in order to avoid plunging the treaty into crisis. These states took the
difficult steps of putting global security above national ambition.
A Middle East weapons-free zone is crucial to both regional and global
security. The states remaining outside the treaty weaken it with their
absence by undermining the benefits for their neighbours and the rest of
the signatories. Regional consensus – no small feat for any task, let
alone one of this magnitude – will be key to achieving these aims.
In light of the lack of progress over the past 15 years, the 2010 NPT
conference has produced a remarkable forward-looking process towards
the implementation of the resolution to establish the zone.
The 2010 Review conference endorsed convening a special conference in
2012, to be attended by all regional states, to discuss a Middle East zone
free not only of nuclear weapons, but of all weapons of mass destruction.
Terms of reference for the envisioned conference will be taken from the
1995 Middle East resolution, which sought to establish (1) a nuclearweapons-free zone in the Middle East as part of weapons-of-massdestruction-free zone (2) the accession to the NPT by states in the region
that have not yet done so, and (3) placing all nuclear facilities in the
Middle East under the full scope of the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) safeguards.
To emphasise the international sponsorship of the process, the review
conference assigned a special role in convening the conference to the UN
Secretary-General and the three co-sponsors of the Middle East
resolution: the United States, Russian Federation and the United
Kingdom (also the NPT's three depository states). The conference also
endorsed the appointment of a facilitator to support the implementation
of the 1995 resolution and to assist in implementing the follow-on
actions, including the necessary preparations for the proposed 2012
conference. With such a mandate, the facilitator can hold direct and
wide-ranging consultations with regional and international stakeholders.
This is a particularly important facet of negotiations, given the current
absence of regional dialogue dedicated to resolving the region's nuclear
issues.
The conference also endorsed technical studies to be
commissioned by the IAEA and other oversight organisations to examine
the various technical modalities necessary for the establishment of the
zone and the verification process.
The agreement of this plan is a significant and important step towards
addressing the long overdue implementation of the 1995 Middle East
resolution. However, extensive preparations and support will be needed
if we are to achieve all of these outcomes. States in the region are now
presented with a unique opportunity to put the Middle East on a nonnuclear trajectory.
This opportunity must be seized through the
constructive and sincere engagement of all regional states; it is not
overstating the case to call it a matter of international importance.
As made evident by the international stewardship assigned to the
conference, the role of the international community remains crucial in
incubating this new process and in providing the needed support. To
keep up the momentum following the review conference, key decisions
must be taken quickly and decisively. These include the appointment of a
facilitator, choosing the host country for the conference and taking
practical
steps
towards
engaging
other
relevant
international
organisations to address the myriad technical questions. In that respect,
the IAEA's role will be vital in devising a verification regime suitable for
the particularities of the region. The last NPT review conference gave a
much needed vote of confidence to the global nuclear non-proliferation
regime. However, the continued relevance of the regime will rely on
concerted global efforts to strengthen and advance the current challenges
that nuclear weapons pose to security. A major achievement of the 2010
review conference has been the adoption of a concrete action plan
towards the fulfilment of the 1995 resolution and in so doing, opening the
way to resolving the region's seemingly intractable nuclear challenges.
While it sounds so difficult as to seem almost outside the realm of
possibility, I again point to the successes in South America, the former
Soviet states and especially South Africa. The Middle East needs a
similarly courageous stance to rid the region of nuclear weapons and
solidly put the region on a non-nuclear course.
While the progress on the implementation of the plan is good news, it is
one of the many proposals that were watered down by key states during
the negotiation process, which tended to move consensus toward the
lowest common denominator.
The process saw differing levels of
commitment and depth of concern, particularly by states in the region.
But, as some of the delegations remarked in their closing statements,
these compromises, mainly between non-nuclear-weapon states and the
nuclear-weapon states, were necessary to secure what was a relatively
good outcome.
Proliferation threatens the entire international community. All states
have an interest and a responsibility to work together to remove this
threat. Forging a common cause is as much the duty of the nuclearweapon states as it is of non–nuclear-weapon states. While the nonnuclear states would have to sacrifice their own nuclear aspirations, it is
in their interest that no one retain a weapons cache; and while it is in the
interests of the nuclear states that rising powers – particularly the ones of
which they are most wary – abandon their programmes, the nuclear
states must encourage this cessation by being the first to lay down their
arms.
A Roadmap to Disarmament
While the road to an NFZ starts with the high-minded first step of
agreement, the second step wades into the trenches of technicalities. The
first challenge on the road to total disarmament is defining the terms.
George Perkovich and James Acton write in their groundbreaking
Adelphi Paper that they have two key aims: ‗First, to identify and explore
the challenges to the complete abolition of nuclear weapons, and second,
to discuss what states can start doing today to circumvent them. We do
not claim to exhaust the range of issues that must be resolved, or to have
optimally framed the subjects we do address. If there are places where
we appear defeated by obstacles that could be dismissed or better
navigated, we welcome other people‘s responses.‘
As I wrote in a paper with my colleague Dr Bharath Gopalaswamy, of the
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, it could be argued that
the ‗abolition‘ of nuclear weapons is a term generally associated with
more philosophical writers, whereas their ‗elimination‘ might be
favoured by diplomats and ‗prohibition‘ by those involved in
international law. Moreover, the technicalities of what might actually be
eliminated or prohibited when we talk about ‗nuclear weapons‘ must also
be considered, even at the earliest stage.
In order of increasing
comprehensiveness and stringency, the following might be included as
our overarching categories: first, nuclear weapons deployed with means
for their own delivery. Second, intact nuclear weapons in all conditions
and locations. Third, all nuclear weapons and all military stockpiles of
directly weapons-usable nuclear materials (separated plutonium and
highly enriched uranium). Fourth, all nuclear weapons and all stockpiles
of directly weapons-usable nuclear materials, both civilian and military.
Fifth, all facilities capable of producing directly weapons-usable nuclear
materials.
Means of deployment are as central to dialogue as the weapons
themselves – without appropriate delivery capability, the military utility
of nuclear weapons is limited.
Missiles are particularly attractive
because they are much easier to operate than manned bomber aircraft
and do not expose an attacker‘s personnel to direct risk.9 Unfortunately,
the lack of legal structures or taboos against the development, testing and
maintenance of missiles creates an environment conducive to their
testing. Without stigma or strictures, these complex systems are being
tested with increasing frequency and becoming exponentially more
dangerous.
To deal with the threat, Dr Gopalaswamy and I believe the ultimate goal
should the Zero Ballistic Missile (ZBM) regime proposed by the
Federation of American Scientists in the early 1990s.10 However, as a
starting point, we propose that states notify each other in advance of
missile flight tests in order to reduce tensions and the potential for
conflict. This step would be a starting point for a gradual missile-flighttest ban as a part of a weapons-of-mass-destruction-free zone.
In theory, an advance notification of a missile flight test is realizable; its
verification is both technically feasible and financially affordable.
Missile testing can be easily monitored from remote sites on the ground,
in the air or from space. The non-deployment of missiles can be verified
with airborne visual inspection or from space.11
Moreover, the
verification process would be a valuable confidence-building measure,
and could be particularly beneficial to regions where tensions run high,
such as South Asia and the Middle East. Indeed, the Frankfurt Peace
Research Institute has set up a Multilateral Study Group on the
Establishment of a Missile-Free Zone in the Middle East (MSG). The
MSG, academic and theoretical in nature, brings together experts from
the Middle East, China, Europe, the Russian Federation and the United
States. It is an attempt to explore a regional effort to control delivery
systems as well as to examine the possibility of banning their testing as
part of the overall effort to establish a WMD-free zone in the Middle
East.
Moving toward a flight test ban: evolution of an idea
To avoid a new arms race on a regional, or even global, scale, there have
been suggestions for more comprehensive arms control approaches with
regard to missiles. While this idea has political appeal, it is yet to prove
realizable.
The idea isn‘t new; it dates back to the 1950s, when the concept of a
flight-test ban was explored in order to kick-start international
disarmament negotiations. France, the United Kingdom, and later the
United States perceived this as an ideal opportunity to curb the nascent
Soviet missile programme.
The discussions ultimately fell through,
though the idea was revisited in 1986, when Ronald Reagan and Mikhail
Gorbachev met at the Reykjavik Summit to discuss perhaps the most farreaching proposal to eliminate ballistic missiles. Unfortunately, these
negotiations collapsed due to differences arising over President Reagan‘s
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), popularly referred to at the time as
Star Wars.12
In 1987, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) was initiated by
the Group of Seven (Canada, France, West Germany, Italy, Japan, the
United Kingdom and the United States). The MTCR is a voluntary and
informal agreement that aims to prohibit the transfer and spread of
ballistic and cruise missile technologies to non-member states.13 The
regime‘s membership expanded to 29 in 1997 and by the end of 2004 it
had 34 member states.
Under the MTCR, states defined a nuclear-
capable missile as one able to deliver a 500kg-or-greater payload a
distance of 300km or more.
These parameters corresponded to the
perceived minimum weight of a nuclear warhead, and to the strategic
distances in the most compact theatres where nuclear armed missiles
might be used. In 1992, the scope of the MTCR was expanded to include
unmanned aerial vehicles for the delivery of WMD, making the payload
and range thresholds less rigid.
The MTCR has played a significant role in constraining horizontal
proliferation of long-range ballistic missiles, especially in the developing
world.
This could be attributed to the regime having increased the
financial costs of proliferation.14 Complete ballistic missile systems as
well as key components, subsystems and manufacturing technology have
become less available, as has the technical expertise vital to the
development and manufacture of ballistic missiles.
The MTCR‘s
expansion has also been instrumental in promoting the concept of a
missile non-proliferation ‗norm‘. This standard has helped drive up the
political costs of proliferation for those countries determined to acquire a
ballistic missile capability or enhance existing systems. In 2002, the
MTCR was supplemented by the International Code of Conduct against
Ballistic Missile Proliferation (ICOC), which calls for restraint in the
proliferation of unmanned delivery systems, and has 119 members to
date.15
Despite some success in delaying missile programmes and building a
basis of support, the MTCR has some fundamental drawbacks that limit
its effectiveness.16 For example, the MTCR‘s approach of technology
denial is a long-term solution to proliferation concerns .It does not
restrain existing arsenals or programmes. A new alternative would be to
follow a path toward missile disarmament, following the proposals of the
1986 Reykjavik summit.17 Curbing missile development by a flight test
ban – including development by the nuclear-weapon states and others
with advanced missile programmes – would be an important step.
Flight testing is an integral part of the missile development process.
Most countries that have or seek to develop missiles with accurate
inertial guidance, solid fuel and multi-staging, undertake numerous flight
tests to ensure their weaponry is durable and up to the task at hand.
While the need to test can be reduced with advances in computer
simulations, improvements in static firings of rocket motors and the
transfer of knowledge from space launches, the history of missile
development demonstrates that new missiles and new technologies that
have performed well in computer simulation and ground testing can
reveal unpredicted fatal defects in flight testing. For example, there were
reports that the United States‘ MX missile inertial guidance system
performed brilliantly in early development tests, but its accuracy fell off
when the production team took over.18 Even states with existing ballistic
missile arsenals would probably argue that flight testing of existing
systems is essential to preserve their reliability. Thus, if missile flighttesting were banned, the loss of reliability would be similar to the loss of
confidence in the reliability of nuclear weapons that is expected from the
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), and should reduce the
likelihood of a pre-emptive first strike.19 As a first step toward a gradual
ban of flight tests, states could notify each other in advance of a flight test
and subsequently verify its occurrence. This would provide all parties
involved with the requisite confidence to negotiate a test freeze as well as
to verify it, and can lay the foundation for negotiating a missile flight test
ban.
Affordable and verifiable
Compliance with missile test notification would be relatively easy to
verify technically, provided that the remote sensing of missile launches is
supplemented by provisions to minimize the risk of the conversion of
space launchers into ballistic missiles. As the then CIA Director William
Webster acknowledged in May 1989, ‗The status of missile development
programs is less difficult to track than nuclear weapons development.
New missile systems must be tested thoroughly and in the open...‘.20 The
existing technical abilities of the most technologically-capable states are
already able to detect and track, for example, ballistic missile launches,
trajectory and telemetry. American early-warning satellites can track
missile-launches around the world. Detecting test preparations in the
case of mobile missile systems may pose a problem, but the actual flight
tests would still be detectable. In addition, an array of ground-based
radar systems would provide reliable for launch detection, target
acquisition and tracking. Over-the-horizon and sea-based radar could
extend coverage into areas difficult to reach for ground-based radar.
The role of technology should not be underestimated in the verification
process‘s establishment.21
Technology helps in systematically
collecting, analysing, storing and rapidly disseminating information.
Technology can operate continuously and at a consistent level, as
opposed to its human inspectors. Technology can also be designed to
detect only treaty-relevant information.
For example, in the 1986
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty between the Soviet
Union and the United States, it was permitted to X-ray the missile
canister to determine the type of missile; however, the resolution of the Xray was constrained so that other relevant, sensitive information was not
revealed.22 Space-based and aerial technologies are common methods
of verification. However, both these technologies suffer from significant
disadvantages.23
The infrasound sensor component of the International Monitoring System
(IMS) of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization could
aid in detecting and confirming a missile launch.24 The IMS is a network
of monitoring sensors set up to detect and provide evidence of nuclear
explosions to CTBT states parties for the purposes of treaty verification.
Infrasound, part of the acoustic spectrum lying below the range of human
hearing (approximately between the range of 20–0.001Hz), is of
particular interest for the monitoring of a number of man-made and
natural phenomena. This is primarily due to the lack of significant
attenuation at these frequencies in the Earth‘s atmosphere, allowing
acoustic waves to be observed even after travelling thousands of
kilometres.25
As a typical rocket infrasound signal is in the 0.1–1Hz frequency range, it
will be possible to detect missile flight launches in the acoustic far field,
far from the launch site.26 The detection of infrasound from rockets
primarily depends on three different factors: the local noise conditions at
the site of the receiver; the propagation conditions between the source
and the receiver; and source characterization.
We can investigate the potential of the IMS infrasound‘s network to
detect rocket launches using an instance of a detection at Aktyubinsk.
The detection observed is that of the Zenith rocket, which was launched
on 29 June 2007 from Baikonur Cosmodrome at 1000 UTC (Universal
Coordinated Time).
The sound waves arrive at the sensor at
approximately 1032 UTC.
Using a minimum of three microphones, the spacing of which depends
upon the frequency characteristics of the waves of interest, the individual
channels of the array are cross-correlated and spatially transformed over
a finite window time in order to provide a direction from which the wave
energy in the window arrives at the receiving array. On performing this
procedure repeatedly over the length of a time series that contains a
signal, the back azimuth as well as the wave velocity can be computed.
Based on openly available data of detections at the Aktyubinsk and other
stations, an empirical relation of the maximum distance at which a rocket
can be detected versus the class of the rocket has been derived by P.
Brown et al.27 This relation is given as follows: 1.3Log(R) = 2.759 +
log(NP), where R is the maximum range in kilometers, and NP is the
noise power of rockets (the total amount of acoustical energy radiated
per time). This relation is used to determine the maximum horizontal
detection range of rockets.
As finance considerations play a crucial role in any verification
agreement, having a verification system already established might help
reduce costs. In this instance, it may very well reduce capital outlay. A
design criterion of less than 0.1Hz is typical for all IMS infrasound
station, and this would be more adequate for missile-launch detection:
rocket signals are prominent at 0.1–1Hz. The mean spacing between IMS
stations is 2,500km on land and 4,500km in the oceans, which would be
sufficient to detect long-range missiles.
Were an independent verification system to be established to detect
missile flight tests, the arrays could be smaller (baseline of 500m between
sensors) than a typical IMS infrasound array as it would not need to
detect signals at such low frequencies. A typical IMS infrasound array is
approximately US$ 200,000. This is primarily due to larger baselines
and the inclusion of equipment to ensure that the data is not tampered
with. The cost of an array purely for missile flight test detection would be
approximately US$ 100,000. The sum does not include the cost of basic
infrastructure such as buildings, communications, and the empty and
isolated land required to site the equipment, which could easily add up to
another 50% of the overall cost. Operating costs should also be taken
into account, and so must the cost of personnel.28
Building confidence
Finally, verification of flight tests using sensors such as the ones
suggested here may also contribute positively to confidence building, thus
constituting a preliminary step toward a possible flight-test freeze,
followed by a ban. For example, India and Pakistan signed an agreement
on 3 October 2005 to notify each other at least 72 hours in advance of a
ballistic missile flight test. The two states also agreed not to allow
trajectories of tested missiles to approach or land close either to their
accepted borders or the Line of Control, the ceasefire line running
through the disputed region of Kashmir. They pledged not to allow
missiles being tested to fly closer than 40km from these boundaries or
land less than 70km away. Verifying such missile tests with infrasonic
sensors located on either side of the border will provide both the
countries with an opportunity to work together, to improve their
knowledge of the technology, and to enhance mutual cooperation.
The road ahead
While there are practical steps to take, it is important to recognize the
centrality of trust if we are to successfully achieve a missile flight test
ban. That is ‗trust‘ no just in the sense of one nation objectively trusting
that another will not violate a treaty or use its backyard as a missile
testing ground. Trust, in this instance, must mean much more than that.
It should include engaging in real dialogue, fostering cross-cultural
understanding and building mutual interests.29
It must go beyond
general assurances that states will not engage in mutually-assured
destruction and reach a level of faith in one‘s counterparts that the tenets
of respect and humanitarian interests will trump petty differences.
Candid conversations about nuclear disarmament should be held more
frequently and all relevant opportunities for such conversations must be
tapped. These should not be limited to state actors. It was members of
civil society who, in raising awareness on small arms, cluster munitions
and on the need for a comprehensive nuclear test ban, brought the issue
to the public‘s attention.
NGOs and civil groups have forged a
partnership with governments to achieve change whose consequences we
are only beginning to see 30 NGOs can help break down the barriers
between governments, engage the citizenry and lay the foundation for
formal talks by enabling, organizing, sponsoring and conducting
informal means of exchange.i
Gender perspectives can affect the way society views nuclear weapons
and pave the way for them to be devalued and abolished.
As
international efforts toward total nuclear disarmament gather momentum
with initiatives such as missile-free zones, the enfranchisement of women
is essential; everyone has a role to play.
Multi-lateral dialogue
There can be no doubt that the NPT is of vital importance to the
achievement of nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation, but
this regime should not be regarded as an ‗a la carte‘ menu. As former
IAEA General Director Mohamed ElBaradei has explained: ‗We must
abandon the unworkable notion that it is morally reprehensible for some
countries to pursue weapons of mass destruction, yet morally acceptable
for others to rely on them for security—and indeed to continue to refine
their capacities and postulate plans for their use.‘2 There can be no
doubt that all states – whether nuclear-enabled or not – must have a seat
at the table.
The NPT remains the only international instrument that not only seeks to
prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons but that also embodies a
firm legal commitment to eliminate these weapons. In 2000, the nuclear
powers made an unequivocal undertaking to eliminate their nuclear
arsenals, and all parties adopted a practical plan for the pursuit of
nuclear disarmament. Since then, however, little progress has been made
in achieving these goals. This reference to an ‗unequivocal undertaking‘
is the strongest affirmation so far of the commitment to the global
elimination of nuclear weapons. It gives diplomatic weight to the 1996
International Court of Justice advisory opinion, which interpreted Article
VI of the NPT in the light of other legal obligations, separating nuclear
disarmament from general disarmament, and making explicit that the
Article VI obligation to negotiate in ‗good faith‘ implies bringing
negotiations to a conclusion.
It is high time to bring to reality the
unequivocal commitment undertaken at the 2000 NPT Review Conference
by the nuclear-weapon states to seriously pursue the elimination of their
nuclear arsenals.
Because these states have the primary responsibility for undertaking the
necessary steps to eliminate nuclear weapons, it is incumbent that they
accelerate the implementation of their promises to make progress toward
achieving the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. This also is a
matter of enforcement. As Perkovich and Acton note, ‗Double standards
on matters as materially and psychologically important as nuclear
weapons
will
produce
instability
and
noncompliance,
creating
enforcement crises that increase the risk of conflict and nuclear anarchy.
Lawyers, diplomats, and military commanders may debate the relevance
and precise meaning of Article VI of the NPT. But it is clear that states
would not have agreed to extend the treaty indefinitely, as they did in
1995, if the nuclear-weapons states had tried to claim that they were not
obliged to pursue nuclear disarmament‘.
NPT articles other than article VI are relevant here too. NATO‘s nuclear
sharing arrangement would seem to be a direct contravention of Article I
of the NPT because it involves the transfer of nuclear weapons during a
conflict to non–nuclear-weapon states (such as Belgium and Italy).
Simultaneously, the states receiving control of the weapons, which are
non–nuclear-weapon state parties to the NPT, would also be in violation
of the treaty because Article II forbids them to receive nuclear weapons
from a nuclear-armed state or to control such weapons.
Restoring Confidence in the NPT: A Task for the Great Powers
Often it is suggested that the NPT has been largely responsible for the
slow growth in the number of proliferators and that it has to be supported
and maintained. However, one must accept the stark reality that the
regime is merely a reflection of the work of the larger forces in the
international system.
The underlying successes and failures are a
function of relations between the great powers, their strategic objectives,
and their power equations. Regimes need a medium in which to operate,
and their effectiveness varies with the investment that major states put
into them. So, while I stress multi-lateral cooperation, it should be noted
that for the regime to work more effectively, it needs the support of great
powers, in particular the United States and the other nuclear-weapon
states.
In this setting as in most others, power must be equal to
responsibility.
For the vision of a nuclear-free zone to be credible, the permanent
members of the UN Security Council should take the lead at an early
stage. The agenda must be flexible, depending on both technical and
political realities, but must include verification, the progressive reduction
of operationally deployed strategic warheads, and a freeze in upgrading,
modernizing, and replacing
existing weapons.
Leadership in the United States and Russia is
imperative, as they have by far the most nuclear weapons. It was a great
moment in non-proliferation circles to see the signing of START I, the
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, in 2010.
Regardless of whether states agree in the near term to outlaw use of
nuclear weapons, a reduction in these weapons‘ roles in security policies
remains an essential component of the nuclear disarmament process, not
only to enhance strategic stability and contribute to a climate of
international confidence and security, but to facilitate the process of their
elimination. Any plans to develop new nuclear weapons or new uses,
roles, or rationalizations for their use must be shelved immediately. In
addition, taking practical steps to decrease the operational readiness of
nuclear weapons systems, with a view to ensuring that almost 6,000 longrange nuclear weapons are removed from high-alert status, would
contribute to nuclear disarmament.
French President Nicolas Sarkozy proposed significant movement by the
five nuclear-weapon states in advance of the 2010 NPT Review
Conference. His speech outlining this program of action – a milestone in
changing the political atmosphere – took the international community by
surprise. The five states need to take up Sarkozy‘s challenge collectively
and consider how to demonstrate the political commitment necessary to
convince other states that they believe in achieving nuclear disarmament
and reversing the dynamics driving proliferation. Sarkozy‘s list includes:
• The universal ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
•
The
transparent
dismantling
of
all
test
sites.
• An immediate moratorium on the production of fissile materials for
military purposes and serious negotiations within the Conference on
Disarmament toward a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT).
•
Greater
transparency
among
the
nuclear-armed
states.
• Implementation of the Hague Code of Conduct against ballistic missile
proliferation.
• Negotiations on a treaty to ban short- and intermediate-range surfaceto-surface missiles.
The Importance of Verification and Transparency
Building a world free of nuclear weapons requires at least a perfunctory
showing of the following, as listed by Jonas Gahr Støre, the Norwegian
minister for foreign affairs: political leadership at the highest levels;
commitment followed up by action; non-discrimination; transparency;
and cooperation. Støre believes that non-nuclear-weapon states should
cooperate with nuclear-weapon states to develop the technologies
required for verifying nuclear disarmament. This cooperation in nuclear
disarmament research should aim to focus on the following:
Developing a generic model of the entire dismantlement process. This
model should include all relevant verification objectives and
technologies and identify suitable verification procedures for each
dismantlement
action.
Developing a declaration standard. This standard should allow the
inspected party to list all sites, documentation, and personnel relevant to
the verification process. It should include a section describing sites,
documents, or personnel not eligible for inspection and for what reasons.
It should include an attached description of special safety precautions the
inspectorate
Identifying
must
key
take
inspection
when
points
visiting
and
the
associated
facilities.
measurement
technologies and techniques, including information barriers and other
restrictions. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Trilateral
Initiative made significant headway in this work.
Developing procedures and methods that will help resolve compliance
concerns involving national security-related facilities and information.
Calculating the cost of building new, identical, built-forpurpose
dismantlement facilities and comparing it to the cost of using existing
facilities with their inherent challenges.
A significant question is whether non–nuclear-weapon states will become
involved in verifying complete nuclear disarmament and if this will
require an extension of the IAEA‘s role. Verification can be understood
as the ‗process of gathering and analyzing information to make a
judgement about parties‘ compliance or non-compliance with an
agreement‘. However, as a practical matter, it is difficult to say what
verification will entail outside the context of a given treaty.5 One thing is
relatively certain: the difficulties of verifying nuclear disarmament will
correspond with the complexity of the disarmament commitment.
Beyond developing verification technology, the nuclear-weapon states
should open their testing sites and their nuclear-weapon facilities to
international inspection. Knowing what to look for and where to look is
always challenging. Verifying complete disarmament is likely to be far
more difficult and will involve addressing an even larger and more
complex set of questions: How can the inspectorate be completely sure a
state has declared all its nuclear warheads? How can the inspectorate be
completely sure there is not a further undeclared production of nuclear
warheads?
A significant factor that would facilitate effective and
efficient verification is a careful selection of which items, activities, and
facilities must be monitored and which need not be.
To increase
transparency and build confidence in a comprehensive verification
scheme, nuclear-weapon states could provide annual declarations to a
register that would be maintained by an observatory body such as the
United Nations. The declarations could include their:
• Total current numbers of nuclear warheads and delivery systems.
• Current projected level of arsenals at the next NPT Review Conference.
• Plans for the development and deployment of missile defenses and
indications of the nature, location, and scope of such defenses.
• Fissile material inventories and plans to place excess fissile materials
under international inspection.
• Plans for the elimination of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles.
Key Practical Steps Toward a Nuclear-Free Zone
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
A few words on the CTBT are in order here. The treaty was first opened
for signature on September 24, 1996. In its preamble, the CTBT argues
‗that cessation of all nuclear weapons test explosions and all other
nuclear explosions … constitutes an effective measure of nuclear
disarmament and non-proliferation in all its aspects.…‘
It also
underlines that ‗the most effective way to achieve an end to nuclear
testing is through the conclusion of a universal and internationally and
effectively verifiable comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty‘.
As of
November 2008, 180 states have signed it; 148, including Russia, have
ratified it; and of the 44 that must ratify the treaty for it to enter into
force, 41 have signed it and 35 have ratified it.
The central premise behind the CTBT, then, is that a ban on nuclear
testing effectively ends the ability of any country to develop and deploy
nuclear weapons. The treaty is intended to stop the nuclear arms race,
and, once and for all, prevent further health and environmental damage
caused by nuclear test explosions. Now that an agreement on the test ban
has been reached and entry into force is within reach, the effort to
establish an international norm against nuclear testing must be actively
pursued.
Although the United States has not conducted a nuclear test explosion
since 1992, the treaty has not been put to the Senate for consideration
since it was last rejected in October 1999.6 If the United States, with its
huge nuclear arsenal, does not commit to the treaty, other states may
start to question their own involvement. Indeed, some disquiet has
already emerged concerning the financial demands of treaty regime.
Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty
The Conference on Disarmament must negotiate a non-discriminatory,
multilateral, and internationally effectively verifiable treaty banning the
production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices in accordance with the 1995 statement of the special
coordinator, taking into consideration both nuclear disarmament and
non-proliferation objectives. The conference should begin negotiations
on such a treaty with a view to completing a final draft within five years.
In addition to this central process, technical and scientific seminars
should be held to discuss scope, definitions, transparency, accountability,
and verification of an FMCT. Efforts should continue in the conference
to break the deadlock over the establishment of an ad hoc committee on
an FMCT with a negotiating mandate. A group of experts should be
convened to examine possible verification measures in the context of an
FMCT.
Operational Status of Nuclear Weapons
Because concrete and agreed measures to further reduce the operational
status of nuclear weapon systems are necessary,7 the nuclear-weapon
states collectively should be encouraged to:
• Deactivate warheads from all systems they are planning to dismantle or
eliminate, unilaterally or through agreement.
• Keep only a minimum number of nuclear weapons on high-alert status.
• Develop transparency measures for changes in operational status.
• Initiate discussions of possible ways to reduce the operational status of
their nuclear-weapon systems, and report their conclusions to the 2010
NPT Review Conference or the Conference on Disarmament, or both.
Missile Technology and Space
No country has developed long-range missiles simply to deliver
conventional warheads. The cost of ballistic missile development and
deployment can be justified only if they inflict the unique level of damage
associated with a nuclear weapon. The stagnation of the disarmament
process has resulted in missile defence systems being regarded in an
increasingly favourable light. The strategic environment could become
ever more competitive as missile defence research yields technologies for
offensive space-based weapons.
Hence, it is hardly surprising that
prevention of an arms race in outer space is becoming the subject of
intense international debate and scrutiny.
Outlaw Use of Nuclear Weapons
It is obvious that the only absolute guarantee against the use of nuclear
weapons is their elimination and the assurance that they will never be
produced again. Following this logic, it should be equally clear that as
long as even a single country possesses nuclear weapons, others will
aspire to acquire them. The continued possession of nuclear weapons, or
the retention of the nuclear-weapon option by some states, creates the
very real danger that they could be used or that they could fall into the
hands of non-state actors.
But while the complicated process of negotiating multilateral nuclear
reductions and operational changes occurs, and of verifiably eliminating
weapons, a global devaluation of the currency of nuclear weapons could
be accomplished by outlawing their use. This would not eliminate the
dangers overnight, but it would have a major impact in taking nuclear
weapons off the list of objects of political status. They would then be
treated as weapons of terror that no sane or civilized state would want or
be able to use.
Of course, major questions arise regarding how to enforce a ban on the
use of nuclear weapons. As long as any states possess nuclear weapons,
the danger of their use will remain clear and present. A ban on use could
therefore be enforced by reaching a legally-binding convention along the
lines of the conventions that prohibit biological and chemical weapons.
Trust and the Way Forward
I have already referred to trust as a central issue, but it bears repeating.
The concept of trust remains, if not poorly understood, poorly practiced.
Trust between nations, neighbours and interested parties is fundamental
to a successful future for nuclear disarmament. We need a genuine and
candid conversation about nuclear capabilities between officials and
experts from both nuclear-enabled and non-nuclear states. It has been a
long time since such a discussion has occurred, and dialogue is, of
course, the only means of reaching out, crossing bridges, building
cultural understanding and creating respect for cultural and political
differences.
With all the strategic dexterity in the world, with the
promises of every nation on earth, with the signature of every national
leader, we can do nothing without trust.
A nuclear disarmament future based on trust would be one in which
Iranian proliferation concerns are addressed; North Korean capability is
rolled back; continuing reductions are made in the existing nuclear
arsenals of the five nuclear-armed states, aiming toward eventual
elimination; the nuclear-free zone in the Middle East makes progress;
Israel joins the NPT as a non–nuclear-weapon state; and non-state
actors do not acquire nuclear weapons.
A combination of trust-building measures would encourage this path. In
contrast, a nuclear disarmament future based on mistrust would consist
of a mix of serious challenges and a failure of the NPT regime, one in
which proliferation occurs. Israel would continue to develop its arsenal;
Iran would gain nuclear-weapon capabilities; and North Korea would
further its capacity. There would be a cascade of nuclear proliferation in
the Middle East and Asia. At the same time, nuclear weapons would play
an increasing role in the security policies of the states that possess them.
And in the nightmare scenario, nuclear arms fall into the hands of rogue
ideologues, unaligned with and not answerable to any state. In light of
the possibilities, the absence of dialogue seems not to be an option.
The Conference on Disarmament
The Conference on Disarmament (CD) has a special role to play in the
facilitation of dialogue between states. Made up of the five permanent
members of the UN Security Council and the non-NPT members, it is a
unique forum that stands a good chance of making NPT participation
universal. To help us along the road to disarmament, it should establish
an appropriate subsidiary body with a mandate to deal with nuclear
disarmament.
Much more could be done in Geneva, where I served for a few years. The
CD has vast potential and expertise that can make a difference if
governments can summon the necessary political will.
Experts,
diplomats, researchers, non-governmental organisations and research
institutes (including governmental ones) could do more; at the very least,
they can and should facilitate workshops and international dialogue to
begin working on a genuine international collaboration. They can begin
working on a genuine international collaboration and then report back to
governments, whether through the NPT process, the Conference on
Disarmament, or the UN General Assembly.
The CD must begin negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multi-lateral
and verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material, based on
the Shannon Mandate, with a view to completing the text within five
years. This will make it available for signature before the next NPT
Review Conference, scheduled for 2015. There is presently a deadlock
over establishing an ad hoc committee on a fissile materials treaty. If
negotiations continue to be delayed, a group of experts should be
convened and technical and scientific seminars should be held to discuss
scope, definitions, transparency, accountability and verification issues.
In addition to reinvigorating efforts to negotiate a Fissile Materials
Treaty, the CD should consider the following:
Discussion by an ad hoc group of the steps that would lead toward
systematic and progressive efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons;
Dialogue among states that possess nuclear weapons and those that do
not
of
practical
steps
that
would
facilitate
these
efforts;
Technical seminars to address issues of scope, definitions and
verification for nuclear disarmament agreements;
Development of ad hoc exchanges to establish a precedent that nonnuclear-weapons states have a legitimate interest and right to question
nuclear-weapon states on disarmament matters.
I fully believe the CD can not only be revived, but that it can have teeth.
If its members can find common ground for cooperative action rather
than issuing endless position statements, it can become a serious actor in
the non-proliferation movement.
The New Agenda Coalition
Non–nuclear-weapon states are not averse to strengthening the barriers
against proliferation. They see no advantage in a world in which more
fingers are on nuclear triggers. This level of commitment to the treaty,
however, does not guarantee progress unless it is coupled with positive
action
by
the
treaty‘s
nuclear-weapon
states
toward
nuclear
disarmament. I referred to the New Agenda Coalition earlier. Over a
decade ago, the foreign ministers of seven countries — Brazil, Egypt,
Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden — joined
together to form the New Agenda Coalition to give fresh impetus to the
efforts to achieve progress in nuclear disarmament.
The need for such energy is as strong as ever today.
We need a
revitalized New Agenda Coalition to work closely with the Obama
administration and the other nuclear-weapons states to accelerate
implementation on agreed practical steps and identify what more needs to
be done.
Non-proliferation is vital to the elimination of nuclear weapons, but
alone it is not sufficient.
Nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear
disarmament are two sides of the same coin. If non-proliferation is to
remain a genuine global norm, the process of disarmament has to be
revived.
Non-proliferation cannot be sustained through coercive
imposition of rules; that would serve only to decrease the chances of
building and sustaining international cooperation and consensus on nonproliferation.
Over time, states would become less inclined to cooperate in critical
areas.
Then British defence secretary, Des Browne, recognized this in a 2008
speech when he related non-proliferation objectives to disarmament and
said that ‗Our chances of eliminating nuclear weapons will be enhanced
substantially if the [non–nuclear-weapon states] can see forward
planning,
commitment
and
action
toward
multilateral
nuclear
disarmament by [nuclear-weapon states]. Without this, we risk
generating the perception that the [nuclear-weapon states] are failing to
fulfill their disarmament obligations, and this will be used by some states
as an excuse for their nuclear intransigence.‘
The New Agenda Coalition campaigns for the world envisaged by the
treaty—a world in which nuclear weapons have no role. Its philosophy is
that we will be safe only when nuclear weapons are eliminated and we
can be sure they will never be produced or used again. This is one
reason that the coalition calls on India, Israel, and Pakistan to join the
NPT as non–nuclear-weapon states. Challenges to the treaty are being
made by states that would defy or undermine its rules. The possession of
weapons by the declared nuclear powers is no excuse for other nations to
develop their own nuclear arsenals, taking into consideration their
inalienable right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy in accordance with
Article IV of the NPT.
The New Agenda Coalition anticipates playing a constructive role in
ensuring that the 2010 Review Conference‘s results have strong, effective
outcomes, especially in removing the threats of existing arsenals of
nuclear weapons and of proliferation. As the vehicle for achieving this
aim, we should pull together the 13 steps from the 2000 Review
Conference – outlined below – with the many other practical proposals
made by member states and expert groups since 2000. Balancing such
initiatives will have a much better chance of achieving global consensus.
A cross-regional multilateral and multicultural dialogue is needed for
this purpose, one with a clear objective of a world free of nuclear
weapons.
The 13 Steps
In 1995 the NPT was extended indefinitely as part of a grand bargain. At
that time, the nuclear-weapon states repeated their resolve for total
elimination of nuclear weapons by agreeing on a program of action that
included some concrete steps toward disarmament. This program was
fleshed out at the 2000 review conference in the form of 13 ‗practical
steps‘ toward nuclear disarmament, which were vigorously pursued by
the New Agenda Coalition.
The coalition, which consists of Brazil,
Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa, and Sweden, seeks to
build international consensus on nuclear disarmament initiatives. Egypt
chaired the coalition at the 2010 review conference.
At the review
conference, the NAM, also chaired by Egypt, played a crucial role, taking
advantage of the positive signs of progress to show the political
leadership necessary to make the conference a success. The resulting
commitments made at this year‘s conference were translated into an
action plan on the three above pillars, including proposed steps for
implementing the 1995 Middle East resolution.
This final document
advances the agenda further than the 1995 and 2000 conferences did and
lays the groundwork for the future. In the final analysis, the document
adopted was the only viable option in moving forward. Balanced in
bringing all countries and groups on board, it spells out concrete action
plans that require universal adherence.
Now that a framework for
progress has been agreed, political will is necessary to achieve it.
The 2010 action plan asks states, for the first time, to take specific actions
in support of the three pillars. The wording of these points reflects the
intent that they serve as benchmarks for measuring progress and as an
assurance of accountability. Transforming the lofty goals of the NPT
debates into concrete benchmarks is a necessary step forward.
Support for the 13 steps by the US and other nuclear-weapon states
reached its nadir during the 2005 review conference, but the election of
President Obama has brought these states back to the fold.
By
committing the United States to nuclear disarmament, and by urging the
rest of the world to follow suit, the Obama administration has taken some
small but significant steps. In this new political environment, where
disarmament is very much back on the agenda, the relevance of the 13
steps is clarified. These are by far the most comprehensive commitments
that the nuclear-weapon states have ever made on disarmament. They
form a clear road map for those countries to fulfil the provisions of
Article VI of the NPT, which refers to measures relating ‗to nuclear
disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament
under strict and effective international control‘, measures such as
bilateral arms control between the United States and Russia, entry into
force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the negotiation of a fissile
material
treaty,
de-alerting
of
nuclear
weapons,
no-first-use
commitments, negative security assurances by the nuclear-weapon states,
irreversible disarmament, and an unequivocal commitment to work
toward the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.
Non-state actors
If states have a role to play, so does society. As the world becomes more
multiplex, and as technology takes us across borders in ways we have
never seen before, the impact of civil society and NGOs sees exponential
growth. There is no doubt they can be integrated into the NPT review
process as partners of traditional government diplomacy, playing a
different, but essential, role.
The 2010 NPT
The NPT remains the only international instrument that not only seeks to
prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons but that also embodies a
firm legal commitment to eliminate them. In 2000, the nuclear powers
made an unequivocal undertaking to eliminate their nuclear arsenals and
all parties adopted a practical plan for the pursuit of nuclear
disarmament.
Since then, however, little progress had been made in
achieving these goals – including the 2005 meeting, which failed to
produce agreement on any substantive issue – until last year‘s Review
Conference.
The 2010 NPT Review Conference broke the stalemate of the previous
decade. It presented an opportunity to build on the success of previous
commitments and take concrete steps toward a nuclear-weapons-free
world.
While talks of this nature are often presented as pointless
gatherings of diplomats talking over one another and ultimately
achieving little in the way of outcomes, this could not be further from the
case.
Key successes in the NPT talks have included South Africa‘s
historic decision to dismantle its nuclear weapons and join the Treaty,
decisions by Brazil and Argentina to roll back their nuclear programmes
and create a bilateral verification agency, and decisions by Belarus,
Kazakhstan and Ukraine to transfer nuclear weapons back to Russia
after they seceded from the Soviet Union.
It is undeniable that the
difficulty of achieving goals rises in proportion to the issue‘s importance
and the number of participants who must reach consensus. Considering
the gravity of the matter and the players involved – virtually the entire
international stage – the Treaty‘s accomplishments should be seen for the
monumental achievements they are.
The success of this conference where others had failed owes itself to some
extent to logistics and is in some ways the beneficiary of historical
circumstance. Speaking on behalf of the Nonaligned Movement (NAM), a
group of 118 developing nations and the largest bloc of treaty members,
Egypt called the timing of the conference a ‗historical juncture‘, citing
‗stronger political will…aimed at the total elimination of nuclear
weapons‘. But overall, the positive outcome stems in good part from the
unique constructive exchange that developed between the governments
and diplomats before and during the conference.
In their closing
statements, many delegations credited the success of the conference to an
improved atmosphere among member states, created by the active
promotion of disarmament and non-proliferation in the lead-up to the
conference. U.S. President Barack Obama‘s April 5, 2009, speech in
Prague calling for steps toward a world free of nuclear weapons and the
April 8, 2010, signing of a U.S.-Russian nuclear arms reduction
agreement were two oft-cited examples. While these undoubtedly had an
impact on the overall international mood, there was, in fact, a broader
range of focused and effective diplomatic efforts and developments that
took place ahead of the conference. There was the positive atmosphere
achieved at the May 2009 NPT Preparatory Committee; the 15th NAM
summit held at Sharm el Sheikh, chaired by Egypt in July 2009, where
leaders reaffirmed their commitment to seek a world free of nuclear
weapons; the ‗G8 Foreign Ministers‘ Statement on Nuclear Non-
Proliferation, Disarmament and Peaceful Uses of Energy: A Contribution
to the 2010 NPT Review Conference‘, which the Group of Eight issued
after its meeting in Canada in March 2010; the U.S. ‗Nuclear Posture
Review Report‘, released in April 2010, which marked a substantial
achievement by reducing the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national
security policy; and the well-timed nuclear security summit in
Washington, also in April 2010, which attracted high-level delegates and
delivered the powerful message that all states must curb proliferation.
The combination of these events created the necessary positive
momentum for the review conference to make substantial and necessary
gains. When the NPT parties convened in New York, it was clear that
most of them came determined to reinvigorate the treaty and the wider
nuclear non-proliferation agenda.
The constructive nature of their
statements and their willingness to seek common ground reflected this
determination, as did the ability of the five nuclear-weapon states to
reach agreement on a joint statement early in the conference. The strong
leadership exhibited by the president of the conference and chairs of the
main committees and subsidiary bodies, along with their wise use of
committee work to push the agenda forward, helped to channel this
goodwill and overcome obstacles posed by parties keen to protect their
status or resist criticism. The overwhelmingly cooperative nature of the
meeting laid the groundwork for the serious steps required to achieve
success. The parties had to navigate delicate negotiations, the most
notable example being the language in the final document on steps
toward establishing a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of
mass destruction in the Middle East. In that case, discussed in detail
later on in this chapter, the common ground reached by the parties
produced an opportunity to make real progress on an issue that could
have considerable bearing on the strength of the non-proliferation regime
in the next decade.
Negotiations and consultations over the four weeks of the conference
were inclusive and transparent. They covered a wide range of issues of
crucial importance to the Treaty‘s credibility and effectiveness as well as
to the security and aspirations of the participating states. We negotiated
and agreed on three forward-looking plans on nuclear disarmament,
nuclear non-proliferation, and the inalienable right of all states to
peaceful uses of nuclear energy. These plans reaffirmed the critical
importance of achieving the universality of the treaty and of putting into
action an effective process to implement the 1995 Middle East resolution.
We examined the need for a nuclear weapons convention on the total
elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time-specific
framework; the need for a global, legally binding, unconditional
instrument on negative security assurances; and many other issues
required to bring about the full implementation of the treaty and a world
free from nuclear weapons. Time constraints prevented delegates from
conclusively considering all these issues or accomplishing all that statesparties were aiming to achieve at the conference, but we nonetheless
moved a step forward.
Time-bound Nuclear Disarmament
One of the most significant outcomes of the 2010 review conference is the
decision to focus on achieving ‗time-bound disarmament‘, agreed in
principle and expressed to a limited degree in the final document. It
requires the nuclear-weapon states to report to the 2014 NPT
Preparatory Committee on their progress in achieving nuclear
disarmament, a welcome addition to the 13 steps.
While I have
commented on the consensual nature of the conference and the period
leading up to it, there were episodes of palpable consternation as well.
The frustration among the non-nuclear-weapon states over the
complacent attitude of the nuclear-weapon states toward implementation
of disarmament was clear. Many states expressed scepticism about the
new disarmament momentum and declared the proposed measures to be
merely cosmetic. Credible commitment to disarmament requires that
disarmament plans have time limits attached and that states are
genuinely held to account in making concrete achievements. Anything
less indicates a lack of willing to observatory participants.
The concept of nuclear deterrence, with its doctrines of continuous
deployment and threatened use of nuclear weapons, also came under
heavy criticism at the conference. Arguing that ‗it is high time that the
lure of nuclear weapons is ended‘, Indonesia‘s foreign minister, Marty
Natalegawa, challenged such doctrines in his opening statement on
behalf of the NAM and called for negotiations on a comprehensive
multilateral treaty to ban nuclear weapons and provide for their
elimination via an action plan with benchmarks and a time frame.
Switzerland, which organized a side meeting with the Monterey Institute
of International Studies to launch the findings of a new study on
delegitimizing nuclear weapons, questioned whether any use of these
weapons could ever be regarded as legitimate and called for
‗humanitarian considerations‘ to form the basis of the nuclear debate, a
point endorsed by others in later discussions. Brazil highlighted the
enduring problem of nuclear weapons having ‗a more basic meaning,
enhancing power and a sense of dominance‘ for their possessors, which
constitutes ‗a serious obstacle to the democratization of international
relations…[and] international peace and security‘.
In all, some 125 countries supported initiating a process leading to
multilateral negotiations on a convention banning nuclear weapons,
taking this concept from the margins to the mainstream. Non-strategic
nuclear weapons were challenged from all sides.
Following a brief
mention by the European Union of the need for short-range armaments
(variously described as ‗tactical‘, ‗pre-strategic‘, and ‗sub-strategic‘) to
be reduced and eliminated, Germany led nine other countries (Austria,
Belgium, Finland, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway,
Slovenia, and Sweden) in a call for increased transparency and the
inclusion of non-strategic nuclear weapons in the bilateral US-Russian
negotiations and in broader multilateral arms control and disarmament
processes.
In support of this proposal, Norway and Poland jointly
argued for the step-by-step elimination of such weapons, noting that ‗the
goal of a world without nuclear weapons, which we all share, cannot be
met without addressing that issue head on‘.
The NAM went further, criticizing the deployment of tactical nuclear
weapons in Europe under the auspices of NATO and proposing that the
nuclear-weapon states should commit to ‗refrain[ing] from nuclearweapon sharing with other states under any kind of security
arrangements, including in the framework of military alliances‘.
Switzerland agreed, arguing that nonstrategic weapons ‗no longer have a
place in today‘s Europe‘. Although the nuclear-weapon states expunged
any explicit reference to such weapons from the final document, it did
refer to the need to include all types of nuclear weapons in negotiations.
However, the high point and marker of success for the review conference
was the reaffirmation of the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclearweapon states to eliminate nuclear weapons.
Participants in the conference welcomed the emergence of new
leadership, expressions of determination, and strong political will to
achieve the total elimination of nuclear weapons, articulated by public
figures, intellectuals, and civil society in nuclear-weapon and nonnuclear-weapon states. Although the issuance of a final document was a
big improvement over the 2005 review conference, which did not produce
one, it was the result of many compromises. The version of the document
to which the parties ultimately agreed was a pale shadow of the plan of
action presented by Egypt on behalf of the NAM countries on the total
elimination of nuclear weapons and of the NAM‘s comprehensive
working paper on all three pillars of the treaty – non-proliferation,
disarmament, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
Ultimately, however, while the 2010 NPT did not reflect the full
range of ambitions, it delivered beyond expectations. Which is not to say
there are not challenges – on the contrary, they are many and great. It is
fair to call the decade preceding the 2010 conference as one of hopeless
stagnation. And to achieve any significant successes moving forward, a
tremendous amount of effort must be undertaken. This will require real
commitment and political will at a time of uncertainty and instability in
both the East and the West.
Conclusions
The effectiveness of the global non-proliferation regime requires the full
support and cooperation of both the nuclear-weapon states and the non–
nuclear-weapon states in the maintenance of a vigorous IAEA with the
inspection powers and resources needed to do its job.
The potential benefits of comprehensive nuclear disarmament are so
attractive relative to the attendant risks – and the opportunities presented
by the end of the Cold War are so compelling – that there is no justifiable
excuse for any state to shirk its responsibilities. Yet we will inevitably see
a reluctance to give up these powerful and terrifying weapons. Success
in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons depends at some
fundamental level on the ability to make a credible and compelling
argument that they are neither necessary nor desirable, that whatever
advantages they confer are outweighed by the costs. It is difficult to
sustain this argument when the large and powerful states that possess
nuclear weapons routinely insist that they provide unique and crucial
security benefits.
The ideal normative environment for promoting non-proliferation is one
in which nuclear weapons are widely or even universally regarded to be
illegal, illegitimate, and immoral. That is, in order to inhibit nuclear
proliferation it is desirable not only to devalue nuclear weapons but also
to delegitimize them. Doing so would put in place an additional barrier
to nuclear proliferation.
Former UN Undersecretary for Disarmament Jayantha Dhanapala
argues that ‗the nuclear powers have a particularly heavy burden to
reinforce this regime by demonstrating through unilateral and
multilateral actions how the interests of international peace and security
are best pursued without nuclear weapons‘.8 It is hard to believe that the
arguments for acquiring nuclear weapons would play out the same way
in a world in which they had been genuinely devalued and stigmatized, in
which nuclear disarmament had been substantially achieved, and in
which international opposition would confront any state that attempted to
breach the universal disarmament norm.
In general, the nuclear-weapon states are keen to establish strict
standards for compliance with the NPT and they support stern
enforcement against states that violate their obligations. However, it is
difficult to effectively advocate that others be held completely
accountable under the NPT when the nuclear-weapon states themselves
are viewed as delinquent. Why should others be taken to task when, as
they see it, the nuclear five are themselves failing to comply with treaty
obligations under Article VI? Thus the stern reminder offered by the
Carnegie Endowment‘s prominent report on universal compliance. ‗The
burden of compliance ... applies equally to nuclear weapon states that are
failing to honor their own non-proliferation pledges‘.
One must accept the stark reality that achieving nuclear-free zone will
reflect the work of the larger forces in the international system. The
underlying successes and failures are a function of relations between the
great powers, their strategic objectives, and their power equations.
Regimes need a medium in which to operate and their effectiveness varies
with the investment that major states put into them. For the non-nuclear
regime to work more effectively, then, it needs the support of great
powers. The permanent members of the UN Security Council will be
crucial in any credible discussion of nuclear disarmament. The role of
nuclear weapons in military doctrines must be dramatically reduced, and
their action plans must include verification, the progressive reduction of
operationally deployed strategic warheads and a freeze in upgrading,
modernizing and replacing existing weapons.
The above acknowledged, the conversation cannot be one-sided. The
roles of other participants – non-nuclear states, NGOs and civil society –
are invaluable, and no consensus can be reached without them.
In this context, it is important to realize the objectives of the NAM parties
leading up to the 2015 review conference. These are:
full and prompt implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments by
the nuclear-weapon states, aiming at the total elimination of nuclear
weapons by 2025;
continued focused and dedicated efforts to achieve at the earliest possible
time the universality of the treaty, recognizing that universality is a key
requirement for the treaty‘s effectiveness and the global realization of its
objectives;
prompt commencement of negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention
as the route to realizing a world free from nuclear weapons by the year
2025;
commencement of negotiations on a legally binding instrument to provide
non-nuclear-weapon states with global, unconditional security
assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, pending
the total elimination of nuclear weapons;
reaffirmation of the inalienable right of non-nuclear-weapon statesparties to pursue their national choices in the area of peaceful uses of
nuclear energy, including their right for the nuclear fuel cycle, without
undue restrictions that would contradict Article IV of the treaty; and
reaffirmation that voluntary arrangements and confidence-building
measures undertaken by states-parties should not be seen as turning into
legal obligations, as that would affect the balanced commitments and
obligations of the states-parties in accordance with the treaty.
I truly believe that with international cooperation and political will we
can truly take the first, most difficult, steps on the road towards total
disarmament. We have seen momentous instances in the past of nations
big and small making individual commitments, and it is encouraging.
And based on these, it seems certain that with a great collective push by
the international community, we can begin this journey as one. It will be
difficult, it will require commitment, it will inevitably suffer setbacks. But
it is a cause we must fight for. And it can be done.
Timeline:
1974
1978
1980
1989
1990
1990
1991
19921995
1995
2000
2010
Egypt and Iran sponsored UN resolution calling for establishment of
a NWFZ in ME. The resolution has been adopted annually since.
UN first special session on disarmament produced a final document
endorsing the goal of establishing NWFZ in ME.
Annual UN resolution on NWFZ in Middle East was adopted by
consensus after Israel voted in favour of the resolution.
IAEA releases a technical study on different modalities of the
application of safeguards in the ME.
Egypt proposal to establish a Weapons of Mass Destruction Free
Zone (WMDFZ) in the Middle East.
UN expert study on ‘A Zone Free of Weapons of Mass Destruction
in the Middle East’ was released.
UN Security Council resolution on Iraq, adopted under Chapter VII
of the UN Charter, frames Iraq’s disarmament in the context of
establishing in the Middle East of Weapons of Mass Destruction Free
zone.
Six plenary sessions of the Arms Control and Regional Security in
the Middle East working group under the 1992 Madrid’s peace
process.
Adoption of Middle East Resolution on establishment of a NWFZ in
the Middle East.
Final document of Review Conference reaffirms the 1995 Middle
East resolution and explicitly calls on Israel to join the NPT.
NPT Final action plan on Middle East
END NOTES
1. Report of the Secretary-General: Establishment of a Nuclear-WeaponFree Zone in the Region of the Middle East, UN document A/45/435, 10
October 1990.
2. I bid. Paragraph 166
3. The Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, Fact Sheet:
Middle East Arms Control Initiative, 29 May 1991.
4. Gerald Steinberg, Middle East Arms Control and Regional Security,
Survival, vol. 36 , No.1, Spring 1994
5. 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on
the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document: Part I, New
York, document NPT/CONF.1995/32 (Part I) , Annex; 2000 Review
Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons, Final Document, Volume I: Parts I and II, New York,
document NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Parts I and II).
6. Sameh Aboul-Enein, 2009, ―The Road Map to Total Nuclear
Disarmament‖. In George Perdovich and James M.Acton (edds),
Abolishing Nuclear Weapons: A Debate, Washington, DC, Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace,pp.271-286; Sameh Aboul-Enein,
presentation made at the Carnegie International Nonproliferation
Conference on ―The Nuclear Order-Build or Break‖, held in
Washington, DC, 6-7 April 2009.
7. See, for example, Sameh Aboul-Enein, 2009, ―Creating a WMD Free
Zone in the Middle East and Relevant Agreements, Al-Siyassa Al-Dawliya
(Egypt‘s main political quarterly) no.177, July.
8. Martin Kalinowski, 1998, ― Steps towards a Weapons of Mass
Destruction Free Zone in the Middle-East‖, INESAP Bulletin, no.15,
April.
9. Brahma Chellaney, 2000, ―New Delhi‘s Dilemma‖, The Washington
Quarterly, vol.23 no. 3, p.145
10. J. Jerome Holton, Lora Lumpe and Jeremy J. Stone, 1993, ―Proposal
for Zero Ballistic Missile Regime‖,1993 Science and International
Security Anthology, Washington, DC, AAAS,pp. 379-396.
11. Richard A. Bruneau and Scott Lofquist-Morgan, 2006, ―Verification
Models for Space Weapons Treaties: a Flexible, Layered Approach as a
Negotiating Tool‖ in Building the Architecture to Sustainable Space
Security: Conference Reports, 30-31 March 2006, Geneva, UNIDIR.
12. Richard Rhodes, 2008, arsenals of Folly: The Making of Nuclear
Arms Race, Simon and Schuster.
13. The MTCR‘s documents are available on its web site, www.mtcr.info
14. Bharath Gopalaswamy and Jurgen Scheffran, ―Time for a Missile
Test Ban‖, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 24June 2009.
15. International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation,
signed November 2002 at the Hague. Austria serves as Immediate
Central Contact (Executive Secretariat). See also UN General Assembly
resolution 63/64 of 2 December 2008, UN document A/RES/63/64, 12
January 2009.
16. J. Scheffran and A. Karp, 1992, ―The National Implementation of the
Missile Technology Control Regime : The US and German Experiences‖,
in H.G. Brauchet al.(eds), Controlling the Development and Spread of
Military Technology, Amsterdam, VU University Press, pp.235-255.
17. For a review of missile control and a different control regime
proposal, see Jurgen Scheffran, 2001, ― Moving Beyond Missile Defence:
The Search for Alternatives to the Missile Race‖, Disarmament
Diplomacy 55, March, pp. 21-26; and Andrew Lichterman, Zia Mian,
M.V.Ramana, Jurgen Scheffran, 2002, Beyond Missile Defense, INESAP
Briefing Paper no. 8, March.
18. Lora Lumpe, 1995, ―A Flight Test Ban as a tool for Curbing Ballistic
Missile Proliferation‖, INESAP Bulletin, no. 4, January, pp. 15-18.
19. The CTBT has not yet entered into force, but a de facto moratorium
on testing has existed since the treaty was opened for signature in 1996
(with several notable exceptions).
20. Prepared testimony of William Webster before the United States
Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, 18 May 1989.
21. Nancy Gallagher, 1999, The Politics of Verification, Baltimore, MD,
Johns Hopkins University Press.
22. Gerald Steinberg, ―New Verifications Technology and Issues: Space
and Airborne Monitoring‖, presented at the Workshop on Safeguards
Verification Technologies and Related Experiences, IAEA, Vienna, 12-15
May 1997, available at <faculty.biu.ac.il/steing/arms/verify.htm>
23. I bid.
24. Bharath Gopalaswamy, 2009, ― Infrasound Detection of North
Korea‘s launch‖ Proliferation Analysis, Carnegie endowment for
International Peace, 5 May 2009.
25. T. Beer, 1974, Atmospheric Waves, New York, Halsted Press.
26. P. Borown, N. Edwards, O. Sukara, The Potential of the International
Monitoring System Infrasound Network for the Detection of Rocket
Launches, Report on Contract #IDC 0061, 5 September 2006.
27. I bid.
28. I bid.
29. Sameh Aboul-Enein, 2009, ―Challenges for the Non-proliferation
Regime and the Middle East, Towards 2010 and Beyond‖, Disarmament
Diplomacy 90, Spring.
30. I bid
31. Thomas Graham, 1999, ― The NGOs and the Track II and III
Process: An Effective Tool for Disarmament‖, presented at Disarmament
and Security: A New Latin American and Caribbean agenda for the Next
Millennium: International Seminar on Disarmament , Lima, 1-3
December.
CHAPTER SIX
Foreign Policy and Nuclear Disarmament
Appendix One
Challenges for the Non-Proliferation Regime
and the Middle East
Appendix Two
The Roadmap to Total Nuclear Disarmament
Appendix Three
The missile regime: verification,
Test bans and free-zones
Appendix Four
The 2010 NPT Review and the Middle East:
Challenges & Opportunities
The 2010 NPT Review and
the Middle East:
Challenges and Opportunities
Sameh Aboul-Enein
Dr. Sameh Aboul-Enein is an Egyptian scholar and diplomat. He holds an MSc and a
PhD (University of London) in International Relations and the Middle East and has
published a number of papers and articles on disarmament issues and international
relations. Dr. Aboul-Enein is currently a visiting lecturer on disarmament at the
Diplomatic Academy, University of Westminster, London and a member of a multilateral
study group on “Missiles & a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons,” convened
by the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (2008-10). He is an alumnus of the School
of Oriental and African Studies and this article forms part of his post-doctoral
research.
The nuclear non-proliferation regime is faced with profound challenges
and dynamic opportunities. This short analysis, delivered in the closing
panel of the 2009 Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference on
“The Nuclear Order — Build or Break,” focuses on practical steps to move
forward to 2010 and beyond.1
The NPT
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) remains the only
international instrument that not only seeks to prevent the proliferation
of nuclear weapons but that also embodies a firm legal commitment to
eliminate these weapons. In 2000, the nuclear powers made an unequivocal
undertaking to eliminate their nuclear arsenals and all parties adopted a
practical plan for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. Since then, however,
little progress has been made in achieving these goals.
It is high time that we bring to reality the unequivocal commitment
undertaken at the 2000 NPT Review Conference by the nuclear weapon
states (NWS) to seriously pursue the elimination of their nuclear arsenals.
Because these states have the primary responsibility for undertaking the
necessary steps to eliminate nuclear weapons, it is incumbent that they
accelerate the implementation of their promises to make progress toward
1
Dr. Aboul-Enein contributed these views solely in his academic and personal capacity. An earlier
version of this article was published in Disarmament Diplomacy, 90, Spring 2009.
16.3&4 67
achieving the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. Double standards
on matters as materially and psychologically important as nuclear weapons
will produce instability and noncompliance, creating enforcement crises
that increase the risk of conflict and nuclear anarchy.
One must accept the stark reality that the regime is a reflection of
the work of the larger forces in the international system. The underlying
successes and failures are a function of relations between the great powers,
their strategic objectives, and their power equations. Regimes need a medium
in which to operate and their effectiveness varies with the investment that
major states put into them. For the regime to work more effectively, then,
it needs the support of great powers, in particular, the United States and
the other NWS.
The 2010 Review Conference
The 2010 NPT Review Conference represents a real window of
opportunity to build on previous commitments — such as those made in
2000 — and to take concrete steps to achieve progress towards a nuclear
weapon-free world. The responsibility to achieve that lies with all of us
— nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states, members and non-members of
the NPT.
The preparatory meetings suggest there is a real willingness on the part
of many members to strengthen the treaty and achieve its universality. We
must remember today that key successes included South Africa’s historic
decision to dismantle its nuclear weapons and join the treaty; decisions
by Brazil and Argentina to roll back their nuclear programs and create a
bilateral verification agency; and the decisions by Belarus, Kazakhstan and
Ukraine to transfer nuclear weapons back to Russia after they seceded from
the Soviet Union. The actions by these states to give up nuclear programs
and weapons deserve greater recognition, for they lead the way for other
states with weapons and military nuclear programs to follow.
Looking towards and beyond 2010, the NPT itself needs to be
strengthened. We must utilize the remaining time before the 2010 Review
Conference with more focused, constructive discussions among the key
protagonists and interlocutors. We need to work towards agreement to
establish a permanent secretariat and move towards creating an implementing
organization to carry through decisions of Conferences of States Parties,
working together with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as
appropriate.
Member states should consider ways to raise the political profile of the
NPT: How about making the upcoming NPT Review Conference in 2010
68
PALESTINE-ISRAEL JOURNAL
a ministerial level meeting, for example? We have recognized the need to
think along the lines of summits on the topics of energy, population, food,
the financial crisis and climate change. Why can’t there be a summit for
a nuclear-weapon-free world? Such a summit would provide a potential
mechanism also to achieve the universality of the NPT.
The New Agenda Coalition
More than 10 years ago, the foreign ministers of seven countries
— Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden
— joined together to form the New Agenda Coalition to give fresh impetus
to the efforts to achieve progress in nuclear disarmament. The need for
such energy is as strong as ever today. We need a revitalized New Agenda
Coalition to work closely with the Obama administration and the other
NWS to accelerate implementation on agreed practical steps and identify
what more needs to be done.
The New Agenda Coalition campaigns for the world envisaged by the
treaty — a world in which nuclear weapons have no role. Its philosophy is
that the world will be safe only when nuclear weapons are eliminated and
we can be sure they will never be produced or used again. The coalition
calls on India, Israel and Pakistan to join the NPT as non–nuclear weapon
states. The 2010 NPT Review Conference will need to address universality
challenges as well as other concerns that have arisen in recent years.
The New Agenda Coalition anticipates playing a constructive role in
ensuring that the Review Conference results in a strong, effective outcome,
especially in removing the threats of existing huge arsenals of nuclear
weapons and of proliferation.
As the vehicle for achieving this aim, we should pull together the
13 steps from the 2000 Review Conference with the many other practical
proposals made by member states and expert groups since 2000. Balancing
such initiatives will have a much better chance of achieving global consensus.
A cross-regional multilateral and multicultural dialogue is needed for this
purpose, one with a clear objective of a world free of nuclear weapons.
The Conference on Disarmament
The Conference on Disarmament (CD) has a special role that it can
play in nuclear disarmament. It is a unique forum that includes the five
permanent members of the UN Security Council (P-5) plus the non-NPT
members. It should immediately establish an appropriate subsidiary body
with a mandate to deal with nuclear disarmament.
Much more could be done in Geneva. The CD has vast potential
16.3&4 69
and expertise that can make a difference if governments can summon the
necessary political will. Experts, diplomats, researchers, nongovernmental
organizations and research institutes (including governmental ones)
could do more; at least they could and should facilitate workshops and
international dialogue. They can begin working on a genuine international
collaboration.
The CD must begin negotiations on a nondiscriminatory, multilateral,
and verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material, based on the
Shannon Mandate, with a view to completing the text within five years so
that it can be opened for signature before the 2015 Review Conference.
There is a deadlock over establishing an ad hoc committee on a Fissile
Materials Treaty. If negotiations continue to be delayed, a group of experts should
be convened and technical and scientific seminars should be held to discuss
scope, definitions, transparency, accountability, and verification issues.
In addition to reinvigorating efforts to negotiate a Fissile Materials
Treaty, the CD should consider making progress on the following:
* Discussion by an ad hoc group of the steps that would lead toward
systematic and progressive efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons;
* Dialogue among states that possess nuclear weapons and those that do
not on practical steps that would facilitate the implementation of this
commitment;
* Technical seminars to address issues of scope, definitions and verification
for nuclear disarmament agreements; and
* Development of ad hoc exchanges to establish a precedent that non-nuclear
weapon states have a legitimate interest and right to question NWS on
nuclear disarmament matters.
Abolish Nuclear Weapons
Leadership by the U.S. and Russia is imperative in this respect, as they
have by far the most nuclear weapons. The United States, with NATO’s
agreement, should withdraw its estimated 240 tactical nuclear weapons
stationed in Europe, while Russia should withdraw its tactical weapons
from operational deployment and place them in secure storage until they
are abolished. In addition, the two countries should extend START I, the
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, to ensure that verification measures
remain in force. Regardless of whether states agree in the near term to
outlaw the use of nuclear weapons, a reduction in these weapons’ roles in
security policies remains an essential component of the nuclear disarmament
process, not only to enhance strategic stability and contribute to a climate
70
PALESTINE-ISRAEL JOURNAL
of international confidence and security, but also to facilitate the process
of their elimination. Any plans to develop new nuclear weapons or new
uses, roles or rationalizations for their use must be shelved immediately. In
addition, practical steps must be taken to decrease the operational readiness
of nuclear weapons systems, with a view to ensuring that almost 6,000
long-range nuclear weapons are removed from high-alert status, would
contribute to nuclear disarmament.
To increase transparency and build confidence in a comprehensive
verification scheme, NWS could provide annual declarations to a register
that would perhaps be maintained by the United Nations. The declarations
could include their:
• Total current numbers of nuclear warheads and delivery systems;
• Current projected level of arsenals at the next NPT Review Conference;
• Plans for the development and deployment of missile defenses and
indications of the nature, location and scope of such defenses;
• Fissile material inventories and plans to place excess fissile materials
under international inspection; and
• Plans for the elimination of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles.
The Middle East
The 1995 Resolution on the Middle East adopted by the NPT Review
and Extension Conference recognized the region’s special status, as did the
Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference. Insofar as it pertains
to the NPT, particularly its review, implementation and universality, the
1995 Resolution on the Middle East focused on achieving the following
clear objectives:
• The establishment of a nuclear weapons-free zone in the Middle East;
• The accession to the NPT by states in the region that have not yet done
so; and
• The placement of all nuclear facilities in the Middle East under full-scope
IAEA safeguards.
The establishment of a nuclear weapons-free zone in the Middle East
is a first step toward creating an effectively verifiable zone in the Middle
East that would be free of all weapons of mass destruction — nuclear,
chemical and biological weapons and their delivery systems. I encourage
all to look once again at Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak’s initiative
for the establishment of such a zone in the Middle East. It has three main
components.
16.3&4 71
a)All weapons of mass destruction — nuclear, biological and chemical
— should be prohibited in all states of the Middle East.
b)All states in the region should provide assurance toward the full
implementation of this goal, in an equal and reciprocal manner to fulfill
this end.
c)Proper verification measures and modalities to ensure the compliance of
all states of the region without exception should be established.
All states in the region must acknowledge and accept a challenging
and deep responsibility towards achieving regional security.
In this context, Egypt notes that all states in the region, except Israel,
are state parties to the NPT. This situation poses the greatest impediment
to the implementation of the Middle East resolution and to achieving the
universality of the NPT. It is important to recall that the 2000 NPT Review
Conference urged all states not yet party to the treaty “to accede to the treaty
as non-nuclear weapon states promptly and without condition, particularly
those states that operate un-safeguarded nuclear facilities.” Furthermore,
there is a strong relationship between the implementation of the Middle
East resolution, the achievement of the NPT universality and, consequently,
the preservation of international peace and security.
Looking forward from here, the universality of the NPT is critical to
regional and global security because states remaining outside the treaty
fundamentally weaken it by undermining the benefits of membership for
their neighbors and by maintaining nuclear programs that constitute a
continuing nuclear danger to their neighbors and the rest of the world.
For 2010 and beyond, the Review Conference should seriously
consider establishing an NPT Universality Adherence Support unit to
address directly the mechanisms that will bring states outside the treaty
into the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states.
Working Paper Submitted by Egypt in the NPT 3rd Preparatory
Committee (PrepCom) (May 2009) on the Implementation of the
1995 Resolution and 2000 Outcome on the Middle East
1. Egypt recalls that the third session of the Preparatory Committee has
been mandated and tasked, among other things to:
(a) Consider specific matters of substance relating to the implementation
of the Treaty and the decisions and resolution on the Middle East adopted
in 1995, and the outcomes of subsequent review conferences;
(b) Consider principles, objectives and ways to promote full
implementation of the Treaty, as well as its universality, and to make
72
PALESTINE-ISRAEL JOURNAL
recommendations thereon to the Review Conference; and
(c) At its third and, as appropriate, fourth sessions, the PrepCom,
taking into account the deliberations and results of its previous sessions
should make every effort to produce a consensus report containing
recommendations to the Review Conference.
2. Egypt submitted substantive working papers on the issue of the
implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East at the first
and second sessions of the Preparatory Committee (NPT/CONF.2010/
PC.I/WP.13 and NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/WP.20), containing substantive
recommendations on concrete measures relating to the implementation
of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East.
3. Egypt calls upon the third session of the Preparatory Committee to
produce a report adopted by consensus that will contain among its
recommendations to the 2010 Review Conference the above referred to
recommendations, as well as the following:
(a) The Conference reconfirms the unequivocal commitment to the
principles and objectives of the resolution on the Middle East adopted
by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. The Conference further
notes with regret that since the adoption of the resolution on the Middle
East and the decision on the extension of the Treaty, no progress
has taken place on the implementation of the resolution. The States
parties renew their resolve to undertake, individually and collectively,
all necessary measures aimed at the prompt implementation of the
resolution, including the accession by Israel to the Treaty as soon
as possible, and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under full
scope of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards,
as well as the establishment of the nuclear-weapon-free zone in the
Middle East;
(b) The Conference reaffirms the importance of the early realization
of universal adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons, and calls upon Israel to promptly accede to the
Treaty and place all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA
safeguards;
(c) The Conference stresses the importance of strict adherence by
all States parties to their obligations and commitments under the
Treaty, and reaffirms that any supply arrangement for the transfer
of source or special fissionable material or equipment or material
especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production
of special fissionable material to Israel, should require, as a necessary
16.3&4 73
precondition, Israel’s accession to the Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon
State and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive
IAEA safeguards;
(d) The Conference calls for the convening by 2011 of an international
conference to launch negotiations with participation of all States of the
Middle East on an internationally and effectively verifiable treaty for
the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East;
(e) The Conference further requests IAEA to prepare background
documentation for the above-mentioned conference regarding the
modalities for verification of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle
East, based upon the work previously undertaken by the Agency
relating to the establishment of the zone, and the implementation of
similar international agreements establishing nuclear-weapon-free
zones in other regions;
(f) The Conference calls upon States parties to disclose in their national
reports on the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East,
all information available to them on the nature and scope of Israeli
nuclear facilities and activities, including information pertaining to
previous nuclear transfers to Israel;
(g) The Conference decides to establish a standing committee to follow
up in the intersessional period progress achieved in the implementation
of the resolution on the Middle East and to conduct consultations with
States of the region in that regard, as well as to undertake necessary
preparations for the convening of the international conference on
the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.
The committee will be composed of the Chairman and Bureau of the
Conference and the three sponsors of the 1995 resolution.
Furthermore, Egypt calls for a recommendation for the establishment
of a subsidiary body to Main Committee II of the 2010 Review Conference
exclusively mandated with the formulation of a follow-up mechanism for
implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East.
Beyond the 2010 Review Conference and Nuclear Zero
For the vision of zero to be credible, the permanent members of
the UN Security Council should take the lead at an early stage. The link
between disarmament and non-proliferation has recently been explicitly
acknowledged by several key statesmen — the progressive deep reduction
of operationally deployed strategic warheads and a freeze in upgrading,
modernizing and replacing existing weapons.
74
PALESTINE-ISRAEL JOURNAL
The role of nuclear weapons in military doctrines must be progressively
and dramatically reduced as a matter of urgency, not only to enhance
strategic stability and contribute to a climate of international confidence and
security, but also to facilitate the process of eliminating the weapons. Any
plans to develop new nuclear weapons or new uses, roles, or rationalizations
for their use must be shelved immediately.
The P-5 need to act in a coherent and coordinated manner in a way
that demonstrates they have the necessary transparent and credible political
commitment to carry through their agreed and required undertakings.
The short-term and medium-term effectiveness of the global nonproliferation regime requires the full support and cooperation of both the
NWS and the non-nuclear weapon states in the maintenance of a vigorous
IAEA, with the inspection powers and resources needed to do its job.
The potential benefits of comprehensive nuclear disarmament are so
attractive relative to the risks — and the opportunities presented by the end
of the Cold War are so compelling — that increased attention is warranted
to studying and fostering the conditions that would have to be met to make
prohibition desirable and feasible.
Success in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons depends at
some fundamental level on the ability to make a credible and compelling
argument that they are neither necessary nor desirable, that whatever
advantages they confer are outweighed by the costs. It is difficult to sustain
this argument when the large and powerful states that possess nuclear
weapons routinely proclaim that such weapons provide unique and crucial
security benefits.
The ideal normative environment for promoting non-proliferation is one
in which nuclear weapons are widely or even universally regarded to be illegal,
illegitimate and immoral. That is, to inhibit nuclear proliferation it is desirable
not only to devalue nuclear weapons but also to delegitimize them.
We must not let the momentum slow after the NPT Review Conference.
We must keep our eyes on the goal — the elimination of nuclear weapons
and the assurance that they will never be produced or used again. This will
require the active negotiation of a nuclear weapons convention, as called for
by the UN General Assembly and recently endorsed by the UN secretarygeneral. This is the logical conclusion to the current campaigns for global
zero and all states need to engage seriously with this project.
Trust and the Way Forward
Finally, the concept of trust remains poorly understood, yet is central
to our work on the future of nuclear disarmament and arms control. Mutual
16.3&4 75
trust is a key to any process of cooperation among nations. Trust, in my
view, is about constructive dialogue, cross-regional exchange, reaching out,
crossing bridges and cross-cultural tolerance; it is about building mutual
interests and respect for differences.
We need a genuine and candid conversation about nuclear disarmament
between officials and experts from NWS and non-nuclear weapon states
(NNWS). There has not been such a conversation for a long time. We need
to exploit all the opportunities that can exist to make this happen and to
invite into the conversation representatives of civil society who can inject
valuable information, insights and perspectives, as well as to provide bridges
and discussion spaces that can help break deadlocks.
Civil society has a key role to play. It raised awareness on small arms
and on cluster munitions, and before that on the need for a comprehensive
ban on all nuclear testing. NGOs have forged an action-partnership with
governments to achieve change the consequences of which are only
beginning to show. We need to recognize the role of civil society and
integrate NGOs more effectively and respectfully into the NPT review
process — as partners with governmental diplomacy, with a different but
essential role to play.
Furthermore, women have an essential role in peace-making and
security-building that should be respected and supported. Women have
long played a leadership role in promoting global disarmament, and gender
perspectives can affect the way society views nuclear weapons and pave
the way for them to be devalued and abolished. The road to total nuclear
disarmament and the culture of peace must be part of an educational and
awareness program that will require women as well as men around the
world to participate fully and actively.
Finally, the time has come for serious people of all political perspectives
to engage in thoughtful, transparent conversations with the clear objectives
of ending current and potential proliferation and eliminating nuclear
weapons, working towards an agreed target date, such as 2015.
In a speech in Prague on April 5, 2009, the president of the United States,
Barack Obama, reconfirmed his intention to seek a nuclear weapon free world;
he said: “Today, I state clearly and with conviction America’s commitment
to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.”
In Cairo two months later, Obama defused the charge of double
standards that has been leveled at the NWS throughout the 40-year history
of the NPT: “No nation should pick and choose which nation holds nuclear
weapons. That’s why I strongly reaffirmed America’s commitment to seek
a world in which no nations hold nuclear weapons.”
76
PALESTINE-ISRAEL JOURNAL
Appendix Five
Creating a WMD Free Zone in the Middle East
and relevant agreements
Appendix Six
Preventing Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle
East
Appendix Seven
Towards a verified nuclear weapon
free zone in the Middle East
“The 2000 NPT review conference
reaffirmed the importance of the
1995 Middle East Resolution to the
indefinite extension of the NPT and
encouraged the states of the region
to pursue vigorously a zone free of
weapons of mass destruction in their
region.”
VERTIC BRIEF • 11 • April 2010
B
R
I
E
F
Towards a verified nuclear weapon
free zone in the Middle East
Sameh Aboul-Enein and Hassan ElBahtimy
“The lack
of universal
membership to the
NPT in the
region has
significantly
contributed
to an enduring security
deficit that
locks the
region on a
proliferation
trajectory.”
In May this year, representatives from
member states will converge in New York
to review the implementation of the 1968
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
The treaty provides the legal and normative basis for the non-proliferation regime
and, the review conference, which comes
every fifth year, is considered an important
indicator of its health. The last review cycle ended in a regrettable failure to adopt
a final document in 2005 reflecting sharp
differences between state parties on a
number of issues. The next review conference is faced with the challenging yet vital
task of reasserting the central importance
of the treaty for international security and
affirming its continued relevance as the
cornerstone of the global nuclear order.
One of the issues on the conference’s agenda is reviewing progress made in achieving
a nuclear weapons free zone (NWFZ) in
the Middle East. The special status of the
region was recognized by a Resolution on
the Middle East adopted in 1995 by the
NPT Review and Extension Conference.
The 1995 conference is famous for its
decision to extend the NPT indefinitely.
However, that outcome was only possible
following the adoption of a package of
decisions that reaffirmed beyond doubt
the principles and objectives of the treaty
and strengthened its review process.
In that package a specific resolution sponsored by the treaty’s three depositories was
passed that addresses the nuclear situation
in the Middle East. The 1995 Resolution
on the Middle East focused on achieving
the following objectives: the establishment of a nuclear-weapon free zone in the
Middle East, the accession to the NPT by
states in the region that have not yet done
so and the placement of all nuclear facilities in the Middle East under full-scope
IAEA safeguards.
In the 2000 review conference, the
conference reaffirmed the importance of
the 1995 Middle East Resolution to the
indefinite extension of the NPT and encouraged the states of the region to pursue
vigorously a zone free of weapons of mass
destruction in their region. The conference also called on Israel to promptly join
2
Towards a verified nuclear weapon free zone in the Middle East
the treaty as a non-nuclear weapon state.
This action indicated the growing recognition of the importance of the universality
of the non-proliferation treaty.
However, in the 15 years that have passed
since the resolution’s adoption no real
progress has been made towards achieving
that aim. Lack of any progress towards
meeting objectives laid out by previous
conferences has consistently undermined
the credibility of the NPT in the Middle East. It is vital for the coming review
conference to satisfactorily address the
nuclear situation in the region and in
particular previous commitments towards
establishing it as a zone free of nuclear
weapons. The recent NPT preparatory
meeting showed willingness on the part
of many members to strengthen the treaty
and achieve its universality.
Key successes of the past has included
South Africa’s historic decision to dismantle its nuclear weapons and join the
treaty; decisions by Brazil and Argentina
to roll back their nuclear programmes and
create a bilateral verification agency; and
the decisions by Belarus, Kazakhstan and
Ukraine to transfer nuclear weapons back
to Russia after they seceded from the Soviet Union. The actions by these states to
give up nuclear programmes and weapons
deserve greater recognition, for they lead
the way for other states with weapons and
military nuclear programmes to follow.
Moving the Middle East away
from the nuclear brink
Failure of implementing the Middle East
resolution has regional as well as universal implications. The lack of universal
membership to the NPT in the region has
significantly contributed to an enduring security deficit that locks the region
on a proliferation trajectory. While all
major states in the region are parties to
the treaty, Israel shows no intent of joining the regime while allegedly possessing
significant nuclear capabilities that are
not under any international or regional
verification regime.
The Stockholm International Peace Re-
search Institute (SIPRI) estimates in its
2009 Yearbook that Israel is in possession
of 80 nuclear warheads while the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)
in its appraisal of global military balance
for the same year assesses that Israel is in
possession up to a total of 200 warheads.
Some analysts suggest that if regional
frustration about lack of progress towards
a nuclear weapons free zone in the Middle
East continues to mount, it is not unreasonable to expect states to re-evaluate the
utility of membership in a regime that
does not address their legitimate security
concerns. Recent events point towards
increased frustration from lack of progress
towards the establishment of nuclear
weapons free zone in the region.
The Arab Summit this year acknowledged
with concern the lack of any progress
towards the establishment of the zone
in the region. The summit called for the
adoption of practical steps at the review
conference towards that aim including
establishment of institutional follow up
mechanisms. Leaders at the summit gave a
clear message highlighting the importance
of achieving progress in implementing the
1995 resolution to the overall success of
the coming review conference.
The nuclear imbalance in the Middle
East stimulates counter-balancing nuclear
ambitions in the region as proven by the
cases of Libya, Iraq and most recently
Iran’s ambiguous nuclear programme.
Limited and selective approaches to address nuclear proliferation in the region
might have managed, so far, to roll back
certain nuclear developments but their
ability to do so in the future is in doubt.
In addition, such selective approaches
have evidently failed to reverse the ongoing proliferation trend in the region.
A comprehensive region-wide framework
in line with the establishment of a nuclear
weapons free zone in the Middle East,
that would include all Arab states in addition to Israel and Iran, is required to put
the region on a solid nonnuclear course.
The lack of progress in implementing the
1995 resolution is also of clear relevance
to efforts aimed at strengthening the
NPT. Frustrated treaty parties from the
region have declared their determination
not to undertake additional obligations,
frequently proposed to strengthen the
treaty, while the treaty’s fundamental
obligations are not universally in force in
the region.
If the NPT is to continue to develop as
a far-reaching and genuinely global pact,
addressing outstanding issues including
the Middle East and fulfilment of disarmament obligations will prove fundamental in any forward looking attempts to
strengthen the treaty. The universality of
the NPT is critical to regional and global
security because states remaining outside
the treaty fundamentally undermine the
benefits of membership for their neighbours by maintaining nuclear programs
that constitute a continuing nuclear danger to their neighbours and the rest of the
world. For 2010 and beyond, the Review
Conference should seriously consider
establishing an NPT Universality Support
Unit to address directly the mechanisms
that will bring states outside the treaty
into the NPT as non-nuclear weapon
states.
“If the NPT is
to continue
to develop
as a farreaching and
genuinely
global pact,
addressing
outstanding
issues including the Middle East and
fulfilment of
disarmament
obligations
will prove
fundamental
in any forward looking
attempts to
strengthen
the treaty.”
Verifying the zone
The 1995 resolution also calls for any
zone free of weapons of mass destruction
in the region to be ‘effectively verifiable’.
This requirement enjoys broad support
from states in the region. In April 1990,
for instance, President Hosni Mubarak
of Egypt proposed that the zone should
contain ‘verification measures and modalities … to ascertain full compliance by all
states of the region with the full scope
of the prohibitions without exception’.
Discussions on how the zone should be
verified in practice, however, have been
largely deferred due to the lack of progress
on establishing the basic principles on
which the zone should be based (see
below).
It is widely assumed that the Middle
Eastern zone will follow the same pattern
as other functional weapons free zones
of the world. The International Atomic
Energy Agency would bear most of the
burden to verify that no nuclear mateTowards a verified nuclear weapon free zone in the Middle East
3
“The region
has had
valuable
experience of
cooperative
monitoring
and verification systems”
rials are diverted into illegal weapons
programmes. It is also likely to play some
role in verifying the dismantlement of any
regional weapons stockpiles, as it has done
in the past. The latest study on safeguards
requirements for the zone was conducted
in 1989. This study could usefully be updated to reflect the latest developments in
safeguards techniques and technologies.
It is sometimes also proposed that regional
co-operative monitoring should form part
of the agreement. Care should be taken
not to overlap the work of the IAEA or,
for that matter, to take action that might
undermine its primary responsibility for
the NPT safeguards system. However,
now might be the time to propose and
initiate technical studies on the topic
involving regional governments. This
may not be as difficult as it sounds as the
region has had valuable experience of
cooperative monitoring and verification
systems (notably under the Sinai disengagement agreements I and II in 1974
and in 1975 as well as the Egypt-Israeli
Peace Treaty in 1979).
The way forward
The goal of a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone
(NWFZ) or, more generally, a Weapons of
Mass Destruction Free Zone (WMDFZ)
in the Middle East has been repeatedly
endorsed by all states in the region, as well
as the international community at the
highest diplomatic levels. Many resolutions are annually adopted to that effect
from the General Assembly of the United
Nations and the General Conference of
the International Atomic Energy Agency
in addition to other fora. Despite the wide
support to the goal of establishing such a
zone in the Middle East, no practical steps
towards its fulfilment have been followed.
Previous Nuclear weapons free zones in
Latin America and the Caribbean (Tlatelolco), South Pacific (Rarotonga), South
East Asia (Bangkok) and Africa (Pelindaba) have all progressed through similar
stages to bring their respective zones into
force. If the five previous nuclear weapons
free zones are taken as an indicator, establishment of nuclear weapon free zones go
through the following stages.
4
Towards a verified nuclear weapon free zone in the Middle East
1. pre-negotiation phase; (outlines principles, preferences towards that and the and
wide parameters that zone would take)
2. negotiation of a treaty text; (targeted
negotiations based on formulating a
legally binding text)
3. entry-into-force; (signing and ratifying)
4. institution building and additional accessions;
5. step-by-step implementation of all
treaty commitments, maturity of the
treaty and regime;
It is clear that the Middle East Nuclear
Weapons Free Zone is stuck at the very
early stages and has not progressed
through any of the substantive stages
conducive to establishment of the zone.
In the coming review conference, state
parties will face mounting frustration
from the failure to implement the 1995
resolution or the 2000 recommendations. To start an overdue process towards
implementing these commitments, the
conference can consider setting up a
standing committee with the aim of following up on progress in implementing
the resolution and other commitments as
well as facilitating and supporting negotiations between prospective zonal states
on a legally binding text that codifies the
establishment of a Nuclear Weapons Free
Zone in the Middle East.
Under this role, the standing committee
can also commission a study to explore
states’ views on a variety of issues pertaining to the establishment of nuclear
weapons free zone. Such issues include the
geographical limitations of the zone, the
scope of zonal obligations and prohibitions, verification modalities as well as the
complaints and compliance mechanisms
for the future zone.
Despite differences on details, similarities
in positions regarding the fundamentals
of these issues are striking. The mandate
given to the committee should also allow
contacts with nuclear weapons states to
explore the provision of negative security
assurances and to examine how such zone
would impact shipping and transit rights
in the region. Also the IAEA’s role will
be vital for devising a verification regime
suitable for obligations under the zone.
An undertaking of that scope is pertinent
given that the last comprehensive examination of various regional positions was
released twenty years ago by UN expert
group in 1990. Once targeted negotiations on the zone starts, states in the
region can consider adopting a variety
of measures to demonstrate good faith
and positively contribute to negotiations
on the zone. Such measures can include
non-attack pledges, by regional states that
can be further endorsed by the Security
Council.
1974
Importantly, all regional facilities producing weapons grade fissile material in the
region will have to be shut down and
decommissioned or converted to civilian
uses under standard international safeguards. Regional states can concurrently
agree to join international non-proliferation instruments like the Comprehensive
Test Ban and Fissile Material ban Treaties.
If these international regimes are currently
stalled, regional pledges, prohibiting
nuclear testing and production of fissile
materials and affirming the underlying
objectives of these regimes, may be considered on a regional scale as a first step.
1989
State parties meeting in May are facing a
challenging task ahead. Fifteen years after
the Middle East 1995 resolution, rhetorical support to the zone will only add to
the mounting frustration in the region
and severely undermines the authority of
the treaty and the non-proliferation regime in the region. The conference needs
to affirm the goal of a nuclear weapons
free zone in the region and adopt an overdue solid plan for its implementation that
includes tangible and practical steps.
Ahead of the conference, all state parties
as well as all regional states would benefit
from considering all proposals presented
to advance the goal of a NWFZ in the
Middle East. Such efforts need to be part
of a truly comprehensive review of the
treaty that would affirm its credibility
and its central position at the heart of the
non-proliferation regime.
1978
1980
1990
1990
1991
19921995
1995
2000
Egypt and Iran sponsored
UN resolution calling for
establishment of a NWFZ in
ME. The resolution has been
adopted annually since.
UN first special session on
disarmament produced a final
document endorsing the goal
of establishing NWFZ in
ME.
Annual UN resolution on
NWFZ in Middle East was
adopted by consensus after
Israel voted in favour of the
resolution.
IAEA releases a technical
study on different modalities
of the application of safeguards in the ME.
Egypt proposal to establish a
Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone (WMDFZ) in
the Middle East.
UN expert study on ‘A Zone
Free of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East’
was released.
UN Security Council resolution on Iraq, adopted under
Chapter VII of the UN Charter, frames Iraq’s disarmament
in the context of establishing
in the Middle East of Weapons of Mass Destruction Free
zone.
Six plenary sessions of the
Arms Control and Regional
Security in the Middle East
working group under the
1992 Madrid’s peace process.
Adoption of Middle East
Resolution on establishment
of a NWFZ in the Middle
East.
Final document of Review
Conference reaffirms the
1995 Middle East resolution
and explicitly calls on Israel
to join the NPT.
“A standing
committee can also
commission
a study to explore states’
views on a
variety of issues pertaining to the establishment
of nuclear
weapons free
zone.”
Towards a verified nuclear weapon free zone in the Middle East
5
About this paper
Editor
Andreas Persbo
This paper outlines the need for a nuclear weapon free zone in the
Middle East, and discusses its relevance for the 2010 npt review conference.
Sub-editor
Larry MacFaul
Design
Richard Jones
Review
VERTIC thanks the three reviewers who offered comments
on a draft of this paper.
ISSN
1740-8083
© VERTIC 2010
Tel +44 (0)20 7065 0880
Fax +44 (0)20 7065 0890
E-mail [email protected]
Website www.vertic.org
Hassan Elbahtimy is a researcher at VERTIC. He is also a PhD candidate and a research associate at the Centre for Science and Security
Studies at the War Studies Department, Kings College, London
Building trust through verification
VERTIC
Development House
56–64 Leonard Street
London EC2A 4LT
United Kingdom
Sameh Aboul-Enein is an Egyptian scholar and diplomat. He holds
an MSc and a PhD in International Relations and the Middle East
and has published a number of articles on disarmament issues. He
is currently a visiting lecturer on disarmament (University of
Westminster) and a member of a multilateral study group on
Missiles (Peace Research Institute Frankfurt ). He is an alumnus of
the School of Oriental and African Studies and this article forms
part of his post-doctoral research. He contributed these views solely in his academic and personal capacity.
VERTIC is the Verification Research, Training and
Information Centre, an independent, non-profit
making, non-governmental organisation. Its mission
is to promote effective and efficient verification as a
means of ensuring confidence in the implementation
of international agree­­ments and intra-national
agreements with inter­­national involvement. VERTIC
aims to achieve its mission through research, training,
dissemina­tion of information, and interaction with
the relevant political, diplomatic, technical, scientific
and non-governmental communities.
Personnel Andreas Persbo, Executive Director;
Angela Woodward, Programme Director; Larry
MacFaul, Senior Researcher; Scott Spence, Senior
Legal Officer; Hassan Elbahtimy, Researcher;
Rocio Escauriaza Leal, Legal Officer; Unini Tobun,
Administrator; Samir Mechken, Legal Consultant;
Jasper Pandza, Consultant; Meena Singlee,
Volunteer; William Eichler, Intern; Martin
Groarke, Intern.
Current funders Carnegie Corporation of New York;
Chatham House; Ford Foundation; Foreign Affairs and
International Trade Canada; Foundation for International
Law and Development; Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust
(JRCT); Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Norway
Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Ploughshares Fund; Sandia
National Laboratories; UK Foreign and Common­­wealth
Office (FCO); US Department of State.
Board of Directors Gen. Sir Hugh Beach, GBE, OBE, KCB, MC
(Co-chair); Dr. Owen Greene (Co-chair); Dr. Molly Anderson;
Professor Wyn Bowen; Nicholas A. Sims.
International Verification Consultants Network
Ms Nomi Bar-Yaacov; Mr Richard Butler AO; Dr Roger Clark;
Dr Edward Ifft; Dr Odette Jankowitsch-Prevor; Mr Robert
Kelley; Mr David Keir; Dr Patricia Lewis; Dr Robert Mathews;
Dr Colin McInnes; Dr Graham Pearson; Dr Arian Pregenzer;
Dr Rosalind Reeve; Mr Victor S Slipchenko.
Appendix Eight
A real opportunity for a Nuclear-Weapons-Free
Zone in the Middle East
Appendix Nine
NPT 2010: The Beginning of a New
Constructive Cycle
Appendix Ten
NPT 2010-2015: The Way Forward Carnegie
Endowment