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Towards A Regional Governance Of The Nuclear
Master of Global Affairs Department of Public Policy and Administration The American University in Cairo School of Global Affairs and Public Policy Towards A Regional Governance Of The Nuclear Fuel Cycle In The Middle East A project submitted to the Public Policy and Administration Department in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Global Affairs Concentration: International Security By Yomna Ismail Ahmed Spring 2016 The American University in Cairo School of Global Affairs and Public Policy Department of Public Policy and Administration Towards A Regional Governance Of The Nuclear Fuel Cycle In The Middle East Yomna Ismail Ahmed Completed under the supervision of Dr. Allison Hodgkins ABSTRACT This purpose of this project is to explore the possibilities and opportunities of regional governance regime for the nuclear fuel cycle in the Middle East. This study argues that a cooperative, regional framework in accordance to international criteria is the ideal solution to the technical, economic, and political challenges confronting the generation of nuclear power generation in the region. The project begins by discussing various existing frameworks for managing the nuclear full cycle, and how they could be applied to the nuclear energy situation in the region. The paper then examines the different obstacles to establishing such a framework in the region, as well as proposing potential solutions. The study concludes by presenting a model for a regional nuclear fuel cycle, which is feasible and sustainable from the viewpoint of nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear security, legal conventions and treaties, international acceptance and assurance of fuel supply. This project presents a number of recommendations to the governments, researchers, regional organizations and nongovernmental organizations of how to promote the nuclear energy industry’s measures attributing importance to incentives for the regional cooperation participating countries, and therefore, nuclear security and weapons free zone in the Middle East. Keywords: Nuclear fuel cycle; regionalization; regional governance; EURATOM; ABACC; IAEA; multilateral nuclear approaches; nuclear non-proliferation; Middle East 2 ACKNOWLEDGMENT First and foremost, I would like to express my highest and sincere gratitude to God who gave me the strength to accomplish this degree and whose many blessings have made me who I am today. I would like to express my gratitude to my thesis supervisor Dr. Alison Hodgkins for her continued understanding, encouragement and patience throughout my master years. She gave me the freedom to explore on my own and at the same time the guidance to recover when my steps stumbled. I would like to express my deepest gratitude and appreciation to Dr. Ibrahim Awad whose expertise, understanding, motivation and support added considerably to my graduate experience. It was an honor to meet such a respectful professor and mentor whose knowledge is the widest I have ever seen. I would also like to thank Dr. Hassan Elbahtimy who graciously helped me with his knowledge, guidance and constructive feedback and provided me with his kind support. I thank him for taking time out from his busy schedule to be my external reader. A very special thanks goes out to Ambassador Nabil Fahmy, Dean of the School of Global Affairs and Public Policy for his valuable insights and guidance. I must also acknowledge the support, kindness, dedication and generosity I have received from all the officials I met in Jordan. Finally, special and sincere thanks to my family who stood by me through my bittersweet journey, believed in me and helped me overcome challenges to bring out the best from within me. To my father, who has taught me the importance of education and inspired me to purse this master degree and provided me with all the support, care and unconditional love since the day I was born. To my mother, who has sacrificed the most so I could accomplish my goal, believed in me and in my ability to accomplish whatever I set out to reach and stood by me every step in the way. To my brother, my person and my buddy whose kindness, patience, dedication and commitment have always inspired me. To my adorable son, Ziad, who brought hope, joy, aspiration and smile into my life again, pushed me to become a better mum and a better person and gave me all the strength at times I thought that it was impossible to continue. You are my true blessing in life and I promise I will always make you proud. This master is for you all! 3 “In loving memory of Mr. Elsayed Taha” 4 LIST OF FIGURES FIGURE 1 THE NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE COUTESY OF IAEA. .....................................11 FIGURE 2 DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSIBILITY IN MULTILATERAL NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE COOPERATION BETWEEN IRAN AND ARAB STATES AS SUGGESTED BY THE RESEARCHER. ...............................................................................................52 FIGURE 3 DEVELOPED BY THE RESEARCHER. ............................................................59 FIGURE 4 SPILLOVER EFFECTS OF EACH MODEL AS ILLUSTRATED AND DEVELOPED BY THE RESEARCHER ...........................................................................................67 5 LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS ABACC AAEA AP BTWC CTBT CWC DPRK ENR EURATOM EURODIF HEU IAEA INFCE INFCIRC LEU LWR MNA MOX NNWS MTCR MWe NCA NPP NPT NSG NWS PU PWR RSAC SCCC SESAME U UN URENCO UNESCO Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials Arab Atomic Energy Agency Additional Protocol (IAEA INFCIRC/540(Corr.)) Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Chemical Weapons Convention Democratic People's Republic of Korea Enrichment and Reprocessing Technology European Atomic Energy Community European Gaseous Diffusion Uranium Enrichment Consortium Highly enriched uranium International Atomic Energy Agency International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (1977-1980) Information Circular Low-enriched uranium Light-water reactor Multilateral nuclear approach Mixed-oxide fuel Non-nuclear-weapons states Missile Technology Control Regime Megawatt electric Nuclear cooperation agreement Nuclear power plant Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Nuclear Suppliers Group Nuclear-Weapon-State under the NPT Plutonium Pressurized water reactor Regional systems of accounting for and control of nuclear material Common System of Accounting and Control (ABACC) Synchrotron-Light For Experimental Science and Applications in the Middle East Uranium United Nations Uranium Enrichment Company UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 6 Table of Contents ABSTRACT.....................................................................................................................................2 ACKNOWLEDGMENT ................................................................................................................3 LIST OF FIGURES ................................................................................................................................ 5 LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS .......................................................................... 6 INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................................................... 8 CLIENT DESCRIPTION ........................................................................................................................ 12 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM ...................................................................................................... 13 LITERATURE REVIEW ........................................................................................................................ 15 METHODOLOGY ................................................................................................................................... 27 RESEARCH LIMITATIONS .................................................................................................................. 30 NUCLEAR PROGRESS IN THE MIDDLE EAST ............................................................................... 31 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK ............................................................................................................ 39 PROSPECTIVE MODELS ...................................................................................................................... 44 CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................................................... 62 SPILLOVER EFFECTS ........................................................................................................................... 67 RECOMMENDATIONS ......................................................................................................................... 69 BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................................................................................................... 71 APPENDICES .......................................................................................................................................... 76 7 Introduction Nuclear power is one possible method of meeting the increasing, global demand for energy. However, in politically unstable states and regions like the Middle East and parts of South East Asia, fear of nuclear materials being diverted to non-peaceful uses has limited the potential for an expanded nuclear energy industry. Several discussions have been raised on revisiting the multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle especially with the emergence of secret nuclear supply links that provide nuclear fuel to covert nuclear facilities. In fact during the past few years, the multilateral approach to the nuclear fuel cycle has been recognized as a potential peaceful cost-effective mechanism for strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime and addressing the growing demand for energy. The multilateral nuclear fuel cycle approach has the potential to gain international favor over unilateral development of nuclear fuel cycle. The study explores the feasibility of establishing a regional governance of nuclear fuel cycle and how can it be implemented and managed in the Middle East region. This study examines the obstacles and windows of opportunity for reaching comprehensive, regional, nuclear cooperation in the Middle East. Since there is no specific definition of a multilateral nuclear approaches framework, lessons from the Europe Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) and other models from Latin America such as ABACC as well models from Asia are drawn and then consider its applicability to the Middle East region. The study develops possible models for regional nuclear fuel cycle cooperation in accordance to criteria adopted from the past proposals and reports including nuclear non-proliferation, safeguards, safety, host site selection, transportation, public opinion, international acceptance, geopolitics, export control, access to technology, legal aspects and economics. However, given the specific nature of the Middle East region and the scope of this study, two fundamental features were selected and then adopted in the proposed model. The literature review covers the multilateral cooperation in nuclear energy at both the regional and international levels. This essential part of the research identifies 8 the main factors and measures that should be considered in the establishment and the implementation of regional fuel cycle integration in the Middle East. This study comprises an analysis of primary data sources collected from interviews with a number of governmental and international and national organizations officials, as well as an assessment of secondary sources related to the question of the multilateral management of the nuclear fuel cycle. In addition, the study utilizes relevant international treaties, conventions and agreements at both regional and international levels. The regional governance of the nuclear fuel cycle management represents an effective solution to the threat of nuclear proliferation as each member to the regional framework would be checking on the others, thus creating more effective verification system, security and safety as well as providing access to crucial nuclear fuel cycle services. At present, there is an increased interest of inexperienced developing countries in nuclear energy that need to be addressed and solved. From a national perspective, the security of future fuel supply is a vital factor in assessing nuclear power’s sustainability. The global abundance of naturally occurring uranium makes nuclear power attractive from an energy security standpoint.1 However, in most cases uranium enrichment is needed before such uranium can be used, which is one of the most difficult hurdles for nuclear development. This study aims at finding solutions to the unanswered questions of implementation process of the nuclear fuel cycle in the Middle East through regional cooperation. Despite the ongoing debate and on and off discussions about the need of internationalization of the nuclear fuel cycle, this subject is rarely discussed in the literature in particular with regards to the Middle East region. By connecting the points that have been covered in the literature and filling in the literature gap, this study is able to find answers to the possibility of creating a regional cooperation on the management of the nuclear fuel cycle in the Middle East. The study answers questions related to the Middle Eastern States’ responsibilities while considering legitimate interests. Additionally, questions about factors that should be considered 1 Nahyan, A. B., Araj, K. J., Fahmy, N., & Chongkum, S. (2008). Why go nuclear? 9 and measured in the implementation process such as which countries will host such facilities and which countries will finance the project are also answered. Further, this study makes an important contribution to the fields of arms control, strategic studies, war and conflict studies, international cooperation, governance of nuclear energy for peaceful uses and security studies in general. This interview-based study will open new scope for future studies on the militarization of nuclear fuel cycle in the Middle East. The study aims at preparing a well-structured feasibility analysis and aims to be a road map to governments and policy-makers of regional and international organizations such as Arab Atomic Energy Agency and International Atomic Energy Agency and to the global nuclear industry on how regional governance of nuclear fuel cycle can be implemented, installed and managed among the Middle Eastern States. In addition, this study explores the regionalization of nuclear fuel cycle as a mean of promoting cooperation and non-proliferation in the Middle East. The advantages and the hurdles are analyzed. The experience of EURATOM Treaty is examined as well as possible reactions from the leading supplier countries are assessed in light of establishing a regional cooperation on the management of the nuclear fuel cycle. The study stimulates additional research in this topic and provides a set of useful recommendations to address the major findings of the study, which is going to be useful contribution to the implementation process of the nuclear fuel cycle regionalization in the Middle East. Background: The Nuclear Fuel Cycle What is the nuclear fuel cycle and why is it important to have a regional governance regime controlling it? Briefly, the nuclear fuel cycle (NFC) is a collective series of activities associated with energy generation from nuclear reactions taking place in nuclear power plants.2 The cycle has a “front end” which is composed of the 2 Retrieved from: https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/nfc0811.pdf 10 following steps: mining and milling, conversion, enrichment and then fuel fabrication. The cycle ends with what is called a “back end” in which uranium that has been used in reactors to produce energy undergoes an additional steps that include temporary storage, reprocessing, and recycling before nuclear wastes are disposed. Figure 1 shows the complete nuclear fuel cycle including the most critical stages, uranium enrichment and spent nuclear fuel reprocessing. Most power generating reactors use fuel from the primary component U-235. Some reactors use natural uranium as fuel without being enriched. While other reactors particularly those established in Europe like France use converted mixed oxide fuel (MOX) consisting of plutonium as the main fuel of fissile material.3 Figure 1 The Nuclear Fuel Cycle Coutesy of IAEA. Natural uranium or the product of a uranium mill (uranium oxide) is not directly usable as fuel for a nuclear reactor and additional processing is required. Only 0.7% of natural uranium is capable of producing a fissile chain reaction that results in producing energy.4 However, once uranium has been enriched to between 3.5% and 5% U-235 it can be used to produce energy. Moreover, according to the 2001 IAEA 3 Retrieved from: http://www.armscontrol.ru/pubs/en/Diakov-NucFuelCycle.pdf 4 http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/nuclear-fuel-cycle/conversion- enrichment-and-fabrication/uranium-enrichment.aspx 11 safeguards glossary, if uranium has been enriched to more than 20% it is considered suitable enough to produce a compact explosive device.5 In addition, if uranium has been enriched to reach 90% U-235 it is considered as a “weapons-grade” material that can be used in producing nuclear weapons.6 That is why uranium enrichment represents a critical stage of the nuclear fuel cycle in which most of the international community fears that any country develops it to produce enriched uranium beyond 20%. Moreover, the journey from zero enrichment to 20% enrichment is more difficult than from 20% to 90% and requires more work. Therefore, the task of producing weapons relevant materials gets progressively easier. On the other hand, plutonium does not exist naturally but only in trace amounts in nature as it is produced in a nuclear reactor operating on either low or natural-enriched uranium. As produced by irradiating uranium, plutonium contains different percentages of isotopes 238, 239, 240, 241 and 242 but most importantly plutonium containing isotope of 239, which is considered a special fissionable material.7 The reprocessing of spent fuel also represents a crucial stage as it considered a threat to the non-proliferation norms. In the reprocessing process, plutonium and uranium are separated from other nuclear waste in the spent fuel which are then can be used as fuel for reactors and also for making bombs.8 Despite having the right to establish a complete nuclear fuel cycle under article IV of the NPT, concerns that it could lead to a buildup of plutonium stockpiles still exist especially in a region like the Middle East where the fear of nuclear terrorism and state-led proliferation is much greater. Client Description This study and its findings would be beneficial to research institutions and regional organizations specializing in security studies regional cooperation and nuclear power. 5 Retrieved from: https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/iaea_safeguards_glossary.pdf 6 Retrieved from: http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Nuclear-FuelCycle/Introduction/Nuclear-Fuel-Cycle-Overview/ 7 Retrieved from: https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/iaea_safeguards_glossary.pdf 8 Retrieved from: http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/nuclear-fuel-cycle/fuelrecycling/processing-of-used-nuclear-fuel.aspx 12 Regional organizations like the League of Arab States and Arab Atomic Agency as well as international organizations like the IAEA would benefit as clients of this study because of the relevance concerning cooperation and development of the nuclear power in the region. In this regard, the Arab Institute for Security Studies is one of the most important and active non-governmental organizations that would find the results of this study relevant to its mission and add its analysis to their work and research. The Arab Institute of Security Studies was established in 1995 and located in Amman, Jordan and carries its activities with local, regional and international agencies. The Arab Institute for Security Studies (ACSIS) believes that security not only limited to a military term but also includes environment, water, food, disarmament and refugees. Therefore, the institute holds an annual inter-regional conference to set an exposure to the international arena and get updated and reliable views from wide spectrum of disciplines. The disarmament and arms control are two of the most vital issues that ACSIS is mainly concerned with. The institute calls for the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destructions and the establishment of a Weapon of Mass Destruction Free Zone in the Middle East. Establishing a nuclear fuel cycle governance regime can be a way of promoting nuclear energy projects, strengthening non-proliferation regimes and establishing a Weapon of Mass Destruction Free Zone in the Middle East. The conclusion could add to their continuous activities in the field in order to be delivered to the region’s decision makers, civil societies and authorities. The recommendations of this study would help in stimulating more research and work and reactivate the role of the region’s institutions concerned with nuclear energy development and cooperation. Statement of the Problem The Middle East has a growing demand for energy for economic growth to match the needs of its growing population, but fossil fuels and other sources are non-renewable 13 and polluted. Nuclear energy is one solution, however it has legal, financial, technical and mostly political difficulties, which are likely to limit the development of such needs unilaterally. Those political complications are related to regional conflict, regional rivalries and political instability in different states. Additionally, the fear of a Middle Eastern country to posses a ‘latent capacity’ for nuclear weapons development casts a serious challenge to non-proliferation efforts. Article IV of the NPT allows the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes but it is still challenging. Nuclear energy as one solution to the energy problem would have to be done in a way that deals with the political side. A regional model would deal with all of these issues and likely to lay the possible foundation for a regional security community. The issue also stems from the fact neighboring countries like Iran has nuclear enrichment capabilities as well as Israel, which has nuclear capabilities for nuclear weapon programs. These facts possess threat to the peaceful stability of the region and create more distrust and tension among other regional states and may encourage states to acquire nuclear weapons. In fact, by 2020 some countries in the Middle East are going to start national programs for the construction of nuclear power stations. However, due to each state’s inability to acquire a unilateral nuclear fuel cycle with facilities for uranium enrichment or spent nuclear fuel reprocessing to guarantee the supply of nuclear fuel needed to generate electricity, a cooperative solution is highly needed now before the international legal dynamics of non-proliferation norms change. This is likely due to the fact that the Middle East states would face difficulties securing nuclear fuel cycle sensitive technology from foreign exporters since the US specifically has been successful in requiring its trade partners to commit to giving up their rights of enrichment and reprocessing technology, which is now called the “gold standard” model used in the US nuclear agreement with the UAE. One solution to the problem is the establishment of regional governance of the nuclear fuel cycle such as the one existing in Europe for example, however, this solution is not simple and easy as it may seems. The Middle East region is not only politically unstable, it is compromising of ethnic and sectarian divisions in large parts of the states that may present both an obstacle and a window of opportunity to unite these divisions under one regional ambitious project. Additionally, given the recent negotiations between Iran and the P5+1, one can imagine a regional governance of 14 nuclear fuel cycle between the Arab States and Iran is applicable. However, the situation of Israel as a non-NPT member and its covert nuclear activities create a challenge in reaching a regional cooperation between the Arab States, Iran and Israel. In all cases, there is no active discussion of this possibility, or efforts to consider the possibilities or the potential of having a multinational nuclear fuel cycle in the Middle East. This study seeks to address this gap in the policy and academic discourse. Towards this end, the main research questions to be addressed in this proposed study are: Research Main Questions: • Does every country in the Middle East region needs to independently develop its own nuclear fuel cycle? • How effective, proliferation resistant and feasible is the regional governance of the nuclear fuel cycle in the Middle East region? Research Specific Questions: • What are the potential models or configurations of introducing a regional governance of nuclear fuel cycle in the Middle East? • What are the challenges facing the regional governance of the fuel cycle in each of the potential models? • How can these challenges be overcome in order to reach a regional governance regime? • What are the benefits of each of the potential models on the participating states? Literature Review The nuclear fuel cycle is the process by which natural uranium is used and processed to generate fuel in a nuclear reactor and eventually disposed of as nuclear waste. The 15 cycle contains stages from the simple mining stage, conversion, enrichment, fuel fabrication, reactor, and storage through reprocessing. The importance of the nuclear fuel cycle and the reason why it has great concerns to posses by each county is the fact the enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing are the two stages that present the greatest proliferation risks.9 Due to the capability to utilize parts of a civilian fuel cycle for military purposes, a country that is involved in uranium enrichment or spent fuel reprocessing as part of its civilian nuclear energy program also posses a ‘latent capacity’ for nuclear weapons development, which casts a serious challenge to nonproliferation efforts.10 Since fuel cycle technology, especially uranium enrichment, is of dual-use nature, and may thus be diverted to nuclear weapons production; it is of great significance that there is sufficient transparency in all fuel cycle activities.11 This can be achieved especially in a politically unstable region like the Middle East, through a multilateral cooperation in the management and installment of the nuclear fuel cycle. Multilateral nuclear approaches (MNAs) correspond to “a concept of international and/or multilateral control of nuclear material and/or nuclear fuel cycle facilities. It is a strategy for contributing to and promoting the sustainability of peaceful use of nuclear energy while enhancing nuclear non-proliferation, by ensuring nuclear fuel cycle services, and risk control and reducing risk regarding nuclear safety”12 Scholars and experts explained that one of basic challenges for guaranteeing effective and efficient functions of the multilateral nuclear approaches (MNA) to nuclear fuel cycle facilities is “harmonization between a MNA framework and existing nuclear cooperation agreements (NCA).”13 However, according to experts there is no specific description of a multilateral nuclear approaches (MNA) framework but it is commonly known that “a number of states’ engagements in 9 International Panel on Fissile Materials, "Global Fissile Material Report 2007: Developing the technical basis for policy initiatives to secure and irreversibly reduce stocks of nuclear weapons and fissile materials," (2007), 117. http://www.fissilematerials.org/ipfm/site_down/gfmr07.pdf. Accessed 10 June 2008. 10 Jo Dong-Joon and Gartzke Erik, "Determinants of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation," The Journal of Conflict Resolution 51, no. 1 2007), 173. 11 Ibid 12 Tazaki, M.; Kuno, Y. The Contribution of Multilateral Nuclear Approaches (MNAs) to the Sustainability of Nuclear Energy. Sustainability 2012, 4, 1755–1775. 13 Tazaki, M.; Kuno, Y. Harmonization between a framework of multilateral approaches to nuclear fuel cycle facilities and bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements. Sustainability 2013, 5, 3802–3818. 16 civilian nuclear activities and facilities, including enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) facilities, and plutonium (MOX fuel) and spent fuel storage.”14 Regional multilateral cooperation on nuclear fuel cycle issues can help to improve energy security for the participating states, “relative to a scenario in which several nations pursue nuclear fuel cycle development on their own.”15 Scholars have shown that regional multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle could be effective in reducing the threat of nuclear proliferation while providing access to these crucial nuclear fuel cycle services especially in volatile regions like the Middle East. According to Shaker (2010) the advantages of this regionalization of the nuclear fuel cycle are numerous like economies of scale, better guarantees of effective international control by the IAEA, strengthened nonproliferation norms and better bridges between the developed and less-developed countries in nuclear technology. Thus, cooperation on nuclear fuel cycle activities could take place between all of the countries of Arab world and the Middle East if Iran would be included in such cooperation. According to experts, cooperation choices can include relatively moderate types of activities such as straight scientific, educational, and technical exchanges and collaborations through the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) or other international agencies, sharing information and data on nuclear “best practices”.16 Moreover, cooperation options can also be extended to include more complex practices such as groups for purchasing of raw uranium or of enriched fuel and enrichment and spent-fuel management facilities. Multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle management seek to provide access to crucial nuclear fuel cycle services while mitigating the threat of proliferation that stems from the unilateral development of this technology. The use of multinational facilities instead of a multiplicity of national facilities would ensure effective international control by the IAEA through reducing the number of plants to be placed under safeguards, hence, increasing the feasibility of continuous inspection 14 Ibid. 15 David, H; Peter, H; Jungmin, K &Tadahiro, K. (2011). Future regional nuclear fuel cycle cooperation in East Asia: Energy security costs and benefits. Energy Policy, Volume 39, Issue 11, November 2011, Pages 6867–6881. 16 Ibid. 17 while possibly reducing costs of these inspections.17 The main goal of this multilateral approach is to establish regional cooperation in the installation and use of nuclear fuel cycle facilities in different Middle Eastern States that complement each other, rather than compete with each other.18 In a case of a multinational enrichment or reprocessing facility, in which ownership, control or operation are shared among a number of states that can watch each other, all of its participants are under a greater degree of peer scrutiny making it more difficult and risky to cheat.19 The main objectives of the use of multinational facilities in the region are to avoid possible interruption of external foreign fuel supply due to political or economical conflicts, to avoid the duplication of all components of the fuel cycle which could add additional costs to the nuclear option, the reduction of risk of spread of sensitive components of the fuel cycle (as enrichment and reprocessing of spent fuel) and to add more transparency for the peaceful uses of the fuel cycle installations which would add more trust to the nuclear programs of different countries in the region.20 Indeed, multinational or regional fuel cycle clusters have several nonproliferation benefits as states may have more self-assurance that their fuel supply is assured if they are part owners prohibiting any political interference with supplies. Additionally, multinational nuclear cooperation may also decrease the state’s desire to invest in national facilities unilaterally.21 The proliferation concerns that rise from the development of nuclear fuel cycle activities such as uranium enrichment and reprocessing of spent fuel in particular prompted former director general of the IAEA, Mohamed Elbaradei to propose the creation of a multinational or regional nuclear fuel cycle in his 2003 article in “The Economist”.22 According to his article, there are three vital areas of importance: how to guarantee the supply of fuel for nucleargenerated electricity; how to set up one or more international repositories for spent 17 Shaker, M. I. (2010). Nuclear power in the Arab world & the regionalization of the nuclear fuel cycle: An Egyptian perspective. Daedalus, 139(1), 93-104. 18 Retrieved from https://www.iaea.org/safeguards/symposium/2014/home/eproceedings/sg2014papers/000341.pdf 19 Scheinman, L. (2004). “The Nuclear Fuel Cycle: A Challenge for Nonproliferation”, Disarmament Diplomacy, no.76, The Acronym Institute. 20 Ibid 21 Internationalization of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Goals, Strategies, and Challenges. Washington, D.C.: National Academies, 2009. Print. 22 Mohamed Elbaradei, “Towards a Safer World,” The Economist, October 2003, retrieved from http://www.economist.com/node/2137602 18 nuclear fuel; and how to bring about multilateral oversight to sensitive parts of the front-end of the nuclear fuel cycle.23 As a result, an IAEA expert group released a report on multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle in 2005, which had great influence on the decision of the 2007 LAS Council to undertake joint cooperative activities for the sake of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy development.24 This 2007 decision of the LAS Council had no followers in the Arab region until now and no Arab government took an advantage of this useful decision. Pellaud Report: In 2004, Mohamed Elbaradei formed an expert group after calls for strengthening non-proliferation norms to face the threats of diffusion of sensitive nuclear technologies. The expert group’s task was to come up with better solutions to control the sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel cycle in addition to proposals for possible multilateral nuclear approaches. The Expert Group composed of representatives of 26 countries and was headed by Bruno Pellaud, the former Head of the IAEA safeguards (IAEA 2005). In 2005, the Expert Group came up with recommendations and proposals that were summarized in INFCIRC/640 that gave a motivation to develop further successive studies and examinations of multilateral nuclear approaches. Additionally, MNAs were examined based on two fundamental features, assurance of nuclear supply and activities and assurance of nuclear non-proliferation. The INFCIRC/640 report proposed types of frameworks for the font-end and back-end of the nuclear fuel cycle. The three options of the MNA framework are categorized as follows: I. Assurances of services not involving ownership of facilities II. Conversion of existing national facilities to multinational ones III. Construction of new facilities.25 23 Ibid Shaker, M. I. (2010). Nuclear power in the Arab world & the regionalization of the nuclear fuel cycle: An Egyptian perspective. Daedalus, 139(1), 93-104. 25 Tazaki, M, and Kuno, Y. (2013). "Harmonization between a Framework of Multilateral Approaches to Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities and Bilateral Nuclear Cooperation Agreements." Sustainability 5.93,802-818. 24 19 As a result of this report, the objective of strengthening non-proliferation norms and maintaining fuel supply assurance can be achieved by adopting Type I in a gradual phase into Type III. The INFCIRC/640 report evaluates the advantages and disadvantages of each element of nuclear fuel cycle from both the front-end and backend such as uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing for each option of the multilateral nuclear fuel cycle framework (IAEA 2005). These elements are evaluated based on features that include the values of assurance of supply, nuclear nonproliferation, siting selection, access to technology, safeguards provisions and multilateral involvement. According to these nuclear energy developments and needs, Mohamed Elbardei in his 2007 introductory statement to the IAEA Board of Governors argued that: The increase in global energy demand is driving an expected expansion in the use of nuclear energy. This means an increase in the demand for fuel cycle services. It also means an increase in the potential proliferation risks created by the spread of sensitive nuclear technology, such as that used in uranium enrichment and nuclear fuel reprocessing. The convergence of these trends points clearly to the need for the development of a new, multilateral framework for the nuclear fuel cycle. In my view, such a framework could best be achieved through establishing mechanisms that would assure the supply of fuel for nuclear power plants—and over time, by converting enrichment and reprocessing facilities from national to multilateral operations, and by limiting future enrichment and reprocessing to multilateral operations. Controlling nuclear material and the use of nuclear energy is a complex process.26 And it is clear that an incremental approach, with multiple assurances in place, is the way to move forward.27 There have been few studies addressing the features of such multilateral nuclear approach in East Asia and identified the challenges and proposed some of the possible solutions. However, there are numerous characteristics needed to create sustainable and feasible regional multilateral nuclear cooperation such as assurance of supply, structure and organization of an MNA framework, finance, economics, 26 UN Document A/59/565, December 2, 2004. Retrieved from http://www.amacad.org/content/publications/pubContent.aspx?d=813#A7 27 Mohamed Elbaradei, “Introductory Statement to the Board of Governors”, Vienna, 11June 2007, retrieved from www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Statements/2007/ebsp2007n007.html 20 industrial operation, decision-making process, political responsibility, choice of host states of MNA facilities, liability, transportation and others. Shaker (2010) addressed basic points that need to be considered when thinking about the regionalization of the nuclear fuel cycle in the Middle East. These questions include; gradual buildup of a nuclear fuel cycle, the need for a supply mechanism, the material to be assured, modalities of assurance’s mechanism, conditions governing eligibility for benefiting from assurance mechanisms, the role of the nuclear industry and possible role(s) for the IAEA. In light of the latter point, The UN High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, established by former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, produced the 2004 report “A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility” in which they urged that: Negotiations be engaged without delay and carried forward to an early conclusion on an arrangement, based on the existing provisions of Article III and IX of the IAEA Statute, which would enable IAEA to act as a guarantor for the supply of fissile material to civilian nuclear users. Such an arrangement would need to put the Agency in a position to meet, through supplies it authorized, demands for nuclear fuel supply of low enriched uranium and for reprocessing of spent fuel at market rates and to provide a guarantee of uninterrupted supply of these services, as long as there was no breach of safeguards or inspection procedures at the facilities in question. Shaker (2010) also addressed other points that considered specifically related to sensitive technologies of the nuclear fuel cycle. These points include uranium enrichment, reprocessing of nuclear spent fuel, spent fuel disposal and storage. Regarding the last point, the spent fuel disposal and storage, Shaker mentioned that, “at present, there is no international mechanism for spent fuel disposal services; all undertakings are strictly national. The final disposal of spent fuel is thus a candidate for international approaches. The IAEA is encouraged to continue its effort in that direction.”28 Some scholars have examined a successful framework in Europe (EURATOM) as they considered it a model they can draw lessons from. According to Mallard and Foradori (2014), EURATOM-like organization would be a great step for 28 Shaker, M. I. (2010). Nuclear power in the Arab world & the regionalization of the nuclear fuel cycle: An Egyptian perspective. Daedalus, 139(1), 93-104. 21 the Middle East and a great model for other regions that must deal with issues of global legal complexity (e.g., how they can harmonize regional and global orders so that they can pursue the same goals with different but compatible means).29 Mallard (2008) and Shaker (2010) proposed that success could be achieved if similar model would be implemented in the Middle East region avoiding the weaknesses and pitfalls in the EURATOM Treaty.30 The most important element of the Convention was “to guarantee nuclear materials supply” by all party states. Additionally, the Convention had the needed safeguards systems, which can be adopted and developed to match the Middle East region in which all member states have the trust and ensure that the used nuclear materials are being used only for peaceful purposes. According to Shaker there are two important features of EURATOM that need to be examined when it comes to establishing a regional governance system of the nuclear fuel cycle in the Middle East: joint enterprises and joint finance. Joint financing of large nuclear projects through EURATOM loans is guaranteed under Article 172.4 of the EURATOM Treaty and implemented through the decisions reached by the Council. Although there are no new loans given to a member state, the first loan was given in 1977 to help financing many enrichment and reprocessing projects within the region’s countries. All loans are now fully repaid but one can argue that this Treaty has helped the development of the nuclear fuel cycle industry at the beginning of its conclusion (Jorant 2013). Joint Enterprise according to Shaker, was innovatively created originally to facilitate the establishment of a European multinational cooperation of the nuclear fuel cycle. Even though there is a pitfall in the concept in which large multinational enrichment industries like the EURODIF in France and URENCO in Almelo have by-passed the joint enterprise and have been used mainly for political reasons, changes could be made in the new proposed multilateral cooperation in the Middle East to avoid this drawback.31 Over the past five years, at least thirteen countries in the region ranging from Morocco and Egypt to Qatar and Saudi Arabia, have declared new or renewed plans 29 Mallard, G., & Foradori, P. (2014). The Middle East at a Crossroads: How to Face the Perils of Nuclear Development in a Volatile Region. Global Governance, 20(4), 499-515. 30 Shaker, M. I. (2010). Nuclear power in the Arab world & the regionalization of the nuclear fuel cycle: An Egyptian perspective. Daedalus, 139(1), 93-104. 31 Shaker, M. I. (2014). Regionalizing Nuclear Energy in the Middle East: Making Progress on the Nuclear- and WMD-free Zone. Global Governance. 22 to start the use of nuclear energy. Under Article IV of the Treaty of the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the spread of nuclear power for peaceful purposes should not be a reason for specific concern. Indeed demanding that NPT parties have the right to pursue programs for the peaceful use of nuclear energy is correct, as mentioned in Article IV of the NPT, “All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also co-operate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.”32 However, in the complicated and unstable Middle East context, a likely nuclear revival represents a potential non-proliferation concern for the region’s states. According to Mallard and Faradori, “the prospects of a nuclear renaissance in this region underline the urgency of holding renewed discussions on a nuclear governance framework that can help buttress confidence and stability in the region.”33 In the same vein, Tazaki and Kuno point to the political instability of the region, as well as political conflicts between the member states and other states that were seen as challenges hindering the creation of MNAs. They argued that there are no simple measures to overcome such challenges, but further case-by-case measures, including “the direct involvement of international organizations, supplier states and nuclear weapon states, in MNAs, as well as the application of regional safeguards and regional systems of accounting for and control of nuclear material (RSAC) within MNAs, may contribute toward mitigating the political challenges.”34 Few scholars have adopted the idea of creating a regional authority over the nuclear fuel cycle management in the Middle East as a solution to Iran continuous nuclear unresolved conflict in the region. Since the beginning of the negotiations until 32 Retrieved from: http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2005/npttreaty.html Mallard, G., & Foradori, P. (2014). The Middle East at a Crossroads: How to Face the Perils of Nuclear Development in a Volatile Region. Global Governance, 20(4), 499-515. 34 Tazaki, M.; Kuno, Y. (2014). Feasibility Analysis of Establishing Multilateral Nuclear Approaches (MNAs) in the Asian Region and the Middle East. Sustainability, 6(12), 93989417. 33 23 now, Iran has only attached to a single red line, which has been reflected in its persistence on having full nuclear fuel cycle in the country. Having the nuclear fuel cycle means that the country would have all stages of nuclear fuel production from extraction of uranium ore all the way to the production of the “yellow cake” followed by production of UF6 after which the UF6 would be fed into fuel rods that will be subsequently used as fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor or Bushehr nuclear power plant.35 The full nuclear fuel cycle means that uranium enrichment is a crucial part of Iran's nuclear activities today and will remain so in the future. According to Seyed Mousavian, “with fourteen countries now operating or building enrichment plants, boosting interest in nuclear energy among Middle East countries, a successful resolution of the Iranian nuclear crisis could provide a model for dealing with other countries with breakout capability and contribute positively to non-proliferation.”36 Nuclear energy will likely to play a substantial role in the economies of the countries of the Middle East region for years to come. Building- up and strengthening the non-proliferation nuclear trust in the Middle East region will promote a wider use of nuclear energy for peaceful applications. However, the extent of that role, and how the various cost, safety, environmental, and proliferation-risk issues surrounding nuclear energy are not at all certain. Regional multilateral cooperation on nuclear fuel cycle issues can help to overcome energy security challenges for the participating states. To establish strong, sustainable, and feasible institutions of nuclear governance in the Middle East region, and to overcome possible conflicts between national, regional, and global levels, each participating country should adapt the experience of EURATOM as well as develop that model to the cultural, economic and political patterns of institution building in the Middle East.37 Furthermore, scholars have argued that the EURATOM Treaty provides appealing technical provisions, particularly regarding safeguards against the diversion of fissile materials by state and 35 Retrieved from https://www.armscontrol.org/ACT/2015_03/Features/Securing-IrreversibleIAEA-Safeguards-to-Close-the-Next-NPT-Loophole 36 Mousavian, S. (2014). After the Iran Nuclear Deal, The Cairo Review of Global Affairs. Retrieved from http://www.aucegypt.edu/Gapp/CairoReview/Pages/articleDetails.aspx?aid=619 37 Mallard, G., & Foradori, P. (2014). The Middle East at a Crossroads: How to Face the Perils of Nuclear Development in a Volatile Region. Global Governance, 20(4), 499-515. 24 non-state actors, confidence-building measures and fuel supply assurances for state actors. 38 Mallard (2008) argues that by pointing out the pitfalls, other regional attempts can develop a stronger legal framework. In this regard, one pitfall of the EURATOM Treaty is the “joint enterprise” concept under Chapter 5, which allowed large multinational enrichment industries like EURODIF chose to ignore it, as the treaty did not make it mandatory for states to use the EURATOM Community framework for nuclear R&D cooperation.”39 Mallard also points out the differences between the political context of the early Cold War, in which the EURATOM was shaped, and the one now, after the Arab spring. This means that for the Middle East region, the goals of cooperation and means will require a different path. However, multinational provisions included in the EURATOM treaty would result in stronger nonproliferation effects than that existed in the loose international cooperation norms.40 The legal sovereignty as mentioned by Mallard of EURATOM, “allowed EURATOM and the IAEA to harmonize their systems of controls, rather than subordinate one system of control to the other.”41 In other words, EURATOM allows its states to negotiate among each other before entering into any agreements with international organizations. Thus, one can conclude that if Israel wishes to join this regional cooperation, it will need to become a full party to the NPT, and submit its nuclear programs to IAEA supervision. In this way reaching an agreement on the establishment of a legal authority like the EURATOM in the Middle East would be a tangible step towards the establishment of a WMD free zone in the region. Middle East states might advance confidence building and trust in the nuclear energy industry by sharing nuclear technology for peaceful purposes under the NPT. The IAEA and UNESCO have adopted similar inter-governmental technological and research project in 2002, the Synchrotron-light for Experimental Science and 38 Mallard, Grégoire. "Can The EURATOM Treaty Inspire The Middle East?" The Nonproliferation Review 15.3 (2008): 459-77. 39 Shaker, M. I. (2014). Regionalizing Nuclear Energy in the Middle East: Making Progress on the Nuclear- and WMD-free Zone. Global Governance. 40 Ibid 41 Mallard, G., & Foradori, P. (2014). The Middle East at a Crossroads: How to Face the Perils of Nuclear Development in a Volatile Region. Global Governance, 20(4), 511. 25 Applications in the Middle East (SESAME).42 This UNESCO sponsored project was initiated by a gift from Germany and building works started in 2003. SESAME is located in Jordan and bringing scientists and researchers form countries like Israel, Iran, Jordan, Turkey, Egypt, Cyprus and Palestine altogether in such an inspiring model of scientific and technological cooperation. The organization conducts many activities including molecular environmental science, micro-electromechanical devices, x-ray imaging, materials characterization, and clinical medical applications.43 SESAME has a council governing the center. The council includes members from Bahrain, Cyprus, Egypt, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Pakistan, Palestine and Turkey. In addition to the members, the council has observers like France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Kuwait, Portugal, Russia, Sweden, Switzerland, UK and USA. Four different committees advise the council: the beamlines advisory committee, scientific advisory committee, technical advisory committee and training advisory committee.44 The aim of this project is building scientific and cultural links between neighboring countries, promoting mutual understanding and trust through international cooperation and advancing a regional scientific community.45 While the existing literature has addressed the regionalization of the nuclear fuel cycle, along with its preconditions, features, challenges and benefits from a comprehensive point of view, it has not taken a specific regional perspective. This is an important oversight; as there remain serious questions about managing sensitive materials and technology in terms of assurance of supply, trust issues, nuclear security, non-proliferation norms, policies of leading supplier states and the management of back-end as well as front-end fuel cycle in the Middle East. Thus, this project will make a modest attempt to fill that gap by presenting a model of cooperation in the Middle East that can be presented to the regional and international community. 42 Retrieved from: http://www.sciencediplomacy.org/perspective/2012/synchrotron-light-andmiddle-east 43 Retrieved from: http://www.unesco.org/new/en/natural-sciences/science-technology/basicsciences/international-basic-sciences-programme/sesame/ 44 Retrieved from: http://mag.digitalpc.co.uk/fvx/iop/esrf/sesamebrochure/ 45 Retrieved from: http://www.unesco.org/new/en/natural-sciences/science-technology/basicsciences/international-basic-sciences-programme/sesame/ 26 Methodology This study comprises an analysis of primary data sources collected from interviews with a number of governmental and international and national organizations officials, as well as an assessment of secondary sources related to the question of the multilateral management of the nuclear fuel cycle. These sources extend beyond the available academic and scholarly works on multilateral nuclear cooperation, arms control and strategic security management to include independent reviews, guidelines and interviews at both national and international levels. In addition, the study examines relevant international treaties, conventions and agreements at both regional and international levels. This section highlights relevant terminology, definitions, and outline prospective sources, reports, documents, and resources. Most importantly, this study uses primary data collection and data analysis of semi-structured in-depth interviews with governments, academics and officials of both international and national organizations who work in the nuclear energy, global governance, international security and international cooperation fields. The in-depth interviews are based on open-ended questions to smooth the process and get the interviewees more engaged in the discussion by reassuring them to express their true opinions, information and concerns based on their own experience. This is especially important for the analysis of this study that aims at reviving the multilateral approaches to nuclear fuel cycle initiatives as well as assessing the feasibility of such cooperation in the Middle East region. Open-ended questions also help the study with setting useful recommendations as such questions allow the respondents to explore issues that can be overlooked by the researcher or not mentioned in the set questions. Moreover, using open-ended questions go further to include findings that will stimulate further research in the topic. Open-ended interview questions have the advantage of offering a wide range of answers that help to capture the essence of interviewees’ responses rather than influencing the responses by adhering to one set of predetermined questions. 27 The interviews conducted with a wide range of officials and researchers who have contributed to the idea of the multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle. The primary goal is the depth of the information of these interviews. The selection of the interviewees is based on their contribution to the multilateral nuclear energy cooperation and security. The purposive interviewed sample cover governmental officials from Egypt and other Middle East countries, international and regional nuclear agencies like the IAEA and AAEA, EURATOM officials as well as academics that contributed to the field. This sample is selected to cover all functions and stages relevant to the regionalization of the nuclear fuel cycle. The process of data collection and data analysis through the semi-structured interviews is lead by a set of questions, which then aims at deepening the discussion. This set of interview questions used according to the context of the main responsibilities and contributions of the interviewees to the regionalization of the nuclear fuel cycle. There are two or more types of sets of question, mainly one concerning the international aspect of the topic and another concerning the national and the regional aspect. Questions directed to the officials from Europe are designed to assess the European legal framework and regulations of the European model to gain a better understanding of both the obstacles and the benefits of that particular model. Their views on the possibility to have a similar model in the Middle East are also discussed in an open discussion. On the other hand, questions directed to the officials working in regional organizations and non-governmental organizations are designed to better understand the actual legal regulations and relationships with other regional states in order to assess the a regional view and capacity of having a regional cooperation in the management of the nuclear fuel cycle. Questions about the Current Status of existing facilities and experience of Nuclear Fuel Cycle in the Middle East region are addressed in the interviews as well. Their views on the political will and the usual obstacles are also discussed in an open discussion. At the other end, questions directed to experts working in international organizations are designed to evaluate the international treaties’ role in organizing and controlling as well as offering assistance to the Middle Eastern states to reach the desired goal. 28 Furthermore, the study uses secondary data from scholarly journals, academic books, articles, published reports, previous proposals and agreed guidelines. It also examines and relies on international and regional agreements, conventions and treaties in analyzing the data. The study begins by examining the nuclear energy process in the Middle Eastern countries individually. Then it looks into the infrastructure, economic, technological, political, environmental and social dynamics in the region. The study goes over the role of the Arab Atomic Energy Agency as a regional organization concerned with peaceful uses of nuclear energy, including development and technological applications. This is examined through assessing the regulations and the agreements holding countries together and organizing nuclear activities. In addition to the literature, open-ended interviews are conducted with experts and officials of the Arab Atomic Energy Agency to assess the potential capacity of having a regional cooperation in the installation of the nuclear fuel cycle facilitates. Additionally, the study analyzes the European model (EURATOM) in many aspects; what kind of agreements do they have, what kind of bilateral agreements do they have, what kind of multilateral agreements do they share, what kind of agreements they have with international actors like the IAEA, their relationships with leading supplier countries like the USA, their relationships with each other politically, economically, technologically and environmentally, what kind of trust issues they have and what is the public opinions do they get. Then the study uses the information gathered about the European model and other regional models like ABACC and interview questions and interpret them to better understand the mechanism of the model and how they have reached to establish it. This data is compared to the Middle Eastern model data collected in accordance to a set of determined requirements. These requirements are identified from the well-known INFCIRC/640 report (Pellaud Report) and based on the specific situation and context of the region I selected certain elements necessary for the establishment of a multilateral nuclear cooperation in the Middle East. The last step in the methodological approach of the study will present three models that can be considered by governments and officials of the nuclear organizations at both international and regional levels. The examination of each 29 model is based on INFCIRC/640 report and the requirements for each model are selected in accordance to the specific context of the Middle East region and for the sake of this project the requirements examined are assurance of supply, nuclear nonproliferation and nuclear safety. First, a small note on the terminology mentioned in this study. The International Expert Group noted in their report that there is a distinction between multilateral, multinational, regional and international.46 However, in this study the terms will be used interchangeably as they all refer to any approach that refers to the management of the nuclear fuel cycle that goes beyond the national authority. Research Limitations There are some limitations to this study due to the sensitivity of the topic of research in the region at this time; interviewees may be reluctant to give accurate perception. The interviews intended to conduct will go through sensitive and confidential information that the interviewees may fear of being published. They may be also reluctant to express their own judgments, opinions or feelings towards the topic itself or towards their contributions to the topic discussed. This particular limitation is what the researcher considers as a threat to trustworthiness. This threat may influence the researcher judgments and analysis of the information getting from the respondents. Informed consent may mitigate some of these concerns, but not all. Additionally, there might be a resistance to provide official documents from governments and national energy organizations because of the sensitivity and security reasons. While acknowledging such limitations, there is still sufficient information and credible sources to complete a thorough feasibility study and present an effective comprehension of the management and implementation of the nuclear fuel cycle in the Middle East. 46 IAEA, Multilateral Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle, Expert Group Report submitted to the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, document INFCIRC/640, 22 February 2005, pp.19–20. 30 Nuclear Progress in the Middle East Over the past few years, about thirteen countries in the region showed interest in pursuing nuclear energy projects. From Morocco, Algeria and Egypt to Saudi Arabia and UAE announced new or renewed plans to establish nuclear power plants. Legitimate reasons push the region’s countries to seek alternatives power options. The demand for electricity is rising; shortage of oil and gas along with the need to reduce carbon emission, nuclear option seems ideal. The Middle East context is unique in its political, geographical, economical and technological characteristics. It has similarities and differences at the same time and with having Iran and Israel who are much advanced in their nuclear capabilities, their Arab neighboring countries face a challenge bringing their ambitious nuclear plans to Iran and Israel level. Additionally, to overcome the fears coming from the nuclear development in this region, the establishment of WMD free zone is the ideal solution to all the security concerns of all parties.47 Jordan According to Jordan’s Atomic Energy Commission (JAEC) programme report, the nuclear law was modified in 2007 resulting into two independent commissions, Jordan Atomic Energy Commission and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (JNRC).48 JAEC projects include nuclear power plant project, uranium exploration and HRD such as education, research reactor and subcritical assembly.49 Due to high growth of electricity consumption, high dependency on imported fuel, scarcity of unilateral energy resources, harmful environmental effects and the fact that 40% of government budget goes to cover energy needs, Jordan is pursing now the nuclear energy option. In order to overcome these factors, nuclear power seems a viable option for Jordan. Having nuclear power ensures security of supply and reduces dependency on 47 Mallard, G., & Foradori, P. (2014). The Middle East at a Crossroads: How to Face the Perils of Nuclear Development in a Volatile Region. Global Governance, 20(4), 499-515. 48 Toukan, K. (2015). Jordan’s Nuclear Energy Programme Report, Jordan Atomic Energy Commission. 49 Toukan, K. (2015, November). [Personal interview]. 31 imported oil and gas if Jordan uses its stocks of uranium. It also produces electricity at a competitive and steady price while guarantees a steady cash flows to investors. Moreover, it supports economic growth of the country as more local companies involve in nuclear project, the more local supply chain it will create as well as the creation of quality jobs. Nuclear power also increases domestic added value due to the potential exports of electricity to neighbouring countries and supports development of high-tech industries. In March 2014, the Jordan French Uranium Mining Company (JFUMC) for the first time, a uranium deposit is classified as a “resource” in Jordan as JFUMC claimed 28,400 tons of U3O8. There are three areas of uranium mineralization in Jordan; Central Jordan where JFUMC announced that 28,500 MT of U3O8 exists there, AlHasa where more than 30,000 MT of U3O8 discovered in Qataraneh Phosphate and lastly South Jordan where an estimated 100,000 MT of U3O8 are there. There are still work going on the way to continue uranium exploration effort where additional resources are expected to be discovered and in areas where are still untouched. Jordan completely built a 5 MW upgradable to 10 MW research and training reactor (JRTR) at the Jordan University for Science & Technology in Irbid. The construction permit was issued in 2013 and it is considered a training center as it provides for 9+ first principle nuclear experiments for nuclear engineering students. It will use 19% enriched fuel and is considered an open pool, heavy water reactor and H2O cooled. Jordan intends that the first nuclear power plant will consist of a Generation III or III+ unit with an option for second unit with capacity ranging from 700 to 1,200 MWe per unit.50 The inland nuclear power plant will rely on reclaimed and treated wastewater as its cooling water, which will be similar to Palo Verde plant in Arizona, USA. The anticipation need is 20 M m3/1,000 MWe unit per year. In 2014, a project development agreement (PDA) has been signed between JAEC and RUSATOM Overseas, the agreement defines the responsibilities and activities required by both parties in phase one (pre-investment phase) of the project. An inter-governmental 50 Toukan, K. (2015). Jordan’s Nuclear Energy Programme Report, Jordan Atomic Energy Commission. 32 agreement (IGA) has also been signed in March 2015, the agreement is a government level agreement that defines a framework in terms of cooperation on the implementation of the project between both governments. There is still more room for small reactors to be established in land away from water or offshore nuclear power plant for example. Government of Jordan decided in 2013 on several decisions: to adopt nuclear energy as one of the options for producing electricity, to establish a company that is fully owned by the government to manage the project, to select Amra site as the preferred site and carry out site characterization for the construction of the nuclear power plant, to select ROSATOM Overseas as the preferred bidder and strategic partner and to designate JAEC to negotiate with the Russian partner the implementation of the project. Despite the importance and the need for these nuclear projects, economic deficiency and political pressure as well as the assurance of fuel supply may prevent or at least interrupt the completion and operation of these nuclear power plants. Egypt Egypt had its nuclear power plans since 1954. However, due to many obstacles did not come to fruition until November 2015 when the government signed a deal with Russia to build its first nuclear plant in Dabaa, on the northern coast. Dabaa was also the preferred site that was selected by the government in 1983. Egypt’s nuclear energy program started when it acquired its first research reactor ETRR-1 from the former Soviet Union in 1958 at Inchass in Nile Delta. Several nuclear power plants were then only proposed and in 1976, the Nuclear Power Plants Authority (NPPA) was established to oversee any nuclear power projects. The nuclear projects were suspended after Egypt-Israel war in 1967 the weakened economic situation of the country. In 1981, Egypt signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty but did not ratifying IAEA Additional Protocol until now because of Israeli nuclear weapons 33 program. Later on in 1992, Egypt acquired 22MW multi-purpose research reactor ETRR-2 from Argentina.51 In February 2015, ROSATOM Overseas and NPPA signed an agreement to build two-unit of pressurized water AES-2006 nuclear power plant with desalination facility.52 In November, an intergovernmental agreement was signed with Russia to build and operate four reactors at Dabaa. The agreement includes fuel supply, used fuel reprocessing, training of scientists and staff and development of monitoring infrastructure.53 Reports say that another financing agreement was signed so Russia would loan Egypt to cover 80% of the costs with repayment over 22 years. United Arab Emirates The nuclear energy history in the UAE has been recent and dates only few years ago. In order to meet its growing electricity demand that is growing by 9% per year, the UAE announced its interest in nuclear power as environmentally assuring and commercially competitive option. As a result, the UAE established a Nuclear Energy Program Implementation Organization that launched the Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation (ENEC) as an Abu Dhabi public entity responsible of implementing nuclear power plans within the UAE.54 In 2009, ENEC signed an agreement with Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO) to build four Korean designed Advanced Power Reactor 1400 MWe (APR)-1400 nuclear reactors at one preferred site “Barakah”. The nuclear plants will be mostly financed by the state without outside loans however with some Korean equity partners. The UAE’s plan is to have the four 51 Retrieved from: http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Others/EmergingNuclear-Energy-Countries/ 52Retrieved from: http://www.rosatom.ru/en/presscentre/highlights/c5ad7a804aa37da1b1fcbf8d686b7041 53 Retrieved from: http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Others/EmergingNuclear-Energy-Countries/ 54 Retrieved from: http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Countries-TZ/United-Arab-Emirates/ 34 nuclear plants ready for running, producing electricity and exporting to Gulf neighbours via regional power grid by 2020.55 In 2012, ENEC signed six different contracts for each stage of the front-end fuel cycle; the supply of natural uranium, conversion and enrichment services and some enriched uranium product. Regarding the waste management, UAE adopted a “dual-track” strategy meaning developing a national storage and disposal system as well as leaving the window open for a regional cooperation as an option.56 Saudi Arabia In 2010, a royal decree stated, “the development of atomic energy is essential to meet the Kingdom's growing requirements for energy to generate electricity, produce desalinated water and reduce reliance on depleting hydrocarbon resources."57 Saudi Arabia developed its own nuclear energy plans few years ago because it realized its high growth in domestic energy consumption and dependency on oil and gas like its neighbouring country the UAE. In the same year, the King Abdallah Center for Atomic and Renewable Energy (KA-care) was founded to oversee the state’s nuclear power projects and represent Saudi Arabia at the IAEA. With the help of international companies overseas, three sites were chosen for nuclear power plants to be built; Jubail on the Gulf; and Tabuk and Jizan on the Red Sea.58 In 2011, the KA-care announced its plan to build 16 nuclear power reactors over the next 20 years. In the same year Saudi Arabia signed some cooperation agreements with Argentina and South Korea in nuclear R&D, nuclear safety, waste disposal, training and construction nuclear power plants and research reactor. In 2015, it signed with France to make a feasibility study for building two EPR nuclear power reactors and ROSATOM Overseas for construction of nuclear power plants, fuel cycle services, production of radioisotopes, used fuel and waste management in addition to training and education. 55 Ibid Ibid 57 Retrieved from: http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Countries-O-S/SaudiArabia/ 58 Ibid 56 35 It is worth to note that Saudi Arabia signed the IAEA safeguards agreement but never signed the additional protocol.59 All these bilateral agreements with other actors does not guarantee the sustainability of the nuclear energy projects in the country nor does it guarantee the assurance of supply and political stability. What does this entail? It entails as discussed in later sections that without being a member in a regional cooperation specialized in the management of nuclear fuel cycle or at least being a partner to already existing enrichment facilities to guarantee the flow of fuel cycle materials, these facilities will not be able to remain sustainably operative. Iran Iran’s interest in nuclear energy is dated back in the history Since the 1950s and has been still expanding until the date. The program was first started with the help of the USA as part of the Atoms for Peace program. The country had signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as a non-nuclear weapon state in 1968 and ratified it in 1970. Bushehr, was the first nuclear plant established in Iran after the Shah had “unveiled ambitious plans to install 23,000MWe of nuclear power in Iran by the end of the century.”60 During the 1970s, the political instability, due to the Iranian Revolution and the Iran-Iraq war as well as the cutting-off of the international cooperation, has limited the nuclear plan’s progress. However, during the 1990s Iran began to regain its expansion and started its unilateral nuclear fuel cycle through the development of uranium mining, conversion and enrichment experiments. Russia and Iran signed a bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement in 1992 in which Russia agreed to complete the construction of Bushehr power plant, however soon later Russia backed up its nuclear cooperation due to the American political pressure. In 2002, Iran declared some of its unannounced nuclear facilities such as Natanz Enrichment Complex and a 40MW heavy water research reactor at Arak under construction. In 2003, the IAEA carried out several inspections and in November that year announced the contradiction between Iran’s new declaration and 59 Ibid Joseph Cirincione, Jon Wolfsthal and Miriam Rajkumar, "Iran," in Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threats (Washington, DC, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005), p. 298. 60 36 the agency’s previous information and requested from the Director General to take the necessary steps to confirm Iran’s previous and present nuclear activities. In order to avoid going to the UN Security Council, Iran decided to cooperate with IAEA and voluntary suspended its enrichment and conversion activities and also voluntary signed NPT Additional Protocol after its negotiations with the EU-3. In 2005 after the June election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as Iran's President, Iran declared its uranium conversion activities resumption at Esfahan to the IAEA, resulting in a resolution that found Iran in non-compliance with its safeguards agreement.61 Iran’s decisions in the following years were against the IAEA norms and P5+1 negotiations; Iran inaugurated a heavy water production plant at Arak, continued to operate its enrichment facility and to install 18 cascades at the FEP's 3000-machine hall.62 On 15 July 2015, Iran and P5+1 signed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. The plan is about taking several measures to limit Iran’s enrichment capabilities. The agreement conditions state that Tehran agreed not to enrich uranium over 3,67% for 15 years including safeguarded R&D exclusively in the Natanz Enrichment facility while at Fardow enrichment facility Tehran will give up its uranium and R&D enrichment activities for 15 years and will keep its centrifuges only for the production of isotopes for medical and peaceful industrial purposes.63 The agreement allows IAEA for inspection of the entire fuel cycle from uranium mining through waste disposal for about 25 years at some facilities. Iran has also agreed to stop producing weapons grade plutonium at Arak facility and all spent fuel from Arak will be shipped out of Iran for the reactor’s lifetime.64 In addition, Iran agreed not to build any additional heavy water reactors or accumulation of heavy water for 15 years. Moreover, Iran agreed to ratify the additional protocol of the NPT and its safeguards agreement. Iran will have a procurement channel monitored by a 61 Retrieved from: http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/iran/nuclear/ Ibid 63 Retrieved from: http://sputniknews.com/politics/20150714/1024587268.html#ixzz3vRmqY6uL 64 Ibid 62 37 joint commission that will allow Iran to get the materials needed to operate its nuclear facilities under the guidelines established by international nuclear supply regimes.65 Israel Israel possesses advanced covert nuclear weapons programme and significant arsenal of short- and medium-range ballistic but no one can determine the status of Israel's chemical or biological weapons programs.66 Israel owns a 5 MWt research reactor at Nahal Soreq near Tel Aviv since 1960 with USA supply as well as 70 MWt Frenchbuilt heavy water reactors at Dimona in the Negev, which is operated mainly for a military purposes as well. It is important to note that Israel is not an NPT member until now which makes it difficult for its neighboring countries to accept and is considered an obstacle towards creating a WMD free zone in the Middle East. Israel also is not a party to any of the major treaties like Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) and Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). It has on the other hand, signed, but not ratified, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).67 Israel has been reluctant to negotiate establishing WMD Free Zone in the Middle East despite the international and regional efforts towards that. It has asserted a pre-condition of a comprehensive peace in the region in order to fully engaged in the negotiations of the WMD Free Zone. Due to the covert nuclear activities of Israel, no one can determine the nature of its civil nuclear power programs. However, reports state that Israel Electric Corporation (IEC) selected a site in the southern Negev at Shivta in 1980s for a nuclear power plant and France would have provided it with the needed equipment. In 2007, the National Infrastructures Ministry and Atomic Energy Commission discussed the issue again but with Jordan in mind for collaboration in which the latter was not welcoming. Ultimately, after the Fukushima incident in 2011 Prime Minister 65 "Full Text of the Iran Nuclear Deal." Washington Post. Retrieved from: http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/documents/world/full-text-of-the-iran-nuclear-deal/1651/ 66 Retrieved from: http://www.nti.org/learn/countries/israel/ 67 Ibid 38 Benjamin Netanyahu said, “I don't think we're going to pursue civil nuclear energy in the coming years.”68 Conceptual Framework Energy demands are increasing due to economic expansion, population growth, industrialization and urbanization but sources of energy like wind, coal, solar, oil and fossil fuels are unsustainable, unreliable and costly. Nuclear energy option is one solution and just one of the states’ resource-conserving schemes but has financial, technical and mainly political problems. Those political problems are related to regional conflict, regional competitions and political instability in different states. Nuclear energy has political and technical folds. Political and nuclear are interrelated in a way that cannot be separated when we talk about reaching a nuclear cooperation agreement. Nuclear energy is one solution to the energy problem but would have to be done in a way that deals with the political side. A regional model would deal with all of these issues and lay the possible foundation for a regional security community. With the increased global tendency towards more regional economic cooperation, consortium security measures that go beyond national boundaries, a possible solution to these problems in the Middle East is the formation of a regional nuclear governance of the nuclear fuel cycle. The NPT allows regional nuclear cooperation for peaceful purposes but it is challenging yet given the case of Iran for example. In this regard, the study proposes three models or configurations of introducing regional nuclear governance regime as concrete policy proposals that can be presented to policy-makers of international, regional, national and nongovernmental organizations as well as officials and researchers. Each model has its challenges as well as its benefits on the participating countries. The study argues that each of the proposed models of the regional governance of the nuclear fuel cycle has its own positive spillover effects despite all the barriers that could be in the way. 68 Israel Prime Minister Netanyahu: Japan situation has "caused me to reconsider" nuclear power Piers Morgan on CNN, published 2011-03-17, accessed 2015-12-05. 39 Before discussing the three proposed models of this study and illustrating their preconditions, requirements, challenges and benefits, it makes sense to look at two popular examples of regional nuclear cooperation EURAROM and ABACC and look deeply into their successful safeguards system. I will explore IAEA safeguards agreements with regional safeguards such as European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) and bilateral safeguard systems between Argentina and Brazil as in ABACC. Then I will highlight two international enrichment centers that worked as an incentive for countries not to develop unilateral enrichment facilities, EURODIF and URENCO. Finally, I will briefly discuss East Asia’s attempts in reaching a regional nuclear cooperation because of its unstable relationships and trust issues between the region’s countries that in some way are similar to the political dynamics among of the Middle East region. Past and Present Approaches: “EURATOM sought to build confidence between the members not only through its own verification system but also by providing a framework for practical cooperation between the parties (Gregoire Mallard, 2010).” Even though EURATOM framework should not be exactly replicated today, yet, it is wise to use it as a model and use some of its tools to create a new regional regulatory framework in other regions like the Middle East. One of the most important benefits of creating a regional governance of the nuclear cycle in the Middle East is building trust and confidence between the members which is a must now to face the division that has been originated from the strained relationship and the mistrust between the region’s states for years. According to Mallard, EURATOM treaty could represent an example for states pursing regional nuclear governance, which would supervise the establishment and the development of nuclear energy industry in the Middle East (Mallard, 2008). After World War II, EURATOM pursued building confidence between the member states through an agreed verification system, schemes for joint development of research and construction or operation of nuclear power plants, and assurance of nuclear supply as well as safeguards system. There are two layers working towards implementation of EURATOM Safeguards, the European Commission and operators. The European 40 Commission inspectors perform measurements to ensure that declarations concern the correct type and quantities of nuclear materials, video surveillance systems, apply seals to suspend nuclear materials that will not be used immediately and perform annual verifications of inventories (European Commission, 2014). The Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) was established under the agreement between Argentina and Brazil in 1991. ABACC comprises of a four-member Commission assigned equally by the two countries and a Secretariat with headquarters in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil (NTI, 2015). It is in charge of “administration and application of the Common System of Accounting and Control (SCCC), which is a full-scope safeguards system applied to all nuclear activities covering all nuclear materials in both countries (NTI, 2015).” As a first bilateral agency dealing with safeguards ABACC has established the Common System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (SCCC) to confirm that nuclear materials used in all nuclear activities in both countries are used exclusively for peaceful purposes in which Argentinean officers are participating in IAEA inspections in Brazil and vice versa. ABACC signed an agreement (INFCIRC/435) with the IAEA to submit all its nuclear activities under the IAEA safeguards and if one of the two countries was found in non-compliance, the IAEA could refer this case to the UN Security council. In 2011, Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG) recognized the Quadripartite Agreement as an alternative to the Additional Protocol (NTI, 2015). When compared to IAEA and EURATOM safeguards system, ABACC is considered more official than technical in the way the office and organization work. URENCO is a joint British-Dutch-German uranium enrichment centrifuge consortium located within its borders in area called Almelo and operate its facilities in mining, conversion, enrichment and fabrication. URENCO has four operational enrichment plants in the UK (URENCO UK), Germany (URENCO Deutschland), the Netherlands (URENCO Nederland) and the US (URENCO USA). They established a joint committee comprising representatives of the governments of the signatory states where they discuss all issues concerning the safeguards system (as established by IAEA and EURATOM), security procedures, exports of the technology and Enriched Uranium Product (EUP) and other related non-proliferation issues (URENCO, 2016). 41 This approach represents one of the types in multilateral nuclear approaches in which all partners operate the facility and share knowledge of the enrichment technology. URENCO partners also participate in research and development, manufacture and other enrichment industry management (Müller, 2016). However, like in the case of URENCO, if new enrichment plants were to be established in other states like France and USA that are already scheduled for construction using URENCO centrifuges, these centrifuges would be “black box” and the United States and France would have no access to technology as well. This would be an ideal approach for the ARAB states cooperation when it opens the door for other countries to join the committee that would be established but at the same time new plants that would be established in later stages would be also “black box” sustaining non-proliferation norms while developing more nuclear energy producing plants. On the other hand, EURODIF represents another approach in which the enrichment facility located in France is operated by the country itself while its partners Belgium, Spain, and Sweden share in the decision-making but do not operate the facility with France and also have no access to the enrichment technology. This approach can be reflected in the second (Arab states and Iran) and third model (Arab states, Iran and Israel) proposed in this study in which all participate in the decision making and obtain enrichment services from Iran’s facilities as well as Israel if the latter agreed on the prerequisites of the proposed multilateral nuclear cooperation in the Middle East. They would be all partners but do not operate the existing enrichment facilities (without giving their right in enrichment later on) in which the centrifuges will be in “black boxes” so that other member states will have no access to the centrifuge technology. The East Asian experience is different in many aspects mostly because of the unstable political relationship and mistrust among its countries, which somehow similar to the Middle Eastern situation, the focus of this study. In the East Asia region there are four states with existing nuclear energy programs, China, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan and North Korea with its secret nuclear program. East Asia states share the need for a stable energy supply but also share territorial disputes and compete for regional economic expansion and security interests. Unlike Europe, East Asia is unique in its culture, history, economic situation, regional relations and 42 nuclear programs and needs a different regional governance scheme in which appropriate steps need to be taken first before entering into a cooperation framework. In contrast to EURATOM, there has been no regional framework for nuclear governance cooperation in East Asia despite the advanced nuclear industry and experts’ efforts. The nuclear programs in the region have accomplished independently through bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements such between Japan and the United States, South Korea and the United States as well as Taiwan and the United States. However, in the past years many experts called for regional nuclear cooperation and presented many proposals like ASIATOM and PACATOM. The outcomes of these proposals suggest that nuclear cooperation needs to take intermediate steps in which areas like nuclear safety obtains top priority and the most probable area for regional nuclear cooperation. In the same vein, in 1997 and on behalf of the South Korean government, a proposal was officially made for the establishment of the Asia Nuclear Safety Consultation Organization (ANSCO) aiming to achieve highest level of nuclear safety, which cannot be achieved without multilateral cooperation in the region. The proposal intended to cover main nuclear issues like nuclear safety of facilities and technologies, nuclear emergency, nuclear liability and radioactive waste management. ANSCO proposal was not the first or the last, other region’s countries made many different proposals but all confirmed the importance of a regional nuclear cooperation and all shared the same regional nuclear priorities. These proposals proved that regional nuclear cooperation framework should be adopted according to the region’s political relations, nuclear situation and economic standards in order to resolve nuclear energy concerns appropriately and secure stable source of energy for these countries. One successful model like the EURATOM given the time, nuclear situation and smooth political relations among its member states, cannot be exactly replicated in unstable regions like East Asia and Middle East. Pre-requisites for Nuclear Security: Regarding nuclear security, which is one of the MNA establishment requirements due to the nuclear terrorism threats especially in an unstable region like the Middle East. Nuclear terrorism occurs when nuclear materials are diverted outside the host states and in order to prevent this threat, MNA member states should take security measures especially that the NPT does not mention nuclear security or safety in its provisions. 43 Currently, some states in the Middle East region have not yet ratified nuclear safetyrelated international conventions. Therefore, in all the three models proposed in this study, states must comply with the following international nuclear safety norms developed by the IAEA to sustain strong nuclear safety qualities: Ø Convention on Nuclear Safety (INFCIRC/449) Ø Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management (INFCIRC/546) Ø Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident (INFCIRC/335) Ø IAEA Safety Standards Ø Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency (INFCIRC/336) Ø Participate in Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) for the protection of nuclear material during transportation Ø Ratify revised CPPNM for the protection of nuclear material and power facilities Ø Participate in Nuclear Terrorism Prevention Convention to prevent terrorism using nuclear and radioactive substances.69 In addition to the above conventions, all regional member states need to establish joint nuclear safety standards and handle nuclear safety peer reviews among the member states to maintain nuclear safety of their facilities. Moreover, in all three models, the law concerning nuclear security of the partner, host or site state, which they belong to be followed.70 Prospective Models In this chapter, three models that foresee the establishment of a regional governance of the nuclear fuel cycle in the Middle East region are discussed. In each case, it is 69 Tazaki, M, and Kuno, Y. (2013). "Harmonization between a Framework of Multilateral Approaches to Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities and Bilateral Nuclear Cooperation Agreements." Sustainability 5.93,802-818. 70 Ibid. 44 assumed that regional governance regime member states have the political will to establish full nuclear fuel cycle cooperation. First, I will present a quaternary consortium model that consists of cooperation between Egypt, Jordan, UAE and Saudi Arabia suggesting an international fuel bank created under the IAEA’s supervision with nuclear fuel in storage. The second model is cooperation between the four previously mentioned Arab states and Iran. Finally, I will present a model of cooperation between the four Arab states, Iran and Israel. These three models are purposely discussed in that order, as I believe that this is the order in which a multilateral nuclear cooperation in the Middle East suppose to occur. It will begin by the establishment of ARABATOM organization then develop in to MEATOM organization. In accordance to the features and their prerequisites, the technical feasibility of each multilateral nuclear cooperation case is analyzed, challenges are identified and possible solutions to overcome challenges are proposed as well. All participating countries will have to put all their activities under the IAEA inspections so that all the international community would be confident that the nuclear activities are in compliance with the non-proliferation norms. 1. Arab States Model: Arab MNA (ARABATOM) The first model assumes that only those Arab states with either existing nuclear energy projects or plans to establish such projects by 2020, will be members of the regime. The states that are currently ready for this kind of cooperation are Egypt, Jordan, UAE and Saudi Arabia. The model does not exclude other Arab states, however it is only a nucleus that will be boost later on as more Arab countries like Algeria for instance join ARABATOM. “The idea of regional fuel bank is a must and it is justified by economic basis because to establish fuel bank you have to have more than 20 reactors for the project to be economically feasible.”71 In total, Arab states will have more than 20 nuclear power reactors and can compliment each other with other resources. Even though Arab states are considered newcomers to the nuclear fuel cycle activities and do not have the experience in that field, a multilateral cooperation regime would benefit them in a number of ways. 71 Toukan, K. (2015, November). [Personal interview]. 45 Shaker wrote “thus, as all countries would start from the same position, every individual state would have an equal say at each step along the way toward complete multilateral mastery of the nuclear fuel cycle (Shaker, 2014).” It would be a slow process but it will eventually proceed into building a big market that has many financial and political rewards to the region, as it will create a demand as it has a regional fuel bank, research and sources. Arab states would jointly form an MNA and transfer their existing facilities and currently under construction facilities to MNA facilities. ARABATOM would reduce the gap between the developed and less developed countries in nuclear activities, as all member states would benefit from economies of scale, nuclear technology and decision-making. Additionally, every state would be checking on each other to reduce the risk of the Sensitive Nuclear Technologies (SNTs) being diverted from peaceful to military purposes. This regional control would be complementary to the international control by the IAEA, which will strengthen non-proliferation norms. Even though regional fuel bank can start without the WMD free zone in the Middle East, it is still a step towards the establishment of the zone in the near future. This model will offer nuclear fuel to other IAEA member states in good standing in the open market through an international fuel bank that will have its fuel in storage. Additionally, for the benefit of the establishment of such regional fuel bank, additional partners might be needed to offer their financial support. a) Nuclear Non-Proliferation: All four Arab States are NPT members. Egypt and Saudi Arabia have not yet ratified the IAEA Additional Protocol. However, for the sake of the non-proliferation regime especially in a region where Iran and Israel are neighbors having nuclear activities undergoing, it is necessary for the member states to establish a regional safeguards system equivalent to the AP, such as those adopted by ABACC pre-dated the compliances of Brazil and Argentina to the NPT. As such, a regional safeguards organization should be established under a regional agreement and its headquarter should be hosted in one of the four mentioned states preferably in a state with large number of facilities for example Egypt or Jordan. This organization will allow confidence and trust building and development of further cooperation in other provisions such in technical, economic and security issues similar to already 46 established safeguards organizations in the example of EURATOM and ABACC. This regional safeguards organization will coordinate its activities with the IAEA safeguards entity but will have its own measures, management, activities and results. b) Assurance of Supply: Since the four states currently have no significant nuclear capacities, it is necessary to conclude an agreement with other states that have ENRs capacities through NCAs. On the other hand, although the establishment of new enrichment facilities and completion of Arab states’ existing enrichment and expected reprocessing capacities is not economically rational, it would promote to the assurance of supply in the future. In this regard, each state has signed NCAs individually with different NSSs in their planned nuclear projects. As mentioned in earlier section, UAE’s nuclear enrichment fuel services supplies are ensured by the US. Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia have concluded NCAs with Russia, ROK and France. The nuclear activities of other states would not be affected by the US except the UAE, which gave its right to enrich uranium under the terms of its NCA with the US. ARABATOM as a multilateral nuclear cooperation consortium can guarantee its fuel supply from the IAEA international fuel bank that was recently approved in August 2015 in Kazakhstan, as an option in case of emergency. The IAEA has set a criteria needed to be met in order for members to use instead of the commercial market. The criteria include the supply of LEU to a nuclear power plant is disrupted; the Member State is unable to secure LEU from the commercial market, State-to-State arrangements, or by any other such means; and the Member State has in place a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA and is in compliance with this agreement (IAEA report, 2015). Kazakhstan’s IAEA fuel bank and Assurance of Supply In 2015, the IAEA has signed a host-state agreement with the ex-soviet nation to locate the first internationally controlled bank of low-enriched uranium in Kazakhstan. This location was chose particularly because it’s well-known Ulba Metallurgical Plant, which according to the IAEA has “handled and stored nuclear 47 material, including LEU, safely and securely for more than 60 years.” The bank will provide each state with fuel that is suitable for its power reactor and design. This fuel bank serves as a fuel supplier for all IAEA member states without risking an unsteady supply because of the transportation, routes or any unpredictable circumstances thus preventing nuclear proliferation and ensuring steady fuel supply. It is worth to note that this LEU bank according to the IAEA “is fully funded by voluntary contributions including $50 million from the US-based Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) organization, $49 million from the USA, up to $25 million from the European Union, $10 million each from Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, and $5 million from Norway.” This bank will be fully operational in 2017 and will contain up to 90 metric tons of LEU enough to operate a 1,000 MWe (megawatt electric) light-water reactor (IAEA, 2015). The bank is managed by the IAEA and it is the first of its kind to not be under the control of an individual country but it is fully open to the IAEA inspectors. This LEU fuel bank would serve as a back up or an emergency system to ensure stable and cost-effective nuclear fuel supply needed for any civilian nuclear programs without affecting the international commercial market and without having to construct enrichment facilities themselves (NTI, 2015). This in fact the most important feature of Kazakhstan LEU fuel bank mainly for the establishment of a regional nuclear cooperation in the Middle East context where enrichment and reprocessing of SNTs are limited with the exception of Iran and Israel. If an Arab State cooperation were to be established and enrichment and supply sources were to be problematic, Kazakhstan’s LEU IAEA fuel bank would be an ideal choice. Since Kazakhstan is the world’s largest producer of uranium ore, it signed an agreement with the IAEA to host the first internationally controlled bank of lowenriched uranium to ensure the non-proliferation norms and provide fuel supplies for power stations. The IAEA will manage and operate the bank while the country’s legal and regulatory requirements will govern it to ensure the fuel bank’s safety and security. This storage facility will be fully operational in 2017 and will be located at the Ulba Metallurgical Plant in the northeastern industrial city of Ust-Kamenogorsk. 48 The bank will provide each state with fuel that is suitable for its power reactor and design. Having the right to receive LEU from the IAEA LEU bank is not problematic to this model of cooperation, as the bank will not “require giving up the right to establish or further develop a national fuel cycle or have any impact on it.”72 However, according to Khaled Toukan the Chairman of Jordan Atomic Energy Commission, there are several Arab countries in particular Jordan which can be the main source of this material as Jordan has more than 42,000 tons of yellow cake uranium in Jordanian phosphate deposits, which are have not been tapped because of the limited economic and technological capabilities in the Kingdom. Arab countries have to be sure that they have security of fuel supply so that they don’t be subject to monopoly and political embezzlement by fuel providers. While the goal of this cooperation remains to ensure an independence of fuel supply, both IAEA international LEU fuel bank and Kazakhstan fuel bank would still be options to guarantee the flow of the supply. As mentioned in an IAEA document, “Effective assurances of supply would have to include back-up sources of supply in the event that an MNA supplier is unable to provide the required material or services (IAEA, 2005).” 1.1 Summary of Model One: To establish the proposed multilateral nuclear cooperation, the followings need to be addressed to ensure nuclear fuel cycle sensitive materials and technologies: 1. Participation of other states with enrichment and reprocessing capacities. 2. Ensuring fuel supply from other states through NCAs or from the IAEA international bank in Kazakhstan. 3. Establishment new enrichment facilities. 4. Completion and Enlargement of existing ENR limited capacities in states like Egypt. 72 Tazaki, M, and Kuno, Y. (2013). "Harmonization between a Framework of Multilateral Approaches to Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities and Bilateral Nuclear Cooperation Agreements." Sustainability 5.93,802-818. 49 The biggest challenge to this model is the political acceptance, mainly the establishment of new ENR capabilities in such politically unstable environment. Without the consent of the P5+1, this model would not see the light. Thus, an MNA with IAEA involvement in addition to regional safeguards complimentary to the existing IAEA safeguards system is a possible solution that would enhance the transparency and confidence and security building measures. Other MNAs pre-requisites or challenges like transportation, siting, economics and degree of multilateral involvement are possible to overcome and solved by creating a treaty with provisions and legal framework agreed upon by all member states increasing equality among members and promoting joint decisionmaking. Since Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and UAE share land and sea routes in addition to the Suez Canal that connects the two continents together without crossing into the territory of any other states, transportation should cause no major problems. 2. Model two: Arab States with Iran If an Arab states nuclear cooperation was to be founded, it is expected to delay the establishment of reprocessing facilities without giving up their right permanently. As such, a reliable partner with existing facilities and nuclear activities is needed and Iran is the one. This model of cooperation is proposed to solve long-term nuclear dispute in the Middle East region and release the tension between the countries as well as to build trust and confidence among them. This framework is based on already existing capabilities, in which Iran will be cooperating in the nuclear activities with its neighboring countries. Iran is already an active participant in the nuclear fuel production community. Arab States have planned nuclear projects, Jordan has uranium reserves and Egypt has some trained and experienced scientists. In other words, the Arab States, “would be sharing with Iran the ownership and the management of its sensitive technologies without having necessarily access to the technologies themselves, which will remain private domain of Iran (Pilat, 2015).” Every individual state will be responsible for different stage of the nuclear fuel cycle and each state will be checking on others as part of the agreement, thus strengthening nonproliferation norms. If Iran is allowed to enrich uranium under this model of 50 cooperation, all its activities will be under the IAEA’s supervision and in any case of non-compliance with the terms of the model’s agreement, the case will be referred to the UNSC to play its authoritative role in implementing sanctions against Iran. The model can be seen as a cooperation between two actors, Iran and the Arab States collectively as an individual actor under the umbrella of the League of Arabs (LAS) or another new organization that would be established for that purpose (ARABATOM) as proposed in the first model. This model of cooperation to produce low enriched uranium resembles both EURODIF in France and URENCO in Netherlands in which existing enrichment facilities provide fuel supply to its neighboring countries without compromising the ownership of its facilities. In this proposed model Iran will be the host of the enrichment facilities and its partners could obtain enrichment services from Iran’s facility. While other cooperation members play role on the decision-making commission, they do not operate the facility and have no access to the technology. It would be challenging for Iran to accept this model as it already has an enrichment technology and facility itself however, turning into a regional nuclear supplier state is clearly a great incentive. Despite the challenges in making this model of cooperation appealing to Iran, this study believes that it would produce positive outcomes for both Iran and Arab states. Iran would share the financial burdens with its partners instead of standing alone with all the expenses, thus giving an opportunity to develop and enhance its enrichment technology. Additionally, Iran would gain an international prestige being recognized as a reliable exporter of enrichment services in the region and possibly in the future could also gain more economic revenues from exporting LEU to other countries as well as securing fuel for its future nuclear power plants. Iran should think of this regional governance of the nuclear fuel cycle as a way of ensuring enough prosperity when it comes to its growing population as well as a way of ensuring enough uranium reserves to match Iran’s desire to continue in developing the entire fuel cycle given the uncertain current situation of its nuclear fuel self-sufficiency. Even if Iran has a capacity to enrich uranium as an individual state, regionalization of the nuclear fuel cycle is preferable and more acceptable in the international community as it realizes both the development of peaceful uses of 51 nuclear power and nuclear non-proliferation. In this sense, Iran will share the management and the ownership of its sensitive technologies with Arab states without compromising its technology to being transferred to other joint stakeholders (blackbox). Figure 2 Distribution of responsibility in multilateral nuclear fuel cycle cooperation between Iran and Arab states as suggested by the researcher. a) Nuclear Non-Proliferation: As mentioned in the first model members of the ARABATOM are all members of the NPT as well except that Egypt and Saudi Arabia have not yet ratified the IAEA Additional Protocol. Iran also signed the NPT many years ago and submitted all its nuclear facilities under the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards in particular after the P5+1 agreement in which Iran allowed tighter control and enhanced international verification on its nuclear programmes. For the sake of nonproliferation, it should be concluded in the agreement that significant amount of the 52 low-enriched uranium are not be stored in Iran, but exported to other cooperation partners for conversion and fuel fabrication. Thus, decreasing the possibility of Iran developing a covert nuclear weapons program. b) Assurance of Supply: In this model, Iran is the only country with enrichment facilities, materials and knowledge. Iran would be responsible for the enrichment process and providing other partners with a sustainable fuel supply without compromising its enrichment technology to diversion. In all cases, member states represented by a commission would conclude agreements with third-state parties, international organization like Kazakhstan’s IAEA fuel bank or conclude an agreement with a national or private centers like EURODIF or URENCO to ensure supply as an option. 2.1 Summary of Model Two: In contrast with model one, the assurance of nuclear fuel cycle services supply within this regional nuclear cooperation model would be available given credits to Iran’s enrichment capacity. This supply assurance could be achieved without third-state party involvement if wanted. Additionally, there would be an economic rationale for the Arab states to acquire a share in already existing enrichment facilities in Iran and receive assurance of fuel supply in exchange if Iran agrees. This is an advantage in which the use of such facilities has an economic benefit when compared with establishing completely new ENR facilities. However, non-ENR technology holder states would not access such technologies “black-box” protecting the technology from diversion, thus enhancing non-proliferation norms. Similar to model one, political and international acceptance and geopolitics are the main challenge facing this MNA model. In order to ensure stable fuel supply and services with this model, member states need to avoid being entangled in any conflicts or disputes between Iran and other states within the region and from outside as well. The possible solution to overcome this challenge is to guarantee an emergency option for fuel supply and services from other nuclear fuel supplier state or international bank as proposed in the ARABATOM model. Alternative 53 transportation routes need to be guaranteed in the model treaty so as not to depend fully in one transportation scheme. 3. Model three: Arab States, Iran and Israel In this model, I will examine the opportunity of having a regional cooperation with ARABATOM, Iran and Israel. Now why Israel? And under what conditions can it Israel takes part of the regional governance of nuclear fuel cycle in the Middle East? Ever since it’s beginning as a weapon of war, nuclear bombs have become the symbolic reminders that sovereignty, deterrence and safety lie in their possession. The Nuclear Weapons Non-Proliferation Treaty, which came into force in 1970, was the result of this dilemma. Non-nuclear states are prohibited from acquiring a nuclear weapons capacity, however, they are allowed to receive technology for peaceful purposes “on a non-discriminatory basis” at a market price. In reality, this nuclear superiority continues to create exemptions. Countries have received nuclear technology in violation of signatory obligations. “The supposed limitations imposed by the NPT on non-nuclear weapons states have been deemed insufficient.”73 Israel has claimed several times that in order to the Middle East to be free of weapons of mass destruction, a lasting peace deal with Palestine and a non nuclear capacity Iran are prerequisites for ensuring that. Israel is the first country to introduce nuclear weapons in the Middle East but it was used for aggressive military expansion purposes. It used this nuclear threat as a stick against all Arab states in order to impose its policies of expansionism and aggression since early 1970s. It also used its nuclear capability to threaten Arab countries and to impose its condition as far as peace process and against any Arab country that wants to embark nuclear energy so that it would be viewed as a suspect.74 In December 2014, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution calling for Israel to join the NPT and put its nuclear reactor at Dimona in the Negev Desert under 73 http://www.globalresearch.ca/voiding-the-nuclear-weapons-non-proliferationtreaty-npt-israel-and-nuclear-exceptionalism/5431822 74 Toukan, K. (2015, November). [Personal interview]. 54 IAEA supervision. The UN General Assembly has passed an Arab-introduced resolution of 1995 calling on Israel not to develop, produce or possess nuclear arms and criticizing the country for not being part to the NPT. The resolution appeals to Israel to "accede to that treaty without further delay, not to develop, produce test or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons, to renounce possession of nuclear weapons," and put its nuclear facilities under the safeguard of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The resolution, initiated by Egypt, was approved by 161 nations with only five voting against it and 18 abstentions.75 Israel should take part in the P5+1 negotiations in which it would announce its readiness to put all its nuclear facilities under the IAEA inspections and join the NPT in return for signing a Middle East Nuclear Free Zone. In order for Israel to join the negotiations on the establishment of a Middle East nuclear fuel cycle, it has to sign the NPT and all relevant treaties, abide by the IAEA standards and join other countries in their to negotiation about the establishment of the WMD-Free Zone in the Middle East as well as the establishment of a Palestinian state and maintaining the identity of Jerusalem now and in the future.76 But what assurance could give the Israelis the will to move forward? It is to start by signing a fissile material ban of treaty that could be on a regional level and controlled by a regional agency in cooperation with the IAEA. Additionally, nuclear freeze could be a first step towards a nuclear disarmament as in the French experience in which they do not produce fissile material for nuclear warhead anymore and all enrichment facilities are completely civilians so the Israelis could do the same and say we will put all what we had produced, identify them as civilians, under international control so now we cannot produce nuclear weapons and we will let your inspectors into our facilities, which is considered a huge gesture. Now what will they ask in return? They will ask for many gestures like the recognition of the Israeli state for instance before they can talk about nuclear disarmament.77 75 http://www.globalresearch.ca/voiding-the-nuclear-weapons-non-proliferation-treaty-nptisrael-and-nuclear-exceptionalism/5431822 76 Shaker, M. (2015, December). [Personal interview]. 77 Mallard, G. (2015, December). [Personal interview]. 55 On the other hand, there is an opposite opinion to Shaker and most of the politicians and researchers which is according to Ayman Khalil the Director of Arab Institute for Security Studies, in order to create a solution outside the box it is not necessarily be a theoretical one. In other words, Israel could be a member of the zone and a partner to any regional governance of nuclear fuel cycle regime without being NPT member first. Evidently, there is no provision in a legal treaty that states that, so why this precondition prevents Israel from joining the regional cooperation.78 In reality however, this is cannot be done because of the persistence of all the Arab countries that in order for Israel to join any regional nuclear cooperation it needs to be a member of the NPT and not vise versa. By getting Israel abide by the mentioned conditions in order to be part of this regional nuclear cooperation, the Middle East will be free of WMDs and the existing political tension will be reduced as well as putting the region as a frontier in the nuclear market. Why Israel should sign the NPT? Israel is no longer under a threat; as demonstrated in the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative in which the Arab stares were willing to normalize relations with Israel in exchange for full withdrawal from the territories captured in 1967. Also, instead of being a threatening stick against the Arab states and Iran, its nuclear arsenal may trigger a nuclear arms race in the region. Paragraph 14 of the binding U.N. Security Council Resolution 687 that called for the disarmament of Iraq also specified the establishment of a zone free of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) in the Middle East (UNSC document, 1991). All countries that joined the US-led coalition to overthrow Saddam Hussein and free Kuwait assumed that after the abolition of Iraqi WMDs, Israel would be required to get rid of its nuclear weapons. As a result, Israel and other countries that have not implemented that paragraph have eventually violated that binding resolution.79 The 78 Khalil, A. (2015, November). [Personal interview]. 79 http://www.globalresearch.ca/voiding-the-nuclear-weapons-non-proliferation-treaty-nptisrael-and-nuclear-exceptionalism/5431822 56 1995 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review and Extension Conference also called for "the early establishment by regional parties of a Middle East zone free of nuclear and all other WMDs and their delivery systems". The international community persisted to ignore these resolutions by not asserting Israel to announce its nuclear activities and give up its nuclear weapons warheads and submit all its nuclear activities under the IAEA control. Additionally, the 2000 NPT Review Conference called on "India, Israel and Pakistan to accede to the Treaty as Non-Nuclear Weapons States (NNWS) promptly and without condition". However, few efforts have been made towards pushing Israel, India and Pakistan to comply as non-nuclear weapon states. The agreement made by Iran, Britain, France and Germany on Iran's accession to the Additional Protocol and suspension of its enrichment activities for more than two years also called for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction throughout the Middle East.80 However all these agreements and efforts have been unproductive due to the Israeli’s consistent and persistent denial of its nuclear activities. a) Nuclear Non-Proliferation: As mentioned in the previous two models, ARABATOM and Iran are all members of the NPT except in this model where Israel is not. Israel has limited enrichment activities primarily serving weapons programs and not for civilian nuclear producing power plants. All of the proposals now under deliberation have a requirement that the member country be in full submission with its international responsibilities according to the NPT and the IAEA’s safeguards scheme. In some cases, countries like India have safeguards on portion of its nuclear activities under the Indo-US nuclear deal so that they would able to receive sustainable fuel supply. While this deal is considered an exemption to the NGS rules, it made India the only known country with nuclear weapons which is not a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty yet allowed to receive nuclear fuel from the international market. However, in this model Israel has to adhere by the NPT and IAEA international obligations required for granting them advanced consent by nuclear supplier states (NSSs) and for the engagement in enrichment and reprocessing activities. The followings are required by all 80 http://www.globalissues.org/news/2015/09/05/21462 57 participating states proposed in this model to maintain their non-proliferation characteristics, and therefore, engage in nuclear fuel cycle sensitive activities: 1. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). 2. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguards including: IAEA comprehensive safeguards (INFCIRC/153) and Additional Protocol (AP, INFCIRC/540). 3. If not adhered to AP, equivalent safeguards similar to the one implemented by the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC).81 If all the above have been accomplished, a regional safeguards organization could be established like in model 1 and 2 in which trust and confidence are built working together with the IAEA safeguards system. b) Assurance of Supply: This model would not differ in its fuel supply guarantees as Iran and Israel both have enrichment capabilities with different degree of enrichment level, however Israel lacks enrichment capabilities on industrial scale that is needed for nuclear power. In this model of cooperation, the regional Commission would be responsible for ensuring that all the member states receive an equitable non-discriminative supply of fuel sensitive materials either from within the community itself or from a third-state parties. A fuel supply agency should be established to oversee the supply and demand market and negotiate all the agreements and avoid the EURATOM Treaty pitfall of bypassing member states like France the status of joint enterprise. 3.1 Summary of Model Three: The great advantage of this ARABATOM-Iran-Israel model is in addition to the assurance of fuel supply and services like in model one and two, is the emerging of a 81 Tazaki, M, and Kuno, Y. (2013). "Harmonization between a Framework of Multilateral Approaches to Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities and Bilateral Nuclear Cooperation Agreements." Sustainability 5.93,802-818. 58 new cooperative era in the Middle East in which Israel is cooperating and sharing with its neighboring countries its nuclear activities under the international control. This MNA would pave the way towards the establishment of a WMDFZ in the Middle East and strengthening non-proliferation norms. This model is the ideal in terms of its goals and objectives. On the other hand, the first and biggest challenge is to convince Israel to sign the NPT and adhere to the international laws and treaties in addition to submitting its covert nuclear activities under the IAEA control. The establishment of ARABATOM may lead Israel to overthink the idea because of the pressure that would arise from Arab states cooperation or the Arab states-Iran cooperation but it may not be enough to convince Israel of all the pre-conditions of this model. However, if Israel and other states in this MNA achieved an agreement on all the pre-requisites, provisions on non-compliance need to be bluntly addressed. In case of political conflicts within the MNA, the Commission needs to urgently work in order to prevent any conflict from disturbing and affecting the assurance of supply. International inspections as well as routinely state-to-state inspections must be performed to avoid any hidden activities. To efficiently prevent the fuel supply and services from being diverted, ARABATOM-Iran-Israel model’s safeguards system needs to target both reported and non-reported nuclear materials and activities unlike EURATOM in which the safeguards system only targets the reported activities and check if they are used for the intended purpose or not. 4. Summary of the three models’ findings: Figure 3 Developed by the researcher. 59 3. Could Turkey be a member in any of the prospective models? One should ask why Israel and not Turkey for example. Some scholars argue that Turkey should have a special status when one of the three models gets established because its proximity to the regional states as well as its active role in the discussions about the security of the Middle East.82 Others believe that the current political situation in the region and Turkey’s role in creating more political unrest would prevent such admission to any of the regional proposed cooperation models at the present time. Additionally, the presence of US tactical nuclear arsenals and defense missile structures within Turkey’s boarder as well as its membership in the NATO are also other barriers to its acceptance in the WMD Free Zone in the Middle East.83 However, this does not mean that once any of the three mentioned models gets established, Turkey can be a partner in any regional cooperation in the future. Turkey tended in the past to pursue scientific cooperation projects with the more developed states to its west rather than to its east and south, this tendency intensified because of the restriction made by scientific organizations like the Arab Atomic Energy Agency to include members outside the Arab states.84 However, there are good indications that this tendency has changed and signs of cooperation began to appear. For instance, Iran and Turkey already cooperated in energy issues in which Iran is Turkey’s second-largest natural gas supplier. Both countries signed various agreements in 2009, assigning three of Iran’s South Pars gas fields to the Turkish Petroleum Corporation for the more effective transport of Iranian gas to Europe through Turkey.85 Turkey is also a member of the Jordan-based Synchrotron-light for Experimental Science and Applications in the Middle East (SESAME) project, which brings scientists from the region to participate in scientific and technological researches. 82 Shaker, M. I. (2014). Regionalizing Nuclear Energy in the Middle East: Making Progress on the Nuclear- and WMD-free Zone. Global Governance, 20(4), 517-528. 83 Ibid 84 Lorenz, T., & Kidd, J. (2010). Turkey And Multilateral Nuclear Approaches In The Middle East. The Nonproliferation Review, 17(3), 513-530. Doi: 10.1080/10736700.2010.516999 85 Ibid 60 Turkey has a wide experience in specific nuclear fuel cycle stages and in fuel fabrication in particular combined with the help of the IAEA upgrading its infrastructure for fabrication. Thus, Turkey would be well positioned to host a joint fuel fabrication plant in any of the three regional governance models previously proposed. Additionally, Turkey with its history and experience in the nuclear field can add tremendously to any model of cooperation as it holds one of the largest concentrations of nuclear expertise in the university division in the Middle East (Lorenz, 2010). Turkey has a political active role in Iran’s nuclear problem pushing for prolonged diplomatic efforts rather than economic sanctions in addition to its active role in the discussions about the security of the Middle East, indirectly increase confidence building in the region. In any of the proposed regional governance models, Turkey can serve as a host of a regional fuel fabrication facility while each of the other member states can host a different stage of the nuclear fuel cycle. It would make much more sense to Turkey’s nuclear industry to cooperate with the Middle East countries rather than the Western countries for productive nuclear joint venture with benefits like sharing economic burdens, pooling natural resources and gaining from other countries’ nuclear technologies and facilities. 61 Conclusion This paper had for principal aim to explore how a regional governance of nuclear fuel cycle can be achieved in the Middle East, but also to modestly fill a gap in the Middle East’s multilateral nuclear cooperation implementation literature. The findings of this study proves that multilateral nuclear cooperation play vital role in guaranteeing that states keep nuclear weapon, sensitive nuclear technology and weapons-usable materials out of the hands of terrorists. Without sacrificing the know-hows of the nuclear industry a country has, it has been proved that it is possible to share technology and security practices without revealing sensitive information. Trust and confidence between cooperating decision-makers and authoritarians are essential and this cannot happen overnight as it takes time, work and determination. Strong support from governments, civil societies, policy-makers and public is needed to keep the momentum of work going and contribute to the progress of such sensitive project. A regional nuclear cooperation would have great effect in minimizing the proliferation risk, increasing protection of nuclear facilities throughout the region and enhancing economic, technological and security advantages to all the member states in addition to satisfying the nuclear energy demands more efficiently in the Middle East. The study argues that regional governance of the nuclear fuel cycle is more strategic than unilateral development of nuclear fuel cycle. This study illustrated the opportunities and challenges related to the prospective models of regional governance of the nuclear fuel cycle in the Middle East. Despite the challenges, the study finds that it is timely and effective to conclude a multilateral nuclear cooperation regime for managing the nuclear fuel cycle sensitive materials and technology as a foundation to making progress in the establishment of a WMD Free Zone in the Middle East. However, without radical changes of policy from the states involved, this regional framework would face a lot of difficulties to be realized. There are four conditions necessary in order for a regional governance of the nuclear fuel cycle in the Middle East to be acceptable by the international community and achievable by the member states: 1. Multilateral and bilateral dialogues: Involvement of all regional parties at 62 the negotiation table as well as the international community including nuclear supplier states. 2. Gradual build up phase with intermediate steps: cooperation should initially begin with members with good political relationships like the Arab states then other partners like Iran, Israel or Turkey could join them later after rounds of expected discussions and negotiations. Implementation could begin with components that are currently feasible and should not be delayed until other options are being discussed and refined. 3. Full transparency: to gain international trust and confidence on the intentions of the member states behind this regional cooperation, discussions and plans should be communicated to the international community in full transparency. 4. Involvement of IAEA: any cooperation plans should be developed in consultation with the IAEA, which would later have an oversight role concerning all aspects like nuclear safety and nonproliferation. In all case studies, the political instability of member states and the region as well as political conflict between nuclear supplier states and some regional states posed the biggest challenge to the establishment of a regional governance regime of the nuclear fuel cycle. There is definitely no simple solution overcome this challenge, however case-by-case measures like the application of regional safeguards organization, involvement of international organization like the IAEA, involvement of international fuel bank and/or nuclear supplier states would help alleviate the political challenges. It is important to mention that any regional nuclear governance regime of the nuclear fuel cycle in the Middle East would not smoothly established without the consensus of the P5+1 and in order to attain that agreement intermediate steps need to be taken first to establish a legal structure first and before the technical one. Efforts and lots of negotiations would be taken place to convince the international community that these attempts are for peaceful purposes and all the proposed activities would be under the international control. Based on the analysis of this study and the three models that were proposed, the Arab States cooperation model seems more realistic to achieve in the short-term 63 future. Why I believe this is more achievable? Because the Arab States already had and still have the political will to cooperate, they share partially the same geopolitics, nuclear energy starting point, environment and public acceptance. Even though there are some economic and technological inconsistencies that could not be denied or neglected, I believe that these differences could be overcome by developing a governance regime in which each of these Arab countries fill in the gap of others and complete each other in harmony without having an inter-Arab competition. Given the nuclear energy agreements that the Arab States have established to start their own nuclear power plants and given the fact that these states have already research nuclear power plants like Egypt, a Quadripartite nuclear fuel cycle cooperation serving as a nuclei in the region seems more possible to be achieved. It can also be an incentive for other countries to join and share nuclear fuel in accordance to the provisions of the ARABATOM Treaty. Furthermore, I believe that the creation of the ARABATOM would put a pressure on Israel to join the NPT and think as one member of this region that has to cooperate not to compete in such sensitive issue. A regional fuel bank without Israel can be seen as an only power development project that lacks political goals and security solutions. However and on the other hand, this does not necessarily undermine the importance of a regional project that brings all the Arab states that already share many similarities and goals together again aiming for one goal, one interest and one ambition. An Arab states nuclear fuel cycle governance regime is a first step towards building trust among the states and their societies. A regional fuel bank can start without a free zone however; you cannot have a free zone without being an NPT member to say the least. I believe that if you cannot reach an agreement now regarding the WMD Free Zone in the region, regional governance of the nuclear fuel cycle is a vital and essential step towards creating one in the near future as it paves the way towards more serious discussions and resolutions to many hanging issues between the Arab states, Iran and Israel. An Arab States fuel bank would create a demand on nuclear related materials from the international market since it would have materials, research, manpower and resources and facilities. The Arab State model can be and should be expanding over time to include more regional partner. While a model of nuclear cooperation between Arab states and Iran can be 64 perceived as an anti-Israel coalition, there are some other issues that cannot guarantee a success in bringing Iran to the negotiations table such as the regional relations with its neighboring Gulf states, technical issues and the international acceptance. However, after Iran’s recent agreement with the P5+1 many politicians consider it a great step for all the international community and the Middle East in particular. According to the provisions of the agreement, Iran has to submit all of its nuclear activities and facilities under the international control for at least 15 years. This may indicate the new will and transformed attitude of the present Iranian government to cooperate in nuclear power projects and negotiate with its neighboring countries in various issues. It may not be the ideal solution to the political and ethnic problems in Iran and neighbouring states, but it may be technical, economic and nuclear security solution. The third proposed model consisting of Arab States, Iran and Israel could be viewed as unrealistic and hard to achieve security solution mainly because of the long-term political dispute between each and every party of the model. However, I proposed this model and believed that for the sake of non-proliferation and the establishment of Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone in the Middle East, this multilateral nuclear cooperation needs Israel. I also believe that this model of cooperation would gain more international acceptance and appear more appealing to the international community than the other two models, thus gaining more support in terms of financing and fuel supply from international commercial market. An encouraging living evidence of the regional willingness to cooperate in the nuclear field is SESAME or Synchrotron-light for Experimental Science and Applications in the Middle East. This proves that these countries are capable of cooperation in other issues despite the mistrust and the tension. Turkey with its active role in the region’s politics and its good-standing relationships with some of the region’s countries especially Iran, Israel and Saudi Arabia, could play a vital role in the regional governance of the nuclear fuel cycle in the Middle East. I believe that Turkey could join any of the proposed models in particular the model with Iran among its members. It also could join the Arab states model at a later stage and gain a special status when the model gets established, thus creating pressure on Israel to join and adhere to the necessary preconditions. 65 In all the proposed models, spent fuel reprocessing outweighs the potential benefits and in principle is not necessary for nuclear power generation. However, spent fuel dispositions could be stored in an agreed international nuclear waste stations without giving up the right of reprocessing in the future. In conclusion, all models are feasible to different degree, gradual build up process with intermediate steps to reach this regional framework could be effective and feasible and also capable of expanding to include more countries in later stages. However, in order for the Middle East to gain an advanced, self-sufficient and influential place in the international nuclear community, it has to develop a complete fuel cycle that is owned and operated by its members. There may be no other way should accomplish this objective as opposed to incorporating Arab countries (Egypt, Jordan, UAE and Saudi Arabia) with Iran, Israel and Turkey. Such a regional fuel cycle, with a supply of uranium from Jordan, enrichment in Iran, fuel fabrication in Turkey, reprocessing in Israel, conversion and other cycle stages in the rest of the Arab states, joint education, research and expertise, would benefit the entire region involved in this endeavor. Countries’ efforts towards realizing this regional project, if successful, prove to be the beginning of a long rewarding road to confidence building and trust in the Middle East in order to cooperate and work together to resolve other issues and prevent a downward twist of exploitation of nuclear energy for nonpeaceful purposes. Ultimately, nuclear confidence building is associated to the wider security and cooperation agenda in the region most importantly, the establishment of a WMD-free zone in the Middle East. 66 Spillover Effects • Way to Arab Union.... • Complete regional fuel cycle/ independent market • Pressure on Israel to join/ Iran open to the world ARABATOM ARABATOM with Iran ARABATOM, Iran, Israel and Turkey ARABATOM, Iran and Israel • Way to WMD Free Zone/ security building Figure 4 Spillover effects of each model as illustrated and developed by the researcher Despite the challenges, the study argues that each model has a positive spillover effect on the member states. The ARABATOM model could lead to the creation of an Arab Union similar to the European Union and how it got established in the same way from a regional technological cooperation. The second model, the ARABATOM with Iran, has a positive spillover in creating pressure on Israel and other non-cooperative countries to cooperate and join the framework. It can also create a new Iran open to the world, bringing the Arabs and Iranians closer back together settling religious and ethnic disputes between the parties. The third model, with increased transparency measures, could gain many benefits regarding security building. It could also be a step towards the establishment of WMD Free Zone in the Middle East. The fourth model, the most desired and preferred model, could lead to a complete open front-end fuel cycle with an independent regional market creating demands for fuel supply, technology and expertise as well as economic profits. 67 All the models have a positive spillover effect in building confidence and trust among the member states and within the region, which can open new avenues of cooperation in other issues as well. 68 Recommendations Driven from the above analyses and findings, this study suggests a set of recommendations that could be useful for decision and policy makers, governments, inter-governmental organizations, NGOs and researchers to develop a feasible regional nuclear fuel cycle scheme centered on the Middle East. For LAS: • State clearly that the Arab States’ goal of this multilateral nuclear cooperation is to generate electricity and to prevent nuclear weapons from being used by a state or a non-state actor as well as the establishment of Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone in the Middle East. • Set up forums where regional countries engage in dialogue on nuclear energy, nuclear nonproliferation, nuclear security, reprocessing of spent fuel, waste management, economic cooperation and public awareness. • Revitalize the role of the League of Arab states and focus the light on the issues of nuclear energy development and cooperation between the member states and also with other non-Arab states in the region. • Restructure the Arab Atomic Energy Agency (AAEA) and recreate a unit that is specialized in the research and development related to nuclear security and technology to produce a feasibility studies of the establishment of nuclear fuel cycle cooperation between the member states. • Allocate a budget for nuclear energy development research in the League of Arab States. • Serious series of discussions and dialogues between Iran and its Arab neighbors regarding Iran’s agreement with P5+1. Involvement of Iran’s neighbouring countries in the future’s negotiation table. 69 For inter-governmental organizations and NGOs: • Create initiatives on a civil society non-governmental level to be presented to the League of Arab States and open liaison offices in each member state of the regional cooperation to have a direct contact with the AAEA in order for the message to be delivered and then adopted by the governments. • Initiate awareness campaigns about the importance and the need of nuclear energy industry to educate the public and eliminate their fears assuring them that nuclear energy is one option and not the only option for creating long-term prosperity and sustainability to them. 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Interview conducted at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva, Switzerland, December 9, 2015. • Dr. Khaled Toukan, Chairman of Jordan Atomic Energy Commission and Acting Director of SESAME, and the Jordan representative to SESAME Council. Interview conducted at Jordan Atomic Energy Commission, Amman, Jordan, November 22, 2015. • Ambassador Dr. Mohamed Shaker, Chairman of the Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs. Interview conducted at the Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs, Maadi, Egypt, December 3, 2015. • Al-Sharif Nasser Bin Nasser, Managing director for Middle East Scientific Institute for Security. Interview conducted at Royal Scientific Society, the Middle East Scientific Institute for Security, Amman, Jordan, November 32, 2015. Note: All interviews conducted, audiotaped, and transcribed by researcher. All interviewees signed an informed consent and agreed to use and mention their names in the research. 77