April 2008 The Newsletter of

The Newsletter of
Middle East Studies Center, American University in Cairo
April 2008
APRIL, 2008
Page 3
INSIDE THIS ISSUE:
4
FROM THE DIRECTOR
JOEL BEININ
THE UNDERSTUDIED COUNTRIES
5
BY RORY A. MCNAMARA
TWO APPROACHES TO WOMEN IN ISLAM
9
BY DEENA DOUARA
BOOK REVIEW: JUAN COLE, NAPOLEON’S EGYPT
12
BY JANAN DELGADO
MESC LECTURE—ZACHARY LOCKMAN
14
BY MARIAM ALI
MESC STUDENT PROFILE—NATASHA GEORGE
15
BY CATHERINE BAYLIN
16
MESC CALENDAR
Cover : Algiers Mosque Door, 2006
Photo courtesy Louiza Sid
The views expressed here are those
of their authors and not necessarily
those of MESC, the editor, or the
Middle East studies program.
Faculty Advisors: J. Beinin, H. Sayed
Editor
Jack Brown
Asst. Editor
Rory A. McNamara
Asst. Editor
Catherine Baylin
WWW.AUCEGYPT.EDU/ACADEMIC/MESC/
Page 4
FROM THE DIRECTOR
JOEL BEININ
In March the Middle East Studies Center hosted an international workshop on “Islamists
and Democrats.” This event
was organized in collaboration
with the Al-Ahram Center for
Political and Strategic Studies
and had been in preparation
for over a year. We are especially pleased that MESC was
able to reach out successfully
to such a distinguished Egyptian institution and to entice
scholars from Morocco, Turkey, Palestine, Denmark,
France, Egypt, and the USA to
participate. Such collaborations, including the monthly
interdisciplinary seminar on
Middle East Studies, are part
of MESC’s ongoing efforts to
engage intellectually with both
Egyptian national institutions,
the foreign research centers in
Cairo, and the international
intellectual community.
Special thanks are due to Dr.
‘Amr al-Shobaki of the alAhram Center and his assistant Nadine Skander. On behalf of MESC, I am deeply
grateful to Kristen Alff, who
undertook the overwhelming
majority of the logistical work
for the workshop with admirable grace and efficiency, assisted by Catherine Baylin and
Angie Nassar. The MESC staff,
Maha Gabr and Rania Hanna,
also provided critical support.
The workshop focused on
comparing the cases of Turkey, Morocco, and Egypt:
countries where there are
legal or semi-legal Islamist
parties seeking to enter the
electoral arena and to play the
political game by its rules.
They are the Justice and Development Party in both Morocco (PJD) and Turkey (AKP)
and the Muslim Brothers in
Egypt. By framing our inquiry
in an explicitly comparative
way, we hoped to overcome a
narrow focus on political
ideology. We also avoided
asking the rather sterile
question: “Is Islam compatible with democracy?” The
answer to that question, of
course, is, it depends on
what one means by “Islam”
and “democracy.” Both
terms encompass a broad
range of possible meanings
and actual political practices.
One of the reasons for selecting these cases is that they
are the countries where the
international financial institutions - the IMF and World
Bank – have been involved
for the longest period. This
opened the possibility of investigating the impact of the
liberalization of the economy
promoted by these institutions on Islamist politics. The
specific social, economic,
and political contexts in
which these parties arose will
likely be stronger indicators
than abstract ideological
proclamations of the capacity
for democratic political behavior.
In late March MESC hosted
its first Distinguished Visiting
Professor, Dr. Zachary Lockman, Chair and Professor in
the Department of Middle
East and Islamic Studies at
New York University. In addition to his two public lectures, Dr. Lockman co-taught
a class in the MEST 570
course. The same week, Dr.
Timothy Mitchell met informally with MESC students
and discussed both his past
work, which many have read
in both MEST 569 and MEST
570, and his current work on
“Carbon Democracy,” which
examines the role of both
coal and oil in relation to
democracy (thanks to Cath-
erine Baylin for arranging that
coup). On April 15 MESC will
host Dr. Larry Diamond of
Stanford University, who will
be visiting AUC as the Distinguished Visiting Professor in
Sociology.
Last, but most definitely not
least in the array of recent
events, several MESC students who recently completed or are about to complete MA theses presented
their work in the seminar
series organized by the Consortium of Interdisciplinary
Centers at AUC (Anne
Czichos, Deena Douara,
Sahra Gemeinder, Francesca
Ricciardone). Their panel
was entitled “Egypt in the Era
of Neo-Liberalism and NeoAuthoritarianism.” Dr. Lockman kindly served as the
commentator on the presentations. This flurry of eminent visitors and events
within the space of a month
is an indication of the lively
intellectual atmosphere at
MESC this semester.
With all of this good news to
report, we must not forget
that Maha Gabr, the MESC
assistant, has been very ill
recently. A group of students
visited her in the hospital
along with Rania, Miriam,
and myself. We hope Maha
will return to work as soon as
she is fully recovered. In the
meantime, please keep her
in your thoughts.
As we look towards the end
of the year, the more prosaic
aspects of intellectual life will
become prominent: preparing
for comprehensive exams,
completing MA theses, taking
Arabic proficiency exams, and
writing final papers or taking
final exams in courses. Good
luck in all these endeavors.
Students who will not be
graduating should also remember to make an appointment with Rania for advising
in order to register for
classes next fall. Advising
appointments will be held
from April 15 to May 8
(except during the spring
break, which you should not
forget to enjoy).
Joel Beinin
APRIL, 2008
Page 5
THE UNDERSTUDIED COUNTRIES
(OR, AT LEAST SOME OF THEM)
BY RORY A. MCNAMARA
Students of Middle East acknowledged difficulties, of ignorance and disinterstudies – and not just would not only shed est set in motion by their
those in Cairo – will likely needed light on the Penin- professors’ professors
recognize the Egypt and sula, but it would also en- before them ad infinitum.
Levant-centric focus of gage with existing and Students who do persetheir field. In many ways ongoing scholarship con- vere, however, and seek
this makes sense; histori- cerning the region. This out Arabian studies in
cally, Egypt has long been will both challenge and spite of the obstacles are
an important center for bolster intra-regional com- often hard-pressed to find
religious, intellectual, eco- parative and paradigmatic sources, finances, and
nomic, and political activ- scholarship..
mentors to guide them in
ity. The Levant occupies a
graduate studies. There
Perhaps chief among the
similar place on the vanare no AUCs or AUBs in
guard of the
Arabia
region’s
that play
history. Genthe role
erally, scholwhich
arship
on
those
the Middle
e s East
has
teemed
reinforced,
universiif not reities play
fied,
this
in Cairo
paradigm by
and Bein e g le c tin g
rut and
much
of
t h e i r
North Africa
hinterand the Aralands;
bian Penint h e
sula.
The
Ameriinadequate
can Unischolarly
versities
coverage of
in
the
the PeninPeninsula is a
sula are
product of The Arabian Peninsula: Terra Incognito in the field?
primarily
both pedageared
pedagogical deficiencies
gogical and institutional
to science and business
which continue to hold
shortcomings as well as a
rather than the social sciback study of Arabia is the
matter of priorities. Simences. Nor is there a CASA
most self-evident: a lack
ply, Middle East scholars
or its equivalent in the
of scholars with sufficient
have largely opted for
region bridging the gap
knowledge of the region.
study of more prestigious,
between fusha and local
Professors with little to no
trendy, and, frankly, easier
dialects while allowing
background in, or even
subjects of study in the
scholars of the region to
knowledge of, the PeninNile Valley and Greater
remain in their field of
sula generally refrain from
Syria. Infusion of Middle
interest as they perfect
teaching what little they
East studies with a more
their Arabic. (In comparido know, thus keeping in
vigorous study of the Arason, both Egypt and the
motion a virtual treadmill
bian Peninsula, despite its
Levant are represented.)
Scholarship on the
Middle East has
neglected much of
North Africa and the
Arabian Peninsula. The
inadequate scholarly
coverage of the
Peninsula is a product
of both pedagogical
and institutional
shortcomings as well
as a matter of
priorities.
WWW.AUCEGYPT.EDU/ACADEMIC/MESC/
Either reflecting or reifying
(it is not completely clear)
this state of affairs, the
Fulbright Program has
awarded approximately
twice as many fellowships,
relative to current population, for study in Arab
countries outside of Arabia as it has for those
within.1 Add to the paucity
of funding for students of
the Peninsula the fact that
costs of living, excepting in
Yemen, are generally substantially higher there
than elsewhere in the Middle East and it is yet
clearer why few graduate
students undertake research in the region.
To be sure, there are in
fact opportunities for
study of the region. Yet,
more often that not, these
have taken the shape of
‘country studies’ heavy on
economic statistics and
laundry list-like descriptions of political leaders,
factions, and parties satisfying only the most ardent
of
r e a l i s ts .
Sheila
Carapico, a devoted student of Arabia, identifies
this trend within local political factors: “If GCC
states have tolerated, or
even funded, AngloAmerican scholarship, it
has been under the rubric
of ‘Gulf Studies,’ preferably economic and strategic
studies utilizing aggregate
data…proscribed in various ways to inhibit the
production of knowledge
that might lead to questioning of the national
myths or legitimizing narratives of contemporary
governments.”2 Indeed,
the very usage of the term
‘Gulf’ underlies basic Ara-
bian and ‘Western’ obsessions with oil wealth and
the glittery monuments to
capitalism that it underwrites in lieu of genuine
social science endeavors.
In such a bastion of realpolitik and oil, tight control
over visas and research
permission are hallmarks
of the region which foreign
students have often been
hard-pressed to overcome.For example, one of
the most celebrated recent books on the Peninsula was written despite
the fact its author
“dissembled” in order to
get a two-week visa for
subsidized tour – his only
period of research in the
country of his study. 3
Page 6
were unfamiliar. Native
sources are often those of
rival polemicists unconcerned with accurate portrayal and eager to see
their own pet projects
through at the expense of
others.4 Even the elsewhere prolific records left
behind by Ottoman governors are fewer and farther
between in Arabia – likely
due to the more uneven
Ottoman presence in comparison with Egypt and the
Levant.
In other respects, the
field of Middle East studies needs to point the finger of blame not just at
image-conscious nationalists and ‘development’-
The Saudi Enigma
Even once in country with
sufficient funding, obstacles remain. Arabian
sources are often reliant
to an uneasy degree on
British government records, foreign travelogues,
and oil companies’ archives – all accounts of
outside observers with
little to no ability to understand the complexities of
a society of which they
crazy think tank-types but
at itself. Too often study of
the Peninsula has been on
the losing side of the battle for attention with politically popular topics and
trendy academic intrigues.
Though one would hardly
propose curtailing study of
any topic, it is vital that
scholars recognize that
the choices they make to
pursue ‘sexy’ topics such
Opportunities for
study of the
region have
taken the shape
of ‘country
studies’ heavy
on economic
statistics and
laundry list-like
descriptions of
political leaders,
factions, and
parties.
APRIL, 2008
as ‘political Islam’, the
Arab-Israeli conflict, and
other frequently published-about topics correlates to less time and effort spent on other ne-
Page 7
better represented, might
throw some monkey
wrenches into current
paradigms which Middle
East studies currently
holds dear while simulta-
‘development’ through
collaboration. In terms of
boundaries, the oftstressed truism of foreignimposed borders by the
League of Nations mandate
system
rarely lapses in
Middle
East
studies
classrooms enough
for more than
passing
comment about Arabia’s exceptionalism – often
then only accompanied by a condescending (and
patently
false)
statement concerning the lack
of foreign interest in the vast,
Better study of Arabia could problematize accepted ways of studying
desolate wastethe Middle East.
land that is the
glected topics. No doubt neously reinforcing and Peninsula.
thinking about the Arabian deepening others. ImmePeninsula, prolific scholar diately coming to mind,
of Arabia, F. Gregory the subfield of postcoloWith recognition of its
Gause writes: “the field's nial studies would be delayed and less intense
obsession with the Arab- hard-pressed to find conti- contact with the ‘West’
Israeli conflict…sucks up nuity in Arabia where the relative to Egypt and the
so much time and energy only example of settler Levant, and the consethat other issues and colonialism occurred in quences of such in reother countries do not Aden (and also perhaps gards to ‘modernity,’ it is
receive the attention they around oil company work- difficult to place the Penindeserve.”5 Moreover, by sites), and was, even in sula in the prevalent traneglecting serious study of that case, limited to a jectory of modernization
Arabia and yet paying lip neighborhood relatively as posited by field-favorite
service to Wahhabism or segregated from the rest Arabic Thought in the Libthe role of oil companies of the city. Exactly what eral Age, 1798-1939 by
in formation of the Saudi role the absence of a his- Albert Hourani.6 Exactly
state, to take two common torically-viable narrative of where oil-exporting counexamples, the practitio- violation and resultant tries such as Bahrain and
ners of Middle East stud- stigmatization of contact Saudi Arabia, when it was
ies impute to their field a with the ‘West’ might have only in the 1930s that
geographical breadth to had in the field of eco- they signed oil conceswhich they aspire but can- nomic liberalization and sions with foreign companot sustain with current coordination with America nies, or Oman and Yemen
scholarship and pedagogi- and Europe is a topic - hermetically sealed from
which could, nonetheless, foreign influences and
cal patterns.
enrich our understanding technologies until years
of the idiom of nationalism after Hourani’s unilateral
e c o n o m i c termination of the ‘liberal
In fact, Arabia, if it were a n d
age’ of modernity - fit into
The subfield of
postcolonial studies
would be hard-pressed
to find continuity in
Arabia where the only
example of settler
colonialism occurred
in Aden (and also
perhaps around oil
company worksites),
and was, even in that
case, limited to a
neighborhood
relatively segregated
from the rest of the
city.
WWW.AUCEGYPT.EDU/ACADEMIC/MESC/
the Egypt and Levantcentric paradigm is problematic. And yet, despite
this delayed encounter
with ‘modernity,’ the
seemingly ultra-modern
appearance of Arabia’s
most-wealthy
cities
seems, in coexistence with
an apparently persevering
faith in religion, perhaps
better suited today to
bridge the gap between
the Hourani problematic
of faith vs. ‘modernity’
than do examples elsewhere in the Arab Middle
East.
For the modern period,
the Arabian Peninsula is
often excluded from the
outset: accounts of the
history of the Ottoman
Empire. Indeed, aside
from the intersection of
the Ottoman center via
Muhammad ‘Ali’s armies
with dark Arabia in order
to defeat Muhammad ibn
Abd al-Wahhab’s uprising,
little light is shed on the
region until state formation appears in the twentieth century. Nevermind
that the history of the Ottoman Empire in Arabia –
from Ibn abd al-Wahhab’s
time to the ‘Ottoman Vietnam’ in the northern Yemeni mountains – is characterized by frequent resistance to Ottoman suzerainty and direct control (if
not colonialism). Commonly taught histories of
the Middle East eschew
this complexity and often
opt to portray seeming
Arab acquiescence/ indifference to, if not preference for, Ottoman rule.
Without adequate examination of this trend, the
dominant historiography is
predictably keen to impute
the ‘Arab Revolt’ during
World War I to British imperial schemes rather
than to view it as the final
act in a continuing pattern
of Arabian resentment and
rebellion against Istanbul.
Such a paradigm not only
casts in doubt local
agency to act and ‘be political’ without ‘Western’
stimuli, but it also reifies a
current pattern of viewing
the peoples of Egypt,
North Africa, and the Levant – the twinkles in the
nineteenth century colonialist’s eye – as the only
rightly aggrieved Middle
Easterners stewing under
the thumb of foreign domination.
There are no quick fixes
for the shortcomings in
Arabian studies. If the
Peninsula is to be better
incorporated into Middle
East studies, however, the
first order of business is a
renewed dedication to
teaching the region to undergraduate and graduate
level students, no matter
how limited a knowledge
current professors might
have on the subject. This
will at least open the horizon and stimulate curiosity which might break the
present cycle of neglect.
The past few years have
seen important contributions to the study of Arabia, and those scholars
who write and think about
the Middle East in a regional paradigm must en-
Page 8
gage with this emerging
scholarship so as to avoid
troublesome generalizations which have occasionally plagued such scholarship and, in other cases,
to enrich such work with
wider examples and nuance. The relevance of
each and every individual
as a historical subject,
rightly one of the abiding
principles of area studies
and its adjunct, subaltern
studies, dictates that the
history of those in Arabia
is just as worthy of being
told as is anyone’s. So far
Middle East studies continues to fail this test.
——————————
Notes
1.)Through award year 2006.
Peninsula countries which
are eligible for in-country
Fulbright grants (Bahrain,
Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar,
UAE, Yemen) have received
67 scholars for an estimated
current population (CIA World
Factbook) of just under 34
million people: roughly 2
scholars per million citizens,
excluding foreign nationals
and ‘non-resident workers’.
The Peninsula’s second most
populous country, Saudi Arabia does not currently receive
Fulbright scholars and is not
included in the population
estimate or grant total. The
Arab countries outside of
Arabia (Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Syria, and Tunisia)
have entertained 593
scholars for an estimated
current population of
149.5 million citizens:
roughly 4 scholars for million citizens or twice that of
Arabian countries, per capita. Even relative to other
variables such as nation
states, the Peninsula is
underrepresented in relation to other Arab countries
(7:5). Source:
h t t p : / /
us.fulbrightonline.org/
program_regions_countries.php?id=4
2.)Sheila Carapico, “Arabia
Incognita: An Invitation to
Arabian Peninsula Studies,” in Robert Vitalis and
Madawi al-Rasheed (eds.)
Counter-narratives: History,
Contemporary Society, and
Politics in Saudi Arabia and
Yemen,” (New York: Palgrave McMillan, 2004), p.
24.
3.)Robert Vitalis, America’s Kingdom: Mythmaking on the Saudi Oil
Frontier (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
2007), p. xv.
4.)J.E. Peterson, “The Arabian Peninsula in Modern
Times: A Historiographical
Survey, The American Historical Review, Vol. 96, No.
5. (Dec., 1991), pp. 14351449.
5.)F. Gregory Gause III,
“Who Lost Middle Eastern
Studies?” Foreign Affairs,
March/April 2002.
6.)Albert Hourani, Arabic
Thought in the Liberal Age,
1798-1939 (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1962).
APRIL, 2008
Page 9
TWO APPROACHES TO WOMEN IN ISLAM:
INDIVIDUAL VERSUS PUBLIC GOOD
BY DEENA DOUARA
Many visitors to predominantly Muslim countries
come with a lot of curiosity
about women’s issues and
their rights within Islam.
They may make assumptions about the religion
based on women cloaked
in black on hot summer
days, or on customs which
have little to do with religion; or they may get a different perspective from
“secularized” AUC-types.
In actuality, there are myriad interpretations but two
polarizing currents. One
view presents modernist
reinterpretations of Islam,
which assert that Islam is
meant to continue to liberate women as it did upon
its arrival in 7th century
Arabia. Its exponents call
for ijtihad, saying that the
Prophet’s cultural and societal context must be considered when interpreting
the Quran and ahadith
(traditions). The second
approach makes no apologies for strict interpretations of Islam but implicitly
challenges Western definitions and constructs imposed on such practices.
Both challenge common
perceptions of Islam as
oppressive to women, but
where the two approaches
diverge is in their differing
emphases on the individual and the society. While
the former group is most
concerned with protecting
the rights of women as
individuals, the latter group
is most preoccupied with
protecting the society from
impiety.
The Reformist Approach
“Reformist” here will be
used to denote those who
question traditional, literal
readings of Islam. One argument sanctioning reform and
flexibility is the fact that before modern times the
Shari’a was not codified.
Instead, judgments resided
with Muslim judges who
judged each case individually
(producing what is called
fiqh). In fact, later Islamic
laws were often far more
strict and patriarchal than
the Quran calls for. Many
scholars suggest that proper
interpretations of Islam
would be gender-egalitarian.
These thinkers draw a link
between tafsir(exegesis and
explanation), and the people
behind it, who have always
been males acting within a
patriarchal structure or discourse.
Reformists also tend to be
more skeptical of ahadith,
recorded centuries after the
Prophet’s death, which they
say is the greater source of
repressive practices and
beliefs, sometimes contradicting the Quran and the
Prophet’s own dealings with
women. At the same time,
the ahadith which seem to
affirm male superiority are
evoked and recalled far more
than those which affirm egalitarianism and speak very
positively of women.
Muslim reformists argue
furthermore for the need to
consider the particular context into which the Quran was
sent and follow its trajectory.
It is widely recognized, after
all, that Islamic decrees profoundly bettered the situation
of women in 7th c. Arabia,
with its rulings on female
infanticide, restricted polygamy, female inheritance, and
property ownership, for example. Many of these reforms
in fact were not available to
Western women until centuries later.
Still, reforms
would have had to have been
gradual so as to be realistic
for its society.
Whether or not the veil is
religiously commanded is a
divisive issue. The cause for
discrepancy has to do with
the fact that while modesty is
clearly prescribed (for both
sexes), the Quran itself does
not specify the covering of
the head. While most clerics
say that the cloak that was
worn in 7th century Arabia
covered the head, some argue first that the Quran is
never explicit about the need
to cover the hair or head, and
second, that Muslims are not
now obliged to copy the traditional costume of 7th century
Muslim and non-Muslim society. In fact, the tradition can
be traced back to the GrecoRoman, Assyrian, Byzantine,
and pre-Islamic Persian Empires, when veiling and seclusion were restricted to
“respectable women”.
Regarding women’s roles in
society, reformists refer to
the active and public leadership of Muslim women in
early Islam, such as the
Prophet’s wives Khadija and
Aisha, who exercised much
power. Other women were
aides or even participants in
battle. Nikki Keddie says
that “throughout Islamic history many rulers were ruled
by their wives or mothers,
and the same things happened in many private
homes”.1
Nothing in the
Quran restricts the female’s
role to childbearing and
motherhood, though Islam
shows great reverence for
this role. Furthermore, noth-
ing in the Quran suggests
that only males should be
leaders. In fact, the only nonprophetic leader depicted
favorably in the Quran is
Bilqis, commended for her
wisdom and independence.2
Explaining legal restrictions
on women in the Quran, reformists again point to context. Women, for example,
had far less experience in
financial matters, accounting
for why one woman was required to assist another to
‘remind’ her of details during
contractual transactions.
Thus, when women have the
same knowledge and experience as men, they would be
considered full witnesses.
Another divisive issue is
polygamy.
In most preIslamic cultures, males were
rarely expected to be faithful
and polygamy was often legal. In that context then
many Muslims use the specifications on polygamy as
limiting the number of wives
permitted and the conditions
under which multiple marriages may proceed. Again,
reformists take this further,
purporting that Islam made
changes gradually so as to be
compatible with the culture
of the time. They argue that
polygamy made sense at the
time of the Prophet for reasons which are no longer
relevant, including the fact
that warfare left behind many
single women, widows, and
orphans in need of protection
and who could not fend for
themselves. A Quranic verse
regarding polygamy relates it
to female orphans in fact,
rarely mentioned by Islamists
(4:3). Reformists also read
the passages regarding polygamy as nearly making it
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impossible, for who among
men can really treat their
wives perfectly equally and
justly? These readers place
emphasis on the verse “You
are never able to be just and
fair as between women
…” (4:129) which, with all the
verses relating to justice and
marital coupling, prove to
them that monogamy is the
preferred Islamic marriage.
Similarly, reformists assert
that Islam was progressive
regarding women’s rights to
divorce and should continue
to be so. The Quran protected women who had not
previously had protection
against abandonment and
abuse.
Islam also grants
women a unilateral divorce
through the khola divorce.
These are just some of the
ways feminists and reformists call for a reexamination
of Islam which takes into
account the liberating spirit
and language of the Quran
and the patriarchal influences guiding later Islamic
Law, exegesis, tafsir, and
ahadith.
The Islamist Approach
While the first approach
reconciles Islam with the
post-Enlightenment conceptions of rights and
“modernity,” the Islamist
approach instead offers an
alternative paradigm which
its proponents believe is ultimately best for society, and
by proxy, women.
This group finds support for
a patriarchal society based
on readings of the Quran and
ahadith which are commonly
interpreted as giving men a
“degree” above women, empowering men in the domestic and public spheres.
This approach emphasizes
how Islam is conducive to
creating a more pious and
generally better society.
These Muslims constantly
refer to the “greater good” to
explain what they see as
ordainments from the Quran
or ahadith. They speak more
of
“roles”
and
“ r e s p o ns ib i l i t i e s ” t h a n
“rights.”
This approach does not
have to have women’s inferiority at its root, but is based
rather on the idea that
women have a different role
than men. In fact, young
Islamist women are commonly active in universities,
work, and even politics. In
the words of the Iranian Islamic activist Ali Shariati,
Islam offers men and women
their ‘natural rights’ rather
than ‘similar rights’.3
Islamists stress the importance of the woman’s role in
the domestic sphere, responsible first and foremost for
the care-taking of her family
and home. Rather than using
terms like “confined” however, they would use terms
like “responsibility,” where
family and home are no less
important than work outside
the home. Mothers, in fact,
are given a very special place
in scripture and are responsible for raising generations of
healthy, happy, and righteous
Muslims.
On the other hand, high
levels of female employment,
they argue, leads to higher
male unemployment, which
in turn emasculates men and
inhibits marriage. Men are
responsible for providing
basic needs for their families
as well as destitute or ailing
relatives.
In this way,
Islamists argue there is a
division of labor and efforts,
which is considered natural
due to God’s making only
women capable of giving
Page 10
birth. It is universally more
commonly thought that
women are provided with a
more generous, caring and
patient temperament than
men, making them best
suited for child rearing. The
sort of hierarchy that is created at home then mirrors
what exists in every other
sphere of society to maximize
efficiency and harmony.
Many of the same conservatives who believe that women
are primarily wives and mothers still believe they may
participate in public occupations and activities so long as
it is not in close contact with
men. This is where the conservative dress becomes
especially important.
Islamists insist that women
are meant to be veiled and
sometimes even face-veiled,
because proper veiling
makes women’s interaction
in the public sphere acceptable by reducing the chances
of fitna(conflict) by reducing
the sexual attractiveness of
women. The same argument
is made for segregation.
Where extramarital sex is
strictly forbidden, it makes
sense to Islamists to reduce
potential sources of temptation. In this way, one gender’s covering up and mutual
separation helps the other
gender maintain piety, in
turn, making both groups and
society at large more pious
and properly Muslim.
Islamists need only use the
example of how many Western men and women cheat
on their spouses with work
associates to make sense of
such concerns. While separation often reduces
women’s mobility rather than
men’s, the Islamist argument
is not that women need be
repressed but simply that the
two genders should be sepa-
Reformists assert that Islam
was progressive
regarding
women’s rights
to divorce and
should continue
to be so.
WWW.AUCEGYPT.EDU/ACADEMIC/MESC/
The Islamist argument is not
that women
need be repressed but
simply that the
two genders
should be separated from each
other in those
ways which are
feasible.
rated from each other in
those ways which are feasible (even if only through
clothing) such that both parties may be helped in not
giving in to temptation and
sinning. Many women say
that they are liberated by
veiling, which reduces class
differences, sexual harassment, and distractions at
work.
On the issue of polygamy,
some contend that it accounts for the differing sexual natures of men and
women. They further claim it
is a much more suitable and
kinder arrangement than
adultery, abandonment, or
prostitution, all very common
in the West.
Traditional Muslims have
little problem with the inheritance proportions because if
men are fully responsible for
providing for their wives and
families (as the woman will
spend much of her married
life raising children), then
women need not inherit
equally. In fact, women have
the right to be “maintained,”
or provided for, by the other
men in her life if she is not
married. Islamists support
this by highlighting women’s
physiology and by their most
important role at home. Additionally, women are paid a
dowry upon marriage, meaning that her total assets will
exceed that of inheritance
alone.
Conclusion
Reformists and Islamists
are both capable of making
strong arguments for the
“true” vision of Islam. One
approach refers more the
Quran and “spirit” of Islam
while the other refers to all
the Islamic texts and their
literal application. What differs ultimately though is
where their concern lies. For
the feminists and modernists, it is most important that
women’s individual rights are
Page 11
protected.
On the other
hand, Islamists and conservatives focus on the larger
picture. They see logic behind every literal translation
and application of the Quran,
Sunna and ahadith because
such application can be seen
to reduce temptations and
possibilities for transgression
and ease an “Islamic” way of
life. This, while preserving
and protecting what they see
as most naturally masculine
and feminine.
What both camps need to
continue doing is to challenge both outsider and insider assumptions about
Islam. In their different ways,
they question the constructs
imposed by the West. Is it
truly liberating, for example,
for a woman to spend eight
hours a day at work to return
home and spend another
eight hours working? Female
labor continues to be most
often a double-burden on
women everywhere who work
but are still primarily responsible for homemaking and
childrearing. Is work really
so fulfilling even for men, or
is it possible to value domestic roles as much as public
roles such that men wish to
care for the home and children as much as women wish
to work outside the home for
wages?
Are women with anorexia
and breast implants, in constant competition for men’s
attention more liberated than
women who are not dressed
to be the objects of male
viewing pleasure according to
the standards imposed by
media and consumerist culture? Surely being free from
negative obsessions with
body, looks, and clothing is
itself another kind of freedom
where a woman can presumably be judged more
readily by qualities other than
her looks and may allot more
time on more important
things.
The West takes it for
granted that a woman in a
miniskirt working twelve
hours in a prestigious job is
certainly more liberated,
equal, and free than women
who are covered and domestic, despite the fact that their
male equivalents are working
far less overall (when domestic duties are considered)
and are not nearly as damaged by concerns over their
appearances.
Muslims will have to also
question assumptions intrinsic to their own societies.
What makes certain exegesis, tafsir, hadith, and even
Shari’a sacred? According to
Islam, after all, God has said
that the only thing which is
unerring is the Quran, which
calls for humans to think, use
reason, and constantly seek
knowledge.
————————————
Notes
1.)Keddie, Nikki. 2006.
Women in the Middle East:
Past and Present. Princeton
University Press, 211.
2.)Wadud, Amina. 1999.
Quran and Woman: Rereading the Sacred Text from a
Woman’s Perspective. New
York: Oxford University Press,
40.
3.)In Keddie, Nikki. 2006
Women in the Middle East:
Past and Present. Princeton
University Press, 112.
APRIL, 2008
Page 12
BOOK REVIEW
NAPOLEON’S EGYPT: INVADING THE MIDDLE EAST
BY JUAN COLE
REVIEWED BY JANAN DELGADO
`“The genius of liberty,
which has since its birth rendered the Republic the arbiter of Europe, is now headed
toward the most distant
lands”, proclaimed Gen. Napoleon Bonaparte to his soldiers in May 1798 (p. 5). The
destination of Bonaparte’s
enterprise was a mystery to
the soldiers at the
time, one which
remained unsolved
until June 19th, when
a proclamation he
had written was
distributed to the
troops: they were
making their way to
Egypt, the land of
the ancient pharaohs, Alexander the
Great and Augustus.
The enterprise had
an aura of grandeur
and moral loftiness.
Who could be better
qualified to rescue
Egypt from the rule
of Mamluk slave
soldiers than the
Revolutionary army,
under a banner of
liberty, equality, and
fraternity? According to Cole, many
French at home
agreed with the assessment,
expecting that the regime
would be easy to conquer,
and that the mission would
take no longer than five
months (p. 14). The Mamluks
were widely considered ineffective and tyrannical rulers,
and many in France believed
in the appeal of the message
of “liberty” that publicly justified the campaign. In the
optimistic words of Captain
Say of the Republican Army,
“The people of Egypt were
most wretched. How will they
not cherish the liberty that we
are bringing them?” (p.76).
leon’s defeated return to
France in October 1799.
Cole’s book is a is a timely
and valuable work of parts; it
is an engaging historical narrative, but closely framed by
his interpretation in the context of a broader historical
perspective, which some
might call an extended analogy to the present,
that involves the
East and the West,
and
organized
around
complex
issues like invasion,
occupation
and
resistance.
As Cole himself
notes, his is not a
book about the
French
cultural
accomplishments
during their time in
Egypt like the discovery
of
the
Rosetta
stone
(p.245).
Instead,
Cole attempts to
provide a historical
narration that reveals what the invasion meant to the
actors by describing
the
events from
their perspectives.
Juan Cole, Distinguished
University Professor of Middle
Eastern History at the University of Michigan, narrates the
history of this failed occupation of Egypt from the Republican Army’s departure from
Toulon in May 1798, to Napo-
Egyptians, both peasant
and Beduin, revolted against
the French, and their engaging stories carry the reader
through the book, and helps
to create a unifying theme of
agency in the face of occupation. In fact, one of the richest elements in Cole’s narra-
Cole attempts to
provide a historical
narration that reveals what the invasion meant to
the actors by describing the
events from their
perspectives.
APRIL, 2008
tive is the juxtaposition of
popular agency and foreign
occupation. We learn that the
Egyptians were far from submissive vis-à-vis French occupation, yet the work also encourages us to move beyond
the familiar theme of conflict
between occupier and population. Cole invites the reader
to reconsider where agency
lies, highlighting how both
people and place challenged
the dominance of France’s
occupying army. For example, Cole makes it clear that
unexpectedly harsh conditions of the desert and the
many bacterial infections
which reduced French forces
were at various moments
more important than any
decree Napoleon might pronounce. Cole writes in the
epilogue that “European colonialism did not end because
that was when the French
President Charles de Gaulle
wanted” (p. 247), and it is
apparent throughout the
book that understanding the
role of the local population,
climatic conditions, diseases,
and even sexual behavior, is
crucial to understanding the
demise of the French enterprise in Egypt.
Cole engages the French
invasion of Egypt in terms of
a longer historical trajectory
that includes contemporary
international politics, claiming that Napoleon was
“pioneering a form of imperialism that deployed liberal
rhetoric and institutions for
the extraction of resources
and geopolitical advantage” (p. 247). Cole’s choice
of historical event was not
accidental, and the underlying message is clear: “North
Atlantic incursions into the
region tell us about the per-
Page 13
sistent pathologies of Enlightenment republics” (p. 247).
Cole repeatedly emphasizes
the irony of employing rhetoric of liberation for occupation and conquest, of boasting of Enlightenment values
while invading other people’s
lands, and the double standards which prevail when
such contradictory elements
are unified in a single international intervention.
If there is a common pathology of Enlightenment
republics characterized by
the nonchalant deployment
of Enlightenment values and
occupying armies to foreign
lands, Cole’s work suggests
there is also a complimentary
pattern in the behavior of
occupied populations. Without making predictions about
the future, his work engages
the recurrent presence of a
number of elements in the
region, and the roles of individual actors that emerge
during the phenomenon of
occupation. Cole’s discussion
of the role of Pan-Islam in the
conflict, and the occupier’s
lack of grasp of its potential
influence, is a case in point,
and of obvious relevance to
the present-day. On January
1799, French General Daniel
Belliard, upon hearing rumors
of a volunteer mujahedeen
force gathering in support of
Egypt, wrote that this was “no
doubt a rumor that [Murad
Bey] spreads so as to encourage them [population] to
insurrection… it is not at all
credible that troops should
arrive from Mecca. What
interests would they have in
making such a long voyage?”(p240). This undermining persistence of PanIslamism is not the only factor that sounds conspicu-
ously familiar. To this we can
add: the instinct to resist
foreign occupation, whatever
a state’s previous troubles,
and the resilience of local
allegiances despite the
French attempt to ‘deMamlukize’ the Egyptian
elite.
This history of Napoleon’s
Egypt: Invading the Middle
East is engaging, provocative,
and at times bound to be
controversial, particularly
when it comes to the strong
parallels between Cole’s descriptions and the current
American occupation of Iraq.
One wonders about the effect
of reading this particular
historical event so closely
within the context of another
modern occupation, and of
the effect of this on Cole’s
selection of voices and stories. One suspects that
whether this parallel reading
is perceived to detract from
the historical rigor of the
work will depend on the
reader’s political
allegiances, but
there is no denying the power of
the
extended
analogy, and the
usefulness
of
introducing
an
accessibly written
historical counterpoint to the ahistorical
discourse of so much
foreign
policy.
There is a great
deal to learn from
Cole’s work, and
some of the most
compelling
lessons will no doubt
emerge as rueful
acknowledgements grudgingly
conceded in the
coming years.
Cole engages the French
invasion of Egypt in terms
of a longer historical trajectory that includes contemporary international
politics, claiming that Napoleon was “pioneering a
form of imperialism that
deployed liberal rhetoric
and institutions for the
extraction of resources
and geopolitical advantage”
French Imperial ambitions in Egypt did not end
with Napoleon’s departure: Statue of Suez Canal builder de Lesseps
APRIL, 2008
Page 14
MESC LECTURE SERIES
DISTINGUISHED VISITING PROFESSOR ZACHARY LOCKMAN
BY MARIAM ALI
On the 25th and 27th of
March, AUC hosted two lectures by Zachary Lockman,
the Middle East Studies Centre’s Distinguished Visiting
Professor for this year. Dr.
Lockman, who received his
BA from Princeton and PhD
from Harvard, is the chair of
New York University’s Middle
Eastern and Islamic Studies
Department. His most recent
book, Contending Visions of
the Middle East: The History
and Politics of Orientalism,
has recently been published
in Arabic by Dar El Shorouk.
Other works include Comrades and Enemies: Arab and
Jewish Workers in Palestine
1906-1948, and Workers on
the Nile: Nationalism, Communism, Islam and the Egyptian Working Class 18821954, which was co-authored
with MESC director Joel Beinin.
The first lecture, entitled
‘United States Foreign Policy
in the Middle East,’ addressed the “complex nexus
of knowledge and power that
underpins US Middle East
Policy.” Speaking to an overflowing Blue Room, Lockman
questioned the origins of the
Bush administration’s policies:
given
their
“ineffectiveness and stupidity,” and the fact that they
have had negative and even
“deadly repercussions” for
the US as well as the region,
what purpose do these policies serve, and why are they
so powerful?
Lockman pointed to the
‘arrogance of power’ as one
of the factors at play behind
these policies, as well as the
rise of neoconservatives in
the US and their commitment
to global US hegemony in the
post-Cold War world. Contrary
to what the American public
may believe, the US ‘War on
Visiting Professor Zachary Lockman
Terror’ is as much about
demonstrating US military
power as it is about fighting
an abstract concept. Terrorism, he points out, is better
understood as a tactic rather
than an enemy.
Lockman continued that in
the run-up to the Iraq war,
the pundits working to sell it
to the public had the backing
of a certain group of academics, and a certain type of
knowledge production, one
perhaps demonstrative of the
frequent gulf between academic and political legitimacy. Via think tanks, policy
makers could get the plausible intellectual expertise and
backing for their policies that
was not forthcoming from
academia.
Another factor in US involvement in the region is its
‘special relationship’ with
Israel. While Dr. Lockman
acknowledged the role of the
so-called Israel Lobby in its
efforts to maintain this relationship, he was critical of
Mearsheimer and Walt’s The
Israel Lobby and US Foreign
Policy for giving it too much
credit and for manifesting a
“basic flaw” of the realist
approach: the assumption of rationality on the part of
the state. Instead,
Lockman stressed
the need to look
closer at the paradigms that shape
the formation of
foreign policy; even
saying it is a
“responsibility
of
scholars” to study
and critique think
tanks and their
forms and processes of knowledge
production.
The second lecture,
‘Race,
Violence,
and Settler Colonialism in
Palestine,’ also saw a large
turnout despite taking place
on a Thursday evening. Dr.
Lockman began by pointing
out that despite the mainstream controversy over comparisons between South Africa and Israel in the US,
there is no question of controversy from a scholarly
perspective—only one of validity, utility and clarity. Lockman’s own endeavour takes
a labour perspective to the
historical trajectory of modern Palestine and South Africa to highlight differences
as well as similarities of Zionism to other settler colonialist
projects.
The first text analysed by
Lockman to this end is a
1927 document by a leading
official of the labour Zionist
movement, which itself compares the problems faced by
the yishuv to those of white
South Africa, and which admits the necessity of coercive
means to the Zionist endeavour. The second text is a
monograph by Gershon
Shafir entitled Land, Labor,
and the Origins of the IsraeliPalestinian Conflict, 1882-
1914. According to Lockman
this text, while a “powerful alternative” to conventional historiography of Palestine, is
incomplete: it overemphasises
the role of pre-World War One
events in shaping later Israeli
policies, and underplays the
importance of ideology and the
“forms of coercion and violence
which always crucially underpinned the Zionist project.” A
complete analysis would also
have to account for the role of
state power, whether local or
global in the form of ‘Great
Power’ protection and aid.
These factors, in addition to the
nature of Palestinian resistance, all contributed to the
ways in which the Israeli experience intersects with and deviates from that of South Africa.
The controversy in the US
over the above comparison ties
into broader issues of US Middle East policy discussed in the
first lecture, as well as to the
theme of Lockman’s latest
book, Contending Visions. Dr.
Lockman, whose interest in the
region began in the late 60’s,
said in an interview that while
current US academic ‘visions of
the Middle East’ were “in good
shape,” the task of challenging
misconceptions about the Arab
and Muslim world among the
general public was an uphill
battle—but not an impossible
task. Wary of undue optimism,
Lockman commented on the
surge of interest in the Middle
East and Arabic language study
in the US that it was a
“hopeful” sign, yet he remains
hesitant “to predict any dramatic change soon.” He is
more positive, however, as to
the current state of Middle East
Studies in general, noting that
“this is, intellectually, a very
fertile and interesting time.”
Some good news at last.
APRIL, 2008
Page 15
MESC STUDENT PROFILE
NATASHA GEORGE — TULIA, TEXAS, USA
BY CATHERINE BAYLIN
What did you do before starting your studies at AUC?
I bartended and managed
trendy nightclubs and bars in
Seattle. After I finished my
undergraduate degree at 35,
I started working at the University of Washington as a
Program Coordinator. In
2004 I co-founded a political
action committee (PAC)
called No Vote Left Behind
that organized music festivals in Seattle that raised
more than $150,000 for the
Democratic National Party.
stricter. By how much, I
mean how much each individual donor could give
us. Since all of us were political novices, we thought we
could put out talents to best
use as a fundraising PAC that
just funneled cash to candidates and other organizations that we thought were
doing good work. I never
dreamed we would raise as
much as money as we did,
but it was a lot of work!
and donors with deep pockets. There needs to be a
balance there that is not
there just yet.
What sparked your interest in
the Middle East?
My brother was deployed to
Iraq in 2003, 2007, and he is
preparing for another deployment right now.
What do you plan to do after
studying at AUC?
I plan to go to law school and
focus on international energy
law. I would like to see more
fair and equitable energy
agreements made that respect the expertise and infrastructure development that
foreign companies bring but
also respect the national
interests of the host countries.
Why did you decide to come
to Egypt before law school?
Fieldwork in Egypt, using the traditional local conveyance
Were you at all politically
active before starting the
PAC?
No, not at all beyond voting.
What were your specific goals
when you started?
Well, actually we started that
PAC with the sole intent of
getting Bush out of office. After much talk, we
finally decided to organize as
a PAC because we could engage in direct advocacy even
though the restrictions on
how and how much money
we raised was much
In what ways did your experience with the PAC change
your views about politics?
It made me realize how hard
it is for regular people to participate in the political process at the level we did. You
really do need an election law
specialist on your team and I
was the closest we had
(scary!). Also, our system of
campaign finance laws need
to be reformed, yet again, to
reflect the realities that people like me want to participate in more ways than just
voting, but also limit the influence of large corporations
Since I am interested in international energy law, I wanted
to get a first hand experience
of the region before I started
working here or working with
people from here. I wanted
to have an experience that
was not colored by my job.
Where do you hope to be in
ten years?
In a Mercedes. Ok just kidding! I really do not know. I
never dreamed that I would
be here 10 years ago, and at
18 I never dreamed that I
would be working in a trendy
nightclub meeting all kinds of
interesting people that I had
only seen in magazines, so it
is hard for me to say where I
hope to be. I've discovered
that I usually end up doing
something that I could not
have even imagined 10 years
prior.
APRIL
2008
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TUE
WED
THU
FRI
SAT
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10
11
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Larry Diamond:
Squandered
Victory: What
went Wrong in
Iraq, MESC
Conference
Larry Diamond:
“Democratic
Breakdowns” 46 pm 801 ew
Falaki
22
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30
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2
3
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James Zogby:
Stakes Never
Higher: US Policy Debate in
2008 Elections: Ewart
Hall, 5pm
14
21
Spring Break
Begins
28
Coming up
April 28: Spring Break Ends
MIDDLE EAST STUDIES
OFFICE
May 1: Labor Day
5 Youssef El Guindi St. Apt. #4
Phone: (+20-2) 797-5994
E-mail:[email protected]