Overview of the Lincoln Laboratory Ballistic Missile Defense Program

• LEMNIOS AND GROMETSTEIN
Overview of the Lincoln Laboratory Ballistic Missile Defense Program
Overview of the Lincoln
Laboratory Ballistic Missile
Defense Program
William Z. Lemnios and Alan A. Grometstein
■ The technical challenge that resulted in the creation of Lincoln Laboratory
was to combine dispersed radars and computers into a system to defend the
continental United States against attack by fleets of strategic bomber aircraft.
The problem of air defense emerged from the end of World War II as one of the
more serious threats against the security of the United States. Within a decade,
the problem of air defense was transformed into one of providing a defense
against attack by ballistic missiles, a problem that has engaged the Laboratory’s
attention ever since. This issue of the Lincoln Laboratory Journal records the
history of the Laboratory’s engagement in ballistic missile defense (BMD); this
article provides an overview of the Laboratory’s role. Other articles in this issue
treat specific aspects of the Laboratory’s BMD work in more detail.
W
     unprecedented
burgeoning of applied technology in
support of the armed forces of the major
nations at war [1–2]. With few exceptions, previous
wars had been fought throughout with the weapons
and technology available at the onset of hostilities. In
World War I, for example, there are few instances except for the development of military aircraft, in which
significant technological development was made by
any combatant [3].
In World War II, on the other hand, significant
technological innovation pervaded most every aspect
of combat. An outstanding example is radar. Inaccurate, low powered, and unreliable when invented in
the early 1930s, it became sophisticated, high powered, and dependable in the following decade. Associated with radar was the development of aiming and
computing devices that permitted rapid, accurate,
and semiautomatic fire control. Allied superiority in
the field of radar played an important role in determining the outcome of the war.
During the war, two civilian laboratories operated
by MIT evolved as centers of expertise in military applications of radar and its associated technology.
From the Radiation Laboratory, or RadLab, and the
Servomechanisms Laboratory, or ServoLab, came
prototypes of the components and complete radar
systems that would later appear in production quantities in the war effort [2].
By 1945, radar technology had progressed from
crude bench-model demonstration apparatus to versatile systems that operated reliably on land, air, and
sea. When the war ended, however, the RadLab was
perceived as having served its purpose and was consequently closed [4]. In the same spirit, activities at the
ServoLab were curtailed. In light of political developments in eastern Europe after the war, closure of the
RadLab was seen post facto as a loss of a national
technological asset. Concern mounted that the momentum of pursuing improvements in radars had
been lost, just as it became clear that the ability to defend the continental United States against attack by
strategic bombers in all likelihood had to depend on
radars.
VOLUME 13, NUMBER 1, 2002
LINCOLN LABORATORY JOURNAL
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• LEMNIOS AND GROMETSTEIN
Overview of the Lincoln Laboratory Ballistic Missile Defense Program
From the end of World War II in 1945 to the early
1950s, the greatest effort by far in strategic defense of
the United States was concentrated on continental air
defense. U.S. intelligence agencies at that time concluded that the USSR possessed long-range bomber
aircraft and had, in September 1949, exploded an
atomic weapon. Concerns about this threat led to the
genesis of Lincoln Laboratory in 1951; the
Laboratory’s mission was initially air defense. It is not
the purpose of this paper to describe in detail the several studies and subsequent recommendations that
eventually led to the formation of Lincoln Laboratory. That story, as well as details of the Laboratory’s
early years, is ably recorded in Reference 1. We briefly
summarize the Laboratory’s efforts in air defense in
the early 1950s, since these formed a prelude to later
Laboratory work in ballistic missile defense (BMD).
Readers interested in more details in these efforts are
directed to References 1 and 5; the latter reference
provides unique insights into this work by an engineer directly involved.
the functions of surveillance, tracking, and interceptor direction in real time, with a minimum of manual
interventions. Whether radar, communications, and
computer technologies could enable such an integration effort was settled by a demonstration in September 1950, when a radar at Hanscom Air Force Base in
Bedford, Massachusetts, tracked an aircraft and transmitted the resulting analog signals, converted to digital signals, over telephone lines to the Whirlwind I
computer at MIT in Cambridge, Massachusetts [6].
Three months later, the success of this demonstration
influenced Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Air Force Chief
of Staff, to write James R. Killian, Jr., President of
MIT, proposing the establishment of a laboratory
dedicated to air defense.
Concerns About Air Defense
Early air defense systems, such as the radar defenses
mounted in England against bombing attacks by the
Luftwaffe, were critically dependent upon calculations and decisions made by humans at several points
in the system. Trained operators performed interpretation of radar data, establishment of tracks on both
bombers and interceptors, and issuance of engagement vectors to interceptor pilots. The development
of digital computers—in particular, their increase in
speed and versatility—made it feasible to conceive of
integrating computers within a radar-human system
to render a faster and more accurate response.
The concept of integrated air defense emerged
from a committee organized by the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board (AFSAB) in December 1949,
which became known as the Air Defense Systems Engineering Committee (ADSEC). The committee, operating under the chairmanship of George E. Valley,
Jr., of MIT, shown in Figure 1, concluded that air defense of the continental United States against the Soviet strategic-bomber threat could only be accomplished by integrating data from numerous radars
into a single powerful computer, and by carrying out
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LINCOLN LABORATORY JOURNAL
VOLUME 13, NUMBER 1, 2002
FIGURE 1. George E. Valley, Jr. (1913–1999), chairman of the
Air Defense Systems Engineering Committee. Valley spent
World War II at the MIT Radiation Laboratory, where he developed the H2X radar bombsight. After the war, he joined
the physics faculty at MIT, where he studied the integration
of radars and computers in extended defense systems. He
was associate director of Lincoln Laboratory from 1949 to
1957 and Chief Scientist of the Air Force from 1957 to 1958.
• LEMNIOS AND GROMETSTEIN
Overview of the Lincoln Laboratory Ballistic Missile Defense Program
LINCOLN LABORATORY AS AN FFRDC
  Research and
Development Centers (FFRDC)
are institutions that work in the
public interest and receive the
bulk of their funding from agencies of the federal government.
There are currently thirty-six
FFRDCs sponsored by the Department of Defense, Department of Energy, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Department of Health
and Human Services, National
Science Foundation, Nuclear
Regulatory Agency, Department
of Transportation, and Department of the Treasury.
The first of these institutions
was established in the early 1940s
as federal research centers. Subse-
quent centers came to be known
informally as Federal Contract
Research Centers (FCRC), although the name Federally Chartered Research Centers was also
used. The use of Department of
Defense FCRCs grew out of
semiacademic laboratories and
research groups created by the
federal government for defense
research during World War II.
They are now called FFRDCs.
By law, FFRDCs are used only
to meet special research or development needs that cannot be met
as effectively by existing federal
government or contractor resources. The FFRDCs have a
special long-term partnership relation with their sponsors, em-
MIT immediately convened a group of scientists
to study and evaluate this proposal. The group,
named Project Charles (after the river in Boston),
studied the proposal from February to August 1951,
then issued a report that became the basis of the eventual air-defense system. The report favored development of an integrated, automated defense system but
required that before work begin on the full-scale continental air defense system, a scaled-down version be
constructed, tested, and evaluated. The scaled-down
effort became known as the Cape Cod System.
Because Project Charles had been an ad hoc study,
MIT decided to pursue further efforts in air defense
on an ongoing basis, and therefore established Project
Lincoln—eventually Lincoln Laboratory—in July
1951 [7]. This decision by MIT was supported by
the Air Force when in February 1952 Secretary of the
Air Force Thomas K. Finletter promised substantial
phasizing independence and
commitment, and they provide a
body of technical expertise that
cannot be sustained within the
Civil Service. The FFRDCs are
not-for-profit activities and operate under restrictions that prohibit the sale of products and
competition with for-profit
industry.
The Department of Defense
FFRDCs are viewed as being in
three categories, with different
functions: (1) studies and analysis centers; (2) laboratories; and
(3) system engineering and technical direction centers. Lincoln
Laboratory falls in the second of
these categories.
funding to the university for the laboratory. Initially,
Lincoln Laboratory was referred to as a federal research center, then as a Federal Contract Research
Center, and is now officially a Federally Funded Research and Development Center (FFRDC) (see the
sidebar entitled “Lincoln Laboratory as an FFRDC”).
The new laboratory was unabashedly an offspring
of the RadLab. The administrative structure of Lincoln Laboratory mirrored that of the RadLab—a
Director’s Office overseeing about ten divisions, each
specialized in one field of technology, with the divisions subdivided into groups of five to twenty technical staff. The first director of Lincoln Laboratory was
F. Wheeler Loomis, a former associate director of the
RadLab. The personnel categories (staff, associate
staff, assistant staff ) duplicated those of the RadLab,
which itself had taken these categories from the academic world of MIT.
VOLUME 13, NUMBER 1, 2002
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• LEMNIOS AND GROMETSTEIN
Overview of the Lincoln Laboratory Ballistic Missile Defense Program
FIGURE 2. The Barta Building on Massachusetts Avenue,
Cambridge, home of the Whirlwind I computer.
Work on the Cape Cod System began immediately
with the establishment of Project Lincoln. In January
1953, Project Lincoln issued a substantial design
document that detailed how the Cape Cod System
would operate to defend southern New England from
air attack. Signals from three long-range (AN/FPS-3)
radars, eleven gap-filler radars, and three height-finding radars would be converted from analog to digital
format and transmitted over telephone lines to the
Barta Building (shown in Figure 2) in Cambridge,
Massachusetts, which housed the Whirlwind I computer (shown in Figure 3). That computer would establish and maintain tracks on aircraft, perform an
identification process, and issue instructions to en-
able interceptor aircraft to intercept the nonfriendly
aircraft. The digitized radar and track information
would be displayed on interactive consoles monitored
by Air Force personnel, who relayed the directional
commands to the interceptors. (Later in the development of the Cape Cod System, such commands were
relayed directly to autopilots in the interceptors.) The
initial version of the Cape Cod System became operational in September 1953, some two-and-a-half years
after its inception, and underwent testing and evaluation over the next four years.
Initial tests of the Cape Cod System used only
simulated data, but later tests employed bombers supplied by the U.S. Air Force, with real interceptors
closing on them. During these tests, flights of B-47s
made simulated attacks against points in eastern New
England, and the Cape Cod System attempted intercepts, utilizing interceptor aircraft scrambled from
four Air Force bases. The results were promising
enough to confirm the soundness of the air defense
concept envisioned by Project Charles. The decision
was made, therefore, to implement the full air defense
system, which was called the Semi-Automatic
Ground Environment (SAGE) Air Defense System. It
was begun by Lincoln Laboratory and was later engineered and developed by the MITRE Corporation.
(MITRE is a separate corporate entity that was
FIGURE 3. The Whirlwind I computer console room in 1950. Seated at left:
Stephen Dodd, Jr. Standing: Jay Forrester, left, and Robert Everett, right.
Seated at the right: Ramona Ferenz.
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VOLUME 13, NUMBER 1, 2002
• LEMNIOS AND GROMETSTEIN
Overview of the Lincoln Laboratory Ballistic Missile Defense Program
formed in July 1958 and staffed with a cadre of personnel from Lincoln Laboratory with experience on
the Cape Cod System.)
Lincoln Laboratory’s work on air defense provided
valuable training for its later work in BMD. The
Cape Cod System was the first large-scale military
system controlled in real time by a digital computer.
The experience gained in such areas as track initiation
and maintenance, weapon assignment and intercept
prediction, battle management, and data fusion (to
list just a few fields of development), served as a basis
for much of the BMD work undertaken later by the
Laboratory.
Concerns about Ballistic Missile Defense
The closing year of World War II in Europe witnessed
introduction of the first generation of cruise missiles
and ballistic missiles as weapons of terror and intimidation. Germany launched its first cruise missile
(V-1) against England in June 1944. Three months
later, Germany began launching ballistic missiles
(Aggregat 4, or V-2). From the first firing until Allied
forces captured the launch sites in Belgium and the
Netherlands on the Channel coast in March 1945,
some 21,000 V-1s and 4300 V-2s were launched.
These relatively short-range missiles (~300 km), carrying payloads of 850 to 1,000 kg of high explosives,
could not be precisely aimed but were used to terrorize civilian targets in large cities [8]. The British
Home Defense Command found that protection
against the slow V-1 was feasible with the normal defenses used against manned aircraft; indeed, many V1s were shot down by interceptor aircraft and antiaircraft guns. However, no defense was possible against
the much faster V-2, and only the capture of the
launch sites in March 1945 stopped the destruction
these missiles caused.
Military planners after the war realized the crucial
role that ballistic missiles could play in future conflicts, and efforts began in several countries (primarily
the United States and the USSR) to increase the range
and payload of these weapons and to improve their
targeting accuracy. With the emergence of nuclear fission bombs in 1945 and of nuclear fusion bombs in
1949, the ultimate weapon envisioned was a ballistic
missile capable of traveling intercontinental distances
while carrying a nuclear warhead—the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). By the early 1950s, development efforts of such a weapon were well underway, and by the latter half of the decade, ICBMs
began to enter the U.S. strategic force structure. On
26 August 1957, the USSR announced a successful
ICBM test, which was followed on 4 October 1957
by the launch of Sputnik I, the first man-made satellite [9]. In response to these events, the United States
began developing the Nike-Zeus system to defend cities against ICBMs in the 1950s. (The first successful
live intercept occurred in July 1962.) This early BMD
system was basically an improvement on existing air
defense elements, such as Nike-Ajax and Nike-Hercules, which were emplaced earlier to guard against
strategic bombers.
Although there are similarities between air defense
and BMD in the use of radars and interceptors controlled in real time by large computers, there are also
significant differences. A key difference is the speeds
of the oncoming threat objects. An ICBM travels at
20,000 to 25,000 kph, depending on type and mission; a strategic bomber travels at speeds of 1000 to
2500 kph, depending on type and mission. The
higher speeds of ICBMs compress the battlespace,
which is the interval—measured either in range or
duration—between the defense’s first and last opportunities to take effective action against an approaching threat object. To compensate for the compressed
battlespace, the defense must detect ballistic missiles
at longer ranges, which requires more powerful radars, and must automate such critical functions as
weapon allocation and fire control.
Another key difference between air defense and
BMD is the more prominent role of countermeasures
in BMD. In 1958, Lincoln Laboratory, which had
transferred responsibility for SAGE to MITRE, was
asked by the Advanced Research Project Agency
(ARPA) of the Department of Defense (DoD) to begin related research efforts in BMD. Ballistic missiles
can and often do embody a variety of tactical devices
intended to confuse the defense and facilitate the
warhead’s penetration of the defense. Among these
devices are chaff and electronic countermeasures,
both of which act to create radar clutter or noise. In
addition, decoys of various shapes and compositions,
VOLUME 13, NUMBER 1, 2002
LINCOLN LABORATORY JOURNAL
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• LEMNIOS AND GROMETSTEIN
Overview of the Lincoln Laboratory Ballistic Missile Defense Program
which are intended to mimic the signatures and metric characteristics of the warheads, may accompany
the missiles. The process of tracking bodies in the
presence of clutter and then discriminating (that is,
identifying and selecting) the warhead from all other
objects is one of the most difficult and most important technical problem faced by BMD system designers. It was in this area that ARPA asked the Laboratory to initiate research, an area that we discuss in
greater depth in subsequent sections of this article.
Historical Overview of
U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense
Before proceeding with a description of Lincoln
Laboratory’s work in BMD, it is instructive to give an
historical overview of the national effort in BMD.
Figure 4 summarizes the U.S. effort in BMD over the
years. Figure 5 is a more detailed two-page timeline
showing Lincoln Laboratory’s contributions to ballistic missile defense programs.
The task of developing BMD systems was initially
the responsibility of the U.S. Army and of ARPA.
The Army (with Bell Laboratories as the system contractor) was responsible for building and testing
BMD system components, and eventually deploying
them in the vicinity of major U.S. population centers.
ARPA was responsible for concentrating on major
technical problems, whose solutions were to be integrated into the deployed BMD systems.
In 1957, little technology was available to address
the problems of BMD. Narrow-bandwidth dish radars operating in the VHF, UHF, and L-band frequencies had been built for air defense; however, a
means to intercept the warhead of a fast incoming
ICBM did not exist. Computers built for air defense
had only begun to address the problem of distinguishing enemy aircraft from natural clutter and
noise. The Nike-Zeus system employed separate dish
radars for surveillance, target tracking, and interceptor guidance. It suffered from two major deficiencies:
a limited traffic-handling capability and an inability
to discriminate warheads from decoys and other objects at high altitudes [1]. (For successful defense of
cities, discrimination must be performed at high altitudes.)
In the 1960s, a new Army system called Nike-X
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LINCOLN LABORATORY JOURNAL
VOLUME 13, NUMBER 1, 2002
was developed specifically for BMD. Nike-X, as well
as its later versions, Sentinel and Safeguard, were designed primarily for city defense. These systems were
also envisioned at various times to be used for area
defense and hard-site silo defense. Nike-X used two
electronically scanned phased-array radars for its operations, and two types of interceptors: a long-range
interceptor able to destroy warheads at long distances,
and a high-acceleration short-range interceptor that
allowed the system to wait until the atmosphere had
effectively filtered out all objects except the warhead.
Both interceptors were tipped with nuclear warheads
that could destroy all objects within their lethal radius. The Nike-X phased-array radars, which could
redirect their beams in microseconds instead of seconds, significantly increased traffic handling.
The offense missile systems were initially simple in
design, few in number, and lacking any sophisticated
penetration aids (penaids) to create false intercept
points. Thus discrimination could be performed with
some success by using only narrowband radar cross
sections and little in the way of computer resources.
But as the number of Soviet ICBMs grew and the sophistication of putative countermeasures increased,
no U.S. technology solution appeared capable of defending cities against a massive attack by ICBMs.
There was also considerable concern about the collateral effects of multiple nuclear weapons detonating
during an engagement. Consequently, a doctrine of
counterstrike, or mutual assured destruction (MAD),
was adopted in lieu of city defense. By 1970, the
United States began to deploy ICBMs within buried
silos for protection. At about the same time, contracts
were awarded for construction of Safeguard anti-ballistic missile sites in Montana and North Dakota. In
1972, the United States signed the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) defense treaty with the Soviet Union,
which allowed only one site for each country, and all
Safeguard construction activities were suspended in
Montana. The treaty limited the scope of any ABM
deployment, so that not all cities in the United States
could be defended. In October 1975, shortly after
Safeguard achieved an initial operating capability, the
U.S. Congress decided to deactivate the system.
Attention then turned to defending U.S. ICBMs
against a preemptive Soviet missile strike. Defending
• LEMNIOS AND GROMETSTEIN
Overview of the Lincoln Laboratory Ballistic Missile Defense Program
50s
60s
70s
80s
Light
Area
Defense
Major BMD
Mission
City Defense
Defense of MM/MX
Nike Zeus
Proposed
U.S. BMD
Systems
Site Defense
Sentinel
Heavy
Area
Defense
Light
Area
Defense
National
Defense
Theater
Defense
00s
SDI
Safeguard
Nike-X
90s
Phase 1
Sentry
GPALS
TMD/NMD
BMDS
FIGURE 4. Timeline of the U.S. national effort in ballistic missile defense (BMD). During an approximately forty-five-year period, the U.S. objectives in ballistic missile defense have undergone several changes. The objectives were influenced by the nature of the threat and by the state of the required technology. The above figure lists the BMD missions and the systems proposed to meet the missions. For a more detailed timeline showing Lincoln Laboratory’s contributions to ballistic missile
defense programs, see Figure 5.
silos rather than cities became the goal, and a new system called Site Defense was designed. (Although no
components of this system were ever deployed, a prototype Site Defense radar was built on Kwajalein
Atoll in the Marshall Islands in the late 1970s.) Defending hardened silos allows intercepts deep within
the atmosphere, thus providing more time to detect
an incoming threat and to discriminate the warheads.
Upon reentry into the atmosphere, launch hardware,
debris, and light exoatmospheric decoys slow down
and fall away from the faster-traveling warhead and
can be discriminated from it. Heavy endoatmospheric decoys that do not slow down until deeper
into atmospheric reentry can be discriminated later.
Further, as atmospheric scientists had long known by
studying the radar trails of meteors, the plasma bow
shock and ionized wake of reentering bodies could be
detected by radars and used to characterize them.
Such characterization requires wideband (several
hundred MHz) phased-array radars that could resolve
small sections of the ionized wakes. Development of
these radars began at the Laboratory in the late 1960s.
On 23 March 1983, President Reagan announced
the beginning of the Strategic Defense Initiative
(SDI). The President asked “Would it not be better to
save lives than to avenge them?” suggesting that international stability could be achieved better through
BMD than MAD. To accomplish this formidable
task, he directed the beginning of a long-term research and development effort. Large amounts of
funding were provided to reinvigorate the missile defense effort and a new organization, the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO), was formed to
manage and direct the programs. Renewed attention
was given to discrimination, with emphasis on spacebased sensors and directed-energy weapons. Now
missiles were to be discriminated during boost phase,
while separating from their booster, and during their
entire midcourse flight as well as in reentry. These
long timelines allow radars to image objects and to
measure their motion with great precision. For resolved targets, space-based infrared (IR) telescopes
could measure thermal properties. At about the same
time, the United States adopted a doctrine not to use
nuclear-tipped interceptors. This doctrine significantly reduced an interceptor’s lethal radius, and required precision guidance of the non-nuclear interceptors.
FIGURE 5. (overleaf) Events and achievements of Lincoln
Laboratory’s program in BMD. The chart is a time-ordered
listing of major Laboratory contributions to BMD. Also
shown are major events that influenced the focus of U.S.
BMD.
VOLUME 13, NUMBER 1, 2002
LINCOLN LABORATORY JOURNAL
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• LEMNIOS AND GROMETSTEIN
Overview of the Lincoln Laboratory Ballistic Missile Defense Program
1955
1960
Project PRESS
Reentry Physics
Program
Lincoln Laboratory
Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)
and BMD-Related Programs
1965
1975
Kiernan Reentry
Measurements Site
(KREMS) Dedicated
(Kwajalein)
Penetration Aids
Program
Millstone Hill Radar
Operational (UHF)
1970
Millstone Hill Radar
Modified
Army BMD Program
Kwajalein Missile
Range (KMR)
Sentinel Studies
Radar Study
(High Frequency,
Wide Band)
Single Silo Hardpoint
Defense
TRADEX Radar
Operational (Kwajalein)
Waveguide Ferrite
Phase Shifter
ALCOR Radar
Operational (Kwajalein)
AMRAD Radar
Operational (WSMR)
Frequency-Stable CO2
Laser
ALTAIR Radar
Operational (Kwajalein)
Radar Test Bed Array
(LL)
Firepond Laser Radar
Operational
TRADEX Radar
Modified-L, S-Band
System Studies
Phased Array Studies
Arbuckle Neck S-Band
Tracker Operational
(Wallops Island)
Microwave and Laser
Radars
Laser Atmospheric
Propagation
Interactions
Intercept-X Studies
Space Object
Surveillance Study
500J Electron-Beam
Excited CO2 Laser
Schmidt Cameras
(Wallops Island)
Long Wavelength IR
Detectors
Tracking Spectrometer
(Wallops Island)
InSb Photodiodes
Army Optical StationSOLITAIRE, GBM
(Kwajalein)
PRESS Ground Optics
(Kwajalein)
Visible and Infrared
Sensors
PRESS Airborne
Optics
Air Force KC-135, Navy
A-3D
(Kwajalein)
Trailblazer Tests
(Wallops Island)
Reentry Simulation
Range (LL)
REDD System
(Kwajalein)
SIMPAR Modification
for ALTAIR
Have Jeep Tests
(Kwajalein)
Laboratory Experiments
and Field Tests
First Thermal Blooming
Experiments
Data Analysis
and Modeling
Near-Wake
Phenomenology
Measured
Clean-Air Wake
Chemistry Modeled
Reentry
Phenomenology
First Successful U.S.
ICBM Flight
Bulk Filtering
Precursor Plasma
Modeled
Project Lunar See
(Measurements
on the Moon)
Structure and Statistics SKYLAB Radar Images
of Turbulent Wake
Measurements
First Successful Live
Intercept by Nike Zeus
Nike-X System
First Successful USSR
ICBM Flight
Adoption of MutuallyAssured Destruction
(MAD) Doctrine
Sputnik (USSR)
Sentinel System
National
BMD Program Events
Strategic Arms
Limitation Treaty
(SALT)
Safeguard System
Deployed at
Grand Forks, ND
Explorer I (US)
Formation of MITRE
Corporation
1955
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1960
1965
1970
1975
• LEMNIOS AND GROMETSTEIN
Overview of the Lincoln Laboratory Ballistic Missile Defense Program
1975
1980
1985
1995
2000
Standard Missile
Program
Navy BMD Program
Optical Discrimination
Technology (ODT)
Program
Optical Aircraft
Measurements
Program (OAMP)
Haystack Long Range
Imaging Radar (LRIR)
Operational
1990
Termination of ODT
Program
Project Hercules
National Missile
Defense
Kinetic Boost Phase
Intercept Program
Haystack Auxiliary
Radar (HAX)
Operational
Strategic Defense
Concept Study
Interactive
Discrimination
MDS-3 Study
LWIR Exoatmospheric
Discrimination
Radar Discrimination
Study
Optical Discrimination
Study
MATTR Study
MMW Radar
Operational (Kwajalein)
LRPA Installed
(Firepond)
ALTAIR 24/7
SPACETRACK
Operational
LITE Laser Radar
Operational (Kwajalein)
SAW Processor at
ALCOR
Navy TMD
IR Seeker Band
Selection Study
Sensor Fusion Study
National Missile
Defense (NMD)
Discrimination
Technology Roadmap
Sea-Based Terminal
Study
GaAs Ka-band
Transmit/Receive
Module
Thermal Blooming
Correction of MIRCL
Laser (SABLE)
KMAR Radars
Operational
Tunable Solid-State
Laser Developed
Wideband Laser Radar
(Firepond)
32 32 Geiger Mode
Avalanche Photodiode
Angle-Angle-Range
Laser Radar
Lightweight Steering
Mirror Fabricated
Semiconductor, Diodepumped, Q-Switched
Nd:YAG Transmitter
(Firepond)
Mid-Course Sensor
Study
Pilot Architecture Study
Design Studies for
Cobra Judy
Pan Pacific Range
Roadmap
Navy Radar Roadmap
Theater Defense
Netting Study
Non-nuclear
Interceptor
2002
Ultraviolet and Visible
Angle-Angle-Range
Laser Radar Developed
Cobra eye Sensor in
“Hot Storage”
Cobra Eye Sensor
Operational
(Shemya AFB, AK)
Schottky-Barrier PtSl
Detectors
Compact LADAR
Range
Kwajalein
Modernization and
Remoting (KMAR)
MMW BeamWaveguide System
Optical Beam-Steering
System Developed
Avalanche
Photodiodes
Cobra Judy II Support
THAAD Radar
Conversion to TPS-X
Cobra Gemini
Operational
Micro-lens Focal Plane
Array
Captive Carry
(IR Seeker)
Fly-Along Sensor
Package (FASP) Flown on
TCMP-2A
Termination of
Cobra Eye
Sea Lite Beam Director
(SLBD) (WSMR)
Seeker Experimental
System (LL)
Space-Based Visible
Sensor (MSX)
Sky Noise
Measurements
NASA Lear Jet
(CA, AK, Panama)
Discrimination
Performance
(k-factors)
Atmospheric
Compensation
Experiments-CLASP,
TRAPAF, OCULAR (FL)
Firefly Tests
(Wallops Island)
Kwajalein Discrimination
System (KDS)
Firebird Tests
(Wallops Island)
Real-Time
2-D Radar Imaging
TCMP-1 Tests
(Kwajalein)
Red Crow Test (Hawaii)
Coherent Polarization
Techniques
Bandwidth
Interpolation
Atmospheric
Transmission
Measurements
NASA Lear Jet
Have Sled Tests
(Alaska)
Atmospheric
Compensation
Experiments-ACE,
SWAT (HI)
Phase-Derived Range
Applied to Target
Dynamics
Cobra Dane Radar
Operational
“Strategic Defense”
Speech by Pres.Reagan
Safeguard System
Deactivated
Defensive Technologies
Study
Site Defense
Formation of SDIO
Measurements-Based
Target Modeling
Multi-Aspect Imaging
Space-Based IR
Calibration
THAAD Analysis
Workstation
National Missile
Defense (NMD)
BMDO Reorganized to
MDA
Persian Gulf War
First Successful NMD
Intercepts
Integrated BMD
System (BMDS)
Theater Missile
Defense (TMD)
First Successful TMD
Intercepts
Navy Theater Wide
System Terminated
Global Protection
Against Limited Strikes
(GPALS)
Cobra Judy Radar
Operational
Dissolution of USSR
START I Treaty
Homing Overlay
Experiment (HOE) ICBM
Hit-to-Kill
1980
Ballistic Missile
Defense System
Testbed
TCMP-2 Tests
(Kwajalein)
Atmospheric
Compensation
ExperimentsLACE, SABLE,
Firepond (CA, MA)
3-Band IR
Discrimination
Technique
1975
TCMP-3 Tests
(Kwajalein)
Simulation of ABL
Propagation Effects
(Firepond)
Lexington Discrimination
System (LDS)
1985
SDIO to BMDO
1990
1995
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• LEMNIOS AND GROMETSTEIN
Overview of the Lincoln Laboratory Ballistic Missile Defense Program
By 1992, the USSR had collapsed, USSR and U.S.
strategic missile arsenals were reduced under Strategic
Arms Reduction Treaties (START 1 and START 2),
and theater missile proliferations were underway. The
Scud missile, a derivative of the World War II German V-2s, which had been further developed by the
Soviets, had become the only ballistic missile used extensively after World War II. Scud was used during
the Middle East War of 1973, later in large numbers
during the War of the Cities between Iran and Iraq,
and extensively during the Persian Gulf War in 1991.
As a result, the BMD effort in the United States was
redirected to deal with more limited threats against
the territory of our nation and our allies and against
deployed troops involved in theater engagements.
The SDIO was renamed the BMD Organization
(BMDO). The discrimination problem, although not
fully solved, became more tractable. The ICBM
threat was more limited in numbers, and technology
had surged ahead during the SDI years. Short-range
missiles used in theater engagements generally do not
carry light decoys. But challenges in theater defense
remain. Short timelines and the need to defend simultaneously against air-breathing threats (cruise
missiles) makes theater missile defense difficult even
against short-range missiles.
In January 2002, the BMDO was redesignated the
Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and given the task of
developing a single integrated Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS).
Current BMD technology provides powerful highfrequency wideband phased-array radars, infrared
(IR) seekers, light non-nuclear hit-to-kill interceptors, and fast computers. A tool kit of discrimination
algorithms, under development since the 1960s, now
exists. The challenge for discrimination is to design
an architecture of discrimination algorithms that is
sufficiently flexible and resilient to deal with evolving
threats and countermeasures. With the advent of hitto-kill interceptors, end-game discrimination is also
needed. Discrimination information from a groundbased radar and from space-based IR sensors must be
handed over to the interceptor seeker in a form it can
interpret and fuse with its own discrimination data.
The interceptor seeker must aim at a specific hit point
on the missile in order to destroy it, and the ground18
LINCOLN LABORATORY JOURNAL
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based radar and space-based IR sensors must assess
the effectiveness of the intercept. Because there are
still no absolute methods for ensuring good discrimination against all threats, the collection and analysis
of performance data during combat to identify discrimination modifications quickly is also needed.
Early Laboratory Work in Ballistic
Missile Defense (1958–1972)
The ARPA program in BMD technology was centered in Project Defender and was focused on one of
the most challenging problems in BMD, namely, discriminating warheads from decoys and deployment
hardware. ARPA turned to Lincoln Laboratory and
began sponsoring work in discrimination in July
1958, an effort that has continued to the present, although under different sponsors [9]. The BMD program at the Laboratory grew to include development
of radar and IR sensors capable of making flight-test
measurements, which led to the formulation of discrimination algorithms, the planning and execution
of flight tests, the development of sensor technologies
appropriate for BMD systems, and the design, analysis, and performance evaluation of candidate BMD
systems. The following section summarizes key research areas in BMD during this period.
Phenomenology and Discrimination
The ability to discriminate a warhead from accompanying decoys or deployment hardware depends on
how closely the signatures of these objects match that
of the warhead and how well the observing sensors
can detect the dissimilarities. In the early period,
when the sensors had relatively crude performance
(e.g., poor resolution), discrimination was difficult. It
was especially difficult at high altitudes, where atmospheric interactions with the incoming objects are
nonexistent. At lower altitudes, where atmospheric
interactions exist, discrimination becomes less difficult for two reasons. First, many objects (especially
the deployment hardware and the more poorly designed decoys) are slowed by the atmosphere with respect to the warhead and thus are naturally filtered
out. Second, objects reentering the atmosphere create
a plasma bow shock and a wake of ionized gas that is
detectable by a radar. The magnitude of these returns
• LEMNIOS AND GROMETSTEIN
Overview of the Lincoln Laboratory Ballistic Missile Defense Program
is related to the energy of the incoming object and
hence to its mass, thus providing a basis for discrimination.
Several field-test programs were initiated to make
phenomenology measurements relating to the effects
described above, and then to develop discrimination
techniques and algorithms. The programs and sensors
used for these measurements are described below.
Measurements at Arbuckle Neck,
Wallops Island, Virginia
The initial set of field measurements (from March
1959 to July 1962) was made in a joint program with
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA), during which launches from Wallops Island,
Virginia, of the NASA Trailblazer I vehicle were observed. Fourteen launches occurred during this fortymonth period. By using a total of six stages, three of
which fired during descent, the Trailblazer I was able
to boost 2-lb payloads to ICBM velocities. Later
(1962 to 1965), the Trailblazer II had a payload capability of 35 lb. Three radars were built by Lincoln
Laboratory and installed at Arbuckle Neck for these
tests. The first radar, an S-band tracker with a 60-ft
dish, successfully tracked the first Trailblazer launch
in December 1959. The second radar, also with a 60ft dish, had duplex UHF and X-band systems that
were slaved to the S-band tracker to form the first integrated multiwavelength data-gathering systems for
missile observations. The third radar of the trio was
the Space Range Radar, or SPANDAR (built for
NASA), another S-band system with a superior
mount designed expressly for tracking satellite and
rocket vehicles at long ranges. Observations of the
small Trailblazer payloads by the three radars led to
increased understanding of the wake properties of reentering vehicles; however, the understanding was
limited because of the poor resolution of the radars
and the small size of the payloads.
Reentry Simulation Range
To supplement the phenomenology measurements at
Wallops Island, the Laboratory constructed a Reentry
Simulation Range (RSR) in 1960. The range included a powder gun that fired half-inch projectiles
with a speed of 9.2 kft/sec, and a light-gas gun that
fired 0.186-in projectiles with a speed of 20 kft/sec
[9]. Optical and microwave sensors and schlieren
cameras were used to make measurements. The RSR,
which operated until 1970, provided insight on the
reentry effects associated with an object entering the
atmosphere at high speed.
White Sands Missile Range
Other tests were conducted at the White Sands Missile Range (WSMR) in New Mexico. The tests used
the ARPA Measurements Radar (AMRAD), an Lband 60-ft dish radar built for Lincoln by Raytheon,
to observe the reentry (at WSMR) of Athena missiles
launched from Green River, Utah, and accelerated
during their late flight. AMRAD used burst waveforms to achieve the high Doppler ambiguities
needed for measuring velocities of ionized gases in the
wake.
Project PRESS
The largest program supported by ARPA to investigate discrimination was Project Pacific Range Electromagnetic Signature Studies (PRESS), which began in
mid-1958, with Lincoln Laboratory as its technical
director. Central to PRESS was the construction of
several large instrumentation radars to make measurements during field tests for developing and validating
discrimination algorithms. Under ARPA sponsorship, three such radars were constructed (described
below). Also constructed under PRESS were airborne
passive optical sensors carried in a KC-135, and numerous ground-based optical sensors interconnected
through and controlled by an IBM 7094 computer.
TRADEX. The Target Resolution and Discrimination Experiment (TRADEX) radar was a derivative of
the UHF surveillance and tracking radar that RCA
had built for the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System, but with an added L-band tracker and datagathering capability. When in February 1959 the
Army decided to locate its Nike-Zeus anti-ballistic
missile system at Kwajalein (where it could operate
against targets launched from Johnson Island in the
Pacific Ocean or from Vandenberg Air Force Base in
California), it became evident that TRADEX should
be located at the same atoll. A site on the island of
Roi-Namur at the northern end of Kwajalein Atoll
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• LEMNIOS AND GROMETSTEIN
Overview of the Lincoln Laboratory Ballistic Missile Defense Program
was selected, and construction of TRADEX began in
1961. (The site is now called the Kiernan Reentry
Measurements Site [KREMS] in honor of Lt. Col.
Joseph Kiernan, U.S. Army, who played an important
role in the site selection process and who was later
killed in action in Vietnam.) On 26 June 1962,
TRADEX successfully tracked the first Atlas ICBM
launched to Kwajalein, which led to its acceptance by
ARPA and subsequent transfer to Lincoln Laboratory
on 1 December 1962. Since then, TRADEX has
gathered valuable data on the discrimination of missile warheads.
ALTAIR. In the early 1960s, the United States discovered that the Soviet Union was developing very
large VHF and UHF phased-array radars (dubbed
Doghouse and Henhouse) for ballistic missile detection and defense. Understanding how U.S. missiles
would fare against these radars required testing them
against radars of similar frequency and capability.
Hence the second PRESS radar was initiated: the
ARPA Long Range Tracking and Instrumentation
Radar (ALTAIR). Sylvania Corporation won the contract to build ALTAIR, which was specified to be a
high-sensitivity VHF tracker, incorporating a UHF
transmitter/receiver to provide data with superior
sensitivity and range resolution than that available
from TRADEX. ALTAIR’s antenna is unusual for its
size and agility: it is a 150-ft dish capable of accelerations of 2∞/sec2 and angular rates of 10∞/sec. The rotating components of the antenna weigh 800 klb.
Since becoming operational in May 1970, ALTAIR
has supplied much valuable data that has contributed
greatly to the development of discrimination techniques.
ALCOR. In this same period, Lincoln Laboratory
engineers began to examine the use of wideband
waveforms for discrimination of warheads from decoys on the basis of their physical dimensions [10].
While it is possible in a test range to employ lowpower short pulses to measure the length of a static
target, it is not possible to pack enough energy in a
short pulse to make similar measurements at ranges of
several hundred kilometers, as would be required by a
BMD radar. Nor was it known how the plasma
sheath that forms around a body in reentry would affect such measurements. The Laboratory used pulse20
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compression techniques to modulate the frequency of
long radar pulses over a wide frequency band and
then upon reception to compress the return signal, effectively integrating the received energy into a very
short pulse [10]. In response to a Laboratory proposal
dated 17 June 1965, ARPA authorized the Laboratory to build the ARPA/Lincoln C-band Observables
Radar (ALCOR) at Kwajalein. Lincoln Laboratory
was the prime contractor, and utilized subcontractors
such as Hughes, Honeywell, Westinghouse, and
RCA. ALCOR became operational in January 1970.
Passive Optical Sensors. The major passive optical
sensors for PRESS were those carried aboard the Air
Force KC-135 aircraft. The initial instrument (called
Skyscraper) was an IR tracker/spectrometer developed by the Geophysics Research Directorate of the
Air Force Cambridge Research Laboratory. This instrument was soon augmented with seven others.
Data gathering on missile flights to Kwajalein commenced in 1964. During the course of the next few
years several of these instruments were replaced. The
Skyscraper was replaced by a new tracker/spectrometer called the Airborne InfraRed Telescope (AIRT).
Operations continued until 1972 when the use of the
KC-135 was ended.
For a brief period (1964 to 1966) some passive optical instruments were also carried aboard a Navy
A3D aircraft. There were also ground-based instruments, including ballistic cameras, a spectrograph,
and a Recording Optical Tracking Instrument
(ROTI) located at various islands of the Kwajalein
Atoll.
Phased Arrays
It was recognized early on that the traffic-handling
capacity of the early BMD radar sensors was limited
by the mechanical movement of their dishes. A much
faster and more agile way of controlling the propagating direction of a radar beam was by using a set of
fixed radiating elements, the relative phases of which
were controlled to form a beam in a chosen direction.
Such electronic movement of the beam could be accomplished in microseconds, in contrast to the mechanical slewing of a dish, in which response times are
measured in seconds.
In the late 1950s Laboratory staff began an intense
• LEMNIOS AND GROMETSTEIN
Overview of the Lincoln Laboratory Ballistic Missile Defense Program
program in phased-array technology. Array theory
was investigated, beamforming and beam-scanning
schemes were analyzed, and several test arrays were
built [11]. Collaborations with a wide range of industrial and government development programs were
established. In later years the Laboratory made important contributions to phase shifters, solid state
transmit/receive modules, gallium-arsenide monolithic microwave integrated circuits, and array calibration and testing [11].
The following example describes Lincoln Laboratory’s work in phased shifters. For a phased-array radar to perform beam steering, it is essential that the
phases of each contributing radiating element be precisely controlled, because the accuracy of the phases
determines the shape and quality of the resulting
beam. In the 1960s and early 1970s, Lincoln Laboratory developed latching ferrite phase shifters, which
have since become standard configurations for industry. These devices produce phase shifts of a microwave
signal through interaction with a magnetized ferrite.
Lincoln also researched and developed suitable ferrite
material, because the materials available at the time
were expensive and incapable of maintaining a controlled magnetic state over a range of ambient temperatures and stresses. Appropriate low-cost ferrite
materials with superior operating characteristics were
developed at the Laboratory in the early 1970s.
Countermeasures
In 1962, under Air Force sponsorship, the Laboratory
began work on the design, development, testing, and
evaluation of countermeasures. The objective of the
program (named Advanced Ballistic Missile Reentry
Systems, or ABRES) was to examine the effectiveness
of various U.S. countermeasures against postulated
Soviet BMD systems. Work of this nature continues
at the Laboratory, but this article does not go into details. We note that during this period several countermeasure devices were fabricated and tested at Lincoln
Laboratory. Among them were the first inflatable replica decoys and compact radar jammers.
Operational Strategic Missiles
The Laboratory has also been involved since the late
1960s in examining the effectiveness of Air Force and
Navy strategic missiles. To that end, measurements of
operational ICBMs impacting in the vicinity of
Kwajalein Atoll were analyzed. Studies at different
levels of complexity have contributed to the determination of the effectiveness of these missiles for different offense-defense scenarios. As with the case of the
ABRES program, we do not treat this topic further in
this article.
It is worth remarking, however, that the Laboratory’s BMD expertise coupled with its involvement in
the ABRES program and strategic-missile effectiveness work enables the Laboratory to view both sides
of a complex offense-defense interaction, in which
the offense develops and tests countermeasures and
the defense develops systems to counter them.
Key Developments of the Early Years
During the early period from 1958 to 1972, the performance of BMD radars improved significantly.
Phased arrays were developed to improve traffic handling. Pulse-compression waveforms, with improved
range resolution, were demonstrated. A library of coherent radar waveforms was built to measure the ionized wake of objects in reentry. By the end of the period, an extensive database of high-quality radar
signature data had been assembled on the plasma bow
shock and wake of warhead-like targets. This information was used for developing discriminants for defense systems designed during the subsequent middle
period, from 1972 to 1983.
The Middle Period (1972–1983)
In 1972, the United States and the Soviet Union
signed the ABM Treaty, which limited the deployment of BMD systems to 100 interceptors located at
a single site. However, the treaty allowed continued
research and development in BMD. In the United
States, that research focused on systems to defend
Minuteman (MM) and Peacekeeper (MX) missiles in
their silos or in a different basing mode. Experts felt
that low-leakage defense of a city against a massive
Soviet first strike was not possible, and that only the
threat of massive retaliation would deter such an attack. That retaliation depended on the survival of
some fraction (roughly, one-third, in some estimates)
of our MM and MX missile force. The putative straVOLUME 13, NUMBER 1, 2002
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• LEMNIOS AND GROMETSTEIN
Overview of the Lincoln Laboratory Ballistic Missile Defense Program
tegic balance achieved by assuring the survival of this
fraction was called mutual assured destruction
(MAD).
The first BMD systems defined in this period,
Sentinel and Safeguard, were based on components
originally developed for urban defense. The radars for
these systems were expensive, and both the radars and
the urban targets were vulnerable to nuclear attacks.
The MM and MX silos, on the other hand, were
much harder than cities, allowing the intercepts to be
conducted at much lower altitudes and the radars to
operate at shorter ranges, and thus be less vulnerable
to nuclear attacks and penaids. The silo-defense systems envisioned were named Site Defense and later
Sentry, neither of which was deployed.
During this period, Lincoln Laboratory’s research
efforts expanded to include a number of areas, which
are described below.
Discrimination
The discrimination requirements for dedicated silo
defense systems differed significantly from those for
urban defense considered in the early period of
BMD. Since the Site Defense and Sentry radars operated at relatively short ranges and had to be hardened
against nuclear effects, the defense battlespace shifted
to lower altitudes than for Nike X, Sentinel, or Safeguard. Against a massive attack with sophisticated
warheads and penaids, the defense would rely on the
atmosphere to filter out much of the missile debris
and light decoys, leaving only the warheads and heavy
reentry decoys to be discriminated.
Early in the development cycle, measurements of
booster-tank breakup in reentry indicated that large
numbers of fast booster-tank fragments must be anticipated in the Site Defense radar battlespace. It was
recognized that some technique of bulk filtering was
needed to discriminate these fragments. Special burst
waveforms were proposed to separate warheads and
decoys from the slightly slower fragments located at
the same range. Once warheads and decoys were detected among the fragment set, it was necessary to
discriminate them. New discriminants were proposed, based on very fine range resolution, such as an
estimate of target length or wake-velocity measurements at low altitudes.
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Radar Development
New burst or pulse-pair waveforms were developed
and installed on the radars at Kwajalein to measure
the aerodynamic structure of the wake. New discriminants based on fine range resolution were achieved
with the wideband waveforms of ALCOR. Concurrently, considerable work was done on the development of signal processors and signal processing techniques to bulk-filter the many fragments in the
vicinity of the warhead with the use of minimal radar
resources.
Radar Modifications at Kwajalein
The new waveforms and signal processing techniques
resulted in, and depended upon, several modifications of the Kwajalein radars, exemplifying three major themes: (1) modification of radars with wideband
waveforms, (2) software development of discrimination algorithms, including their real-time testing, and
(3) development of a millimeter wave (MMW) radar
to obtain data for interceptor seekers. These modifications are discussed below.
ALCOR. Simple tracking radars can collect metric
data (that is, determine the location and trajectory of
a target) but can do little in the way of processing signature data (for example, determine target size or
shape). Interest in wideband measurements resulted
from the need to reject small decoys that might be
otherwise credible targets (that is, they might have
credible slowdown and present warhead-like radar
cross section [RCS] levels to a narrowband radar).
Initial work on wideband radars focused on the hardware required to generate and process high-resolution
waveforms [10]. Initial tests of ALCOR in the 1970s
showed that length measurements were feasible and
could provide important discrimination information
against penaids such as small decoys. Later in this period, Laboratory staff developed and installed surface
acoustic wave (SAW) devices for pulse compression.
TRADEX. In the late 1970s, TRADEX was shut
down for a major redesign. The UHF capability was
removed. A new feed and additional channels were
added to make it an L-band tracker, and an S-band
radar was added, which complemented a phased-array Site Defense radar built at Kwajalein. The phased
• LEMNIOS AND GROMETSTEIN
Overview of the Lincoln Laboratory Ballistic Missile Defense Program
array could make measurements over a very large
threat cloud, but it lacked the sensitivity and measurement precision of TRADEX. Thus these two radars were combined to gather a database of measurements for developing discrimination algorithms.
Real-Time Testing of Discrimination Algorithms. By
the late 1960s, considerable data had been collected
by the TRADEX radar, on the basis of which several
discrimination algorithms had been developed. The
conventional manner of developing a discrimination
algorithm was to analyze a large set of field data, then
to postulate an algorithm that could be tested at leisure on other collected data. This process was time
consuming and depended on the insights of individual scientists. Furthermore, this approach did not
disclose the practical difficulties that would arise
when the algorithm was implemented in a realistic
environment in the field. One of the pioneering efforts of the Laboratory was to develop techniques for
converting a candidate algorithm to a detailed software program that would accept radar data at realtime rates and output a decision, or sequence of decisions, concerning the nature of the target. Integration
of such an algorithm into an overall logic (or schema)
that realistically simulates the conditions of a radar in
the field is an essential step in selecting algorithms
that will work not only in the laboratory but also in
practice.
In 1969, after ARPA had relinquished its role in
BMD to the Army, the Army Ballistic Missile Defense Agency (ABMDA) requested the Laboratory install a real-time discrimination schema on the Kwajalein radars, to be used as a model for such systems as
Safeguard and Site Defense. The implementation,
which was termed the Reentry Designation and Discrimination System (REDD), became operational in
1972.
TRADEX was the first radar incorporated into
REDD, which was based on a CDC 6600 computer.
An identical computer with identical software was installed at Lexington, where algorithms were developed and tested on recorded radar data. The promising algorithms were then demonstrated in real time
on actual missile flights into Kwajalein. In this manner, a number of tracking and wake discriminants
were fully tested.
Shortly after its initial operational date, ALCOR
was incorporated into REDD for real-time testing of
various length-measurement algorithms for the Site
Defense system. Although ALCOR operates at Cband and Site Defense at S-band, the algorithms developed on ALCOR data worked well when they were
implemented on the Site Defense radar. A number of
bulk filtering algorithms were developed and partially
tested by using TRADEX data modified so as to resemble data collected by a phased-array radar.
ALTAIR. Initially, ALTAIR tracked at VHF and
passively collected data at UHF. Because the Perimeter Acquisition Radar (PAR) of the Safeguard system
operated at UHF, however, this part of ALTAIR was
modified to represent the PAR. Actual PAR algorithms were tested during Safeguard flights and became a major element of the REDD system. (After
the termination of the Safeguard system, the PAR was
transferred to the Air Force to be used for surveillance
and threat warning.) The Simulation of PAR
(SIMPAR) involved running the PAR real-time program on the CDC 6600 at Kwajalein, modifying the
ALTAIR feed to permit monopulse tracking at UHF,
and adding new waveforms to simulate narrowband
PAR waveforms. The new feed included a frequencyselective subreflector almost 7 m in diameter. The
modified radar operated well; the PAR software produced good results, and the modifications were invaluable for future ALTAIR operations.
Millimeter-Wave Radar. Late in the 1970s, interest
arose in using MMW seekers for homing interceptors, such as the Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC3), and in using MMW radars for airborne or space
applications to detect and discriminate targets at
higher altitudes. In general, millimeter waves are attractive when the antenna size is limited by platform
constraints. Lincoln Laboratory proposed to the
Army that a MMW radar be constructed at Kwajalein
to make measurements relevant to these interests.
With Army approval, the radar was constructed; it
achieved operational status in the early 1980s. The
MMW radar has a 14-m dish and operates at 35 and
94 GHz. Interpolation between its lower frequency
and ALCOR (at 5 GHz) provides a good approximation to what a current defense radar at X-band (10
GHz) might measure.
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• LEMNIOS AND GROMETSTEIN
Overview of the Lincoln Laboratory Ballistic Missile Defense Program
(Nd:YAG) laser operating at a wavelength of 1.064
mm. LITE began operations at Kwajalein in 1977.
Flight Tests
The Laboratory also conducted several flight tests
(Have Jeep, Have Sled) with sounding rockets during
this period to collect data for discrimination algorithm development. For a detailed account of these
tests, see the article by Kent R. Edwards and Wade M.
Kornegay, entitled “Measurements, Phenomenology,
and Discrimination.”
Infrared Sensors
In the late 1970s, there was increasing interest in the
use of passive IR sensors for discrimination. Calculations suggested that the temperature of thermally
uninsulated black and gray bodies would depend on
their mass. Therefore, multicolor IR sensors might be
useful in exoatmospheric discrimination. A detailed
study carried out by the Laboratory resulted in the
design, development, and construction of the Cobra
Eye aircraft described in the final section of this article, and in an accompanying article in this issue by
Bartley L. Cardon, Donald E. Lencioni, and William
W. Camp, entitled “The Optical Aircraft Measurements Program and Cobra Eye. “
Army Optical Station
With the focus of the U.S. BMD effort shifting to the
defense of hard targets, measurements made during
missile reentry became important. Because the airborne optics program was terminated in 1972, there
was a need for expanded ground-based optics. The
Laboratory proposed the creation of an Army Optical
Station (AOS) at Roi-Namur Island in the Kwajalein
Atoll. The AOS consisted of two passive IR sensor
and a laser radar.
The passive IR sensors (SAMSO/Lincoln Tracking
and Acquisition Infrared Experiment [SOLITAIRE]
and Ground Based Measurement [GBM]) were originally located at White Sands Missile Range and were
both originally developed and operated for measurements there. Each was extensively reworked (SOLITAIRE by the Laboratory and GBM by General Electric) and installed in the AOS. Operations began in
1973 for SOLITAIRE and in 1976 for GBM. The
Laser Infrared Tracking Experiment (LITE) was a
neodymium-doped yttrium aluminum garnet
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BMD Analyses and Studies
As Soviet ICBM force levels and circular error probabilities (CEPs) improved (primarily, through the use
of multiple independently targeted reentry-vehicle
[MIRV] technology, which increased the numbers of
independently targeted warheads per missile, and
through the use of bussing, which improved their impact accuracy), it was expected that improved BMD
would be required to maintain survivability of the deterrent force. Several national studies were conducted
during this period to investigate and evaluate the performance of BMD systems proposed for the defense
of MM and MX. Lincoln Laboratory staff played major roles in these studies.
Foreign Missile Data Collection and Interpretation
In the 1970s, radars began collecting foreign-missile
data, which was subsequently interpreted. The primary collection radars were the Cobra Dane radar
and the radars of the Cobra Judy ship [10]. Lincoln
Laboratory was consulted in the design of these radars
(both built by Raytheon Corporation), and played a
role in reduction and analysis of the data. The information gained was of great use in the design of BMD
systems. The Laboratory later developed the Cobra
Gemini shipboard collection system to gather intelligence on shorter-range missiles.
Thermal-Blooming Experiments
The transmission of a laser beam through the earth’s
atmosphere broadens the beam and degrades its coherence, a phenomenon known as thermal blooming.
The general technique for correcting this effect is to
measure the gradient of the phase error of the
wavefront from a known source and use that information to reconfigure the surface of a deformable mirror.
In the 1960s the Laboratory began the development
of the hardware and conducted measurement programs to verify this technique. These efforts extended
well into future eras.
Key Developments of the Middle Period
The period from 1972 to 1983 saw impressive ad-
• LEMNIOS AND GROMETSTEIN
Overview of the Lincoln Laboratory Ballistic Missile Defense Program
vances in the use of radars for BMD discrimination.
Phased array radars were deployed, among them the
Missile Site Radar and Site Defense radars at
Kwajalein, and the PAR in North Dakota. The first
wideband radar (ALCOR) sited at Kwajalein made
important measurements on ICBMs. Many discrimination algorithms were developed, some of them
based on wideband measurements that achieved high
resolution. Schemas were designed, implemented at
Kwajalein, and tested in real time. These advances
were preludes to the needs of BMD during the subsequent periods from 1983 to the present. As a result of
these efforts, a large body of knowledge on the performance of radars for BMD discrimination existed at
the beginning of the SDI era in 1983.
The SDI Era (1983–1993)
The SDI era of ballistic missile defense began as a result of President Reagan’s speech to the nation on 23
March 1983. In this speech, the President questioned
whether the strategic doctrine of mutual assured destruction could produce lasting stability. He argued
that effective ballistic missile defense would allow
“free people to live secure in the knowledge that their
security did not rest on the threat of instant U.S. retaliation to defer a Soviet attack.”
Following his speech, the President ordered that
two studies be conducted. The first of these was directed to examine the feasibility and technology required to conduct effective defense against massive
ICBM attacks. The second was to examine strategic
and arms-control policy implications. Both studies
were conducted in the summer and early fall of 1983.
The technology study, called the Defensive Technologies Study (DTS), was headed by James Fletcher,
a former NASA director, and involved approximately
forty experts in BMD systems and in BMD technology. Several Lincoln Laboratory staff members served
on this study and contributed to the DTS conclusions and recommendations.
The DTS resulted in two major recommendations.
1. A multilayer defense should be used to achieve
low leakage. For example, a three-layer defense,
each layer independent of the others and with a
leakage of 10% per layer, could achieve an overall leakage of 0.1%. Figure 6 shows a generic
sketch of an ICBM trajectory with possible layers and associated timelines.
2. To complicate the design and use of countermeasures, several different types of sensors (microwave radars, lasers, passive IR sensors)
should be employed for detection, tracking, and
Midcourse
10–15 min
Deployment
0–5 min
Terminal
2–3 min
Boost
3–5 min
FIGURE 6. Ballistic missile timeline for a nominal intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) flight. The trajectory is divided into
four phases: boost, deployment, midcourse, and terminal. Under the Defensive Technologies Study (DTS) multilayer defense
plan, sensors would detect, track, and discriminate, and interceptors would attack during each of the four phases.
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discrimination. In addition, a variety of interceptors (e.g., kinetic energy interceptors, lasers,
neutral particle beams) should be used to maximize the probability of warhead kill.
Not all the technologies required for implementing a multilayered BMD were available. In some cases
there were competing technologies and the DTS
could not select the one most likely to succeed. However, the DTS concluded that “powerful new technologies are becoming available that justify a major
technological development effort offering future
technological options to implement a defensive strategy.” The DTS then recommended a long-term research and development effort that would select the
most promising technologies, which in turn would be
the basis for future BMD architectures.
To implement the research and development program recommended by the DTS, the SDIO was established in January 1984 with Lt. Gen. James
Abrahamson of the Air Force as the director. Lincoln
Laboratory’s efforts during this period are summarized below.
Technology Studies
The SDIO moved quickly and vigorously to initiate
research programs in all the areas the DTS recommended. This was accomplished by conducting detailed studies in specific areas to investigate particular
technologies in detail. The Laboratory was the lead
organization for these investigations, directing four
crucial studies in the 1980s that were instrumental in
guiding SDIO research in BMD sensors. These studies were:
1. The Optical Discrimination Study (1984) examined the capabilities of passive IR sensors to
discriminate countermeasures from warheads
and made recommendations on IR sensor development.
2. The Radar Discrimination Study (1985) examined the capabilities of microwave radars to discriminate countermeasures from warheads and
made recommendation on microwave radar development.
3. The Interactive Discrimination Study (1986)
investigated the performance of interactive discrimination (disturbing ICBM components
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and measuring the effects of the disturbance),
and described the sensors required for this type
of discrimination.
4. The Midcourse Sensors Study (1988) did a
cost-effective analysis of space-based IR sensors
that detected, tracked and discriminated ICBM
elements.
Research Development Highlights
As these studies progressed, SDIO was quick to begin
research developments along the recommended lines.
The Laboratory had significant involvement in the
following research efforts.
Exoatmospheric Discrimination. The exoatmosphere is the most difficult phase for successful discrimination. Here there is no atmosphere to slow
down or to impart particular signatures to decoys.
Reliance must be placed on “birth-to-death” tracking
schemes, on small motion differences, and on thermal
signatures measured by IR sensors. The Laboratory
conducted research in all these areas, focusing on the
capabilities and limits of optical discrimination including analyzing data gathered by passive IR sensors
and lasers on flight tests at Wallops Island, Virginia.
Development of Optical Sensors. Following the recommendations of the Optical Discrimination Study,
an extensive program was carried out to develop passive IR sensors and lasers for discrimination. Of great
interest was the development of several laser “phased
array” techniques that allowed many bodies to be
tracked near simultaneously. Discrimination algorithms based on passive IR and laser-radar data were
developed, and several field tests were conducted.
Constructing and Operating Optical Measurement
Sensors. The Laboratory constructed optical measurement sensors to make the measurements necessary for
developing optical discrimination. The AOS assembled at Kwajalein consisted of two passive IR sensors and a doubled-frequency Nd:YAG laser.
A large-scale (60 cm diameter) IR telescope was
designed, built, and installed on a modified KC-135
aircraft. The Cobra Eye IR sensor was used for the
collection of both foreign and domestic missile tests.
Modifications to the Kwajalein Radars. The Kwajalein radars were modified with waveforms and signal
processors that simulated radars that eventually
• LEMNIOS AND GROMETSTEIN
Overview of the Lincoln Laboratory Ballistic Missile Defense Program
Capability
Advanced directed energy
Weapons and support technologies
Directed energy systems
Active discrimination sensors
Phase III
Phase II
Kinetic energy interceptors,
radars and passive sensors
Phase I
Development and
deployment decision
Time
FIGURE 7. The architecture plan toward “thoroughly reli-
able” defenses. The plan envisions a BMD system of increasing capability. Initially the system elements are radars,
infrared sensors, and kinetic energy interceptors. Laser directed-energy interceptors and advanced discrimination
sensors are added.
would be used as BMD operational radars. Of greater
importance, the Kwajalein radars were netted together, thus allowing for improved operation and a
more effective simulation of netting the operational
BMD radars.
Lexington and Kwajalein Discrimination Systems.
Large-scale simulations were constructed to allow the
testing of individual discrimination algorithms and of
combinations of discrimination algorithms. There
were duplicate systems, one at Lexington and one at
Kwajalein.
Other Technology Efforts. Several other technology
efforts important to BMD were pursued. These included development of monolithic 35-GHz transceivers, electro-optic switches, and analog-to-digital
converters.
Architectural Studies
There were two major architectural studies in the
1980s with extensive Laboratory involvement:
Pilot Architecture Study. In the fall of 1984, SDIO
sponsored the Pilot Architecture Study (PAS). The
members of this study were drawn from various Federally Funded Research and Development Centers
(FFRDCs), the government, and the military. The
PAS defined a baseline multi-tier defense-system architecture to counter a massive ICBM attack from the
Soviet Union. The PAS concluded that rocket-basedtechnology weapons could be developed more
quickly than directed-energy systems. Consequently,
the concept of an evolutionary architecture was
adopted by the SDIO. Figure 7 shows a notional
chart depicting the planned evolution of BMD [13].
Mid- and Terminal-Tier Review. A comprehensive
review (in which Lincoln Laboratory staff members
took a leading role) of the expected capabilities and
cost of the Phase I system was concluded in the summer and fall of 1990. Called the Mid- and TerminalTier Review (MATTR), the study concluded that
small space-based interceptors as well as space-based
sensors would be needed to augment ground-based
interceptors and radars to counter a massive (over
3000 warheads) attack on the United States.
Key Developments of the SDI Era
Toward the end of the SDI Era, two major events occurred that changed the direction of BMD efforts.
The first was the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991. The second was the theater ballistic
missile attacks launched by Iraq upon U.S. and allied
forces as well as upon Israel during Desert Storm, the
Gulf War in 1990 [13]. The main threat changed
from a massive ICBM attack upon the U.S. mainland
from the Soviet Union to a limited attack from any of
several countries [14] and to a theater attack upon
U.S. and allied expeditionary forces. The shift in direction was made explicit by the Missile Defense Act
passed by Congress in 1991. The act directed the Pentagon to develop and deploy theater BMD systems,
which included participation by the Army, Air Force,
and Navy. It also directed the Pentagon to pursue the
development of an ABM-treaty-compliant national
missile defense (NMD). In 1994, the NMD Program
was redirected to a technology-readiness program
[13].
The SDI Era was characterized by the following:
1. Technologies required for NMD were explored
and selected, and development was initiated.
2. Architectural evolutions of an NMD system to
counter a large scale attack upon the United
States were defined.
3. The threat was shifted from that of a massive attack upon the United States from the Soviet
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Overview of the Lincoln Laboratory Ballistic Missile Defense Program
Union to a limited attack initiated by any of
several countries on the United States and allied
expeditionary forces.
4. The NMD effort was redirected to a technology-readiness program.
5. A major effort involving all military services was
begun to develop and deploy TMD systems.
Table 1. Theater Missile Defense Systems
Army
Theater Missile Defense
Because ballistic missile attacks upon expeditionary
forces can occur in a variety of geographic locations,
no one armed service can develop a TMD system that
is effective for all situations. Both land-based and seabased systems are required. Thus both the Army and
the Navy became involved in TMD. Both services began development of systems that would operate at
low altitudes (endoatmospheric) as well as at high altitudes (exoatmospheric). The systems, shown in
Table 1, are designed to protect expeditionary forces
against attacks by ballistic missiles. The Laboratory’s
work in TMD was and continues to be critical to the
success of the program. Key areas of the Laboratory’s
involvement are listed below.
Discrimination. The wide variety of theater missiles
systems, their behavior, their signatures, and their
countermeasure capabilities require new and robust
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High Altitude
Patriot Advanced
Capability (PAC-3)
THAAD
Theater High
Altitude Area
Defense (THAAD)
The BMDO/MDA Era (1993 to Present)
By 1993 there was a major redefinition of the goals of
BMD and a consequent restructuring of the program.
The new goals were to (1) place primary emphasis on
the development and acquisition of Theater Missile
Defense (TMD) for the protection of expeditionary
forces, and (2) restructure NMD to a technologyreadiness program [13]. Consequently, the program
office was restructured and its name was changed
from the SDIO to the BMDO. Funding for research
efforts was reduced to achieve these goals.
In January 2002, the Secretary of Defense redesignated the BMDO as the Missile Defense Agency
(MDA) and directed the establishment of “… a single
program to develop an integrated system….” The
role of that system, to be called the Ballistic Missile
Defense System (BMDS), was “to intercept missiles
in all phases of their flight, against all ranges of
threats.”
Low Altitude
Navy
Navy Area Defense
(NAD)*
Navy Theater Wide
(NTW)
*In December 2001, the NAD System was discontinued by
the Department of Defense.
discrimination algorithms. The Laboratory continues
to be foremost in this area. Two particular areas of
concern are the filtering of clutter as boosters disintegrate during reentry, and the correlation of tracks between surface-based radars and interceptor IR seekers
during the final stages of an intercept.
Theater Critical Measurements Program. To investigate signatures of putative countermeasures, the
Laboratory has been and is conducting a series of
well-instrumented field tests at Kwajalein. Three
campaigns consisting of two or three flights each have
been conducted thus far. The devices flown on these
tests were designed and built by the Laboratory. The
analysis of the test data has led to new discriminants.
THAAD Radar. The radar for the Theater HighAltitude Area Defense (THAAD) system is a new and
powerful phased array that incorporates several novel
design features. (The radar was designed, developed,
and built by Raytheon.) Early in its design phase,
Laboratory staff aided in defining the radar requirements and in critiquing the radar design. Later the
Laboratory staff analyzed data from prototypes of the
THAAD radar and evaluated its performance.
Navy Theater Wide. Several studies were conducted
to determine the effectiveness of Navy assets in a theater-wide role. The studies determined where improvements or new capabilities (especially for radars)
were needed. The Laboratory played a major role in
these studies by making major design recommendation for the Navy radar systems after conducting a
• LEMNIOS AND GROMETSTEIN
Overview of the Lincoln Laboratory Ballistic Missile Defense Program
design and performance analysis of more powerful radars. The Laboratory also was a key contributor of
discrimination technology for use in these systems.
THAAD System Tests. Some of the first THAAD
system tests failed; others were only partially successful. In cooperation with staff from other organizations, Laboratory staff analyzed the data to determine
the cause of the failures.
TMD Netting. With the large number and variety
of TMD systems likely to be deployed in a theater of
operations, it is important that these systems be netted through a battle-management, command, control
and communication network. Netting provides an
economical use of interceptors, reduces missile leakage, and aids the discrimination process. The Laboratory has been very active in this area. In 1994 the
Theater Defense Netting Study (TDNS) was carried
out under the leadership of Laboratory staff. The
study showed that significant performance gains can
accrue if TMD systems are netted during a missile attack. Since the study, the Laboratory has continued to
examine netting especially as it aids discrimination.
National Missile Defense
The NMD Program was recast as a technology-readiness program in 1993 and its funding was drastically
reduced in order to emphasize the TMD Program.
Coping quickly with an emerging threat required a
system architecture based primarily on surface-based
components (radars and interceptors). In the late
1990s, IR sensors on satellites were integrated into
the architecture. The threat facing NMD consists of a
few missiles but with very sophisticated countermeasures, and is assumed to originate from any of several
geographically dispersed nations. An NMD system is
needed to ensure that leakage will not exceed an extremely low amount. These assumptions and requirements make the discrimination requirements very
stringent.
In more recent times the NMD Program has become a deployment-readiness program. In 1997 a
“3 + 3” schedule was adopted. Under that schedule,
development and testing would occur over the next
three years with a deployment readiness review in
2000. Although the initial deployment, if warranted,
was to have been in 2003, the schedule was modified
Table 2. National Missile Defense
System Components
Surface-Based Radars
Upgraded Early Warning Radars (UEWR)
Position and Velocity Extraction Phased Array
Warning System (PAVE PAWS)
Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS)
X-Band Ground-Based Radar (XBR)
Radars on Navy ships (Aegis)
Space-Based Sensors
Defense Support Program (DSP)
(initial version of NMD only)
Space-Based Infrared Sensor (SBIRS)–High
Space-Based Infrared Sensor (SBIRS)–Low
Weapons
Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI)
Navy Ship-Based Interceptor
Airborne Laser (ABL)
Space-Based Laser (SBL)
in 1999 so that the initial deployment would occur in
2005 (with a presumed reduction in technical risk)
[13]. The change in the NMD Program to deployment readiness resulted from a proliferation of longrange ballistic missiles by so-called third-world countries, some of whom have interests inimical to the
United States and its friends and allies. As of the date
of this article, the architecture for NMD is undergoing review, and its exact composition is unknown.
The components listed in Table 2, however, are expected to play a role in NMD.
Discrimination
The Laboratory’s role in this program continues to be
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measures that have been postulated by countermeasure specialists make this one of the key technical areas that must be resolved for a successful NMD system. As in the case for TMD, the fusion of data from
several sensors should aid the discrimination process
and is being actively pursued.
Range Support, Measurements, and Data Analysis
The primary location for the collection of data relevant to NMD continues to be the Kwajalein Missile
Range (KMR). The Laboratory’s radars at KMR are
the nation’s premier asset for this collection, and they
are used whenever any U.S. test planned to impact
near the Kwajalein Atoll is conducted. Test planning,
radar operations, data reduction, and data analysis are
all conducted by Laboratory staff and contribute to
discrimination research as well as to NMD performance evaluation.
Foreign-Data Collection
The proliferation of the threat to several countries
(together with the proliferation of missile systems)
make it mandatory that data on foreign missiles be
collected and analyzed whenever possible. The Laboratory participates in this endeavor and is a major
contributor to the understanding of the capabilities
of foreign missile systems.
Architecture Studies
With the large number of sensors and weapons being
considered for NMD architectures, shown in Table 1,
it is essential that trade-offs be made of the overall system performance as the mix and use of system elements changes. The Laboratory is one of several organizations engaged in these studies.
Summary
Throughout approximately a forty-five-year period,
the U.S. objectives in ballistic missile defense have
undergone changes. The changes have been made in
response to three factors: the perceived threat, the
technology available to meet the threat, and above all
the calculus that provides the greatest security for the
United States. However, during this same period
many of the key technical issues of BMD have remained the same. These are discrimination, architec30
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Table 3. BMD Reviewers
Reviewer
Affiliation
Mark Bernstein
Lincoln Laboratory
William P. Delaney
Lincoln Laboratory
George Dezenburg
SAIC
John C. Fielding
Raytheon
J. Richard Fisher
DESE Research, Inc.
Richard Gray
Nichols Research (retired)
Michael S. Holtcamp
Holtcamp Associates, Inc.
Leslie A. Hromas
TRW
Robert H. Kingston
Lincoln Laboratory
(retired)
Michael Lash
SMDC Technical Center
Charles. W. Niessen
Lincoln Laboratory
Glen Pippert
Lincoln Laboratory
(retired)
William P. Schoendorf
Torch Concepts, Inc.
ture design and evaluation, and technology leading to
new system elements. Lincoln Laboratory has played
a key role in all these issues and has made important
contributions to BMD. Figure 5 shows a timeline of
events and achievements in Lincoln Laboratory’s program in BMD. Figure 5 also shows the major events
that influenced the focus of the U.S. BMD program.
Acknowledgments
Each article in this special issue of the Lincoln Laboratory Journal was reviewed by at least one BMD specialist outside the Laboratory and one BMD specialist
at the Laboratory. Their careful scrutiny of the text
and helpful suggestions greatly improved the quality
of each article, and we thank them for their efforts.
The reviewers are listed in Table 3 with their current
affiliations.
In addition to reviewers, this issues owes such
qualities as it might possess, and even its very existence, to numerous people at Lincoln Laboratory who
contributed essential services. We thank them for
their invaluable support.
• LEMNIOS AND GROMETSTEIN
Overview of the Lincoln Laboratory Ballistic Missile Defense Program
REFERENCES
1. E.C. Freeman, ed., MIT Lincoln Laboratory: Technology in the
National Interest (Lincoln Laboratory, Lexington, Mass.,
1995).
2. H.E. Guerlac, Radar in World War II, vol. 8, bk. 1 (A–C) and
bk. 2 (D–E), The History of Modern Physics, 1800–1950
(Tomash Publishers, Los Angeles, 1987).
3. In 1909, the U.S. Army specified that its “Airplane No. 1” must
achieve a speed of 65 kph. By 1918, the heavily armed (British)
Bristol F.2b had a top speed of 200 kph.
4. In place of the Rad Lab, the Research Laboratory for Electronics (RLE) was formed, a smaller counterpart with academic
rather than military overtones.
5. J.F. Jacobs, The SAGE Air Defense System: A Personal History
(MITRE Corp., Bedford, Mass., 1986).
6. Whirlwind I had been developed at the MIT
Servomechanisms Laboratory for the Office of Naval Research, to be part of a flight simulator. The Navy released it to
the Air Force.
7. It became clear that the new laboratory would eventually be
based, not in Cambridge, but rather on Hanscom Air Force
Base, which lies at the juncture of the towns of Bedford, Concord, and Lincoln. Projects involving the names “Bedford” and
“Concord” already existed, so the new laboratory took its name
from the third town. “Project Lincoln” became “Lincoln Laboratory” soon thereafter.
8. D. Lennox, “Threats—Development and Proliferation of Ballistic and Cruise Missiles,” Seventh Multinational Conf. on Theater Missile Defense: Theater Missile Defense: Systems and Issues—1994, Annapolis, Md., June 1994, pp. 29–36.
9. P.A. Ingwersen and W.Z. Lemnios, “Radars for Ballistic Missile
Defense Research,” Linc. Lab. J., vol. 12, no. 2 (2000), pp.
245–266.
10. W.W. Camp, J.T. Mayhan, and R.M. O’Donnell, “Wideband
Radar for Ballistic Missile Defense and Range-Doppler Imaging of Satellites,” Linc. Lab. J., vol. 12, no. 2 (2000), pp. 267–
280.
11. A.J. Fenn, D.H. Temme, W.P. Delaney, and W.E. Courtney,
“The Development of Phased-Array Technology,” Linc. Lab.
J., vol. 12, no. 2 (2000), pp. 321–340.
12. R.J. Purdy, P.E. Blankenship, C.E. Muehe, C.M. Rader, E.
Stern, and R.C. Williamson, “Radar Signal Processing,” Linc.
Lab. J., vol. 12, no. 2 (2000), pp. 297–320.
13. “Harnessing the Power of Technology: The Road to Ballistic
Missile Defense from 1983–2007,” Ballistic Missile Defense,
Sept. 2000.
14. This missile defense system called Global Protection Against
Limited Strikes (GPALS) included not only defense of the
United States, but also defense of U.S. Allies. This latter requirement was subsequently dropped and the basic architecture of GPALS, many of its system elements, and even the
name did not survive for long.
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 . 
received an S.B. degree in
electrical engineering from
MIT and an M.S. degree in
physics from the University of
Illinois. His early work at the
Laboratory included design
and programming of the
intercept function of the Cape
Cod System and the SAGE
system (both prototype systems of continental air defense), and analyses of the
acquisition and tracking capabilities of the Ballistic Missile
Early Warning System radars.
From 1963 to 1969 he was
associate leader and then
leader of the Systems Analysis
group, where he was engaged
in the design, fabrication, and
performance evaluation of
ballistic missile penetration
aids. From 1969 to 1993 he
served as assistant head, associate head, and head of the
Radar Measurements division.
He is now a consultant to the
division as well as a member of
the Independent Science and
Engineering group that advises
the Ballistic Missile Defense
Organization on matters
related to ballistic missile
defense. Among his awards are
the Outstanding Civilian
Service Medal, conferred by
the Secretary of the Army. He
is a lifetime Senior Member of
the IEEE, a Senior Member of
the American Institute of
Aeronautics and Astronautics,
and a member of the American Physical Society, the
American Association for the
Advancement of Science, and
the Society of Sigma X.
32
LINCOLN LABORATORY JOURNAL
 . 
received a B.A. degree in
physics from Columbia College, an M.A. degree in mathematics from Columbia University, and an M.B.A. degree
from Western New England
College. He joined Lincoln
Laboratory in 1956, working
first on the SAGE air defense
system, then on ballistic missile testing, analysis, and
evaluation. In 1989, after 33
years at Lincoln Laboratory as
staff member, group leader,
and senior staff, he retired—a
transition that his wife claims
to have seen little evidence
of— and has since worked
part-time at the Laboratory. In
1999 he published The Roots
of Things—Essays on Quantum
Mechanics, and he is currently
writing a book on special
relativity.
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