Discussion on Characteristics and Price Regulation of Urban Rail Transit
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Discussion on Characteristics and Price Regulation of Urban Rail Transit
Discussion on Characteristics and Price Regulation of Urban Rail Transit YANG Liu, ZHENG Xiang School of Economics and Management, Beijing Jiaotong University, Beijing, P.R.China, 100044 [email protected] Abstract: Urban rail transit all around the world is generally under strict price regulation imposed by concerning urban government authorities. Such regulation as price-caps, comprehensive cost recovery, standard cost comparison and etc. are popular with cities as Beijing and Seoul. Experiences of Tokyo and Shanghai show that it’s imperative to regulate urban rail transit price according to a comprehensive model. Urban rail transit has such characteristics as network economy, public goods, and marketability, which determine and imply the importance of fiscal subsidy and operational cost. Price regulation should comprehensively take subsidy, electricity, CPI, PPI and transportation volume into consideration. In fact, urban rail transit price regulation should not only compensate operational cost, but also introduce market incentive. Keywords: Urban Rail Transit, Characteristics, Price Regulation 1 Introduction Urban rail transit (URT), characteristics differ from those of inter-city rail transit, dedicated passenger line or high speed railway, they are built when industrialization, urbanization and transportization developed into a specific period. Adopting wheel and track technology, organization pattern as “small trainset, high density, quick speed”, URT can satisfy passenger’s traveling demand in urban and suburban areas with specific metropolitan at the core. With rapid social and economic development and expansion of cities, various scares economic resources begin to cluster in big and medium sized cities in large scale. Thus, planning, construction, investment and operation of URT enter into a rapid development phase. Simultaneously, social capital flows into various business sectors of URT through financial innovations of BOT, BT, TOT, PPP and etc. However, URT price is still under strict government regulation. Cities such as Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Nanjing, Shenzhen, HongKong, Tokyo, Seoul, Newyork and Paris regulate URT from perspectives of price level and structure, financial subsidy, ticket mechanism, ticket form, entrance and exit, and etc., see Tab.1. No. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 City Beijing Shanghai Guangzhou Nanjing Shenzhen HongKong Tokyo Seoul Newyork Paris Moscow Tab.1 Price regulation status quo of URT Whether Regulate or How to Regulate Price Level and Financial Ticket Ticket Form Structure Subsidy Mechanism Regulated Yes Single Various Regulated Yes Distance-based Various Regulated Yes Distance-based Various Regulated Yes Distance-based Various Regulated Yes Distance-based Various Regulated Yes Distance-based Various Regulated Yes Distance-based Various Regulated Yes Distance-based Various Regulated Yes Single Various Regulated Yes Distance-based Various Regulated Yes Single Various Operator Entry Regulation Entry Regulation Entry Regulation Entry Regulation Entry Regulation Entry Regulation Entry Regulation Entry Regulation Entry Regulation Entry Regulation Entry Regulation Obviously, URT price is under strict regulation by urban authority worldwide. There are few disputes about whether it’s imperative to regulate URT theoretically or practically. However, there exists great dissension about what kind of price regulation should be adopted, namely, return on investment 9 regulation, price cap regulation, yardstick competition, or other kinds of price regulation. In fact, in Japan, price regulation for Tokyo URT experienced 3 stages: (1) Stage 1 is before December, 1996 when comprehensive cost pricing mode is adopted; (2) Stage 2 is between December, 1996 and July 31st, 2006 when price cap regulation mode is adopted based on comprehensive cost. (3) Stage 3 is after August 1st, 2006, when standard cost comparison mode is adopted. Thus, what kind of factors lead to the change of URT price regulation, and what is its internal economic logics? 2 Function Definition and Features Analysis of URT 2.1 Function Definition of URT URT is a specific transportation mode which differs greatly from other rail transportation, and it serves urban and suburban transportation including metro, light track, tramcar, suburban railway, etc, as shown by Fig.1. URT is an indispensable part of urban comprehensive transportation system. In developed countries, URT shoulders most part of transportation demand and connects bus, taxi, regional railway, and aviation through urban transportation terminals. Operation Entity Fast Transportation National Railway Metro Local Railway Light Track Suburban Rail Tram Railway Classification Serve Target Urban Rail Transit Inner and Near City Regional Railway Far from City (around 100kms) Medium Distance Intercity Transportation Trunk Railway Long Distance Intercity Transportation Fig.1 Railway classification and urban rail transit[1] From Fig.1, we can see that URT mainly serves transportation inside, outside metropolitan within certain distance. It’s generally agreed that railway lines serving commuter transportation whose distance is less than 100 kilometers from city center belong to URT, while lines between 100 and 300 kilometers are regional intercity railway, for lines with distance more than 300 kilometers, they must belong to long distance or trunk intercity railway. Therefore, functions of URT include but not limited to: (1) Connecting large transportation terminals, URT concentrates in certain urban area and makes transit between different terminals convenient and economic. (2) URT serves regular transportation demand such as commuter and commerce travel. (3) In contrast to private transportation, URT is usually a public transportation railway under strict government regulation. (4) Generally, URT service is operated with electrical multiple units (coaches). (5) URT runs at a comparatively high speed linking important satellite cities. (6) URT is organized in with small trainsets, high density, quick turnover, and unified dispatching command. (7) URT is a kind of light track weight lines. (8) URT is a part of urban transportation system, and its planning, investment, construction, operation, and price level have to be regulated by municipal authority. (9) Investment 10 mainly comes from public finance while some fractions originated by social investors. (10) Transportation oriented development (TOD) can enhance industrial structure adjustment, transportation structure optimization and environment improvement. 2.2 Characteristics of URT URT has such features as network economy, quasi-public good and marketability which determine reliability of price regulation on cost and financial subsidy. In other word, URT price regulation has to take subsidy, transportation volume, electricity, CPI, PPI, and other factors into consideration. 2.2.1 Network economy[2] of URT based on scale economy and scope economy. URT has obvious feature of network economy, which is composed by scale economy and scope economy and transform into density economy and size economy in transportation sectors as shown in Tab.2. Scale Economy and Scope Economy Tab.2 Network economy of URT Density Economy URT Transportation Resources and Network and Size Economy Economy Natural Monopoly City train passage density Track Network Scale Economy Density Economy Concurrent usage with national and regional railways Large trainset numbers and cabin type (A type) per km URT terminal capacity Scope Economy Size Economy Line extension and network concentration Small trainset, high speed, stop at more stations Large network Average cost decreases or so called “cost subaddivity” phenomenon Connectivity improvement Scale economy refers to the phenomenon that URT average cost decreases with an increase in transportation volume. Furthermore, URT achieves scale economy when average cost of one transportation operator is less than that of several competitive independent rail operators, that is, cost subaddivity appears in URT sector. Scope economy refers to the phenomenon that URT average cost of multi-product production is lower than that of single product production. Because of technology, transaction and market limitation, concentrated mass production can obtain cost economy than scattered one. URT carries out its production in certain space time condition on rail transportation network, thus, scale economy transforms into density economy, scope economy into size economy. Density economy refers to the economic phenomenon of average cost reduction under the condition that, within unit space or distance, transportation volume increases when capacity of track network, movable equipment, trainset number, and terminal scale expand gradually. Size economy refers to average cost reduction phenomenon of URT when the length or density of URT or scope of service targets increases. URT has significant network economy. For example, marginal cost per person for line 1 and line 2 of Beijing metro is RMB0.4928, for line 13, RMB1.6235, for Batong line, RMB2.358,[3] which manifests that line 1 and 2 have lower marginal cost and have more significant network economy than that of other lines. If price regulated is set according to the principle of marginal revenue equaling marginal cost, it’s unavoidable that URT will suffer operational loss and government subsidy will become an indispensable part of overall regulation policies. 2.2.2 Quasi-public good characteristics of URT based on product classification. Goods can be classified into private goods, quasi-public goods, pure public goods according to its degree of unrivalness and unexclusiveness. Unrivalness refers to the situation that marginal cost is zero when one more unit product is consumed, while unexclusiveness refers to the situation that consumption of one person doesn’t affect that of the other person. Before transportation volume reaches a certain 11 degree, URT has unrivalness; after that, traffic congestion appears and marginal cost increases dramatically. Under such a circumstance, exclusive arrangement should be set up in order to avoid excessive usage of URT facilities. Thus, URT is a typical quasi-pubic goods. There are different kinds of public goods, and government subsidy and market competition mechanism can be applied accordingly. We can classify URT development into 3 periods, that is, primary period, development period and maturity period. (1) In primary period, transportation volume is low, congestion point is not reached, and private capitals are reluctant to participate in investment and operation businesses. Thus, government shoulders responsibilities of investment and operation subsidy. (2) In development period, URT transportation volume increases gradually, profit making capability becomes better off, private capitals have desire to take part in investment and operation businesses, and market mechanism begins to gain its ground. (3) In maturity period, transportation volume increases by a large margin. Market revenue can cover variable cost expenditure and some part of fixed cost, traffic congestion becomes prominent, rivalness and exclusiveness are significantly high, it’s suitable to hand over URT operation to private sectors. Since URT has natural monopoly characteristics, it’s necessary for government to regulate its price, service quality, safety and etc. in order to control potential market power of private operators. 2.2.3 Marketability of URT. Marketability refers to ability that goods or service can be divided into small units with clear property right boundary, sold in the marketplace and receive corresponding revenue to compensate production cost. Operationability is defined at the same time. Generally speaking, the higher the marketability, the better the operationability; the lower the marketability, the lower the operationability. Marketability is the precondition for operationability, which is shown by Tab.3. Tab.3 Marketability and operationability of URT Potential Public Characteristics External to Cover Service of Goods or Environmental Cost by Obligation Service Factors Fare extremely extremely public goods no high high club goods low high high club goods medium medium medium Units of URT Competition Potentials Planning no Track Station Rolling stocks low medium high private Electricity medium private high private high private very low medium Track maintenance Rolling stocks maintenance Dispatching command Financial subsidy high Marketability Index Operationability Index no no low medium low medium low low high high low very low very high very high very low very low very high very high very high very low very low very high very high common resource very low very high low very low very low public goods no very high extremely high medium medium very high very high very extremely No extremely low extremely high high high Note: The author combines characteristics of URT and literature Report on infrastructure investment and financing comparison in China[M]. China Construction Industry Press, 2002. Labor very high private From Tab.3, we can see that marketability and operationability of components of URT varies from each other. For planning, track, dispatching command, financial subsidy, and etc., there is low possibility to introduce market mechanism, while for station rolling stocks, maintenance and labor, there is high potential to adopt market mechanism. 12 3 Analysis on Price Regulation Mode for URT Characteristics of URT imply that we have to take government subsidy and PPI into consideration besides electricity, salary and welfare, CPI and etc. 3.1 Several Modes for Price Regulation of URT Price regulation modes for URT include: (1) Specific cost compensation mode, that is, government only covers specific cost such as salary and electricity. (2) Comprehensive cost compensation, that is, government pays for internal cost and external cost shouldered by URT operators. (3) Income cap, that is, regulation focuses on total income control, or puts limitation on return rate on capital. (4) Price cap, that is, once total cost is checked and ratified, price adjustment has to be connected with Consumer Price Index (CPI), Producer Price Index (PPI). (5) Standard cost comparison or yardstick competition mode, that is, standards for cost compensation are determined by regression results of several URT operators. For example, if average electricity cost per person kilometer is α, average electricity cost for operator one is β, if then β>α, the gap β-α will not be covered by government subsidy. Tab.4 illustrates five URT price regulation modes. [4] Tab.4 Price regulation modes for URT Factors Factors Covered Neglected No. Price Regulation Mode , Linkage Mechanism 1 Specific cost compensation mode P, Cx Q Cn Cx and P linkage 2 Comprehensive mode P, Q, Cx, Cn ---- Cx ,Cn and P linkage 3 Income cap adjustment mode ( return on investment mode) P, Capital, I, ---Cx, Cn Q and Cx, Cn, I, Capital, then links P 4 Price cap adjustment mode P Q, Cx, Cn CPI, PPI, X% and P, whereas X% refers to technology improvement rate 5 Standard cost comparison ( yardstick competition mode) ---- Cost linkage operators cost compensation mode several enterprises among URT Note: P—Price, Q—Quantity produced, Cx—External cost which cannot be controlled by operator, Cn—Internal cost In Tab.4, there 3 main kinds of URT price regulation modes: (1) Cost compensation mode, it includes: Specific cost compensation mode, that is, only costs of electricity, maintenance and etc. are taken into consideration. Comprehensive cost compensation mode, that is, all cost expenditures are calculated. Income cap mode, or return on investment mode, of which, three factors –– P, C and Q — are considered. (2) Price cap adjustment mode, that is, only CPI, PPI and X% are taken care of when P of URT is going to be adjusted. (3) Standard cost comparison mode, that is, average cost level is determined by several URT operators’ historical cost data through estimation methods, and is used as benchmark for cost comparison and government subsidy quantity. ① ③ ② 3.2 Comprehensive Price Regulation Mode for URT In reality, neither price regulation mode can fit for the need of URT. Only we combine main factors which affect URT price regulation, can we find out a comparatively suitable price regulation mode. 3.2.1 Calculation of general price level of URT. Price level of URT cannot be determined completely by demand and supply factors in the marketplace. Because of its commonweal and externality characteristics, URT price regulation is determined by government subsidy, transportation volume, fixed and variable cost and etc. comprehensively. 13 General price level is illustrated by formula (1). pt = Ct ( E , S ,..., Others ) − St Qt (1) In formula (1), pt stands for price level of period t, Ct stands for total cost for period t, including electricity cost E, salary expenditure S and other costs. St is government subsidy for period t, and Qt is persons transported in period t. 3.3.2 Adjustment of general price level for URT. Within a certain period of time, price level for URT keeps constant, however, because the change of CPI, PPI and volume transported, price regulated has to be adjusted accordingly, see formula (2). pt = C0 + C E × ∆Ce + CS × ( CPI t − CPI 0 ) Qt +C Else × ∆PPI (2) C In formula (2), pt is price level, C0 is cost after deduction of financial subsidy, E is electricity expenditure, ∆Ce is price increase rate for electricity, CS is salary expenditure, CPI t is consumer price index for period t, CPI 0 is consumer price index for base period zero, CElse is other production cost, ∆PPI is the change rate of producer price index, and Qt is quantity transported for period t. Historical cost method, that is, we admit In formula (2), C0 can be determined by two ways: historical cost completely or partially and put it as the cost for base period zero. Standard cost comparison method, that is, we select historical cost data of several URT operators of different cities, make regression on their line cost, communication and signaling cost, rolling stock cost, trainset operation cost, station cost, etc., then obtain basic cost benchmark for price adjustment. Cost benchmark is illustrated by formula (3). yi=aixi1 (bixi2)+ci (i=1, 2, ……, n) (3) In formula (3), yi is the specific cost for URT operator i, ai and bi are constant term, xi1 stands for factor or activity input 1 of operator i, xi2 stands for factor or activity input 2 of operator i, ci is also a constant term. Through statistical calculation, we determine ai and bi, which is the benchmark cost for all URT operators. For cost in excess of the benchmark cost, excessive cost will not be accepted and has to be covered by concerning URT operator. For cost lower than benchmark cost, certain percentage of the savings will reward concerning URT operators. When parameters in formula (3) are determined, we can then fix price level of URT operators, as shown by formula (4). ① ② + n ∑ C ×x it pi t = it i =1 Qt − St (4) Formula (4) is the typical standard cost price regulation mode or yardstick competition pattern, of which, pit is price level for period t, i is integer from 1 to n, Cit is the standard cost for production factor or xit refers to quantity of production or activity i for period t, St stands for government subsidy for period t, and Q t is quantity transported for period t. activity i for period t, 3.3.3 Summary for URT comprehensive price regulation. The overall thought for URT price regulation and adjustment is “respect historical comprehensive cost, adopt price cap regulation for specific production factors, introduce standard cost comparison method, take government subsidy, transportation volume, depreciation, salary cot, electricity, standard cost and etc. into consideration, and form a comprehensive URT price regulation mode”. 14 4 Positive Study on Price Adjustment of Beijing URT ( + We use formula (5) for price adjustment of Beijing URT. + ) (5) ∆Pt = P0 × δ × ∆Ce β × ∆CPI γ × ∆PPI In which: Pt -- price adjustment rate; P0 -- ratified price level for base period zero, and P0=income of base period/volume transported of base period; -- proportion of electricity to overall cost expenditure, that is, =electricity cost of base period/total cost of base period; Ce – change rate of electricity price; – proportion of salary to overall cost expenditure, that is, =(salary of base period + welfare of base period)/total cost base period; CPI – change rate of consumer price index; – proportion of other cost, that is, =1- - ; PPI – change rate of producer price index. We can calculate cost structure in accordance with historical data, see Fig.2. Δ δ Δ β Δ γ Δ δ β γ δβ 35.00% 30.68% 30.00% 22.92% 25.00% 20.00% 15.00% 12.85% 11.15% 8.31% 10.00% 6.95% 4.30% 5.00% 2.84% 0.00% salary management cost op eration cost electricity tax maintenance cost welfare rolling stock maintenance cost Fig.2 Cost structure for Beijing URT δ If we take the year of 2003 as the base period, then, proportion of electricity expenditure is 11.15%, salary and welfare is 34.98%, is 53.87%. Then we can get conclusions as follows: (1) To 2008, electricity price increased by 5.5%, which will lead to price increase by 0.6133%. (2) To 2008, CPI increased by 2.52%, which will lead to price increase by 0.8815%. (3) To 2008, PPI increased by 27.24%, which will lead to price increase by 14.67%. In sum, if P0=RMB3, then price will increase by RMB0.485. β γ 5 Conclusion URT is a special kind of railway which differs from regional, trunk railways. With dedicated network formation, URT has its special characteristics at infrastructure level, operational level, enterprise level and policy level. URT network concentrates in urban and suburban area, operation mainly satisfies commuter transportation demand, enterprise organization has special governance structure which combines both public and private contracts, and a transportation policy cannot take effect without strict government regulation. URT price is under severe regulation worldwide, and price cap mode, 15 comprehensive cost compensation mode and etc. are popular for many big metropolitans. URT has such features as network economy, quasi-public goods, marketability, which determine or imply the importance of government subsidy and reliability on operational cost. URT price regulation involves factors of financial subsidy, electricity cost, salary and welfare cost, CPI, PPI, and transportation volume. Therefore, it’s imperative to form a comprehensive price adjustment model for efficient and sustainable URT investment and operation. Acknowledgements: The research has been financially supported by the key project (07JZD0012) of China MOE Foundation for Social Sciences, Ministry of Railway Project (2008F011) and by Beijing Jiaotong University Foundation Project (2007XM080) References [1]. BJTU Research Task Team. Network operational management mode of Beijing Urban Railway Transit[R]. Beijing Jiaotong University, 2008: p1-18. (in Chinese) [2]. Rong Chaohe. Discussion on scale economy and scope economy of transportation industries[J]. China Railway Science, 2001(4): p97-104. (in Chinese) [3]. BJTU Research Task Team. Research on Beijing URT Ticket System and Level[R]. Beijing Jiaotong University, 2007.3: p40-41. (in Chinese) [4]. Li Hongchang. Contractual analysis on railway regulation[M]. Economic Science Press, 2005: p8. [5]. Oliver E. Williamson. The economics of capitalism[M]. 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