FPRC Journal ____________________________________

J-9-2012 (i)
FPRC
Journal
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(a Quarterly devoted to the studies on Indian foreign Policy)
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Focus : India and South Asia
Responses, Articles
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Foreign Policy Research Centre
NEW DELHI (India)
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FPRC Journal No. 9
India and South Asia
Contributors
RESPONSES
1. Dr.Iftekhar Ahmed Chowdhury,Former Foreign Advisor (Foreign Minister) of Bangladesh
Currently,Sr. Research Fellow, ISAS, National University of Singapore, Singapore
2. Ambassador Deb Mukharji,New Delhi
3. Prof.Indra Nath Mukherji ,Jawaharlal Nehru University,New Delhi
4. Prof.John Wood, , NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY,,WASHINGTON
5.Prof. Ishtiaq Ahmad, University of Oxford
6. Dr Kripa Sridharan , Head of Research-Asia,World-Check
Special Comment on
Bonn’s Second Afghanistan Conference December 5th 2011
by Prof.Siegfried Wolf, South Asia Institute, University of Heidelberg
ARTICLES
1. Amb. Shamshad Ahmed,Former Foreign Secretary of Pakistan
2. Amb.Kazi Anwarul Masud, Former Ambassador of Bangladesh
3. Amb.Touqir Hussain, Former Ambassador of Pakistan
4. Dirgha Raj Prasai,Former member of Parliament ; Political Analyst,Nepal
5. Prof.Ishtiaq Ahmed, Professor Emeritus of Political Science, Stockholm University
6. Prof. A. Lakshmana Chetty,Centre for Southeast Asian & Pacific Studies,Sri
Venkateswara University, Tirupati
7. Prof.Moonis Ahmar, Dept. of International Relations ,University of Karachi, Karachi
8. Dr Sheo Nandan Pandey, Expert in area studies,in particular Hanxue (Sinology)
9. Dr.Abanti Bhattacharya,Dept. of East Asian Studies,Delhi University
10. Sathiya Moorthy-Director, Observer Research Foundation,Chennai Chapter
11. Prof.Siegfried Wolf, South Asia Institute, University of Heidelberg
12. Dr. Kamal Kinger , Head, Dept. of Defence and Strategic Studies, Punjabi
University, Patiala
13. Tridivesh Singh Maini, Associate Fellow, Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi
14. Dr. Monika Mandal,Fellow,MAKAIAS, Kolkata
15. Satheesan Kumaaran , Editor-in-chief, Voice of Voiceless
16. Dr Sanjeev Bhadauria,Associate Prof,Dept. of Defence & Strategic tudies,University
of Allahabad,Allahabad
17. Marian Gallenkamp, Senior researcher, South Asia Institute, University of
Heidelberg ; Bhutan Research Organisation
18. Dr. Sanjeev Kumar H.M. ,Asst. Prof.,Dept. of International Relations,South Asian
University,New Delhi
19. Dr.Joyeeta Bhattacharjee, Associate Fellow,Observer Research Foundation,New
Delhi
20. Balaji Chandramohan,Editor ,Asia for World Security Network
21. Ravi Sundaralingam, Academic Secretary ASATiC (Academy of Science and Arts for the
Tamil Communities in Ceylon)
22. Ullas Sharma,former columnist , yellowtimws.org
23. Dr. Maneesha S. Wanasinghe – Pasqual,Department of International Relations,
University of Colombo
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FPRC Journal No. 9
India and South Asia
India‘s PM Dr.Manmohan Singh said : ‗The destinies of countries in South Asia are
very closely linked.‖And he rightly observed, ―India will not be able to realise its own
destiny without the partnership of its South Asian neighbours….‗We want them as
partners in progress.‖
It is the region of South Asia which is set to be the biggest challenge for India‘s foreign
policy. On the one hand, India‘s emergence as a major power appears to evoke little
concern amongst the existing great powers; On the other hand, within South Asia—
where India has long been the dominant player—India is regarded by its neighbours
with resentment and wariness, if not hostility and fear. In the next few years South Asia
is set to be the biggest test of India‘s resilience and future potential. India holds a
particular responsibility for, as well as, a vital interest in promoting regional peace
and prosperity.
The 9th issue of the FPRC JOURNAL focuses on India and South Asia.
We are thankful to our contributors who have shared our sentiments and accepted our
invitation to enrich the contents of the Journal,even at the cost of personal
inconvenience. They have always been our source of strength.
Mahendra Gaur
Director
Indira Gaur
Mg. Editor
Foreign Policy Research Centre
New Delhi
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FPRC Journal No. 9
India and South Asia
1. Dr.Iftekhar Ahmed Chowdhury,
Former Foreign Advisor (Foreign Minister) of Bangladesh
Currently,Sr. Research Fellow, ISAS, National University of Singapore, Singapore
2. Ambassador Deb Mukharji,New Delhi
3 Prof.Indra Nath Mukherji ,Jawaharlal Nehru University,New Delhi
4. Prof.John Wood, , NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY,WASHINGTON
5.Prof. Ishtiaq Ahmad, University of Oxford
6. Dr Kripa Sridharan , Head of Research-Asia,World-Check
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FPRC Journal No. 9
India and South Asia
(1) Dr Iftekhar Ahmed Chowdhury
Former Foreign Advisor (Foreign Minister) of Bangladesh
Currently,Senior Research Fellow,Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS)
National University of Singapore, Singapore
Dr Iftekhar Ahmed Chowdhury was Foreign Advisor
(Foreign Minister) of Bangladesh from 2007 to 2009. During
his four decades of public service career, he has held the
posts as Ambassador and Permanent Representative to both
New York (2001-2007), and Geneva (1996-2001). He served
as Ambassador to Qatar between 1994 and 1996.At the
United Nations (UN), he had also been Chairman of a
number of Committees including Social Commission,
Population and Development Commission, Second
(Economic) Committee, Information Committee, and
President of the Conference on Disarmament. At the World Trade Organization, he chaired
the Trade Policy Review Body, and the Committee on Trade and Development. He had been
closely associated with the UN Reforms Process, and as a ‘Facilitator’ helped shape the
principle of ‘Responsibility to Protect’ adopted by World Leaders at the UN Summit of 2005.
He was knighted by the Pope in 1999. In 2004, the New York City Council issued a
Proclamation naming him as ‘one of the world’s leading diplomats’, acknowledging his global
contribution to advancing welfare, alleviating poverty, and combating terrorism.
Dr Chowdhury has a PhD and MA in International Relations from the Australian National
University, Canberra. Earlier, he obtained a First Class in BA (Honours) from the Dhaka
University. He has addressed seminars in many universities and think-tanks around the
world. He has been a prolific writer on issues pertaining to current multilateral diplomacy
and contributes regularly to learned journals and the media.
Area of Interest and Expertise
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
Disarmament
UN Issues including Peace-Keeping
Social and Economic Development
Current Research
South Asian Issues
Articles in Journals
1) ‘Prehistory’ of the Bangladeshi Nationalism and a Theory of the Tripartite Balance (Asian Affairs, Vol IV NovemberDecember 1982)
2) Strategy of a Small-Power in a Subsystem: Bangladeshi’s External Relations (Australian Outlook Vol 34, No 1, April 1980)
Articles for the Media
Singapore Newspapers :
1) Collaboration, Only Way to Defuse Tensions (Straits Times, 11 May 2009)
2) How Neighbours See the Elephant (Straits Times, 29 May 2009)
3) Rising threat of the many-headed ‘netwars’ (Straits Times, 25 June 2009)
4) Does the 21st century belong to Asia? (Straits Times, 6 July 2009)
5) A method in the Dragon's shifting mood (Straits Times, 17 July 2009)
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India and South Asia
6) Between the devil and the deep blue sea (Business Times, 6 August 2009)
7) Transforming conflict to harmony in South Asia (Business Times, 26 November 2009)
8) India and its other, friendlier neighbour (The Straits Times, 1 September 2010)
Chapters in Books
1) "Effects of Conflicts in Myanmar and their Consequences on Bangladesh" published in the Book entitled "INTERNAL
CONFLICTS IN MYANMAR: TRANSNATIONAL CONSEQUENCES EDITED BY V.R. RAGHAVAN (Vij Books India Pvt Ltd, New
Delhi, India) in 2011
Participation in Conferences
Dr Chowdhury has attended and chaired numerous international conferences connected
with the UN, WTO, UNCTAD, NPT, CTBTO, SAARC, Non-Aligned Movement, OIC and others.
He has adressed many seminars in think-tanks and universities around the world. He has
contributed articles on International Relations and Economic Development issues.
Reports and Policy Papers
1) Tackling Battlefield Asymmetries - Changing Tactics in Emerging Insurgencies (ISAS Insights 72, 18 June
2009)
2) The Roots of Bangladeshi National Identity - Their Impact on State Behaviour (ISAS Working Paper 63, 10
June 2009)
3) Post-Election India - How the Neighbours View the Elephant (ISAS Insights 68, 22 May 2009)
4) The Sorrows of Swat and the Mayhem in the Malakand (ISAS Insights 66, 19 May 2009)
5) The Malaise in Myanmar - What is to be done? (ISAS Insights 62, 8 May 2009)
6) The Sri Lanka Situation and the Principle of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (ISAS Insights 61, 30 April 2009)
7) The Maldives - Paradise in Peril? (ISAS Brief 105, 28 April 2009)
8) The South Asian Nuclear Genie Out of The Bottle, it can be useful (ISAS Brief 102, 13 April 2009)
9) The New Bangladesh Government - The Road Ahead (ISAS Insights 59, 9 April 2009)
10) A Method in the Dragon's Moods:Why China Behaves as it Does?' (ISAS Working Paper No. 75, 21 July
2009)
11) Myanmar:Effecting Positive Changes (ISAS Insight No. 82, 24 August 2009)
12) India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh: 'Trilateralism' in South Asia. (ISAS Brief No. 129, 16 September 2009)
13) Non-Proliferation versus Disarmament: A Destabilising Dichotomy. (ISAS Working Paper No. 94, 21
October 2009)
14) Towards a World Without Nuclear Weapons: Can 2010 be a Year of Hope? (ISAS Insight No.86, 9 December
2009)
15) Hasina's Visit to India and Emerging Indo-Bangla Relations: Implications for the Future (ISAS Brief No. 149,
18 January 2010)
16) The 'Free Market' and 'Social Concerns': 'Asian Values' and 'Walking on Two Legs'(ISAS Brief No. 152, 29
January 2010)
17) India and Pakistan: Breaking the Ice (ISAS Insight No. 92, 4 March 2010).
18) Bangladesh-China: An Emerging Equation in Asian Diplomatic Calculations (ISAS Working Paper No 105,
31 March 2010)
19) The Global Governance Group ('3G') and Singaporean Leadership - Can Small be Significant? (ISAS Working
Paper No. 108, 19 May 2010)
20) Maoism in Bangladesh: Past, Present and Future (ISAS Insight No. 104, 25 June 2010)
21) A New Priority in India’s Look East Policy: Evolving Bilateral Relations with Bangladesh (ISAS Insight No.
111, 31 August 2010)
22) Bangladeshi Courts: Reaffirmation of Democratic and Secular Norms (ISAS Insight No. 113, 19 October
2010)
23) WTO and RTAs: How the ‘Spaghetti Bowl’ Impacts on Global ‘Trade-Meal’ (ISAS Working Paper No.118, 6
December 2010)
24) Libya and the UN: Whose Responsibility to Protect? (RSIS Commentaries No. 34/2011, 4 March 2011) coauthored with Dr Yang Razali Kassim
25) Foundations of Bangladesh's Foreign Policy Interactions (ISAS Insight No. 120, 23 March 2011)
26) Anguish in Abbottabad, Pains in Pakistan and American Anger (ISAS Insight No. 123, 20 May 2011)
27) Power-Play of Peers in the Pacific: A ‘Chimerican’ Chess Game? (ISAS Insights No. 124, 10 June 2011)
28) China-Pakistan Relations: Evolution of an ‘All-Weather Friendship (ISAS Insights No. 125, 14 June 2011)
29) Come September, Manmohan Comes to Dhaka (ISAS Brief No. 214, 18 August 2011)
30) China and Its Aircraft Carrier: The Dragon’s Deft Dealings with a Nervous Neptune (ISAS Insights No. 133, 7
September 2011)
31) China’s “Look West” policy (ISAS Insights No. 134, 7 September 2011)
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India and South Asia
32) Manmohan in Bangladesh: The Visit Revisited (ISAS Working Paper No.134, 14 September 2011)
33) The Crisis in United States-Pakistan Relations: An Alliance Unstuck? (ISAS Insights No. 139, 7 October
2011)
34) Pakistan, India and the Security Council: Thinking the Unthinkables (ISAS Brief No. 219, 4 November 2011)
35) WTO accomodates RTAs :A Triumph of Pragmatism over Pristine Theory ( ISAS Insights No. 145, 30
November 2011).
36) The Mohmand Mayhem and its Impact on US-Pakistan Alliance: For the Frienship a Blush, For the ties a
Tear!
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Response to Questionnaire on India and South Asia
1.
Do you agree with the view that it is the region of South Asia which is set to be the
biggest challenge to India‘s foreign policy? On the one hand, India‘s emergence as a major
power appears to evoke little concern amongst the existing great powers: on the other hand,
within South Asia- where India has long been the dominant player-India is regarded by its
neighbours with resentment and wariness, if not hostility and fear.
Ans.: India, as any large and powerful global entity has several challenges in the foreign
policy arena, and I am unsure if it would be appropriate to put them in any pecking order.
The fact remains though, the region must needs be India’s major focus, and I believe it is. Yes,
India may be a source of worry to some neighbours- it is no secret that it is to Pakistan’s- but
it is only in line with what the great international relations theorist Hedley Bull once said,
that the deepest source of fear for a smaller state is often its powerful close neighbor. There
are three things India can do to dispel such apprehensions: First, behave as an ‘elder’ rather
than a ‘big’ brother, that is show understanding and empathy rather than muscle and power
in the resolution of regional issues; second, ensure that neighbours also benefit from India’s
burgeoning economic prosperity by providing market access and trade concessions ; and
third, emphasize ‘people- to- people’ soft-power contacts, and not depending on
governments or any specific political parties.
2.
Has India become irrelevant in South Asia due to US-China rivalry?
Ans. I do not believe US-China rivalry has anything to do with India’s relevance or lack of it to
South Asia. Whether the US and China are friends, or rivals, India remains a key player in the
region, indeed the ‘pre-eminent’ ( rather than the‘pre-dominant’, the term you used earlier!)
one. In fact some believe the Sino-American rivalry has led both the US and China to seek its
close South Asian ally, Pakistan in the case of China, and India in the case of the US, though
less so given India’s comparatively lesser dependence on the US and its understandable
reluctance to unnecessarily rile China. In any case India remains important for different
reasons to other South Asian nations- Bangladesh, Nepal, Afghanistan, Bhutan, Sri Lanka and
the Maldives.
3.
How should the nations of the region cope with ‗extra-regional ‗influences?
Ans. In any region, the weaker powers will either choose the ‘pilot-fish’ behavior-pattern, i.e.
tacking close to the shark in order to avoid being eaten, as Finland did with the Soviet Union
during the Cold War, or building a network of extra-regional linkages to reduce or close the
power-gap with the perceived regional threat as Pakistan did vis-à-vis India during earlier
times by joining the CENTO and SEATO. At this time while US-Pakistan relations are at their
lowest nadir, and China-India ties are not necessarily on the mend, we see a noticeable
relaxation of tensions in South Asia itself. Pakistan has just decided to accord MFN status to
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India and South Asia
India, Bangladesh has moved closer to India, first under its Caretaker government and then
under its Awami-League led coalition.This is perhaps the time to move on ‘trilateralism’, a
loose understanding that I have been advocating for a while between India, Pakistan and
Bangladesh the three original members of the old colonial British India, who share so many
commonalities between them.
4.
India holds a particular responsibility for, as well as, a vital interest in promoting
regional peace and prosperity. Do India‘s poor relations with the neighbours hobble its
global interests?
Ans. As the most populous, the most economically endowed, the most militarily powerful and
geographically the largest State in South Asia, India does bear a disproportionate
responsibility for responsible leadership. This is one that must be discharged with caution
and circumspection, and above all with wisdom, all of which are within India’s diplomatic
capability. India’s global ambitions specifically involve aspirations for a permanent seat in
the UN Security Council, which could be hobbled by poor relations with neighbours. It is a
noteworthy happy sign that both India and Pakistan have supported each other in their bid
for temporary seats in the Security Council over the last two years, but this kind of
cooperation must be rendered structural and sustainable.
5.―Non-reciprocity‘ is an important aspect of India‘s policy for neighbours. Should India
give up this approach?
Ans. Most certainly not! The element of ‘non-reciprocity’ is vital to India’s ability to be at
peace with its South Asian partners. ‘ Pre-eminence’ does not come without a cost. Only that
India will need to ensure it is able to bear it! The Indian people must see the price as
affordable.
6.Do you agree with the view that India‘s neighbours are not ―sensitive‖ to its security
concerns?
Ans. I am not aware that such a view exists, and if it does, I have no hesitation in describing it
as erroneous. India’s neighbours are all mature enough to be aware of India’s security
concerns, indeed to be ‘sensitive’ to them, but problem occurs when these concers are seen
to be colliding with their own! This is no different from any other region in the world!
7.Has SAARC exhausted its potential as inter-governmental movement as nothing significant
has come out of it for decades? Despite attempts to bring countries together through the
process of economic integration itself – neither peace nor the process of economic integration
itself has been fully realized in South Asia due mainly to inter and intra-state conflicts.
Ans. When we conceived of SAARC in Bangladesh in the early 80s, we were not looking to
miracles! We knew that the States of South Asia were in somewhat of an intellectual
confusion as to whether to stress their commonalities, or their distinctiveness to underscore
their separate sovereignties. We were influenced by ‘functionalists’ and not
‘integrationalists’. We wanted to create linkages across a broad spectrum of functional
activities so that tensions at more ‘core’ or ‘central’ levels would be diffused! SAARC might
not be the ringing success that the EU has been, or even the African Union or ASEAN, but
each region has its uniqueness and peculiarities as we also have in ours! But SAARC does give
an opportunity for our leaderships, officials, and civil societies to meet and interact, and
sometimes we have had successes! We are most definitely better off with SAARC than we
would have been without it!
8. How to strengthen cooperative initiatives throughout the South Asian region? Could
human contact and people-to-people interaction and media help in bringing these nations
together?
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India and South Asia
Ans. The short answer to the question is, yes! Human contacts can, and indeed will bring us
together. I have spent forty years as a diplomat for my country, Bangladesh, two years as a
member of its Cabinet shepherding its foreign relations, and am currently an academic
studying the region, and I am entirely persuaded that reliance on peoples than on
governments has to be the key to bringing our nations closer together! Recently in Singapore,
the Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS), where I am a Senior Research Fellow, held a
conference of the South Asian diaspora. We were able to feel the civilizational and cultural
ties that bind us together , something felt more overseas than in the region itself! If there is a
hill that separates us from our goal of seeking unity, we must try and overcome it now:
waiting will not make it any smaller!
.****************
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India and South Asia
(2) Deb Mukharji
Former Ambassador of India
Deb Mukharji was a member of the
Indian Foreign Service (1964-2001) and
retired as India’s Ambassador to Nepal. He
had earlier served as High Commissioner
to Bangladesh (1995-2000), and to Nigeria
(1986-1989). He is an alumnus of the
National Defence College (1976)
After retirement from the foreign service
Shri Mukharji was the convenor of the
Indo-Bangladesh Track II Dialogue (20052007) and has anchored over a hundred tv discussions on Indo-Bangladesh relations.
He is an occasional contributor to newspapers and journals.
Shri Mukharji has published two books: The Magic of Nepal (2005) and Kailash and
Manasarovar:Visions of the Infinite (2009). His interests include trekking,
photography, reading and music.
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India and South Asia
Response to Questionnaire
1.Do you agree with the view that it is the region of South Asia which is set to be the biggest
challenge for India‘s foreign policy? On the one hand, India‘s emergence as a major power
appears to evoke little concern amongst the existing great powers; On the other hand, within
South Asia—where India has long been the dominant player—India is regarded by its
neighbours with resentment and wariness, if not hostility and fear.
There are several elements to this question:
a) South Asia is and shall remain a major challenge to India‘s foreign policy. Not possible
to categorise as to which is the greatest.
b) India‘s emergence as major power is certainly of concern to China. It is also of much
interest to the US
c) The bald statement of India being regarded with resentment, wariness, hostility etc is
baseless and contrary to facts. Of the countries in South Asia, India has stable and
friendly relations with Myanmar, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka and Maldives, close relations
at many levels with Nepal (which has its own internal problems) and extremely friendly
and mutually co-operative relations with Bhutan. Relations with Bangladesh have at
times been negatively affected by the internal politics of Bangladesh. In recent years
these relations have shown a marked improvement. Certainly, in any geographical
configuration, smaller nations would have concerns about any very large neighbor. But
this should not be overstated. The question translates Pakistan into South Asia – which
is unfortunately a continuing tendency among Indians at all levels.
2.Has India become irrelevant in South Asia due to US-China rivalry?
I do not understand the basis of the question. It is mixing up apples and oranges. By virtue of its
size, strength and potential India can never be ‗irrelevent‘ in South Asia. Sino-US relations
have many dimensions which are not confined to, nor focused upon, South Asia.
3. How should the nations of the region cope up with ‗Extra-regional‘ influences?
I presume ‗influences‘ here relates to security and political issues. Ideally, the nations should
not encourage such influences. But the imperatives of geography and immediate security
concerns makes this, at least presently, unavoidable. Afghanistan and the US is a case in point.
We should also remember that China is also a regional power – bordering five South Asian
states.
4. India holds a particular responsibility for, as well as, a vital interest in promoting regional
peace and prosperity. Do India‘s poor relations with neighbours hobble its global ambitions?
Even more cordial relations with her neighbours would certainly enhance India‘s global
prestige.
5. ―Non-reciprocity‖ is an important aspect of India‘s policy for neighbours.
Should India give up this approach ?
―Non reciprocity‖ is usually identified with the Gujral doctrine. I do not think India follows
such a policy. Broadly, I think India tries to develop relationships that go beyond the purely
transactional. I think India should try and be more forthcoming in providing facilities/trade
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FPRC Journal No. 9
India and South Asia
concessions to her neighbours wherever possible. (Pakistan is an exception and requires a
separate discussion)
6.Do you agree with the view that India‘s neighbours are not ― sensitive‖ to its security
concerns?
With the exception of Pakistan, which is positively hostile, I think the other neighbours try to
appreciate our security concerns and react accordingly. In this respect, there were negative
responses from Bangladesh, but in the past few years Dhaka has fully met our security
concerns.
7.Has SAARC exhausted its potential as inter-governmental movement as nothing significant
has come out of SAARC for decades?
Despite attempts to bring countries together through the process of economic integration –
neither peace nor the process of economic integration itself has been fully realised in South
Asia due mainly to inter and intrastate conflicts.
This statement is, unfortunately, broadly correct.
8.How to strengthen cooperative initiatives throughout the South Asian region?
Could Human contact and people –to-people interaction and media help in bringing the
these nations closer?
Investment, besides trade, is an excellent avenue for fostering long term positive relationships.
People to people contact is always important, even if it does not always translate into
government policies. Media can play a very important role in creating understanding and
removing mis-pereceptions. Most regrettably, the Indian media has shown little or no interest in
her neighbours, while remaining obsessed with Pakistan.
*******************
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FPRC Journal No. 9
India and South Asia
(3) Prof. Indra Nath Mukherji
Professor Indra Nath Mukherji, is currently
Senior Consultant, Research and Information
System for Developing Countries, New Delhi.
Professor Mukherji, a gold medallist from Patna
University, where did his Masters (MA) in Economics
in 1964. Later in 1966 he did his Master of Science
(Msc.) in Economics and Administration from
Loughborough University of Technology (UK) under a
scholarship from Burmah Shell. He subsequently
chose teaching as his career, by joining Patna
University as Lecturer in Economics where he taught up to 1971. During the period 1971-2008 he has
been with the Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU). During this period he has served twice as Chairman,
Centre for South, Central, Southeast Asian and Southwest Pacific Studies in the School of International
Studies and Dean School of International Studies from 2001-03. .
He was invited to Institute of Development Studies at the University of Sussex as Visiting Fellow in
1993. He has participated in several national and international Conferences.
Subsequent to joining JNU, Professor Mukherji’s teaching and research interest concerns
international trade and development issues, particularly focussing on the South Asian region.
He has authored two books and co-authored and edited several others. He has to his credit
more than 90 articles published as chapters in books and as research articles in journals in
India and abroad.
Professor Mukherji has completed over 17 research projects sponsored by the Indian
Council of Social Science Research, New Delhi, International Development Research Centre,
Canada, SAARC Network of Researchers, South Asia Network of Economic Research
Institutes (SANEI), Indian Council for Research in International Economic Relations, and a
number of national/international Non-Governmental organisations. He has served as a
consultant/ resource person/peer reviewer for ESCAP, World Bank, Ford Foundation,
Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry, New Delhi, and for a number of
other Governmental and Non-governmental Organisations. These projects relate mostly to
modalities for strengthening of bilateral and regional cooperation in the Asian region,
particularly in South Asia.
During his tenure in Jawaharlal Nehru University Professor Mukherji has in addition,
been teaching at MA./ M.Phil levels on Economic Development and Political Economy of
South Asia. He has been actively involved in supervising and guiding M.Phil / Ph.D.
dissertations / thesis bearing on South Asian development issues, many of which have been
awarded degrees and some have also been published.
Professor Mukherji is currently Member Editorial Board (India), South Asia Economic
Journal, Ex- Member, Editorial Board, Journal of Himalayan Studies, External Member, UGC
Special Assistance Programme, Department of Economics, Kurukshetra University, and in
Centre for South and Southeast Asian Studies, Calcutta University.
Ever since retiring from Jawaharlal Nehru University in September 2008, Professor
Mukherji is currently Senior Consultant, Research and Information system for Developing
Countries, New Delhi.
Email : [email protected]
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FPRC Journal No. 9
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Response to Questionnaire
1. Do you agree with the view that it is the region of South Asia which is set to be the biggest
challenge for India‘s foreign policy? On the one hand, India‘s emergence as a major power
appears to evoke little concern amongst the existing great powers; On the other hand, within
South Asia—where India has long been the dominant player—India is regarded by its
neighbours with resentment and wariness, if not hostility and fear.
True-India’s neighborhood -South Asia -is the biggest challenge in India’s foreign policy. The
second statement is not borne by events-existing major powers do recognize India as an
important emerging power. India’s membership in BRICS, ASEAN COMMUNITY, IBSA, G-20, all such groupings recognize India’s growing status. Many others support India’s candidature
in an expanded United Nations Security Council. Yet, India’s neighbors do lack the confidence
to consider India as a “consensual hegemon”
2. Has India become irrelevant in South Asia due to US-China rivalry?
Both US and China have strong presence in South Asia. Hence US-China rivalry makes India
even more relevant as the region’s major power. If increasing US-China rivalry on global
issues keeps the two major powers away from the region, India could play a more positive
role in the region. However since this is unlikely, US would closely monitor India-China
balance in the region. This could possibly lead to some relaxation of export control regime of
US and US-allied Western powers in favour of India.
3. How should the nations of the region cope up with ‗Extra-regional‘ influences?
In a globalised world, extra-regional influences have come to stay, particularly in the
economic sphere. However, the adverse influences can be better addressed by adopting
common approaches or positions (eg. throu gh SAARC ) in international forums such as
WTO, FAO, UNDP, G77, etc. Vibrant participatory democracy is essential to exercise judgment
on what filters to apply to external influences. Sometimes extra-regional powers are
welcomed to participate in deliberations of regional organizations (eg. presence of extraregional powers as observers in SAARC).
4. India holds a particular responsibility for, as well as, a vital interest in promoting regional
peace and prosperity. Do India‘s poor relations with neighbours hobble its global ambitions?
Since the 1990s, India’s growth story has attracted attention world-wide. India’s foreign
policy too has been aspiring for a global reach. India’s “look east policy” is one such
illustration. Its recent move towards greater linkage with Africa is another example. This
reflects India’s quest for extended markets as also sourcing of vital resources to meet its
developmental goals. It is true that the absence of regional peace and security will impinge
on India’s quest for outreach. However noting that it will take time to mend fences with its
neighbors, India cannot wait for an extended global reach until such times as peace in its
neighborhood has been secured. Given the global financial turmoil in the west, India cannot
miss the opportunity to extend beyond its immediate neighborhood given further that its
major global competitor, notably China is already far ahead in this game. Both the two
processes –strengthening its cohesiveness with neighbours while extending its outreach,
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India and South Asia
must proceed in tandem. Fortunately, some signs of India’s increasing cohesiveness with its
neighbours are visible.
5. ―Non-reciprocity‖ is an important aspect of India‘s policy for neighbours.
Should India give up this approach?
India should continue with this approach of “non-reciprocity”. India cannot afford to lose out
to more resourceful China which is perhaps more proactive in the region and applying this
instrument more actively.But at the same time this policy should ensure that the
beneficiaries are the ones intended to benefit. To illustrate, “non-reciprocity” under the so
called “Gujral Doctrine” permitted, under a revised protocol in 1996 to India Nepal treaty of
1991, the duty-free imports of all manufactured goods from Nepal (barring a short negative
list of 3 items), without any requirement for “rules of origin.”This led to sharp increase of
exports of manufactured products, (particularly vegetable fats, copper products, zinc oxide,
acrylic yarn) to the Indian market. Taking advantage of low external tariffs of principal
inputs for manufacture of such products, Indian investors relocated their manufacturing to
Nepal importing nil or low-duty inputs to export duty-free to India. Such investments had
negligible backward linkage to the Nepalese economy, creating minimal domestic
employment. The Indian government lost customs revenue. The only beneficiaries were a
handful of Indian businessmen who had no long term stake in the Nepalese economy. The reimposition of the “rules of origin” under a protocol in 2002 led to some re-balancing with
stricter conditionality, but not without considerable damage to the bilateral relations
between the two countries.
6. Do you agree with the view that India‘s neighbors are not ―sensitive‖ to its security concerns?
It is true that by and large, India’s neighbors are more concerned about their own country’s
security than that of their larger neighbor. However this is not the case at all times for all the
neighbours. For example Bhutan was quite response to India’s request to weed out ULFA
terrorists who had found sanctuary in Southern Bhutan. ‘Operation all Clear” against Ulfa and
Bodo militants was launched in December 2003 and all camps were burnt down by 5 January
2004. More recently, in late 2009, there took place a dramatic change in counter-terror cooperation between India and Bangladesh. Bangladesh has taken significant steps against
Indian insurgent groups and handed over to Indian authorities several top leaders of a major
insurgent group, the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA). Besides, it has also acted
against religious extremist groups, exposing their network in the sub-continent. These
developments have addressed to some extent India’s complaint that Bangladesh was serving
as a safe haven for such groups.
7. Has SAARC exhausted its potential as inter-governmental movement as nothing significant
has come out of SAARC for decades?Despite attempts to bring countries together through the
process of economic integration – neither peace nor the process of economic integration itself
has been fully realized in South Asia due mainly to inter and intrastate conflicts.
True, the SAARC process has been slow. But the potentials for cooperation are emerging.
The decision of SAFTA Ministerial Council to intensify efforts to fully and effectively implement
SAFTA and the work on reduction in Sensitive Lists as well as early resolution of non-tariff barriers
and expediting the process of harmonizing standards and customs procedures are significant
developments.
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India and South Asia
The SAARC Contracting States have agreed to prune their Sensitive Lists by 20 per cent from the base
level for which the implementation will start from 1 January 2012. Most notable is that at the 17th
SAARC Summit, India has offered to reduce its Sensitive List for LDCs to only 25 items (from an
earlier reduced list of 480 items) which became effective from 9 November 2011. India’s earlier
decision at a bilateral level to permit duty-free imports on a number of tariff lines in garments with
improved and unconditional quotas from Bangladesh and Sri Lanka is already witnessing more
favorable market access for its partner countries. Further, the 17th SAARC Summit Declaration has
urged the conclusion of a Regional Railways Agreement and to convene the Expert Group Meeting on
the Motor Vehicles Agreement before the next Session of the Council of Ministers and directed the
early conducting of a demonstration run of a container train (Bangladesh – India – Nepal). These are
no insignificant gains and I see more to come as progress on greater connectivity and
trade/investment facilitation takes place.
8. How to strengthen cooperative initiatives throughout the South Asian region?
Could Human contact and people –to-people interaction and media help in bringing these
nations closer?
Yes-there is greater need to foster more people-to-people contact to bring the people of the region
together. The seventeenth SAARC declaration to hold the Twelfth SAARC Trade Fair along with
SAARC Travel and Tourism Fair in Kulhudhuffushi, Maldives in 2012; and to develop modalities, by
involving the relevant private sector, in promoting the region globally as “Destination South Asia” are
positive initiatives. Besides, an initiative to mark a SAARC Media Day and, in that context, to convene
a Regional Conference on Media to consider deepening collaboration in the region is another
initiative to be worked on.
It is unfortunate that even though a report on SAARC Regional Multimodal Study (SRMTS) was
submitted as far back as June 2006, its recommendations have not been acted upon with necessary
follow-up plan. Only two meetings of SAARC Transport Ministers have so far been convened and even
some of the proposals highlighted in these meetings drawn from the SAARC study needs to be acted
upon. Fortunately, India is trying to further connectivity with its neighbors at a bilateral level.
******************
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(4) John Wood, COL, USA (ret.)
Associate Professor
[email protected]
NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY
NEAR EAST SOUTH ASIA CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20319-5066
John Wood is an Associate Professor on the faculty of
the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies.
Prior to joining the NESA Center he served as the
Senior Director for Afghanistan, The National Security
Council, Washington, D.C. from 2007 to 2009 under
both the Bush and Obama Administrations.
John served 28 years in the United States Army as an
Armor officer, retiring as a Colonel. Prior to his time
at the National Security Council, he served in the
Pentagon as the Assistant Deputy Director for PoliticoMilitary Affairs – Asia, The Joint Staff, where he was
responsible for regional planning and policies for the
implementation of the National Security Strategy for Asia, providing politico-military advice to
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the National Command Authorities, and
supporting the commanders of the U.S. Central Command and the U.S. Pacific Command.
Previous assignments include both command and staff billets in Korea, Europe, and the United
States. John was previously an Assistant Professor of Operations Research at the Army
Logistics Management College and was later the Division Chief for Army Well Being on the
Army Staff. From 2002 – 2003 he served as the Military Assistant to the Acting Secretary of the
Army.
He holds a bachelors degree from the US Military Academy, West Point, NY, as well as
masters degrees from the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California (Operations
Research and Systems Analysis Engineering) and from the Industrial College of the Armed
Forces, National Defense University, Washington, D.C. He is a graduate of the Combined
Arms and Services Staff School, the Command and General Staff College, and the Industrial
College of the Armed Forces.
John resides in northern Virginia with his wife, Laura. They have three children .
―CONCORDIA PER COMMENTATIONEM‖
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FPRC Journal No. 9
India and South Asia
Response to Questionnaire
on
India and South Asia
1.Do you agree with the view that it is the region of South Asia which is set to be the biggest
challenge for India‘s foreign policy? On the one hand, India‘s emergence as a major power appears
to evoke little concern amongst the existing great powers; On the other hand, within South Asia—
where India has long been the dominant player—India is regarded by its neighbours with
resentment and wariness, if not hostility and fear.
South Asia will undoubtedly remain a major challenge for India‘s foreign policy for the foreseeable
future. While India continues to grow in terms of military, economic, and diplomatic power, it will
still be some number of years – if ever - before India becomes a ―great power‖ in the historical
sense of the phrase. From a regional perspective, though, India is likely to wield an increasing
degree of influence. Relations with Pakistan are likely to remain problematic, but economic realities
will eventually set in, and India‘s massive and growing economic power may eventually be the force
that compels Pakistan to alter its present course. The recent gesture from Pakistan‘s political
leaders toward extending Most Favored Nation status to India is encouraging. However, it is also
important to put such gestures into proper context. As founding members of what is now the World
Trade Organization, Pakistan and India should have been pursuing equal and non-discriminatory
trade since 1948. The key now is to see whether the Pakistani parliament and military establishment
will take meaningful actions to implement such a change in policy to move away from the Positive
List system currently in use, and likewise whether India will move from rhetoric to true
implementation.
2.Has India become irrelevant in South Asia due to US-China rivalry?
Quite the contrary. India‘s importance and influence in the region becomes all the more important
as the U.S.-China economic competition intensifies. It is India‘s potential as an economic
powerhouse, coupled with the geographic location in South Asia that will increase India‘s role vis-àvis the U.S. and China.
3. How should the nations of the region cope up with ‗Extra-regional‘ influences?
The United States, China, Russia, and other external actors will always be active in South Asia,
whether in terms of economics, diplomacy, or security activities. The countries of South Asia
cannot afford to simply ―wish away‖ the presence and influence of ―extra-regional‖ actors.
Therefore, increased diplomatic and trade negotiation efforts are warranted, as well as continued
cooperation and actions within regional organizations such as SAARC.
4. India holds a particular responsibility for, as well as a vital interest in, promoting regional peace
and prosperity. Do India‘s poor relations with neighbours hobble its global ambitions?
India has perhaps better relations at present with its neighbors than in years past, but the relations
are nevertheless not as good as one would desire. India cannot graduate to ―global power‖ status if
it cannot maintain positive and productive affairs within the South Asia region. First and foremost,
India must work with Pakistan to improve and expand positive relations through confidence
building measures that build mutual trust, improved economic opportunities beneficial to both
countries, and broader regional economic integration. India‘s ―concentric circle‖ model is apt –
build improved relations with the neighbors and near-neighbors before attempting global ambitions.
5. ―Non-reciprocity‖ is an important aspect of India‘s policy for neighbours.
Should India give up this approach?
India need not abandon non-reciprocity. In fact, India may want to strive to actually apply all five
principles of the policy across the region. What India might also want to do is re-evaluate what the
Gujral Doctrine means in today‘s context and, more importantly, how the region perceives India‘s
current application of the doctrine. Much of the region continues to believe India‘s actions are
inconsistent with, or in direct opposition to, the doctrine. All five of the principles must be adhered
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India and South Asia
to first by India, and in ways that are apparent to all. Only then will the neighbors reach out in ―good
faith and trust‖ as the first principle states.
6.Do you agree with the view that India‘s neighbours are not ― sensitive‖ to its security concerns?
India‘s neighbors are first and foremost sensitive to their own security concerns. Any nation,
regardless of what region of the world, takes actions and formulates policy in its own interest, not in
the interest of others. The neighbors are quite aware of India‘s security concerns, but they will
formulate policies and strategies only in their own self-interest.
7.Has SAARC exhausted its potential as inter-governmental movement as nothing significant has
come out of SAARC for decades?
Despite attempts to bring countries together through the process of economic integration – neither
peace nor the process of economic integration itself has been fully realised in South Asia due
mainly to inter and intrastate conflicts.
SAARC remains an important regional organization. Although as you say ―neither peace nor the
process of economic integration itself has been fully realized‖ there is no reason for India or the
other members of SAARC to abandon the organization. Any forum that facilitates dialogue and a
sincere exchange of views is worthwhile, and remains important precisely because the ultimate
objectives have yet to be met.
8.How to strengthen cooperative initiatives throughout the South Asian region?
Could Human contact and people –to-people interaction and media help in bringing the these
nations closer?
One only need look at the Arab Spring events of 2011 to see the enormous power of social
networks, people-to-people interaction, and the growing impact of media. Social networks and
digital media are in fact changing the definition of people-to-people interaction, as the virtual world
eclipses physical travel. Governments are beginning to realize that the digital communications
facilitate the links between the people of the world and break down artificial barriers erected to keep
countries (and ideas, culture, and politics) distinct and apart. As the digital connectivity between
the people of South Asia increases, the demand for workable economic agreements, sharing of
resources, and the exchange of ideas will explode. Government-to-government interaction will be
hard-pressed to keep up with the people-to-people interaction.
**************************
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(5) Dr Ishtiaq Ahmad
Quaid-e-Azam Fellow at St. Antony’s College,
and Senior Research Associate
at Centre for International Studies, University of Oxford, UK
Dr Ishtiaq Ahmad is the Quaid-e-Azam Fellow at St.
Antony‘s College, and Senior Research Associate at Centre
for International Studies, University of Oxford, UK. He is
also an Associate Professor of International Relations at
Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad. He previously served
as Assistant Professor/Vice Chair of International
Relations, Eastern Mediterranean University, North
Cyprus; Senior Research Fellow, Area Study Centre, Quaid-e-Azam University; and
visiting faculty member, National Defense University and Foreign Service Academy,
Islamabad. He is a recipient of several fellowships, including Fulbright Fellowship,
University of California, Santa Barbra; Hanns-Seidel Foundation Fellowship, ChristianAlberchts University, Kiel, Germany. He has written widely on security and terrorism
issues in South Asia. His publications include several articles published in refereed
journals such as Asian Affairs; chapters in edited volumes by publishers like Sage
and Routledge; and books such as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar: An Afghan Trail from Jihad
to Terrorism (2004) and Nuclear Non-Proliferation Issues in South Asia (1996).
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FPRC Journal No. 9
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Response to Questionnaire
on
India and South Asia
1.Do you agree with the view that it is the region of South Asia which is set to be
the biggest challenge for India‘s foreign policy? On the one hand, India‘s emergence
as a major power appears to evoke little concern amongst the existing great
powers; on the other hand, within South Asia—where India has long been the
dominant player—India is regarded by its neighbors with resentment and wariness,
if not hostility and fear.
Yes I agree with this view. For almost all the attributes of its national power—geography,
demography, economy, military, and culture—give India an irrevocable edge over the rest of
the countries in South Asia (provided China is considered an extra-regional player). India‘s
economic rise in the past two decades has particularly added to its international profile as a
major South Asian power that is increasingly making its presence felt at the world stage. It is,
therefore, quite paradoxical to observe growing recognition of India‘s regional prowess by the
existing great powers, particularly the United States and its Western allies, alongside a
simultaneously continuing perception or misperception among India‘s South Asian neighbours
about its traditionally domineering approach in the region. Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bangladesh and
especially Pakistan are four of India‘s neighbours that have continuingly, or at some point in
recent history, maintained a ―hegemonic India‖ outlook. The prevalence of such outlook is
understandable, given the enormous disparity between India‘s national power and that of its
neighbours, particularly the historical instances of India‘s intrusive conduct vis-à-vis Sri
Lanka, Nepal and Bangladesh and mostly hostile relations with Pakistan. How to gain
confidence of its smaller South Asian neighbors has been and will, therefore, remain the
principal foreign policy for India.
2. Has India become irrelevant in South Asia due to US-China rivalry?
Not necessarily! It may be wrong to presume that a full-blown rivalry exists presently
between the United States and China. There are areas of mutual dependence between the
two great powers revolving around trade and commerce. Even in the security sphere, such as
countering international terrorism, the Sino-US interests are mostly compatible. In the postCold War American foreign policy, China has mostly been considered a challenge rather than
a threat—and, therefore, the Sino-US relationship can at best be described as one of
competition between an established and an emerging great power. However, as clear from
the recently unveiled US defense strategy for the next decade by the Obama Administration,
Washington perceives Beijing as constituting the key challenge to US global military
superiority. China‘s consistent economic growth in the last over three decades has enabled it
to emerge as the second biggest defense spender after the US. Seen in this backdrop, India
will remain relevant in South Asia both in the short term, as both China and the US woo it as
part of their competitive strategy for Asia; and the long run, when India will have the choice
to align with either the US or China during their rivalry, or be relatively neutral, as it did
during the US-Soviet Cold War. Even in contemporary literature on the subject, America using
India as a counterpoise to contain China in future is a notion that is widely embraced by
proponents of emerging Sino-US rivalry.
3. How should the nations of the region cope up with ‗extra-regional‘ influences?
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India and South Asia
Ever since the end of British colonialism, South Asia has consistently been a victim of ‗extraregional influences.‘ During the Cold War, the US-Soviet competition was extended to the
region—with the anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan creating source of instability that continue to
haunt it until present. The War on Terror in Afghanistan and the region in the last over a
decade has likewise made South Asia susceptible to the squabbling of international powers,
with its ripple effect being felt in Pakistan and beyond. Given that, it is in the individual and
collective interest of all the South Asian states, meaning the eight members of the South
Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), to act together to minimize the
inherently or potentially destabilizing role and influence of outside powers. Only a viable
normalization process aimed at harmonizing the hitherto sordid relations among the South
Asian states can help them realize this pragmatic goal.
4. India holds a particular responsibility for, as well as, a vital interest in promoting
regional peace and prosperity. Do India‘s poor relations with neighbors hobble its
global ambitions?
As already mentioned, India‘s extraordinary prowess in the region empowers it with this
particular responsibility and vital interest. That a few of India‘s smaller neighbours continue to
suspect its regional ambitions remains the most important challenge for its foreign policy
establishment. The gap between how rising India is globally viewed in a positive fashion and
how it is regionally perceived in a negative manner has to narrow down—as without winning
over the countries of the region, India‘s global acknowledgement of being a major South
Asian power will continue to be marred by a major aberration. New Delhi is, thus, left with no
choice but to proactively foster closer links with all the countries of the region, and do
whatever it can to overcome their respective insecurities and suspicions having rational
historical roots or legitimate current causes. It has done well to help Sri Lanka tackle Tamil
insurgency, and also attempted to considerably overcome tensions over trade and water
issues with Nepal and Bangladesh. India‘s decision to resume dialogue with Pakistan at the
start of 2011, which has made significant progress in the trade sector, is almost a good omen.
India has to build upon the peace momentum generated by such credible bilateral overtures
on its part.
5. ―Non-reciprocity‖ is an important aspect of India‘s policy for neighbors.
Should India give up this approach?
India should not give up this unique principal of its foreign policy for the simple reason that all
of its neighbors are far smaller than it in almost every way. Would expecting reciprocity from
Nepal or Bangladesh, for instance, make sense? Since becoming nuclear powers in 1998,
India and Pakistan may have been able to achieve strategic parity, yet Pakistan is several
times behind India in the remaining, essentially non-military elements of national power.
Following the 2008 terrorist attacks in Mumbai, New Delhi made progress in the peace
process conditional to Pakistani reciprocity over counter-terrorism issues. An approach that
did not work, and eventually since the start of 2011, the two countries have resumed the
dialogue without letting their differences over terrorism becoming a stumbling bloc. Broadly
speaking, India‘s claim as a major regional power with global ambition must correspond with
a due sense of responsibility for regional stability and peace, which necessitates continued
adherence to ―non-reciprocity‖ principle in its external relations in the region.
6. Do you agree with the view that India‘s neighbours are not ―sensitive‖ to its
security concerns?
Yes, but only partly. First, a major reason why South Asia‘s smaller states such as Pakistan,
Sri Lanka or Nepal may be insensitive to India‘s security concerns is their respective sense of
insecurity from India. Second, there have, indeed, been a couple of instances in the last over
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FPRC Journal No. 9
India and South Asia
a decade where India‘s civilian or military leadership has unnecessarily attempted to create
public hype over the security threat to the country from China. If this threat ever became real
in future, the degree of sensitivity towards it among India‘s neighbours would depend on its
ability or the lack of it to tackle their respective India-centric sources of insecurity.
7. Has SAARC exhausted its potential as inter-governmental movement as nothing
significant has come out of SAARC for decades?
Despite attempts to bring countries together through the process of economic
integration – neither peace nor the process of economic integration itself has been
fully realized in South Asia due mainly to inter and intrastate conflicts.
An organization that has been in existence in South Asia since 1985 but has not moved ahead
in fostering credible regional integration constitutes a legitimate critique on SAARC. But, then,
is there any other alternative available for bringing the South Asians together on a single
regional platform? At least SAARC must be credited with whatever meaningful initiatives it
has undertaken and positive accomplishments it has been able to make, especially in the
fields of commerce, trade and culture. It is true that the existence of bilateral conflicts such
as Kashmir is the main factor that has prevented due progress in SAARC. However, there are
a couple of examples of successful regionalism in South Asia‘s vicinity, including the
Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) in South-East Asia and the Shanghai
Cooperation organization (SCO) in Central Asia, in which the respective member-states
deemed it important to resolve bilateral conflicts at the start and subsequently move ahead to
foster a viable regional cooperation in crucial economic, political, security, social, cultural and
environmental areas. There is no reason why SAARC member-states cannot emulate the path
adopted by countries in the region‘s neighbourhood.
8. How to strengthen cooperative initiatives throughout the South Asian region?
Could Human contact and people–to-people interaction and media help in bringing
these nations closer?
For a viable integrative process in South Asia, what is required is simultaneous progress in a
top-down approach that aims to settle lingering political disputes among the South Asian
countries and a bottom-up approach which strives to deepen their economic and cultural
links. The Information Age offers enormous opportunity for cross-border public connectivity,
and, if combined with enhanced people-to-people interaction under the auspices of SAARC, it
can make a big difference in overcoming the sources of insecurity, suspicion and hatred
engrained in the public mindset of the South Asian states with bilateral conflicts. Of course,
the quest for peace and progress in South Asia is easier said that done, but it remains an
option not worth abandoning.
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(6)Dr. Kripa Sridharan
Head of Research,
Asia for World-Check
Kripa Sridharan is currently the Head of Research, Asia for
World-Check.* She was an Adjunct Associate Professor in
the South Asian Studies Programme, Faculty of Arts and
Social Sciences, National University of Singapore (NUS)
from August 2007 to August 2010. Prior to that she was a
Senior Lecturer (1992 – 2007) in the Department of Political
Science, NUS where she taught international relations and
South Asian politics.
Kripa’s refereed articles have appeared in the Asian Studies Review, Third World Quarterly,
Round Table, Diplomacy and Statecraft, Contemporary South Asia, and Asian Thought and
Society. She has also authored a few books:
Indo-US Engagement: An Emerging Partnership and its Implications, New Delhi: MacMillan, 2009.
Regional Cooperation in South Asia and Southeast Asia, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian
Studies, 2007.
Political Science: An Introductory Text, Singapore: McGraw Hill Asia, 2007.
Human Rights Perspectives, Singapore: United Nations Association of Singapore & Pagesetters,
1999, (co-editor).
The ASEAN Region in India’s Foreign Policy, Aldershot, UK and Brookfield, Vermont: Dartmouth
Publishing Co., Gower House, 1996.
Kripa has a post-graduate degree from the University of London and a Ph.D. from the National
University of Singapore. She was awarded the Henry Charles Chapman Visiting Fellowship in 2006
by the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London.
Apart from her academic pursuits Kripa is also fond of travelling, reading and listening to Indian
music, both classical and light. She enjoys reading 18th and 19th century English literature, modern
European history and political biographies. Her travels have taken her to Africa, Australia,
Europe, North America and almost every part of Asia.
*World-Check provides website-based risk screening service and it was recently acquired by
Thomson Reuters.
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FPRC Journal No. 9
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Response to Questionnaire
on
India and South Asia
1.Do you agree with the view that it is the region of South Asia which is set to be the biggest
challenge for India‘s foreign policy? On the one hand, India‘s emergence as a major power appears to
evoke little concern amongst the existing great powers;on the other hand, within South Asia—where
India has long been the dominant player—India is regarded by its neighbours with resentment and
wariness, if not hostility and fear.
The South Asian region cannot be ignored by India if it wants to realize its goal of becoming a
global player of consequence. Obviously, the region has not been easy to manage owing to
several unresolved conflicts and an overall trust deficit. To that extent, the region certainly
remains a challenge for India but not an insuperable one.
It is true that India’s rise is perceived in more positive terms by outsiders than by its own
regional neighbours who find it difficult to give India the benefit of doubt. In comparison to
other regions where major regional powers enjoy a certain amount of confidence among its
smaller neighbours India evokes deep misgivings.
It is also true that no other region displays the level of asymmetry that South Asia does. This
complicates India’s engagement with its neighbours even when India does not indulge in any
overtly antagonistic acts against them. Pakistan has never been comfortable with India’s
primacy. The other South Asian states do no better than grudgingly acknowledge New Delhi’s
pre-eminence. A rising India only adds a further edge to these perceptions. No doubt, India’s
ties are not uniformly bad with all its neighbours but overall, the lack of goodwill for India is
clearly palpable in the region.
Among the external powers India’s emerging great power status is perceived in beneficial
terms by the US, EU and Japan. The Southeast Asian states also view India’s rise in positive
terms as this fits in with their preference for a multi-polar balance. But China, on the
contrary, has reservations about India’s growing strength for obvious reasons. Beijing’s
South Asian forays plus its efforts to limit India’s presence and influence in Southeast Asia
attest to this fact.
2.Has India become irrelevant in South Asia due to US-China rivalry?
I do not think so. India cannot become irrelevant in South Asia given its size and capabilities.
If I understand the question correctly, it presumably refers to the current US-China equations
that may result in South Asian states having to choose between the two great powers. While
this might be so in the case of Pakistan which is facing a crisis in its ties with the US and is
therefore trying to strengthen its already strong relations with Beijing, it cannot be said that
this applies equally to the rest of South Asia. India, of course, looms large in Pakistan’s
strategic calculations and therefore the question of irrelevance does not arise. As for the
other South Asian states it is well nigh impossible for them to ignore India just because of USChina rivalry. India has always been, and will continue to be, the major factor in their
security.
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India and South Asia
China’s sustained effort to reach out to the smaller sub-continental countries naturally riles
India. While reciprocating China’s overtures some of these countries also look up to the US as
insurance. This means that China cannot have it all its way especially now when US-India
relations have grown quite close.
3. How should the nations of the region cope up with ‗Extra-regional‘ influences?
Ideally, by not playing off one power against another but that is easier said than done.
India and her neighbours have viewed the presence and influence of extra-regional actors
within the region in diametrically opposite ways. India has been extremely wary of outside
intervention in the region and has regarded their role as highly intrusive and harmful to its
strategic interests unless such intervention occurred on its terms. Interestingly, India’s
insistence that extra-regional powers should acknowledge New Delhi as the pre-eminent
regional power and leave the region to its care has never been honoured either by its
regional neighbours or their external mentors. This is particularly so in the case of Pakistan
which has relied on extra-regional partners/friends to bolster its security vis-à-vis India. The
external powers have been equally dismissive of India’s exclusivist claims even if they
reluctantly admit that New Delhi is a regional heavyweight. Time and again, they have
supported Pakistan in its bid to balance India. India’s smaller neighbours have been no less
assiduous in forging external links to offset India’s overwhelming weight.
That said, perhaps the time has come when there is a need to overcome such divergent views
on external powers’ presence and a more nuanced approach adopted to deal with extraregional interests in South Asia. India, in any case, has never succeeded in insulating the
region and preventing outside meddling. What is more, perhaps there is no need for India
anymore to persist in this quest. With its growing economic and strategic weight New Delhi
is in a position to channel such interests in a structured way which could be beneficial for
itself and the region. Making a virtue out of necessity India should devise a constructive
engagement strategy with external actors and encourage them to work for regional
prosperity. China in particular has been keen to make its presence felt in SAARC and that
vehicle can be used for involving it in the region’s economic development. This in turn would
reduce the level of anxiety experienced by smaller South Asian states when they reach out to
other countries. It would also make their relationship with external powers more open and
transparent.
4. India holds a particular responsibility for, as well as, a vital interest in promoting regional peace
and prosperity. Do India‘s poor relations with neighbours hobble its global ambitions?
It has been mentioned by many seasoned observers that unless India manages or secures its
own immediate neighbourhood it cannot hope to make any mark in the larger Asian or global
arena. The region’s protracted bilateral conflicts and a glaring lack of regional harmony have
kept India overly pre-occupied with the region leaving it with little energy to pursue a more
vigorous global role. In fact, a recognition of the debilitating effects of such pre-occupation
led India in the 1990s to opt for a benign initiative like the Gujral Doctrine which was
anchored in the concept of ‘positive asymmetry’, that is, as the largest state in the region
India should make unilateral gestures and concessions without insisting on reciprocity. This
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helped stabilize India’s ties with its neighbours and led to a greater interest in strengthening
the regional cooperation process.
5. ―Non-reciprocity‖ is an important aspect of India‘s policy for neighbours.
Should India give up this approach ?
Non-reciprocity is a very useful strategy to follow and it does have some decided benefits.
What is more, India is in a position now more than at any other time to make certain
concessions given its economic weight. The present government seems to be in a mood to
take the benign approach forward by pursuing a ‘peaceful periphery’ policy which has seen
substantial improvement in ties with Bangladesh, Nepal and so on. Even with Pakistan
India’s relations are on the mend. Pakistan’s decision to extend the most favoured nation
status to India was a notable departure from its earlier policy. Reportedly, the two countries
are now proposing to move towards a preferential trade agreement.
The policy of positive asymmetry and non-reciprocity was in full display during the recent
SAARC summit when the Indian Prime Minister held bilateral meetings with all his regional
counterparts. That said, while it is true that a larger country like India should offer unilateral
concessions to its smaller neighbours, they in turn, should also play their part in such a way
that their larger partner finds it worthwhile to be generous.
6.Do you agree with the view that India‘s neighbours are not ― sensitive‖ to its security concerns?
While India is keen to uphold the principle of non-reciprocity it is also not coy about stating
that it would like its neighbours to be sensitive to its security concerns. New Delhi would not
unduly stress this factor unless it strongly felt that its vital concerns were not being fully
taken into account by the regional states when they permit the use of their territories for
hostile activities against India. At the same time, India should also appreciate the domestic
political compulsions that determine some of these states’ policies towards India.
7.Has SAARC exhausted its potential as inter-governmental movement as nothing significant has
come out of SAARC for decades?
Despite attempts to bring countries together through the process of economic integration –
neither peace nor the process of economic integration itself has been fully realised in South
Asia due mainly to inter and intrastate conflicts.
As explained in my book on Regional Cooperation in South Asia and Southeast Asia, nowhere
is the need for conflict management through cooperation greater than in South Asia and
nowhere is it as patchy as it is there. A lack of common understanding on the guiding
principle of regionalism has bedevilled the smooth progress of SAARC. SAARC seems to be a
victim of two irreconcilable notions underlying regional cooperation. Some members are
convinced that without achieving peace and security in the region and resolving bilateral
disputes it is pointless to expect any meaningful progress in regional cooperation. As
opposed to this there are those who support the functionalist logic with its emphasis on
economic cooperation and a spill over effect. Such cooperation is expected to strengthen
mutual trust and eventually dampen political differences between member-states.
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What is surprising is that SAARC may not have achieved great success but it has nonetheless
spawned sufficient international interest. It has admitted nine states as observers and more
want to join the band. SAARC seems to have become important because of the world’s
growing interest in South Asia, a region which is full of challenges and but also holds great
potential.
8.How to strengthen cooperative initiatives throughout the South Asian region?
Could Human contact and people –to-people interaction and media help in bringing the these nations
closer?
It is undeniable that bringing the region’s people into the equation is gaining great merit in
regional discourses these days. This is a dominant concern in many regional projects.
Regionalism cannot be advertised as being beneficial to people without making any effort to
include them in the regional enterprise. People-to-people contacts and identity-creation are
therefore the two major regional themes that are being emphasised now. Most regional
organizations want to shed their elitist image and make regionalism more inclusive. For
regionalism to succeed it is essential that people should buy into that project.
This is something which both the EU and ASEAN, in varying degrees, are trying to promote.
SAARC is also exerting some effort in this direction but its fractious politics makes it doubly
difficult to ensure a people-driven SAARC. It is perhaps this reality which is inducing some
citizens to push vigorously for ‘popular regionalism’ in the fond hope that demand from
below will force the political class to take regional cooperation more seriously.
South Asia’s civil society is more restive to take the regional process forward than its leaders.
They are aware of the cultural and social commonalities that exist in the region and are
confident that left to themselves they can forge a common identity and work together. The
21st century SAARC should be a people-centric SAARC. Creative diplomacy and the power of
technology should act in tandem to make this possible.
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Special Comment :
Bonn’s Second Afghanistan Conference (December 5th 2011) in Perspective
Shifting or Shirking Responsibility?
by Dr. Siegfried O. Wolf
South Asia Institute, University of Heidelberg
‘Nothing is straightforward in Afghanistan’, for this remarkable finding of German Foreign
Minister Dr. Guido Westerwelle in his policy statement to the German Parliament on the 15th
December 2011, the international community needed 10 years, billions of dollars and cost
thousands of human lives. After Bonn I in 2001, which was about dreams of security and
freedom, one decade later Bonn II had to deal with realities on the ground, limiting the
damage of another military adventure of the US and its allies. On December 5th 2011, around
1000 delegates from more than 80 countries and 15 international organizations/regimes
discussed the basic framework for a new phase of the international engagement in
Afghanistan. But the overall aim of the conference was not to set concrete parameters for the
country’s future, it was more about finding a good story-line for the West to get out of
Afghanistan as soon and as cheap as possible without losing face. Therefore, tremendous
efforts were made to underline the achievements of the last decade as well as to give the
impression that the withdrawing combat troops would be leaving behind an almost stable
country and an international community which would never forget Afghanistan again. Being
aware of this staged spectacle, a remarkably self-confident Afghan delegation aimed at
extracting as many commitments as possible from the international community and in return
offering almost nothing. However, the official purpose of the conference was to broaden the
basis of cooperation between the international community and Afghanistan as well as to
convince the Afghan government and people that they could trust the international
community and that they will receive support beyond 2014. In this light, Bonn II was
envisaged to cover particularly the following three areas: Handing over responsibility for
security from the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to the Afghan National
Security Forces (ANSF), long-term international engagement including financial support and
training for Afghan security forces, building-up of administration, economic development,
and the continuation of the peace and national reconciliation process. Due to various
reasons, it is not surprising that regarding each of these issues – beside vague ‘mutual
commitments’ – the conference did not produce any significant outcomes. Regarding the
aspect of, there is a common understanding among the ISAF states that instead of deploying
some tens of thousands of combat troops, it’s time that the Afghans by themselves should
fight the Taliban and other Opposing Militant Forces (OMF). This process, which is called a
period of transition, will be finalized by the end of 2014. There is no doubt that the Afghan
government has to gain full sovereignty and authority as soon as possible. But given the
difficulties which the ANSF currently has had to face after security responsibilities were
handed over in almost 30% to 40% of the territory, one might raise the legitimate question if
the Afghan government will be able to maintain the monopoly over the use of force, ensure
stability as well as protect the political system and its institutions. In other words, it is
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obvious that the decision to withdraw the international troops from Afghanistan was not
based on a positive assessment of the security situation, meaning that ISAF fulfilled its
mission and is leaving a stable and secure Afghanistan behind. In contrast, the ISAF was not
able to crack down on the Taliban and other OMF in the country which are starting to
interpret the withdrawal as a forced retreat and claiming victory. Interestingly, the ISAF is
now promulgating that a military solution is not possible and a political one is the only way
forward. But, this of course must be an ‘Afghan-led process’, the buzzword of Bonn II. Here
lies the real handing over of ‘responsibility’. Taking into account the on-going insurgencies,
high profile terrorist attacks, the killing of former President Burhanuddin Rabbani who
initiated the negotiations with the Taliban, stiff resistance and controversies regarding the
establishment of a Taliban-liaison office, all actors involved realize that peace and
reconciliation is hardly feasible in the near future. As such, one must admit that it seems as if
the ISAF lost twice: First, they were not able to implement a military solution; second they
refused to take on the official responsibility to carry out a political solution. This is gaining
momentum when one assesses the performance of the Taliban over the last decade,
compared to the ISAF and ANSF. Today’s Taliban are not only stronger morally and
psychologically than ever before, but also mightier in political, economic and military terms
as well. For example, Taliban fighters get paid 30 to 50 per cent better on average better than
members of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP).
Furthermore, considering the insufficient equipment of ANA and ANP, the existence of local
power centers with private militias, the tremendous tasks and security threats to deal with, it
will be difficult for the central (civilian) government to keep the security sector loyal and
under control. There are already numerous reports of members of the ANP defecting to the
Taliban or other OMF. In this context, one must also ask if the Taliban are actually willing to
enter a peace process. The Taliban are quite aware that the central government is losing
legitimacy, its administration is ineffective and corrupt, and in military terms not an essential
challenge to their own armed capabilities. Consequently from a Taliban point of view, one
could argue that there is no need to enter a peace process. However, the fact that no Taliban
representative were at the latest Bonn conference indicates the long and difficult way
towards a political solution for future Afghan governments.
In this context, it was most unfortunate that the conference was overshadowed by
Pakistan’s boycott. Islamabad’s decision not to participate is a dramatic setback for any sort
of peace and reconciliation process. First of all, Pakistan is becoming increasingly isolated in
the region because of its arch rivalry with India, increasing disharmony between Kabul and
Islamabad, and, despite improvements, a still ambiguous relationship with Iran. Dropping
out of such an important international conference will isolate Islamabad even more. Second,
it creates suspicions about Pakistan’s interests in Afghanistan. In other words, Afghans are
becoming increasingly concerned that Islamabad might be not interested in cooperating with
the international community since it has its very own strategy deviating from Karzai’s vision
of peace and national reconciliation. Third, it indicates how volatile and fragile Pakistan’s
civil-military relations are, especially the unsteadiness of the civilian government. Therefore,
one cannot help but feeling that it seems as though Pakistan’s Afghanistan policy is primarily
dominated by short-term domestic determinants instead of a visionary long-term foreign
policy. However, one has to understand that the political landscape in Pakistan is complex,
and the political room to maneuver for the civilian elite as well as the military top echelon
has become remarkably constricted. Basically the country needs to re-assess the
fundamental determinants of its foreign policy. This process needs time which nobody has or
is willing to grant decision-makers - neither the civilians in Islamabad nor the generals in
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Rawalpindi. Nevertheless, the international community is aware that there will be no
political solution for Afghanistan without Pakistan.
The regional determinants for Afghanistan’s future are becoming even more complex
with a view to Iran’s plans. Being also very interested in a stable neighborhood, Iran played a
relatively constructive role during Bonn II. But despite the fact that Iran’s Foreign Minister
Ali Akbar Saleh spared the conference with an all too open attack on the US, he made quite
clear that his country will not accept the maintenance of foreign bases and troops in
Afghanistan after 2014. In the light of this US-Iran hostility, the worsening of US-Pakistan
relations, an Iran-Pakistan rapprochement, and the Indo-Pakistan rivalry there is no doubt
that the matrix of interests of major regional and non-regional players is quite complex,
contradictory and will remain harmful to Afghanistan’s development. Therefore, besides
promises, there is no guarantee that the Afghan government can be assured that its
neighbors will respect its sovereignty and territorial integrity. In other words, there is no
assurance that attempts from abroad to undermine the autonomy of Afghan political
decision-making will be stopped.
In retrospect, Bonn II did not have much to offer except the presentation of remarkable
‘taboo topics’. For example, the term ‘Taliban’ did not appear in official statements during the
conference. Even more, the topic of Taliban was not discussed at all (at least not publicly),
which is confusing since peace and reconciliation was a major issue. Another astonishing
experience was that it seemed that any critic of President Karzai and his administration was
cut from the agenda. This was an unfortunate phenomenon, since it seems that the current
Afghan government developed a certain degree of resilience and resistance regarding the
implementation of reforms and concrete anti-corruption measures. This not only creates
suspicion but also raises the legitimate question regarding the credibility of the Karzai
commitment’s towards democracy. In this context, one should also scrutinize Karzai’s
ambitions to change the constitution in order to get reelected and stay in power for a third
term in office as President. In this context, there are also plans of reshaping the Afghan
central government. Changing the institutional design in such an unstable democratic
landscape is an ambiguous and venturous political exercise which might transform the
constitution into a scapegoat for particular interests. Being neither a donor meeting nor a
peace conference, but a conference which tried to set up the basic frame for future
cooperation and development -one must wonder why the international community did not
shed any light on the alarming patterns of democratic transformation.
Last but not least, on the issue of the international community’s commitment towards a
long-term engagement in the so-called period of transformation – the decade which is
follows the transition of responsibility (2014-2015) - serious challenges appear. Basically,
the leading NATO/ISAF states are totally exhausted military, financially and politically. The
governments are losing the support from their own people, especially from their respective
electorates, for the on-going military mission. Furthermore, in the face of the economic and
financial crisis of the US and EU, their politicians lack the room to maneuver to legitimate any
kind of future engagement in Afghanistan. Subsequently, one must be aware that the US and
EU are not only running out of arguments but also of financial resources for any kind of longterm engagement. Therefore, the donor conference in Tokyo in July 2012 will be the real
‘Litmus test’ for the future partnership between Kabul and the international community. To
sum up, there is a slight perception that the West is not ‘shifting’ but ‘shirking’ responsibility.
However, Karzai is once again achieving his central goal - keeping the cash flowing from the
international community!
***************
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Articles
1. Amb. Shamshad Ahmed,Former Foreign Secretary of Pakistan
2. Amb.Kazi Anwarul Masud, Former Ambassador of Bangladesh
3. Amb.Touqir Hussain, Former Ambassador of Pakistan
4. Dirgha Raj Prasai,Former member of Parliament ; Political Analyst,Nepal
5. Prof.Ishtiaq Ahmed, Professor Emeritus of Political Science, Stockholm University
6. Prof. A. Lakshmana Chetty,Centre for Southeast Asian & Pacific Studies,Sri
Venkateswara University, Tirupati
7. Prof.Moonis Ahmar, Dept. of International Relations ,University of Karachi, Karachi
8. Dr Sheo Nandan Pandey, Expert in area studies,in particular Hanxue (Sinology)
9. Dr.Abanti Bhattacharya,Dept. of East Asian Studies,Delhi University
10. Sathiya Moorthy-Observer Research Foundation,Chennai
11. Prof.Siegfried Wolf, South Asia Institute, University of Heidelberg
12. Dr. Kamal Kinger , Head, Dept. of Defence and Strategic Studies, Punjabi
University, Patiala
13. Tridivesh Singh Maini, Associate Fellow, Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi
14. Dr. Monika Mandal,Fellow,MAKAIAS, Kolkata
15. Satheesan Kumaaran , Editor-in-chief, Voice of Voiceless
16. Dr Sanjeev Bhadauria,Associate Prof,Dept. of Defence & Strategic
Studies,University of Allahabad,Allahabad
17. Marian Gallenkamp, Senior researcher, South Asia Institute, University of
Heidelberg ; Bhutan Research Organisation
18. Dr. Sanjeev Kumar H.M. ,Asst. Prof.,Dept. of International Relations,South Asian
University,New Delhi
19. Dr.Joyeeta Bhattacharjee, Associate Fellow,Observer Research Foundation,New
Delhi
20. Balaji Chandramohan,Editor ,Asia for World Security Network
21. Ravi Sundaralingam, Academic Secretary ASATiC (Academy of Science and Arts for the
Tamil Communities in Ceylon)
22. Ullas Sharma,former columnist , yellowtimws.org
23. Dr. Maneesha S. Wanasinghe – Pasqual,Department of International Relations,
University of Colombo
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A REGION IN TURMOIL
Ambassador Shamshad Ahmad
Former Foreign Secretary of Pakistan
Shamshad Ahmad is a senior Pakistani diplomat with over 37years of practitioner's experience in bilateral and multilateral
diplomacy, regional cooperation, preventive diplomacy and
conflict resolution. He became the 22nd Foreign Secretary of
Pakistan at an important period in India-Pakistan relations, from
1997 to 2000. He retired as Pakistan Ambassador to the United
Nations in 2002.
He currently writes a weekly column for English daily The News. Before that he was a regular
contributor to The Nation. He also writes occasionally for Dawn.
Shamshad Ahmad did his Masters in Political Science and B.A (Hons) from Government College Lahore
before joining Foreign Service of Pakistan in 1965.
His diplomatic career includes various posts at headquarters in Islamabad and in Pakistan missions
abroad. He served as Ambassador to South Korea (1987–1990) and Iran (1990–1992), as SecretaryGeneral, Economic Cooperation Organization (1992–1996), Pakistan's Foreign Secretary (1997–2000),
and as Pakistan's Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the UN (2000–2002).
As Secretary-General of ECO, a regional cooperation organization headquartered in Tehran, he steered
its expansion in 1992 from a trilateral entity (Iran, Pakistan and Turkey) into a 10-member regional
organization with the induction of seven new members, namely, Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, giving it a new global dimension and fresh
regional framework and common socio-economic development strategy.
As Pakistan's Foreign Secretary, he managed and executed his country's foreign policy during an
extraordinary period of its history that saw the resumption of India-Pakistan peace process, overt
nuclearization of South Asia, the Kargil War and the October 12, 1999 military coup. He signed the June
23, 1997 agreement in Islamabad with his Indian counterpart Salman Haider on resumption of IndiaPakistan peace process which is today the basis of the ongoing "composite dialogue" between the two
countries.
In the aftermath of India-Pakistan nuclear tests in May 1998, he played a key role in promoting mutual
"restraint and responsibility" between India and Pakistan, and on the occasion of the Lahore Summit,
signed a memorandum of understanding with his Indian counterpart on February 21, 1999, laying
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down a framework of mutual "nuclear risk reduction" and other confidence-building measures aimed at
preventing the risk of nuclear conflict and unauthorized or accidental use of nuclear weapons.
Shamshad Ahmad also held eight rounds of talks with his US counterpart Strobe Talbott from May 1998
to February 1999 on issues of peace and security in South Asia, including nuclear and strategic stability
stabilization measures.
During his tenure as Ambassador to the United Nations, he co-chaired UN General Assembly's Working
Group on Conflict Resolution and Sustainable Development in Africa, and also served as Senior
Consultant to the UN on economic and social matters (2002–2003) with particular focus on sustainable
development and poverty alleviation.
_____________________________________________________________________
A REGION IN TURMOIL
AN ENIGMATIC REGION:
South Asia is an enigmatic region. Home to one-fifth of humanity, it is a region that offers so
much to the world; yet, it is held back by poverty and underdevelopment. The serious economic
and social challenges that it faces have been compounded by long-standing intra-regional tension
and unresolved inter-state disputes.
The complex security challenges confronted by South Asia have assumed an ominous dimension
with India and Pakistan, two nuclear capable states, always remaining in a confrontational mode.
No other region in the world today is as volatile and unstable as South Asia with its longstanding
India-Pakistan hostility and conflict and its crucial role in the post-9/11 scenario.
While India-Pakistan thaw is nowhere in sight, their region is already in turmoil with a vast array
of problems ranging from interstate and civil conflicts to unresolved disputes, human tragedies,
humanitarian catastrophes, religion-based extremism, terrorism and poverty-driven violence. The
complexity of these issues is rooted in South Asia‘s turbulent political history, its geo-strategic
importance, its untapped economic potential, and the gravity of its problems impacting on the
overall global security environment.
With overt nuclearization of the sub-continent, South Asia is seen today as "the most dangerous
place on earth" where peace is hostage to one accident, one act of terrorism, or even one strategic
miscalculation. This reality itself is a poignant reminder of this region‘s critical importance as a
factor of regional and global stability.
The policymakers in world‘s major capitals, especially Washington, should have been working
―extra time‖ to promote a sense of security and justice in this region by eschewing discriminatory
policies in their dealings with India-Pakistan nuclear equation, the only one in the world that grew
up in history totally unrelated to the Cold War.
What this region needs is not the induction of new destructive weapons and lethal technologies but
the consolidation of peace, stability, development and democratic values that we lack so much.
Any measures that contribute to lowering of nuclear threshold and fueling of an unnecessary arms
race between the two nuclear-armed neighbours are no service to the people of this region. South
Asia needs stability through balance not asymmetry of power.
The foremost requirement for world‘s major powers, the US in particular, was to avoid any
policies or steps that led to disturbing the strategic balance of power in this turbulent region. But
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Washington had its own priorities for this region as part of its China-driven larger Asian agenda
and its ongoing post-9/11 Central Asia-focused ‗great game‘ in pursuit of its worldwide political
and economic power. India, once a founder of the non-aligned movement, is today one of the most
aligned countries of the world. It has allowed itself to become a wheel in America‘s larger Asian
power play.
No wonder, US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton, in her ―Vision for the 21st Century‖ speech at
Chennai in July this year publicly asked India to assume a larger role in regional affairs and assert
its leadership in Asia. That, she said, ―will shape positively the future of the Asia-Pacific.‖ This
aspect of America‘s Asian policy, it seems, is being played out against the backdrop of China‘s
increasingly firm assertion of South China Sea, Tibet and Taiwan as its ―core interests‖.
If the turbulent political history of this region had any lessons, Washington's engagement in this
region should have been a source of stability not instability in our region‘s volatile security
environment. It should have been promoting a sense of security and evenhandedness in this region
by eschewing discriminatory policies in dealings with India-Pakistan nuclear equation, the only
one in the world that grew up in history totally unrelated to the Cold War. But this never happened.
Instead, in 2005, the US signed a long-term multi-billion dollar military pact with India just to
keep its own military industry running. It also entered into a country-specific discriminatory
nuclear deal with India introducing an ominous dimension to the already unstable security
environment of the region. This ―strategic partnership‖ with all its ramifications raised serious
fears and concerns in Pakistan about its impact on the overall strategic balance in the region,
including prospects of durable peace in South Asia.
South Asia‘s problems are further aggravated by the complex regional configuration with growing
Indo-US nexus and India‘s resultant strategic ascendancy in the region with an unprecedented
influence in Afghanistan and serious nuisance potential against Pakistan‘s security interests. This
situation is not without serious implications for the delicate balance of power and stability in this
region and is already undermining the peace process and prospects of conflict resolution and
nuclear and conventional stabilization between India and Pakistan.
Conflict is the last thing the region needs. Given the unique political history of South Asia and the
particular social and cultural proclivities of its inhabitants, this region needs stable peace, not
confrontation. It needs a co-operative approach towards the resolution of contentious issues
through dialogue and not the perpetuation of hegemonic ambitions, which generate disputes. This
approach requires responsibility, restraint and statesmanship on the part of all regional and extraregional stakeholders,
WHAT HAS GONE WRONG WITH SAARC?
South Asia is today one of the world‘s poorest regions of the world with a vast majority of its
peoples still living in grinding poverty and sub-human conditions. Five of eight SAARC member
states – Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, the Maldives and Nepal – belong to the UN‘s category
of Least Developed Countries or LDCs. South Asia‘s total external trade is only a small fraction of
the region‘s GDP while its intra-regional trade is also non-consequential.
With its unbroken legacy of poverty, hunger, disease, illiteracy and conflict, SAARC, as a regional
cooperation organization has not gone beyond declaratory pronouncements with no tangible
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achievement to its credit. It has neither improved the quality of life in the region, nor accelerated
the economic growth, social progress or cultural development of its member-states. With one or
two exceptions, SAARC countries also lag behind in developing genuine democracy, rule of law
and good governance.
What has gone wrong with SAARC is a question that keeps agitating the minds of policy makers
and practitioners of all sorts both within and outside this region. With its almost negligible output
and a yawning gap between its promise and performance, SAARC has yet a long way to go before
it comes of age. The common vision upholding the ideals of peace, stability, good-neighbourly
relations and mutually beneficial cooperation in South Asia remains a distant dream.
Problems besetting its member states and those hampering a coherent regional approach remain
unaddressed. SAARC‘s regional approach not only lacks operational inadequacies but is also
captive to the peculiar geo-political environment in which India‘s hegemonic role and its
outstanding problems with its neighbours continue to hamper meaningful progress towards
regional integration.
All SAARC countries share a border with the largest state of the region, i.e., India, and do not
share a border with each other. This unique geographic feature limits the scope of cooperation to a
great degree. It makes transit trade difficult, since there remains no room for bypassing Indian
borders, granting India an undeniable influence on all proposals for intra- and sub-regional
cooperation.
Further, the geographic centrality of India in South Asian region has given rise to a host of border
conflicts and water disputes in the region all of which involve India, be it India-Pakistan, IndiaBangladesh or others.
Political differences and bilateral disputes have impeded SAARC‘s performance from its very
onset. While many regional organizations around the world, including ASEAN came into
existence due to common external challenges and a consensus at the basic level, the SAARC
region was fraught with centrifugal tendencies and mutual mistrust from the very beginning. The
two largest actors of the region, India as well as Pakistan, were skeptical about entering into a
regional arrangement when the proposal was first launched by Bangladesh president Zia-urRehman in May 1980.
Indian inhibitions revolved around potential exploitation of the organization by smaller states for
collective bargaining against their much bigger neighbor. Pakistan‘s skepticism was founded on
apprehensions of a likely hegemonic India-led nexus in the region. The Kashmir issue between the
two countries was central and remained the greatest stumbling block for regional cooperation.
SAARC nevertheless came into being with a restrictive agenda and a limited cooperative
framework. Bilateral and contentious problems are excluded from its platform. Security issues and
cooperation also are outside its ambit. The absence of an intra-regional dispute settlement
mechanism has severely limited the capacity of the Association to contribute to regional peace,
security and development without which there can be no meaningful progress in socio-economic
and cultural cooperation in the region.
As an organization, SAARC‘s role is limited to socio-economic and cultural cooperation within
South Asia. Its objective was to ensure better standard of living of the people of South Asia by
means of economic growth and development. South Asia is among the poorest regions in the
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world. It accounts for 45% of world population, only 0.25% of world GNP and 40% of world‘s
total absolute poor population. The region is dominated by India, with 76% of total SAARC
population and 80% of the total GNP.
Absence of any political role in SAARC is a direct consequence of the unwillingness of its
member states to widen its scope and incorporate bilateral and contentious issues as items of
interest. This has had a crippling effect on the organization‘s capacity to provide an environment
for mutual cooperation. Because of this major omission, SAARC has remained totally nonconsequential during major regional crises including the Kargil crisis, border skirmishes and
military build up along India-Pakistan border. Member states blame each other for promoting
Intra-state conflicts, and secessionist movements.
A ‗DEAF, DUMB AND BLIND‘ ASSOCIATION:
All SAARC countries share a border with the largest state of the region, i.e., India, and do not
share a border with each other. This unique geographic feature limits the scope of cooperation to a
great degree. It makes transit trade difficult, since there remains no room for bypassing Indian
borders, granting India an undeniable influence on all proposals for intra- and sub-regional
cooperation.
Further, the geographic centrality of India in South Asian region has given rise to a host of border
conflicts and water disputes in the region all of which involve India, be it India-Pakistan, IndiaBangladesh or others. Yet SAARC‘s mandate does not allow the organization to respond
politically to internal issues such as in Jammu and Kashmir, Tamil-Sinhalese conflict, Nepalese
Maoist movement and internal political problems in Bhutan and Maldives.
SAARC‘s role in resolution or management of political disputes in the region is virtually non
existent. No wonder, upon his inability to raise the issue of Indian involvement in Tamil problem
on SAARC forum, Sri Lankan Foreign Minister A.C.S. Hameed once warned that unless SAARC
dealt with bilateral issues, ―it will remain a deaf, dumb and blind association.‖
MISSING ENABLING ENVIRONMENT:
SAARC as an organization has many faults or weaknesses inherent in its structural and functional
architecture and even some glaring shortcomings in its Charter-laid principles and objectives. But
the absence of an ―enabling environment‖ is the only big and deep fault line that cuts across the
region‘s ―regionality‖ leaving it with little or no ―regional impulse‖ for any notable cooperative
process towards regional integration.
The faults and shortcomings of an organization can be remedied or repaired but the fault line is a
congenital defect or an unbridgeable crack in the crust of a body that cannot be repaired without
replacing the plates back on their original spot. The insurmountabilty of this task is inherent in the
complexity of India-Pakistan issues involved and in the legacy of conflict and confrontation that
both countries have carried since their independence.
Foremost to this end is the overarching need for an ―enabling environment‖ free of mistrust and
hostility without which no regional endeavour anywhere in the world has worked. The requisite
―enabling environment‖ will come only with a fresh regional impulse on the part of the member
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states to manage and resolve their disputes through peaceful means in accordance with universally
accepted norms.
No doubt, an environment of durable peace in South Asia will augur well for the stalemated
process of regional cooperation. But for ―enabling environment‖, South Asia must be freed of its
legacy of tensions, conflicts and confrontations and escalating military budgets. At the regional
level, an institutionalized approach is needed by giving SAARC a political role that enables it to
contribute to peaceful settlement of deputes between its member-states and creation of an
―enabling environment‖ for regional cooperation.
India-Pakistan equation with all its ramifications is not the only feature of the SAARC fault line.
Another ominous factor adversely impacting on SAARC‘s performance is the perception of India‘s
dominant role in the region which remains a constant source of mistrust and apprehension among
smaller states of the region. Unless India, as the largest state and also centrally located, has an
equal role and participation in the SAARC process, a sense of insecurity and suspicion among the
smaller member-states will continue to restrict the scope of regional cooperation. Even subregional cooperation minus India has had serious limitations.
While SAARC‘s other faults and shortcomings are all remediable, the question of trust deficit
because of India‘s hegemonic ambitions will not go away unless India inspires confidence in the
region by resolving its outstanding disputes over territory and water with its neighbours. And that
doesn‘t seem to be happening anytime soon given the prevailing climate of conflict and mistrust
between SAARC's largest country and its smaller neighbours.
Yet India‘s former External Affairs Minister Yashwant Sinha did speak the truth by acclaiming the
need for conflict resolution, but on whose terms. he left it to imagination. He said: ―Recent
developments have demonstrated a simple truth – our chances of resolving the most contentious
issues are higher, when we tackle them in a warm, friendly and supportive environment. If India
and Pakistan nurture the ties of kinship, commerce and culture, if we emphasise all that we have in
common, we will be able to smoothen the fault lines in our relationship.‖
Political commitment and deeper engagement on the part of member states will facilitate the
regional impulse to keep apace with the changing times. All institutions are susceptible to change
and improvement. SAARC must also adapt itself to the new realities even if it means the re-writing
of its basic Charter. It needs realistic approach with a result-oriented normative framework and
operational culture consistent with regional ground realities.
For an enabling environment‘, South Asia must free itself of tensions, conflicts and confrontations
and escalating military budgets. Like ASEAN, this Association should also establish a regional
political forum, called ―South Asia Regional Forum‖ to reinforce intra-regional process of
―confidence-building, preventive diplomacy and peaceful settlement of disputes‖ and also to
institute inter-regional cooperative linkages with its relevant counterparts in other regions as
common factor of global peace and security.1
THE MAIN CHALLENGE FOR THE REGION:
The real challenge for SAARC lies in moving from the realm of ideas to implementable plans of
action. South Asia needs an exceptional impulse to keep apace with the changing times. This fresh
1
Fresh Regional Impulse By Shamshad Ahmad: “New Life Within SAARC”: Institute of Foreign Affairs-FES (Nepal),
Kathmandu; November 2005
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regional impulse, must spring from within South Asia. Only then will our peoples be able to
harness the full potential of the South Asian region and to join the worldwide quest for economic
growth and development.
We need to realize that the ―business as usual‖ approach will not work. Besides political
commitment and deeper engagement on the part of all member-states, a new result-oriented
normative framework and operational culture consistent with our regional ground realities is
needed to infuse ―new life within SAARC.‖
At the turn of the century, the world leaders, in their Millennium Declaration, recognized the
importance of making progress on the three pillars of sustainable development, namely, economic
growth, social development and environmental protection, in an integrated manner. They also
resolved to make the "right to development" a reality for everyone and to free the entire humanity
from want and misery.
The road map set out in the Declaration identified a set of quantified and monitorable goals, called
the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). These time-bound goals with the year 2015 as cut
off date, more than any other region, are of special relevance to South Asia. There is no denying
the fact that the basic ownership of development rests with each developing country and region.
But the development capacity and the potential of each developing country or a region is inevitably
conditioned by the ‗enabling environment‘ for mobilization of the needed resources through aid,
trade, investment, debt relief, technical know-how, and global economic management. This
‗enabling environment‘ is inevitably predicated on the recognition that without durable peace
within and between countries, and in the absence of good governance "within countries and at the
international level"; the goal of their sustainable development will remain elusive. Peace,
democracy and development are mutually reinforcing and must, therefore, be pursued together by
SAARC countries.
Macroeconomic stability, market access, debt relief, capital flows, ODA and, above all, fair and
just treatment by international financial and monetary institutions are of great relevance and
importance to their capacity-building as the principal means of poverty eradication and sustainable
development. This is what SAARC countries need to pursue as a general principle of their regional
economic cooperation.
They do not have to look for charity. South Asia is rich in natural and human resources and
technological skills. What they need is enough space to harness their own resources and to
capitalize on their multidimensional potential through regional cooperation on the basis of
mutuality of benefit. The foremost requirement for this purpose is to identify the areas of their
common potential, and to establish a reliable economic inventory of the region in the form of wellplanned SAARC Data Bank.
In order to augment SAARC‘s capacity to serve as a catalyst in the economic and social
development of the region, we might consider the possibility of establishing a South Asia Trade
and Development Bank which could also facilitate SAFTA‘s operationalization.
A recent evidence from ADB suggests that contrary to popular intuition, India and Pakistan are not
the most important markets vis-à-vis each other. More than 60% of the increase in exports to the
region for both India and Pakistan are directed towards Bangladesh. This revelation requires
reappraisal of the very complementarities among SAFTA partners. Barriers and constraints
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impeding trade are many and varied that require awareness, attention and collective remedial
action.
Special efforts towards regional cooperation should be concentrated for the next ten years on three
areas, namely, trade, energy and services sector. In other fields of cooperation, the already
agreed activities, depending on their feasibility and mutuality, may continue to be implemented.
Meanwhile, at this stage, no new programmes and projects in areas other than the three priority
areas should be undertaken.
In the energy sector, transit facilitation measures for oil and gas pipelines and other energy
resources including access to international markets should be pursued in keeping with the region‘s
interests without succumbing to outside pressures for vested interests. SAARC member-states
should also explore the feasibility of inter-linkages of their power-grids to be able to enter into
mutually acceptable arrangements for sharing their power surpluses and shortages.
Other areas worth consideration for regional cooperation are:
- Increased engagement of non-governmental stakeholders, including NGOs, civil
society and the private sector in realization of SAARC goals and objectives will not
only help bridge the mental divide, created by governmental policies and propaganda,
between the peoples of the region but will also give an added impetus to the process of
regional cooperation.
-
Private sector participation should be encouraged in the regional cooperation projects
and measures be taken to promote mutually beneficial joint ventures in the region.
-
Freedom of movement should be allowed for more people to people contacts across the
SAARC borders and the visa regime in South Asia must be more open. Besides
simplifying and facilitating travel within the region, we must also promote business and
cultural exchanges, and cooperative linkages among educational institutions in the
region.
-
An effort could also be made to build on our common civilizational assets and
experiences, cultural affluence and mutuality of values and interests.

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India and South Asia
INDIA AND SOUTH ASIA
Kazi Anwarul Masud
former Secretary and Ambassador of Bangladesh
A career diplomat Kazi Anwarul Masud served as Bangladesh
ambassador in Germany, Vietnam, Republic of Korea and
Thailand. During his over three decades of diplomatic career he
served in the Middle East, in Europe, in South East Asia and the
Far East. At home he served as Director General and also as
Additional Foreign Secretary. His expertise includes both foreign
political and economic relations. A widely traveled person
Ambassador Masud has written two books and also works as a columnist for an English language
newspaper in Dhaka, Bangladesh.
PROFILE:
1998-2001 Ambassador of Bangladesh Bonn/Berlin. Germany
Promoted to the rank of Secretary to the Bangladesh government.
1996-98 Ambassador of Bangladesh Hanoi, Vietnam
1993-1996
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Director General (South East Asia & Africa)
Additional Foreign Secretary (South Asia)
1989-93 Ambassador of Bangladesh Seoul, South Korea
1987 -1989 Ambassador of Bangladesh Bangkok Thailand and Permanent Representative to ESCAP
1967 –1968 Probationary Officer Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Islamabad, Pakistan
1966 -1967 Probationary Officer Foreign Service at the Civil Service Academy Lahore, Pakistan
EDUCATION:
MA. (Economics) 1964, Dhaka University Dhaka, Bangladesh
FOREIGN TRAVELS :
Traveled to USA, UK, Belgium, Holland Luxembourg, France,
Germany, Switzerian4 Austria, Czechoslovakia, Russia, Egypt,
Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Morocco, Guinea, Senegal~ South Aft/ca,
Pakistan, India, Hong Kong, Thailand, Singapore, and South Korea
PERSONAL DETAILS :
Date of Birth: 10 October1943
Nationality: Bangladeshi. Marital Status: Married
Children: one daughter (married) and one son.
Wife: Salma Masud
PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES :
1. Represented Bangladesh in all EEC- Bangladesh bilateral meetings during 1976¬1979.
2. Represented Bangladesh in Extra ¬ Ordinary meeting of Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers (ICFM)
at Amman, Jordan in 1981.
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India and South Asia
3. Represented Bangladesh in ICFM meeting at Fez, Morocco.
4. Represented Bangladesh in ICFM meeting at Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.
5. Represented Bangladesh at Al ¬ Quds meeting at Rabat, Morocco.
6. Represented Bangladesh Third Islamic Summit Conference at Taif Saudi Arabia in 1982.
7. Represented Bangladesh at Islamic Commission meeting at Conakry Guinea in 1982
8 Represented Bangladesh at ICFM meeting at Baghdad, Iraq.
9. Represented Bangladesh at Non¬ aligned Summit at New Delhi, India in 1983.
10. Represented Bangladesh at Joint Economic Commission meeting at New Delhi India.
11. Represented Bangladesh at Annual General meeting of ESCAP at Bangkok Thailand in 1987.
12. Represented Bangladesh at Annual General Meetings in ESCAP at Bangkok Thailand in 1988.
13. Elected Chairman, ESCAP Trade Commission meeting at ESCAP at Bangkok, Thailand in 1988.
14. Participated at Several Bangladesh Investment Forums at Seoul, South Korea Organized by Korea
Trade Promotion Organization (KOTRA) in 1989-1993.
15. Elected President of the Assembly of International Center for Private Enterprises for 1998¬2000 in
Slovenia.
16. Participated in Bangladesh Investors Forum at Hamburg in 2001, organized by German East Asia
Business Forum.
PUBLICATIONS:
As a regular contributor to the English language news papers The Independent and The Daily Star, Indian
on line think tank South Asia Analysis Group and Pakistan based Quaterly Criterion I had published several
hundred articles mostly related to current international affairs. Additionally Bangladesh Journal of National
and Foreign Affairs (vol. 4 No. 3. October 2003) published an article of mine titled Post-nine eleven Global
Construct. Goethe-Instut published a book titled Dialogue versus Confrontation containing a 38 pages
article by me in August 2007. I have published two books¬ ISSUES OF CONTEMPORARY POLITICS and
BANGLADESH CRISIS.
__________________________________________
INDIA AND SOUTH ASIA
Why, one may ask, despite common cultural heritage and long bonds of history
and added to these factors was Indian humanitarian intervention during the
Bangladesh Liberation War Indo-Bangladesh relations, notwithstanding public
diplomacy by the authorities of the two countries, are currently in rough waters.
If one were to look for historical roots, proved faulty in 1971, one could try to
trace Indo-Pak relations and the history of India since 7th century when Islam
entered in the then India with the conquest of Sindh by Mohammed bin
Quasem. Skipping the Muslim and British episodes of Indian history exploration
of more recent events could be useful.
Indo-Pakistan differences were partly based on ideological difference between
the two countries, one professing undying fealty to the Western bloc through
SEATO, CENTO and other ties while the other earning the wrath of the US by
attaching itself with the Non-Aligned Movement, compounded by religious basis
of the partition of India in 1947. Some analysts (Sumit Ganguly & Manjeet
Pardesai –Explaining sixty years of Indian foreign policy) have posited that
India‟s post-independence policy makers under the leadership of Pandit
Jawarharlal Nehru being acutely sensitive to the colonial legacy sought to keep
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India out of the ambit of Cold War rivalry. Besides they explained that “Pandit
Nehru was acutely concerned about the opportunity cost of defense spending.
Any involvement with the two emerging blocs would draw India into a titanic
struggle and divert critical resources from economic development”. The
disastrous border conflict with China in 1962 and the Bangladesh War of
Liberation of 1971 brought India out of the incoherence of non-aligned foreign
policy.Then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi signed a 20 years pact of “peace,
friendship and cooperation” with the Soviet Union that resulted in several vetoes
by the USSR in the UNSC against the Western sponsored draft resolutions
calling for a political solution of the Bangladesh crisis when the entire world was
being daily fed with the revolting news of genocide being perpetrated by the
Pakistan occupation army on unarmed Bengali civilians in the then East
Pakistan. Pratap Bhanu Mehta( Reluctant India-Journal of Democracy- October
2011) described Indian military actions of 1971 “widely and fairly regarded as
one of the world‟s most successful cases of humanitarian intervention against
genocide. Indeed India in effect applied what we would now call the
responsibility to protect principle and applied it well”. The question arises as to
why the US followed such an anti-Bangladesh policy during the Bangladesh
crisis that was contrary to all fundamental precepts that had endeared the of
American way of life to the entire world? It is believed that the driving factor was
Henry Kissinger‟s policy of realism that put opening relations with China with
Pakistani help having greater strategic value to the US national interest than
coming to the aid of the persecuted civilians of then East Pakistan. Christopher
Hitchens‟ indictment of Henry Kissinger in his book The Trial of Henry Kissinger
mentions Kissinger‟s refusal in 1971 to condemn Pakistan‟s genocidal invasion
of Bangladesh because Pakistan was a secret conduit for Nixon‟s secret
diplomacy with China. Hitchens further accuses Kissinger of involvement in the
overthrow of Salvador Allende in Chile in conjunction with General Pinochet,
sabotaging 1968 Paris peace talks with North Vietnam thus extending the
unwinnable war by four more years, secret and illegal carpet bombing of Laos
and Cambodia, massacre of tens of thousands of Vietnamese civilians and
needless sacrifice of 32000 additional American troops. In his defense Kissinger
said : “The Vietnam War required us to emphasize the national interest rather
than abstract principles. What President Nixon and I tried to do was unnatural.
And that is why we didn't make it”. If not the trial Hitchens succeeded in
dismantling Kissinger‟s efforts to build a Mount Rushmore image of himself to be
remembered by the Americans. The US was also not convinced in the initial
years of our independence of the extent of overwhelming Indian influence on
Bangladesh and of the reality of our sovereignty. China was opposed because
she regarded Bangladesh liberation war as a machination by India to break up
Pakistan as was felt by Middle Eastern Arab Muslim countries. Bangladesh had
to wait till Islamic countries‟ Summit at Lahore and Pakistani recognition of
Bangladesh as a sovereign country for many others to follow.
After Pakistan‟s breakup consequent upon the liberation of Bangladesh India
emerged as the leading power in South Asia and it has been most acutely felt by
her immediate neighbors. The argument proffered that Indian intervention was
not totally altruistic but to deal a death blow to its greatest enemy can be
explained in terms of “realism” in that India was never so scrupulous in
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honoring the sovereignty of others when its vital interests were involved. Indian
occupation of Kashmir( and that by Pakistan as well) on the basis of accession
by Maharaja Hari Singh of Jammu and Kashmir, occupation of Goa, Daman and
Diu that were Portuguese colonies, and the incorporation of Sikkim into India as
a state are examples of Indian use of hard power in her neighborhood. But then
it is the nature of both established and emerging powers to flex their muscles as
the US has done since the enunciation of Monroe Doctrine. If diplomacy
requires deceit and use of force or hard power as defined by Joseph Nye jr then
India has been an able follower of Chanykka in her dealings with neighbors.
Disquiet in India‟s relations with Bangladesh began with the nonimplementation of 1974 Mujib-Indira agreement that was further aggravated by
the construction of Farakka Barrage turning a significant part of Bangladesh
into a desert, affecting navigation, agriculture, environmental degradation, and
hurting the livelihood of millions of people. Farakka‟s adverse effects have made
a section of Bangladeshis suspicious of the proposed Tipaimukh Dam to be built
on the river Barak in Manipur state of India. The proposed construction is
controversial in both India and Bangladesh. Bangladeshi experts have said the
massive dam will disrupt the seasonal rhythm of the river and have an adverse
effect on downstream agriculture and fisheries. The government of Bangladesh
decided to send an expert team to the Dam area to examine the features and
likely impact of the dam on the flow of water into the Surma and the Kushiara.
Another is the environmental factor. The Tipaimukh area lies in an ecologically
sensitive and topographically fragile region. It falls under one of the most
seismically volatile regions on the planet. Additionally huge imbalance in trade
favoring India partly due to para- tariff and non-tariff barrier erected by India on
exports from Bangladesh has been a thorn in bilateral relations. A recent study
revealed that harsh testing requirement, complex harmonized code classification,
inadequate infrastructure, and special labeling requirement are among major
non-tariff barriers put up by India to thwart Bangladesh‟s export to that country.
The report adds that Indian authorities impose mandatory testing requirements ,
additional technical regulations, and difficult banking norms. Additionally
Indians also slap duties other than tariffs, restricting entry of Bangladeshi
trucks into India. Inordinate delay by Indian port health authorities in releasing
food consignments from Bangladesh seriously
hamper export of food items
from Bangladesh to India. Besides huge demand for Bangladeshi cement, steel
products, electrical and electronic goods in North East India cannot be exported
due to the requirement to comply with Indian bureau of Standard( BIS). It is
also believed that Indian bureaucracy is reluctant to open Indian market to
Bangladeshi products. Non-demarcation of maritime boundary with India that
has been taken to arbitration by Bangladesh can lead to tension in our
relations. The litany of irritants are endless as is usual between neighbors. The
question facing Bangladesh authorities, irrespective of the fact whichever party
remains in power, is whether Bangladesh can afford to follow an anti-India
policy without thwarting its socio-economic development? Many will raise the
issue of safeguarding of vital national interests at any cost. But then definition
of “vital national interests” may vary among different sections of society as
unfortunately cohesion of all political parties on vital domestic and foreign
policies remain a far cry in Bangladesh. Unanimity remains on the question that
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economic development should be the guiding principle of governance and hence
a cash strapped and resource poor countries like ours have to maintain an open
economy and interact with as many countries of the world as possible.
Globalization in any case has forced even introvert nations to come out in the
open. If the main driver of the Arab Spring has been securing citizens political
rights the civilianization of reclusive Myanmar appears to be an admission that
no nation in the globalized world can remain an island- be it one of plenty or
underdeveloped. Changing nature of security threats from traditional to nontraditional ones makes it imperative for nations of the world to unite. But then it
was possible in Pericles Athens to have direct voice in decision making which is
not possible in a world of 193 members of the UN. Hence it has become
necessary, more so now with the Western economies in deep trouble, to have G20 nations to have summits and high level contacts to smooth out the wrinkles
in global politics and economy. Ever since the end of the Cold War and fleeting
US unipolar moment various scenarios are being constructed for the next world
order. One such scenario urges Washington, Beijing and New Delhi to consider,
if a war happens in the 21st century, it will be America-China or China-India.
According to this scenario NATO intervention in Libya has shown lack of
coherence of Western alliance that had served the stability of the post-Second
World War world. Besides neoconservatives like Robert Kagan are convinced of
Europe‟s lack of centrality in global politics if not the soft power that is essential
for global peace. This school of thought consider China and India to be
globalization‟s lead integrating agents. Russia and Japan are not considered to
be serious first tier candidates for global power. In this equation Europe too is
discounted as is Brazil among the BRIC nations. But the shining China may face
impediment as in two decades or so China will lose considerable number of
workers who will join the aging senior group of citizens. By contrast America
will add few dozen million workers and India is expected to add 100 million to
the workforce. In terms of per capita income by 2030 that of the US is expected
to be $ 60000/- while that of China will be $ 20000/- and that of India is
expected to be $ 10000/-. The US despite its indebtedness will reign over the
others because both China and India will remain tethered to the proverbial ball
and chain of impoverished rural poor. Besides China may face developmental
impediments in the forms of environmental damage, resource constraint,
demographic aging, inequitable distribution of income among different sectors of
the society, better standard of living leading people to demand greater voice in
governance translated into weaker hold of the Communist Party over the people.
In case of India fractious domestic politics and inequitable division of the
developmental benefit among the growing population may stay the rate of
development of the economy. The inequity in the distribution of income can be
gauged by the fact that both in China and India increase in per capita income
has been flat between 1820 to 1950 but it increased by 68% by 1973 and 245%
by 2002 and continues to grow despite global financial meltdown. The situation
has been no different if we take the case of the US where between 2002 and
2007 65% of all income growth went to the top 1% of the population. The world
has virtually been divided into two classes--plutocrats and the rest. Despite
such skewed rich and poor equation recently demonstrated by occupy the Wall
Street march in New York the policy makers in the Game Room of the powerful
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countries would be working on inclusion of China and India along with the US
as future arbiters of global fate and guarantor of peace than the old alliances
with Europe and Japan. Zbigniew Brezinski and Fred Bergsten( Petersen
Institute for International Economics) have advocated formation of G-2 with the
US and China (The United State and China: a G-2 in the making Brookings-Oct
2011). The essence of the proposal is that these two biggest economies working
together can provide global public gods that the world required. The convergence
between the two at present appears to be difficult because China saves too much
and the US consumes too much creating a disequilibrium in their economies
and imbalance in trade. China uses its surplus cash to buy US Treasury bonds
thus increasing American indebtedness. Unless the trade surplus countries like
China starts buying and consuming more US made products the equilibrium will
not be achieved. Politically and militarily G-2 appears to be a distant proposition
because a rising power has the tendency to expand its influence, often through
hard power, that an established power like the US would have to acquiesce in
though such expansion may impinge on the areas of influence of the established
power. So far Chinese use of influence in global affairs has not caused any
ripples in the world. But there can be no guarantee that with the passage of time
power transition will remain smooth. For example in the case of North Korean
sinking of South Korean naval vessel CHEONAN in March 2010 and the shelling
of South Korean village China did not take any measures against North Korea
disappointing South Korea and the US. Besides disputed Sparatly Islands
remain unresolved and the world is not certain yet how the Chinese would
finally react to the claims by other countries sovereignty over the Islands.
Consequently as the established power cannot be sure of the real intent of the
rising power it is likely to hedge its bet by roping in. in this case, countries like
India, Japan, South Korea and Vietnam to counter China.
So the G-2
condominium appears to be farfetched proposition and would have deprived the
world of cooperation in cases like six party talks on North Korean
denuclearization, Permanent Five plus one on Iran‟s nuclear program, and
finally G-20 assembly of nations that is expected to oversee primarily economic
mess afflicting the global economy and gradually expanding the combines power
to tackle international issues. For G-20 to have an effective role democratization
of the UNSC is essential. The current set up of global powers and the passage of
power from the Atlantic to the Pacific demand a realignment of the United
Nations for countries like India to play an effective international role. The reform
in the UNSC was keenly felt during the Kosovo crisis due to UNSC paralysis
caused by veto threat from Russia and China necessitating NATO intervention.
It called into question UNSC capacity to perform its functions and revived anew
the debate for its reforms. Reforms suggested are basically the following: - (a) an
increase in the number of elected members retaining the five permanent
members; (b) two more permanent members (Japan and Germany) and three
more elected from Asia, Africa and Latin America; and (c) semi-permanent
members with no veto power. There is almost universal appreciation of the fact
that the present composition of the UNSC and veto power of P-5 reflective of the
situation following the Second World War needs reforms. Former UNSG Butros
Ghali observed in his Agenda for Democratization that the UN had little moral
authority to preach democracy to the outside world when it was not practicing it
in its own backyard. It is often pointed out that four out of five permanent
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members are European (a concept that includes the US) and industrialized
countries, the latter argument that goes against Japan‟s inclusion while in its
entirety the argument works against Germany. Besides, Argentina, Mexico and
Pakistan question the choice of Brazil and India to be taken in as permanent
members. Despite differences over future composition of the UNSC among
member states its democratization is essential to arrest the increasing trend
towards unilateralism. One has to bear in mind President Bush‟s warning of the
UN becoming irrelevant if it failed to act on Iraq as of the US Congress
resolution on Sudan urging Bush administration to act unilaterally if the UN
failed to act to meet the humanitarian disaster in Darfur. Kofi Annan‟s mild
chastisement of President Bush that only the UN can lend unique legitimacy to
military intervention fell on deaf ears of the Bush administration. But then one
must recognize the fact of irreversible change in the global construct in the postCold War era in terms of nation-states responsibility not only in its conduct of
inter-state relations but also its treatment of its own people for retaining
sovereignty. Boutros Ghali in his Agenda for Democratization laid emphasis on
promoting democracy within the architecture of the UN as the world‟s largest
and most inclusive organization. He felt for a clear need for an organization in
which all principal organs function in balance and harmony. While Boutros
Ghali‟s prescription would have been ideal in the changed circumstances
prevailing in the world today both the developed and the developing countries
should join hands in rewriting the UN Charter that would be capable of meeting
the politico-economic challenges of the Twenty First century. In the ultimate
analysis the democratization of the UN and its institutions as called for by
Boutros Ghali in his Agenda for Democratization is a pressing need and has to
be taken into account by the major powers not only to ensure a semblance of
distributive justice in the allocation of global resources but also to ensure a
conflict free world in which different seemingly competing civilizations can live in
peace and harmony.
The problem with India as a permanent member of the UNSC, already supported
by Bangladesh, could pose a dilemma for her neighbors given her not so friendly
relations with them. Indo Pak rivalry dates back to the partition of the subcontinent by the British and more on the unresolved issue of Kashmir claimed
by both as integral part of their respective country. Pakistan harps on the
decades old UN resolution calling for referendum by the people of Kashmir to
decide on their fate while the situation on the ground has radically changed
since 1947 in favor of India which retains greater part of the Muslim dominated
Kashmir valley albeit under virtual military occupation. Relations with
Bangladesh is bedeviled with problems relating to maritime boundary
demarcation, land boundary disputes, trade imbalance in favor of India and
impediment imposed by India on Bangladeshi exports through para-tariff and
non-tariff barrier, border killings of Bangladeshi nationals by Indian Border
Security Force, Indian allegation of illegal Bangladeshi nationals entry and stay
in India, alleged use of Bangladeshi territory by Indian separatists and Pakistani
terrorists etc. Relations have taken a turn for the better after the assumption of
power in Bangladesh by Awami League led combine of political parties. Relations
with Nepal have been strained after the assumption of power by Maoist leader
Puspa Kumar Dahl who openly blamed Indian machination for the downfall of
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his short lived government and subsequent failure to form a government. In a
party conference he even urged his followers to free Nepal from Indian
domination. His successor Dr. Babu Ram Bhattarai who just returned from a
visit to Delhi where he signed three agreement of cooperation with India faced
strong criticism in Parliament in Nepal both from the opposition and his own
party over the agreement. Nepal, a landlocked country, is virtually dominated by
India commercially where Indian currency can be used in the markets. Bhutan,
another landlocked country, is also heavily dependent on India but the people
are ferociously independent minded and refuses to integrate with the globalized
world and believes in Gross Domestic Happiness instead of GDP as is
understood throughout the world. Bhutan, a country with seven hundred
people, has extremely cordial relationship with India. With Afghanistan India has
developed special relationship much to the chagrin of Pakistan though it is
believed that Indian efforts are directed to counter Chinese influence and not to
contain Pakistani influence in Kabul. At the moment Pak-Afghan relations are
going through rough waters as both Karzai and the US government are highly
critical of the safe heaven enjoyed by the Haqqani group in Pakistan from where
the terrorists launch their operations. It would , therefore, appear that unless
India meds her fences with her neighbors the US efforts to prop up India as a
counter to China would be a difficult endeavor as would be Indian ambition for a
permanent seat in the UNSC. Though not at the same economic level India could
try to play the role in South Asia as Germany is playing in helping out
European countries i.e. Greece to get the country out of the economic difficulties
she is facing at the moment. Use of hard power by India in South Asia is going to
be counterproductive if she thinks the smaller neighbors have little option but to
bow down to Indian dictates. The net result may be to push the South Asian
countries into the arms of China as a hedge to counter Indian efforts to
dominate the region. Indian policy planners may wish to consider that Indian
democratic structure is more attractive to her South Asian neighbors for
establishing fruitful bilateral relations with India than with China, albeit a rising
power, but with an authoritarian system of governance China yet
remains
inscrutable to many countries having liberal political system. In the ultimate
analysis the scenario of an India countering China in Asia may be a more
theoretical than a realistic proposition US wish notwithstanding. The people in
South Asia would prefer both giants to have complimentary than a competitive
relationship that would help millions of people of this area to get out of the
poverty trap and leave a prosperous life for their children and grand children.
Despite Lester Browns anxiety about the global food situation in coming decades
( Who will feed China? Wake Up Call for a Small Planet) the current financial
free fall in the Western democratic economies has started a debate whether the
free market economy that the world has gotten used to is still the preferred
destination of the nations of the world compared to the Chinese model of state
control in the management of the economy. Clearly under Deng Xiaoping‟s
tutelage China had moved away from Mao Zedong‟s politico-economic
management that has borne fruit to the extent that China is now looked upon as
a possible savior of the collapse of the Euro Zone as China has perhaps the
largest liquidity or disposable income in the world. China has reportedly offered
to buy Greek debt in its entirety and of a few other European nations as well.
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But before the international community runs after adopting Chinese model as
“herd instinct” is common in international commerce one has to examine
whether China will remain comfortably rich for many years to come. Lester
Brown, President of Earth Policy Institute, has warned that limits to food
production has already crippled crop lands around the world, water and
irrigation has become scarce, additional fertilizer no longer produces more
crops as before, and promises of bio-technology have their limits. Chinas rapid
industrialization, as in the case of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, will take
away more and more crop land by factories and industrial units and for houses
for an estimated i.6 billion people by 2030. Brown points out that China may be
huge but only one tenth is arable, half the crop land is irrigated, and four fifths
of the grain harvest comes from irrigated land. By 2030 Chinas grain production
will fall by 20% and Chinas demand for grain may cross 480 million tons or a
short fall of more than 200 million tons. One can well imagine the effect on
international food price when a country of 1.6 billion comes to the global market
to buy to feed its hungry and possibly restive population. The picture for India
and a few other countries will be no different as they will require to import about
200 million tons by 2030. In other words todays net exporters of food grains
will become importers in the near future. Skeptics of the dark future of the world
could be advised to look up Paul and Anne Ehrlich‟s book Population Bomb,
criticized by both far right and far left, that contains the main message that it
is dangerous to have a population that cannot be supported by the Earth‟s finite
resources and that the future of civilization is in grave doubt. Revisiting the
Population Bomb Paul and Anne Ehrlich( Electronic Journal of Sustainable
Development) cited the testimony to the US Congress by NASA scientist James
Hansen in June 2008 that the world has long passed the „dangerous level” for
green house gases in atmosphere and must get back to 1988 level. Today bad
effects of green house gas emission is a top global concern and the most affected
countries like Bangladesh who contribute nothing to the harmful emissions are
clamoring for redress and for control by emitters of gases into the atmosphere.
The critics of Population Bomb, mainly from the far left, argue that the world has
enough food to feed its now 7 billion people if the distribution is equitable.
Unfortunately in a free market economy the rich has the money to feed their
people and the poor have to starve. The other argument of population being
“human capital” to further growth misses the point that had population and
growth been directly related then China and India would have been four times
richer than the USA and more affluent than all nations of Europe combined.
British environmentalist, scientist and futurologist James Lovelock believes
“global warming is now irreversible and that nothing can prevent large part of
the planet becoming too hot to inhabit or sinking under water resulting in mass
migration, famine and epidemics”. In the case of India demographics occupy
2nd rank among the world's most populated countries. With its current
population of more than 1.21 billion people (As per Census of India 2011), the
country is estimated to surpass China and be the leading populous country in
the world. The total population of the nation is growing at the rate of 1.41 %.
Literacy rate is estimated to be 74% in India. India has the advantage of
demographic dividend of having a working population of 65 per cent compared
to aged population of 5.5% and non-working population of about 30%. China,
however, does not have this advantage with a shrinking workforce and
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FPRC Journal No. 9
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increasing aged population.
Under such adverse situation condition of countries like Bangladesh can be
well imagined. But then it is posited that in post-industrial society economic
development will proceed in a comparatively equitable manner directed by a
knowledge elite with sectional conflict between technical intelligentsia and
literary intellectuals or between professional administrators and technical
specialists. In Daniel Bell‟s ( an American sociologist and of End of Ideology
fame ) post-industrial society knowledge has the primacy that transforms a preindustrial society where agriculture, fishing and mining dominates the economy
to an industrial society which centers on human-machine relationship and
application of energy to mass manufacturing and processing of tangible goods
and finally to a post-industrial society. It is, however, difficult to imagine a
society, particularly in developing countries where most of the people are
illiterate, to accept the dictates of a knowledge elite which in any case is contrary
to the fundamentals of democracy and denies equal role in decision making to
the less educated and consequently disadvantaged section of the society. Besides
Harvard Professor Nathan Glazer( Democracy and Deep Divide-Journal of
Democracy- April 2010) points out the threats to democracy posed by social
divisions that are essentially formed by birth and are inerasable: race, ethnicity,
religion and native language. He cites three cases of USA, Canada and India and
tries to explore how these countries have endeavored to solve these divisions
through democratic means. In the US deep divisions are marked by racial
divides that till today mark the differences in social and economic positions
between the whites and the African-Americans. The average income of a white
middle class family is more than that of an African-American family. There are
more African-Americans in prisons than whites. In Canada the division is
between Francophone and Anglophone while in India grave divisions in caste,
religion and languages continue to threaten the common thread of Indianism
which has also been translated by a section of the people as Hindutva that
considers Jains, Buddhists and Sikhs to be adherents of indigenous Indian
religions but excludes Muslims and Christians as outside the pale of Indianism
though representatives of both communities have and continue to adorn high
political, judicial and administrative posts in India. Muslims in particular are at
a disadvantage due to unresolved problem with Pakistan on Kashmir and the
belief of the opposition Bharatya Janata Party that Muslims cannot be good
Indians as theirs is an outsider religion and culture. According to Nathan Glazer
influences of democracy have been able to moderate these divides and bring
forth a measure of stability, more active in the US, firm in Canada but shakier
in India. Globally, however, Muslims continue to be vilified due to their weak
politico-economic position, both as Diaspora in Western countries and as
minorities in many developing countries. Some leaders in Europe have already
declared that multiculturalism is not a workable proposition
and as a
consequence immigration from Islamic countries are being restricted and
Muslim Diaspora are reportedly being profiled as possible terrorists regardless of
their having no criminal record in the past. The appeal of Professor Bassam Tibi
( of Gottingen University)
that Muslims in Europe be Europeanized but not
integrated has fallen on deaf ears because many in the West are convinced that
Islam is a belief system- religious but also political that demands violent
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suppression of non-adherents. In this narrative the origin of the Palestine
tragedy is often forgotten that the Biblical promised land actually belonged to the
Arabs and from the Balfour Declaration to Winston Churchill assurance to the
Arabs ( when Churchill was Colonial Secretary) that the Jewish exodus to
Palestine would not affect then existing demographic and cultural composition of
the area proved to be sham. The Arabs faced with Western hypocrisy were given
the option of accepting the UN proposal of 1947that would have created a
Palestinian state alongside the nascent Israeli state a proposal the Arabs refused
but now regretted by Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas who termed the
refusal a mistake. The points of this discourse is to highlight the possible global
scenario in the coming decades relating to food security, global warming, energy
scarcity, conflict centering water scarcity, growing anti-Muslim sentiment thus
dividing the world along religious lines and possibly giving encouragement to the
spread of radical Islam who basically believe in Taliban philosophy of forcible
transformation of the world into rule by pristine Islamic code , and myriad of
insoluble problems increasing the number of failed states, inter-country conflict(
refer to Condoleezza Rice‟s recent revelation of Indian deployment of nuclearcapable missiles along Indo-Pak border to punish Pakistan following terrorist
attack on Indian Parliament in 2001 in her memoirs No Higher Honor) etc. South
Asian expert Bruce Riedel has for long termed this region as the most dangerous
place in the world. Apart from the bitterness borne out of the bloody partition of
1947 Pakistan‟s refusal to acknowledge the changed status of India as an
emerging global power and also Pakistan‟s acquisition of nuclear capability
compounded by military domination of Pakistani politics and ferocious antiPakistani feeling nursed by a section of Indian population indeed makes the
South Asian region as a very dangerous region. Pakistan also eyes with
suspicion growing Indian involvement in Afghanistan long regarded as „strategic
depth” in case of Indo-Pak conflict.
All said and done India to have global influence has to first ensure that she has
cordial relations with her neighbors, not hegemonic but on the basis of equality
and respect of each country‟s sovereignty. Indian authorities should shed any
pretension of Seymour Martin Lipset‟s concept of “American Exceptionalism”
that in any case is being challenged by both friends and foes in this age of
multilateralism. Unless due respect is given to the legitimate concerns of her
neighbors Indian conduct of international affairs would be suspect to the world
at large. Such advice should not be taken as attempt at diminution of Indian
primacy in this region but to enable her to play a role expected of a major G-20
nation.
**************
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India, Pakistan and the United States :
A Zero Sum Game in the Reverse?
Touqir Hussain
Former Ambassador of Pakistan
E-mail [email protected]
Web: http://www.TouqirHussain.com
Touqir Hussain is a Senior Visiting Fellow at SAIS Johns
Hopkins University and Adjunct Professor at Georgetown
University and the Syracuse University ( Washington DC
campus). Earlier he also taught at the University of Virginia. He
is a former senior diplomat from Pakistan, with expertise on
issues including South Asian security, political Islam,
terrorism, and U.S. relations with the Islamic world.
Mr. Hussain held senior positions in the Pakistani Foreign Office, and served as the Diplomatic
Adviser to the Pakistani Prime Minister from 1996 to 1998. He served as Ambassador to Brazil
(1990-1993), Spain (1993-1995), and Japan (1998-2003). He also was a Senior Fellow at the
U.S. Institute of Peace from 2004 to 2005, and a Research Fellow with the Center for the
Study of Globalization at the George Washington University from 2006 to 2010.
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India, Pakistan and the United States :
A Zero Sum Game in the Reverse?
South Asia has changed and so has the nature of
relations among India,
Pakistan and the United States. The changes, brought on by the end of the Cold war,
globalization, the region’s nuclearization, and 9/11, present new opportunities and
threats for the three countries and their relations. These relations are independent yet
related requiring
coherent policy responses by them specially on their common
challenges.
India stands tall in the region. It compels attention with its marked economic
and technological achievement and potential, the projection of military power, its
democratic structure, aspirations for a big power status, and as the likely balancer to
China and a factor of stability in South Asia and its periphery. This offers great
economic and strategic prospects to the US forming the basis of a promising
relationship with India. Yet this relationship’s success will remain limited if it is out of
synch with the other two relations that remain unsatisfactory—between the US and
Pakistan, and India and Pakistan.
Pakistan India—false start; and happy ending?
Historically Pakistan had the potential for a comparable achievement to that of
India though on a lesser scale but it took a different road, partly by choice and partly
by circumstances. There were circumstances of
birth, and a difficult security
environment to which India no doubt made a meaningful contribution. But Pakistan’s
understandable security concerns got inflated, not only by the Indo Pak historical
mistrust and contrasting national identities but also by their respective domestic
politics and policy miscalculations in which the institutional pride of the two armies,
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specially on Pakistan’s side, making rivalry and competition between them as an end
itself, played no small part.
The US tried to address Pakistan's insecurities by enhancing its defense
capability and so helped advance its own strategic purposes. But there was a downside;
it laid the foundations of Pakistan’s troubled relations with India and, in time, with
the US itself , aggravated by their own short sighted and expedient policies. In the end
each country became part of the problem for the other two, and unfortunately remains
so.
While the US Pakistan relations are complicated and have become more so after
9/11, both India and Pakistan are finally groping to start a new chapter in the relations
with the initiative having come mainly from Pakistan beginning with Musharaf. Of
course India too has played its part. With international support and understanding,
and her own coercive diplomacy, India has been raising the cost of conflict for
Pakistan. Pakistan may finally be realizing that its regional ambitions can only be
pursued at the expense of international disapproval, war with India, and threat to its
internal order. And as the Indian economy soars and Pakistan lags far behind, it may
be consigned to subservience to its neighbor.
Thus peace with India may have become critical to Pakistan’s economic survival
and national security. This is the emerging realization in the country specially among
the intelligentsia but it lacks clarity and strength of conviction as cross currents
released by the Afghanistan war that has added fresh tensions in the relations are
muddying the debate.
Afghanistan—good intentions, bad policies
Afghanistan where American and Indian presence is seen as converging
negatively for Pakistan has come to redefine its relationship not only with India and
but also with the US specially as the spill over of the war onto Pakistan has come to
endanger its security and threaten its stability. It has impacted on the country’s
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internal dynamics by raising the profile of the Islamists specially empowering Jihadist
groups who have assumed a populist face benefiting from as well as contributing to
the rise of nationalism and an assertive Islamic identity triggered by the Post 9/11 US
wars, tensions between Islam and the West, and the growing US India relations. The
Jihadists see the US and India as a single adversary and are using this narrative to
spread dangerous and radical thoughts in Pakistan. They are a threat not only to
Pakistan’s stability but also to the peace and stability of the region, and to global
security.
India cannot rise under threat of destabilization by these forces. The American
and Indian think tank community trivializes their profile by stereotyping them as
Pakistan specific or surrogates of ISI which at on time they may have been; whether
they still are is open to question. The reality is since 9/11 they have become part of a
wider phenomenon. Their constituency has gone beyond the state which clearly lacks
the capacity to deal with them making the debate as to whether it is supporting them
or lacks the political will to oppose or is ambivalent towards them largely irrelevant.
The bottom line is Pakistan is facing serious challenges to which the
Afghanistan war and the post 9/11 US military and intelligence profile in and around
Pakistan have made a significant contribution. And the irony is Afghanistan itself
despite American presence there for over a decade --with good intentions but bad
policies-- not only remains unstable but has become a serious threat specially if it fails.
If Afghanistan goes down how can Pakistan remain immune or safe? And then India
may not shine all that brightly either.
A complex web of challenges and opportunities
So threats and opportunities in the region have all become complex and
interlocked. Pakistan cannot become a normal country unburdened of its insecurities
and unsustainable regional ambitions without normal relations with India. And
Pakistan’s relations with the US have become both an opportunity and compulsion for
it to meet the crises both of its own and America’s making. And Washington itself
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cannot achieve its strategic purposes without a moderate and stable Pakistan enjoying
peaceful relations with India without which Afghanistan cannot be stabilized. This is
a compelling reason for all the players in the region to coordinate and adjust their
policies if they are to advance their interests.
Washington, of course, cannot and should not dictate policies, especially to an
independent minded and rising power like India for whom the US is just one
dimension of a large foreign policy landscape. But it can and should exert its influence
and adjust its own policies to enhance its influence with both India and Pakistan. In
India it should be urging on policies that encourage Pakistan’s efforts to change its
national outlook for which it does have the resources, resilience and inherent strength
of people and the institutions but lacks leadership, motivation and incentive.
Kashmir
India needs to demonstrate to Pakistan that there is an alternative model of
relationship, and that she could be a credible partner in the search for it. The
resolution of the Kashmir dispute would be critical to this search as this will undercut
the Jihadist forces, weaken the extremism that masquerades as ultra nationalism,
enhance the liberal voice, make Pakistan feel more secure, and unblock the road to
progress in the India Pakistan relations. Delhi has to acknowledge that Pakistan does
have genuine concerns vis a vis India—its having exaggerated them does not
delegitimize them.
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh may have a point when he says that borders
cannot be changed but surely that does not mean nothing else can or should change or
needs to change to help solve the Kashmir issue. The way India relates to Kashmiris
can be and should be changed. If the territory is its integral part as claimed by India,
then you do not need to keep the estimated 700,000 troops there. But if you need to,
surely that means it may not belong to you since you need to keep it by force. This
has to change.
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While there is a growing awareness in Pakistan that victory in Kashmir remains
elusive, there is also a feeling that defeat is not an option. So a settlement has to be
such as does not tarnish Pakistan as defeated and does not degrade India’s territorial
integrity. And above all it must be acceptable to Kashmiris. Resolution of the dispute
will help Pakistan to be at peace with itself and with India. And that will improve US
Pakistan relations by abating anti Americanism that has been intertwined with the anti
India sentiments.
Yet neither anti Americanism nor anti India sentiments will disappear as long as
the Afghanistan war continues. It was a war that may not have been unnecessary but
was certainly avoidable. It has been an unwinnable war the way it has been conducted
specially given the realities of a broken and strife torn country racked by multiple
conflicts for decades and above all the way 80’s war and the subsequent civil war have
changed not only Afghanistan but also the adjoining tribal areas in Pakistan making
the Afghan Pakistan border areas almost like a one country. And last but not least, not
only has the centuries old internal balance of power within Afghanistan broken but
also the regional balance of power among its competing neighbors. To simplify and
trivialize matters which is what the US think tank community has been doing on
Afghanistan --aided by and competing with the media-- Pakistan is being seen as the
sole reason for all this mess. It makes a good story but bad analysis.
The reality is that a weakened Pakistan with an over stretched army has
essentially gone on the defensive. Pakistanis are being asked not to support Taliban
which is a fair demand. But then the alternative being offered is Karzai who is
presiding over a corrupt and Northern Alliance dominated Afghanistan where the civil
war that began in 1973 with the overthrow of the King has not been settled. If anything
American intervention in this civil war after 9/11 has made things worse ,and not just
for Afghanistan but for Pakistan as well. The fact is Washington has been wrong in
Afghanistan twice, both in helping create radical forces in the 80’s and now in the way
it is fighting these very forces since 9/11.
That is why it is important to go beyond the blame game. This present formula
being worked out--strengthen the non Pashtun elements within Afghanistan and build
a non Pakistan coalition in the region led by US and India will not work. The solution
has to include a Pashtun element and Pakistani segment--not on Pakistan's terms but
not on Washington's terms either. And that is the challenge. For that you need a re-set
US Pakistan relationship and reassessment of the Afghanistan war specially the
balance of power inside and outside of Afghanistan.
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The fundamental fact is interests of all four countries US, Afghanistan India
and Pakistan have become interlinked. And they must go beyond their self centered
policies which are advancing nobody’s national interests. Peace in the region has
become indivisible. Indeed Afghanistan whose stability is crucial not only to defeat
threats that could menace India’s rise and Pakistan’s stabilization but it could open
whole new vistas of regional economic integration.
Rather than reenacting a modern day great game in Afghanistan and end up as
both sides losing as Afghanistan has produced no winners in centuries of battle for
internal domination and external control Pakistan and India should cooperate and
there could be win for everybody. Pakistan should understand that India does have
legitimate interests in Afghanistan, and India should accommodate Pakistan’s
interests.
Indeed the rewards that a stable Afghanistan could possibly bring that may
eventually include an integrated South Asia market that also takes care of the water
and energy issues are a strong incentive to both India and Pakistan to normalize their
overall relations. And that is where the US has to help by bringing a clarity in its own
strategic purposes in the region. The present confusion is only forcing other players to
assume the worst and plan accordingly thus acting on cross purposes, harming
everybody’s interests.
Conclusion
The problems being faced by all four countries in the region have been caused
by decades of a broad range of policy failures by them; and the solutions will require a
similar broad based policy successes. Pakistan faces the toughest challenges. And the
hardest part is these challenges are both internal and external and they are intertwined.
Pakistan can but will not change on its own. It needs engagement not containment, not
just compulsion but also incentive to change. It must be given an alternative vision of
relations with both India and the US that serves its national interests—an offer it
cannot refuse. That is how US and India have to relate to it in the context of larger
picture of what has gone wrong in the region for decades and who has done what. A
thinking that considers Pakistan as the sole source of all the problems in the region
and single focus of all the solutions will not work. This way Pakistanis will keep
blaming America and India for all their adversity ands there will be no paradigm shift.
Finally the US has to move on beyond the 9/11 tragedy and the wars it has
generated causing so much anxiety and uncertainty in Pakistan and in fact in many
other countries. Washington should scale down its military posture and leave behind
workable regional coalitions to fight and contain extremist forces. Its continued
massive presence to fight these forces itself is only strengthening them by giving them
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an exploitable cause and political space and causing anti Americanism to the detriment
of not only America’s interests but also those of the region.
Let the region discover its own balance without wars and strategic competition
of outside powers be it US or China. That does offer an opportunity of a leadership
role to India. But along with leadership comes responsibility. If India does have such
aspirations it must help advance other countries interests as well. Only then will they
feel confident of their ties with India as it may bring benefits to them. And the
benefits could be enormous. They will go beyond economic as India’s benign role in
the region and example as a democratic and pluralistic nation will be a great incentive
for others to become so. In the end it will possibly be a win win situation for all.
************
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Is India playing
‘The Suicidal Game’ with Nepalese Maoists?
Dirgha Raj Prasai
Former Member of Parliament
Former Member of Parliament-Nepal (two Times)
Former President of Panchayat Analysis Centre
Former president of Nepal Ideological Monch
Former advisor of Nepal Development Ministry
Former Consulant of Nepal Administrative staff College
Political and Cultural Analyst-Nepal.
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Is India playing
‘The Suicidal Game’ with Nepalese Maoists?
Nepal and India are aspiring for full democracy. The concerns of both the countries is
political stability, peace and good governance. It is because only a good and well-established
political system can lead the masses by appropriate social and economic management of the
state through concrete policies and programmers. So, the both nations are interested in
democratic system. But, the Maoists of Nepal and India want a democratic government to
step down; to be replaced by one led by themselves. Then why the Indian politicians and
diplomats are supporting the anarchist groups?
The Maoists are using their agendas and are opening a 'Pandora's Box'- one-party communist
anarchism. The Maoist Party has their own army. The UNMIN also listened only to the Maoist
rebels and the leaders of the so-called big party. The UNMIN and other unseen groups are
working to push Nepal into a bloodier civil war and conflict. From the very beginning,
UNMIN has been demoralizing the Nepal army.
Nowhere in the world, would a country be able to protect its sovereignty by making the
national army weak and powerless? Can we compare the national army with the Maoists
cadre (army)? Due to the suspicious activities UNMIN, now, in Nepal, we have two kinds of
armies- the national army and the Maoist's army. Can we imagine two kinds of army in a
country?
India has blundered in its assessment of Maoists and did much harm to its own interests in
Nepal. Its calculations in doing so have gone totally wrong. It can not expect any good
results by adopting such policies. Now, the Nepalese Maoists, RIM and COMPOSA have joined
hands for one-party Communism.
Due to the blunder of the Nepalese leaders and the Indian diplomats, democracy in both
countries is in danger. Indian security forces are becoming targets of day-to-attacks by
Indian Maoists (Naxalites). In such circumstances, why Indian politicians and diplomats are
supporting Maoists in Nepal ? The Nepalese and Indian people's position is in danger.
Without analyzing the assumption, why the Indian leaders are not able to see through the
Nepalese Maoist's hypocrisy?
An Indian scholar Dr. Arvind Gupta writes- Anti-India feeling in Nepal is at its peak. The
peace process in Nepal is extremely complicated. India helped bring about the 12-point
agreement. It is doubtful that India can help bring the peace process to the desired outcome.
There is no guarantee that the Constitution will be drafted soon and that even if drafted, it
will bring stability. Nepalese are suspicious of India when they hear Indians talk about
cooperation on water issues. Many in Nepal feel that mega projects will not help Nepal. The
unregulated, open India-Nepal border is a major security concern for both countries. Crossborder crime, smuggling, fake currency and infiltration of undesirable elements including
potential terrorists into India are a major security concern. Nepal also has concerns
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regarding the smuggling of small arms from the Indian side into Nepal.' (August 27, 2010
'INDIA NEEDS A NEW PARADIGM IN ITS NEPAL POLICY'.)
A prominent journalist Pushpa Raj Pradhan, editor-People's Review, writes- 'Indian Embassy
in Kathmandu is spending 57 billion rupees per years under the ' Small Grant Project'. Out of
total FM radios, 50 percent of them are receiving such Indians grants. Similarly, some
Christian missions have also funded those FM radios just to broadcast Christian
programmed. India wants the Indianization of Nepal and the Christians want to transform
Nepal from a Hindu state to a Christian state. A famous researcher, Yogi Narahari Nath
always used to say that Nepal is giving everything to India, from its fresh air to herbs, fresh
water, indigenous production working manpower, etc and Nepal is getting nothing from
India. The Indian wish is to bring all the political parties in the Indian fold. The Indian
mission was fulfilled by the seven parties plus Maoists alliance with the direct support of
India-from human resources to financial resources. Christians too became successful to
declare Nepal a secular state.'-(5 Aug.2010). It is a matter of grief that the political leaders
are not feeling the naked foreign intervention.' So, it is very necessary that all the nationalists
including King should stand to save the identity and sovereignty of this pious land- NEPAL.
Cordial people- to -people level relations between Nepal and India have existed since ancient
times. We have to keep friendly relations with India due to our similar cultural and religious
traditions. But, since 2005, the situation in Nepal is deteriorating day by day. So, Nepalese
nationalists, India and all the democratic forces should unite to restore cordial relations
between Nepal & India and save the identity, unity of Nepal . External powers are fishing in
troubled waters. This may destabilise the country even further. The UNMIN is playing a
questionable role in the affairs of Nepal. The policies of EU and the US do not inspire
confidence. China is being wooed by many political parties as suspicion against India
grows.Pakistan is active. Middle Eastern countries like Saudi Arabia are paying increasing
attention to Nepal.Nepal should not become a battle ground of international powers
Email:[email protected]
*****************
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The India-Pakistan Imbroglio: Time to Change Course
Ishtiaq Ahmed
Professor Emeritus of Political Science,
Stockholm University
Prof. Ishtiaq Ahmed
has
a
PhD
from
Stockholm University. He is a Professor Emeritus of
Political Science, Stockholm University. He is also
Honorary Senior Fellow of the Institute of South
Asian Studies, National University of Singapore. He
can be reached at [email protected]. His has recently published his major undertaking, The
Punjab Bloodied, Partitioned and Cleansed: Unravelling the 1947 Tragedy through Secret British
Reports and First Person Accounts, New Delhi: Rupa Publications, 2011; Karachi: Oxford
University, early 2012. Another major work, The Pakistan Garrison State: Origins, Evolution,
Consequences, Karachi: Oxford University Press, May 2012, is currently in the production process.
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The India-Pakistan Imbroglio: Time to Change Course
An imbroglio is a confused and perplexing political situation. One can wonder if the IndiaPakistan imbroglio has any other serious candidate to compare with except the Arab-Israeli
imbroglio. Both originated as a result of the withdrawal of the British from territories to
which different groups claimed the right to establish nation-states. Failure to agree to a
power-sharing formula between the competing groups resulted in a partitioning of territory
which was accompanied by forced migration, violence and terrorism against innocent
people. The events and subsequent trajectories of these two conflicts have been different but
the important point to keep in mind is that when two or more groups stake the exclusive
right to establish a state on a disputed territory and no peaceful resolution is found to the
problem, great suffering is caused to the people who are driven out of their hearths and
homes. The bitter memories of real and felt injustice become a part of the national memory
and such a consciousness casts long shadows over subsequent relations between the two or
more states that emerge (India and Pakistan), or, one state and the stateless people denied
their right to establish their separate state (Israel and the Palestinians). In this paper, we
shall confine our review to the main features of the India-Pakistan imbroglio.
Relations between states are based on national interests, which in turn are a product of a
“rational” calculation of the benefits and penalties that are likely to accrue from the
relationship. This primary premise underpins modern international relations theory, but a
key question it fails to address is the following: who is the State? Or, rather who speaks on
behalf of the State? I shall argue that when we speak of rational calculations of a state we are
in fact thinking of the calculations made by the power elite of a country. In a democracy the
power elite derives its authority from the consent of the people and therefore when it speaks
on behalf of the nation it is assumed to be legitimately claiming such a prerogative. On the
other hand, power elites can and do claim to speak for a nation without the ritual of elections
conferring democratic legitimacy on them. In some societies it is the established practice,
where the right to speak on behalf of the nation derives from non-elective roots such as
descent (monarchies), divine preference (Rahbar or Supreme Guide as in Iran who has the
last word), charisma (Hitler), praetorian grounds (military dictatorships) and so on. In short,
power elites, whether enjoying democratic legitimacy or some other type, for all practical
purposesmake the crucial decisions in regard to the domestic and external domains. Given
such advantage, power elites can play an enlightened role in initiating change that benefits
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the country as a whole, but they can exploit their dominant position in society to conflate
national interests with their own narrow interests.
Now, rational calculation of states should not in principle preclude states saddled with
historical bad memories, suspicion and fear transcending their differences and establishing
normal, good neighbourly relations. However, the dominant Realism paradigm that the
hawkish lobbies in the Indian and Pakistani security establishments deploy to rubbish
notions of peace and friendship furnishes no scope for thinking beyond the Doomsday
scenario. According to such a perspective,the Hobbesian state of nature prevails in the
international system. Therefore states must prepare for the worst and that means for war.
Even when they establish peace it is a temporary situation and real security comes from
military vigilance and preparation (Morgenthau 1985).
Such a perspective famously fails to explain why states that are notorious for playing zerosum power games between themselves undergo metamorphosis and instead establish trust,
peace and solidarity. Most classically the question would be: how come inveterate rival
neighbouring states such as France and Germany who have a long history of warfare
between them are today the closest partners in the EU project? One can extend the same
question to the whole of Europe, which historically has seen more bloodshed and war than
any other continent in the world. Today almost all western and central European states and
many in eastern Europe are members of the EU, which is primarily a peace project but also a
prosperity and welfare project, the current economic crisis notwithstanding. No doubt NATO
continues to be a formidable military alliance between Europe and North America against
perceived threats from Russia and rogue states such as Iran, but within themselves former
European enemies are now members of the same regional fraternity. While there is never a
guarantee that the EU project will not collapse or some member states would not go to war
the chances that it will happen are minimal.
Consequently, clues and answers as to why former enemy states become close peace
partners have to be sought in a benign understanding of relations between states. The
liberal-internationalist perspective upholds the rights of states to maintain credible defence
and to ensure their security and integrity, but it recognizes that trust between states can be
built if the states in conflict can be convinced that they gain more from investing in
cooperation and mutually beneficial trade, which in turn can serve as the basis for lasting
peace (Deudney and Ikenberry 1999: 179-96).
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In this regard, it is important to point out that relations between states are not always a
product of bilateral interaction. External actors, superpowers, major powers and regional
powers can influence the behaviour of states through carrot-and-stick tactics and strategies.
This is especially relevant in the context of the India-Pakistan imbroglio because Pakistan
has been dependent on external patrons – the United States (from its inception), PR China
(from the 1960s) and Saudi Arabia from the 1980s) – and such dependency has affected its
relations with India.
On the whole, one can say that when power elites perceive greater good being achieved
through peace they can initiate policies that can serve to build mutual trust and confidence.
In this regard, the role of intellectuals and media is also important. In this age of globalization
and the Internet interconnectivity between nations and people is more of a rule than an
exception.
The historical baggage of grievances
All efforts to identify a specific date or event to mark the beginning of the estrangement
between the Indian National Congress, secular-nationalist party dominated by upper-caste,
middle class professionals and the All-India Muslim League, a communal Muslim party
comprising middle class professionals and landowning classes – the two elite parties that led
the struggles for a free and united India or a separate, independent Pakistan, respectively –
are likely to be arbitrary. It was a long drawn process with many ups and downs, and an
outcome of intended and unintended consequences compounded by thecommissions and
omission of their leaders in the context of a colonial power that wanted to safeguard its own
interests before power was handed over to nativesin a united or divided India. Suffice it to
say, that while the Congress led the struggle for more than 50 years to achieve self-rule and
independence and in that process its leaders and cadres were incarcerated many times for
long and short spells, the Muslim League in less than seven years – if 23 March 1940 Lahore
resolution be taken as the first serious call for a separate state – succeeded in gaining
Pakistan, without a single confrontation with the British. One can add that had the British not
wanted to partition India it would not have happened. During the Second World War the
Congress leadership did great harm to its standing with the British by refusing to extend a
helping hand and cooperation while the Muslim League supreme leader, Jinnah, extended full
help to them (French 1997: 149–72, 198; Sarila 2005: 135–9). Additionally, the British military
reached the conclusion in the last months and weeks before the transfer of power that
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Pakistan would be a better bet to safeguard their interests in the Persian Gulf and as a
frontline state against Soviet Russia (Mansergh and Moon 1981: 788-92).
On the other hand, the Muslim League felt betrayed and denied of the whole of the Muslimmajority Bengal and Punjab provinces, which were partitioned on the demand of the Punjab
Sikhs and the Congress Party. Their standpoint was that if India is divided on the basis of
contiguous Muslim and non-Muslim areas then the same principle should apply to these
provinces in which Hindus and Sikhs together constituted a substantial minority of nearly 40
per cent (Ahmed 2011a: xxxv) However, in the 3 June 1947 Partition Plan “other factors”
besides contiguous Muslim and non-Muslim areas was added to modify the majority factor.
Determining contiguous areas was not an easy task because what should serve as the size or
measure of contiguity was fiercely contested by the Muslim League and Congress-Sikh
counsels.
The inclusion of other factors rendered that task even more difficult. The
Congress-Sikh counsels laid great stress on it because they were in a minority in western and
central Punjab. They insisted on ownership of property and the Sikhs on their religious
shrines as well for claiming portions of central Punjab, while the Muslim League emphasized
contiguous majority as the correct measure of territorial claims (Ahmed 1999: 116-67).
Moreover, the implementation of the partition process was notoriously badly organized.
There was a serious dearth of neutral troops to supervise the partition and the Radcliffe
Award of 17 August 1947 left both sides with serious objections and reservations about it,
but they accepted it. The on-going rioting escalated to unprecedented proportions and as a
result for the common people the partition imposed unprecedented suffering, primarily in
the Punjab province but also to a lesser extent in Bengal and with rioting taking place in
Bihar, NWFP, Sindh and some parts of the United Provinces as well as cities such as Delhi,
Bombay and Karachi. Estimates of fatalities range from 1-2 million while the number of
people forced into migration across the India- Pakistan border are anywhere between 14-18
million; the biggest ever in peace time anywhere in the world and ethnic cleansing on both
sides of the divided Punjab (Ahmed 2011a: xlii).
Concurrently negotiations between representatives of the future Indian and Pakistan
governments brokered by the British over a share in the common assets inherited from the
colonial state were conducted in a most unfriendly and suspicious environment. Pakistan
was to receive military assets from the British Indian Army in the proportion of 64:36, India
receiving the greater share since it was bigger in terms of territory and population in roughly
the same proportion. However, Pakistan claimed that it received outdated material,
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hundreds of tanks were never delivered and all the ordnance factories were left in areas
given to India (Cheema 2003: 18). Some statements of Indian leaders such as Prime Minister
Jawaharlal Nehru and Sardar Patel suggested that they hoped that Pakistan would not be
able to survive and therefore return to the Indian fold.
Moreover, in the immediate months after the transfer of power India allegedly tried to bring
down Pakistan on its knees through different tactics: for example, withholding Pakistan’s
share from the colonial kitty and briefly stopping to the flow of water to Lahore from the
waterworks located on the other side in the Indian Punjab (Burki 2011: 69-71). The fact that
the international border between India and Pakistan was drawn dangerously close to Lahore
(some 20 miles) and other major towns in Punjab, instilled from the beginning a strong sense
of vulnerability to Indian aggression in war. Such a feeling later found manifestation in the
notion of ‘the strategic depth’ quest of the military commanders of Pakistan.
Contrasting national identities
The painful and controversial legacy of the births of India and Pakistan as two different
nations circumscribed the freedom of the power elites on both sides to determine the core
characteristics of national identity (Basrur 2010: 18). Such a task had to be undertaken in the
context of the two target communities – Muslims in India and Hindus in Pakistan. In both
countries bloody attacks on these minorities continued outside Bengal and Punjab (which
had already been ethnically cleansed in 1947) for quite some time. In India the ideological
stand taken was that if Pakistan was the state of Muslims then what are Muslims doing in
India. Roughly some 10 per cent of the Indian population comprised of Muslim (which has
been growing over the years and now is around 14 per cent). In the 1960s, vicious attacks on
Muslims in Bhagalpur profoundly shocked Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru who thought
that after the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi and the severe punishment that was meted
out to the culprits Hindu extremists had been deterred from such crimes. Nevertheless the
decision of the Indian power elite – dominated by Nehruvian secularists – to establish a
secular-inclusive nationalidentity prevailed in terms of the Indian constitution. Also, the
Nehruvians were successful in institutionalizing parliamentary democracy (Ahmed 2011b:
49-52).
From the 1980s onwards, anti-minority violence and terrorism revived on both sides. The
Hindu nationalist BharatiyaJanata Party (BJP), had from about the middle of the 1980s begun
to look for populist issues to expand its electoral base. The Hindu nationalistsfundamentalists identified Muslims are a fifth column in India and began a general campaign
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against minorities. Following a yearlong campaign of marches and demonstrations Hindu
hoodlums descended on 6 December 1992 upon the northern India town of Ayodhya and
destroyed the Babri Mosque which they alleged had been constructed on the site of a Hindu
temple and the birth spot of the god Rama(Berglund 2000: 121-56) There were widespread
attacks on Muslims in and around Ayodhya and the rioting spread to other places as well. In
the early 1990s, attacks on Muslims in Mumbai resulted in bomb explosions in Mumbai in
1993 that claimed hundreds of lives. The Indian authorities blamed Muslims from the
Mumbai underground for being behind the bomb blasts with the assistance of the Pakistan
spy agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence(ISI). Such developments were exploited by the
Hindu nationaliststo reinvigorate their campaign that only Hindus were loyal to India and
Muslims were a fifth column (Ahmed 2011b: 53). The BJP began to make progress in
elections on a programme based on aggressive Hindu cultural nationalism, hard line on
Kashmir, no concessions to Pakistan and a general suspicion of minorities.
In February-March 2002, another massacre of over 2000 Muslims took place in the western
Indian state of Gujarat. At that time, Gujarat state was under a BJP government led by
NarendraModi. Hostilities started when Hindu activists returning by train from some
campaign were allegedly attacked by Muslims at Godhra. As a result, 56 of them were burnt
to death. Immediately Muslims were hunted down in the state capital of Ahmedabad and
elsewhere. At least 2000 Muslims were killed and 100,000 displaced. There can be no
denying that violence against Muslims has also been a reaction to terrorism in India by
Pakistan-based groups which recruited radicalized Indian Muslims in some of their
operations (Ahmed 2009: 72).
Pakistan’s travails with its national identity were from the outset marked by inconsistency
and confusion. ‘Cultural nationalism’, based on confessional criteria, was the mobilizing
ideology behind the two-nation theory on which the demand for Pakistan in pre-Partition,
colonial India was based (Ahmed 2011a: 91-133). Pakistan’s founder, Mohammad Ali Jinnah
assured the ulema that Pakistan’s legal system will be based on Islamic law. Yet, he made a
complete about-turn when in an address to the members of the Pakistan Constituent
Assembly on 11 August 1947, he talked of equal rights of all citizens irrespective of their
private faith (Speeches and Writings of Mr Jinnah 1976: 403-4).
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The 11th August 1947 statement such a statement made no sense even to Jinnah’s immediate
followers. For them Pakistan was the state of the Muslim nation and that meant that the
primary Muslim nation should be distinguished from the religious minorities. For them it
was imperative that Pakistan’s national identity should be unambiguously distinguished
from secular India’s. Thus on 7 March 1949, Prime Minister Liaqat Ali Khan moved an
Objectives Resolution in the Pakistan Constituent Assembly. God, not the people or its elected
representatives, was declared the sovereign in Pakistan. Democracy was going to be
observed within limits prescribed by Islam. Muslims and non-Muslims were to enjoy
fundamental rights ‘compatible with’ Islam (Constituent Assembly Debates 1949: 1-2).The
1956 and 1962 Pakistan constitutions upheld the commitment to bring all laws in conformity
with Quran and Sunna (practices of Prophet Muhammad).
Such a commitment was exploited by the ulema to assert that Pakistan was an Islamic state
and in an Islamic state rights were confirmed according to religion. Such a standpoint
received the full backing of the state when General Zia-ul-Haq came to power in 1977. The
Islamization programme that he introduced included a law re-instituting separate
electorates whereby non-Muslim became a separate group. Non-Muslim Pakistanis voted for
the few seats reserved for non-Muslim members of the national and provincial legislatures.
The blasphemy laws of 1982, 1986 and 1991 progressively created a basis for persecution of
non-Muslims on charges of having blasphemed against Islam. On the whole Pakistani Hindus
were not accused of blasphemy. It was mainly Christians and Ahmadis (a group declared
non-Muslim in 1974 as a result of an act of the Pakistan Parliament), but a hostile
atmosphere was created by such discriminatory laws.
Unlike India, in Pakistan hardly any Hindus had stayed in West Pakistan behind after the
partition except a tiny minority in Sindh. Attacks on Hindu temples took place immediately
after the attack on the Babri Masjid in India. Later, violence against Hindus in Sindh has been
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reported every year by the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan. It has included gruesome
murders and abduction of Hindus, mostly women, and their forced conversion to Islam.
(Ahmed 2011b: 84-89). Moreover, Pakistan school and college textbooks were rewritten to
instil hatred and fear of India and Hindus (Aziz 1993). It was also the period when Saudi
Arabia gained considerable clout in Pakistan as Zia’s Islamization policy were hailed by the
Saudis as a step in the right direction (Synnott 2010: 153-6).
It is worth noting that a radical Islamistnational identity was constructed in post-1971
truncated Pakistan in the background of a belief that Hindus and India had conspired to
breakup Pakistan and this was achieved by misleading East Pakistani Bengali Muslims to
believe that West Pakistanis exploited them and treated them as inferior. The ultimate proof
of such a conspiracy was the Indian intervention in the civil war that raged between the
Pakistan military and East Pakistani separatists in 1971. It was alleged that because of the
Indian military intervention Pakistan was defeated and Bangladesh came into being. Official
propaganda downplayed any responsibility of the West Pakistani power elite that ordered
military action in East Pakistan (Aziz 1993: 154-6).
Besides problems with the construction of a coherent national identity in constitutional
terms, the Pakistani political class proved to be singularly incompetent to evolve procedures
and mechanisms that could ensure civilian hegemony. It meant that the civil service from
early times began to call the shots as governments were made and unmade. Afterwards the
military was summoned to restore law and order, notably during the 1953 Punjab
disturbances as a result of the anti-Ahmadiyya riots. Recurring political instability was the
reason for the military progressively expanding its involvement in politics; hence military
coups were staged in 1958, 1969, 1977 and 1999 on grounds of saving the country from a
breakdown of law and order. The Pakistan Supreme Court passed controversial judgements
upholding the coups on grounds of the Doctrine of Necessity (Nawaz 2008: 561).
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Such internal processes of contrasting state-nationalism and evolution of democratic
government in India and authoritarian rule in Pakistan with the military at the helm of affairs
obfuscated communications between the two sides and sustained the suspicion and fear
from the past and created additional barriers that undermined good relations and
understanding between the two nations.
Restrictive visa regimes
Symbolically and substantively the suspicions and fears resulted in mutual rejection and
repulsion in the form of comprehensively restrictive or rather prohibitive visa policies and
regimes. Initially both sides permitted rather easy movement of people but gradually the
bureaucracies, especially those entrenched in the foreign office began to impose severe
restrictions on granting visa to nationals from the other side. Usually 1954 is regarded as the
year when the restrictive visa regimes began to be put into effect. After the 1965 war visits to
the other side became even more restrictive. The main losers were divided Muslim families
with relatives on both sides. The Sikhs were also badly affected as almost all of them were on
the Indian side while some of their holiest shrines were in Pakistan. Muslims and Hindus
who could not claim relatives on the other side were virtually excluded from being
considered for visa. Even when visa was granted, usually restricted to one or two places it
required police reporting. Besides great inconvenience fear of police harassment and other
irregularities became part of the experience of those granted visa. Over the years such policy
only became more prohibitive as more wars and then terrorism accentuated distrust (Ahmed
2011a: 688-98).
External factors accentuating alienation and estrangement
The alienation and estrangement that accrued as a result of clashing national identity and
standards of nation-building was further augmented and reinforced by the two
statesadopting conflicting strategies in international relations to relate to other states and
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powers during the Cold War. While Nehru became a leading figure of the Non-Aligned
Movement (NAM), which was perceived as pro-Soviet,Pakistani leaders joined in the 1950s
first the Baghdad Pact and later CENTO and SEATO and thus became an ally of the antiCommunist alliance led by the United States. Membership in such international clubs, so to
say, vicariously fed into the politics of confrontation between them.
The military alliance with the United States provided Pakistan with the armament and
training it needed to assert itself military vis-à-vis the much bigger and more powerful India.
A calculation was made by the Pakistan military that as a better trained fighting force
equipped with superior weaponry it could offset the disadvantages of smaller size and
economy and its geographical peculiarity of comprising two separate territorial units(Basrur
2010: 13). The Americans had, however, expressly forbidden the use of their armament in a
war with India. In any case, the standard policy adopted by the Pakistan military was to try to
maintain a balance of power vis-à-vis India.
On the Indian side, priority on defence and security derived from constant tension and a
number of armed confrontations with Pakistan as well as from the perceived threat from
China. The 1962 crushing defeat in the border war with China was the beginning of a rapid
modernization and expansion of the Indian armed forces. That Pakistan and China had
become allies lent credibility to Indian ambitions to be ready to fight a war on two fronts.
Moreover, periodic Indian military exercises along the Pakistan border always kept caused
great concern in Pakistan. India nuclear test of 1974 served as a further boost to the arms
race in South Asia. India’s protracted Operation Brasstacks during autumn 1986 and spring
1987 along the hundreds of kilometres-long India-Pakistan border generated profound
anxiety in Pakistan (Arif 2001: 242-76). It finally convinced Zia, who had been under intense
US pressure that Pakistan had to resist US pressure not to go nuclear and thereafter the
nuclear weapons programme was pursued with increasing vigour. Both India and Pakistan
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demonstrated their nuclear weapons capability during May 1998.
Another external route to confrontation was that India and Pakistan sided with opposite
sides during the Afghan civil war in the wake of the Soviet and US withdrawals from
Afghanistan in 1989. That confrontation saw many vicissitudes. During the Taliban regime
(1996-2001) Pakistan’ premium sharply rose at Kabul but plummeted when that regime was
ousted in the end of 2001. At present, India’s premium with the Karzai government is high
while Pakistan has demonstrated its power and influence in challenging the US-NATO and
Afghan forces largely through the Afghan Taliban, many of whom enjoy sanctuary in
Pakistan.
Pakistan military main gainer
The internal and external fallout of recurring tensions and conflict was that the Pakistan
military, especially the Pakistan Army, emerged as the most powerful institution in Pakistan.
The Indian power elite responded to such a reality by deciding to wait for democracy to
stabilize in Pakistan to start looking for a peace partner. Whether this was a correct
assessment or only an evasive tactic to postpone any resolution of the Kashmir dispute is
difficult to say but it contradicted the realism dogma that otherwise informed policy
formulation in Delhi.
The Kashmir dispute
Given such complications it was not surprising that when at the time of their founding both
sides staked claims on the former princely Jammu and Kashmir State they would be drawn
into a conflict that would prove well-nigh impossible to resolve. The India Independence Act
did not explicitly and unequivocally lay down the principles according to which the hundreds
of princely states will determine their future. In principle the termination of British
paramountcy implicitly permitted the princely states to remain independent or join either
India or Pakistan. It is generally agreed that the Maharaja was toying with the idea of
remaining independent, but both India and Pakistan desperately wanted to acquire Kashmir
and tried to advance their influence through their allies and supporters in the state. Apart
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from the legal fictions maintained by both sides, problems of identity and self-image
complicate matters. India considers the retention of Kashmir an essential feature of its
secular-composite national identity while Pakistan considers its Muslim identity incomplete
as long as Kashmir has not joined it (Basrur 2010: 19-21). After all, the principle according to
which British India was to be divided between India and Pakistan was that contiguous
Muslim majority areas were to be given to Pakistan and in geographical terms Kashmir is
directly contiguous to Pakistan. Moreover, the third letter in the acronym PAKISTAN stands
for Kashmir.
It was in these circumstances that a tribal force backed by Pakistani regulars entered
Kashmir on the night of 21-22 October 1947 with a view to liberating it and making it join
Pakistan. At that point the Maharaja decided to sign the bill of accession with India. The date
of the Accession Bill given in Indian publications is 26 October 1947. It must be pointed out
that the Accessional Bill mentioned that the future relationship between India and Kashmir
would be negotiated later and that the accession was temporary. Its legality is thus contested
by Pakistan (Ahmed 1998: 141-46).
The rest of the story is too well-known to be retold here. Suffice it to say that on 1 January
1949, a ceasefire brokered by the United Nations came into effect with both sides
maintaining control over the territory they had acquired during the various battles: roughly,
two-thirds stayed within India and the rest went to Pakistan. Subsequent Security Council
resolutions called for a plebiscite, but were never implemented as both sides dug deep into
the territories under their control and both sides have prepared legal briefs justifying their
respective standpoints on that issue.
India in particular overruled any third party
intervention or arbitration while Pakistan persisted has been in favour of it.
Notwithstanding emotive factors, it can be argued that the Kashmir dispute is primarily a
hydro-political problem. The most developed regions of Indian agricultural production and
almost the whole Pakistani agricultural sector are dependent on the waters from rivers
which originate in the mountains of Kashmir or the adjacent Himalayan range. These rivers
meander into the territories of both the states. Consequently, the state which constitutes the
upper riparian enjoys a strategic advantage because it can divert the flow of water or even
deny it to the other. This advantage is enjoyed by India.
Surprisingly, although tension and hostility over Kashmir have remained high and erupted in
wars, both sides realized that they could not afford to postpone an agreement on water
sharing until the final status of Kashmir was settled. Consequently, under the auspices of the
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World Bank the Indus Waters Treaty was agreed between them in 1960 whereby the waters
of the three eastern rivers - Ravi, Sutlej and Beas – were awarded to India. Pakistan was
allocated water from the western rivers of Indus, Jhelum and Chenab. The treaty allowed
Pakistan to construct a system of replacement canals to convey water from the western
rivers into those areas in West Pakistan which had previously depended for their irrigation
supplies on water from the eastern rivers. (Bhatnagar 1986, pp. 230-31)
In subsequent years, Pakistan has built the Mangla and Tarbela dams and several other
similar facilities on the waters of Indus, Jhelum and Chenab. The funding has come from
international donors. Similarly India has been building various dams and barrages on the
Ravi, Sutlej and Beas. Disputes over the shared waters have been cropping up from time to
time, most notably over theBaglihar dam which India has constructed on Chenab River. It
was submitted for arbitration. The ruling given by the arbitrator upheld the Indian right to
build the dam but recommended some changes in the construction that were in violation of
the 1960 agreement. However, Pakistan is deeply worried that if India continues to build
such dams it would seriously harm Pakistan’s interests (Tariq 2010).
A sort of breakthrough was achieved in the aftermath of the 1999 Kargil mini-war between
the two rivals. General Pervez Musharaf who masterminded the Kargil Operation climbed
down from the official stand of Pakistan that the UN resolutions be implemented in letter and
spirit. Such a radical break from Pakistani orthodoxy on the Kashmir dispute was significant
as Musharraf represented the most powerful element in the Pakistani power elite – the
Pakistan military or rather the Pakistan Army. He accepted that it was impossible to redraw
the borders but that some formula of conceding maximum autonomy to the two Kashmirs
could be acceptable to Pakistan. Reportedly both Prime Minister AtalBihari Vajpayee and
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh have been sympathetic to some such solution.
Musharraf alleged that an understanding had been reached between him and Vajpayee at the
July 2001 Agra Summit but at the last moment ultra-nationalist forces in the BJP and in the
Indian bureaucracy sabotaged the Agra Declaration which would have facilitated a resolution
of the Kashmir dispute (Musharraf 2006: 298-99). The second time this happened when an
anti-Musharraf movement starting in 2007 culminated with his ouster in August 2008.A US
secret cable revealed by the whistle-blower Internet network,Wikileaks,claimed that
Musharraf and Manmohan Singh had worked out a “non-territorial” solution to the Kashmir
dispute (Times of India, 3 September 2011).
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Terrorism and subversive activities across borders
After the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989 and the United States followed
suit, acivil war broke out among rival Afghan ethnic warlords. Initially the Northern Alliance
was successful but then the Taliban comprising mainly Pakhtuns of southern Afghanistan
ousted them in 1996. The Taliban regime received support and recognition from Pakistan.
Pakistani defence strategists had always worried about Pakistan’s lack of ‘strategic depth’
vis-à-vis India began to entertain ambitions of creating an Islamic super-state or
confederation comprising Pakistan, Afghanistan and liberated Kashmir. Many of the
Pakistani mujahideen from the Afghan theatre had already shifted their activity to the
Indian-administered Kashmir. Within Pakistan militant fundamentalist organizations were
openly active in recruiting volunteers to fight in Kashmir. The Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, Jaish-eMuhammad and the Laskar-e-Tayyaba were the biggest among them. The mujahideen
regularly crossed into the Indian-administered Kashmir and carried out armed attacks
against what they perceived were Indian occupation forces. These organizations were
patronized by Pakistani intelligence services and by that token by the Pakistan military as
well (Wilson 2007).
Terrorism was extended to Indian towns and cities as well and during the first decade a
number of terrorist attacks were carried out in Delhi and Mumbai and other places. On 13
December 2001 an attack by Pakistan-based militants on the Indian Parliament nearly drove
the two countries to war as both sides sent hundreds of thousands of soldiers to the border.
It was international diplomacy led by the United States which calmed tempers on both sides
and a major war; this time between two neighbouring nuclear-weapon states was averted.
However, on 26 November 2008 a terrorist attack carried out by the Lashar-e-Tayyaba
cadres on resulted in the death of 170 innocent people including more than 50 Indian
Muslims. Once again the prospects of an all-out war became imminent. Once again intense
pressure by United States, the UN, UK, Japan and others helped to avert war. On the other
hand, Pakistan has persistently alleged that India is behind the on-going armed insurgency of
Baloch nationalists. However, whereas in the case of the Mumbai terrorist attack of 2008
which resulted in the capture of one culprit, AjmalKasab, whose origins to Pakistan were
verified and confirmed beyond any reasonable doubt Pakistan has yet to produce conclusive
proof of Indian involvement in Balochistan.
More importantly, an unintended consequence of investing in militant Islam has been that
after Pakistan joined George W Bush’s war on terror the Pakistani Taliban turned their guns
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on the Pakistani power elite while simultaneously wreaking havoc on completely innocent
men, women and children through a spate of indiscriminate suicide bombings and so on.
During 2001-2011 at least 35 thousand Pakistanis including 5000 military personnel lost
their lives because of the terrorism carried out by the Taliban in Pakistan(The News, 14 May
2011). Such activities had devastating impact on the Pakistan economy as foreign investors
fled and Pakistan gained the unenviable reputation of the epicentre of international
terrorism and much worse.
Moreover, Pakistan’s main ally and patron, the United States, decisively re-oriented its policy
in South Asia so that India became the explicit strategic partner in this region. In one sense,
the Americans had always considered India the paramount power in South Asia. In the
aftermath of the 1962 Sino-Indian border war, the United States greatly increased economic
and military aid to India. Moreover, during the 1965 India-Pakistan war the United States
imposed an arms embargo on both the adversaries but it hit mainly Pakistan which was
heavily dependent on US arms. Pakistan tried to diversify such dependence by cultivating
Chinese help. According to both Washington DC and New Delhi, the Chinese helped Pakistan
in its nuclear weapons programme.
However, since Chinese Muslims from Xinxiang province in the northwest linked up with
Pakistani militant groups the Chinese have been wary of such developments. On the other
hand, China and India have cautiously and gradually been expanding trade. China has also
toned down its support to Pakistan on the Kashmir dispute and has been advising both
nations to resolve that conflict peacefully. Pakistan’s third main external patron, Saudi
Arabia, continues to exercise influence in Pakistan but its interests are mainly to keep the
Iranian influence in Pakistan at bay. It does not seek confrontation with India.
With regard to India, if any designs to weaken Pakistan were entertained at any stage and
that intention remains it is time to review such policy. Pakistan possesses a formidable
fighting force and capability and credible deterrence at its disposal (Chowdhury 2011). Any
involvement in the Balochistan secessionist movement or to squeeze Pakistan through
alliance with Afghanistan is likely to strengthen the resolve of the Pakistan military to
overrule a normalization and peace deal with Pakistan. In both cases it is in India’s interest to
make a strong effort to convince Pakistan that it does not nurture any nefarious designs on it.
Moreover, failure to respond flexibly and generously to Pakistan’s stand that the Kashmir
dispute should be amicably resolved so that a win-win solution emerges that benefits not
only India and Pakistan but also the Kashmiris, necessitates an equal response with concrete
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proposals instead of high-sounding rhetoric and generalities that Indian negotiators are
known for. It is to be wondered whether the Kashmir dispute is the cause or a symptom of
the India-Pakistan rivalry. Whatever be its real nature one cannot deny that its resolution is
imperative so that the two states do not plunge themselves into an all-out nuclear war.On the
other hand, nuclear war is not an option since the arsenals at the disposal of the two
adversaries are enough to ensure mutual assured destruction (MAD).
Incentives to change course
Historical memory is selective memory which means that emphasis can always shift. Since
India and Pakistan emerged out of a pluralist civilization with many shared cultural traits
and ethical and moral values the raw materials for mutual acceptance exist in their historical
baggage. Already, both sides as members of SAARC are committed to cooperation and peace.
Therefore the framework for realizing such a commitment only needs to be pursued
seriously. Also, while the India-Pakistan story is one of conflict it has redeeming features as
well. The fact of a rich, composite 1000-year-old culture cannot be denied. Classical and
popular film-music, Bollywood films and film-stars, and Pakistani television plays have
always served to connect the two sides. Equally, Urdu-Hindi poets and lyricists continue to
enjoy the admiration of middle-class Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs. The similarities between
the two Punjabs need not be overemphasized. Sports, especially cricket has surprised both
Establishments by the spontaneous warmth and friendship between fans when they have
met during matches, inside and outside the stadiums. There is good reason to believe that on
both sides the emphasis on suspicion and fear is largely a product of the official narratives
and policies. In this regard, it is important to note that the main opposition leader Mian
Nawaz Sharif delivered in August 2011 a message of peace and friendship to Indian
journalists who attended a conference in Lahore arranged by the South Asia Free Media
Association (SAFMA) (Daily Times, 14 August 2011). The PPP-led government had been
making similar utterances after it came to power in March 200.
Mutual benefit and prosperity through trade
The establishment SAARC in 1985 was largely the recognition that the states in South Asia
could address the problems of abject poverty of their citizens if they agreed to invest in trade
and cooperation on environmental issues (Muni 2010). However, the trick is to seize
opportunities which arrive at historical junctures. When nations fail to do it they have to wait
a long time for another chance. The bandwagon of economic growth originated first in East
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Asia, then moved towards Southeast Asia and then continued westwards to India.
Bangladesh very wisely decided to hitch its future to it and is reaping impressive benefits.
Pakistan becomes the automatic candidate to be on this fast-moving bandwagon of economic
growth and development. A vast market exists that extends from Afghanistan into Central
Asia for Indian and Pakistani goods.
For Pakistan, a real challenge to free trade with India can be the fear that India can flood its
markets with cheap goods. Pakistani manufacturers and factory-owners have aired such
concerns though now the chambers of commerce on both sides are in favour of greater trade.
If India and Pakistan can establish a trade regime that ensures mutual benefit, the dividends
can be enormous. Bangladesh and India have recently agreed to establish joint industrial
ventures, most notably in the jute industry. Similar enterprises can be established between
India and Pakistan, which ensure a fair share to Pakistan. Moreover, cheap Chinese products
have already flooded the Pakistan market, so perhaps Indian products can help to diversify
such a challenge and it may not be a bad thing if Pakistani consumers benefit from it.
In this regard, India has to demonstrate its sincerity to become a reliable trade partner with
Pakistan. Pakistani experts have been complaining that the Indian bureaucracy behaves far
more meanly than what its leadership professes. The fact is that emphasis on trade has been
the Indian call and Pakistan has been resisting it thus far. Trade has been progressively
increasing but remains woefully small. India has already granted MFN status to Pakistan and
the Pakistan government has announced that it is about to do the same. Foreign Minister
HinaRabbaniKhar announced that the military are on board (Dawn, 6 November 2011). So, if
the main power-holders in Pakistan are in favour of increasing trade then the most
important hurdle can be crossed with much greater ease. India and Pakistan have a large
numbers of professionals, educationists and technocrats who, because of their ability to
function in the English language, can find jobs and opportunities in Afghanistan and Central
Asia as these entities connect with the global economy. Even our unskilled workforce can be
of interest in such markets, but for such to happen both sides should build trust and mutual
interests in such ventures. Discussions are already going on between Indian and Pakistani
officials on generous visa regimes for the business communities. It should be underpinned by
generous visa regimes for ordinary citizens as well. Elitist solutions will not work unless the
mass of people are involved and benefit from it. Tourism can provide new avenues for
incomes and jobs on both sides.
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Then there are the challenges of the deeper structural and environmental type that both
India and Pakistan face, but which can only be dealt with effectively if they work together.
The increasing gap between poor and rich, environmental degradation, sinking water levels,
unbridled population growth — all pose immediate and long-term challenges that cannot be
ignored and need attention right. It must be said that environmental awareness is very poor
in South Asia as a whole. India is a major polluter and Pakistan is no better. The elites, power
elite, business elite and academics have to address the environmental challenges which if left
unattended can greatly increase agricultural land into deserts thus aggravating poverty and
bad health and so on.
Solving the Kashmir dispute
It must be said with great emphasis that without a reasonable solution of the Kashmir
dispute a real psychological breakthrough to normalize relations will not be forthcoming.
There are several reasonable solutions on the line, but unless India and Pakistan abandon the
combative mind-set no progress is going to be possible. Neither can win a war against the
other even if it can launch a surprise attack. Both are likely to inflict irreparable damage on
each other. It is clear that no zero-sum approach or ‘winner takes all’ solution is likely to
succeed. The UN resolutions regarding a plebiscite are clearly not workable. The third option
about an independent Kashmir will always be opposed by the Hindu and Buddhist minorities
and it is doubtful if the Indian and Pakistan governments would approve of it.
It is therefore important that India and Pakistan be persuaded that a rationalized Line of
Control be converted into an international border. As soon as that happens, both states
should start withdrawing or at least drastically reducing their armed personnel from their
respective parts. Kashmiris from both sides should be allowed substantial autonomy, but
without the right to maintain their own armed forces. This should be accompanied by
relatively free travelling facilities between the two sides for bona fide Kashmiris, though
without the automatic right to settle on the other side. The Indus Waters Treaty should
continue to be the basis of water sharing between India and Pakistan.
It is also clear that the ultra-nationalist postures of India and Pakistan will have to be
abandoned, religious extremism weeded out and democratic forces given a free
play.Pakistan’s responsibility to extricate itself from self-destructive extremism and
terrorism is no doubt far greater than that of India but the latter too has to put its house in
order. The RSS, Shiv Sena and terrorist groups such as the one behind a number of bomb
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attacks, including the one on the Samjautha Express in 2007 are proof of such rabidly antiMuslim and anti-Pakistani constituencies in India.
If both sides take proper measures to establish an environment of trust and peace the Ghost
of Partition can be exorcised from their midst. This is essential because South Asia needs a
cooperative framework for not only progress but also bare survival. India and Pakistan can
continue to challenge each other’s’ strength on the playing grounds. Just as football is the
medium through which former European rivals test and challenge each other’s strength,
cricket, land hockey and the popular South Asian sport of kabadi and kushti (wrestling)
should provide ample opportunities for friendly competition and combat. Only a South Asian
Union of Independent States seems to be the solution that can deliver rich dividends in terms
of peace and prosperity.
References :
Ahmed, Ishtiaq, State, Nation and Ethnicity in Contemporary South Asia, London and New
York: Pinter, (1998).
Ahmed, Ishtiaq, ‘The 1947 Partition of Punjab: Arguments put Forth before the Punjab
Boundary Commission by the Parties Involved’ in Ian Talbot and Gurharpal Singh (eds),
Region and Partition: Bengal, Punjab and the Partition of the Subcontinent, Karachi: Oxford
University Press, (1999).
Ahmed, Ishtiaq, ‘Politicized Religion in Illiberal South Asian Contexts: The Cases of India and
Pakistan’, South Asian Review, Theorizing Religion in a Postmodern Context, 2009 Special
Topic Issue,Volume 30, Number 1, (September-October 2009).
Ahmed, Ishtiaq, The Punjab Bloodied, Partitioned and Cleansed: Unravelling the 1947 Tragedy
through Secret British Reports and First Person Accounts, New Delhi: Rupa Publications,
(2011a).
Ahmed, Ishtiaq, ‘Secular versus Hindu nation-building: Dalit, Adivasi, Muslim and Christian
experiences in India’, in Ishtiaq Ahmed (ed), The Politics of Religion in South and Southeast
Asia, London: Routledge, (2011b).
Ahmed Ishtiaq, ‘Religious nationalism and minorities in Pakistan: constitutional and legal
bases of discrimination’ in Ishtiaq Ahmed (ed), The Politics of Religion in South and Southeast
Asia, London: Routledge, (2011b).
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Arif, K. M. (General), Khaki Shadows: Pakistan 1947-1997, Karachi: Oxford University Press,
(2001).
Aziz, K. K., The Murder of History, Lahore: Vanguard, (1993).
Basrur, Rahesh, M., ‘India – Pakistan Relations: Between War and Peace’, in SumitGanguly,
India’s Foreign Policy: Retrospect and Prospect (New Delhi, Oxford University Press, 2010).
Berglund, Henrik, Hindu Nationalism and Democracy: A Study of the Political Theory and
Practice of the BharatiyaJanata Party, Stockholm: Department of Political Science, (2000).
BHATNAGAR, N., ‘Development of Water Resources in South Asia’ in BhabaniSen Gupta (ed.),
Regional Cooperation and Development in South Asia, Vol. 2, New Delhi: South Asia Books,
(1986).
Burki, ShahidJaved, 2011, South Asian in the New World Order: The Role of Regional
Cooperation, London: Routledge, (2011).
Cheema, PervaizIqbal, The Armed Forces of Pakistan, Karachi: Oxford University Press, (2003).
Chowdhury, Iftekhar Ahmed, ‘Interview with Iftekhar Ahmed Chowdhury’, New York: Global
Observatory,
http://www.theglobalobservatory.org/interviews/143-interview-withiftekhar-ahmed-chowdhury.html, 28 October 2011 (accessed on 8 December 2011)
Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates, Volume V, Karachi: Government Printing Press
(1949).
Deudney, D. and Ikenberry, G. J., ‘The Nature and Sources of Liberal International Order’,
Review of International Studies, 25/2, (1999).
French, Patrick, Liberty or Death: India’s Journey to Independence and Division, London:
HarperCollins Publishers (1997).
Mansergh, Nicholas and Moon, Penderel (eds), The Transfer of Power 1942-47, Vol. X, The
Mounbatten Viceroyalty, Formulation of a Plan, 22 March – 30 May 1947, London: Her
Majesty's Stationery Office, (1981).
Morgenthau, H., Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, New York: Knopf, (1985).
Muni, S. D (ed.), The Emerging Dimensions of SAARC, New Delhi: Cambridge University Press.
Musharraf, Pervez, IntheLineofFire, London: Simon and Schuster, (2006).
Nawaz, Shuja, Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army, and the Wars Within, Karachi: Oxford
University Press, (2008).
Sarila, Narendra Singh, TheShadowoftheGreatGame:TheUntoldStoryofIndia’sPartition, New
Delhi: HarperCollins Publishers India and The India Today Group (2005).
Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah, Vol. II, Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, Lahore, (1976).
Synnott, Hilary, ‘Chapter Four: Regional Relationships: India, China, Saudi Arabia and the
Gulf’ in Adephi Papers Special Edition, 49:406, Transforming Pakistan: Ways out of
Instability, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, (2010).
Tariq, Sardar Muhammad, India-Pakistan Relations, Implementation of Indus Water Treaty: A
Pakistani Perspective, Islamabad: Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and
Transparency (PILDAT), (2010).
Wilson, John, The General and Jihad, New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2007).
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Newpapers
Daily Times, Lahore, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2011\08\14\story_14-82011_pg13_6, 14 August 2011 (accessed on 26 December 2011).
Dawn, Karachi, http://www.dawn.com/2011/11/06/khar-foresees-improvement-in-tieswith-india.html, 6 November 2011(accessed on 25 December 2011).
The News, Karachi,
The Times of India, New Delhi, http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2011-0903/india/30109679_1_pervez-musharraf-president-musharraf-pakistani-president,
(accessed on 25 December 2011).
**************
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SAARC AND EXTRA-REGIONAL POWERS
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO CHINA AND THE US
Prof. A. Lakshmana Chetty
Former Director
Centre for Southeast Asian & Pacific Studies
Sri Venkateswara University
Tirupati – 517502.
Prof. A. Lakshmana Chetty is former Director, Centre for
Southeast Asian & Pacific Studies, S.V. University, Tirupati. He
taught cultural history, modern history and geopolitics of
Southeast Asia. He has to his credit seven books and 35 research
articles published in national and international journals. He has
successfully guided four Ph.D. and two M.Phil. scholars. He was
the recipient of Best Teacher award for the year 2004 from the Government of Andhra
Pradesh. Besides organizing two Conferences of Directors of Area Studies Centres in India
and two National Seminars, one on India and Indochina States, and the other on The Role of
India in the emerging Southeast Asian region, Prof. Chetty participated and presented
scholarly papers in various national and international Conferences. As the Director of the
Centre for Southeast Asian & Pacific Studies for fourteen years, he had the opportunity to
shape the destiny of the Centre. He served as Vice-Principal of Sri Venkateswara University
College of Arts and Sciences, Tirupati. The other academic positions he held in Sri
Venkateswara University include Dean, Faculty of Arts, Member of Academic Senate, Member
of University Research Committee, and Chairman, Board of Studies on Indochina. In addition,
he also served on the academic bodies of other Universities including, Nagarjuna University,
Guntur, Tamil University, Tanjavur, and Osmania University, Hyderabad. Currently he is
working on two projects – India’s Role in BRICS and Shifting Trends in India-China Relations.
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SAARC AND EXTRA-REGIONAL POWERS
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO CHINA AND THE US
The right way to collective prosperity for the nations is to organize themselves into multilateral
cooperative mechanisms to get their common goals of peace and prosperity realized. Regional
groupings found virtue in associating themselves with extra-regional powers chiefly to benefit by
their expertise and economic prowess and this gains currency at a time, when the economic
landscape of the world is swept by globalization. Transition from a unipolar world to a multi-polar
world characterizes the geopolitics of the post-Cold War period. The regional multilateral
frameworks have emerged as major players in the global system, given the fact that the UN has
recognized the relevance of regional organizations in the prevention, management and resolution
of regional conflicts. The regional outfits, as Indonesia‘s Foreign Minister Hassan Wirjuda, the UN
Security Council President for November 2011, has pointed out, were well positioned not only ―to
understand the root causes of many conflicts and other security challenges close to home and to
influence their prevention or resolution, owing to their knowledge of the region‖ but also to
respond early to disputes and emerging crises.1 A plethora of regional organizations sprouted in
various parts of the globe in the post-war period. While some of these regional organizations were
military in character, others were intended to address political issues and some others were meant
to achieve social and economic advancement of the peoples of the region concerned. Even though
the regional groupings are primarily concerned about the growth and development of their
respective regions, the cumulative effect of the endeavours of all these bodies is the advancement
of the mankind. Even the regional outfits that sharpened focus on issues related to defence,
contribute to the progress of the humanity by promoting an environment of peace and stability
which is the prime requisite of the economic development of the humankind. Going by their
performance, these organizations could be divided into three categories. Some of the organizations
such as the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) and MAPHILINDO were well founded but
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vanished within no time without leaving any traces of their existence. Some regional organizations
like the European Union and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) created a
niche for themselves through their impressive performance. The third category comprises those
organizations which continued to exist though their performance remains uninspiring. South Asian
Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) falls into this category. Yet, nine extra regional
powers – Australia, China, the U.S, Japan, the European Union, South Korea, Iran, Mauritius and
Myanmar – had evinced interest in South Asia and obtained the Observer status in SAARC. In this
paper an attempt is made to trace the origin and growth of SAARC, the events leading to the dawn
of a new era of cooperation in the region, to analyse the role of China and the US in the region and
to suggest the role India could play in the context of the evolving regional scenario.
While various regions of the world were in the thick of the process of successfully
experimenting with the concept of regionalism and benefited much from the same, South Asia,
having been in the dark about the regional integration remained one of the least developed regions
of the world. However, South Asia was not at all ―immune to the global trends‖. The regional
leaders felt the need for harnessing the rich resources to improve the lot of the people groaning
under the weight of poverty. Despite mutual suspicions, distrust and hatred, by which these
otherwise contiguous countries were divorced from each other, the seven countries of the regionIndia, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Nepal, Bhutan, Sri Lanka and Maldives assembled in December 1985
to form SAARC with the chief objective of developing the region in economic, social and cultural
spheres. Afghanistan joined SAARC as an eighth member in 2007.
Trust deficit among the member nations continued to hold a hostage to the growth and
development of the South Asian grouping. The familiar refrain has been that SAARC ―has not
measured up to expectations.‖ The regional body was struggling to evolve into a viable
organization to realize its modest goals. At their summit meetings, SAARC leaders emphasized the
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need for addressing issues such as poverty alleviation, preferential and free trade and establishment
of good neighbourly relations but nothing tangible was achieved and SAARC paled in comparison
with both ASEAN and GMS which had made rapid strides in the process of regional integration.
The responsibility for this sorry state of affairs lies with the largest country of the region, India, as
well as its smaller neighbours. Pursuing an inward looking policy, economically unsound India
failed to reach out to its neighbours who were in dire need of external assistance to address
effectively problems such as food and energy security, floods and famines, they were confronted
with. India‘s economic ties with its neighbours were in a bad shape. The diverging security and
political interests made economic integration all the more difficult. Security-conscious Pakistan
found comfort in the military pacts it had concluded with countries like the US and China, while
India advocated national and regional resilience. Unresolved political issues among the countries
of the region, particularly between India and Pakistan, did not allow economic cooperation to
prosper in South Asia. Pakistan Premier Yousuf Raza Gilani candidly admitted on the eve of the
17th SAARC summit that SAARC had been losing its effectiveness and could not move forward an
account of the tense relations between India and Pakistan, the two major countries of South Asia.2
Initially, India and Pakistan turned SAARC summit into a convenient forum for discussing the
still-vexed question of Kashmir. This prompted the President of Maldives Mohamed Nasheed to
remark at the 16th SAARC summit at Timphu in 2010 that India-Pakistan bilaterals were
overshadowing SAARC meets.3 Problems like continuous flow of illegal migrants into India,
sheltering of Indian insurgent groups by the neighbouring countries, have also prevented India
from establishing a harmonious relationship with its neighbours.
While countries across the globe were seeking to establish mutually beneficial partnerships
with India, India‘s smaller neighbours saw New Delhi as a threat rather than as a source of an
opportunity. The fact that India is a large country with immense economic and military power
caused ―apprehensions of so-called domination‖ among its neighbours. Some of the SAARC
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nations sought to ―counterbalance‖ India within SAARC by seeking association with outside
forces. Lingering political disputes impeded the growth of economic relations in the region. South
Asia remained one of ―the least economically integrated regions of the world.‖ 4 Even though
South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) was set in motion on January 01, 2006, South Asia, despite
its huge size and potential, is yet to emerge as a regional trading area of consequence. The trade
within the ambit of SAFTA accounts for mere $ 1.3 billion which is in sharp contrast with the
region‘s outside trade worth $ 14 billion.5 Regional infrastructure, transportation networks and
communication links which contribute to better regional economic integration, were in bad shape.
However, six decades of depressing and disheartening regional scenario began to yield to
an environment supportive enough to turn the region into a zone of peace and prosperity, thanks to
the ruling elites who realized the need for ―coordination and synchronization of their policies‖ in
the best interests of the peoples of the region. An eminent Indian scholar said thus: ―It is a lesson
of history that governments can optimize opportunities and enhance their capacity to shape events
if they joined hands and worked together on the basis of shared political and economic interests‖.6
Shedding all inhibitions and setting aside political and security divergences for the time being,
India, in the wake of the reforms of 1991 and the opening of its market, quietly transformed its
neighborhood policy. India realized that its destiny is closely linked with its neighbours. Peaceful
periphery is the sine qua non for India‘s sustained economic development and the welfare of its
people and also for India to emerge as a global power. Thus, India, which was the highest recipient
of foreign aid, took on a new role as an economic donor. New Delhi also paid serious attention to
end cross-border terrorism and tensions and to establish harmonious relations with its neighbours.
India volunteered to prune the sensitive lists for the benefit of the LDCs, from 480 to 25 tariff
lines. South Asian University set up in New Delhi, has started functioning from August 2010 with
50 students enrolled from all over the region. India agreed to provide all necessary help to the
SAARC Development Fund (SDF) perceiving it as ―an important pillar of SAARC in
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implementing collaborative projects that bring tangible benefits to the people of the region‖.7
India has funded social development projects such as Tele-medicine, Tele-education, Rain Water
Harvesting, Seed Testing Laboratories and Solar Rural Electrification – which have direct bearing
on the lives and livelihood of the people-are being implemented in SAARC member states.8
Seeking the optimum utilization of the region‘s geographical resources endowment, India has
embarked on an ambitious programme of upgradation of border infrastructure along its borders
with Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh. New Delhi has allowed the goods trains to run between
Bangladesh and Nepal through Indian territory as a result of which freight costs were considerably
reduced and the regional trade was given a welcome boost.9 The smaller neighbours of India,
having realized the utter futility of remaining at loggerheads with their largest neighbour for ever
began to visualise the tremendous opportunity that India presents for their national advancement.
India‘s FTAs with Bhutan and Sri Lanka and the trade and transit agreement with Nepal, were
cited as shining examples of the potential benefits offered by regional economic integration. The
shrinking markets for their products ascribed to prolonging Western economic crisis convinced
India‘s neighbours to see virtue in an enhanced and fruitful interaction with India. The rising rate
of economic growth in these countries, has served as an incentive for working for higher growth
rates. A member of the Australian Observer team that attended the 17th SAARC summit in the
Maldives in November 2011, pointed out that the economic growth in the SAARC countries was
making each realise that it could go much faster if it acted in unison with the others and
coordinated certain policies and took advantage of complementarities offered by one another.10
India‘s neighbours appear to be keen to push their economies by adopting a more positive and
pragmatic approach to regional issues. A South Asia watcher has rightly pointed out that earlier the
smaller countries of the region, which harbored grievances against India, took all care not to point
out anything to Pakistan as they thought Islamabad was being obstructionist. But the mood is now
changing. That is why, Pakistan‘s opposition to a rail link that might join Afghanistan to India and
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Bangladesh through Pakistan, has not been positively viewed. Several small countries now openly
speak to India about doing things bilaterally if a positive decision for the region as a whole is
thwarted or delayed by Pakistan‘s stance.11
As the region‘s premier country, India took the lead to improve bilateral ties with the states
of the region, and this augurs well for promoting peace, security and development of South Asia.
As a stable and peaceful Pakistan was in the interest of all in the region, India exhorted Pakistani
leadership that the best way to develop the bilateral ties in a positive manner, was to enter into a
meaningful dialogue instead of indulging in sabre-rattling. Premier Manmohan Singh was
forthright when he noted: ―The time has come to write a new chapter in the history of two
countries and the era of accusations and counter –accusations should be behind us.‖12 Peace and
prosperity of the entire region to a large extent depend on friendship and cooperation between
India and Pakistan. Nonetheless, of late, much to the satisfaction of India, Pakistan which has been
a source of major concern for New Delhi, has begun to send positive signals like the prompt return
of the Indian military helicopter that had strayed into Pakistan territory, the decision to grant MFN
status to India and the visit of a Pakistani Judicial Commission to Mumbai in connection with
26/11. However, India, being committed to resolving all outstanding issues through dialogue in an
atmosphere free of violence and terror, naturally believes that a fruitful and productive relationship
with Pakistan is contingent on Islamabad‘s honoring of its commitment to deny its territory to be
used for terrorist activities against India. Addressing National Defence College in New Delhi on
November 14, 2011, Indian Foreign Secretary, Ranjan Mathai, said ―India‘s vision of peaceful,
cooperative and progressive South Asia cannot be realized unless the dark shadow of terrorism
emanating from Pakistan is eliminated‖.13 It will not be out of context to recall the prescription
given by Pakistan‘s cricketer-turned-politician, Imran Khan, for the bright future of India-Pakistan
relations: ―I think the more confidence we build with each other, the more trade we have, the more
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trust we develop and the moment militancy or intelligence agency‘s roles disappear and the more
we solve issues on the dialogue table, that‘s the only way forward.‖14
The India-Bangladesh relations, having reached the nadir during the rule of Begum
Khaleda Zia, registered spectacular growth following the Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina‘s visit to
India in January 2010. India offered $ one billion line of credit to Bangladesh to undertake a
number of infrastructure developmental projects. India has been greatly concerned about illegal
migration and terrorism originating in Bangladesh. While the issue of illegal migration to India
remains unresolved, Hasina government, however, earned the goodwill of India by cracking down
on anti-India elements and separatist groups like the ULFA.15 India wants Bangladesh to enter
into an extradition treaty which would be mutually beneficial since the ULFA leaders have been
hiding in Bangladesh and the assassins of Sheikh Mujib, the father of Premier Hasina, have been
hiding in India. New Delhi is also worried about human trafficking, smuggling of narcotics and the
nexus between extremist groups of the two countries. To illustrate the contentious issue of massive
trade imbalance, Bangladesh‘s exports to India were worth a paltry $ 100 million, while India‘s
exports accounted for $ 2 billion. India encouraged exports from Bangladesh which have increased
by 56 per cent during 2010-11. The annual duty free quota for the export of garments from
Bangladesh to India has been hiked from 8 to 10 million pieces.16 India has been concerned about
the growing Chinese involvement in Bangladesh, and in particular the Chinese developing the
Chittagong port. However, Bangla Army Chief Gen. Mohd Abdul Mubeen said soothingly, that the
Chinese building infrastructure in his country would not affect India.17
Both sides found solution to the issue of the swapping of territorial enclaves. However,
India and Bangladesh did not go the whole hog to get their partnership refurbished. Trust deficit
has not been wiped out in its entirety as is evidenced by Dhaka‘s denial of transit access to the
Northeast through Bangladesh territory. The issue of Teesta water sharing remains unresolved.
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Official relations between India and Afghanistan have been good. Frequent exchange of
high level visits facilitated regular communications between the two nations. India, which has been
greatly concerned about the ―growing fusion of terrorist groups that operate from Afghanistan and
Pakistan and their activities in India,‖ 18 has been supportive of the US crusade against terrorism
and the US concern for stability in Afghanistan. However, India refused to endorse the US strategy
of holding a dialogue with ―good Taliban‖ as it felt that all Talibans are bad to the core.19
India is playing a major role in the massive programme of rebuilding Afghanistan. New
Delhi has offered assistance to the tune of 1.3 billion, to be spent on various projects in
Afghanistan. India built a 218-km highway between Zorang and Delaram to provide better
connectivity to the Iranian port of Chabahar and gifted hundreds of buses and three airbuses to
Airana, Afghan Airlines. India is constructing the Afghan Parliament building and the Salma dam
power project in Heart province. All this help was extended despite the grim situation in which
India finds itself in Afghanistan. Terrorists targeted twice the Indian embassy in Kabul and hence,
an exodus of Indian personnel working in the projects in Afghanistan to India. Moreover, the
Indian projects are on hold and no new ones are on the anvil. Describing the plight of India in
Afghanistan, Rajiv Dogra, a former Indian diplomat, observed: ―We are on a slippery slope in
Afghanistan. Karjai is a puppet, already twisting in the wind.‖20
India-Maldives ties have been normal. Indeed, India has been offering developmental
assistance to cover a broad spectrum of areas. India has a very close defence relationship with the
Maldives. In a rare gesture underlining ―time-tested ties‖ between the two nations, Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh addressed the People‘s Majlis, the Maldivian Parliament, on November 11,
2011. Incidentally, he was the first foreign head of government to do so in its eight decade-old
history.21
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India-Nepal relations are characterized by occasional hiccups. Yet, the border between the
two countries is open. Nepali citizens seeking jobs or living in India, have free access. Nearly half
of the economic aid to Nepal is Indian, while the remaining half is taken care of by the rest of the
world. Tiny and landlocked Nepal gets vast majority of the supplies from India. Two thirds of
Nepal‘s annual foreign trade is with India which is in sharp contrast to a paltry 10 per cent of trade
with China. As in the case of Bangladesh, Nepal‘s balance of trade is heavily in favour of India.
The import-export ratio, as the Prime Minister of Nepal, Baburam Bhattarai has stated, is about
7:1.22 In order to narrow this trade gap Nepal seeks India‘s cooperation. Two areas in which India
could play a major role include exploitation of water resources for mutual benefit and investments.
India played a ―positive role‖ in the peace process in Nepal as well as in Nepal‘s transition from
monarchy to democracy much to the satisfaction of all parties in Nepal. It is in this context, that
the India-educated Nepal Prime Minister Baburam Bhattarai‘s visit to India in October 2011 with
the chief aim, ―to build trust between our two countries, two governments, and two people‖, as he
himself professed, becomes significant.23 The message that India is on top of his foreign policy
agenda, is behind Bhattarai‘s first state visit to India after he became the Prime Minister. India
lived upto the expectations of Bhattarai by offering $ 250 million in easy credit which was ―many
times more than sought‖. Instead of appreciating Bhattarai for successfully completing his mission
in India, the anti-India elements in his own Maoist party and some others subjected the Nepal
leader to scathing criticism.24 Yet another landmark event is the signing of the key ‗Double
Taxation Avoidance Agreement‘ by the Finance Ministers of India and Nepal on November 28,
2011 in Kathmandu, which would help create better investment climate for Indian businesses in
Nepal.25 India-Nepal relations have a negative side too. India is gravely concerned about the
safety of Indians and Indian investments in Nepal. External Affairs Minister S.M. Krishna, in his
talks with the Nepali leadership during his visit to Nepal in April 2011, indicated that the safety
concerns are caused by the Maoist Party and so he sought assurances that Indian workers and
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projects are protected. India is also concerned about the use of Nepali soil by anti-Indian elements
involved in terror attacks in India.26 An Indian strategic analyst, who visited Nepal sometime ago,
noted: ―… it was disconcerting to find that the anti – Indian sentiment in Nepal, especially among
the elite, continues to be almost as widespread today as it was four decades ago‖, He, however,
added that after Nepali premier Bhattarai‘s Delhi visit ―there has been some talk of India – Nepal
relations having warmed up‖.27
The relations between India and Bhutan, as Prime Minister of Bhutan Thinley has said, are
―exceptionally good.‖28 Even though a small country sandwiched between the two Asian giants,
Bhutan does not suffer from a sense of ―claustrophobia‖. Bhutan perceives India as an
―opportunity.‖ It has FTA with India and has ―access to all the knowledge, technology and support
in the form of development assistance from India.‖ Thinley was really effusive in describing his
country‘s India connection: ―India is a high growth trajectory and Indians are prospering. As a
result, we as neighbours of India will naturally prosper, unless we have the will not to benefit from
such prosperity… Had we adopted a negative attitude to our large neighbours, everything would
have become a constraint instead of an opportunity.‖29
India-Sri Lanka bilateral ties, particularly in the post-LTTE period, registered significant
growth. Ties between these two proximate neighbours are marked by frequent and close
interaction at the highest political level, growing trade and investments, cooperation in
developmental, socio-cultural and defense spheres, besides a broad understanding of major global
issues.30 India, which supported Sri Lanka in its war against the LTTE, has now been greatly
concerned about the fate of 300,000 Tamil civilians who were displaced as a result of three
decade- long internal strife. New Delhi provided Rs 500 crores for the rehabilitation and
reconstruction of the North and Eastern Sri Lanka. However, India maintains that the Tamil
question should be solved by Sri Lankan leaders themselves without outside interference. It is sad
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that certain elements in Sri Lanka are up in arms against India‘s guarded policy on the issue of the
Tamils. A senior Lankan diplomat said: ―India was making a mistake by siding with the Tamil
minority and not taking into account the legitimate interests of the Sinhalese who accounted for
more than 70 per cent of Lanka‘s population‖. The diplomat further said: ―This lopsided policy
will only push Lanka into the waiting arms of China and Pakistan‖31 Sri Lanka is among the major
recipients of development, the credit being offered by India. While Sri Lanka is India‘s largesttrade partner in SAARC, India is the largest trade partner in Sri Lanka‘s global trade. The trade
volume between the two countries has grown five fold since the India-Sri Lanka Free Trade
Agreement (ISLFTA) has come into force in 2000. Facilitated by ISLFTA the Indo-Sri Lanka
bilateral trade burgeoned to a record $ 4.1 billion in the first ten months of 2011. Interestingly,
inspired by the galloping Indo-Sri Lanka bilateral trade which was facilitated by ISLFTA, Pakistan
proposed to use Sri Lanka as a manufacturing base for exporting goods to India, availing itself of
ISLFTA. Significantly, Sri Lankan exports to India, unlike those of Nepal and Bangladesh,
outweighed India‘s exports to Sri Lanka. Commenting on this phenomenon, Deccan Chronicle
observed editorially thus: ―This ought to allay the fears of those in South Asia who might fear
being swamped by the larger Indian economy. Pakistan‘s worries on this account may turn out to
be not realistic.‖32 India tops the list of FDI contributors in Sri Lanka.
Two-way tourism between India and Sri Lanka is flourishing. India has been making
efforts to strengthen its cultural relationship with Sri Lanka through initiatives such as exchange of
cultural troupes, exhibitions, distinguished visitors and scholarships. Defence ties between the two
countries are in the upswing, thanks to their shared security concerns. Exchange of visits by
Defence Secretaries and Service Chiefs and the holding of Annual Defence Dialogue reflect the
growing defence cooperation between the two countries. However, China‘s increasing
participation in Sri Lanka‘s developmental projects has been causing concern to India.
Paradoxically, despite India‘s massive economic assistance and cooperation with Sri Lanka in
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multifaceted areas, it is not Indian rupee but the Chinese Renminbi which is included in the list of
designated currencies permitted for international transactions through banks in Sri Lanka. Further,
as in Nepal, an anti-Indian sentiment overwhelms the people of certain sections of Sri Lanka in
order to offset which India has geared up its public diplomacy.
It is in this backdrop of regional political, economic, security and cultural scenario, the role
of extra-regional powers in South Asia is reviewed.
SAARC and Extra regional Powers
In the first two decades of its existence SARRC was dismissed by the global community on
account of its dismal performance. However, after SAARC began the third decade of its journey,
countries across the world started paying attention to the South Asian grouping because of various
factors like relaxation of tensions between South Asia‘s two major powers, India and Pakistan, in
the wake of the cease-fire which came into effect in 2003; enhancement of economic cooperation
among SARRC member-nations, which led to the conclusion and operationalisation of SAFTA;
adoption of Social Charter., the signing of Additional Protocol on Suppression of Terrorism; and
the presence of India, world‘s second fastest growing economy.
Many countries showed interest in associating themselves with the SAARC process and
applied for observer status. Major powers such as the United States, European Union, China and
Japan, and other important players including Australia, Korea, Myanmar and Iran, besides
Mauritius, which is strategically located in the Indian Ocean, were accorded Observer status. Many
more countries like Russia, Indonesia, Germany, Cyprus and South Africa have expressed desire to
secure Observer status. The growing interest of number of countries outside the region in the
observer status in SAARC prompted the Minister of External Affairs, S.M. Krishna, to comment
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members. In fact, that an organization of eight members has nine Observers from all across the
world is a testimony to the potential the organization holds‖.33 Of the nine Observers, China and
the US stand out by virtue of their expanded presence and influence in the South Asian region.
SAARC and China
China‘s policy towards the South Asian countries had three phases. During the first phase
lasting from1949 to 1978, China pursued an aggressive and hostile policy. It launched a scathing
attack on the states of the region for being intimate with and dependent on Western countries for
assistance. India, in particular, was subjected to severe criticism despite the fact that India was
among the first non-communist countries to recognize the People‘s Republic of China established
in 1949. China called Nehru variously as ―a stooge of Anglo-American bloc,‖ and ―a member of
the political garbage group in Asia.‖34
The second phase of China‘s South Asia policy began in 1978 and lasted up to 2008.
During this period, under the stewardship of Deng Xiaoping, China was opened. Seeking a
‗peaceful periphery‘ which was the sine qua non of the domestic development, Beijing pursued a
―Balanced South Asia Policy‖. All the regional countries were given fair treatment without their
sentiments being hurt. For example, abandoning its Pakistan tilt and adopting a neutral stand,
China advised India and Pakistan to settle Kashmir issue amicably. The reasons for this policy
shift are not far to seek: India‘s economic growth and emergence as a regional and global player;
US moves to woo India to contain China; and China‘s desire to secure economic cooperation from
all nations in the region. As the major power in the region, India received special attention from
China, which also sought India‘s cooperation on global issues such as WTO, climate change, and
reform of global financial system. Hence China concluded with India high profile agreements such
as ‗strategic and cooperative partnership for peace and prosperity‘ and ‗Guiding Principles for
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settlement of the Boundary Question‘ in 2005 and ‗Shared Vision for the 21st Century‘ in 2008.
China and India treated each other as an opportunity and not as a threat.35
The third phase in China‘s South Asia policy having started in 2009, is continuing even
today. Discernible signs of a major policy shift were noticed, when China pursued altogether a new
policy called ―Assertive Policy‖ dictated by its ‗core interests‘ such as Tibet, Taiwan, South China
Sea and Xinxiang. 36 Commenting on the shifting trends in China‘s foreign policy, Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh noted: ―There is new assertiveness on the part of China.‖37 Factors that
contributed to the pursuit of ‗Assertive policy‘ include, China‘s growing global clout following the
successful holding of Olympics; China‘s high growth rates amidst global meltdown; the shifting of
global balance of power from the West to the East; and the need for securing uninterrupted energy
supplies vital to its growing economy.38
China‘s assertive policy, among other things, aimed at affecting India‘s interests to the
extent of making India an ineffectual power in the region. Premier Manmohan Singh saw in this
move of China an attempt ―to expand its influence in South Asia at India‘s expense‖.39 However,
justifying China‘s policy towards India, Prof. Zhao Gancheng, Director of South Asia Studies,
Shanghai Institute of International Studies, said in an article in May 2010 that India‘s regional
hegemony prompted China to ―reassess‖ its South Asia policy to establish a stable and peaceful
order in the region.40 To prevent India from playing its due role, China took a plethora of
initiatives in the South Asian political, strategic and economic landscape. Chinese troops have
been indulging in border violations ceaselessly. China claimed Arunachal Pradesh as a part of
Tibet. China suspects India‘s stand vis-a-vis Dalai Lama. China accused India of interfering in
Tibet by offering shelter to Tibetan refugees. India has repeatedly said that it recognized China‘s
sovereignty over Tibet and New Delhi was not supporting Tibetan independence movement, but
to no avail. China evolved a maritime strategy which is popularly called as ‗string of pearls‘ to
encircle India and to dominate the Indian Ocean, which is vital for the import of energy from
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Middle East. Hence China is establishing naval bases such as Gwadar in Pakistan, Hambantota in
Sri Lanka, Chittagong in Bangladesh, Sittwe in Myanmar and Marao in the Maldives. The latest
addition to the ‗string of pearls‘ is Seychelles which assumes significance in the context of the
Chinese Navy‘s massive modernization programme that includes the induction of the indigenously
built aircraft carrier and frigates and high speed boats.
Apart from adopting a hard-line stance towards India, Beijing made efforts to build a
mutually beneficial relationship with New Delhi. India too responded positively. Both the
countries put in concerted efforts ―in the last three decades to chart the path of peace and friendly
cooperation‖ and to develop a ―framework for a stable, a more productive and a multisectoral
relationship.‖ Though not spectacular, the results of joint endeavour have been not altogether
discouraging. This positive trend was driven by the perception that ―protracted estrangement‖ was
in no body‘s interest particularly at a time when both were involved in the stupendous task of
domestic transformation.
Their accommodation and understanding manifested in the common stand they adopted on
global issues as well as on problems infesting Asia such as terrorism and extremism, and maritime
security. To facilitate regular consultations on key issues, a hotline between the two Prime
Ministers was set up. Frequent high level meetings, exchange of views and cooperation on a wide
array of bilateral issues characterize the growing relations between the two Asian majors. The
evolving India-China partnership found expression in the joint communiqué issued during the state
visit to India by the Prime Minister of China in December 2010 which read in part: ―There is
enough space in the world for the development of both India and China and indeed, enough areas
for India and China to cooperate.‖41
While working with India to foster ―cooperative bilateralism,‖ China has been ―ultra
active‖ in deepening its relations with other South Asian countries including Sri Lanka,
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Bangladesh, Nepal and Maldives besides Pakistan.42 These countries, subjected to the syndrome
of being sandwiched between the two major countries – India and China – have been blissfully
playing both the ―China card‖ and the ―India card‖ much to their own advantage, 43 thus swimming
with the current, prompted by worldly wisdom.
China established close ties with Pakistan, even though the latter has no economic
attraction for China. Bilateral trade between these two has been small when compared with that
between India and China. However, China is lured by strategic location of Pakistan, a neighbor
more often than not, pitted against India. China, therefore, has been offering much needed
economic and military assistance to achieve its own ends. In 2005, both concluded a unique peace
treaty which was clearly aimed against India. The treaty provides for mutual support in
safeguarding national sovereignty and integrity. By signing this treaty, according to an Indian
scholar, Beijing assured Islamabad that the improvement in Sino-Indian relations would in no way
affect Sino-Pakistan relationship.44 In order to subject India to ―strategic pressure,‖ China has
been developing roads and railways in Pakistan occupied Kashmir (POK) where Chinese troops
are deployed. China recognizes POK as part of Pakistan and refuses to treat Kashmir as part of
Indian Union. In conformity with this policy, China issued stapled visas to Kashmiris which
triggered an outcry from India. No wonder, Islamabad boasts that Pakistan was China‘s ―all
weather ally‖. It is an undeniable fact that Pakistan-China alliance – anchored in convergence of
their interests – has been the most robust. Moreover, efforts were made to strengthen this alliance
by roping in smaller nations of South Asia and Nepal was a prize catch.
Ever since King Mahendra pursued the policy of playing China against India, Beijing
started moving closer to Kathmandu. China displayed its credentials as a staunch supporter of
monarchy in Nepal turning a blind eye to all political parties including the Maoist party headed by
Pushpa Kamal Dahal, popularly called Prachanda. Little wonder, as an analyst has pointed out,
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China was ―dismayed‖ when monarchy was brought to an end in 2008. Thereupon, Beijing started
cultivating every section of the Nepali society. 45 China undertook to ―protect Nepal‘s sovereignty‖
if it was threatened. 46 When Nepal wanted to express its gratitude to China by building hydroelectric projects with China‘s assistance and export clean energy to China, Beijing reacted in the
negative because the cost of transmitting power to China would be prohibitive.47 China‘s prime
concern in Nepal was to curb anti-China activities of 20,000 odd Tibetan refugees and to prevent
the US and others from making use of Nepal to ―destabilize Tibet‖.48 Yet another objective of
China‘s policy in Nepal was to expand its influence in this Himalayan nation and subject India to
pressure. However, China advised Nepal to maintain ―good relations‖ with India. By antagonizing
New Delhi, Beijing did not want to force India to move ―too close‖ to the US, particularly after the
Indo—US nuclear deal started taking shape in 2005. Further, by edging India out of Nepal, China
did not wish ―to take over the generous role‖ of India.49 When Prachanda went against this strategy
of China and launched tirade against India, Beijing admonished him.
China‘s relations with Bangladesh were on a sound footing during the government headed
by Khaleda Zia (2001-2006) who was the sworn enemy of India. Consequently, China-PakistanBangladesh nexus with anti-India agenda flourished. Bangladesh‘s bilateral trade, tilted in favour
of China. 50 However, following the rout of Zia‘s BNP party at the hustings in 2008 and the
landslide victory of the Awami League under Sheikh Hasina, who formed the government, Dhaka
has been maintaining correct relations with Beijing. On the heels of her historic visit to India in
January 2010, Hasina paid an official visit to China in March 2010. China promised to provide
development aid besides financing several new infrastructure projects in Bangladesh. China has
emerged as the largest trade partner of Bangladesh. Bilateral trade as of January 2010 stood at $
4.6 billon. 51 China supplied military equipment of poor quality, of course on conditions favorable
to Bangladesh.
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China did not find it difficult to expand its presence in Sri Lanka in view of the uneasy
India-Sri Lanka relationship. Beijing won the trust, confidence and gratitude of Colombo by
supplying military hardware to Sri Lanka when it was in the midst of a grim struggle against the
LTTE. What is more, when global community including India, denied the supply of offensive
weapons, China not only supplied the weapons but provided the same at friendship prices. No
wonder, during his visit to China in 2009, President Rajapaksh hailed China as a ―friend in need‖.
Sri Lanka also values greatly its China connection in the context of growing pressure from the US
and the Western countries over human rights violations by Sri Lanka‘s security forces during the
civil war. While India was engrossed in solving the Tamil issue, China strongly entrenched Sri
Lanka by involving itself in infrastructure and power projects. An Indian strategic analyst
lamented : ―While Chinese projects, from Hambantota port to Colombo South Harbour project
race ahead, Indian projects languish‖.52 In China‘s strategy of containment of India, Sri Lanka,
which is strategically located on the transit lines of the Indian Ocean, has a major role to play as a
littoral of the Indian Ocean. All these developments allowed room for suspicion whether Sri Lanka
was turning into a quasi-military ally of China.53 China‘s overwhelming influence in Sri Lanka is
evident from its ever increasing financial involvement in this island nation. When Sri Lanka was
suffering from paucity of funds in the aftermath of its war against the LTTE, Beijing went to the
rescue of Colombo by offering liberal financial assistance. This timely help had obviously struck a
chord with Sri Lanka. Since then, China‘s financial assistance to Sri Lanka witnessed rapid
expansion. As per the financial management report of 2011 released on November 21, 2011, China
stood on top with 44 per cent or $ 784.22 million of total financial commitments made by foreign
nations and multilateral agencies during January-September 2011. 54
China‘s relations with the Maldives are steadily growing. China is developing a port in
Male, which could be used by China as and when required. India took note of the visit of Wu
Bangguo, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People‘s Congress (NPC) of China
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to the Maldives in May 2011. On November 8, 2011, on the eve of the 17th SAARC summit hosted
by the Maldives, China joined the select band of nations-India, Sri Lanka, Pakistan and
Bangladesh – which already established diplomatic presence in the Maldives. The island nation‘s
President Mohamed Nasheed sought to allay Indian fears when he said: ―I can assure all Indians
that Maldives will always be India‘s friend and we believe that we cannot find a better friend than
India.‖ 55
The only South Asian country where China could not make inroads, has been Bhutan.
Land-locked Bhutan, like Nepal, may not be strategically important, but China is attracted by the
Himalayan Kingdom‘s resources, particularly clean energy which it produces on a large scale.
Bhutan has diplomatic relations with India but not with China. Beijing has been making vain
efforts to bring Thimphu into its sphere of influence. China‘s encroachment upon Bhutanese
territory is a major source of concern for Thimphu. Bhutan held several rounds of talks with China
over six roads China had built by encroaching on its territory. In 1998, Bhutan signed with China
an agreement on the ‗Maintenance of peace and Tranquility in China-Bhutan border areas‘. Yet
there has been no respite from the Chinese incursions into Bhutan which are ―precariously close to
India‘s ‗chicken‘s neck‘ the vulnerable Siliguri corridor which links the northeast passage.‖ 56
Commenting on Chinese incursions a Bhutan watcher said thus: ―The general feeling is, the more
Bhutan proximate itself with India, the more it faces trouble from China‖. 57
China made use of the issue of its participation in the SAARC to demonstrate its growing
influence with the countries of the region. At the time of the 12th SAARC summit in 2004, China
had requested for ―any kind of association‖ with SAARC, meaning either full membership or
Observer status. While India was rather lukewarm in its response, other South Asian nations
including Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka were keen on bringing their benefactor into
the SAARC fold so as to neutralize India‘s primacy in their regional grouping. They even
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threatened to block the entry of Afghanistan into SAARC, if China‘s request was not conceded to.
After ―a lot of behind-the scenes diplomatic wheeling and dealing‖,58 India agreed to grant
Observer status to China. A comment on this development noted: ―And yet another chapter in the
use of SAARC to ‗balance India‘ was written when Nepal, supported by Pakistan and Bangladesh,
decided to demand China‘s inclusion as a dialogue partner, as the price of India‘s own attempts to
bring Afghanistan into the South Asia‘s premier squabbling society.‖59 At their 13th summit in
Dhaka, the SAARC leaders agreed to grant China an Observer status. As an Observer, China for
the first time attended the 14th SAARC summit in New Delhi in April 2007. Not content with the
Observer status accorded to China, Pakistan and Nepal made a determined bid to secure full
membership of SAARC for China, but their efforts did not bear fruit.
The US and SAARC
Following the emergence of South Asian countries as independent nations since 1947, the
US, as a superpower, lost no time in establishing relations with them. With all the countries of the
region, Washington has been maintaining diplomatic relations. Since the people of the countries of
this region were suffering from widespread deprivation and grinding poverty, the US sought to
support their economic development agenda. Through the US Agency for International
Development (USAID), the US contributed to their economic growth by participating in various
projects designed to reduce unemployment, to improve housing, to modernise the judicial system
and to provide better access to education, health care and electricity, to mention a few. The US is
held in high regard by these countries which have witnessed significant improvements in their
living conditions, as a result of the USAID assistance.
Of the South Asian Countries, India and Pakistan received greater attention of the US. In
fact, the US wished to cultivate India, the largest democracy, but New Delhi, pursuing the policy
of non–alignment, spurned American initiatives for a deeper association. Disappointed by India‘s
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negative response, the US felt happy to find Pakistan more than willing to become its ally. Till the
termination of Cold War, the US was involved in moves designed to ―containing, encircling and
destabilizing India by a variety of alliances‖. India bashing was so ingrained in America that an
Indian analyst has observed: ―Even now there are influential Americans who continue to wear the
blind fold, though much has changed in the last decade‖.60 Assiduously pursuing the Pakistancentered South Asia policy, Washington provided financial, political and military assistance to
Islamabad. The US became ―a handy milch-cow‖ which was ―episodically milked‖ by Pakistan
―for billions of dollars in aid and advanced military equipment‖.61 General Musharraf himself
admitted that Pakistan had been receiving millions of dollars from CIA for handling Al Qaeda
operatives. Pakistan was dubbed as America‘s ―most allied ally.‖ 62
Following 9/11, the US launched Global war on Terror in which Washington accorded
greater role to Islamabad. The United States offered a multi-billion dollar package to Pakistan for
its campaigns against Taliban, inhabiting Af-Pak border. However, the US-Pakistan rift began
widening following a guerrilla group-directed day-long fire at the American embassy in Kabul on
September 13, 2011. While the US left no stone unturned to catch Bin Laden, Pakistan sheltered
him. On several occasions, Pakistan voted against the US positions and interests in the United
Nations for all its being an ally of Washington. Pakistan pursued China-centric policy, as the US
was perceiving threat to its interests from China. The American anger and frustration knew no
bounds when Pakistan was found sponsoring Taliban insurgency against the Karzai government
which was aided by the US. The US secretary of State Hillary Clinton, made stinging remarks
against Pakistan‘s double game in Afghanistan. Clinton quipped, Islamabad ―has to be part of the
solution or they will continue to be part of the problem‖ in the war-torn Afghanistan. 63 Clinton
demanded that Pakistan‘s dismantling the safe havens for terrorists and refraining from the
continued threats across the border to Afghanistan.64 Reacting to a stream of vitriol poured out by
the US, Pakistan President Zardari asked the United States ―to stop the public criticism of
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Pakistan.‖ He warned: ―The uncalled for accusations do not help the alliance‖. Pakistan‘s
Ambassador to the US, Husain Haqqani had said that Islamabad was not playing ―a double game‖
with Washington.65 Angry over Pakistan‘s lackluster cooperation in the war on terror, top US
Senators sought amendments that would make it tough for US government to give military and
civilian aid to Islamabad.66
As the US-Pakistan relations were going through a bad patch, the US-India ties witnessed
an upswing. Hailing the US-India relations, the White House deputy National Security Adviser
Ben Rhodes observed that ―India… as a rapidly growing economy, as a strong democracy and as
an important security partner and counterterrorism partner in South Asia, is a very important
relationship to the United States‖. 67 President Barack Obama had told the Indian Parliament
during, what he himself described as, his ―extraordinary trip‖ to India in November 2010, that the
Indo-US relationship would be one of the defining partnerships of the 21st century rooted in
common values and interests. He viewed India-US ties ―as an anchor to US approach in Asia and
the promise of the 21st century‖. 68 Secretary Clinton described India as a ―linchpin‖ in South, East
and Central Asia.69 She urged India not just ―to Look East but to engage East.‖ 70 Signaling clear
shift in the American South Asia policy from the earlier Pakistan-centered to India-centered, a
close aide of President Obama, Jesse L. Jackson Jr, said India, not Pakistan, was the true ally of
America.71
Convergence of interests and policies helped India and the US to forge an intimate
relationship. On the issue of tackling terrorist menace in South Asia, both stood on the some side.
Both the countries, wanted a stable, peaceful, and prosperous Afghanistan in the interests of the
region and beyond. The US viewed India‘s developmental aid to Afghanistan as ―extremely
positive‖. 72 Appreciating India‘s interest in Afghanistan and recognizing the enormous sacrifices
that India made in helping to stabilize that country, Obama expressed his country‘s support for
India‘s continuing contributions to the defence of Afghanistan.73 In early 2011, India pledged $
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500 million more to its $ 1.3 billion development assistance package to Afghanistan.74 Like the
US, India advocated freedom of navigation in the waters of the South China Sea which China
considers as its own backyard. Unlike China – which was not at all positive about India playing its
due role in East Asia and even made an unsuccessful attempt to prevent India from joining East
Asia Summit (EAS) as a founder-member – the US, hailed India‘s ―Look East‖ approach and
welcomed New Delhi‘s active role in the East Asian region. White House deputy National Security
Adviser Ben Rhodes said; ―We believe that just as the United States, as a Pacific Ocean power, is
going to be deeply engaged in the future of East Asia, so should India as an Indian Ocean power
and as an Asian nation‖.75 To help energy hungry India the US successfully lobbied for the supply
of uranium to India by Australia.
The flip side to the Indo-US relations is that they differed on certain issues. While the US
wanted to play a dominant role in Asia-Pacific, India favored ASEAN‘s dominant role in matters
of peace and security in this region of vital importance. During his visit to Australia on the eve of
the EAS 2011 in Bali, President Obama said that, the US military would enhance its Asia-Pacific
role despite budget constraints. He declared that America was ―here to stay‖ as a pacific power.76
Washington‘s initiative to assert its presence across the Asia-Pacific was viewed in international
circles as a measure to send a signal to China which was becoming assertive. It was against this
backdrop that premier Manmohan Sigh told President Obama on the sidelines of the EAS summit
in Bali that instead of the individual power shaping the regional security scenario, the centrality of
ASEAN should be respected.77
The US and India also differed in their approaches to China. The US-which perceives
China as a threat economically and strategically, and set up and strengthened its military bases in
Singapore, Taiwan, South Korea, Japan and in Australia in particular, to beef up its base wherein
Washington unveiled plans in November 2011, of adding more marines-hopes to make use of India
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to contain China. In contravention to the American whishes, India perceived China as a challenge
as well as an opportunity. The dominant opinion in India is that New Delhi should not align itself
militarily or strategically with the US or any other power for such alliances would alienate its
traditional allies and also would undo its time tested independent foreign policy.78 Encouraged by
the perceptional gaps between India and the US and with a view to preventing closer association of
India and the US directed against Beijing, China played down its differences with India. Following
the East Asia summit of November 2011, where the US sought to isolate China on the dispute over
the South China Sea, the Chinese Foreign Ministry seemed to suggest that differences with India
were created by third parties, the echoing editorials in the state media that have blamed the US for
sowing discard between China and its neighbours and for attempting to ―contain‖ China. In a
forthright statement, the Foreign Ministry spokesperson Liu Weimin said at a briefing: ―There is
no power in the world that can prevent the development of bilateral relations between the two
countries.‖79
Notwithstanding China‘s friendly gestures, India reacted sharply when Beijing wanted to
dictate New Delhi that India should disallow the four-day congregation of the world Buddhists in
order to prevent the Dalai Lama from addressing the same. As New Delhi did not concede to
Beijing‘s demand, China retaliated by postponing the 15th round of border talks which coincided
with the Buddhist conference. However, China came round soon. On November 28, 2011, the
Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hong Lei said that his country was ―in communication‖
with India on resuming the border talks for which Beijing paid ―great attention‖.80 India‘s firm
action in this regard was lauded particularly by the Indian media. Deccan Chronicle editorially
observed: ―India quite correctly declined to entertain such foolish requests. With unbecoming
stubbornness for a rising power, Beijing refuses to understand that India is a democratic country
which guarantees spiritual freedoms and not a dictatorial or one party state‖. 81 The New Indian
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Express noted in its editorial: ―Had India succumbed to pressure tactics, it would have only invited
more pressures from China‖. 82
The Chinese media, on the other hand, were puzzled to notice India‘s ―bold‖ and assertive
position on the Buddhist conference. Global Times, an influential tabloid of the ruling Communist
Party of China, which had earlier carried write-ups asserting that China should resolutely stop
India-Vietnam cooperation in the South China Sea by using ―every possible means‖, cautioned that
China must begin to take ―pushy‖ India ―seriously‖ as the latter ―wants to play triangle affairs
with‖ the US and China and ―will do anything it can, to maximize its benefits out of it‖, in which
case, it would be hard for China ―to buy India over‖. 83
But for certain divergences between the US and India, their bilaterals have been on a sound
footing. The US, whose thinking about India in the past was dominated by concerns such as
India‘s nuclear weapons programmes and the pace of India‘s economic reforms, currently views
India as a ‗growing world power‘ with which it shares strategic perceptions. In January 2004, the
two largest democracies of the world successfully launched the ‗Next Steps in Strategic
Partnership‘ (NSSP) which has been hailed by the US State Department Report as ―both a
milestone in the transformation of the bilateral relationship and a blueprint for its further
progress‖.84 In October 2008, the US-India strategic partnership passed yet another milestone
when both concluded the ―123 agreement‖ which ‗governs the civil nuclear trade between the two
countries and opens the door for American and Indian firms to participate in each other‘s civil
nuclear energy sector.85 India demonstrated its ―growing trust ― in its strategic partnership with the
US by sounding out the US in 2005, to join SAARC as an observer. As the Joint Secretary
(SAARC) in the Ministry of External Affairs, P.K. Kapur, has observed that the insistence of
Pakistan and Nepal on China being inducted into SAARC as an Observer, created a unique
opportunity for India to suggest a similar status for the US. Though ―surprised‖ by the Indian
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suggestion, the US viewed it as a ―welcome opportunity to play a prominent role in promoting US
foreign policy goals for South Asian integration‖. In his cable to Washington on November 17,
2005, the Political Counsellor in the American embassy in New Delhi, Geoffrey Pyatt, said: ―If the
US wants a closer association with SAARC any time in the next ten years, you should tell us
now.‖ He further said that ―the invitation may be India‘s attempt to devalue China‘s Observer
status‖, but it is nonetheless a ―welcome‖ move as it would facilitate closer association of the US
with the South Asian grouping.86 The US was convinced by various factors on the need for
associating itself with SAARC. As a country leading the global war against terrorism, the US
believed that closer association with SAARC was absolutely imperative at a time, when South
Asia was becoming a major theatre of terrorism directed against the US. The economic interaction
with South Asia, which represents a huge market, particularly after the inauguration of SAFTA,
was quite tempting to the US. Most of the SAARC nations, of whom the US has been a major
trading partner, maintain their reserves in dollars for their trade payments. The presence of
emerging powers such as India and China, as a member and as an Observer respectively, was yet
another major attraction. Induction of Afghanistan as a full member, with the ―direct blessings‖ of
Washington, further deepened the American interest in the South Asian grouping. Guided by
geostrategic, political and economic compulsions the US made a formal request for an Observer
status of SAARC in April 2006, which was conceded to by SAARC in August 2006. For the first
time, the US attended the SAARC summit held in New Delhi in 2007. In the joint statement issued
at the end of their 14th summit, SAARC leaders, while welcoming the US into SAARC fold,
fervently hoped that South Asian region would ―benefit‖ from its linkages with the United States,
which would help the region‘s economic integration with the international community.87
Conclusion
SAARC, formed in 1985, is an instance of unity in diversity, as it strove to bring together, a
group of states with mutual distrust and differences. The member states were evidently fired by the
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zeal to work together as a group, to promote the ―welfare of the people of South Asia‖ and to bring
about improvement in the ―quality of life‖ and hence twenty five years later, SAARC still thrives
making a bold attempt for the economic advancement of the region despite a long spell of not
altogether encouraging performance.
South Asia is a region with immense potential for growth and development and thus
SAARC nations form a rich storehouse of resources for the world. South Asia is an exporter of raw
materials as well as a rapidly expanding market of 1-5 billion people with rising purchasing power.
The growth trajectory of the economies of the SAARC nations is very much encouraging. India is
among the most dynamic and fastest growing economies of the world and its neighbours also have
been faring well making a mark in the field. While the foregoing account presents a bright side of
the SAARC region. The dark side of the regional scenario is dominated by the scourge of terrorism
which poses a real threat to the economic stability of any civilized society. Interestingly, the
region‘s negative as well as positive features played an important role in attracting global attention
which is evident in the growing number of countries outside the region, courting an Observer
status in the regional grouping.
Unlike in the past, when India, in its pursuit of an inward-looking policy, could not
accommodate outsiders‘ role in the region, once it opened and launched reform programme, India
ceased to be averse to the extra-regional powers playing a benign role. Further, in this world of
globalization which ―offers many benefits and opportunities for development and enrichment of
the lives of the people‖, no country or region can afford to grow in isolation. It is axiomatic that for
the establishment of a stable order in South Asia, the presence of global and extra-regional powers
such as the US and China which have long established interests of their own is a strategic
imperative. India welcomed the proposal of an Observer status being conferred on China once it
was ensured that the same status is granted to the US and Japan which would serve as a counter
force in case China chose to play a negative role within the organization. This did not mean that
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India considered China as its enemy. On the other hand, New Delhi perceived Beijing as at once a
challenge and an opportunity. India, therefore, wanted to ensure that the Observers worked only to
advance SAARC‘s modest goals through their investments and technologies but certainly not to
subvert the grouping, by promoting schism among the SAARC member states.
The fact of the regional states such as Pakistan, Nepal and Bangladesh which had fought
for the Observer status of China ―to counterbalance‖ India within the South Asian grouping,
convinced India of the dire need to win the trust and confidence of its neighbours. India strove to
secure the cooperation of its neighbours in multiple areas so as to make them, what the former
foreign Secretary Shyam Saran has rightly observed, as ―full stakeholders in India‘s economic
destiny‖ and ―in creating a truly vibrant and globally competitive South Asian Economic
Community‖.88 By pruning its negative list, India exposed itself to all its neighbours. India took
every care to refrain from interfering in the internal matters of its neighbours. For all the sacred
intensions of New Delhi that South Asia should become home for flourishing democracies, it
remained a passive spectator and did not thrust democracy on countries such as Nepal which
attempted to establish a political system other than democracy and thus demonstrated its
credentials as a passionate upholder of the principle of non-interference only. With meticulous
care, India abstained from indulging in ―hostile propaganda‖ and ―intemperate statements‖ so as to
―create a positive and constructive environment‖, 89 which is an absolute necessity for eliciting the
much needed trust and cooperation of the neighbours. At the same time, India expected its
neighbours to deny access to anti-India elements engaged in acts such as insurgency and secession,
inimical to India. Gratifyingly, India‘s neighbours – which are pleased by India‘s investments and
other developmental initiatives – have begun to live upto New Delhi‘s expectations as a result of
which India‘s cherished ambition of establishment of a ‗peaceful and tranquil periphery‘ in the
larger interests of the region seems to be gradually turning into a practical reality.
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NOTES
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
http://www.unmultimedia.org/radio/english/delail/38432.htmt.
The New Indian Express, November 10, 2011.
The Hindu, November 06, 2011.
Srinath Raghavan ―Saarc: India needs to lead the way‖ Deccan Chronicle, November 03, 2011.
Ibid, November 05, 2011.
V. Suryanarayan, ― Can South Asia forge ahead,‖ The Hindu, March 22, 2011.
Strategic Digest, March 2011, p. 205.
Ibid.
Ibid. p. 193.
Anand K. Sahay, ―Growing up SAARC‖, The New Sunday Express, November 13, 2011.
Ibid.
The New Indian Express, November 14, 2011.
Deccan Chronicle, November 24, 2011.
The New Indian Express, November 14, 2011.
Editorial, ―Think Big,‖ The Times of India, September 02, 2011.
Strategic Digest, August 2011, p. 776.
Deccan Chronicle, November, 30, 2011.
Strategic Digest, October, 2010 p.971.
Sudarsan, ―The Sniper Club‖, The New Sunday Express, November 13, 2011.
Ibid.
Sudarsan, n. 19.
Baburam Bhattarai, ―A vision for Nepal-India relations,‖ The Hindu, October 20, 2011.
Ibid.
Editorial, ―Nepal, Bhutan ties looking positive‖, Deccan Chronicle, October 28, 2011.
Deccan Chronicle, November 27, 2011.
Ibid, April 22, 2011.
Inder Malhotra, ―Hearing Chinese footfalls in Nepal‖, Ibid, November 16, 2011.
The Hindu, November 9, 2011
Ibid.
Tharoor, ―India-Sri Lanka Relations‖, http://tharoor.in/media/india-srilanka-relations-opeming-speech-by-drtharoor/.
31. The New Indian Express, June 6, 2011.
32. Editorial, ―Trade may give a fillip to Saarc‖, Deccan Chronicle, November 16, 2011. See also The New
Indian Express, December 14, 2011.
33. Strategic Digest, October 2010, p. 967.
34. World Culture, September 16, 1949, cited in Girilal Jain, Panchsheel and After: A Reappraisal of SinoIndian Relations in the context of the Tibetan Insurrection, (Bombay, 1960), pp 8-11.
35. D.S. Rajan ―China and South Asia: An Indian perspective,‖ Paper No. 4294, January 25, 2011, Chennai
Centre for China Studies, Chennai 2010.
36. Jayadeva Ranade, ―China‘s core Interests,‖ The New Indian Express, September 14, 2011.
37. Rajan, n. 35
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid.
41. For text of India-China joint communiqué issued on December 16, 2010 see Strategic Digest, January 2011,
pp. 24-28.
42. Rajiv Bhatia, ―A vision for the Indian Ocean,‖ The Hindu, October 15, 2011).
43. Ibid.
44. Alka Acharya, ―Tale of two big brothers‘, The New Indian Express, November 29, 2005.
45. For an excellent account of Nepal‘s relations with the two Asian majors see Inder Malhotra, ―Hearing Chinese
footfalls in Nepal,‖ Deccan Chronicle, November 16, 2011.
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid.
48. Bhaskar Roy ―As P M Manmohan Singh prepares for BRICS summit‖, C3S paper no. 776, April 12, 2011.
49. Ibid..
50. Bhaskar Roy, ―China: Back to containing India ?‖ C3S paper no. 3296, July 7, 2009.
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51. K.M. Rehan Salahuddin, China-Bangladesh relations: Friendship with mutual cooperation
http://www.china.org.en/opision/2010/08/content_21078441.htm.
52. Sudarshan, n.19.
53. Bhaskar Roy, n.50.
54. The New Sunday Express, November 27, 2011)
55. Deccan Chronicle, November 1, 2011.
56. Mohan Balaji, ―In Bhutan, China and India collide‖, http://www.atimes.com /atims/china/JA12Adoz.html.
57. Ibid.
58. Mohar Chakraborty, ―The Kaleidoscope of Sino-Bangladesh Relations‖, World Focus, February 2010, p 70.
59. ―Noah SAARC‖, http://acorn.nationalinterest.in/2005/11/13/noahsaarc/
60. Bhaskar Roy, n. 50.
61. Subhash Kapila, ―South Asia: The United States Foreign Policy Predicaments‖,
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org %5Cpapers20%5Cpaper1968html.
62. Ibid. See also Inder Malhotra, ―Crabby bed fellows,‖ Deccan Chronicle, December 14, 2011.
63. Deccan Chronicle, October 14, 2011. An Indian strategic analyst has pointed out: ―An era of duplicity –
hunting with the American hound and running with the Jihadi hare – ushered in by Mr.Musharraf has
continued after him.‖ Malhotra, n.62.
64. The Hindu, October 21, 2011.
65. Deccan Chronicle, November 10, 2011.
66. The New Indian Express, November 18, 2011.
67. Ibid, November 11, 2011.
68. Ibid, April 30, 2011.
69. Deccan Chronicle, October 14, 2011.
70. Ibid, October 10, 2011.
71. Ibid, May 24, 2011.
72. The New Indian Express, November 11, 2011.
73. Strategic Digest, May 2010, p. 515.
74. The Hindu, May 24, 2011.
75. Deccan Chronicle, November 24, 2011.
76. Ibid, November, 19, 2011.
77. The Hindu, November 19, 2011.
78. For an excellent discussion on this aspect see Anuradha M Chenoy, ―A Balancing Role in ASEAN‖, The New
India Express, November 25, 2011.
79. Ananth Krishnan, ―After Bali, China plays down differences with India‖, The Hindu, November 22, 2011.
80. The Hindu, November 29, 2011.
81. Editorial, ―Petulant Beijing should grow up‖, Deccan Chronicle, November 28, 2011.
82. Editorial, ―Bluntness Has its Use in Dealing with China.‖ The New Indian Express, November 28, 2011.
83. ―China and India mustn‘t go for the throat‖, Global Times, November 29, 2011.
84. ―US-India Relations‖, http://www.state.gov./r/pa/ei/bgn/3454.htm.
85. Ibid.
86. The Hindu, May 24, 2011.
87. For text of ‗Declaration of the Fourteenth SAARC Summit‘ visit http://www.saarcsec.org/data/summit14/ss14declaration.htm.
88. Refer to Shyam Saran‘s address, ―India and the nieighbourhood‖, at a meeting jointly organized by India
International Centre and IDSA, New
Delhi, on February 14, 2005.
89. Ibid.
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A NEW STRATEGIC VISION FOR SOUTH ASIA?
Dr. MOONIS AHMAR
Professor of International Relations University of Karachi
and Director, Program on Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution.
E. Mail: [email protected]
Dr. Moonis Ahmar
is Professor of International
Relations at the University of Karachi and Director, Program on
Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution.
Since April 2010, Dr. Ahmar is a DAAD Visiting Professor, Conflict
Studies and Management Program, Willy Brandt School of Public
Policy, University of Erfurt. Apart from teaching courses to MPP
students on Conflict Management in Central Asia and Conflict
Transformation in South Asia, he is also working on research
project, “Conflict Management and Vision for a Secular Pakistan:
Lesson from the European Experience.”
His field of specialization is conflict and security studies focussing on the South and the Central Asian
regions. Dr. Ahmar has 27 years of academic experience in Pakistan and in different foreign universities
and research think tanks. He is the author of two books, four monographs and has edited 15 books on
different themes of International Relations. Dr. Ahmar has published his research in international journals
like Asian Survey, BIISS journal, Central Asia, Contemporary South Asia, Eurasian Studies, IPRI journal,
Journal of European Studies, Journal of Political Studies, Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies,
Margalla Papers, National Development and Security, Nepali Journal of Contemporary Studies, NDC
Journal, Pakistan Horizon, Pakistan Journal of American Studies, Pakistan Perspectives, Pakistan Vision,
Strategic Studies, South Asian Studies and World Affairs. Dr. Ahmar has worked on several research
projects related to terrorism, conflict and security studies and has received research grants from the Ford
Foundation, Plougshares Fund, Higher Education Commission, Islamabad, Research Facility Center,
University of Karachi, U.S. Institute of Peace, Asia Fellows Program and Regional Center of Strategic
Studies, Colombo. Dr. Ahmar has been the recipient of Best Teacher Award from the Higher Education
Commission, Islamabad, UNESCO, UN Commission for Human Development and the Federal Ministry of
Education, Islamabad. Dr. Ahmar was also a Visiting Fellow, South Asia Program, Institute of Defense and
Strategic Studies, Ragaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University,
Singapore and was doing research on: The Challenge of Extremism in Pakistan: Are there lessons to be
learned from Singapore?’ Dr. Ahmar held post-doctoral positions at the Arms Control Program, University
of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Stimson Center, Washington DC, Middle East Institute, Washington DC,
Center for International and Strategic Studies, Washington DC, Kroc Institute of International Peace
Studies, University of Notre Dame, Indiana, United States, Asia Fellow, Department of International
Relations, University of Dhaka, Bangladesh, London School of Economic and Political Science, U.K, Max
Planck Institute for Foreign and International Criminal Law Freiberg, Germany.
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A NEW STRATEGIC VISION FOR SOUTH ASIA?
MOONIS AHMAR
ABSTRACT
This paper will examine the need to articulate a new strategic vision and foresight for South Asia
so that the region which has enormous potential to excel in science and technology, human
development and human security can overcome the baggage of the past and move ahead to attain
the goals of progress and prosperity. Furthermore, the paper will also argue for learning lessons
from other regions of the world where a consensus on formulating a new strategic vision produced
miracles in dealing with issues which for decades and centuries had caused paranoia, mistrust,
insecurity, stagnation, displacements, violence and wars among the countries of the region.
I. INTRODUCTION
With more than 20% of world population, hundreds of nuclear weapons possessed by India
and Pakistan, colossal poverty, social backwardness and the surge of extremism, intolerance,
radicalization and terrorism, South Asia is at the crossroads. Unresolved inter and intra-state
conflicts tend to raise several questions about the future of 1.5 billion population of South Asia. It
is not only the issue of poverty and social backwardness which threatens to de-stabilize the region
but the failure of state actors to deliver in the realm of good governance and human security also
raises a question mark about the bright future of South Asia. Yet, there is no coherent and clear
vision about South Asia and its role in global politics, economics and security in the years to come.
As a cradle of several civilizations and a home of hardworking and enterprising people,
South Asia can match with other regions of the world in key areas of modernization and
industrialization but its predicament is the absence of a visionary leadership which can provide a
better sense of direction for the attainment of strategic objectives. At the country level, one can
observe the formulation of policies based on future objectives, but not as far as the region is
concerned. Even, visionary policies articulated at the country level remain unimplemented because
of corruption, nepotism, incompetency, shortage of resources and lack of ownership of issues
which are a cause of South Asian marginalization in global power structures. Right from
Afghanistan to Bangladesh and from Nepal to Sri Lanka, a huge land mass called as South Asia
shares a common historical landscape, similar issues which relate to the survival of hundreds of
millions of impoverished people of the region but is far behind in unleashing a thought process
which can provide South Asia a sense of direction in emerging as an economic and technological
―power house‖.
More than 64 years since the Indian sub-continent (renamed as South Asia) got
independence from the imperial tutelage, it is time to analyze what went wrong in the deepening of
insecurity and unresolved conflicts in the region and how a new strategic vision of transforming
South Asia as a developed and prosperous region can be articulated? It is true that since 1947 till
today, the South Asian countries failed to identify right issues and priorities which should have
been taken up for a better future of the region. Yet, since the formation of South Asian Association
of Regional Cooperation (SAARC) in December 1985 till today, a lot of work has been done under
the auspices of that organization to augment the level of regional cooperation but with marginal
positive results. Unfortunately, despite doing enormous paper work in enhancing trade, travel and
other forms of connectivity in South Asia, SAARC became a victim of parochial mindset which
reflected lack of political will and determination to change things for the better in the region.
This paper will examine the need to articulate a new strategic vision for South Asia so that
the region which has enormous potential to excel in science and technology, human development
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and human security can overcome the baggage of the past and move ahead to attain the goals of
progress and prosperity in the years to come. Some of the questions which will be responded in
this paper are as follows:
1. What is meant by the concept of a new strategic vision?
2. How historical and psychological factors prevent to seek strategic consensus in South
Asia?
3. What can be the areas of strategic consensus in South Asia?
4. How can state actors in South Asia unleash the process of identifying common strategic
objectives in the region?
5. What role can non-state actors play in cooperation with state actors in articulating strategic
vision for South Asia?
6. What are the impediments in formulating a new strategic vision for South Asia and how
these impediments could be removed?
Furthermore, the paper will also argue for learning lessons from other regions of the world where a
consensus on formulating a new strategic vision produced miracles in dealing with issues which
for decades and centuries had caused paranoia, mistrust, insecurity and stagnation among the
countries of such regions.
II. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Vision means a capability to see things beyond present circumstances. Vision has been
defined as follows:
Vision is a process of discovering from images what is present in the world, and where it is.
Vision is, therefore, first and foremost, an information – processing task, but we cannot
think of it just as a process. For if we are capable of knowing what is where in the world,
our brains must some how be capable of representing this information, in all its profusion
of color and form, beauty, motion, and detail. The study of vision must therefore include
not only the study of how to extract from images the various aspects of the world that are
useful to us, but also an inquiry into the nature of internal representations by which we
capture this information and thus make it available as a basis for decisions about our
thoughts and actions. This duality, the representation and the processing of information lies
at the heart of most information-processing tasks and will profoundly shape our
investigation of the particular problems posed by vision.1
Strategic vision means an approach pursued to achieve vital objectives for strengthening the
position of an individual, organization or state in the years to come. Planning, foresight,
imagination, intelligence, clarity, consistency, determination, courage, risk taking and knowledge
are the major requirements shaping the formulation of strategic vision. If a society is educated,
empowered and developed, its leadership may have an edge than others in formulating strategic
vision in order to maintain its influence on others in coming years. Whereas, societies grappling
with poverty, illiteracy, corruption, bad governance, violence, unresolved inter and intra-state
conflicts cannot proceed in shaping a credible strategic vision. Human history is full of examples
to prove why nations and regions were marginalized and how they managed to catch up with the
challenge of reclaiming their status and glory. As a multi-dimensional approach, strategic vision is
also pursued in the corporate sector where the prime objective is to seek profit, economic benefits
and a secure viable position vis-à-vis their competitors. Competition, ambitions and
professionalism also shape strategic vision on the part of individuals, organizations and states.
Conceptually speaking, strategic vision is dependent on 10 important requirements viz:
Better education
Clarity of purpose
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Expertise in crisis and conflict management
Expertise in professionally managing security, economic and political matters
Understanding of pluses and minuses of adversaries
Understanding of one‘s strengths and weaknesses
Better human intelligence
Skills of planning, mapping and organizing future strategies
Skills of early warning and early response
Visualizing threats and measures to deal with such threats
Patriotic feelings and commitments for the wellbeing and betterment of a country
The question of leadership capable of transforming strategic vision into practice is raised from
time to time particularly in those societies where there is dearth of individuals having sound
expertise and capability to plan things for a better future. Furthermore, strategic vision of a country
is not just restricted to the military field, but its scope is quite broad. When one talks of nontraditional security, it means encompassing all those issues which threaten the livelihood and
survival of its citizens either by men made or natural disasters. Human security and well being of a
country is best guaranteed when its leadership pursues a strategic vision in which state managers
give priority to enhance the quality of life of their citizens. That can only happen when strategy is
not merely understood in terms of traditional national security paradigms but guarantees better
future and respect for the people.
The problems with the majority of developing countries is the lack of foresight and vision
to alleviate the plight of common people. Whether it is the example of South Asia or the Middle
East or the regions of Africa, the parochial strategic vision of ruling elites not only shattered the
dreams of independence but also plunged the majority of the Afro-Asian countries in the perpetual
state of under-development, social backwardness, internal colonization, political violence and
anarchy. When the vision of leaders who replaced their colonial masters was just to protect their
interests, gather more and more power and wealth instead of ensuring the well being of people, the
outcome was the emergence of fragile, failing or failed states. On the other hand, some postcolonial societies managed to understand the importance of unleashing a thought process which
could provide a better sense of direction for a promising future. The focus and priority in such
cases was on human development, providing good quality of life, basic sense of security and well
being instead of militarization, seeking false sense of security and augmenting conflicts for the
perpetuation of power. Because, if people of a particular state are secure and prosperous, there is
no way that state can have issues related to its survival.
As far as the conceptual paradigm of strategic vision for South Asia is concerned, the lack
of theoretical grounding to be observed among those at the helm of affairs in South Asia is a major
cause of not articulating strategic foresight for 1.5 billion people of this region. For a long period
of time, there was no awareness either at the official or non-governmental level about the
phenomenon of regionalism or regional integration in South Asia. The formation of SAARC to
some extent compensated for the lack of understanding about regional cooperation but no proper
headway was made in South Asia to fill the vacuum in the arena of common strategic vision for
the region. Arguably, the absence of the culture of research and innovation coupled with the poor
educational system in South Asia failed to produce a generation capable of thinking strategically
and analytically for transforming the region as an industrialized, developed and prosperous.
Enough damage was done when there occurred a realization in South Asia that in order to catch up
with other regions of the world, they must concentrate on identifying priorities instead of wasting
their resources on non-issues and inter and intra-state conflicts. At the country level also, strategic
vision appeared shallow because of lack of capability of state actors to formulate and implement
policies strengthening their country‘s technological, industrial, financial and economic interests.
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Even the societal actors which could have played a significant role in shaping in strategic vision of
their country failed to deliver and made no effort to effectively with intra-state conflicts.
III. HISTORICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS
The baggage of history and psychological barriers in South Asia seem to contribute
significantly in causing stagnation in formulating strategic vision for a better future in the region.
Centuries of colonial rule may have contributed to ―strategic thinking deficit‖ in South Asia. But,
one cannot disagree with the notion that even after 64 years of the decolonization of South Asia,
those who matter in the region are unable to unleash a strategic thought process which can bridge
the gap with the developed world in the arena of science and technology, research, economic
growth rate, per capita income, poverty alleviation and a suitable quality of life of people. As
rightly said by a noted historian Ayesha Jalal that,
The loss of a sub-continental vision has not only compartmentalized South Asian
historiography but deflected from any sort of comparative understanding of common
dilemmas of the region‘s present and the interlocking trajectories of the future.2
Merely blaming history and the colonial heritage responsible for the existing backwardness of
South Asia is meaningless. Furthermore, the manner in which the post-colonial states of South
Asia handled their affairs and undermined the need for seeking a strategic consensus on critical
issues also reflected poor vision and foresight on their part. Indifference, lack of a united approach
and deep rooted mistrust for a long time precluded the emergence of a regional approach to deal
with critical issues in South Asia under the framework of SAARC. Even SAARC failed to make
headway in areas where stagnation and unresolved conflicts in South Asia made it highly difficult
to pursue an innovative approach for a better regional security framework.
More than the colonial baggage, it is the events of 1947 leading to the partition of the
Indian sub-continent and after which seem to preclude the hard task of pushing the South Asian
leadership capable of visualizing for a better future of the region. The generation which
experienced the bloody events of partition and also suffered as a result of unpleasant circumstances
has almost phased out or is phasing out, but the generations which were born after 1947 were not
kept out of the vicious cycle of hate, paranoia and mistrust. Mutual antagonism and insecurity
passed from one generation to another either because of biased history textbooks, curbs on the free
movement of people, absence of a pragmatic approach and the role of religious-cultural-nationalist
chauvinism. As a result, even after 64 years of partition of the Indian sub-continent, the walls of
suspicion between India and Pakistan could not be dismantled thus impeding the formulation of
strategic vision articulating common ground for meaningful cooperation between the two erstwhile
neighbors. Each step which India and Pakistan took since 1947 reflected to a large extent
insecurity, psychological gap, false egos, hardening of enemy images and lack of political will to
undo the bitterness of the past. When the mindset of governing elites, security establishments and
the hard line sections of societies in the two countries had no space for moderation, rationality and
flexibility, there was no question of pursuing a vision for a conflict free and prosperous future.
Unlike societies where despite centuries of bloodshed and violent conflicts, lessons were
learned from the bitterness of the past, no such lessons were learned in South Asia. For example,
since 1945, no war or armed conflict has taken place between or among the first world countries.
For a long period of time, wars which were fought in large parts of Europe are now the thing of the
past. The Second World War was the last demonstration of violence and destruction seen in
Europe and since then, barring few cases, one can see peace in that Continent. How Europe, which
for long was pitted against each other has transformed and how it enjoys a paramount position in
global strategic environment? For that matter, one needs to refer to the post-Second World War
leadership of Europe particularly the then French President De Gaulle and the then Chancellor of
West Germany Kurt Adenaeur who can rightly be called as the ―strategic visionary leaders‖ of
Europe. The transformation of Europe in the shape of free movement of people, goods, services
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and capital was only possible when the then European Economic Community (EEC) and the
present European Union (EU) adopted policies to deepen the process of economic, political and
security integration of Europe. Referring to the foresight and vision of European leaders, it is
stated that, ―A country‘s raison d‘etre is to provide three goals: security, freedom and wealth for its
citizens. These are its overarching goals, the criteria from which the interests for specific policies
can be derived. The (European) Union, in fact, formulated this mission statement in the preamble
of its draft constitution in a very simple way: the aim of EU is to promote peace, its values, and the
well-being of its people.‖3 Therefore, it has been rightly argued that,
For centuries, Europe struggled to keep a balance between its nations. None could be too
powerful. Each time one nation tried to dominate the others war was the consequence. The
regular outbreak of violence befell the population with the same sense of inevitability with
which one grows accustomed to changes in weather. The suffering was tremendous. But
only two world wars made it unbearable. The invention of new weapons resulted in mass
slaughter. It became clear that the balance of power politics of the past failed and Europe
needed a revolutionary new designs to ensure peace and prosperity on the continent. In its
core the European Union had proud national identities agreed to end a history of national
egoism to avoid further war on the European continent. The foregoing of national identity
for a common purpose, higher welfare and stable peace was highly successful.4
Outside Europe, the vision of the then President of Soviet Union Mikhail Gorbachev to strive for
Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals also coincided with unleashing of chain of events like treaty
for Mutual Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) 1986, dismantling of the Berlin Wall, reunification
of Germany and the collapse of the Warsaw Pact. Despite the Euro crisis in Europe, there is no
consideration among EU members using Euro to give second thoughts as far as the process of
European integration is concerned.
The post-cold war strategic vision of Europe which articulated Europe without borders,
with a common currency and free trade was possible regardless of centuries of bloodshed and
wars. Instead of becoming a victim of historical cleavages and ruining the lives of their future
generations, European leaders opted for the policy of reconciliation, human security, human
development, stability and peace. Why South Asia lagged behind in articulating a vision which
provided people of that impoverished region a sense of hope and optimism? It is true that there is
no such obvious parallel between the historical dynamics of Europe and South Asia, but unlike
Europe where a chain of events took place starting from renaissance, age of enlightenment,
reformation, counter-reformation, geographical discoveries, French revolution, industrial
revolution, unifications of Germany and Italy, first and the second world wars, in case of South
Asia the region remained stagnant and backward partly as a result of colonial rule and partly
because of the absence of a leadership bringing a qualitative change in the lives of people.
The process of regional cooperation in South East Asia under the leadership of Association
of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) is another example of vision and statesmanship pursued by
ASEAN members for transformation their region from backwardness and under-development to
technological advancement and economic-social development. Interestingly, in the beginning, the
process of regional cooperation in South East Asia was quite slow as is evident from the fact that
the first summit of that regional organization was held in 1967 and the second summit took place a
decade later, i.e. in 1977. Yet, the vision ASEAN leaders made it possible against all odds to create
consensus on seeking regional economic, political and security cooperation. To what extent,
SAARC countries learned from the experience of ASEAN is yet to be seen.
A lot of time has been wasted in South Asia about shaping a common destiny for achieving
the strategic objectives of human security, human development, rule of law, access of people to
inexpensive and speedy justice and a good quality of life. Again, by remaining a hostage of the
past and not abandoning some of the traits developing as a result of historical and psychological
legacies like paranoia, false ego, negative thinking and enemy images, it became highly
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improbable on the part of India and Pakistan to think about a vision which can undo bitterness of
the past and strive for a promising future for not only their people, but for the people of South Asia
as a whole. Recently, some headway has been made in South Asia about getting over the historical
baggage but not much has been done to revise history textbooks which instead of promoting
centuries old culture and civilization of the region talks about religious and cultural prejudices.
IV. AREAS OF STRATEGIC CONSENSUS
There is no short cut to seek strategic consensus in South Asia for articulating a vision of the
region which can make a difference in terms of attaining common goals for a stable and
prosperous South Asia. But, in an era of globalization, technological advancement and
connectivity, 64 years matter a lot for a region to settle down and by now, those at the helm of
affairs in South Asia after observing the ―success stories‖ of other regions of the world should
have come up with a plan redefining security, strategy, power and national interest. When there
exists lack of proper communication, coordination, sharing of information and knowledge in the
power centers of South Asia, the outcome has been vacuum in playing a leadership role in
formulating strategic consensus in the region on issues which are vital and critical to the present
and future of 1.5 billion people.
South Asia needs to formulate a plan of around 25 years in which the bulk of major issues
which tends to deepen pessimism and gloom in the region are sorted out and resolved in a
successful manner. Some of the strategic objectives which the state and non-governmental actors
of South Asia may visualize to accomplish by 2035 are as follows:To rid South Asia of poverty, social backwardness, under-development and illiteracy.
To give priority to human development, human security, better work ethics and rule of law
so that a good quality of life of common people of South Asia is assured.
To seek excellence in education, research and development.
Consensus among the South Asian countries to manage and resolve their inter and intrastate conflicts.
To work out a strategic plan to give emphasis on the areas of non-traditional security
particularly in energy, water, food and environmental security.
To agree on reducing their defense budgets and investing the amount for modernizing
infrastructure, technological advancement and strengthening the industrial base.
To provide basic health, transport, educational and employment facilities
These are ambitious objectives for South Asia which needs to be attained by 2035 so that
before reaching 100 years of the partition of the Indian sub-continent, the people of South Asia are
better off and are at par with other developed and prosperous regions of the world.
For those who adhere to the traditional mode of security and strategy, a radical shift in the
state policy aiming to slash defense expenditure can only deepen threats to what they call ―national
security threats.‖ Unfortunately, since quite long, state actors in South Asia are unable to reconcile
to the fact that in present circumstances, the real threats of insecurity emanate from poverty, underdevelopment, illiteracy, corruption and bad governance. By denying people a better quality of life
and adhering to the false sense of security, the result is not difficult to gauge. South Asia is ranked
quite below in global human development index and is far behind than other regions where the
prudent and planned strategic planning substantially improved the quality of life of their people.
Who is going to take the initiative in South Asia for seeking strategic consensus on issues
which have been outlined above and to what extent those who since decades monopolize power
will allow marginalization of their role and position? Is SAARC, as the only governmental
organization in South Asia capable of articulating strategic vision for the region and can it
collaborate with civil society actors in providing a road map for South Asia in which the welfare of
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people rather than interests of governing elites are protected? Since the 2035 plan primarily deals
with future generations of South Asia, it is the younger segment of society which has enormous
stakes in a region which can provide them hope, respect and basic sense of security. For that
purpose, strategic vision of 2025 cannot be prepared by the traditional and status quo oriented
bureaucrats or leaders of political parties but by those who possess vision and the capability to
transform that vision into a reality.
Since its inception in December 1985, SAARC has done a lot of paper work to identify
critical areas of regional cooperation and for dealing with the issues of environmental and human
security but it cannot pursue a non-traditional approach on the vision thing because to a large
extent, state policies are a part of the problem, rather than part of the solution. For that reason,
despite quarter of a century of its existence, SAARC has not pursued a practical approach on
regional connectivity through meaningful trade, tourism and travel. But, for the strategic objectives
for South Asia to be achieved by 2035, the role and involvement of SAARC is essential. Some of
the ideas which were presented from the platform of SAARC in the last two decades do touch
upon strategic vision for a better South Asia. For instance, SAARC Disaster Management Center
and SAARC Agricultural Vision, 2020 can go a long way in providing strategic leadership for
inducting dynamism in its functioning. In other areas also primarily in trade, travel, education,
energy, water, environmental and food security, SAARC can seek positive results if it coordinate
and collaborate with non-governmental actors and civil society groups for visionary plan for the
region.
Should not the newly established South Asian University (SAU) functioning under the
auspices of SAARC in Gorgoan outside New Delhi be given the task to prepare strategic vision for
South Asia 2035? Other academic institutions of South Asia and think tanks focusing on futuristic
can also give their own input to SAU on bettering things in South Asia before the region is further
marginalized in global affairs. SAU can seek expertise from other regions of the world where the
process of positive transformation took place and which helped changed the destiny of their
people. One cannot expect those who have remained in the corridors of power for long to
transform and provide a leadership role in bringing a qualitative change in the lives of around 1.5
billion people of South Asia. But, certainly, it is the younger generation which can play a major
role in articulating a comprehensive strategy for 2035 because of two main reasons. First, the
youth of South Asia do not carry the baggage of past which deepened paranoia and insecurity
among the older generations. Second, it is the youth which is highly vulnerable to violent armed
conflicts and the marginalized role of South Asia in global sphere.
V. STATE AND NON-STATE ACTORS
Serious crisis is emerging in South Asia as far as the role of state and non-state actors for
managing crises and conflicts is concerned. The biggest and the largest state in South Asia, i.e.
India is unable to create an equation in vibrant corporate sector and inadequate public spending in
welfare programs. As a result, one can observe the assertion of violent non-state actors like
Nexalites/Maoists who want to eliminate economic and social injustices accentuated by state‘s
neglect and exploitation of corporate sector by revolutionary means. When state actors are unable
or face difficulties in dealing with the Violent Non-State Actors (VNSA), they try to raise national
security concerns and threats to maximize their power. In the recent past, the violent and terrorist
activities of various non-state actors benefited state actors in diverting the attention of people from
the real issues dealing with human security and human development but the situation may not
remain the same as far as future is concerned.
Insurgency in Afghanistan against foreign military presence, violent and terrorist activities of
Non-State Actors in Pakistan, India, Nepal and Sri Lanka caused colossal damage to economy and
infrastructure of these countries. When VNSA‘s engaged state actors in guerrilla warfare and
terrorist acts, the outcome is neglect and deviation of state actors from the welfare of people. In
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societies where the non-state actors are engaged for the development of people, the situation is
different as state actors are also compelled to do their job and play a responsible role in society.
Unfortunately, almost all the South Asian countries are a victim of violence and terrorism
engaging state and VNSA‘s which makes it impossible for governments to formulate a strategic
vision for a better future. For that matter, it is imperative on the part of state actors to deal with
issues which cause economic and social stratification in society so that non-state actors who pursue
an extremist approach are neutralized. By providing good governance and pursuing an approach
based on social justice, state actors can create a positive environment in a society which can
ultimately help in better strategic planning for providing better sense of security and well being for
common people. Till the time, state actors pursue an indifferent approach to deal with the real
issues and the VNSA‘s are involved in acts of terrorism, one cannot expect any breakthrough in
the arena of a comprehensive strategic vision for South Asia.
Not only VNSA and terrorism pose a serious threat to regional peace and security but the
looming crises in the shape of energy shortages of oil and gas, water scarcity, melting of glaciers
and high prices of food are considered as major challenges for South Asia today and also in the
years to come. The most dangerous scenario for South Asia is two-fold: first, the region in sinking
deeper in violence and terrorism, and second, the failure of South Asia to curb corruption,
breakdown of rule of rule, food, energy and environmental crises. No country in South Asia can
claim to be above the fault lines which impede its efforts to ensure a stable and prosperous future.
India, which in the last two years witnessed a ―great leap forward‖ in economic growth rate cannot
achieve the objective of matching with stable and powerful global actors unless its internal fault
lines are managed and resolved. These issues are quite serious because of rising class conflict and
the surge of NVSA‘s threatening the writ of the state. Sri Lanka, which saw the end of bloody civil
war more than two years ago is in a relatively better shape but will take years to rebuild its war
devastated economy. Nepal is also grappling with the implications of Maoist insurgency and
despite the overthrow of monarchy has not been able to seek political stability in the country.
VI. IMPEDIMENTS
Most of the impediments which one can figure out for seeking a strategic consensus in South
Asia are the result of deep rooted mistrust, paranoia, enemy images and negative approach on
pursuing positive objectives. The problem with South Asia is not under-development or poverty,
but the failure of people in power to think in terms of regional, rather than individual, group or
class interests. Is it not strange that South Asia having some of the oldest civilizations and cultural
heritage is unable to excel not only in global economic indicators but also in the areas of science
and technology, education, industrialization and world sports? During the last Olympics held in the
summer of 2008 in Beijing, the South Asian countries were able to secure only couple of medals.
Had the leaders of South Asia thought in terms of sharing their expertise in sports for a better
performance in world Olympics, things would have been different for South Asia not only in
Beijing Olympics but also in other sport‘s competition.
Some of the impediments, which are responsible for the lack of strategic thinking and vision
for a better South Asia are as follows:
1. Unprofessional approach on issues which are critical to the future of South Asia
2. Finding scapegoat instead of accepting their failures.
3. Not appreciating achievements if accomplished by their South Asian counterpart(s).
4. Giving priority to individual, group or class interests than the interests of their country or the
region.
5. Restrictions imposed on the free movement of people, goods, services and capital.
6. Not giving priority to peace, stability and development at the grassroots‘ level.
7. Not giving priority to education, research, science and technology.
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8. Failure to reduce corruption and provide good governance.
9. Failure to provide ownership to the region.
10. Unable to learn lessons from the success stories of strategic achievements in other regions of
the world.
There may be more impediments responsible for causing stagnation in articulating strategic
vision for South Asia but it is also true that even after 26 years of the formation of SAARC,
questions are raised about the ―artificial‖ nature of South Asia. Even when SAARC was being
launched, there was a question about the viability and rationality of South Asia as a region when
one country i.e. India has more than 70% of the population, territory and resources of South Asia.
The geographical ―asymmetry‖ of South Asia was termed as a major impediment for a purposeful
regional cooperation particularly when majority of the members of SAARC have a history of
conflicts with their neighbor India. Small and medium level states of South Asia also argue that in
the presence of India and Pakistan their voice is not heard in SAARC. If geographical and power
―asymmetries‖ in South Asia are a reality then in the same manner some strong common
characteristics among the regional countries also contribute to keep SAARC alive. After all,
despite various limitations, South Asian countries are geographically part of their region and the
only way they can move forward for a better future is not by pulling out of the region but by
making serious endeavors in dealing with obstacles which tend to keep South Asia behind than
other regions of the world.
How these impediments could be removed and to what extent a ―New South Asia‖ can
become a reality by the year 2035? Truly, there is no short cut to achieve the new strategic vision
for South Asia by the year 2035 because the region lacks a team of visionary leaders who can get
together and formulate a plan which can as pointed out earlier ensure a secure, developed and
prosperous South Asia. Dealing with the impediments which since decades block a positive
headway for a better future in South Asia are not difficult to gauge as the problem lies somewhere
in the parochial mindset of those individuals of the region who are not committed to the welfare of
people and want to maintain the status quo by sticking to the traditional paradigm of security ad
strategy. The marginalization of that mindset will take years because of entrenched nature of
mistrust, suspicion and paranoia.
Perhaps, the new generation of strategic thinkers in South Asia will keep in mind the notion
of addressing the ―real‖ security issues faced by the region and understanding the concept of vision
from a non-traditional point of view. When the culture of research and ownership to deal with the
―real‖ issues of South Asia will take roots resulting into more awareness and connectivity in the
region, then one can hope for a qualitative change in the socio-economic conditions of people.
End notes
1
See David Marr, “Selections from Vision” in Alva Noe and Evan Thompson (eds.), Vision and Mind Selected Readings
in the Philosophy of Perception (London: The MIT Press,2002), p.229.
2
Ayesha Jalal, Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia – A Comparative and Historical Perspective (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 1.
3
Guido Houben, “On European Interests, Goals and Policies” in Guido Houben/Thomas Pollan (eds.), European
Interests – A 2020 Vision of the Union’s Foreign and Security Policy (Baden – Baden: Nomas, 2005), pp. 13-14.
4
Thomas Pollan, “Diplomacy: Effective Multilateralism” in Ibid., pp. 49-50.
***************
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Terror Threat to China and the Control Mechanism
Dr Sheo Nandan Pandey
Born on Jan 14, 1947, the author, Dr Sheo
Nandan Pandey has richly contributed to area
studies, in particular Hanxue (Sinology) while
being in bureaucracy. Before superannuating as
Officer on Special Duty (OSD) in Jan 2007 from
National Technical Research Organization
(NTRO), he served a number of Ministry Dept. and academic institutions.
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Terror Threat to China and the Control Mechanism
Abstract
Incidents of mass protests and violence including explosions are of late common in the People’
Republic of China (PRC). The perils of the incidents spell impending disasters to social and national
lives. Notwithstanding, exponential growth of the menace is symptomatic of China getting caught in
vicious ‘capability trap’. While the problem abound both in ‘China Proper’ and ‘China Peripheral’, the
tactical veil of terrorism to the incidents in the latter, particularly in XUAR, TAR, IMAR and parts of
Sichuan, Yunnan, Gansu and Qinghai provinces does not stand scrutiny of the phenomenon. Course
corrections would need even handed approach. Proximity effects of the development may have lateral
bearings on the neighbouring countries in South Asia, Central Asia and North Asia.
Terror
conceptually constitutes part of Non Traditional Security (NTS) threat. Counter measures, if at all have
to correspond to NTS paradigm and balance their outreach between the public security and individual
freedom. The PRC has no go but to live with ‘peripheral nationalism’ in parts of ‘China Peripheral’ until
a logical conclusion was succinctly reached.
Introduction
The Associated Press has just released data on the rate of conviction against arrests of terror
suspects around the world.1 It covers 67 countries, including China. It relates to the first decade of post
9/11 new millennium. While it suffers the limitations of comprehensiveness, it has its worth on several
counts. It has potentials sensitize people and their nations to take „court route‟ in higher interest of rule
of law gaining prominence. This is against the Guantanamo phenomenon raising heads in the world at
large and China in particular.2
Terror conceptually constitutes part of Non Traditional Security (NTS) threat. This is beside the point
whether the incidents of protests and violence in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) in
China fall in category of terror.3 Notwithstanding a necessity, and a lot of efforts, the theoreticians and
ideologues widely differ on the issue of antidotes to the malaise of NTS. Holding rather constructivist
perspective, Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde (Security: A New Framework of Analysis,
Lynne Rienner, 1998) advocated "securitization", which speaks beyond military means. Ralf Emmers
(Non-Traditional Security in the Asia-Pacific: The Dynamics of Securitization, Singapore: Eastern
Universities Press, 2004), Mely Caballero-Anthony, Ralf Emmers and Amitav Acharya (Non-Traditional
Security in Asia: Dilemmas in Securitization, Ashgate Publishing, 2006) and a number of other studies
hold credit in similar vein in expanding the horizon beyond what the traditionalist school of security
studies could ever prescribe. However, they have little to offer in definite terms when it comes to say
where the state action has to stop lest it could encroach upon human rights.
The act of terrorism involves deliberate and indiscriminate violence.4 The actors are normally non-state
even as state and sub-state perpetrators do as well exist in the annals of history. Targets are ordinarily
soft. It is quite often high profile. In either case, irrespective of the nature and character of motivation, it
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is aimed at intimidating. The typology of the phenomenon has now come to cover a large number of
fields. It influences audience beyond the immediate victims.
In Beijing‟s parlance, as the deliberations at the 23rd Session of the 11th Standing Committee of the
National Peoples Congress bear out, the label “terrorist” refers to individuals who organize, plan or
implement terrorist activities. “Terrorist activity”, in the same vein, relate to the “activities carried out
with the intent of creating social panic” that leads to “loss of life”, “damage to public facilities” and
chaos to social order. “Terrorist organization” stands for criminal groups carrying out terror activities.5
On ground, the term terror has constantly been referred to denote all political and extra-political
activities of Uyghur and other ethnic minority nationalities in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region
(XUAR), Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), and to a lesser extent, Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region
(IMAR).
As a matter of principle, the term terrorism encompasses as many as three perspectives: the terror
perpetrator, the victim, and the general public. The perpetrators of terror acts do not view themselves
as evil and demonic for all the barbaric deeds. They draw support from a section of ideologues on
different counts. In the bargain, there are plenty of loopholes and safe havens for the perpetrators of
the act to give a faux pass to the delivery mechanism of justice. Nonetheless, where and when the
state mechanism of control and management transgresses the boundary of rule of law, the combat
measures turn counter productive.
Counter terror measures have to balance the outreach between the public security and individual
freedom. As a matter of principle, discretions at the hands of the state to fight the phenomenon hold
possibilities of impacting civil liberties and human rights adversely. The paper explores the Chinese
system of terror control and management. In the run up, it would critically examine the Chinese anti
terror legal framework and its working in the backdrop of nature and character of the phenomenon.
The paper is schematically organized to rummage through: Nature and Dimension of the Threat;
Intensities and Impacts of the Acts of Terror; Trouble Shooting Palliatives and Measures; and, the
inscrutability of the Policy and Action Instruments.
The postulates included: the act of terror invariably constitute of „violence‟ in different forms and shape
but „all acts of violence‟ can not be labeled as the act of terror; terrorist attack in China as elsewhere
could conceptually involve a decision of an alleged “individual” and/ or “group” who are not necessarily
obedient instruments in a greater game ordained by social science theory on the cause of terrorism; as
being a very pejorative term, the plausibility of it being used to delegitimise political action of the
opponents can not be ruled out; and, the acts of terror, if any in China is rooted in „structural‟ factors
including „peripheral nationalism‟ and, it is bound to loom large until the disconnects and anomalies at
their back, whatsoever find logical ends.6
Nature and Dimension of the Threat
In the Chinese official account, the alleged acts of terror have hitherto been confined to XUAR and
TAR. In XUAR again, the happenings took place in just four politically sensitive city locations- Urumqi
(Ulumuqi), Kashgar (Kashi), Aksu (Akesu) and Hotan (Hetian). Beginning Feb 5, 1992, there have
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been seven out of 11 incidents only in Urumqi. While Kashgar witnessed two incidents, first on Aug 12,
208 and the next on July 30th and 31st, 2011, the two other locations, Aksu and Hotan have had share
of one each incident respectively in 2010 and 2011.
In Urumqi, the centre of gravity for the terror incidents all through, there have been altogether 43
deaths and 97 injuries.7 2008 has predictably gone down as a turning point, when the intensity of the
incident was exceedingly high. 31 of the 43 death toll took place then alone. The targets of all the
incidents were bus lines, in particular Bus line 2, 10, 30 and 44. It was perhaps meant for drawing
world attention and arousing sentiments about the plights of ethnic Xinjiang people at the hands of
Han rulers in Beijing. There was a solitary case on Feb 5, 1992, when the alleged perpetrators of the
terror acts had targeted a public building, set four bombs and caused death to three persons and
injured 23 others. The other set of acts on the part of those perpetrators of terror, supposedly
prejudicial to the interests of the Chinese state, included posting of video on internet with appeals
some kind or the other.
In the first incident of Kashgar, taking place on Aug 12, 2008, the alleged perpetrators went on
stabbing spree.8 They had targeted the Chinese Public Security Bureau personnel on duty at a place
known as Yamanya. The incident claimed three lives.9 The intensity of the second incident was far
graver. 23 people died on July 30 and 31. On the first day, two Uyghur men hijacked a truck, ran it into
a crowded street, and started stabbing people. As may as nine persons died. They were overpowered
by the crowd, who killed one attacker. On the second day, 12 would-be car-bombers stormed a
restaurant with knives, killing 13 people. A firefight ensued with police who captured the group and
killed seven of them.10 East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) claimed responsibility for the attack.
One of the alleged perpetrators, named Memtieli Tiliwaldi had reportedly received training at ETIM
camp in Pakistan.11
Aksu incident is but queer.12 A three wheeled tempo reportedly rammed past a crowd, which claimed
lives of eight people and injured 15 others. The occupants of the vehicle were non-Han origin ethnics
of Xinjiang. While it could be an accident, the Chinese government and its security apparatus choose
to brand it an incident of terror acts, organized and carried out by the adherents of three evils of
„Terrorism, Separatism and Religious Extremism‟ and Hizb al-Tahrir.13
In Hotan, as the Chinese Public Security Bureau release says, 18 ethnic Uyghur youth “clashed with
the police personnel at the Public Security Bureau (PSB) station on Na'erbage” on July 18, 2011.14
Eye witness account, available in several foreign electronic media and social network sites including
the reportage of World Uyghur Congress (WUC), suggest that the group of 18 Uyghur youth were part
of 100 and odd others, including women and children, who had then marched up to the police station
to demonstrate against unfair practices and the police excesses. It included ban on Islamic dresses15.
They did as well raise slogans and level accusations of kidnappings and torture of their kith and kin. 16
Scuffle ensued and a band of Uyghur youth reportedly attacked the duty officer at the front desk. They
have been accused of hurling petrol bomb.17 They did as well take hostage of a few Han personnel.
Zhao Genlin, the Deputy Party Secretary of the Hotan City Police, has since acknowledged that the
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police firing claimed lives of 14 of the 18 Uyghur youth who had reportedly stormed the police station
in rage.18 In all, the death toll ran to 20, which included four women and an 11-year-old girl named
Hanzohre.19
Notwithstanding, the Chinese officials and media did not find cogent and coherent words to describe
the alleged perpetrators of the incident. Nuerbage police station Chief Abulaiti Maitiniyazi (Ablet
Metniyaz), credited for being present on the spot and responsible for the police action held them little
different from being “thugs”20. In its first hand reportage, Xinhua News Agency dispatch did as well
label the attackers as “thugs”. It did not see the ramification in serious terms. Global Times did not as
well trigger any alarm. In his dispatch, Yang Shu went on to caption the story: “Sky not falling in
Xinjiang after Hotan Attack”.21 Hou Hanmin, Chief of the XUAR information office, branded them as
“rioters”.22 Li Wei, an expert with China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR),
sought to term the incident as “terrorist” attack, and the perpetrators as “terrorists”.23 He arrived at this
conclusion as the attack looked organized and “adopted complicated approach”. Pan Zhiping, Director
of the Institute of Central Asia at the Xinjiang Academy of Social Sciences, found Hotan “prone to the
influence of terrorism” as it was inhabited largely by ethnic Uyghur.24 Characterization of the incident
as “long planned” by Yang Guoqiang and Hou Anmin, the two official of the XUAR Publicity
Department appear to be tactical official account.25 Chinese Ministry of Public Security under Meng
Jianzhu resorting to the “three evils” doctrine and some of the think tanks seeing foreign hands speak
of premeditated explanations by the Chinese state organs, both central and the local smacked
premeditated and sweeping summations.
The counterview on the incident suggests a bit of cover up. Unrepresented Nations and Peoples
Organization (UNPO) article, filed just a day after the incident puts a question mark about the veracity
of the official version about the locale as much as sequence of the event.26 While suspect of objectivity
in the eyes of the Chinese government, some of the blog including Zhongguo Rixian (The China
Hotline), China Letter, Today‟s Zaman and host of others go to corroborate the UNPO story. The
shooting incident did not take place at Nuerbage police station. It happened in Nuerbage Bazar, where
more than 100 local Uyghur had gathered to demonstrate against the police crackdown. It was nonmarket day.27 They wanted to know the whereabouts of their near and dear ones who were taken into
custody in course of house to house searches. Police opened fire, and killed at least 20 people. Josh
Summers questioned the authenticity of the Chinese media reportage including the picture as being
“cropped”.28 World Uyghur Congress (WUC) spokesman held that the demonstration of the Uyghur
populace on the day was “peaceful” and after the Police opened fire, a group of Uyghur youth did take
some of the police personnel hostage to demand the release of their family members detained since
July 2009.29
Intensities and Impacts of the Acts of Terror
While terror is an age old phenomenon, the term is yet to have an objective, value free definition. 30
One man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter. The problem, as Walter Laqueur says, is
“ideological”.31 The confusion stems largely since the academic divide look at the phenomenon from
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narrow prism of vice and virtue, independent of common denominator. In most of the seminal works,
such as those of Michael Walzer‟s Just and Unjust Wars (1977), Barrie Paskins and Michael Dockrill
The Ethics of War (1979), Richard Norman Ethics, Killing, and War (1995), Brian Orend War and
International Justice (2001) and Michael Walzer on War and Justice (2001), as well as articles by
Thomas Nagel “War and Massacre”, Elizabeth Anscombe “War and Murder”, and a host of others,
commonly found in the journals Ethics or The Journal of Philosophy and Public Affairs, the balance of
fairness and otherwise of the “act of violence” is being seen against the tenets of “Just War Theory”.32
The hall mark of engagement could thus, stretch not beyond Jus in Bello considerations, in particular
the “criterion of discriminating (COD) and affording immunity to innocents.33 As a matter of principle,
asymmetric character of the act of terror, irrespective of having been triggered by radicalized non-state
or the coercive state factor leaves little leeway for complacence on any count.
Terrorism has something that war has not, and that is the element of surprise. Terrorist attack can be
done at any time and any place. While, war has to be declared and organized, therefore, this gives
some time for the other side to get prepared or surrender before the first strike. What makes the two
different is that war requires mass organization, governments, countries and thousands of volunteers
and military personnel, while terrorism can be performed with just one or two individuals. Again, in
terrorism, the perpetrators of the act of violence quite often do not choose the targets, and as a result,
most times, innocent people get hurt and die. War, on the other hand knows its targets, and the
victims, both combatants and innocent people in the street are euphemistically called "Collateral
Damage". 34
Violence and explosions are of late common in the People‟ Republic of China (PRC). This is not some
thing exclusive to a particular region and/ or set of people as being made out. For quite some time in
the last decade of the bygone and the first decade of the present millennium, the Chinese and foreign
media reported unease (xinshen buan) in rural China. It happened alongside historic resurgence to
prosperity and power. It has subsided but would continue to haunt until China resolves its dual system
of land tenure and a host of other vexed problems of fundamental nature.35 The elements of
spontaneity in the waves of unrest in Taizhu, Zhejiang province and Lichuan, Hubei and other places
in the last couple of month of 2011 suggest a rare disquiet, borne of growing social inequality, abuse of
power, and suppression of legitimate grievances setting around rural China. It is now the turn for
Urban China, the privileged Child of China‟s socio-political and economic dynamics.
Some of the recent mass incidents (quntixingshijian) of protests and violence such as those in
Kunming city, Yunnan province (March 26-27, 2011), Fuzhou city, Jiangxi province (May 26, 2011),
Lichuan city, Hubei province (June 9, 2011) Xintang Town, Zengcheng, Guangdong province (June
12, 2011), Tianjin city, Hebei province (June 13, 2011), Nanchang city, Jiangxi province (Aug 4, 2011),
Qianxi county, Guizhou province (Aug 9, 2011), Wukan village and Lufeng city, Guangdong province (
September 22, 2011) Huzhou city, Zhejiang province (Oct 27, 2011) and a lot of other incidents of the
kind speak volumes about the pent up angers of the Chinese populace. Nonetheless, unabated year to
year to year rise in the number of mass incidents of protests and violence tell the tale of unfolding
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simmers in China‟s social life. In 2010, the number of such incidents in China had reached all time
high of 180,000. In his study, Prof. Sun Liping of Tsinghua University is quoted to have put the per day
figure of mass incidents of protests and violence in urban China running to around 120-250. It is
around 90 and 160 in rural China. 36
The exponential character of the malaise in over all perspectives can be gauged from the fact that it
has grown from paltry 8700 in 1993 to 87,000 in 2005, and exponentially 127, 000 in 2008 in the
subsequent years.37 Some of these incidents were very large in size and impacts, and the number of
such incidents has been rising side by side. In 2003, there were just nine mass incidents of protests
and violence, involving 500 and more people. It touched all time high of 76 in 2008.38 There is yet little
respite despite the Chinese law enforcing bodies getting proactive. In the words of Yu Jianrong, an
academic with the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, given China‟s effort to enforce “rigid stability”,
the “venting incidents” of the kind could spell “massive social catastrophe”.39
But for the ethnic and separatist connotations, the mass incidents of the kind in XUAR have been just
few and far between. Much talked about and gloated violent incidents in the Chinese government
accounts in 1990s prior to 9/11 included Talip Incident, Yarkand (Jan 5, 1990), Baren Incident, Akto
Township, Kashgar (April 5, 1990), Urumqi Bus Bombing Incident (Feb. 1992), Serial Bombings,
Yining, Kashgar and elsewhere ( Feb. 1992-Sep. 1993), Hotan Demonstration ( July 7, 1995), Kuche,
Kashgar,Aksu Protests, Bombing and Assassination and Crackdown (April-June 1996),Yining (Ghulja)
Incident (Feb. 5-8, 1997), and Aksu Police Station Attack And Kidnapping Incident (Jan 2000).
Some of these incidents were innocuous. Talip incident of Jan 1990, for example involved
demonstration by several thousand students who opposed the government order for closing down
privately run Quranic schools, known popularly as Madarsa. In the same vein, Hotan incident of July
1995 flared after the arrests of three Imams, first two relating Quranic teachings to life situation and the
third for advocating improvements in women rights. Prohibition and banning of Uyghur social
organization known as mäshräp stood at the back of the trouble. There are then host of other incidents
with remote terror connections. Neither August 2001 Kuqa Gun Battle Incident nor Feb. 2002 have
Urumqi Suicide Bombing Incident, and even Jan 2005 had Karamay Bus Bomb Incident do not fall in
the category of terror. In all the three cases, the perpetrator of the act of violence had personal reason,
in particular impulsive violent response to hurt sentiments.
Much of these mass incidents of protests and violence in Xinjiang were thus, not „act of terror‟, borne
of separatist instinct.40 In the bargain, the authenticity of 2002 Chinese government report on the issue
remains suspect of gross fudging.41 Strange but true, quite a number of mass incidents of protests and
protests, taking place during and after the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games do not as well qualify the
criterion of terror. Ground realities since testify the fact that the Chinese and foreign intelligence
reports on the likelihood of terror attack during 2008 Beijing Olympic were just hoax, if not outright
fabrications as the Uyghur activists contended and research studies bear out.42 Incidents of the kind
outside XUAR such as explosions in Shanghai (May 2008), Kunming Bus Bombing (July 2008) do not
fully qualify to be acts of terror. In scale as much as in sway, the menace of terror in China is thus, far
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less than what is being projected. While the Chinese political and academic elites could contest the
null test of the hypothesis on one count or the other, it is a plain truth that the hubbub on the menace
of terror in China in its entirety does not squarely measure the ground realities.
Trouble Shooting Palliatives and Measures
The fear of unknown has gripped all layers of the Chinese decision making system and mechanism. In
2005, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and State Council issued an
internal directive. It got to proclaim reduction of the level of social unrest a major policy goal for 2006. 43
As part of the strategy, the Chinese National People‟s Congress (NPC) passed a legislation to impose
fine for unauthorized reporting. State control of information thus, leaves least leeway to get to the truth
besides and beyond methodological groping.44
As being a component of NTS threat, the mass incidents of protests and violence in the PRC
theoretically called for extra traditional security threat measures. It could, inter alia, include due
process of law while dispensing criminal justice, solid and fair mechanism to redress public concern
and dependable social safety net against multifaceted socio-political and economic vagaries. The PRC
has instead meticulously harnessed soft and hard components of traditional security measures.
The soft components tend to comprise of measures that could „take the fuel out of fire‟. Sometimes
leaders of protests are taken away; other times they are paid off; still other times they are given what
they want. Much of this is done quietly.45 According to the latest Duihua Foundation report, roughly
25,000 alleged perpetrators of the incidents of protests and violence, in particular those belonging to
Falungong sect are facing the music of their lives in Ankang (psychiatric) Hospitals and Laojiao
(reeducation through labour) Centers, distributed and spread over to various nondescript locations.
Various units of 180,000 strong People‟s Armed Police Force (PAPF) were deployed to handle the
boiling public wrath in varying proportions in China proper and China exterior.
The PRC has, inter alia, developed a new concept of security and strategy.46 Euphemistically, it is
being called “anti-terrorism with Chinese characteristics”.The most demonstrable side of such
measures included enacting plethora of laws, some of which are apparently aimed at silencing human
rights violation critics.47 Yanda (strike hard) coupled with permissiveness and compromises of different
denominations rule the roost.48 There is a specific pattern. In XUAR and TAR, and to some extent in
Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region (IMAR), the policy instruments and tactics, brought to bear upon
squarely emit specter of untold „severity and swiftness‟, borne of China‟s „Yanda approach‟,
characteristic of a summary trial to tame the voice of discord then and there.49 The dynamics of „China
proper‟ and „China peripheral, borne of an array of factors including the baggage of portentous cultural
and pseudo-legal righteousness basically lay at the back of Chinese mind. This is while the sources of
general social discontents in two settings are no different.50 This is besides the political issues calling
for political correctives.
There is of late incontrovertible change in the flip side of China legal infrastructure in comparison and
contrast of yesteryears. From a very small base, the legal profession has grown quickly to a ratio of
one lawyer for every 7000 people. Thanks to the „2008 Legal Reform‟, the „defence lawyers‟ in China
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can see their clients without permission from the judicial authorities and without fear of being heard
and observed by the Public Security Bureau personnel. There leeway in getting access to the case
files, too. Damocles sword yet, hangs large in the provisions of Article 306 of the Chinese Criminal
Laws 1997. It stipulates detention, arrest and prosecution of defence lawyers on the charges of
„fabrication‟ of evidence. Uncorroborated reports suggest sizable number of such cases.
Notwithstanding, in criminal and political cases, the sentences are decided by the „Court Committee‟
and not by the trial judges. Nonetheless, it is CPC and not the Chinese government organ that goes
into the appointment procedures. In the bargain, justice in China is not what the merit of the case
states but what the ruling elite in the party thinks correct.
In the fist decade of the new millennium, as per the Associated Press (AP) data, there were year after
year anti-terror 7,649 arrests and 7,776 convictions of the activists, labeled perpetrators of „three evils‟
in China. The AP data is far from exact. According to Chinese official mouthpiece, the PRC had made
18227 arrests in Xinjiang in 2005 alone.51 The number sky rocketed on the eve of 2008 Beijing
Olympic Games. As per AP data, Turkey (37242), Pakistan (29050), Nepal (18934) and Israel (7,971)
surpassed China. There were 12,897 convictions in Turkey and 2,905 in Pakistan. There is no
conviction figure available for Nepal and Israel. There were such 119,044 anti-terror arrests and
35,117 convictions in 66 countries, accounting for 70 percent of the world's population. As in the case
of China, the actual numbers of arrests run higher elsewhere too. The central point in AP report yet
remains same and valid. First, China as most other countries have since enacted and put in place antiterror laws; and, the Second and last, the country has been moving past increasingly to get to court
route to criminal justice.
Of 66 entities in the report, Turkey alone shares China‟s odds in spirit, if not letter. Both face the odds
of „peripheral nationalism‟ in the estimation of Becquelin, Mackerras, Bovingdon and Gladney besides
host of other scholars who subscribe Hechter‟s prescriptions with a difference, and hence, the two
have gone for almost identical recourse.52 The aftermath in store can be no different for either. The
caveats lay in quality of course correction measures and responses of the people.
Inscrutability of the Policy and Action Instruments
The perils of the incidents of mass protests and violence are thus, writ large on China‟s social and
national lives. It tells upon the efficacy much less the rationale of most of the preventive and punitive
policy and action instruments in place. The phenomenon suggests China‟s political dispensation
getting viciously caught in „capability trap‟ to handle an array of contradictions, called maodun in
popular Chinese communist lexicon to its development and modernization pursuits.53
Much of the policy and action instruments presently in vogue in China peripheral carry meticulously
planned but diabolically skewed measures. XUAR, TAR, IMAR and parts of Sichuan, Yunnan, Gansu
and Qinghai provinces bear the brunt. Individually and collectively the measures go to stifle political
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dissents. This is despite the fact that clan or ethnic clashes have dominated the scene there. This is
true about all that happened in 1980s, 1990s and the post-9/11 epoch in the first decade of the new
millennium.
As the facts on ground suggest, the Chinese official releases on the issue stand to blindfold even
discerning minds. On January 21, 2002, the Information Office of the PRC State Council released a
document titled “East Turkistan Forces Can not Get Away with Impunity. While comprehensive in form,
the document lacks thoroughness and hence, the truth of the fact remains victim of propaganda. The
US was one to be taken to ride in a stride to put East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) in the list of
terrorist organization. Likewise, closer looks on the release of December 2003 document of the
Chinese Ministry of Public Security, alleging involvements of the World Uyghur Youth Congress
(WUYC), the East Turkistan Liberation Organization (ETLO) and the East Turkistan Information Center
(ETIC) in various incidents of violence as act of terror appear little convincing. Scholarship on the issue
tend to dispute the stand of the PRC, US and even United Nations on Al Qaeda and Taliban funding,
training and guidance to these organizations. While hard to predict future events, there has been little
convincing evidence of collusion of these organizations with the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
(IMU) either. In the bargain, it is hard to buy China‟s logic and justify the validity of policy and action
instruments.
Notwithstanding, the specters of terror do loom large over China. What is refuted in academic parlance
is the criticality of the menace. Turning blind eyes to the objective reality can not be an answer to
plausible woes and wails. Chinese think tanks are not oblivious either. The PRC has but to give up its
tactical veil and respond to the problem even handedly in „China Proper‟ and „China Peripheral‟. It has
to live with peripheral nationalism in „China Peripheral‟ until a logical conclusion was succinctly
reached in times to come.
End notes :
1
Global Terrorism Document: The associated Press http://hosted.ap.org/interactives/2011/global-terrorism-document
2
China has 623 prisons for different sets of accused persons, spread over to different parts of the country. Many of
them are traditional. Uncorroborated reports of intelligenceonline.com suggest that China has of late set up
Guantanamo sort detention centers.
3
The book On Non-Traditional Security, published by Institute of China Contemporary International Relations (CCIR),
talks of as many as 17 phenomena that could fall in the category of NTS. The basket of NTS has since been to growing
with one and all issues threatening to human life except those classified as traditional security threat. As for China and
among Chinese scholars, there is Prof. Liu Jianyong of Qinghua University who has identified seven major fields of NTS
threat- terror, economy, crimes on high seas, drug trafficking, information, illness and ecology. There is then In his
paper, Defining Non-Traditional Security and its Implications for China (http://www.iwep.org,cn), Wang Yizhou finds the
threat posed by the „three evils‟ of „separatism, terrorism and religious extremism‟ in West China not grave enough to be
included in NTS threat.
4
The word “terrorism” got currency first, in 1775 to denote powerful group member oppressing less powerful group
members. Moreover, the connotation is „interest specific‟ and varies as a function of time and historical context.
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5
India and South Asia
Zhang Yang and Bai Long, People‟s Daily, Oct 27, 2011 http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90786/7628544.html
6
„Peripheral nationalism‟ constitute one of the four sets of nationalism in Hechter M. (Containing Nationalism, Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2000) theoretical framework. The other forms of „nationalism‟ in Hechter‟s typology included
state-building, irredentist and unification. The sustenance of „peripheral nationalism, as several scholars in the field hold
depended on several factors including ‟weak/strong local/ outside elite affiliation, national identity and economic
engagement. China‟s ethnic minority issue in Xinjiang, Tibet and other regions thus confront real life problem.
7
Urumqi is the capital city of Xinjiang. In Chinese it is called Ulumuqi (乌鲁木齐).It is a multiethnic city, inhabited by over
2.8 million people, belonging to 40 nationalities including the Uyghur, Tajik, Kirgiz, Xibe, Mongol, and Han.
Urumqi means "A beautiful Pasture land ". Uyghur has been the majority. However, the Chinese resettlement policy has
gradually telling upon the demographic profile of the city. Han population now occupies 40.6% of the total population. In
the annals of its history, the city has witnessed an array of rebellious battles. It included the Battle of Urumqi (1870) and
Kumul Rebellion (1933). After it got incorporated as one of the five Autonomous Regions of the PRC in 1954, it has
witnessed numerous rebellious riots, in particular with the resettled Han populace. Change in demographic profile of the
city constitutes one of the key irritant and cause of unrests.
8
Kashgar, in Chinese known as Kashi (喀什), has a population of over 3.5 million people. It is next to Urumqi in sociopolitical importance in the region. The name is Middle Iranic in its origin, meaning "Kush Mountains" (from gar/ghar,
"mountain", and Kush/Kâsh, being the same as the ethnonym of the Kushan Empire and the Hindukush mountains in
the neighboring Afghanistan. In the annals of its history, it has been most volatile. Han nationality constitutes about 20%
of the population and lives apart from the local Uyghur. Anthropologist Dru Gladney has gone on record to point out
said that "any small incident in Kashgar has potential to quickly overheat and boil into something much larger".
9
Three dead as unrest flares in Xinjiang". Daily Times. 2008-08-13.
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2008/08/13/story_13-8-2008_pg4_Retrieved 2011-11-22
10
Cheng, Yongsun; Yu, Xiaodong, The Bloody Weekend. News China, October 2011, pp. 23-25
11
Zenn, Jacob, „Catch 22 of Xinjiang as Gateway‟, Asia Times, http://www.atimes/China/MI22aD02.html
12
Aksu, in Chinese called Akesu (阿克苏), is the oasis town, located at the southern foot of Tianshan Mountain on the
northern rim of Tarim Basin and bordering Kyrgyzstan to the west, has a population of 2.4 million. There are 30 ethnic
groups living in Aksu including the Uyghur, the Hui, Russians and Han. The Han settlers now hold the majority with their
share of approximately 56% of Aksu's total population. It is the birthplace of Guizi culture and Duolang culture. It has
faced political control and exploitation in its long history. In the 7th, 8th, and early 9th centuries, control of the entire
region was often contested by the Chinese Tang Dynasty, the Tibetan Tufan Empire, and the Uyghur Empire; cities
frequently changed hands. The Battle of Aksu occurred here on May 31, 1933. The bombing of 2010 reflects the volatile
nature of social and political relations in the region.
13
China‟s approach to counter terrorism is the „Three Evil Doctrine‟, hitherto exclusively applied to ethnic minority
groups, in particular to Uyghur and Tibetans. With its clout in Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the doctrine
has come to acquire official sanction in Central Asian countries and the Russian Federation. In the eyes of Human
Rights in China (zhongguo renquan), the Doctrine, as being practiced in China, stand distinctly apart the UN
Convention on the issue.
14
th
Hotan, in Chinese 和田) was known as Yu Tian (in) for long. 19 Century European explorers called it Ilchi. It is again
an Oasis town in Tarim Basin, just north of Kunlun Mountains, crossed by Sanju Pass, Hindu-tagh and Ilchi Pass. As
one of the earliest Buddhist state in the world, the Khotan Kingdom once served as a cultural bridge between India and
China.
15
Choi, Chi-yuk, “Uyghur Resentment at Unfair Practices”, South China Morning Post, July 23, 2011;Choi, Chi-yuk,
“Ban on Islamic Dresses Sparks Uyghur Attacks, South China Post, July 22, 2011.
16
In the Chinese media reports, some of the slogan raisers spoke with Aksu and Kashgar accents. The slogans were
akin to what Jihadist elements normally. This goes to suggest the support and/ or complicity of out side elements to the
incident. There is dispute on the identity of the flag, reportedly carried and hoisted atop the police station. According to
the official account, the flag was black with white Arabic lettering. It suggested Jihadist. Interview of locals, appearing In
Financial Times, said the flag was instead blue half moon, attributed to advocates of independence of Xinjiang from the
yoke of China. South China Post reporter said it was black with crescent.
17
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/6a1558cc-b39d-11e0-b56d-00144feabdc0.html
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18
Olesen, Alexa. "China says 14 Extremists Killed in Xinjiang Attack". Associated Press, July 19, 2011.
http://www.deseretnews.com/article/700164452/China-says-14-extremists-killed-in-Xinjiang-attack.html.
19
Xinjiang Clash Killed 20, says Exile Group, South China Morning Post, July19, 2011; Radio Netherlands Worldwide
(RNW), July 19, 2011.
20
Richburg, Keith B. "China: Deadly attack on police station in Xinjiang". San Francisco Chronicle, July 19, 2011
http://articles.sfgate.com/2011-07-19/news/29789314_1_police-station-hotan-muslim-uighurs.
21
http://www.globaltimes.cn/NEWS/tabid/99/ID/666919/Sky-not-falling-after- Hotan-attack.aspx
22
Shao Wei and Wang Huazhong. “ 4 Dead in Xinjiang Police Station Attack”, China Daily, July 19, 2011.
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2011-7/19/content_12929242.htm
23
Xu Tianran and Zhu Shanshan. “Hotan on High Alert after Attack”, Global Times, July 20, 2011.
http://www.globaltimes.cn/NEWS/tabid/99/ID/666967/Hotan-on-high-alert-after-attack.aspx
24
Ibid
25
http://www.china.org.cn/china/201107/18/content_23015331.htm;www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/201107/21/content_1294
7603.htm;
26
27
http://www.unpo.org/article/12920
http;//thechinahotline.wordpress.com/201107/26/hotan-incident-more-questions-than-answers/
28
Joss Summers, “What Really Happened in Hotan Riots”, China Letter, July 27, 2011
http://chinaletter.blogspot.com/2011/07/china-last -say-on-hotan-incident.html
29
Rabiya Kadeer, “Hotan Incident was not a Terrorist Attack”, World Uyghur Congress, July 21, 2011
http://www.uyghurcongress.org/en/?p=9466
30
The earliest acts of radical acts of violence included Zealots of Judea, called socarii by the Romans, who carried on
an underground campaign of assassination of Roman occupation forces. Their motive was an uncompromising belief
that they could not remain faithful to the dictates of Judaism while living as Roman subjects. A breakaway faction of
Shia Islam called the Nizari Ismalis adopted the tactic of assassination of enemy leaders. The Zealots and the
Assassins operated in antiquity, and can be called forerunners of modern terrorism with a difference in aspects of
motivation, organization, targeting, and goals of perpetrators of the violent acts.
31
Laqueur, Walter. The Age of Terrorism, Little, Brown and Company, Boston, 1987.
32
Just War Theory enjoys popularity over the two other traditions of thoughts of Realism and Pacifism while adjudging
the ethical aspect of the act of war. The parameters of the theory include the imperatives of “just cause”, “proper
authority”, “right intention”, “and reasonable prospect of success”, “proportionality and last resort”.
33
Agreements defining limits on acceptable conduct while already engaged in war are considered "rules of war" and are
referred to as the jus in bello. Thus the Geneva Conventions are a set of "Jus in Bello". The criterion of discrimination
prohibits direct and intentional attacks on non-combatants and the use of force must be proportionate to the military
advantage sought in attacking the legitimate military target.
34
The phrase collateral damage is prevalently used as a euphemism for unintentional or undesired civilian casualties of
a military action. The most common terrorist tactics include; car bombing, aircraft hijacking and suicide attacks. At the
moment, the world‟s biggest fear is use of Bio-Chemical and Nuclear weapons in wars and terrorism.
35
Under China‟s Land Administration Law, which was firstly drafted in 1986 and amended in 1998, the State owns all
urban land, while farmer collectives own all rural land. Notwithstanding, land ownership (土地所有权) and land use
rights (土地使用权) stand distinctly apart. As the local government holds the rein of land use, the rural China is bound to
suffer the pang of manipulation push to unease and social instability.
36
http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/10/striks-protests-surge-in-china/
37
Small group incidents of protests and violence include sit-ins (jingzuo), petitions (qingyuan) and rallies (jihui). They
are peaceful in intent and purpose. They have been seen taking violent turn on provocations from the Chinese security
forces. Quite often counter group do as well work as agent provocateurs. Large group incidents of protests and violence
(daguimo quntixing shijian) normally involve more than 500 people. They constitute of incidents where the protestors
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block roads and highways and destroy public transports facilities (zusai jiaotong); encircle and attack public buildings
and officials (chongji weigong); and, gather at a public place and commit mass suicides (quanti zisha shijian).
38
Tong Yanqi and Lei Shaohua, “ Large Scale Mass Incidents and Government Response in China”, International
Journal of China Studies, Vol.1, No.2,Oct 2010, pp.487-508.
39
Yu Jianrong, “Holding Tight and Not Letting Go: The Mechanisms of Rigid Stability”, Global Asia, June 2010
http://www.globalasia.org/V5N2_Summer_2010/Yu_Jianrong.html
40
Beijing looks at terrorism as a violent expression of the aim of ethnic separatism and the result of zealous religiosity
on the part of one or the minority nationality (shaoshu minzu).
41
Information Office of the State Council of the PRC, „East Turkistan terrorist forces cannot get away with impunity‟,
People‟s Daily, 21 January 2002, http://www.peopledaily.com.cn/200201/21/ print200020121_89078.htm
42
See Dr Sheo Nandan Pandey, “2008 Beijing Olympic Security Management:: Myth and Reality of Intelligence Inputs
on
Terror
Attack”,
South
Asia
Analysis
Group,
Paper
No.2918,
Nov.
10,2008
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/paper30/paper2918.html
43
.中共中央办公厅国务院办公厅转发《中央政法委员会、中央社会治安综合治理委员会关于深入开展平安建设的意见》
的通知 (Circular of the General Offices of the Chinese Communist Central Committee and the State Council Regarding
the Re-issuance of the “Political and Legislative Affairs Committee and the Committee for Comprehensive Management
of Public Security „Joint Opinion Regarding Carrying Out Stable and Secure Development , October 21, 2005;
中央综治办负责人就关于深入开展平安建设的意见答记者
(Spokesman for the Committee for Comprehensive
Management of Public Security Responds to Journalist‟s Questions Regarding Deepening Peaceful Construction) , Dec
5, 2005. Accessed at: http://www.npc.gov.cn/zgrdw/common/zw.jsp?label=WXZLK&id=343072&pdmc=010520.
44
Dui Hua Foundation, http://www.duihua.org.
John Lee, China‟s Latest Tibet: Why Beijing won‟t Compromise in Xinjiang, Foreign Policy, July 6, 2009
http://www.foreignpolicy.com
45
46
China‟s new security concept sought to expand the scope of security to comprehensiveness from the traditional
military measures, where terror prevention and control was considered „zero-sum-game‟ of the nation in question and/
or its allies. The new security concept of China has thus, raised the floor of engagement from individual nation to
international. „Common security‟ and „cooperative security‟ are the watchwords. The implementation mechanism in
vogue constituted of regional and sub-regional security arrangements of different sorts.
47
For long, the Chinese prosecutors relied on confessions, obtained on the strength of tortures. This attracted media
attention world over. The Chinese government enacted laws in 2004 forbidding use of third degree methods for the
purpose. 2006 saw enactment of law requiring video graphing of the interrogation process. The new rules issued in
2010 calls for accountability of the prosecuting authority and payments of compensation for the incidents of custodial
deaths and injuries. State compensation for physical and mental torture is yet an exception rather than rule.
48
Zong Shengli, Li Guozhong, 2005年社会治安形势 [The Situation of Social Order in 2005], in Ru Xin, Lu Xueyi, Li
Peilin, eds., 2006年：中国社会形势分析与预测 [Analysis and Forecast on China‟s Social Development (2006)] (Beijing:
Social Sciences Academic Press, 2006), p. 151.
49
See Dr Sheo Nandan Pandey, “Chinese Counter Terror Intelligence Module: Compatibility to Nov 26 Mumbai Type
Terror
Attacks”,
South
Asia
Analysis
Group,
Paper
No.2993,
Dec
27,
2008
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpaper30/paper2993.html; as also Dr Ralph A. Thaxton, Jr, “The Violent Dawn of
Reform: Yanda in the Countryside”, Department of Politics, Brandies University, Oct 10, 2009
http://webapp.mcis.utoronto.ca/ai/pdfdoc/thaxton_brief.pdf
50
Protests in China do not generally challenge the decisions of the central authorities. They are poised to oppose local
authorities.
51
“18,000 Uyghur Arrested for „Security Threats‟ Last Year, South China”, South China Morning Post, Jan 21, 2006.
52
Becquelin, N. (2000) „Xinjiang in the Nineties‟, The China Journal, 44: 65-90; Mackerras, C. (2001) „Xinjiang at the
Turn of the Century: The Causes of Separatism‟, Central Asian Survey, 20 (3): 289-303; Bovingdon, G. (2004)
„Autonomy in Xinjiang: Han Nationalist Imperatives and Uyghur Discontent‟, Policy Studies, 11 (1); Gladney, D. C.
(1998) „Internal Colonialism and the Uyghur Nationality: Chinese Nationalism and Its Subaltern Subjects‟, Cahiers
d'‚tudes sur la M‚diteran‚e orientale et le monde turco-iranien, 25: 47 63.
53
„Capability trap‟ broadly refers to „governance‟ chasm. It stands for „dysfunctional‟ state of the system in vogue.
Scholarship in the field has developed several indicators, which includes Kaufmann, Krray and Mastruzy (“Governance
Matters VIII:Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators for 1996-2008”, Policy Research working Paper No 4978,
Washington, DC: The World Bank) perspectives- (People‟s) Voice and Accountability; Political Stability and Absence of
Violence; Government Effectiveness; Regulatory Quality; Rule of Law; and, Reining Corruption.
***************
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South Asia: The US and Chinese Perspectives
Abanti Bhattacharya
Associate Professor
Department of East Asian Studies
University of Delhi
Dr Abanti Bhattacharya is currently Associate Professor
at the Department of East Asian Studies, University of
Delhi. She teaches courses on China’s foreign policy,
India-China relations, East Asian international relations
and Chinese Nationalism. Prior to joining the University
of Delhi, Dr Bhattacharya was an Associate Fellow at the
Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi
(2002 to 2009) where her research was primarily on
Chinese nationalism, minority politics and China’s
foreign policy. At the IDSA Dr Bhattacharya was also a
member of the editorial board for the IDSA journal,
Strategic Analysis, and part of many specialized
projects on China, including those from the MEA and the DRDO. She had been part of the
Government Exchange Programme and got Chinese language training from Fudan University
Shanghai. She has published extensively in national and international journals including Issues
and Studies, Asia-Pacific Review, East Asia, Journal of East Asian Affairs among others. Dr
Bhattacharya can be reached at: [email protected]
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South Asia: The US and Chinese Perspectives
In tracing the role of the US and China in South Asia in the post-War era when the region
came under the influence of the Cold War politics, one fact that grabs preeminent attention is
the convergence of interests of the US and China on Pakistan. Despite positioned
antagonistically in the Cold War matrix, the US and China shared the common strategy to
cultivate Pakistan as an ally; for the US Pakistan served as an ally against Soviet
expansionism and for China Pakistan was an ally against both the superpowers.For Pakistan,
the primary concern was to check Indian hegemony in South Asia. Consequently, in the
1950s, Pakistan opted for membership in the US led CENTO and SEATO while it also
established diplomatic ties with China. Also in the 1970s, it was Pakistan that emerged as a
conduit for US-China rapprochement. Pakistan thus emerged as “the most allied ally” of the
US and an “all-weather friend” of China in the Cold War period. India, on the other hand,
turned towards the Soviet Russia. The US and Chinese perspectives towards South Asia in the
Cold War period were thus woven around the India-Pakistan rivalry. However, South Asia
did not occupy a foremost priority in US or China’s policy perspectives in this period.
The Post-Cold War US and Chinese Perspectives
With the end of the bipolar politics in 1991, the Cold War overlay on international politics
was gone and this brought a focus on the regional politics. In this altered world order South
Asia as a region acquired prominence.
With South Asia gaining importance, the US relation with India and Pakistan too witnessed a
change. With the collapse of the Soviet threat, Pakistan ceased to be strategically important
to the US while Washington’s relations with India transformed phenomenally from estranged
to engaged democracies. The US President Clinton’s visit to India in 2000 for five days while
only five- hour stop-over in Pakistan spoke tons about this transformed nature of US’ South
Asia policy.
For China, the end of the Cold War also ended the Soviet threat. While the Sino-Pakistan
nexus continued, its policy towards the South Asian region saw a perceptible shift from
pursuing an-anti India policy to a policy of readjustment. The policy of readjustment was
driven by Beijing’s economic development oriented policy that called for building good
neighbourly ties with India. This policy of readjustment called for maintaining a fine balance
between India and China so that Pakistan is checked from being too reckless a power and
India is discouraged from being too ambitious a power. Though, constraining India still
remained a fundamental geo-political consideration in Sino-Pakistan relations, China ceased
to support Pakistan on the Kashmir dispute. This was evident during the 1999 Kargil conflict
when China adopted essentially a neutral position. More than balancing, this neutrality was
precipitated by China’s own domestic consideration, especially the unrest in Xinjiang.
Nevertheless, the end of the Cold War era brought a significant change in the perspectives of
two countries vis-à-vis India. In other words, the end of the Cold War enhanced India’s
position in South Asia vis-à-vis Pakistan.
The Post-9/11 US and Chinese Perspectives
The 9/11 terror attacks again reshaped the regional balance of power. Pakistan again
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acquired a front-line state in the US War on Terror, reminiscent of the Cold War years when
it was the front-line state against the Soviet threat.The US policy in South Asia in fact, came to
be driven by primarily three broad concerns: one to maintain stability in the region, two to
prevent the region from becoming the base for terrorism targeting America and three to
avert India-Pakistan crisis.
More specifically, the post-9/11 US’ South Asia policy had two broad ramifications for the
region:it revived the salience of Pakistan in the US War on terror and simultaneously it led to
the strengthening of the Indo-US ties. As a result of the first, American security forces arrived
for the first time in Pakistan and Afghanistan as well as in the Central Asian region. As a
result of the second, in 2005, Condoleezza Rice expressed the American wish to help India
emerge as a major power in the 21st Century. The2000 decade also saw high-level Indo-US
defence cooperation. The Indo-US engagement peaked when in 2008,through US support
India gained NSG waiver that ended New Delhi’s 34 years of nuclear isolation and opened the
gates for nuclear commerce with the world. The NSG waiver in effect, reshaped the Asian
balance of power by decoupling India’s nuclear status from that of Pakistan and by giving
India strategic parity with China on the nuclear issue.
For China, the US gaining footholds in Central Asia and Pakistan through the establishment of
bases posed grave security threats. Moreover, a result of the more robust India-US relations
was the perceptible shift in China’s own assessment of India. While there is no doubt that
China’s perceptions of India began to show signs of change from the time India conducted
the nuclear tests in 1998, the real perceptible change could be traced more clearly from
Wen Jiabao’s India visit in 2005. During his visit, the Premier called India a ‘major power’ for
the first time. An article in Beijing Review noted, “While the rise of the Chinese dragon
propels Asia to global prominence, India's outstanding performance is not far behind in
Asia’s global economic emergence. With its 1.1 billion population, seventh largest land mass
and strategic location on the Indian Ocean rim, India has everything necessary to become a
major power.”1Talking about ushering in a truly Asian century, the Chinese leadership spelt
out that it can happen only with the simultaneous development of both India and China.
Indeed, such rhetoric of an Asian renaissance was articulated to preclude India from falling
into the American embrace.Admittedly, China’s recognition of India as a major power came
on the heels of growing India’s defence ties with the US. Raising alarm over the Indo-US
nuclear deal, several writings came up in the Chinese media and academia in the years 2005
and 2006. An article in the official weekly Beijing Review highlights the ‘China factor’ in
“boosting US-India relations” and stated that the US policy of helping India to become an
Asian power is aimed at counter-balancing China.
Besides the Indo-US factor driving China’s South Asia policy, four broad interests determine
Beijing’s South Asia perspective. One, China shares borders with several South Asian
countries and has unresolved border problem with India. Two, it has concerns about Islamic
extremism and its cross-border linkages. Third, it has concerns about the activities of the
exiled Tibetans located in Nepal and India and finally, South Asia serves as a large market for
China. These four concerns primarily form part of China’s domestic concerns. In other words,
China’s South Asia policy is not simply shaped by the changes in the international order but
to a large extent driven by internal politics. For instance, China’s recent activism in Nepal is
to a large extent guided by the need to curb the clandestine activities of some 20,000
Tibetans in Nepal. Therefore, for China its perspectives on South Asia are largely shaped by
its domestic security imperatives.
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In general, however, the Chinese leadership perceives the South Asian region as full of
conflicts; conflicts between religious and secular forces, between geo-strategic interests and
mafia and drug-led interest, and between civilian and military systems of government. The
spill over effects of such political uncertainties and tensions are thought to be disastrous for
China. Therefore, it wants the region to be stable and in this endeavour the Chinese
government is willing for major powers’ cooperation and intervention towards establishing
peace and stability in the region while it would remain anchored to the region’s development
through bilateral economic engagements. In fact, for the first time, moving away from a
bilateral approach, it indicated a multilateral approach in resolving the problems of the
region.In the case of Afghanistan, China was so long happy with the US presence in the Af-Pak
region as its presence guaranteed stability in the region which created the necessary
environment to pursue Beijing’s economic interests. In the post-2014 US withdrawal from
Afghanistan, China is likely to opt for multilateral cooperative security mechanisms in
tackling the political situation.
Convergence and Divergence in US and Chinese Perspectives
For US and China the common primary interest in the region is maintenance of stability.
Particularly, both want strong and stable Pakistan. Both want an end to terrorism in
Afghanistan. Further, both want to prevent the region from becoming a nuclear flashpoint
and therefore, want a peaceful India-Pakistan relationship. From this perspective it is
worthwhile to note that US-China joint statement of 2009 called for US-China cooperation on
South Asia. It said2,
The two sides welcomed all efforts conducive to peace, stability and development in South
Asia. They support the efforts of Afghanistan and Pakistan to fight terrorism, maintain
domestic stability and achieve sustainable economic and social development, and support
the improvement and growth of relations between India and Pakistan. The two sides are
ready to strengthen communication, dialogue and cooperation on issues related to South
Asia and work together to promote peace, stability and development in that region.
Compared to the 2009 Joint Statement, the 2011 January US-China Joint Statement
does not mention of US–China “communication, dialogue, and cooperation on issues
related to South Asia.” However, P J Crowley, State Department spokesman denied
that “the omission reflected any change in US policy”. Reflecting on the Indo-US
relations, particularly about the US President Obama’s visit to India in November
2010, he talked about the need for India’s greater role in East Asia. To quote from his
address to the joint session of India’s Parliament 3,
India and the United States can partner in Asia. Today, the United States is once again playing
a leadership role in Asia-strengthening old alliances; deepening relationships, as we are
doing with China; and we're reengaging with regional organizations like ASEAN and joining
the East Asia summit-organizations in which India is also a partner. Like your neighbors in
Southeast Asia, we want India to not only "look East," we want India to "engage East"because it will increase the security and prosperity of all our nations (emphasis added).
The recent visit of Hillary Clinton to India in July 2011 has again indicated US’ support for
India’s assertive role in Asia. In other words, the US is not comfortable with China’s growing
power in South Asia. So if China is interfering in India’s sphere of influence, it wants India to
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play a pro-active role in China’s sphere of influence and thereby maintain a sort of balance in
Asian politics.
Thus despite the convergences in US and Chinese perspectives on South Asia, critical
divergences exist between the two in four areas: first, on the China – Pakistan nexus, second
on the Indo-US cooperation, third on China’s growing influence in South Asia and fourth on
US return to Asia as not only a resident power but predominant power in Asia.
The Future Trends
With regard to China-Pakistan nexus that predominantly irks India and worries the
US,traditionally China benefited from India’s estranged relations with the US. It propped up
Pakistan to keep India embroiled in a conflict, drain and divert India’s economic resources
and thereby offset India’s rise in Asia. In other words, by keeping India-Pakistan hostility
alive, China sought to maintain a balance of power in South Asian region. But with the
turnaround in the US-India relations, the balance got upset to the disadvantage of China. The
Indo-US civil nuclear deal de-hyphenated India from Pakistan and re-hyphenated it with
China. Again, China’s recent activities in POK, including the presence of some 4,000 Chinese
PLA, building up of the two infrastructure projects- the Diamer-Bhashahydeldam and
upgradation of Karakoram and a proposal for a 411 mile long rail link through POK are
nothing but Chinese strategy to legitmise Pakistan’s presence in POK and undermine India’s
sovereignty on Kashmir and thereby, reinforce the Pakistan card against India. Further,
China’s insistence on a civil-nuclear deal with Pakistan akin to the Indo-US civil nuclear deal
is basically seeking to re-hyphenate India-Pakistan relations again.This would not only limit
India’s power to South Asian region but also weaken the Indo-US deal and thereby weaken
the US dominance in Asia.
Arguably, the major contest in Asia is not between India and China but between China and
the US. Therefore, Chinese concerns seemed to emanate not from India’s role in Asia as
much as that of the combined role of the US-India in Asia. China’s concerns about India has
also compounded with the return of the US in Asia.The recent US foreign policy postures
following Hillary Clinton’s visit to India in July 2011 calling for Indo-US joint efforts in
leading the Asian development has to a large extent contributed to the rising anxiety among
the Chinese leadership. In fact, Chinese analysts view that India is being used as an offshore
balancer (after Christopher Layne) in Asia by the US and thus, India alone is not a potential
threat to China but Indo-US partnership in Asia has the potential to destabilize the Chinese
long term dream of Asian leadership. This has therefore, to large extent injected mistrust
between India and China.
Looking at the current US-Pakistan relations, particularly after the cross-border attack in
November 2011 in which 24 Pakistan soldiers died, US-Pakistan relations have deteriorated
sharply. Most Pakistanis believe that their country is unlikely to be the ally of US in future. On
the other hand, China’s all-weather friendship attained newer heights with both the
countries celebrated 2011 as the year of friendship on the occasion of sixty years of
diplomatic relations.
Given the broad contours of Chinese and US perspectives on South Asia, India has two policy
options. First, it would be prudent for India to stick to its strategic autonomy and maintain a
fine balance between the US and China instead of tilting to either side. Second, India could
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only undermine China’s Pakistan card by reaching out to Pakistan and resolving all its
outstanding disputes peacefully.
_________________________________
1
Lu Jianren, “Is this Asia’s Century?” Beijing Review, vol.48, no.16 (21 April 2005): 18.
US-China Joint Statement, November 17, 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/us-china-jointstatement
2
Full Text of Obama’s Parliament Speech, IBNLive.Com, November 08, 2010, http://ibnlive.in.com/news/fulltext-of-obamas-parliament-address/134649-3.html
3
*****
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India and southern neighbours
N. SathiyaMoorthy
Director
Observer Research Foundation
Chennai Chapter
Journalist-turned Policy Analyst, N SathiyaMoorthyis
at present the Director of the Chennai Chapter of the
Indian public policy think-tank, Observer Research
Foundation (ORF), headquartered in New Delhi
(www.orfonline.org). His areas of policy studies
include Sri Lanka and Maldives, including their
domestic politics and society, apart from international relations, strategic
security and economy. He also writes occasionally on Indian politics and policy
issues, from time to time. Email: [email protected]
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India and southern neighbours
In historic terms and contemporary geo-strategic realities of the post-War world, India has always
understood the importance of the Indian Ocean in its economic and security calculus. The world
had also done as much, yet until the end of the ‗Cold War‘, no one really gave it much thought and
started talking in terms of ‗energy security‘ and the Indian Ocean sea-lanes/lines, as we are doing
now. The ‗OPEC price rise‘ of 1973 was an early pointer, if one was required. Then followed the
US acquiring the strategically-located Diego Garcia Island from the UK and set up a military-base
much to the discomfort and chagrin of the neighbourhood nations, including India and Sri Lanka.
The immediate neighbour, if any, namely, Maldives was just coming out on its own, and did not
have much time or reach in the global context as ecological issues have empowered it now. The
combined India-Sri Lanka effort for keeping Indian Ocean a ‗zone of peace‘ did not evoke much
response. Both nations were seen as playing for the Soviet Union, and not for themselves. Yet, the
truth behind their reservations could not have been missed out. With the result, when the postSoviet era has thrown up the possibility of China emerging as an alternate, ‗second super-power‘
after the US, greater attention is being paid to the Indian Ocean.
The perceived, and at times propagated arguments about China acquiring ‗blue water naval
capabilities‘, and the western academic assertions based on the ‗String of Pearls‘ theory have made
the Indian policy-maker cautious. This perception also owes to the past, when China was believed
to have reneged on the ‗Panchsheel‘ of peaceful co-existence, to attack India on the land. Future
Chinese designs on India would also involve the sea-front, making the southern seafront
neighbourhood an important factor in New Delhi‘s geo-strategic calculus. The increasing global
perceptions that link global ‗energy security‘ to the Indian Ocean, at least over the short and the
medium terms, make India as much responsible as it would look vulnerable.
India has both Sri Lanka and Maldives as immediate neighbours in the Indian Ocean. Australia and
New Zealand form another layer. The Indian perceptions of Sri Lanka and Maldives based on the
common South Asian identity and their shared membership of the South Asian Association for
Regional Cooperation (SAARC) are more recent, and socio-political and economic in nature. The
geo-strategic relevance of these two countries for India has been a permanent factor in India‘s
calculations for centuries and generations, It has increasingly manifested itself in decade after
decade since the commencement of the 20th century, after rapid modernisation of warfare made it
possible for extra-regional nations to knock at the Indian doors from the south, as well.
Earlier forays, almost from the beginning of Indian history, were confined to trade and commerce,
and consequent migration from and to India. Thus Arab traders who settled along the southern
Tamil Nadu coast brought with them Islam, long before the long arm of the sword forced it onto
northern India, from across the land border. Christianity had come to India even earlier, within
decades of the Crucifixion. Vasco da Gama‘s famed sea trip around the Cape of Good Hope
brought introduced possibilities of trade first and political submission, later.
All these are now in the past. To the conquerers it should be said that the Britishers were the ones
who gave India common, unified political identity, even if it meant that the sub-continent had to
undergo the trauma and division that accompanied Partition. Today, not only India and Pakistan,
but also Bangladesh and Sri Lanka are also realities that these nations and the rest of the world had
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learnt to live with. Sri Lanka may be the odd man out in this list, yet the fact was that the British
rulers had either seen the then Ceylon either as an extension of India, or of the UK, or both.
What they needed experimenting in India, as the Government of India Act of 1935, they first tested
it in Sri Lanka (in the form of the Donhomore Constitution of 1931, making the island-nation, the
first in Asia to have universal adult suffrage). The fact remains that the common British rulers
decided to leave Sri Lanka to the care of the Sri Lankans, and left within months once they were
convinced that they could not hold on to the Indian ‗jewel in the crown‘. For with the crown, the
‗pearl‘ also had to go, though their ways.
First line of defence
Between them, Sri Lanka and Maldives have now come to constitute the first line of defence for
the larger Indian neighbour. This is more in terms of geo-political terms than real-time geostrategic terms. Translated, this means that one does not always expect anti-Indian forces to park
themselves militarily in either or both these countries, or their immediate neighbourhood seas. The
very possibility of such a thing happening in the undefined future has upped the antenna in
sections of the strategic community in India -- and more so elsewhere, where such studies revolve
around India and the Indian Ocean.
Translated, this has meant such thinkers attributing motives to either or both these countries using
the ‗China card‘, for instance, viz India, in political, economic and strategic terms. In the past, such
perceptions and practices too might have remained. In the ‗Cold War‘ era, India and Sri Lanka,
among others, were seen as unacknowledged allies of the erstwhile Soviet Union as they had
‗socialist regimes‘ at the time. Not anymore. Post-Cold War regional politics in South Asia has
evolved in ways that were not exactly predictable until they began unfolding in a big way two-plus
decades back.
While embracing capitalist development model in the early Nineties, and staying the course
despite the change of political power at the Centre, over the past two decades and more, India has
nonetheless tried to balance its geo-strategic interests and concerns. New Delhi seems aware of the
limitations involved in putting all its strategic eggs in the American basket, with the hope of the
US coming to its military aid, out in the open, in case of open adversity with China. If the
adversary were Pakistan, as it stood even at the beginning of 2011, it would be doubtful if New
Delhi could count on the US not arming Islamabad.
India‘s strategy in the ‗Bangladesh War‘, coupled with the inability of the US inability of the US
to move in the famed Seventh Fleet before Pakistan armed commander for the East, the late LtGen A A K Niazi, signed the surrender agreement, may have influenced Washington to try and
influence the ruling United National Party (UNP) with its pro-West, market capitalist economic
orientation, to set up a military facility of some sort in the eastern Trincomallee Harbour in the
mid-Seventies. Accompanying that was also the reported US attempt to set up a ‗Voice of
America‘ transmission station, at times interpreted in India as an ‗intelligence interception‘ node.
The rest, as they say, is history. If nothing else, India has moved to the middle-path, where the US
is seen more as a friend with whom New Delhi signed a ‗strategic agreement‘ in 2005, and
followed it up with a series of measures aimed at strengthening the belief, nearer home and
elsewhere. Today, the US naval presence in the immediate Indian Ocean neighbourhood, off
Pakistan and Afghanistan, is a reality. American troops are on the soil of both nations even as
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Chinese troops are also there, though in much smaller numbers, in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir
(PoK), whatever the reason and justification.
Regional power and global power
In the post-Cold War era, efforts have been made to paint India as an emerging global power, as
much in strategic terms as in economic terms. They do not go in tandem. The Chinese precedent in
the immediate and adversarial neighbourhood is often cited to argue how Beijing first became an
economic super-power, and how that status has facilitated, empowered and even necessitated
China to become a strategic super-power, as well. There is some truth in the argument in the
context of China. In terms of competing interests for depleting stocks of energy sources/resources
and other minerals for keeping the country the economic super-power that it already is, the world
believes that Beijing has to acquire the status of a strategic super-power, and retain it as well.
Going beyond the existing ‗border row‘ with India, the ‗String of Pearls‘ theory flows from such
perceptions of China having to contain India in terms of competing for global economic and
industrial resources as both race against each other, and a few other existing players, for a topnotch at the global level, and again retaining that/those position(s) as well. Yet, the fact remains
that India will take time to catch up with China, particularly in economic terms. The one
possibility where India could arrive there earlier than expected could be internal compulsions in
China that could force Beijing to spread out the economic benefits from the reforms regimen to
cover much, if not all of the nation‘s population and population-centres.
This contrasts with the existing model, where a few industrialised population-centres cater to the
global market, keeping the costs low. In the case of India, the burgeoning domestic demand,
coupled with democracy, is both a blessing and a bane. Or, so it would seem. In case of global
economic recession, the ranks of urban/urbanised middle class in the country provide a ready
market for keeping the economy going, at least until the policy-maker could elsewhere for midterm and long-term cure. Yet, the ingrained democratic polity in India has also provided the sociopolitical necessity for the ruling class to diversify economic development in ways that China has
not thought of, or is unwilling to think about.
Under controlled environment, China thus has a greater advantage over India, yet in the emerging
Asian scenario of existing autocracies falling by the wayside one after the other, where and how
China will be in the years and decades to come remains unclear. No one predicts a collapse of
Chinese communist political model in the foreseeable future. But none similarly predicted the
collapse of the Soviet Union, either. Or, even that of Egyptian autocracy until after it had
happened, in much more recent times, in the 21st century.
Friends are neighbours, neighbours friends
Yet, for India to become a super-power, first it has to be acknowledged as a regional power. There
is no denying the fact that including Pakistan, or combining some of them, South Asian neighbours
of India do not have the size -- in terms of landmass, economies, military strength, population, and
the rest -- to compete with India, for the top-rung in the South Asian regional power structure. Yet
for India to grow beyond that, it has to be accepted by all and each one of them, as one -- for them
to work with and for India, in different ways. If nothing else, they need to ensure that India could
reach out to the extra-regional power-centres, for itself and also on their behalf as a fellow South
Asian nation, without having to worry about its neighbourhood backyard all the time.
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India may not have friends for neighbours, but it has to have neighbours as friends. Among them,
Sri Lanka has repeated in recent years how India is a ‗relation‘ while other nations (implying and
including China and Pakistan) are friends. Independent of scholarly perceptions in Colombo, the
policy-maker in Sri Lanka seems to favour a pro-active strategic relationship with India,
independent of business and commercial relations with other nations, starting with China with its
bagful of money. This is same as the Indian strategic community‘s cautious approach that sees a
Chinese strategic presence in Sri Lanka with every investment and infrastructure presence.
Independent of democratisation process and change of government, Maldives has continued to
look at India as a friendly neighbour capable of taking care of its immediate security needs, if and
when called upon to do so. India had rushed military help to crush a mercenary-run coup attempt
in 1988. The increasing arrival of Somali pirates in the immediate neighbourhood in recent years,
coupled with the global talk of Indian Ocean becoming the most important of energy supply routes
and the venue of competitive geo-strategic play by extra-territorial powers has meant that Maldives
has to be cautious in future, given in particular its limited resources to face off adversity of all
kinds.
Be it Sri Lanka or Maldives, the temptation would be for either or both of them to use the ‗China
card‘ against India at one level, and against the US and the rest of the West, otherwise -- for
economic benefits and political advantages on the global scene. At the same time, it is anybody‘s
guess if the policy-planner in these countries would want to make their territory or strategic locale
or limited political leverage in the regional and international levels, to be the battle field for other,
bigger nations to fight their cold, warm or hot wars. Yet, there is no denying the inherent
suspicions in these countries, as in other smaller neighbourhood nations of India, about New
Delhi‘s ‗strategic plans‘ for them.
Indian concerns and consequences
For India to become a super-power, if at all, it needs to have the immediate neighbourhood nations
on its side, if extra-territorial powers in particular are not to needle it from behind by aligning or
even being seen with third nations, even if only to irritate New Delhi and make it feel
uncomfortable and unsure in its own neighbourhood. In this India can follow three existing
models, or evolve one of its own. The ‗US model‘ from the ‗Cold War‘ era involved Washington
befriending its neighbours in ways that they would not be able break away the shackles. It has been
in place to date. Against this, the ‗Soviet model‘ involved the jack-booting of neighbours. As was
only to be expected, it gave way at the first signs of the collapse of the Soviet Union, and fasttracked the collapse, as well.
The post-Cold War era has witnessed both US and China taking the war, real or imaginary,
purportedly to the enemy‘s camp, and away from their own borders. The US-led war in
Afghanistan and Iraq, and the ‗String of Pearls‘ theory involving China stand out in this regard -one for the present and the other concerns the future. Yet, the need of the US and China for
keeping their neighbourhood safe and secure for their own comfort cannot be under-estimated. The
‗Bay of Pigs‘ episode in the ‗Cold War‘ era, and the Chinese reservations to India entering the
South China Sea in some form by working with Vietnam in what essentially is a commercial deal
are examples.
In India‘s case, New Delhi did not protest when China obtained the construction and funding
contract for the Hambantota port or the Matara airport, both in Sri Lanka. The argument extends to
cover other neighbouring nations around India, including Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal and
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Myanmar. The strategic community in India does not accept the arguments from these countries
that they were commercial transactions, where China alone has the kind of funds needed for fasttracking their development and growth. The policy-planner in New Delhi, in turn, may be
concerned about the ability of these nations to stand up to Chinese pressures in the future, they
having accepted massive credits and other aid from Beijing and will no way be in a position to
redeem the same.
SAARC as a collective vehicle
For a long time to come, for India‘s neighbours to be able to fend off external pressures,
particularly exerted through economic aid and funding, they need substantial finances from
elsewhere. In their perception, independent of the traditional Pakistani view and that in a section of
Bangladesh, India may not reach that economic height over the short and the medium terms, for
them to ignore external offer of help and aid, lest they should be falling back on their own growth
projections. At least that is the reason that many of these nations often cite. Add to that the fact that
China alone is cash-rich among donor/creditor nations in the world, and the picture is complete.
In this context, the recent Indian decision to set up a massive ` 50,000-crore fund to help smaller
nations would go some distance, particularly if used imaginatively. The fund would be run by the
Ministry of External Affairs, which means that the nation‘s larger concerns in terms of diplomatic
strategy and security concerns would weigh with the decision-maker in allocating funds and
executing promised projects. The current scheme of Indian aid for neighbouring nations and others
for whom it is promised often suffers from a multi-lateral approach to decision-making, with the
result there is little or no respect for Indian promises and agreements with India in those capitals.
The proverbial Indian delays in decision-making and execution of projects are often misused by
host Governments and their decision-makers to sweep their own shortcomings under the Indian
carpet.
It is in this context, the re-emergence and revitalisation of the South Asian Association of Regional
Cooperation (SAARC) needs to be viewed. Moving slowly but surely away from an unsure
political existence revolving around the traditional India-Pakistan mutual suspicions, SAARC has
begun focussing increasingly on collective action on the social and economic front. This flows
from the twin realisations. In India there is an acceptance about the need for looking at the larger
sub-continent in terms of economic policies, to benefit all and thus benefit the country, ultimately.
The eruption of jihadi terrorism in Pakistan over the past years has shown Islamabad that it cannot
continue to work in isolation, to encircle India through its one-time successful ‗zero-option war‘,
but should work with India and the rest of them all to eradicate terrorism from South Asia as a
whole.
Translated, the increasing interest that member-nations have started showing in the SAARC
apparatus, viewing it as an integrating mechanism as a whole, would go a long way in ensuring
that meaningful bilateral and multilateral ties could lead to, or flow from the SAARC scheme,
could become a time-tested procedure for the entire SAARC to follow with India at its core and
centre. That way, there is a grudging appreciation of India, and for India‘s methods of growth,
equity and development, across the SAARC member-nations, and also a greater willingness to
look up at India as a facilitator of their respective growth and security.
In this context, the various duties and tax reform agreements under the SAARC domain will be of
help in harmonising the best practices available in one nation or the other, and also spread the
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benefits to all. The SAARC agreements on road, rail and maritime cooperation involve a stage-bystage approach, with the immediate focus on the least controversial and most important of the
components under each head. As such, the SAARC rail-road project covers the land-locked
countries with India as the peg. Others, including an India-Sri Lanka land-bridge connecting the
island-nation to the Eurasian landmass and not just to India or other SAARC nations, could be
considered at a later stage.
The immediate purpose of the maritime agreement focusses on India, Maldives and Sri Lanka,
where exploitation of maritime surface wealth like fish could be the starting point, and leading up
to the joint exploration of offshore mineral wealth. In the interim, the three nations could work
towards securing their shared seas from extra-territorial poachers and pirates of the Somali variety.
All three have the seas, India has the hardware and depth, Sri Lanka has had the immediate
experience of dealing with the ‗Sea Tigers‘ squarely, through innovative and cost-effective
mechanism, with shared inputs from the other two nations and extra-territorial powers, as well.
All that could only be a beginning, but sky alone can be the end, if the SAARC accepts the current
realities and also the pace of progress made -- and walk on the same path with the full realisation
about the India-Pakistan irritants and the reality of India being the centre of South Asian politics
and economy. In this, Islamabad‘s acceptance will go a long way in tempering the South Asian
situation, in more ways than one, but that does not mean that India and its southern neighbours
cannot set off on the course, which has since commenced, for Pakistan and others in the region to
join at the appropriate time at the appropriate levels.
(Chennai, 29 December 2011)
************
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India–Afghanistan–Relations:
Towards a More Robust Engagement?
Dr.Siegfried O. Wolf1
South Asia Institute (SAI),
Heidelberg University
Dr. Siegfried O. Wolf is lecturer and research fellow at the
South Asia Institute (SAI), Heidelberg University. His
research interests focus on democratization, civil–military
relations, international relations, political parties, social
movements, identity constructions and conflicts in South
and Southeast Asia. He is co-author of A Political and Economic Dictionary of South Asia
(London: Routledge, 2006), co-editor of State and Foreign Policy in South Asia (New Delhi;
Samskriti, 2010), and Deputy Editor of the Heidelberg Papers in South Asian and Comparative
Politics (HPSACP).
____________________________
1
I want to thank Prof. Subrata K. Mitra, Dr. Jivanta Schöttli, Paul W. Chambers, and Djan Sauerborn for their support
and valuable comments.
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India–Afghanistan–Relations: Towards a More Robust Engagement?
―We should not make the mistakes of the past and let Afghanistan slip back‖.
S.M. Krishna, External Affairs Minister of India,
At the Internal Afghanistan Conference in Bonn, December, 5, 2011
1. Background – Afghanistan in Transition
One decade after the claimed ‗fall of the Taliban‘, the prospects for Afghanistan‘s future look
rather pessimistic. Today the goals for Afghanistan as manifested at the first Bonn conference in
2001 (Bonn I)2 ―to help the Afghan people to end the tragic conflicts in their country and promote
national reconciliation, lasting peace, stability and respect for human rights‖ seem distant. Even
the prerequisite, the ousting of Opposing Militant Forces (OMF), namely Taliban, Al-Qaeda
operatives, 'Hezb-i-Islami Afghanistan (HIA) and other anti-government forces, could be not
achieved (cf. Hanif, 2009, 6). In fact the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) is facing
stiff resistance from the OMF. Furthermore, political and administrative institutions set up with
tremendous financial and technical support from the international community remains ineffective
and ―have not succeeded in broadening the scope of democratization‖ (Bertelsmann Stiftung,
2009, 2). There are numerous reports on electoral fraud and, human rights violations. (e.g.
Freedom House, 2011). Therefore, there is a general consensus that the country is still far away
from having a democratic political system implemented that is generally accepted by the Afghan
people. Consequently, despite the increasing flow of international aid and assistance, Afghanistan
continues to grapple with poverty, underdevelopment and instability (D‘Souza, 2007, 833). The
ISAF mission lost a window of opportunity due to a wrong strategy in the early years of their
deployment. This strategy was characterized by incoherence, lack of a long-term perspective and a
2
Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment of Permanent Government
Institutions, December 5, 2001 as well as UN Resolution 1383 (2001); see UN Press Release, Security Council 4434th
Meeting (PM) SC/7234, 06/12/2001
[http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2001/sc7234.doc.htm].
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too narrow focus on military aspects, thus neglecting civilian capacities. Furthermore, the success
of rebuilding Afghanistan was hampered by lack of aid prioritization, corruption, and a low degree
of local ownership. The latter is gaining momentum, since this is linked to an inadequate
involvement of the Afghan Government (Phillips, 2011; D‘Souza, 2007, 833) as well as
insufficient coordination among the (to many) foreign actors and between them and the Afghanis
in development, (re-) construction and reconciliation.
In addition, the foreign actors (governmental and non-governmental organizations)
developed their own structures for decision-making and -implementation in parallel to government
ones. In consequence, the government of Karzai was increasingly undermined, producing poor
governance and weak political institutions. For example, the Afghan ministries and governmental
bodies were not fully integrated in the US/ISAF development efforts. Resources and authority
were handed over to the Afghans too late and in an insufficient manner. This has led to a situation
where Karzai is seen as a ‗foreign puppet‘ (especially by the OMF) , leading to a tremendous loss
of legitimacy and an alarming decline of law and order, a major concern for foreign and especially
‗western‘ actors. These developments have serious consequences in the mindset of many Afghans
who realize that the state of justice under certain former regimes 3 was - besides all grievances (e.g.
human rights violations, enforcement of inequalities and injustice, rule by coercive force) - better
then today. This viewpoint is gaining ground as people do not see a significant improvement in
their own socio-economic situation. Subsequently, original enthusiasm for regime change among
the majority of Afghan people as well as ―the commitment to democratic institutions is eroded‖4
(Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2009, 9).
3
E.g. the Taliban were generally perceived as being not as corrupt as the Karzai government (at least not to such an
extent) or that the Soviet occupiers provided at least a minimum kind of order.
4
The BTI states, based on several surveys, that the the opinon about democracy being the best form of government has
dropped from 44% in 2006 to 30% in 2008 and the disproval of democracy has grown from 11% in 2006 to 16% in
2008 (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2009, 10).
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Furthermore, the security situation is constantly in decline. Pessimistic attitudes regarding
the military success of the ISAF mission among the participating states are gaining the upper hand.
The support of their governments and people is declining. Additionally, not only Karzai‘s
government but also the ISAF mission is losing trust, legitimacy and the confidence of the people
– in and outside Afghanistan. In consequence, the Taliban are able to increase their support among
certain sections of the Afghan people and are gradually ―perceived to be struggling to liberate their
country from foreign ‗occupation‘‖ (Bertelsmann, 2009, 2). In such a situation, the OMF,
especially the Taliban, were able to create parallel government structures5. Therefore one can state
that the Karzai`s government has been undermined simultaneously from two sides: by
uncoordinated development, reconstruction and reconciliation efforts of the international
community as well as extremist elements such as the Taliban and Al-Qaida.
However, the international community realised that they are not able to crack down on the
insurgents especially due to the asymmetric character of the on-going war. Hence, a military
solution to the conflict in Afghanistan is not feasible and a process of an inclusive process of peace
and national reconciliation has been initiated. The main feature of this process, which was
showcased at the International Afghanistan Conference, December 5, 2011 in Germany (Bonn II),
is the integration of all factions, – even the insurgency groups as long as they are willing to respect
human rights (especially woman rights) as well as the achievements of the last decade.
With the new strategy of ISAF to hand over power and responsibilities to the Afghan people
as well as to its central Asian neighbors, concerns are rising that they might be not prepared. In this
context, one must state that only one third of the country is under (full) control of foreign troops6.
However, even in these areas, the insurgents are able to launch high profile attacks, the latest being
5
E.g. with their own defense and financial councils (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2009, 5). Most importantly due to crime,
corruption, lawlessness, the Taliban are able to control in certain provinces the drug trafficking and to raise their own
taxes.
6
Interview: Marcel Burkhardt (ZDF heute.de politik) with General Egon Ramms, former Commander of NATO Joint
Force Command, Brunssum, NL.
[http://www.heute.de/ZDFheute/inhalt/10/0,3672,8355978,00.html]
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the attack on the Intercontinental Hotel in Kabul and the assassination of Burhanuddin Rabbani,
the Chairman of the High Peace Council, both in summer 2011. Therefore, one must point out that
the country‘s security forces, neither the Afghan National Army (ANA) nor the Afghan Police
Force (APF), are currently able to attain a monopoly on the use of force in the country
(Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2009). They remain heavily dependent on the assistance of the ISAF to
ensure security, law and order and to maintain the integrity of the territory. Actually, one must
state that the influence of the Afghan government is mostly limited to Kabul and some provinces.
Nevertheless, the process of handing over responsibility and authority is already done in around 30
percent of the territory at the time of Bonn II with the aim to raise this level to 50% within the
following week7. As a result, international troops have to permanently help out in the respective
areas under control of the Afghan security forces.
To sum up with the words of S.M. Krishna, External Affairs Minister of India, ―Afghanistan
today faces at least four deficits: a security deficit, a governance deficit, a development deficit, and
an investment deficit. All four of these deficits Afghanistan‘s will require enormous assistance for
a long time if it is to address these four deficits adequately‖ (Krishna, 2011). Having this in mind,
an engagement of India with its expertise and credibility is much needed. However, any extension
or intensification of an engagement will increasingly become complex, especially regarding the
return of the Taliban and the rise of extremist, political groups which are becoming more
entrenched in the current political system and its institutions in Afghanistan.
2. India‘s Return to Afghanistan
2.1 India-Afghanistan Relations: A Brief Introduction
7
Source: Speeches and statements of German Foreign Minister Dr. Guido Westerwelle, at the Civil Society Forum
Afghanistan, December 2 & 3, 2001; and the International Afghanistan Conference in Bonn, December 5, 2011.
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Historically Indian and Afghan leaders enjoyed extremely close relations, before and after India‘s
independence. Due to the friendship with the Soviet Union, India was one of the first non-aligned
states to recognize the communist regime installed after the Soviet invasion in 1979. The Indians
also appeared very keen to support successive Afghan governments in order not to lose its
economic and political ties (Bajoria, 2009). However, with the Taliban‘s assumption of power in
the 1990s, which were not only closly linked to hostile Pakistan but turned the country into a hub
for anti-Indian militant activities, the relationship between both countries was seriously eroded.
Since the last decade, the Indian government has tried to re-establish this pre-Taliban relationship.
Therefore, it restored full diplomatic relations and established an unusually large consular service8
across Afghanistan followed by extensive development assistance. India was not necessarily
encouraged by the international community. Especially The US was afraid that any official
enthusiasm on the part of India regarding its activities in Afghanistan would provoke Pakistan, one
of the key-actors in Afghanistan. However, most important is that India‘s engagement was favored
and supported by many Afghan leaders who were educated in Indian universities and attached
great affection to their host country. Furthermore, India is still benefitting from its former support
for the victorious Northern Alliance9 which was able to include many of their leaders in the postTaliban government.
2.2 India‘s Involvement in Afghanistan
Since the overthrow of the Taliban in 2001 India is increasingly emerging as a major actor in the
on-going reconstruction process of Afghanistan in order to renew its ties with this country
(Waintraib, 2010). Pledging US $ 2 billion in development aid for Afghanistan until the period
2014 (Krishna, 2011) India is one of the most significant bilateral donor countries as well as the
largest regional one (Joshi, 2010; Lamont, 2010). Today the assistance covers a number of diverse
8
9
India opened consulates in Herat, Mazar-e-Sharif, Jalalabad, and Kandahar.
Actually, due to the successful US led Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF).
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areas, including infrastructure, agriculture10, transportation11, communications, trade, investment12,
mining, education (including student exchange & scholarship programs), science & technology,
energy, healthcare13, social welfare14, sports, quality assurance and standardization, training of
officials15, economic development, institution-building, and parliament to parliament exchanges
(Krishna, 2011; D‘Souza, 2007, 833; Waintraub, 2010; Gupta, 2011). All these long and shortterm projects will help strengthen mutually beneficial economic ties between both countries but
will also greatly reinforce India‘s soft power (Joshi, 2010). However, it is important to note, that
unlike most other international donors, India is focusing since from the beginning on sectors that
―have been identified by the Afghan Government as priority areas of development‖ (D‘Souza,
2007, 833). Additionally, its long as well as short-term projects (e.g. road construction and power
generation) are channeled through the Afghan government with local, provincial ownership aiming
to enhance Afghan participation at all administrative tiers (D‘Souza, 2007, 833, 5). Additionally,
India is trying in most of its projects to keep a low visibility. This is a process which has still to be
learned by the general international community and which was persistently pointed out by many
representatives of the civil society at the Civil Society Forum Afghanistan in Bonn as well as
during the International Afghanistan Conference, both at Bonn in December 2011.
With the recently signed Strategic Partnership Agreement on October 4, 2011, India
extended its commitment to an all-round assistance. This includes not only trade and economic
cooperation, capacity development and education, social cultural & civil society aspects and
10
To be able to tap the potential in Agriculture India is helping to build an Agricultural University (Krishna, 2011).
Especially public transport facilities several Airbuses, hundreds of city buses (buses, mini, buses, utility equipment
etc.) for public transport facilities (D‘Souza, 2007, 834, 838).
12
At Bonn II in 2011, S.M. Krishna (Minister External Affairs, India) announced that Indian companies are willing to
invest up to US $ 10 billion in mining, setting up a steel plant, and related infrastructure in Afghanistan‖ in order to
implement the Istanbul process on regional security and cooperation for a secure and stable Afghanistan (November 2,
2011). See also: http://www.mfa.gov.tr/istanbul-process-on-regional-security-and-cooperation-for-a-secure-and-stableafghanistan.en.mfa; and Krishna (2011).
13
E.g. the reopening of the Indira Gandhi Children‘s Hospital in Kabul, and sending medical missions (Kabul, Mazare-Sharif, Jalalabad,and Kandahar) to assist in humanitarian work (D‘Souza, 2007, 834-835).
14
Especially for youth and children like school feeding program delivery.
15
Including officials from various departments of Afghanistan‘s government: public officials, and cartographers,
diplomats and policemen. Additionally, India is providing training for lawyers, judges, doctors, paramedics, Woman
entrepreneurs, teachers as well as women‘s employability programs (Pant, 2010, 9; Waintraub, 2010).
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people to people relations but also a remarkable security dimension especially cooperation in
defense, fighting terrorism including the training of Afghan Security forces (Army, Police and
Intelligence) (BBC, 4.11.2011; Gupta, 2011; D‘Souza, 2007, 835).16 This is a crucial development
given that previously India‘s major disadvantage was that it was not really ―involved in
Afghanistan‘s security in a meaningful way‖ (Sikri, 2009, 52) despite the fact that India‘s security
is deeply affected by political developments in Afghanistan.
However, one has also to recognize that India‘s willingness to offer military and economic
support has certain constraints due to American-Pakistani resentments. Instead of engaging India,
the US administration has remained stuck in old policy patterns and continues to ―send the wrong
signal‖17. As a result, the US policy for the Afghanistan-India-Pakistan triangle still lacks a
concrete idea on how to deal with the large extent of India‘s political and economic engagement in
Afghanistan and how to balance the India-Pakistan interests (cf. Pleming, 2010).
As a result, one can identify two major consequences for India-Afghanistan relations: First,
India‘s support regarding military ‗hardware‘ is limited ―to supplying Afghanistan with defensive
military equipment, such as armoured checkposts and watch towers‖ (Pant, 2010a, 8). In addition
to this Afghanistan is plagued with certain trade and transit limitations for goods. (D‘Souza, 2007,
836, 839). On various occasions the government of Pakistan has refused to grant transit
permissions from India to Afghanistan and vice versa. In this context one has to mention that in
order to put pressure on Afghanistan, Pakistan also closed the access to its Karachi seaport for
land-locked Afghan trade (cf. Rubin/Rashid, 2008). In consequence, India has supported
infrastructure projects to make Afghanistan‘s trade more independent from Pakistan, especially via
16
To include security as an issue in bilateral relations is a process which started already in April 2008, as India agreed
to share its experience in counter-insurgency with Afghanistan, offered training for pilots, and help to maintain
Afghanistan‘s fleet of helicopters (Sikri, 2009, 53).
17
Lisa Curtis, South Asian expert, quoted in Pleming (2010).
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the construction of a ring road18 (‗south trade corridor‘) connecting Afghanistan to closer Iranian
ports (e.g. Chabahar) in order to facilitate its trade with India and the Gulf states (Waintraub, 2010;
D‘Souza, 2007, 839). Nevertheless, despite the hindered exchange of goods, India opened its
steady growing market for Afghanistan‘s products and ―announced the virtual elimination of
sensitive lists affecting exports of at least developed SAARC countries to India‖, including
Afghanistan (Krishna, 2011. Even though one can name some positive aspects such as an open
market and the existence of a law tax regime, the influx of foreign goods into Afghanistan as well
as ―price dumping‖ from neighboring countries are disrupting local industrial progress (especially
small caps). However, this partnership agreement, which aims to position India and Afghanistan
for the post-2014 ISAF withdrawal scenario when the Afghans will be solely responsible for their
own security, has implications not only for India-Afghan relations but also for ―India‘s wider
neighbourhood policy‖ (Gupta, 2011). It should showcase that a close cooperation with India will
be mutual beneficial and enhance cultural and socio-economic integration into the South Asian
contributing to greater regional stability (cf. D‘Souza, 2007; Waintraub, 2010; BBC, 4.11.2011). In
other words, collaboration with New Delhi will enable Kabul not only to integrate more effectively
with the Indian economy but also in other economies in South, Central and Southeast Asia too.
It is also important to note that this strategic arrangement is flanked by the setting up of
several other institutional mechanisms to enforce its implementation and enhance efficiency. Most
worth mentioning is the formation of a ―Partnership Council‖ at the Foreign Ministers‘ level‖. In
order to promote dialogue and mutual consultation in the identified areas of India‘s assistance, four
separate, respective joint working groups were created: (1) on political & security consultations,
(2) trade and economic cooperation, (3) capacity development and education, and (4) social
cultural & civil society interactions (Gupta, 2011). Two separate Memoranda of Understanding‘s
18
Namely the Zaranj-Delaram road. This project was carried out by the Border Roads Organisation (BRO). Another
important road project is linking the Kandahar with Spin Boldak, an important city close to the Pakistan border
(D‘Souza, 2007, 837; Gundu/Schaffer, 2008, 2)
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(MoUs) have been signed on mining and hydrocarbon exploration as well as agreements which are
focusing on Afghanistan‘s energy requirements. These achievements were only possible because
India and Afghanistan established high-level talks characterized by regular meetings of their
respective heads of governments each of which generated significant bilateral agreements.
To summarize, this Strategic Partnership Agreement, is actually the first of its kind for
Afghanistan and has raised serious concerns in Pakistan. The fact that this agreement includes a
strategic dimension including a regular strategic dialogue (Gupta, 2011) further enhances the
existing perception that India wants to extend its engagement in Afghanistan in order to encircle
and contain the influence of Pakistan. However, for India it is also the first strategic agreement
with a South Asian state. Regarding Gupta (2011) it appears that India is ―taking a cooperative
security approach to deal with security issues, combining hard and soft power options‖. In other
words it indicates not only that India is willing to overtake more responsibility, even after the
withdrawal of ISAF, but also it demonstrates the country‘s tremendous soft power capacities. In
this context, what is most interesting for Indian decision-makers and political strategists, is the
proposition that if India - despite the complex and difficult circumstances- is able to maintain such
a comprehensive partnership leading to successful results, ―it would serve as a model for India to
manage its relationships with other neighbouring countries.‖ (Gupta, 2011)
3. India-Pakistan-Afghanistan – Triangle Under Stress
‗Increasing Indian influence in Afghanistan is likely to exacerbate regional tensions and
encourage Pakistani countermeasures in Afghanistan or India‘
U.S. General Stanley McChrystal, Former Commander ISAF / US Forces
3.1 Political and Economic Tensions
For decades India and Pakistan have contended for favorable positions within Afghanistan with
remarkable ups and downs for both sides (Waintraub, 2010). While India enjoyed warm relations
and leverage before and during the Soviet invasion, Pakistan maintained close relations during the
eras of Mujahedeen and Taliban governments. The US-led ‗Operation Enduring Freedom‘ and the
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subsequent ISAF mission has again influenced the fortune of India and Pakistan in Afghanistan. In
light of India‘s rising significance and Pakistan‘s potential regaining of leverage in Afghanistan,
which was significantly reduced by the foreign military intervention, India-Pakistan antagonism is
one of the most critical determinants for a successful peace process in Afghanistan. This will only
gain more momentum than it already has. Pakistan‘s viewpoint and threat perception regarding
India‘s involvement in Afghanistan can be described in the words of the Pakistan based political
analyst Ahmed Rashid: ―India‘s reconstruction strategy was designed to win over every sector of
Afghan society, give India a high profile with Afghans, gain the maximum political advantage and
of course, undercut Pakistani influence‖ (Rashid, 2008). Bajoria (2009) argues in a similar way
and additionally emphasizes the positive Afghan reception of it: ―some also see India‘s
involvement in Afghanistan as an effort to displace or counterbalance Pakistan‘s influence in the
country, which some elements within Afghanistan welcome‖19. These assessments are rooted in
Pakistan‘s perception of ―Afghanistan as a part of a threatening Indian pincer movement‖
(Gundu/Schaffer, 2008, 1). Consequently Pakistan identifies its western neighbor as an essential
constituent of its national security. Having this in mind, any kind of involvement of its archenemy, India in Afghanistan is seen as the opening of a second front and an encirclement of
Pakistan. According to Waintraub (2010) ―Pakistan‘s behind-the-scenes support for the Taliban is
believed to be rooted, in large part, in its concern that India is attempting to encircle it by gaining
influence in Afghanistan‖. Islamabad feels not only threatened by India‘s large diplomatic
presence but is also questioning the motives of Indian assistance and aid, ‗as New Delhi does not
frequently provide economic assistance, much less a billion dollars‘ worth‘ (Levine, 2010, 3). In
this light, India‘s reconstruction and development efforts in the ‗Pashtun belt‘, which close to the
border, are seen as promoting separatists within Pakistan, e.g. Balochistan20 (Waintraub, 2010).
19
See also Waintraub (2010).
Pakistan believes that India uses its consular services as intelligence bases which provide cover for the Indian
intelligence agency (Research and Analysis Wing/RAW) to run operations against Pakistan, e.g. circulating false
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The establishment of an air force base at Farkhor in Tajikistan21, following up a former medical
center and logistic facilities set up by Indians to support the Northern Alliance, in Pakistan‘s view
confirms this threat. Therefore, it is vital and indispensable for Pakistan security concept of
‗strategic depth‘ to ensure that in Kabul a Pakistan-friendly government is in power. At the same
time, India is convinced that as long as its relations with Pakistan remain hostile, it will not accept
―Afghanistan under Pakistan‘s exclusive sphere of influence‖ (Sikri, 2009, 52). Therefore, it is not
a surprise that the mutual accusation between India-Pakistan has an enduring, paranoid character.
These mutual suspicions make it complicated to find a sole regional solution without any
intervention of non-regional key players.
3.2 The US Factor
After the withdrawal of US/ISAF troops, the US as a facilitator in balancing India‘s and Pakistan‘s
interests and security needs will lose remarkable its significance because of following reasons:
First, the US will have fewer options to restrict India‘s role in Afghanistan in order to
appease its ally Pakistan.
Second, the current Obama administration realizes that its influence on Pakistan‘s political
decision-makers is not only limited but is also in the process of waning. The killing of Osama Bin
Laden by an unauthorized US-Special Operation on Pakistani soil and recent NATO airstrike
against a Pakistan border post killing around two dozen regular Pakistani soldiers has, without
doubt, seriously damaged US-Pakistan relations22. Taking into account the tremendous historical
volatility in the relations between US and Pakistan, this does not necessarily determine a critical
currency, and running training camps for Afghans to carry out destructive activities and to initiate and support
separatist rebellions in Balochistan. In this context, Pakistanis also accuse the Kabul government that it uses the
Ministry of Tribal Affairs and the Afghan intelligence service to cooperate with India to finance and arm the separatist
Baloch Liberation Army (Bajoria, 2009; Singh, 2009, 3; Gundu/Schaffer, 2008, 1).
21
This is the first Indian military airbase outside South Asia, and is convenient for transportation of troops and
material to and from Afghanistan. The military facilities will be most important beyond 2014 because it seems that
also the US will maintain military facilities in the region. Farkhor will help not only to protect India‘s security and
energy interests but also ensure that it does not get sidelined again. (Bajoria, 2009)
22
There were also other issues, preparing the ground for the recent troubles with the US-Pakistan relations, e.g. the
Raymond Davis incident, when a CIA contractor killed a couple of Pakistani intelligence operatives in February 2011.
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juncture leading to a change in the basic patterns of their interactions, at least not at the informal
level. The Pakistanis are fully aware of the fact that they are being used by the US as an instrument
to achieve other, bigger goals. Pakistanis ―have gone along with it in part to use the United States
to do something else—which was always to fight India, or contest India, or compete with India―
(Perkowich, 2011). But what is more important is that the latest incidents and worsening of the
US-Pakistan relations might have an impact on the military internal power structures leading to
four major consequences: (1) it is questioning the competence of the Pakistan security forces of
being the guarantor of the countries integrity and sovereignty, not only outside but also inside the
country. This is gaining momentum since the armed forces just restored its image after it suffered
heavily during the last military government; (2) eroding the military-to-military contacts, the
backbone of US-Pakistan relations; (3) disturbing the internal cohesion of the Pakistan Army, the
main guarantor of its institutional resilience; (4) it is also compromising the civilian government
and waning the much limited success regarding civilian oversight of the armed forces. This will
turn civilians again towards the traditional skeptical mindset regarding the US and its role in
Pakistani politics. George Perkovich states that Washington‘s policy towards Pakistan ‗has had the
unintended but undeniable effect of empowering Pakistan‘s military and intelligence services at
the expense of the country‘s political future‘. One could also argue that it might help to create the
moment for a military coup. However, it is important to note that the next military direct
intervention, is unlikely to be initiated by Chief-of-Army-Staff (COAS) General Kayani23, who is
not in favor of taking over. Instead, middle ranking officers with backing from elements of the
corps commanders‘ conference, the most influential institution in the country are more likely to be
the force behind a potential military coup. Washington therefore, has not only to accept that
Islamabad needs political space but that the room to maneuver for Washington with the top
23
Each (successful) coup in Pakistan was initiated by the Chief of Army Staff/COAS (before Commander in Chief/Ci-C) with full support of the Pakistan Army represented by its Corps Commanders (meeting or conference). This was
made possible because of the extraordinary cohesion, discipline, loyalty, and internalization of the chain of command
within the Pakistan armed forces.
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echelon of the security forces of Pakistan is getting much tighter. The fact that, according to some
US analysts, the Government of Pakistan remains unwilling to end its covert support for the
Taliban to influence developments in Afghanistan, can be seen as such an indicator.
A third reason why the US is losing its significance in balancing the India-AfghanistanPakistan triangle is the improvement of Pakistan-Iran relations. Particularly after the withdrawal of
the international combat troops, growing Pakistan-Iran ties have the potential to reduce the role of
US in the region. Since certain elements in Iran are most likely not in favor of a flourishing,
consolidated Afghan democracy, spreading liberal-democratic norms and values into its
neighborhood, any activities to consolidate democracy in Afghanistan might be a thorn in the eye
of Iran`s foreign power projection. This could pose a threat to each Indian involvement in
Afghanistan. A closer cooperation between Pakistan and Iran, including mutual assistance,
especially financial, would make Pakistan less dependent on US aid.
However, irrespective of this most discussed accusation that Pakistan is involved in state
terrorism in order to destabilize Afghanistan, India, and Kashmir, or try to figure out an anti-Indian
as well as anti-US/NATO block, it is important to note that at the moment, Islamabad needs time
for itself in order to re-asses the foundations, needs, and interests of its foreign policy along with
its domestic implications. Pressing Pakistan to be more active in the war against the Taliban and
other OMF, which is still not seen as a Pakistani but as an American war, will further destabilize
the political situation in Islamabad.
To recap, there is neither a significant player to put pressure on Pakistan or India to support a
credible and sustainable the peace process in Afghanistan, nor a respected third force with
capacities to de-escalate. Due to the eroding reputation of the US in Pakistan, Washington should
distance itself from Pakistan and especially reduce the military-to-military contacts. If there is any
US involvement in Pakistan then it should only be in cooperation with the civilian government in
order to promote political and economic reforms – but on demand. Due to the close contacts and
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mutual affinity between Turkey and Pakistan, Turkey could play a significant role as a valuable
intermediary between the US and Pakistan, especially in the context of Afghanistan.
Besides the political rivalry in Afghanistan there is also an economic one between India and
Pakistan. On the one side, Pakistan is benefitting from the growing poppy cultivation and rampant
inflation in Afghanistan. This is not only funding the Taliban insurgency - still seen as a useful
strategic tool to undermine Indian activities in Afghanistan as well as challenging human security
within India itself- but also helping to eliminate or reduce Pakistan‘s own narcotic production. One
the other side, it is much more lucrative to sell Pakistan food and essential commercial goods in
Afghanistan. As a result, there is an increasing shortage in Pakistan of these commodities favoring
the growth of a tremendous parallel economy in Baluchistan and the Tribal areas organized by
(Afghan) Pashtun‘s as well as increased cross- border smuggling (Gundu/Schaffer, 2008, 2).
Besides this, there is growing India-Iran cooperation in infrastructure projects, e.g. India is
building the port in Chabahar, which will create a setback of Pakistan‘s own port project in
Gwadar, supported by the Chinese. This economic rivalry, besides several socio-economic
tensions, will set limits to the future of Iran-Pakistan relations. Due to its close ties with China
(which is supposedly not delighted about US/NATO presence in its immediate area of influence
and interests) and subsequently Beijing‘s assistance for Islamabad, Pakistan is less reliable on
American military equipment and technology transfer.
3.3 From Conflict towards Cooperation?
Generally with the reduction of the US as the most significant and perhaps the only facilitator of an
India-Pakistan rapprochement the opportunities for an improvement in their relations are much
limited, particularly in light of the ongoing Taliban insurgency and the increasing attacks on Indian
personal and projects in Afghanistan. This will not only create bitterness in the India-Pakistan
relations but will also sour Pakistan‘s relations with Afghanistan. However, there is no way to
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produce stability in Afghanistan or to resolve its problems without Pakistan‘s cooperation (Sikri,
2009, 55). The fall of the Taliban and the coming to power of India-friendly elements within the
Northern Alliance, were perceived by many Pakistanis as a strategic disaster (Gundu/Schaffer,
2008, 1). Also India‘s much closer, warm relationship with President Karzai compared with
Pakistan‘s relations, is seen as unfortunate because it ―has left Pakistan with fewer friends and
more enemies in Afghanistan, particularly among the literate urban middle class and nonPashtuns‖ (Rais, 2008, 201). Therefore, a tactful diplomacy of New Delhi and Kabul towards
Islamabad is needed to find a fine balance within the triangular relation of India, Pakistan and
Afghanistan. At the core is the need to negotiate an agreement between India and Pakistan to
cooperate for the sake of Afghanistan as well as regional development. Therefore, it is not
necessary to settle an enduring peace between both but to achieve a kind of normalization in their
relations. This normalization will be based neither on harmony nor friendship, but on a realistic,
mutual understanding that political stability and economic growth serves both countries. A premise
for the success of such an agreement is the resumption of the composite dialogue and to de-link
Kashmir from Afghanistan. Insulating the Afghan national conflict from regional conflict
constellation will not be possible, but at least one has to try to separate it from the India-Pakistan
rivalry. Demanding a solution to the Kashmir conflict as a precondition for cooperation between
India and Pakistan in Afghanistan would turn the peace and reconciliation process into an
‗unrealisable utopia‘.
However, there are necessary premises for some kind of further cooperation to occure. This
depends on a necessary change in the mind-set of all actors as well as a subsequent clearing up of
misinterpretations that are disproportionate to actual threats.
Afghanistan should stop its policy of using India as a counterweight to Pakistan.
Furthermore, it should stick to its old policy of trying to maintain a neutral status including a
careful approach towards any kind of alignment. The suggested approach is best described in the
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words of Bajoria (2007): ―Afghanistan now must walk a fine line to avoid becoming a pawn in a
new proxy war between India and Pakistan. Given the geopolitical realities of the region, it can
neither spurn India‘s aid nor afford to antagonize Pakistan‖.
Pakistan should stop being paranoid about India‘s assistance to Afghanistan and overcome
its obsession with ‗strategic depth‘ (Sikri, 2009, 56). In this context, Pakistan should start to
interpret its role in Afghanistan not any more exclusively through the struggle against India. This
may seem most unlikely but some slight modifications have been evident, like the recent
statements of COAS General Kayani, ‗a peaceful and friendly Afghanistan can provide Pakistan a
‗strategic depth‘ and that Pakistanis ‗want a strategic depth in Afghanistan but do not want to
control it‘ (Hussain, 2010). However, ‗Afghans remain highly sensitive to such language‘
(Waintraub, 2010). Therefore, Pakistan should also be aware that a more ‗balanced rhetoric‘
including more ‗political sensitive vocabulary‘ in public statements would reduce the
misinterpretation of its intentions.
It also should change its view of Afghanistan as a ‗little brother‘ or a ‗Pakistani outpost‘.
Furthermore, Pakistan should distance itself from the idea that a stable and sovereign Afghanistan
will automatically align with India. The international relations and its domestic implications are
too far complex for Afghanistan to afford such a one-sided policy. There is no doubt, that the
signing of the Indo-Afghan Strategic partnership agreement make a future neutral Afghanistan
problematic, as well as eroding Pakistan‘s vision of forming an Islamic alliance consisting of
Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan and Turkey (Khan, 2011). In this context, Pakistani strategic thinkers
should also drop the notion of building an alternative scenario in which instead of Afghanistan,
China is included in an kind of ‗regional Islamic Alliance‘, not only to counter India but also US
influence within the region (Khan, 2011). First of all, this would isolate Pakistan as well as narrow
down future policy options; second it is most unlikely to work out in a sustainable – and for
Pakistan satisfying- manner. Neither in the Kashmir issue in general, nor in 1965 and 1970/1 Indo168
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Pakistan wars, has China let itself be drawn directly into conflict. Third, it would further worsen
relations in relation to Afghanistan and India. When it comes to shared security interests and
financial assistance, Iran might be an interesting partner for Pakistan - at least for the time being.
However, in the long run Pakistan-Iran cooperation will not give rise to normalized relations with
Afghanistan and India - neither in terms of security nor economic development. Furthermore, Iran
and India have their own special relationship beyond Pakistani (as well as US) sphere of influence.
To sum up, despite the fact that the Strategic partnership agreement provokes Pakistan, it also
states clearly that it is not directed against ―any other state or group of states‖. Furthermore, the
Indian government has merely agreed to assist in the ―training, equipping and capacity building
programs for Afghan national security forces‖ (Gupta, 2011). Therefore the signing does not mean
per se a more active and robust engagement of India in Afghanistan, and especially it does not
mean Indian boots on Afghan soil. Therefore, the Pakistani security establishment has to recognize
that this agreement does not constitute a serious threat –yet- to Pakistan‘s interests. In this context
it should re-asses its threat perception regarding the Indian diplomatic presence in Afghanistan and
realizes that certain consular interests are legitimate due to Hindu and Sikh populations,
commercial relations, and aid programs (Waintraub, 2010). However, it seems that there are some
improvements in so far that Pakistan, at least at the official diplomatic level, no longer suspects
India of using its consulates as bases for covert activities (Delhi Policy Group, 2010, 2). A next
step towards more cooperation must be the offering of transit access to and from Afghanistan.
Beside the threat that this constitutes partly a risk for Pakistan‘s industry since India and Pakistan
are competing for the same consumer goods market in Afghanistan (Bajoria, 2007; Ali, 2007),
Pakistan‘s economy would also benefit tremendously (cf. Sikri, 2009, 56). Regarding the Pakistan
Working Group (2008, 21) ―No single change would likely transform Afghanistan and Pakistan
and their relationship more than a dramatic opening of trade routes traversing the two nations‖.
Last but not least Pakistan‘s political elite, both of civilian and military origin, must realize that
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instrumentalizing the Taliban as a political tool in terms of its strategic depth concept to counter
India and gain political leverage in Afghanistan has ―serious negative security repercussions for
Pakistan itself.‖ (Pakistan Working Group, 2008, 21).
At the same time, India should not try to undercut Pakistan‘s, justified or unjustified,
position in Afghanistan as this lies within the sole responsibility and tasks of the Afghan
government and people to deal with. Furthermore, it needs to stop provoking and start assuring
Pakistan that it respects Pakistan‘s genuine security interests in Afghanistan. Reducing its
relatively huge consular network24, which is still (informally) under suspicion in carrying out
intelligence activities, might be an eminent step towards confidence-building and cooperation.
However, the condition therefore must be that Pakistan ―reciprocates by giving up its objection to
India playing a prominent role in Afghanistan‘s reconstruction‖ (Sikri, 2009, 56). In this context
one has to note, that even if the Karzai government is able to include the Taliban in the peace
process and they accepted an envisaged agreement, this would not automatically create a situation
in which Islamabad‘s civil and military elite are satisfied. A Pakistan feeling disadvantaged and
threatened will face no difficulty in finding political-military aspirants in and outside Afghanistan,
to influence politics and undermine each government in Kabul, hostile to Islamabad. In light of
this, the protagonists of a more robust strategy in order to oust pro-Pakistan Taliban or other OMFs
in Afghanistan have to understand that no military operation will be able to prevent or control
insurgencies or ensure stability. If not, Pakistan will continue to use the Taliban which still seems
to offer the best chance to neutralize India‘s influence in Afghanistan and subsequently also its
regional power expansion (Waintraub, 2010; Pakistan Policy Working Group, 2018). To counter
this, India has to find its own way how to deal with the reconciliation with the Taliban and other
extremist-groups.
24
E.g. Jalalabad or Kandahar (Sikri, 2009, 56).
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4. India‘s Interests in Afghanistan
4.1 Economic Interests
Historically the eastern and southern parts of Afghanistan ―which has dominated Afghan political
and economic life, has always been economically anchored to the Indian sub-continent‖ (Sikri,
2009, 55). Economic ties were disrupted by decades of war, foreign influence and anti-Indian
governments in Kabul as well as the total break-down of Afghan‘s economy after the Soviet
withdrawal. Since the recovery of Afghanistan‘s economy following the downfall of Taliban rule
in 2001, the country has been gradually gaining momentum as a place for manufacturing in areas
such as cement, gas, oil, electricity and other resources and also as a potential market for Indian
products (e.g. tea, sugar, pharmaceuticals). There is also an increasing demand for services like
banking, hotels and (basic) telecommunication networks which can be offered by India (cf. Pant,
2010, 10). Afghanistan can also earn large sums of money as a tourist destination (Sikri, 2009, 55).
Furthermore, due to its geostrategic position between South, South Asia and the Greater Middle
East, Afghanistan serves as a corridor and hub for trade and transit. The recently discovered vast
array of industrial metals in addition to the already identified rich repository of about 300 minerals
including copper, coal, zinc, gold and rare minerals, as Sharma (2011, 111) points out, ―could
dramatically transform not only the Afghan economy, but its geopolitical standing in the region if
exploited in the right way‖. This offers India a variety of opportunities to expand its economic
activities. Afghanistan therefore must not only be secured but also has to ‗emerge as a stable and
economically integrated state in the region‘ (Pant, 2010, 10). This must be seen as one of India‘s
most fundamental interests in Afghanistan.
However, taking today‘s ground realities into account; one must state that at the moment
―Afghanistan on its own does not have the resources that can enable it to be even semiindependent economically‖ (Sikri, 2009, 55). The worsening security situation and endemic
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corruption not only hamper further investments but also threaten recently gained economic
achievements. Additionally, Afghanistan‘s industry had to suffer seriously from the influx of
Chinese products through dumping prices, which have ousted Afghan small- and medium sized
companies who have not been able to compete.
With this in mind, Afghan President Karzai welcomed India‘s economic engagement in
Afghanistan. On various occasions, he has persistently invited Indian entrepreneurs not only to
invest but also to start doing business in Afghanistan, especially in the areas of mining, cement, oil
and gas, electricity and service industries such as hotels, banking and communications (D‘Souza,
2007, 837). For example, an Indian consortium has been awarded the bid for three blocks of the
Hajigak iron ore reserves by the Government of Afghanistan, which has attracted the highest
foreign direct investment in Afghanistan until now (Krishna, 2011). Basically India sees
Afghanistan as a potential, untapped consumer market as well as a way to access energy rich
Central Asian Republic, such as Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan (Basu, 2007). Besides energy
resources, Central Asia is also gaining momentum as a growing market. Nevertheless, it is
currently suffering from having to import expensive goods from the West. Like Afghanistan,
Central Asia is flooded with cheap, low-quality goods from China and other neighbors. Sharma
points out that, ―both the Afghan as well as the Central Asian markets offer immense potential for
Indian tea, pharmaceuticals, food processing, information technology (IT), banking, health,
tourism, consumer durables and automobiles industry‖ (Sharma, 2011, 111). Therefore, India must
secure the transit and trade routes through Afghanistan.
This explains the nature of India‘s heightened involvement in Afghanistan‘s (re-)
construction projects especially regarding infrastructural development and capacity-building. In
these areas India has undertaken massive investments with the clear intention of ‗fastening the
consolidation of an emerging local market‘ (Gosh, 2009). To push economic cooperation further
India signed the Preferential Trade Agreement with Afghanistan in 2003. In 2006 India hosted the
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second regional Economic Cooperation Conference on Afghanistan. This was followed by the
decision to admit Afghanistan as a full member of the South Asia Association for Regional
Cooperation (SAARC) at its 14th summit in New Delhi in April 2007 (Sharma, 2011, 112).
Subsequently India supported the incorporation of Afghanistan into the protocol of accession to the
South Asia Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA) for Afghanistan in 200825, which is easing tariff
barriers for sub-continental trade (Sharma, 2011, 112). Both decisions, to include Afghanistan into
SAARC as well as into SAFTA, were as much strategic as they were commercial. Strategic,
because this formally draws Afghanistan into the South Asian regional matrix, dominated by India
as the biggest economic player (Sharma, 2011, 112).
4.2 Ensuring National Security
4.2.1 Avoidance of an Extremist, Militant Taliban regime in Afghanistan
After the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan, India and its dispute with Pakistan over
Kashmir was increasingly the focus of Islamic extremists. In the light of outplaying a super power
for the sake of one‘s own religion, ideological motivated (former) Mujahedeen fighter were
looking for a new opportunity to be further engaged. Subsequently, India faced increased
infiltration by militants, a process which peaked during the Taliban regime (1996-2001) in Kabul,
calling for Jihad against Indian forces in Kashmir. Experiencing traumatic and stiff hostility, e.g.
the establishment of camps for training terrorists to send into India and neighboring countries, the
participation of Taliban fighters26 in the Pakistan-led Kargil operation of 1999, the highjacking of
Indian airline IC 815, it is not surprisingly that preventing the re-emergence of an anti-Indian
Taliban in Afghanistan is a major national security interest.
25
Which got finally ratified by Afghanistan in May 2011; see also SAFTA protocol [http://www.saarcsec.org/areaofcooperation/detail.php?activity_id=36]
26
200 soldiers of Taliban‘s elite brigade 055 took part in Pakistan‘s offensive in the Kargil region, taken the Indian by
surprise (cf. Sharma, 2011, 108)..
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4.2.2 Curtailing the Spread of Drugs-trafficking
One of the major priorities of India in Afghanistan is the containment of drug-trafficking, which is
for several reasons not only a threat to its national security but also human security. First of all,
India has in quantitative terms the largest cannabis and opiate-using population‘ in the sub-region
―inflicting tremendous damage in the country‘s social fabric (Sharma, 2011, 110). Second,
Afghanistan drugs are canalized through Pakistan to India‘s consumer, processes that are
organized and controlled to a large extent by the Taliban and their network. Having this in mind,
one can state that there is a causal link between the drug-trafficking and the strengthening of the
Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan. According to Sharma (2011, 131), the money generated from
drugs-trafficking is being used to fund a supply of sophisticated arms and to win over foot soldiers
for the insurgency by paying them a monthly salary, which is on average much higher than what
the members of Afghan National Army (ANP) and Afghan National Police (ANP) get paid.27
Consequently, it must be in India‘s interest to undermine the cultivation of crops used for the
production of drugs or at least to prevent their trafficking.
4.3 Achievement of Energy Security
India‘s increasing engagement in Afghanistan can also be seen as ‗advancing more specific
strategic goals‘ (Waintraub, 2010). As one of the largest and vital economies in the region, India
needs to ensure conditions for tapping into Central Asia‘s rich energy resources in order to achieve
energy security (Singh, 2009, 4). Diversifying its oil and gas supplies portfolio would help reduce
country‘s dependence on energy resources from the Middle East. Afghanistan is geographically
well placed to serve as a ‗viable access route for energy‘ coming from the Central Asian Republics
(Waintraub, 2010). Without energy security, further economic growth in India will be seriously at
27
According to Sharma (2011, 131) A Taliban fighter is earning between $250-$350, as compared with paltry sum of
$40 being paid to an Afghan National Army soldier. Only recently the salary was raised to a range of $180-240‖
(Sharma, 2011, 131). The situation among the police is even worse, they get only the half of an average Taliban
payment.
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risk. With its extensive and untapped reserves of oil and gas Afghanistan is not only gaining
momentum as a transit route for energy, but also emerging as a major supplier (Sharma, 2009,
111). However, in order to pursue energy security through Afghanistan, the first steps towards
more regional energy cooperation were initiated by India through the facilitation of a
memorandum of understanding with Turkmenistan to develop a natural gas pipeline (TAPI)28,
which envisages the inclusion not only of Afghanistan but also Pakistan (Gundu & Schaffer 2008;
Waintraub, 2010). India‘s role in Afghanistan includes in addition, the essential task of ensuring
the safety of this energy supply which will not only be beneficial for the region in economic terms
but also promote regional integration and cooperation at the political level.
4.4 Geostrategic Argument
Since ancient times Indian rulers or governments have tried to gain influence in Afghanistan.
Stretching from the Hindu-Kush to the Indian sub-continent, India considers Afghanistan to be part
of its extended as well as immediate strategic neighbourhood (Singh, 2009, 2; Sharma, 2011). Its
strategic importance for India is largely geographical. Afghanistan is not only the gateway to and
from South and Central Asia but also a part of what is called the ‗Greater Middle East‘ (Aron,
2003). Furthermore, it grants access to a large extent into West Asia, Russia, and even Europe.
Afghanistan is also identified as a significant geopolitical constraint on Pakistan and India has
wanted ‗to protect and expand its stakes in Afghanistan in order to prevent the consolidation of an
anti-India block extending westwards from Pakistan‘ (Gundu/Schaffer, 2008). In this light
Afghanistan is gaining importance as a platform for New Delhi to seek friendly allies in
Afghanistan‘s neighbourhood or at least to make sure that they stay neutral in its conflict with
Pakistan. One can state that Afghanistan plays not only a significant role in India‘s South Asian
28
TAPI – Turkmenistan (Dauletabad), Afghanistan, Pakistan, India.
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policy but also in its grander strategy to gain more influence in Central Asia29 and the ‗Greater
Middle East‘.
However, India suffered its greatest geostrategic setback in Afghanistan with the rise of the
Taliban in 1996. Not only were its economic ties with Afghanistan cut off, commercial and trade
routes were massively put under stress. Today the relations between India and Central Asia are
improving. India‘s future influence will once again be seriously challenged by the/a re-emergence
of the Taliban. The rising insecurity in Afghanistan will also further destabilize the fragile Central
Asian Republics. These spill-over effects, are enhanced by cooperations between radical elements
in Afghanistan and Central Asia like the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan/IMU (Sharma, 2011,
114-115).
5. India‘s Advantages in Afghanistan– What makes India ‗exceptional‘?
5.1. India‘s High Esteem in Afghanistan
One of the greatest advantages of India in Afghanistan is that it enjoys tremendous goodwill and a
highly positive image in the country (Pant, 2010, 2). Only during the Soviet occupation, the
standing of India in Afghanistan was at stake as New Delhi recognized and supported the Moscowbacked governments in Kabul.30 The fact that it is perceived by Afghans that India has taken a
leading role in the reconstruction process is confirmed by several international surveys. For
example, a Gallup survey, carried out in November 2009, revealed that a majority of Afghans (56
per cent) recognised India‘s role in reconstruction more than any other single group, including the
UN (51 per cent) and NATO (44 per cent) (Gallup, 2009; Joshi, 2010, 22). Even more believed (59
29
India‘s interests in Central Asia is indicated by several measures, e.g. the setup of a military base in Tajikistan
(Farkhor) and a $ 17 million grant for the country to modernize a hydropower plant. It also signed a Memorandum of
Understanding (MoU) with Turkmenistan for a natural gas pipeline (Ghosh, 2009; Bajoria, 2009).
30
The reason therefore was that India was dependent on the Soviet Union, the only significant ally which she had, to
ensure its interests in South Asia which got increasingly under the influence of the US and China, closely associated
with hostile Pakistan. However it made an unequivocal endorsement that it was not in favor of the Soviet military
intervention and long term presence (Sharma, 2011, 108).
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per cent) that India should take the lead role in reconstruction as its ideal role (Gallup, 2009).
There are no doubts that this has a causal impact on bilateral relations between the countries. In
this context another survey from the International Republican Institute (IRI) ranks India top in the
list of countries perceived to have good relations with Afghanistan31. The esteem of Afghan people
for India is a resource which most of the non-regional but also regional actors are lacking. For
example, only 22 per cent of Afghan people have a favorable opinion of Pakistan and only around
one third believes that it plays a role in the reconstruction of Afghanistan. However, many more
Afghans expressed a desire that Pakistan should play a role in reconstruction but should stop
supporting the Taliban (Gallup, 2009).
5.2 Sustainability of India‘s development projects
Afghanistan is characterized by a ‗volatile strategic environment‘. This can be seen in permanent
shifts in the Afghanistan strategy of the US and its allies to such a strong degree that is difficult to
speak of any coherent concept for the development and reconstruction for the country. India is
focusing on structural factors in its response to the changing strategic environment in Afghanistan
(cf. Pant, 2010, 2). In this context, it basically follows the concepts of non-regional actors in
Afghanistan. However, in order not to repeat their mistakes, India should continue to not only take
the Afghan government but also local agency seriously into account by creating more people‘s
participation in its development and reconstruction projects. Until now, the strategy of low
visibility projects corresponding to the needs and demands of the Afghan government and people,
implemented with the objective of maximizing local ownership has worked very well. According
to Waintraub (2010), such involvement has contributed greatly to a positive public perception of
India and its development efforts among people in Afghanistan.
31
Almost a quarter of Afghans named India, above the US (19 per cent), Iran (17 per cent), Tajikistan (12 per cent),
China (8 per cent), and Pakistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan (each 5 per cent). (Gallup, 2009, Joshi, 2010).
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5.3 India‘s credibility regarding a ‗long term engagement‘
Although the international community renewed its pledge (Bonn II) to stay committed to the
Afghan people, it is legitimate to question the ability of the international community to maintain
the high level of aid to Afghanistan. Especially in light of the financial (Euro) crisis in the EU, the
flagging US economy, already existing, multiple commitments and missions worldwide and the
increasing disapproval of their respective citizens regarding future engagements in Afghanistan
(portrayed by critics as waste of financial and human resources). Despite this, several western
actors have tried to downplay the contemporary and future role of India and are ignoring the
significance of its achievements even though the current government and people of Afghanistan
are in favor of an enduring Indian engagement. Due to its ‗silent‘, low-visible and unconditioned
assistance combined with growing economic strength and popularity of its ‗soft power‘, India has a
high degree of credibility as being a reliable and trustworthy player in Afghanistan. The fact that
the international community conditioned future support (mutual commitments: – ‗aid in return for
reforms‘) will further increase the relevance of India in the eyes of the Afghani government. The
experience of being left alone after fighting a liberation war as well as a proxy war for the
‗Western World‘ against communism will enhance the suspicion of Afghanis towards ‗pledges‘
from the international community. In contrast, there are processes of mutual reinforcement
between India‘s credibility as a reliable partner with the level of trust in New Delhi‘s long term
commitment to Afghanistan and its people. Credibility, fortified through close contact and
beneficial interaction, has created a remarkable high degree of trust between India and Afghanistan
in bilateral relations in general but also at the institutional (civilian and military) level in particular.
This is an asset which many states involved in Afghanistan are (increasingly) lacking.
5.4 Domestic support and consensus for India‘s basic engagement
Besides the ongoing debate about the way in which India should be engaged in Afghanistan, there
is a general consensus that engagement is necessary. The Indian media, unlike in NATO countries,
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supports India‘s growing role and presence in Afghanistan. Most interesting is, that even in
Pakistan the media has been highly critical of any investment in Afghanistan as a waste of
resources (cf. Gundu/Schaffer, 2008, 1). Furthermore, there is the conviction that the ‗identified
and experienced ungratefulness‘ of the Afghan government and people is one of the core
challenges for Pakistan‘s Afghanistan policy.
5.5 The Absence of Serious Conflict in India-Afghanistan Relations
Besides some historical issues, such as Afghanistan being in ancient times a base for invasions into
the Indian subcontinent or the struggle between Indian and Afghan leaders to gain influence and
control over each other‘s territories, today‘s bilateral relations are characterized by the absence of
serious conflict. In this context, one can state that unlike many post-colonial states, being no
neighbors India and Afghanistan naturally have no border conflicts or any other territorial disputes.
Therefore, the general disadvantage of a ―long-distance relationship‖ meaning the lack of a
common shared border (especially in economic terms), can be identified as a clear advantage
compared to Pakistan-Afghanistan relations which are hampered by the existence of a contested
border (Durand-Line) and territorial claims (Pakhtunistan)32.
5.6 India‘s Economic Experience
India‘s economy which is most successful in capitalizing its own (local and traditional) resources
and skills has much to offer to Afghanistan‘s economy, not only as a market or supplier, but even
more in terms of its rich experience in building up a successful economy in the region. In
particular, India‘s experience when it comes to setting up and running small and medium-sized
enterprises would be most valuable. Furthermore, India‘s rich experiments in developing rural
areas could be a significant asset for improving the agricultural sector in Afghanistan.
32
See also the elaboration of Pant (2010a, 7) on this argument.
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5.7 Advantage ‗Skilled Hybridisation‘33
Based on the belief, that the concept of liberal democracy can serve as an ideal form of governance
in all cultural, ethnic, societal and regional contexts, India could function as a model example of
how to implement a so-called ‗western‘ notion of governance in a successful, sustainable and
meaningful way. Accepting the core principles of democracy -absolute political equality,
individual freedom, control, the presence of institutional control and checks and balances (Merkel,
2004)- this type of governance offers a tremendous variety of instruments and options to establish
a functional political system suitable to all types of societies. The challenge (as in each other case
too) is to find the applicable matrix in which core democratic principles are ensured, the suitable
democratic components are identified and regional traditions of the respective society are taken
into account. In order to establish or to enforce a functioning institutional design in Afghanistan,
one has to adapt indigenous institutions and local practices, e.g. the Loya Jirga. This might sound
for many, particularly in the West, as an obsolete form of informal law but for the people in
Afghanistan it is not. This would not only enhance political participation and confidence in a
democratic political system, but also help protect the constitution as well as generate the necessary
respect for it in the long run, especially towards human rights and gender equality (I think this
important point needs to be expressed more clearly). In this respect, India has much experience to
share, e.g. the adaption of the Panchayati Raj (village councils), development of a unique quotasystem, an indigenised federal system, all of which have served the needs of the largest, and one of
the most heterogeneous democracies in the world.
5.8 Brief note on the use of the cultural argument
It is also interesting to mention that beside the economic experience, there is another advantage in
this field – the popular Indian entertainment industry, namely ‗Bollywood‘. ‗Apart from having
33
Regarding to Subrata K. Mitra, Hybridisation is part of the explanatory factor behind the resilience of the modern
state. The hybrid state emerges as a consequence of the conflation of indigenous and alien categories and institutions.
In this context, Hybridisation is the natural consequence of the real world process of institution making, and the
adaptation of alien institutions into the native medium (Mitra, 2012, 2009, 1994).
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huge commercial interests in Afghanistan‘s market, it also serves as one of the most powerful
vehicles for India‘s ―soft power‖ projection ‗(Sharma, 2011, 112). ‗While Indian films have long
been popular with Afghans, with the coming of satellite television a booming Indian television
industry has helped India make rapid inroads into the hearts and minds of the people of
Afghanistan‘ (Sharma, 2011, 112).
In the current debate on India-Afghanistan relations and the possibility of stronger
engagement in its extended north-western neighborhood, Indians in general like to emphasize, that
because of strong historical and cultural ties both countries have stable relations (cf. Pant, 2010a,
3). This is an argument that has been used in foreign policy formulation and diplomacy and which
has in the past led to (serious) misinterpretations and misperceptions of India‘s attitudes, for
example amongst South East Asian states, creating suspicions towards the intentions of the so
called ‗Look East Policy‘34. The cultural argument was not seen as a way to emphasize common
bounds and to create a positive environment for cooperation but rather as a strategy to stress and
legitimize in a ‗soft way‘, India‘s bid for regional hegemony. However, India-Afghanistan
relations have been getting more stable because of concrete ‗hard facts‘ and not because of ‗vague
imagined‘ historical and cultural bounds. Besides this, the emphasis on the positive impact of
historical bonds between India and Afghanistan is surprising given that relations between the two
has been characterized more by tensions, misperceptions and conflict than cooperation (cf.
Gregorian, 1969; 91-128)35. India‘s assistance to the Northern alliance during the Soviet invasion
and occupation, promoted a certain degree of cooperation but it also challenged India‘s prestige
and credibility among certain sections of the Afghan peoples (cf. Swami, 2008). In consequence,
Afghans have been temporarily divided over India and its involvement in the country. The major
34
The „Look East Policy― is an attempt to forge closer and deeper economic integration with its eastern neighbours as
a part of a new realpolitik evident in Indian foreign policy. The engagement with ASEAN is the recognition on the part
of India‘s elite of the strategic and economic importance of the region to the country‘s national interests. (Haokip,
2011.7).
35
Bezieht sich auf die Grenzkonflikte zwischen Britisch Indien und Afghanistan.
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ethnic grouping of Pashtuns, culturally and ethnically closely associated with Pakistan‘s border
areas, are not in favor of a (Hindu) cultural influx from India or even the accentuation of cultural
ties and commonalities. This might not hamper an Indian rapprochement towards the Pashtun‘s but
it will also not be a catalyzer.
To sum up, relations today are deepening because India is a major donor, pro-Indian
elements in the current government will become even more important in the 2014 withdrawal
scenario of the US/ISAF forces. The increasing anti-Pakistan sentiments in Afghanistan will also
create an additionally positive environment for India.
6. Challenges and Options for India
Basically India faces two major challenges that require an immediate positioning in the on-going
period of transition (2011-2014) as well as during the period of transformation in the post-2014
withdrawal scenario. These are: (1) Reconciliation with the Taliban; and (2) Military Engagement
(a robust forward policy):
6.1 The Question of Reconciliation with the Taliban
In the light of the enduring resistance of OMF and the high profile terrorist attacks – in quantitative
and qualitative – terms, the ―Kabul-led and the West backed reconciliation and reintegration
process aimed at anti-government groups does not seem to be going anywhere‖ (Chandra, 2011,
120). It shows that the goodwill of the international community and Afghan government, which
were strongly reconfirmed at Bonn II to enforce an inclusive (meaning inclusion of all Afghan
actors) peace and reconciliation does not meet the interests of extremist elements, inside and
outside, Afghanistan. In light of this Philipps (2011) has raised the question of why the Taliban
should start or even continue to talk to President Karzai when they know that he is losing and
things are working out quite well for them? (Phillips, 2011). Dr. Massouda Jalal (2011), political
analyst and former minister for woman affairs (2004-2006) states that ―seeking to negotiate with
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an implacable enemy could be seen either as foolish or foresighted‖. This faith in negotiations
appears to be based on the conviction that there exist ‗moderate‘ factions within the Taliban, and
that they can be coaxed toward supporting constitutional democracy. But according Jalal (2011) –
―there are no moderate Taliban‖. However, regardless of how disreputable and unpredictable,
moderate or not the Taliban as interlocutor are, the ―lines of communication must never be shut
down‖ (Sareen, 2011, 138).
India‘s approach towards peace and reconciliations processes in Afghanistan (and beyond)
should comprise the following elements: (1) A watch-and-wait strategy; and (2) Inclusiveness.
(1) A ‗watch-and-wait strategy‘, means that ―instead of seeking out the Taliban, India should
wait for the Taliban to reach out‖ (Sareen, 2011, 138). The Pakistani objective ―to establish a client
government in a dependent Afghanistan and keep India out will continue. This however should
not be a major concern for India‖ (Kumar, 2011, 130). There is no doubt that ―Pakistan is seen as a
key player in any plan for reconciliation‖ (Pleming, 2010) but ―India should wait for the time the
Taliban-Pakistan relationship sours, as it bound to do…‖ (Sareen, 2011, 138). Despite the close
relations between Taliban and the Pakistan government, the Taliban has failed Islamabad until now
in terms of realizing its aspiration to have a client government‖ (Kumar, 2011, 130). The major
reason therefore is, that neither the common Afghan people nor the Taliban associated forces such
as Al-Qaida are in favor of being subordinate to Pakistan, to function as a Pakistani outpost, and/or
being part of any ‗Grand Strategies‘ of certain states or governments. The fact is that the Taliban
have today a much broader financial basis then before which is basically due to two reasons. First,
money through drugs- which the Taliban & Co. control and which has only gained momentum
during the last years.
Secondly, the Taliban got much stronger due to the influx of foreign investment, the economic
boom and their ability to benefit from these processes via extremist elements in the political
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system, public administration and economy.36 These two monetary factors will make them less
dependent on foreign sources and is likely to change the pattern of Pakistan-Afghan relations.
Concretely, a potential new Taliban government does not necessarily mean being pro-Islamabad
and part of its ‗strategic depth‘ approach as well as being anti-New Delhi and aiming to undercut
India‘s influence. Here the support of the last military regime for the US-led invasion in
Afghanistan and several military operations carried out by Pakistan‘s Armies in the Swat Valley
and South Waziristan (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, former NWFP) against several extremist groups
including the Taliban will be a heavy burden for any future relations between a Taliban-influenced
government in Kabul and Islamabad. The recent worsening in US-Pakistan relations, will not
necessary warming the relationship between the Pakistan government and the US government,
especially if US reports w get confirmed that the whole scenario was set up by the Taliban to
worsen the Washington-Islamabad ties and to provoke Pakistan to drop out of the Bonn II
conference.
In this context one has also to note, that the ‗shared interests‘ and cooperation between Pakistan
and the Taliban finds its limitations when it comes to ground realities in Afghanistan. Due to the
existing tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan, each future Afghan government (including
the Taliban) has to take the resentments of its people into account, which is currently at a historic
peak (cf. Gallup, 2010). Most important are the demands of the Pashtun‘s living on both sides of
the border for an own territorial entity ‗Pashtunistan‘ (Gundu/Schaffer, 2008, 1). Subsequently this
would lead to a break up of Pakistan‘s most sensitive and geo-strategically significant border areas.
Furthermore, it would motivate sub-national, separatist ambitions in other parts of the country.
With the Pashtun‘s as the main social and recruiting base of the Taliban, it is obvious that a
Taliban-dominated government in Kabul will not be willing to undermine such claims (e.g.
36
Personal interview of the author with Dr. Massouda Jalal, former minister for woman affairs (2004-2006), and
former presidential candidate.
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formation of ‗Pashtunistan‘). There will also not be any support for the Pakistani demand to the
Afghan government to finally accept the Durand Line, the border between both countries.
To sum up, the Taliban –with or without a worsening of Taliban-Kabul-Pakistan relations-,
will remain the greatest concern of India.
What is most worrying in the context of the re-emergence of Taliban is the combination of
the new political and economic strength combined with the feeling of superiority, since they have
never been beaten militarily. Such a potential new Taliban government will not only be financially
consolidated (at least regarding their own criteria of development goals) as well as independent
from Pakistan, making the security situation and chaos more complex. In case the Taliban will turn
against Pakistan using its prosperous, ‗lawless frontier regions as its own strategic depth‘ (Sharma,
2011, 114). This would not only enhance the destabilization of Pakistan‘s border areas but also
bring the threat much closer to ―India‘s geographical as well as psychological frontiers‖ (Sharma,
2011, 114). In this context one has to emphasize that at the moment it is unclear what kind of
relationship between the Pakistan Army and the ISI (Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence
(ISI) exists, which makes any assessment of the relationship between the Pakistani government
(including the civilian and the military/army establishment) and the Taliban as well as the
opportunity to influence the Taliban, difficult. Therefore, India should still continue its watch-andwait strategy
(2) Inclusiveness: This ―watch-and-wait‖-strategy does not mean that India should be
reactive. In contrast, is has to build up and maintain ties with all significant factions in Afghanistan
such as the Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras, non-Taliban Pashtuns. In this context, Sareen (Sareen, 2011,
138) has emphasized that India should ―not make the mistake of junking one for the other, an old
Indian habit‖. Most important is that India has to break the ‗Pashtun indifference‘ towards India.
Nevertheless, India should not get too involved in the reconciliation process. This is due to a
number of reasons.
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First of all, it is within the exclusive responsibility of the Kabul government and the Afghan
people. Second, even if the Taliban are stronger than before, today one and a half decades after
they took over for the first time, there is a much better organized and stronger civil society on the
ground which will not be so easily suppressed. In addition there is a political system with a
minimum of functioning institutions, as well as stronger local power centers. In this context on can
state that not only has the Taliban got stronger but also potential countervailing forces (e.g.
warlords, the constituents of the former Northern Alliance). Of course, there is no guarantee that a
fall-back into patterns of the first Taliban regime can be avoided and that Afghanistan will not turn
once again into the hub for international terrorism. One has to remain skeptical about the resilience
of anti-extremist forces in Afghanistan, much less so about the potential of the Taliban given that
they are already back in power, at least informally.
6.2 The Issue of a Military Engagement
Basically this article proposes that India should avoid every kind of military options (understood as
a proactive forward policy)37, either in the form of deploying armed forces on Afghan soil, nor in
terms of a too-intensive program of military assistance for the ANA, especially equipment and
training. The latter does not necessarily include the ANP. Support for the ANP should depend on
how far the US is willing to build up a civilian police who takes care of civil policing so that it
does not get involved in counter-insurgencies operation as an auxiliary for the military. In this
context one can state, that just in case the security forces of Afghanistan are able to ensure security
and stability as well as the integrity of the country after the handover of authority and
responsibility from ISAF to the Afghan authorities, another already existent major challenge will
come to the fore. The ‗infant democracy‘ will have to struggle not only against extremist elements
37
See also Sushant Sareen elaboration on the same argument (2011, 138). However, the author does not agree with
Sareen‘s statement that ‗soft-power‘ ―will not be of much use as far as the war in Afghanistan is concerned‖, perhaps
from a historical short term perspective but not in the long run..
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(the ISAF missions shows that there is no military solution for that, and a political and socioeconomic one will take time) but also will have to guard against the increasing power of the
security sector, especially of the Armed Forces and the Intelligence Services, which is not an
surprising, unknown phenomena in the South Asian region38. Given the complexity of challenges
that Afghanistan has faced in the last decade, the promotion of civilian supremacy and
(democratic) civilian control has not been prioritised. ‗De-militarising‘ the ANP along democratic
norms to make the Afghan government less dependent in internal security and law and order
matters on the armed forces could be an area for Indian assistance. This could also be carried out in
cooperation with the European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan, whose success so far has
been quite limited, and not sustainable.39
However, India with its record of untroubled civil-military relations might offer assistance to
the Afghan government regarding the establishment of civilian control. Offering support to
civilians (elected representatives) to build up the resources to exercise certain necessary control
strategies over the military could be an alternative approach or at least a complementary one. The
fact that India has traditionally warm personal links with many civilian leaders and is also
gradually building military-to-military contacts will help its being accepted from both sides to
facilitate the institutionalisation of civilian control. This must be seen as a sine quo non for the
consolidation of democracy in Afghanistan. Otherwise, the notion of the Afghan people as the
supreme power of the state will be in danger and this will further erode confidence and trust in
democracy as the best form of government.
In case India decides in favour of an extensive military option, it will be most likely
identified as a combatant too. The fact that Pakistan is much excluded from the building up of the
38
E.g. Pakistan and Bangladesh experienced in their history several direct military interventions (coups) (cf.
Wolf/Kane, 2010; Wolf, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c).
39
Among others, some major reasons are: First many members of the ANP are illiterate, former Mujahedeen. EUPOL
training programs are not sufficiently prepared for such a situation and subsequently not conducive; second, ANP
members get only half the salary of a Taliban (mercenary) fighter. There are several reports that after police forces
have finishing their training they defect to the Taliban.
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Afghan security sector forces is due to difficult bilateral relations (Gundu/Schaffer, 2008, 2). It is
tempting for India to fill this vacuum but will enforce Pakistan‘s sensitivity and will provoke
respective reactions. The immediate bombing at the Indian Embassy in Kabul in July 2008, soon
after India and Afghanistan agreed on security cooperation can be seen as an indicator thereof. In
such a case, India is forced to carry out a robust response which will draw the country into intergroups rivalries, especially between Pashtuns and non-Pashtuns and conflicts between local power
centres. Subsequently, India will lose its ability to function as neutral facilitator. Even more, it will
be just a matter of time till it is recognized as a ‗foreign occupying force‘ which will undermine its
reputation and goodwill among common Afghan people. Furthermore, due to increasing domestic
security challenges, within India e.g. the Naxalites, it will be a complex challenge to convince the
Indian public that a potential loss of human lives as well as the dedication of large financial
resources is necessary in order to be engaged in Afghanistan. For this reason, Indian boots on
Afghanistan soil must be seen as a major roadblock to bringing lasting peace, reconciliation and
stability to the country. To sum up, India cannot sustain a robust, military option and will only
harm its image by doing so (Sareen, 2011, 138). Why should India move with troops into
Afghanistan when all foreign forces until today have decided that moving out is a ―correct and a
common-sense step towards de-escalation‖ (Kumar, 2011, 130). After all the foreign military
interventions failed – why should there be an ‗Indian Exception‘?
Nevertheless, when India is pushing forward security cooperation, it does not matter to
which extent she has to coordinate the activities with the international community, particularly
with the regional powers. Of course, ―as two sovereign countries, India and Afghanistan have full
rights to determine the nature and content of their bilateral relationship‖ (Singh, 2009, 4) but India
also has to recognize that an independent approach, which is demanded by several observers and
analysts, will provoke all actors involved and create mistrust and hostility. In contrast, joint
initiatives would not only serve the stabilisation of Afghanistan but also reduce bilateral tensions
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in the region. Therefore, the suggestion to delink India‘s Afghanistan policy from the West in
order to act independently is ‗unwise‘ (Sareen, 2011, 138). Last but not least, if India‘s implements
more `hard power‘ elements in its Afghanistan approach, they will have to be well syncronised
with its notion of portraying itself as a state exercising primarily ‗soft power‘.
7. Conclusion
India should not be tempted to fill the gap which will inevitably arise after ISAF forces leave
Afghanistan in 2014, especially not with a too-robust military engagement, for a couple of reasons.
First, besides the re-emergence of the Pakistan factor and the Taliban in Afghan politics, the
US-Pakistan alliance, Pashtun indifference towards India, and the geographical limitations, there is
an incoherent policy and confusion among NATO/ISAF states about how to deal with India‘s
involvement in Afghanistan. On the one hand it seems that they would not mind if there was
simply no Indian activity at all, since they fear that Afghanistan will turn into a battleground for
another proxy war between India and Pakistan. Subsequently this would hamper significantly the
future of peace and reconciliation processes. This kind of thinking obviously ignores the fact that
the Taliban insurgency is not the cause of the Indo-Pak conflict in Afghanistan but the
consequence of it. However, as a result India has been frequently sidelined in major decisions on
Afghanistan and its role has been downplayed and marginalized. On the other hand, the
international community has realized that it cannot beat the militant insurgencies through its
strategy of appeasing Pakistan by trying to keep India out. This has neither improved cooperation
with Pakistan nor avoided further infiltration of militants from Pakistan into Afghanistan. In light
of the constant attacks on the NATO supply-chain through Pakistan, its unwillingness or inability
to move its troops into North Waziristan to root out militant camps which function as a base for
activities inside Afghanistan, the harsh rejection of NATO offers to help out by Pakistani civilian
as well as military elites, has overshadowed Pakistan‘s own fight against (domestic) terrorism. It
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increasingly realizes the value of India‘s engagement and the future potential of India‘s role.
Nevertheless, the US and other regional and non-regional actors have not ‗gone beyond ritual
statements on the constructive role which India has played in Afghanistan‘ (Chandra, 2011, 121).
In contrast, many of them see any Indian role still as controversial and stick to Pakistan as a
supreme partner to build peace and stability in Afghanistan. But Pakistan will not be able to fill
this power vacuum due to its domestic duties and the need to crack-down on cross-border
extremist elements in order to fulfill the expectations of Afghan government and the international
community. It is also not sure how the Afghan security forces will interact with the Taliban and
other OMF in the post-withdrawal scenario. In other words, the question appears how loyal are the
Afghan security forces to a potential Taliban-controlled Afghan government which might not be in
line with the current constitution? Will they defend the constitution and democratic institutions?
This is particularly interesting because there is no specified constitutional role for Afghanistan‘s
armed forces – ―defending the country‖ (article 55, constitution) and ―observance of the provisions
of the constitution‖ (article 56, constitution) is recognized as a duty of all citizens. And what does
it mean if the government turns autocratic and repressive? Also it is unpredictable how the
different ethnic groups especially the non-Pashtuns will react when the ‗Pashtun-Taliban
conglomerate‘ regains power in Kabul. All these factors are increasing the likelihood of a civil-war
after 2014.
Second, Afghans might show deep affection towards India and appreciate its ‗soft power
factor of ‗Bollywood‘ but this does not mean that they want to experience an adventurous forward
policy in the form of Indian combat troops in Afghanistan. This prospective is gaining momentum
since there is a steady worsening of the security situation in the country. Recurring insurgencies
are hampering the implementation of development projects40 as well as posing challenges for
Indian decision-makers in areas affected by OMF influence, especially South and East Afghanistan
40
E.g. the Zaranj-Delaram highway project: India‘s was forced to deploy some hundreds Indo-Tibetian Border Police
(ITBP) forces to provide security for the workers and the whole project (D‘Souza, 2007, 840).
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(D‘Souza, 2007, 839). In this context, India compared to Pakistan, lacks supply routes to
Afghanistan but even more it lacks an adequate supply of intelligence (Joshi, 2010). These two
factors are a serious disadvantage in the geopolitical rivalries within the context of Afghanistan.
Third, the aim to portray itself as a non-partisan actor in order to apply an inclusive approach
in working for the common good of the people of Afghanistan in any kind of social, political and
economic dimension is overshadowed by India‘s traditional support for the Northern Alliance,
basically comprising only three ethnic groups of Tajiks, Hazaras and Uzbeks which approximately
constitute only 45 per cent of the total population (Sharma, 2011, 113). It is most important that
India overcomes its non-Pashtun centric focus and image. It has to build up links parallel to
President Karzai‘s government with local leaders from the ‗Pashtun belt‘. To do so, India should
start creating political capital in Afghanistan by capitalizing on its multi-faceted development and
(re-)construction projects and building the base for interaction with the Pashtun. Without dealing
with the Pashtuns including their Taliban inclination, an inclusive, multi-ethnic political solution
towards peace and reconciliation remains a ‗Disney-World-Scenario‘.
Fourth, the success of any Indian involvement is deeply inter-linked with the perceptions of
Afghanistan‘s neighboring countries. The regional constellation is not only characterized by the
goodwill of Afghans towards India as well as a relatively high level of bonhomie between Russia,
Central Asian Republics (CAR) in the Afghan-India relations and the general goodwill of the
people, but also by the enduring geopolitical rivalries, e.g. India-Pakistan or India-China.
To conclude, Afghanistan is most of the time seen as a test case for India`s foreign policy, its
rising regional and global prominence (cf. Pant, 2010a, 2) but the need for engagement in
Afghanistan is not just an expression of India‘s growing international ambitions as a rising power.
Instead it must be realized that this is a basic matter of national defense, and of course regional
security and stability.
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In light of the Soviet and the US/ISAF experience, any robust military engagement in
Afghanistan appears unsustainable and unwinnable and this is unlikely to be any different for
India. Therefore, a military intervention would lead in the wrong direction. India needs to continue
and to intensify its successful multi-sectoral, soft-power approach and to envisage deeper
engagement in areas like security sector reform, especially civil-military relations and police
reform as well as building civil-society capacities. However, most important is to support
Afghanistan‘s economy and to ensure that the government is able to gain sufficient revenues to
maintain its relatively high but necessary level of security forces including adequate remuneration
in order to keep them loyal.
In this light, India will have to make difficult choices between ‗soft power‘ and ‗hard power‘
(including the military option), whether to ignore or take into account Pakistan‘s interests and
security concerns in Afghanistan, how to position itself in the Iran-US conflict, and last but not
least how to deal with China‘s growing activities in Afghanistan. To conclude, India‘s position in
Afghanistan is not a catch-22 situation but the success and prospects of its engagement remain
uncertain.
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India - Bangladesh Maritime Boundary Dispute
and the Law of the Sea
Dr. Kamal Kinger
Head, Department of Defence & Strategic Studies,
Punjabi University, Patiala
Dr. Kamal Kinger joined Punjabi University,
Patiala in 1996 and is presently working as
Associate Professor and Head, Department of
Defence and Strategic Studies, Punjabi University, Patiala. He has completed his
doctoral research on `Major Irritants in Indo- Bangladesh relations: Its Impact on
India’s Security’. He visited Bangladesh to collect data for Ph. D thesis and interviewed
Begum Sheikh Hasina and various other politicians and academicians in Bangladesh.
He has written two books and more than dozen research papers in various journals of
national/international repute. His area of specialization is South Asia and
International Relations.
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India - Bangladesh Maritime Boundary Dispute
and the Law of the Sea
Abstract
Due to the non delimitation of the maritime boundary between India and
Bangladesh, a dispute had been arisen over the `New Moore Island’ in the Bay
of Bengal near India-Bangladesh coast. This island surfaced during one of the
worst cyclones of the modern times that hit the coastal areas of Bangladesh
in November, 1970. The controversy over the ownership of this island had
generated heat between the two countries in the past. The island in question,
which was formed in the estuary of the Hariabhanga and the Raimangal
rivers after the cyclone and tidal bore of 1970, lies in the estuary of river
Hariabhanga and the boundary between India and Bangladesh in this area is
the mid channel of the Hariabhanga River. New Moore Island is a tiny island
estimated to be around 2 to 12 square miles depending upon the rising and
receding tides. The island, which is relatively closer to India distance wise, 5.2
kms from the nearest Indian land mass against 7.6 kms from the nearest
point of the land mass in Bangladesh, has a great economic significance. The
areas around the island have a potential for oil and gas and is strategically
and economically important area.
Introduction Maritime delimitation remains an important topic: in boundary-making, sensitive
questions of state sovereignty, sovereign rights, jurisdiction and title to valuable natural
resources are all put into question.1Nowadays, the potential political and security risks of
boundary disputes are high, and unresolved maritime boundaries between states may easily
affect bilateral relations or even international peace and security. "Frontiers are the razor's
edge on which hang suspended…issues of war and peace".2 Lord Curzon. Such disputes may
also hamper economic activities, such as exploitation of fishing sites, due to fear of action by
the other states. Furthermore, unresolved maritime boundaries may also cause disputes over
certain areas of jurisdiction between states if oil and gas discoveries are made in overlapping
claimed areas.
Through out history, territorial issues and wars have been closely linked. In fact,
contests over territory have played a major role in most of the international wars of recent
centuries. As both a cause and a stake of war among nations, territory has probably mattered
more than any other single factor.3 In today’s world, territory remains a matter of crucial
importance to states. The nature of territorial conflicts, however, appears to have evolved
over time. Similarly, both India and Bangladesh, a close door neighbours, are also squabbling
over the territorial issues both landline and maritime.
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Both India and Bangladesh require delimiting each and every sea zone starting from
the coast. But until now these states have not been successful to solve this complex issue.
According to experts, there are four issues involved with regard to maritime boundary
dispute between the two countries. First, determination of the Hariabhanga border river
boundary, especially the ownership of South Talpatty Island, secondly, the determination of
boundary of territorial waters up to 12 nautical miles (n.m..), and thirdly, determination of
boundary of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of another 188 n.m.. from the end of
territorial waters and lastly, the issue of boundary demarcation of the continental shelf up to
another 150 n.m.. from the end of the EEZ.4
There arises to some extent involvement of diplomacy for accomplishing agreement
on the delimitation of sea boundaries between them. As signatories to the United Nation’s
Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS), India, Bangladesh and Myanmar need to
resolve their maritime boundary issues, and file their claim by 29 June 2009, 27 July 2011
and 21 May 2009 respectively. But both the countries have not yet done anything in this
regard.
India – Bangladesh Maritime Boundary Dispute – A Brief Background India and Bangladesh are adjacent coastal states. The configuration of the coast of
India is convex whereas that of Bangladesh is concave. The maritime boundary of
Bangladesh adjoins India to the West and Burma to the East. After the emergence of
Bangladesh in 1971, with the moral and material support of India, both the countries in a
gesture of goodwill agreed to resolve the outstanding issues in a friendly manner. In this
regard, both India and Bangladesh started their bilateral talks to resolve the maritime
boundary dispute in 1974 which were inconclusive and had not been able to settle the
delimitation problem, mainly because of the concave nature of Bangladesh coast. Besides,
Bangladesh wanted to solve this problem on the principle of ‘equity’, and India, on the other
hand, applied the principle of ‘equidistance’. `It ought not to be forgotten that law is not
merely a convenient device for the settlement of disputes. The law is something that can be
made effective instrument at a crisis and left out of account at other times. It is useful as a
mean of settlement only, when and so far as, a society has accepted the rule of law as its way
of life’5
The non-delimitation of maritime zones has created a conflict between India and
Bangladesh. Disagreement arose between the two countries when government of
Bangladesh, in 1974, signed contracts with some international oil companies, granting them
oil and natural gas exploration rights in its territorial waters in the Bay of Bengal which was
strongly contested by India. However, at the three days foreign secretary level talks held
between both the countries at Dhaka on February 10, 1975 to resolve the maritime boundary
issue, a three point agreement on the principles of delineation of maritime boundary was
evolved. The three points of the general agreement on the maritime boundary were:6
1. The maritime boundary between the two countries should be delineated by mutual
agreements;
2. It should be demarcated in a manner which should be equitable to India and
Bangladesh and;
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3. The line of demarcation should safeguard the interests of both countries.
After that various rounds of talks on delimitation of maritime boundary were held but
failed without any suitable agreement. “Although the deposits potential is expected to be
quite limited by international standards, it has been more than sufficient to create both
interests and impatience in the resource hungry disputants i.e. India and Bangladesh”.7
Delimitation means the determination of a boundary line by treaty or otherwise,
whereas demarcation means the actual laying down of a boundary line on the ground. As per
international law of the sea, all the coastal states are permitted to bring under their
jurisdiction their well defined sea zones. The two countries have not agreed on the baseline
on which rectangles are to be drawn to cover 200 n.m. economic zone of each country. This
concept of 200 n.m. commercial zone stretching from the coasts of the countries is
inapplicable in the Bay of Bengal because of the ‘funnel like shape and the highly irregular
configuration of the coastlines’.8 In 1977, Bangladesh declared that her economic zone in the
high seas would be the area extending up to 200 n.m. measured from the basement sea at the
depth of 10 fathoms. The economic zone will be beyond territorial waters of 12 n.m. as the
nearest baselines should be marked through depth method for measuring breadth of
territorial waters.9 But at the UNCLOS that was held in June 1977, Bangladesh modified her
proposal and said that due to unst able coasts, Bangladesh’s baselines should be demarked
by a straight line or series of straight lines connecting appropriate points on adjacent coastal
waters.10
Since then various rounds of talks have been held between the two countries. Claims
and counter claims have also been made but no concrete solution is in sight so far. In fact,
both the countries are fighting over the “equidistance” and “equity” principles in so far as
they relate to delimitation. Whatever principles, India and Bangladesh adopt in their
delimitation of maritime boundary talks, their conflict over the ownership of the islands in
the maritime zones will end only when the maritime boundaries are delimited.
Controversy over the New Moore Island Due to the non delimitation of the maritime boundary between India and Bangladesh,
a dispute had been arisen over the `New Moore Island’ in the Bay of Bengal near IndiaBangladesh coast. This island surfaced during one of the worst cyclones of the modern times
that hit the coastal areas of Bangladesh in November, 1970. The controversy over the
ownership of this island had generated heat between the two countries in the past. The
island in question, which was formed in the estuary of the Hariabhanga and the Raimangal
rivers after the cyclone and tidal bore of 1970, lies in the estuary of river Hariabhanga and
the boundary between India and Bangladesh in this area is the mid channel of the
Hariabhanga River. New Moore Island is a tiny island estimated to be around 2 to 12 square
miles depending upon the rising and receding tides. The island, which is relatively closer to
India distance wise, 5.2 kms from the nearest Indian land mass against 7.6 kms from the
nearest point of the land mass in Bangladesh, has a great economic significance. 11 The areas
around the island have a potential for oil and gas and is strategically and economically
important area.
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UNCLOS defines an island as naturally formed area of land, surrounded, by water,
which is above water at high tide.12 An island is capable of naturally supporting life. “Rocks,
which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no exclusive
economic zone or continental shelf,”13 are only entitled respectively to a 12 n.m. territorial
sea and a 500 n.m. safety zone. These terms of the convention seem to apply to the most
features of the New Moore Island.
This inhibited piece of land, having been apparently formed through silt
accumulation, is believed to have been first sighted by the American `Earth Resources
Tracing Satellite’ (ERTS). The ERTS conveyed the discovery to the Indian Remote Sensing
Agency in Hyderabad, which in turn brought it to the notice of the government of India.14 The
Indian government included the island in the List of “Islands in Possession of India” (total
1135) by the Ministry of Home Affairs in consultation with Chief Hydrographer to the
Government of India. During the Indo-Bangladesh maritime talks in 1974 India brought this
island to Dhaka’s notice but no doubts were raised. Again in 1975 and 1979 talks,
Bangladesh did not question Indian ownership of the island.
Thus, the island has remained under the control of India ever since 1970 until it was
seriously contested by Bangladesh in 1979. And, it was only in late 1979, Bangladesh staked
its claim to the island when the West Bengal (India) government started calling ‘New Moore
Island’ as ‘Purbhasha’ (hope of the east). Now Bangladesh thought that there were two
islands, New Moore and Purbhasha – claimed the former as its own calling it ‘South Talpatty’.
This ignorance on the part of Dhaka in a way indicates that their claim on the New Moore
Island was not based on fully ascertained facts.15
Events Leading to the Worsening of the Dispute The first survey of the island was done by the Indian Navy in 1974, when
identification pillars were also put up on it in accordance with the international law and
practice. On March 12, 1980, Indian flag was hoisted on the island after the formal
declaration of its sovereignty on March 3. India brought to Dhaka’s notice about the Indian
ownership. Simultaneously, the information was shared with the British and US navies,
which are widely regarded as very knowledgeable on the maritime geography of the region.
Neither Bangladesh nor the Anglo-American naval establishments raised any objection about
India’s claim over New Moore Island at that time.
When these reports reached Dhaka, the Bangladesh government reacted by voicing
loud protests. It expressed the view that though it had not objected to India’s ownership on
the island in 1974-1975 and early 1978, yet it had reserved the right to do so. Dhaka also
supplied some maps to India to support its claim to New Moore Island.16 But the matter got
so much heated that on July 10, Dhaka threatened to hoist the Bangladesh flag on the
island.17 The island was converted into a controversy by Dhaka when it proposed a joint
survey with India to ascertain the ownership of then newly emerged island of ‘Purbhasha’ or
‘South Talpatty’ in the Bay of Bengal. But in January 1980, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, as prime
minister of India, ruled out any joint survey and recognized that the island belongs to India.
Bangladesh retaliated in March 1981 by claiming a maritime economic zone stretching over
320 kms from a baseline at a depth of 10 fathoms. 18 However, during September 1981 talks
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between the foreign ministers of the two countries, it was reiterated that delimitation of
maritime boundary should be resolved, ‘by mutual agreement in a spirit of good
neighbourliness’.19
The government of Bangladesh claimed that it was in possession of data to prove that
the two islands belonged to her. This ignorance on the part of Dhaka in a way indicated that
their claims on the New Moore Island were not based on fully ascertained facts. It believed
that forcible occupation of the island and prejudging the issue were unjustifiable and did not
establish India’s ownership of the island. Bangladesh even threatened to bring the island for
consideration of the UNO,20 if it was not solved through negotiations. On May 22, 1981, there
was a massive demonstration by supporters of several parties in Bangladesh in front of the
Indian High Commission in Dhaka. In reply, India stuck her claim on the island after
supplying all relevant information to Bangladesh. But Dhaka government rejected India’s
claim and also denied that any information had been supplied by India regarding this
island.21
In order to settle the dispute, the government of India conducted the survey of the
island. The job was assigned to INS Sandhayak, which provided a mass data on the location
and features of the two square km island. During its 16 days of surveying, Sandhayak
confirmed India’s claim to the island. However, the findings of the survey were not
acceptable to the Bangladesh side and it refused to recognize the ‘so called results of the
unilateral and illegal survey’.22 Bangladesh also regarded Sandhayak as a battleship and
alleged that launching of Sandhayak was an aggression on her territory. A spokesman of the
foreign ministry of Bangladesh said that by conducting the survey India had violated the
understanding reached between the two countries.23
A peculiar situation arose when fully armed gunboats Bishkhali, Patuakhali and
Noakhali, belonging to Bangladesh trespassed into Indian waters and menacingly threatened
Indian personnel and an unarmed survey ship at the New Moore Island. India took a strong
note of the Bangladesh action and expressed its grave concerns over the presence of fully
armed Bangladesh’s gunboats in and around the island in India’s territorial waters. 24 In
reply, India posted a sophisticated patrol craft near the island. The government of
Bangladesh denied that any of her naval gunboats had encroached Indian waters. Meanwhile,
anti-India tirade was stepped up in Bangladesh. The ‘Bangladesh Times’ had a front page
story captioned ‘Nation Determined to Resist Invasion’.25 This was termed as gunboat
diplomacy on the part of Dhaka which had accentuated tension between the two countries.
Many observers in India at that time felt that sending of gunboats to the New Moore
Island was a well planned action of Bangladesh government and anti Indian political parties.
‘The Tribune’ wrote in its editorial that ‘It was transparent effort to put up a show of anger
against India so that the impact of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s daughter on the popular mind
should be minimized. This was always a convenient tool to use against India, although it does
not solve the internal problems of Bangladesh’.26
The Law of the Sea UNCLOS-I, which was held in Geneva in 1958, led to the codification of four
conventions that dealt with some areas of the Law of Seas i.e. convention on the territorial
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sea and the contiguous zone; convention on the continental shelf, convention on the high
seas and convention on the fishing and convention of the living resources of the high seas.
But some scholars felt that these laws are vague and agreement could not be reached on a
number of issues. One such fundamental issue was the breadth of the territorial seas.
Similarly, UNCLOS-II, which was convened in 1960, to solve the problems left open by the
first conference too ended without results. 27
From 1973 to 1982, UNCLOS-III was convened and eleven sessions were held during
this period. By the end of conference, 164 states and as well as 102 observers had
participated in this conference. The negotiations of the UNCLOS that modified the Law of the
Sea (LOS) can be considered one of the greatest diplomatic events in the history of
international relations.28
According to the UNCLOS-III, the costal states are entitled to extend their National
Jurisdiction over the sea up to 12 n.m. from the appropriate coast line, which is known as
territorial water (article 3), its contiguous zone up to 24 n.m. (article 33 (2), its Exclusive
Economic Zone (EEZ) up to 200 n.m. (article 57) and the Continental Shelf up to the depth of
200 meters or up to the maximum natural prolongation up to 350 n.m. (article 76).29
However, this is a tricky matter as the coasts of India and Bangladesh follow a curve which
implies overlapping of territories. In theses circumstances, neighbouring countries settle
these issues through mutual understanding. Sometime they also opt for joint exploration and
development of disputed blocks. But things become difficult in South Asia where politics and
economics are closely related, and, at most of the times, politics scores over economics.30
Thus it is evident that in the case of two adjacent states, every sea zone must be
delineated between them. But for the two opposite states, the delimitation can not be
affected unless the sea zone in question is at a distance less than 400 n.m. from the baseline
of these states. So in any case, every sea zone between India and Bangladesh must be
delineated. But the provisions of norms and principles of international law concerning the
delimitation of maritime boundaries are many and complex with a scope for varying
interpretations. It is, therefore, surprising that they contribute to various disputes.
The LOS convention establishes the jurisdictional regimes, under which coastal states
can claim, manage and utilize its ocean resources. Both India and Bangladesh face problem of
lack of delimitation and negotiation of the maritime boundaries, connected to the lack of a
comprehensive framework for management of maritime issue, lack of appropriate
technology to exploit the resources that lie in the sea, and lack of means by which to exercise
and guarantee their sovereign rights.
Claims and counter claims of India and Bangladesh over the ownership of the island The crux of this island problem is that the maritime boundary between India and
Bangladesh has not yet been delimited. Moreover, the exact location of this island is not clear.
Actually it has emerged at the mouth of river Hariabhanga which is considered a border line
between the two countries. ‘The basis of Indo-Pak borders delineation in 1947 was the
Radcliffe Award. Radcliffe had awarded the districts of 24 Pargana and Khulna to West
Bengal (India) and East Bengal (Pakistan) respectively. The southern most boundary
between 24 Pargana and Khulna was regarded as the mid – stream of Hariabhanga river till it
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meets the bay. The bay begins where the main island mass of the two countries are joined by
a line’.31
India’s claim on the New Moore Island is based on the principle of ‘Median line’. India
had solved the same problem relating to ‘Kachchativu Island’32 with Sri Lanka. Both the
countries were involved on the Coral Island located almost midway between India and Sri
Lanka in Palk Strait. By application of the median line principle, the island fell on Sri Lankan
side and the island was handed over to Sri Lanka. However, Bangladesh disapproved the
principle of ‘equidistance method’ as laid down in the 1958 convention because it felt that
the article in question, which was formulated in a narrow perspective, would be of limited
help under present circumstances, more so in its own case of the shape of the coast.33
However, if no treaty exists otherwise, as in case of India and Bangladesh, the
equidistant line should be considered as boundary. There is neither any historic title, nor
special circumstances exist between two countries and no official stay orders have been
issued from International Court of Justice (ICJ) on this dispute either. Hence, technically
Indian claim gets priority over the Bangladesh claim since former one follows the
equidistance method. Even article 15 of UNCLOS regarding “delimitation of the territorial sea
between states with opposite or adjacent coasts” says, “where the coast of two states are
opposite or adjacent to each other, neither of the two states is entitled , failing agreement
between them to the contrary, to extend its territorial sea beyond the median line every
point of which is equidistant from the nearest point on the boundary from which the breadth
of the territorial seas of each of the two states is measured. The above provision does not
apply, however, where it is necessary by historic title or other special circumstances to
delimit the territorial seas of the two states in a way which is at variance therewith”.34
Even Article 33, chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations, provides for the
peaceful settlement of disputes by means of the parties’ own choice. These means always
include negotiations. If negotiations are not successful, recourse may be had to conciliation,
good offices (e.g. Office of the UN Secretary General), and arbitration (ad hoc or according to
annexure VII of UNCLOS or judicial settlement (ICJ/ITLOS).35 Methods of settling differences
and disputes about overlapping entitlements include resolving any sovereignty differences,
the establishment of a complete boundary, a partial boundary or a joint area, or combining
some of those methods. Maritime boundaries are to be established by agreement in
accordance with international law.36
Proposals made by Bangladesh Bangladesh’ policy makers cites the example of World Court’s judgment of 1969 in the
‘North Sea Continental Shelf Case’ relating to F. R. Germany, Netherlands and Denmark,
where the court ruled out that ‘equidistance’ as a method of delimitation is not a principle of
customary international law and that delimitation is to be effected by agreement in
accordance with equitable principle, taking into account all relevant special circumstances
including the general configuration of the coast. It also held that though ‘a median line’
between adjacent states can in many cases produce inequitable consequences.37
Bangladesh also proposed that the midstream of the river Hariabhanga should be
considered as the boundary line between both the countries and the ownership of the island
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should be determined on the basis of mid channel flow of this river. This is because when
Hariabhanga river enters the Bay of Bengal it is pushed westwards by the thrust of another
river `Raimangal’. This situation makes the island in Bangladesh possession. Bangladesh has
also shown maps taken through the US satellite pictures which establish the river
Hariabhanga estuary is sweeping around the island from the West.
Indian Stand On the other hand, Indian argument is that the concept of mid channel flows is not
considered in international law. So, if the flow of river Hariabhanga is considered in the same
direction of its course, the island falls in Indian territory. The `equidistant method’ between
two opposite states may not apply between adjacent states because it grossly distorts the
boundary, contrary to the principle of `equity’. Any attempt towards maritime border conflict
resolution should take into account a few key factors. Therefore, prior to the demarcation of
the sea boundary, the border of the Hariabhanga river is required to be determined first.
Ordinarily, in case of a navigable river, under international law (Article 76 and 82 of the
UNCLOS), the boundary line runs through the middle of the deepest navigable channel
(Thalweg principle) 38 unless agreed otherwise between the parties. `Equidistance principle
from the baseline under Article 15 of UNCLOS, `Thalweg Principle on Centre of the Navigable
River/Channel, proximity of the Islands to the mainland coast/river/channel’, has resolved
many maritime boundary disputes’.39 Also, according to international law, the states shall
settle the boundary through negotiations. If negotiations fail, the principle of equity will
apply, implying that justice and fairness must be the hallmark of the settlement.40Apart from
this, the "equidistant method" that is applicable between the opposite countries in respect of
delimitation of EEZ and Continental Shelf cannot be invoked to draw the sea boundary
between adjacent countries as it disregards the physical features of coastal areas and does
not achieve "an equitable solution" as mandated by the UN Convention. If this method is
applied, the boundary between adjacent countries will be unfair, distorted and inequitable.
Therefore, sea boundary of Bangladesh with its adjacent neighbours requires to be drawn in
terms of the provisions of the UN Convention so as to achieve “an equitable solution”.41
Recent Developments Bangladesh ratified UNCLOS in 2001 and India in 1995. Accordingly, both countries
are obliged to comply with the provisions of UNCLOS. Article 74 and 83 of UNCLOS lay down
the methods of delimitation of the sea boundary between adjacent states such as India and
Bangladesh, to achieve an equitable solution. But in spite of a series of negotiations, India and
Bangladesh have still not been successful to settle the dispute on the island. Claims and
counter claims are being made. The important fact is that each country is claiming the island
on the ground that it is lying in her territorial sea. There is no doubt that the conflict between
India and Bangladesh over the claim of the island is concerned with the matters of fact rather
than of law.
Moreover, the major cause of Bangladesh’s refusal to accept the ‘median line
principle’ is that once ‘New Moore Island’ comes under India’s control, India may utilize ‘New
Moore’ to be the outer most of the Indian coast. In such case India will get possession of
about 16,000 sq. miles in the sea bed. The area contains important mineral resources such as
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oil and gas and hydrocarbon rich Bay of Bengal seems to be emerging as another centre of oil
politics.
Indian Security Concerns Even from the Indian security point of view the Bay of Bengal islands are receiving
better attention because of its strategic locations. Earlier these islands were reported to have
been left in utter neglect from security point of view, as Admiral Chatterjee, the former Chief
of Indian Navy said, ‘once an enemy occupies any of these islands it may be difficult to
dislodge him, specially if the naval forces of one of the big powers present in the ocean,
declare support for the invading power’.42
The reality is that while India is a “continental” power, it occupies a central position in
the Indian Ocean region, a fact that will exercise an increasingly profound influence on
India’s security environment. Writing in the 1940s, K. M. Pannikar argued that “while to
other countries the Indian Ocean is only one of the important oceanic areas, to India it is a
vital sea. Her lifelines are concentrated in that area, her freedom is dependent on the
freedom of that water surface. No industrial development, no commercial growth, no stable
political structure is possible for her unless her shores are protected”.43 Even the former
Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee made the following statement on India’s strategic
priorities during the Combined Commanders’ Conference in November 2003:
…the strategic frontiers of today’s India, grown in international stature, have expanded
well beyond confines of South Asia…Our security environment ranges from Persian Gulf to
Straits of Malacca across the Indian Ocean, includes Central Asia and Afghanistan, China…and
South-East Asia. Our strategic thinking has also to extend to these horizons. 44 This was also
emphasized in the Annual Report of India’s Defence Ministry, which noted that “India is
strategically located vis-à-vis both in continental Asia as well as in the Indian Ocean
Region”.45
The recent three day boundary talks, held on 15-17 September 2008, to settle the
maritime boundary between the two countries too proved inconclusive. Both sides once
again reiterated their earlier positions, which made it imperative to explore the concerns for
an early resolution to the protracted conflict. In fact, both the countries are still squabbling
over the ‘equidistance’ and ‘equitable’ principles in so far as it relate to delineation of
maritime boundary.
Conclusion and Suggestions However, the need for resolution has become imperative for several reasons. As
stated earlier, India, Bangladesh and Myanmar need to resolve their maritime boundary
issues, and file their claim by 29 June 2009, 27 July 2011 and 21 May 2009 respectively. But
both India and Bangladesh are not willing to claim their stakes before the stake may prove to
be high. If at all oil exists in these blocks, the countries may face each other in International
Courts. Whatever principles, India and Bangladesh adopt in the delimitation of maritime
boundaries, their conflict over the ownership to the emerging islands, such as New Moore
Island, in the maritime zones will remain until the maritime boundaries are delimited.
`Practically, the peaceful settlement of a dispute depends on the goodwill of the parties
concerned. Short of this, it is not possible to settle the disputes peacefully’.46
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Ordinarily, the delimitation of maritime boundary takes a long time and if there is an
issue of overlapping maritime areas that remains disputed and unresolved, the experience
and lessons of many states are one of cooperation to a provincial agreement of joint
development and exploitation of resources in off-shore areas. Fortunately, there are a
number of maritime boundary delineation agreements worldwide between maritime states
and many countries have been able to conclude such interim agreements of sharing maritime
resources. For instance, Thailand and Malaysia agreed in 1979 and in 1990 to jointly exploit
sea resources of the continental shelf pending a final agreement. In 1989, Indonesia and
Australia concluded an interim agreement to share resources of the Timor Savaii.47 In June
2008, long time adversaries, Japan and China also struck a landmark deal to jointly develop
gas fields in disputed waters in the East China Sea, pending the conclusion of the delimitation
agreement.48
But in case of India and Bangladesh, joint exploration is probably not going to take
place easily because Bangladesh has always linked up this issue with other bilateral issues.
Resolution of the maritime boundaries with Bangladesh on established principles of UNCLOS
with some adjustments is most desirable for lasting peace and economic benefits. Therefore,
keeping in view the economic and security interests of both the countries some important
decision should be taken as soon as possible so that the tense relations between both the
countries remain cool and cordial. Apart from this, cooperation among the SAARC countries
in socio-economic, cultural, environmental, and political fields would be a best method of
resolution of threats and conflicts. Both India and Bangladesh must remove their bilateral
irritants and initiate confidence-building measures. And as a big power in the region,
initiative must come from Indian side and it must play a decisive role to resolve the
outstanding issues between the two countries.
___________________________________
End notes
1http://www.un.org/depts/los/nippon/unnff_programme_home/fellows_pages/fellows_papers/jamine_0607_mozambiq
ue.pdf
2http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files/3307_ilp140206.doc
3 Stephan A. Kocs,” Territorial Disputes and Interstate Wars, 1945-87. The Journal of Politics, vol.57, no.1, February
1955, p.159
4 Rear Admiral KR Srinivasan, (Retd), `India’s Maritime Boundaries with Special Focus on Pakistan and Bangladesh’,
at http://www.usiofindia.org/article_Jul_Sep07_3.htm
5 The Law of the Sea and the Settlement of Maritime Disputes, BIISS Journal, Vol. 5, No. 1, January 1984, pp. 79-80.
6 Accord on the Maritime Boundary, Asian Recorder, Vol. XXI, No. 13, March 26- April 1, 1975, p.12499.
7 Statesman Year Book, 1977-78, London, p.277.
8 Marcus F. Franda, `Bangladesh- The First Decade’, Delhi, 1982, p.132.
9P . B. Sinha, India-Bangladesh Maritime Boundary Dispute, Strategic Analysis, Vol. 1, No. 4, July 1977, p.7.
10 Ibid.
11 R.N. Mishra, Indian Ocean and India‘s Security, Delhi, 1986, p.118.
12Article 121, UNCLOS (1982)
13Article 121(3), UNCLOS (1982)
14Amrita Bazar Patrika, January 6, 1982.
15India Backgrounder, Vol. 6, No. 19, August 10, 1981, pp.2759-60.
16 National Herald, January 9, 1982.
17Asian Recorder, Vol. 27, No. 42, October 15-21, 1981, p.16269.
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18National Herald, August, 9, 1982.
19 The Tribune, August 9, 1980.
20Asian Recorder, Vol. 27, No. 42, October 15-21, 1981, p.16269.
21 The Statesman, December 20, 1981.
22Dr. Khondakar M. Hussain, ‘The Impact of the Link Canal on the Geology of Bangladesh, Bichitra, (Weekly, Dhaka)
(in Bengali), December 2, 1983, pp.27-31.
23The Statesman, May 24, 1981.
24Hindustan Times, May 17, 1981.
25S.S. Bindra, India and Her Neighbourhood, New Delhi, 1985, p.113.
26The Tribune, May 19, 1981.
27no.1
28Ibid.
29 See Document A/ conf. 62, / 121, Final act of the 3rd UN Conference on the Law of Seas.
30Dr. Anand Kumar, `Oil Poaching’ Controversy in the Bay of Bengal, paper no. 1877, dated 14.07.2006, at
www.southasiaanyalysisgroup.org.
31 Chandrika J. Gulati, Bangladesh: Liberation to Fundamentalism, New Delhi, 1986, p.101.
32 The issue of Kachchativu first arose in 1921, at the conference to demarcate fisheries line between India and Sri
Lanka and was followed by a series of bilateral discussions, relating to maritime boundary demarcation and related
matters. However, the two parties were able to reach an agreement in 1974. This agreement regarding the historic
waters between India and Sri Lanka in the Palk Strait and the Palk Bay formally confirmed Sri Lanka’s sovereignty
over the island.
33E.Ahmed, Coastal Geomorphology of India, New Delhi, 1972, p.17.
34Poornima Ravinathan, Demarcating Bangladesh's Maritime Boundary: Issues and Challenges, at
http://www.southasiamonitor.org/2009/June/news/an1.shtml
35International Court of Justice/ International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea.
36no.1
37 Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, Oxford, 1979, p.229.
38 Thalweg (a German word compounded from Tal, valley, and Weg, way) is a term adopted into English usage for
geography. It signifies the line of greatest slope along the bottom of a valley, i.e. a line drawn through the lowest
points of a valley in its downward slope. It thus marks the natural direction of a watercourse. The Thalweg principle is
the principle which defines the border between two states separated by a watercourse as lying along the thalweg.
The precise drawing of river borders has been important on countless occasions; notable examples include the Shatt
al-Arab (known as Arvand Rud in Iran) between Iraq and Iran, the Danube in central Europe, the Kasikili/Sedudu
Island dispute between Namibia and Botswana, settled by the International Court of Justice in 1999, and the 2004
dispute settlement under the UN Law of the Sea concerning the offshore boundary between Guyana and Suriname,
in which the thalweg of the Courantyne River played a role in the ruling. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thalweg.
39Rear Admiral KR Srinivasan, (Retd), no.4
40Alok Kumar Gupta, INDO-BANGLADESH MARITIME BORDER DISPUTE: PROBLEMS AND
PROSPECTS, At http://www.ipcs.org/articlesdetail.php?articleno=2699&cID
41 Poornima Ravinathan, no.34
42 R.N. Misra, no.11
43 K. M. Pannikar, India and the IO, London: Allen and Unwin, 1945, p. 84.
44 G.S. Khurana Maritime Security in the Indian Ocean: Convergence Plus Cooperation Equals Resonance, Strategic
Analysis, Vol. 28, No.3, Jul-Sep 2004, p.411
45 See Ministry of Defence, Annual Report 2004– 2005 (New Delhi), also available at www.mod.nic.in / reports
/welcome.html.
46 Chandrika J. Gulati, no.31
47 Poornima Ravinathan, no 34.
48 Harun-ur-Rashid, “Bangladesh - India Maritime Boundary”, at http://www.ipcs.org/articlesdetail.php? articleno=
2805&cID
***********
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Border Provinces and India's neighbourhood policy
Tridivesh Singh Maini
Associate Fellow
Observer Research Foundation
New Delhi
Background
Tridivesh Singh Maini graduated from the University of
Sheffield in Great Britain in 2002 with a Bachelor of Arts in
Politics (Honours). He then received an MA in International
Development from The School of International Service,
Washington D.C. in 2004. Maini has authored 'South Asian
Cooperation and the Role of the Punjabs', and co-authored
'Humanity Amidst Insanity: Hope During and After the IndoPak Partition' with Tahir Malik and Ali Farooq Malik. He is also one of the editors of " Warriors after
War: Indian and Pakistani Retired Military Leaders Reflect on Relations Between the Two countries,
Past Present and Future", being published by Peter Lang. This book is a collection of interviews with
retired army officials from India and Pakistan.
Before joining ORF, Maini worked as a Senior Staff Writer with The Indian Express, New Delhi and as a
Research Associate with The Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore.
Presently
In his present capacity as an Associate Fellow at ORF's Centre for Resources Management he is working
on the project titled: "Re-imagining the Indus.”
E-mail ID: [email protected]
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Border Provinces and India's neighbourhood policy
Introduction:
Most scholars agree that India's border provinces will play a crucial role in its ties with
neighbouring countries. There is a general consensus among scholars on the factors
responsible for the increase in the role of provincial governments in foreign policy.
It is factors such as the growth of interdependence, globalisation, growth of regional parties,
coalition government, sub-regional organisations, etc have increased the political “space” of
the provincial governments. Then off course in the case of the two Punjab’s and RajasthanSind, the emotional causes such as the logic of geography and a common past.
Some scholars such as C Rajamohan who have been arguing for greater utilisation of India's
borders for opening up to its neighbours believe the former has a lot to learn from China in
this regard. A good illustration of the same being the fact that i:
For more than a decade, the Yunnan province has spent much energy in developing economic
cooperation with Burma, Bangladesh and India. The Tibetan regional government in Lhasa
wants to develop closer links with Bhutan, Nepal and India. Xinjiang, which had long
benefited from trans-Karakoram links with Pakistan, is now exploring similar connectivity
with Afghanistan. As China develops the historic city of Kashgar in Xinjiang as a regional hub,
the idea of a “Pamir Group” bringing Xinjiang, Afghanistan and Pakistan together into a
regional forum is gaining ground.
One more point which has bolstered the argument of border states playing a pivotal role in
India's neighbourhood policy is the failure of SAARC. Ever since its advent nearly two and a
half decades ago, the South Asian regional forum for cooperation, SAARC, has been held
hostage to bilateral disputes, principally between India and Pakistan. As a consequence,
SAARC has not been able to facilitate cooperation between its member states. To overcome
this the central government has encouraged a direct relationship between border provinces
with India’s neighbours.
The thrust ever since the ruling United Progressive Alliance (UPA) led by Manmohan Singh
took over the reins in 2004, has been on ‘making borders irrelevant without redrawing
them’. To ensure this, there has been a continuing stress on connecting India’s border
provinces with those of its neighbouring countries.
It would be crucial to mention here that while the previous National Democratic Alliance
(NDA) regime had conceived of the bus service between the two Kashmir’s and the train
service between the provinces of Rajasthan and Sind. Increased connectivity between other
border regions has especially increased during the UPA regime. A perfect example is the
connectivity between the Punjabs, which was virtually non-existent before the first Amritsar208
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India and South Asia
Lahore bus was flagged off in January 2006 followed by the bus from Amritsar to Nankana
Sahib in March 2006. Similarly efforts are underway to increase connectivity with Bhutan
and Myanmar ii.
In non-SAARC countries, as a separate instance, there has been increasing talk of greater
connectivity with China and Myanmar.
It would be useful now to examine how provinces have reacted to these overtures, and
whether there have been any tangible results so far.
Relations between border provinces and neighbouring countries:
If one were to look at the relations between border provinces and India's neighbours, there
are some interesting dynamics at play.
In some cases states such as Tamil Nadu and West Bengal (which border Sri Lanka and
Bangladesh respectively) take a more aggressive posture with neighbouring countries on
certain issues. A water agreement with Bangladesh was put on hold because West Bengal
Chief Minister, Mamata Banerjee was not convinced by some of its provisions. Originally
scheduled to accompany the Prime Minister on his visit to Bangladesh in September, Ms
Banerjee ultimately refused to go. Similarly in Tamil Nadu, Chief Minister Jayalalitha has
been urging the Central Government to take a tougher stance against the Sri Lankan navy
which has been attacking Indian fishermen in the Palk Strait.
On the Western borders, states such as Punjab and Kashmir have been pitching for better ties
with Pakistan. If one were to take the case of Punjab, the period between 2003-2007 which
was witness to some incredible strides in the peace process between both countries also saw
greater interaction between Indian Punjab and Pakistani Punjab.
Apart from interactions at the official level, there were numerous cultural exchanges and off
course greater interaction between businessmen from both sides, with the Chambers of
Lahore and Amritsar working quite closely.
The first consequence of this closeness and anticipation of trade opening up was the sudden
sky rocketing of land prices in both the border towns of Amritsar and Lahore. This bonhomie
has carried on even in the aftermath of the Mumbai attacks, with trade continuing
uninterrupted.
In Kashmir it was the Mufti Mohammed Sayeed led PDP’s brain child to open up the Sri
Nagar-Muzzafarabad bus route which received unflinching support from the BJP led central
government, even though the PDP was allied to the Congress. Apart from connectivity by bus,
trade between the two Kashmir’s has played its role in improving ties.
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On the Eastern borders, the relationship with Bangladesh has improved manifold in spite of the hold
up in the Teesta water treaty. Bangladesh has concurred to a transit route between the mountainous
north- eastern states and the rest of India via Bangladesh. Aside from this, the use of Bangladeshi
seaports and river ports was also be discussed during the Indian PM’s visit to Dhaka. Realising the
importance of the North-Eastern states, Singh was accompanied by the chief ministers of four of the
five northeastern states bordering Bangladesh: Meghalaya’s Mukul Sangma, Tripura’s Manik Sarkar,
Assam’s Tarun Gogoi, and Mizoram’s Lal Thanhawla. Mamata Banerjee as mentioned earlier, backed
out at the last minute. It might be mentioned that Tripura Central University is conferring the
Bangladeshi Prime Minister, Sheikh Hasina with an honorary Doctorate of Literature in its ninth
convocation to be held here on January 12 iii.
Similar efforts are underway to increase connectivity with Myanmar. During his visit to India,
Myanmar President U Thein Sein discussed the possibility of more bus services, ferry services and air
connectivity between the two countries. Indian Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh was reported to
have discussed with the U Thein Sein the possibility of a road linking Moreh-Mae Sot that would
connect India and Thailand via Myanmar iv.
In this context, both sides agreed to examine commencement of ferry services on the Kolkata-Yangon
and Chennai-Yangon routes.
Obstacles:
While all the above mentioned developments discussed above are encouraging, it must be mentioned
that there are some crucial impediments which prevent freer exchange of goods and services
between India’s border provinces and neighbouring countries. Some of them are as follows:
(1) CBM’s a failure due to unimaginative visa regimes:
If one were to look at the Western borders, as a consequence of the logistical challenges of
cross-border travel, none of the initiatives have delivered the results which were expected of
them. In Punjab, travelling from Amritsar to Lahore takes barely an hour – but first, Indian
travellers have to go all the way to New Delhi to secure a visa, an exercise that many do not
have the time for or the money to afford. In addition to a visa, security clearance is required
to travel to Pakistani Punjab. This is a tedious process.Kashmir, where measures in the name
of national security legislations as a major impediment to smooth people-to-people contact
between the two sides. Two bus routes, the Uri-Muzaffarabad and the Poonch-Rawalkote,
run between the Kashmir and the Jammu divisions. But the current procedures for crossing
the heavily militarised Line of Control (LoC) are tedious, and they discourage most people
from cross-border travel; detailed scrutiny of applicants makes obtaining a travel permit an
effort that takes months. In Rajasthan, the Khokhrapar-Munabao train has not been
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successful because passengers have to go all the way to New Delhi to secure a visa. This,
when Khokhrapar is much closer to Karachi than it is to Jaipur v.
(2) Poor infrastructure
India is slow to build infrastructure for facilitating cross-border trade, this is the case on all its
borders. A recent illustration of this fact is that In December 2011, traders in Akhaura,
Tripura went on a strike, impacting bilateral border trade worth lakhs of rupees. The traders
were protesting against the poor infrastructure of the integrated check-post at Akhaura,
which has made it virtually impossible to trade. In June 2011, home minister P Chidambaram
inaugurated the checkpost with a lot of fanfare, promising construction in 18 months vi. It
might be mentioned that after a visit to Nathu-la Pass in 2007, Defence Minister AK Antony
while comparing the infrastructructure on the Indian side and Chinese side was quick to state
vii, "It is an eye opener for me. There is no comparison between the two sides. Infrastructure
on the Chinese side is far far superior. They have gone far in developing their infrastructure,".
If India’s overtures are to show any substantial results, it is imperative that infrastructrure at
the borders is improved.
(3) New Delhi’s policies not in consonance with border states
New Delhi’s neighbourhood policy is not in consonance with border states such as Tamil
Nadu and West Bengal who due to political constraints take an aggressive stance.viii On the
contrary, there are provinces such as Kashmir and Punjab in the West and Manipur in the East
which feel that Delhi has been non-serious with regard to its cross-border initiatives. The
latter needs to ensure that it is on the same page with its border provinces, otherwise it will
have to face severe embarrassment as it did when Mamata Banerjee refused to be a signatory
to the Teesta treatyix. Similarly on issues pertaining to cross-border trade and visa regimes, it
should keep state governments and local visa chambers in the loop as they are the actual
stake holders whose concerns need to be taken more seriously. If trade is restrictive and
there are unnecessary embargos, local traders will have to go against rules set by the
government. A good illustration of this is Moreh (Manipur). According to a write-up in The
Business Standard, ‘... during the four-month long economic blockade, the Manipur
government requested the Central government to allow it to import petrol and diesel from
Myanmar. The request was, however, turned down by the Central government stating that the
quality of fuel in Myanmar was not suited for Indian automobiles. Despite the Central
government’s gag-order against import of petrol/diesel, local shops in Moreh are seen openly
selling petrol and diesel that are bought from across the border’.
Although there has been change in mindset as far as cross-border provinces are concerned,
deep-seated concern among some sections linger, would allowing the cross-border
provincial interactions dilute the central government authority over the border provinces. It
is imperative that the fears of such lobbies within India’s polity, strategic community and
media are allayed. It is imperative to drive home the point that provinces are meant to
facilitate India’s foreign policy not to act as a substitute. For example in the case of the two
Punjabs, it has been argued by many analysts that interactions between 2004-2006 between
politicians and common Punjabis helped in healing wounds not only between the provinces,
but also changing perceptions about the each other’s country. While these provincial
exchanges cannot obliterate policies determined in the national capital, they can become an
important component of itx.
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Conclusion:
In conclusion, it is imperative that cross-border initiatives are taken more seriously and there
are periodic appraisals. Border provinces should join hands and form a grouping where they can
discuss problems and also persuade New Delhi to look into some of the issues which they face with
regard to visa regimes, cross-border trade and connectivity. For starters, ‘the northern states, such as
Rajasthan which borders Sind, the Indian Punjab and Kashmir at the Indian side, form a grouping
among themselves. They can identify common problems with regard to trade, visa issues and
exchanges in the realm of culture, education and sports, and urge New Delhi to pay serious heed.This
trilateral should identify areas like agriculture, trade, medical tourism and exchanges and make sure
that interaction in these areas should not be disrupted, even if the bilateral relationship between both
countries is not cordial. A good beginning can be made by bringing academics, prominent political
leaders and journalists from these states onto one platform’xi. Later on this grouping can be further
expanded.
New Delhi should also make sure that it consults its border states on neighbourhood policies
which may affect them, so that the national policy does not seem confused and bereft of
clarity.
Maybe with some of these steps, Dr Manmohan Singh’s dream of making borders irrelevant
can be realised.
___________________________________________
1
C Rajamohan, ‗South Asia Rising‘, The Indian Express, November 10, 2011
2
The Financial World, ‘Keep the SAARC borders soft and irrelevant’, May 5, 2011
3
The Times of India, ‗Hasina to be conferred honorary D Litt by Tripura Central Varsity‘, December 31, 2011
4
Akshat Kaushal, ‗Moreh: The gateway to South East Asia‘, Business Standard, December 30, 2011
5
The Financial World, ‗Needed: A trilateral of Northern States‘, July 15, 2011
6
The Times of India, ‗India's indecisiveness is spoiling a good Bangladesh story‘, December 30, 2011
7
The Times of India, ‗Develop border areas to match China: Antony‘, December 2, 2007
8
C Rajamohan, ‗South Asia Rising‘
9
The Times of India, ‗India's indecisiveness is spoiling a good Bangladesh story‘
10
TS Maini, South Asian Cooperation and The Role of the Punjabs. New Delhi: Siddhartha Publications
11
The Financial World, ‗Needed: A trilateral of Northern States‘
**************
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India and South Asia
Bilateral Trade Treaties between Nepal and India
Dr Monika Mandal
Fellow,
Maulanan Abul Kalam Azad
Institute of Asian Studies, KOLKATA
[email protected].
[email protected].
Qualifications:
M.A from University of Burdwan, 1998.
M.Phil from Department of International Relations, Jadavpur
University, 2001.
PhD from Department of International Relations, Jadavpur
University, 2007.
Research Interest:
In South Asia Perspective.
Experiences (Research):
1. „Development of Refugee Colonies in West Bengal: study in Bankura District‟.
2. „Refugee Relief and Rehabilitation in West Bengal: A study of Bankura District‟.
3. Interview in refugee colonies in Malda District.
4. Interview with Limbu people in Nepal.
Other Experiences:
Participant in International Workshop on UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, Centre for
Refugee Studies, Jadavpur University and Norwegian Refugee Council, November 28-30, 2001.
Worked as a Research Assistant in International Seminar on Terrorism and Low Intensity Conflict in South
Asian Region, 6-8 March 2002, Department of International Relations, Jadavpur University, Kolkata.
Participant in Creative Writers‟ workshop on Forced Displacement of Population, Organized by- Mahanirban
Calcutta Research Group. Darjeeling, November 6 to 10, 2003.
Research Assistant, Edited in Book “Terrorism and Low Intensity Conflict in South Asia Region”, Edited by
Prof. Omprakash Mishra and Sucheta Ghosh, MANAK Publication PVT.LTD, 2003.
Research Assistant, Edited in Book “Forced Migration in the South Asia Region: Displacement, Human
Rights and Conflict Resolution”, Edited by Prof. Omprakash Mishra,Published by: Centre for Refugee
Studies, Jadavpur University, Kolkata in collaboration with Brookings institution-SAIS Project on internal
Displacement Washington DC and MANAK Publication PVT.LTD, 2004.
Present Work :
1. Fellow in MAKAIAS from 2005.
Project Title: „Towards Integration: Social and Cultural Aspects of Refugees and Host Community Relation
in West Bengal‟.
2. Fellow in MAKAIAS from 2008.
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Project “Social Inclusion of Ethnic Community in Contemporary Nepal”
Books:
Title: „Settling the Unsettled: A Study of Partition refugees in West Bengal‟ Publisher Manohar, New Delhi.
2011.
Articles :
1. „Refugee Problems in South Asia.‟ Asia Annual 2006. MAKAIAS.
2. ‘Refugees in Malda District: The Past and Present Scenario.’ Research Report Asia Annual 2007.
MAKAIAS.
3. “Partition Memory and Refugee Experience: A Study of Literature and Cinema in Post-Colonial Bengal”.
Asia Annual 2008. MAKAIAS.
4. “International Refugee Law”. Published from ICFAI University Journal of International Relations. Vol. III
No. 2 April 2009.
5. “Internal Displacement in India: status, Condition & Prospectus of Return”. Published from Refugee
Watch A South Asian Journal on Forced Migration, Mahanirban Calcutta Research Group. Vol. 33.
6. “Refugees and Security: The Experience of Nepal”.Published by Manohar, New Delhi as part of Asia
Annual Series. Asia Annual 2009 MAKAIAS.
7. “Ethnic conflict in Nepal”. Published from ICFAI University Journal of International Relations. Vol. III No.
2 April 2011.
8. „Indo-Nepal International Open Boundary Relations‟ Published from ICFAI University Journal of
International Relations. Vol. III No. 3 April 2011. (Forth coming)
9. „Bilateral Trade Treaties between Nepal and India‟ Published from FPRC, New Delhi. (Forth coming)
Book Review:
Ali Riaz and Subho Basu, Paradise Lost? State Failure in Nepal, The edition is published by arrangement
with Lexicon Books, USA, 2007. Published in 2010 By Nirmal Kumar Karn, Adarsh Books, New Delhi. Asia
Annual 2010 MAKAIAS.
Paper Presentation:
1. “Refugee crisis in West Bengal from 1947 to 1971.” 27 April 2007. MAKAIAS.
2. International Conference on Social Development, Social Movement and the Marginalized: Perspectives
and Concerns. February 16-19, 2008 in the Maidangarhi Campus of IGNOU, Delhi. Paper “Socio-Economic
Dimension of Globalization Relates to the Lifestyle and Societies”
3. National Seminar on Marginalized groups: Problems and Prospects in Contemporary India on 5-6 March
2008, in the Department of Sociology, Vidyasagar University, West Bengal. Paper “Marginalized groups:
Problems and Internal Displacement in Contemporary India.”
4. National Seminar on Representing People, Redefining Society: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Popular
Culture on 28-29 April 2008, MAKAIAS. Auditorium of the Centre for Social Sciences and Humanities,
University of Calcutta, Alipur Campus, 10th Floor. Paper “Reflection of Refugees in Bengali literature and
Movies on Partition and host community”.
5. Participation and paper presentation in National Seminar on Development Discourse: Intervention for
Sustainability held on 25th to 26th March 2009, Department of Sociology Vidyasagar University, W.B. Title
is 'Social Conditions and Development of Dalits in Nepal'.
6. Paper presentation in National Seminar on Alternative Paradigms of Security in Asia held on 15th to 16th
October 2009, MAKAIAS. Paper “Refugees and Security: The Experience of Nepal”.
7. Paper presentation in International Seminar on “Nepali Diaspora in the Globalised Context”held on 28th
to 30th November 2011, North-Eastern Hill University Campus, Shillong. Paper “Limbu Diaspora in India.”
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India and South Asia
Bilateral Trade Treaties between Nepal and India
Economic relationship between Nepal and India is unique. There are historical, geographical,
cultural, linguistic, ethnic, social and family links between people living in India and Nepal.
Institutions relating to government and the economic activities are also more or less similar.
Therefore, the trade and other related relationship between Nepal and India has its own
significance. Trade relationship between these two countries often goes beyond the economic
reason significantly influenced by the social-ethical norms and values. Research and studies reveal
that both the countries have comparative cost advantages in trading amongst themselves for several
reasons. Historic trade relation, geographical proximity, identical culture, similar agriculture
productions are cited few examples quite repeatedly. Economical transport cost is seen as another
important factor determining the volume of trade between these countries. In view of the rising
energy costs, it often considered that the transport costs are likely to rise so that the transport cost
advantage to both these countries trading with each other is likely to increase in future. This would
further increase the potential for trade between these countries.1 On the other hand, notes that the
economic cooperation between Nepal and India is based on the movements of goods and services
across Nepal-India border of about 1,600 km. The movement is free and spontaneous. This
movement further accelerated by the movement of people for economic pursuits, social and
marriage relations. The cultural ties and non-existence of visa system have created better
environment for the conduction of free trade between the two countries.2
Indo-Nepal trade has its own importance for the economic development of both these countries.
Trade relation with India is rather crucial to Nepal particularly due to her landlocked geographic
characteristics. Trade statistics show an increasing trend of trade in both the exports and imports.
However, it is noteworthy that the trade balance is not in favour of Nepal. As such, it does not
present a convincing picture in the macro-economic performance of Nepal. Both the countries
have realized the significance of bilateral trade. Trade with India is likely to play further a key role
in trade and industrial fronts in the future as well. Trade and transit treaties held between the two
countries are continuously reflecting the fact. And, these treaties have increasingly guided the trade
direction, more specifically in the case of Nepal. Taking into account these factors, this study has
made an attempt to analyze some of the key issues related with Indo-Nepal trade relation and
scope for improving trade relationship between these countries in the future.
Nepal-India Trade Treaties
Bilateral treaty, by and large, reflects a symbol of the very special relationship that prevails
between two countries. Bilateral trade and trade related activities between Nepal and India are
generally governed by the treaties of trade, transit and other agreements for cooperation to control
unauthorised trade. Nepal is a land-locked country surrounded by India in the east, south and west.
Due to its geo-situational characteristics, bilateral trade and treaties with India play a significant
role in the economic development process of Nepal. They determine, to a large extent, the trade
pattern and prospects of the country.
Nepal and India have historical relationships. The history of Nepalese trade reveals that India has
been the old trade partner since a quite long time ago. Prior to 1950s, India and Tibet were the
major trade partners of Nepal. Virtually, the country had a closed economy. The signing of Treaty
of Peace and Friendship, and Treaty of Trade and Commerce between Nepal and an independent
India in July 1950 can be seen as the landmark towards the external trade of Nepal. Treaty of
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Peace and Friendship 1950 formalised close relations between the two countries. This Treaty can
be seen as a non-reciprocal treaty. The Treaty symbolises a balanced document and served for
more than five decades to keep harness between the two countries. Apparently, it can therefore be
seen that the pace of organized and diversified trade, in true terms, began after the signing of the
Treaty of Trade in July 1950. Article 1 of this Treaty made the provision of full and unrestricted
right of commercial transit of all goods and manufactures through the territory and ports of India.3
Formal trade relation between the two countries was established in 1950 with the signing of the
Treaty of Trade. This Treaty was modified and renewed in 1961 and 1971, and incorporated
provisions regarding transit facilities extended by India for Nepal‘s trade with a third country, as
well as on cooperation to control unauthorized trade. Duty free access to Nepalese imports on a
non-reciprocal basis was first given in 1971 but with a Nepalese/Indian material content
requirement of 90 per cent. This was gradually reduced when the Trade Treaty was periodically
renewed and in 1993, it was brought down to 50 per cent of Nepalese/Indian material content and
Nepalese labor content. In 1978, instead of a single Treaty, three different agreements were signed.
These treaties were modified significantly in 1991, after the advent of democratic government in
Nepal. India signed two treaties on trade and transit with Nepal in 1991. Indo-Nepal Treaty of
Trade 1991 made the provisions of extending substantial concessions. The Treaty of Trade, valid
for five years, was revised and renewed through an exchange of letter on 3rd December 1996. The
Treaty was renewed in December 1996 for a further period of five years with the provisions for
further periods of five years, at a time, by mutual consent subject to such modifications as may be
agreed upon. The Protocol to the India -Nepal Treaty of Trade was renewed with some
modifications in February 2002.
The Treaty of Transit, 1991 came up for renewal in December 1998 and following bilateral talks, a
renewed Transit Treaty was signed on January 5, 1999. The renewed Treaty contains liberalized
procedures of the transit of the Nepalese goods. The Government of India accepted Nepalese
request for ―automatic renewal‖ of the Treaty for further seven-year periods. However, the
Protocol and Memorandum to the Treaty, containing modalities and other would be subject to
review and modification every seven years or earlier if warranted.
The Nepalese request for an additional transit route to Bangladesh via Phulbari was accepted in
June 1997. Operating modalities for the transit were accordingly worked out. And, the route was
operational from 1 September 1997. A review of the working of the route was held in March 1998
at Commerce Secretary-level talks in Delhi when several relaxations of the operating modalities
requested by the Nepalese were agreed to. These included Nepalese request to keep the route open
on all days of the week.
Trade and Transit Treaties, held between Nepal and India, can be seen as the outcomes of progress
and understanding towards improving trade relationship between the two countries. On the other
hand, it can also be seen as the reform initiatives of the both countries as per demand of the socioeconomic and geo-political framework. These treaties have been quite comprehensive
concentrating on the issues of hazardous cargo, insurance, quantum of primary commodities and
rules of origin. The rules of origin norms enabling preferential treatment of the Nepalese
manufactured goods for entry into the Indian market has gradually been relaxed to improve
coverage of eligible products. As a result of the good understanding reflected in the bilateral trade
and transit treaties, the number of primary commodities eligible to enter into both the countries
free of restrictions has been increased. Similarly, the number of transit points to facilitate Nepal‘s
trade with India and, also Nepal‘s trade with third countries through Indian Territory has been
expanded.4 Realizing the significance of the bilateral treaty and its impact on the foreign trade, it
has been remarked that the Indo-Nepal bilateral economic cooperation treaties have led to
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significant policy inferences for future economic cooperation in the South Asian Region (SAR). It
is due to the fact that India has emerged as a major trade partner of Nepal as both exports and
imports in value terms have been quite high in comparison with Nepal‘s major trade partners. The
possible reason for this tendency could be the freer trade regime that has existed between India and
Nepal.5 Since 1991, trade relation between Nepal and India has been intensified and also entering
into a new arena. Taking into account the fact, this study has made an attempt to analyze the
provisions made in the trade and transit treaties and the major impact of these on the structure and
trend of Indo-Nepal trade.
Treaty of Trade
In order to expand trade between Nepal and India and also to encourage collaboration in economic
development, Treaty of Trade, 1991 was signed on 6 December 1991. It was explicitly expressed
in the Treaty to promote mutual trade between the two countries for the benefits of mutual sharing
of scientific and technical knowledge and experience.
Article II of the Treaty provisioned of endeavoring to grant maximum facilities and to undertake
all necessary measures for the free and unhampered flow of goods needed by one country from the
other to and from their respective territories. With a view to promote trade, Article IV of the Treaty
stated that the contracting parties agree, on the reciprocal basis, to exempt from basic customs duty
as well as from quantitative restrictions on the import of such primary products as may be mutually
agreed upon from each other. Furthermore, the Government of India agreed to promote the
industrial development of Nepal through the grant on the basis of non-reciprocity of especially
favorable treatment to import into India of industrial products manufactured in Nepal in respect of
customs duty and quantitative restrictions normally applicable to them. As such, a scope for
exception was made in the Article V of the Treaty to the Nepalese manufactured products. On the
basis of reciprocity and with a view to facilitating greater interchange of goods between the two
countries, it was expressed in the Article VI of the Treaty that His Majesty‘s Government of Nepal
shall endeavor to exempt, wholly or partially, imports from India from customs duty and
quantitative restrictions to the maximum extent compatible with their development needs and
protection of their industries.
This Treaty also made the provision of all goods of Indian or Nepalese origin shall be allowed to
move unhampered to Nepal or India respectively without being subjected to any quantitative
restrictions, licensing or permit system with the exception of restricted or prohibited goods and
articles. Furthermore, the Government of India agreed to allow to His Majesty‘s Government of
Nepal the payment of excise and other duties collected by the Government of India on goods
produced in India and exported to Nepal provided that:
i. such payment shall not exceed the import duties and like charges levied by His Majesty‘s
Government of Nepal on similar goods imported from any other country, and
ii. His Majesty‘s Government of Nepal shall not collect from the importer of the said Indian goods
as much of the import duty and like charges as is equal to the payment allowed by the Government
of India.
In respect to the access, duty and quantity of the goods and articles, the Treaty provisioned of
providing access to the Indian market free of basic and auxiliary customs duty and quantitative
restrictions, generally, for all manufactured articles, which contain not less than eighty per cent of
the Nepalese materials, or Nepalese and Indian materials. Furthermore, the Government of India
would provide access to the Indian market, on case-to-case basis, free of basic and auxiliary
customs duty and quantitative restrictions for manufactured articles that contain not less than fifty
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five per cent of the Nepalese materials or Nepalese and Indian materials. In addition, with a view
to extend benefits to small manufacturers, the Treaty made a provision of levying ‗additional‘ duty
on the ‗small‘ units manufactured in Nepal equivalent to the rate of excise duty applicable under
the Indian Customs and Central Excise Tariff to articles produced in similar units in India.
With regard to ‗additional‘ duty collected by the Government of India in respect of manufactured
articles other than those manufactured in ‗small‘ units, certain provisions were made as whenever
it is established that the cost of production of an article is higher in Nepal than the cost of
production in a corresponding unit in India, a sum representing such difference in the cost of
production, but not exceeding 25 per cent of the ‗additional‘ duty collected by the Government of
India, will be paid to His Majesty‘s Government of Nepal provided that:
i. such manufactured articles contain not less than eighty per cent of Nepalese and Indian
materials, and
ii. His Majesty‘s Government of Nepal has given assistance to the same extent to the
(manufacturer) exporter.
In the case of other manufactured articles in which the value of the Nepalese and Indian materials
including labor added in Nepal is at least forty per cent of the ex-factory price, the Government of
India will allow the articles on case-by-case basis following preferential treatment keeping in mind
the need for expeditious clearance in the Indian market. On the other hand, in the case of other
manufactured articles in which the value of the Nepalese and Indian materials and labor added in
Nepal is less than forty per cent of the ex-factory price, the Government of India will provide
normal access to the Indian market consistent with its import regime and most favored nation
(MFN) treatment. This Treaty, by and large, concentrated on the material content requirements
while importing goods and articles in India. However, the Treaty recognized the immense
importance of export trade for the economic development of Nepal and as such made necessary
provisions in the Treaty.
This Treaty, signed on December 3, 1996 at Kathmandu, sets a landmark in bilateral trade relation
between Nepal and India. It gave a new direction in the trade related areas as well as a scope for
the trade improvement especially to Nepal. Some of the provisions made in the earlier treaties
were replaced and modified. It made the procedures simple and straight so as to remove the
procedural delays. Moreover, the Treaty committed the cooperation in more specific and extended
manner. Some of the provisions of the Treaty are stated below:
i. access to the Indian market free of customs duties and the quantitative restrictions for all articles
manufactured in Nepal.
ii. import of articles in accordance with (i) above shall be allowed by the Indian customs
authorities on the basis of a Certificate of Origin (CoO) to be issued by the agency designated by
His Majesty‘s Government of Nepal in the format prescribed at ‗ B‘ for each consignment of
articles exported from Nepal to India.
But this facility is not provided to the negative list of articles mentioned in ―C‖.
iii. on the basis of a certificate issued by His Majesty‘s Government of Nepal, for each
consignment of products manufactured in the small scale units in Nepal, that the relevant
conditions applicable to the products manufactured in similar Small Scale Industrial Units (SSIU)
in India for relief in the levy of applicable excise duty rates are fulfilled for such a parity,
Government of India will extend parity in the levy of additional duty on such Nepalese products
equal to the treatment provided in the levy of effective excise duty on similar Indian products
under the Indian Customs and Central Excise Tariff.
However, The ―Additional Duty‖ rates equal to the effective Indian excise duty rates applicable to
similar Indian products under the Indian Customs & Central Excise Tariff will continue to be
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levied on the imports into India of products manufactured in the medium and large-scale units in
Nepal.
iv. In regard to Indian additional duty collected by the Government of India in respect of
manufactured articles other than those manufactured in ―small‖ units: whenever it is established
that the cost of production of an article is higher in Nepal than the cost of production in a
corresponding unit in India, a sum representing such difference in the cost of production, but not
exceeding 25 per cent of the ―additional duty‖ collected by the Government of India, will be paid
to His Majesty‘s Government of Nepal provided His Majesty‘s Government has given assistance
to the same extent to the (manufacturers) exporters.
v. Export of consignments from Nepal accompanied by the Certificate of Origin (CoO) will
normally not be subjected to any detention or delays at the Indian customs border check posts and
other places en route. In case any need for clarification arises, this will be obtained expeditiously
by the Indian Border Customs authorities from the Indian and Nepalese authorities, as the case
may be.
Negative list of articles that are not allowed preferential entry from Nepal to India on the basis of
Certificate of Origin (CoO) include:
i. Alcoholic Liquors/ Beverages and their concentrates except industrial spirits,
ii. Perfumes and Cosmetics with non-Nepalese/ non-Indian Brand names, and
iii. Cigarettes and Tobacco.
However, a provision was made that Nepalese beers can be imported into India on payment of the
applicable liquor excise duty equal to the effective excise duty as levied in India on Indian beers
under the relevant rules and regulations of India. Furthermore, it was also stated that the
Government of India might modify the negative list in consultation with His Majesty‘s
Government of Nepal. Furthermore, provisions were made in the Treaty to adopt appropriate
measures in the event of facility leading to a surge in the import. In this regard governments of the
both countries may consult with each other with a view to take appropriate measures.
With regard to the validity of the Treaty, it was mentioned that it would remain in force up to
December 5, 2001. In accordance with the provision made in the Treaty6 it would be automatically
extended for further period of five years at a time on the condition that unless either of the parties
gives to the other a written notice of its intention to terminate the Treaty. But the notice should be
given three months in advance. Furthermore, the scope for amendment and modification of the
Treaty was provisioned upon the mutual consent of both the countries.
This Treaty facilitated to a greater extent in favor of Nepal. By virtue of this Treaty Nepal can
export to India without any quantitative restrictions on the one hand and, free of custom duties on
the other. These provisions were definitely the positive aspects and also creating an appropriate
environment for boosting up the Nepalese export trade.
This treaty is a continuation of the Treaty of Trade, 1996 rather in a revised form with the
inclusion and exclusion of some of the provisions in the Articles. After a series of meetings in
Delhi from 27th February to 2nd March 2002, an agreement was reached to extend the validity of
all the twelve Articles of the India-Nepal Treaty of Trade, and Protocols to Articles I, II, III, IV
and VI in their present form for a period of five years with effect from 6th March 2002.
And, it was also agreed that the revised Protocol to Article V and the new Protocol to Article
IX of the Treaty would also be valid for the same period. Some of the major provisions made in
the Treaty can be identified as follows:
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1. preferential access to the Indian market free of customs duties normally applicable and
quantitative restrictions for all articles manufactured in Nepal, except the mentioned articles,
provided they fulfill the qualifying criteria.
(a) the articles are manufactured in Nepal wholly from Nepalese materials or Indian materials or
Nepalese and Indian materials ;or
(b) (i) the articles involve a manufacturing process in Nepal that brings about a change in
classification, at four digit level, of the Harmonized Commodities Description and Coding System,
different from those, in which all the third country origin materials used in its manufacture are
classified; and the manufacturing process is not limited to insufficient working or processing as
indicated in ―B‖, and
(b) (ii) From 6th March 2002 to 5th March 2003 , the total value of materials, parts or produce
originating from non-Contracting Parties or of undetermined origin used does not exceed 75 per
cent of the ex-factory price of the articles produced, and the final process of manufacturing is
performed within the territory of Nepal. From 6th March 2003 onwards, the total value of
materials, parts or produce originating from non-Contracting Parties or of undetermined origin
used does not exceed 70 per cent of the ex-factory price of the articles produced, and the final
process of manufacturing is performed within the territory of Nepal.
(c) Preferential access to the Nepalese articles not fulfilling the conditions of 1 (b)
(i) But fulfilling the condition 1 (b) (ii) on a case by case basis.
(d) Normal access to other articles manufactured in Nepal which do not fulfill the qualifying
criteria specified with MFN treatment.
2. Import of articles in accordance with (1) above shall be allowed by the Indian customs
authorities on the basis of a Certificate of Origin to be issued by the agency designated for this
purpose by His Majesty‘s Government of Nepal in the format prescribed at -―D‖ for each
consignment of articles exported from Nepal to India.
3. for each consignment of articles manufactured in the small-scale units in Nepal, on the basis of a
Certificate issued by His Majesty‘s Government of Nepal, that the relevant conditions applicable
to the articles manufactured in similar Small Scale Industrial Units in India for relief in the levy of
applicable Excise Duty rates are fulfilled for such a parity, Government of India will extend parity
in the levy of Additional Duty on such Nepalese articles equal to the treatment provided in the levy
of effective Excise Duty on similar Indian articles under the Indian Customs and Central Excise
Tariff.
4. ―Additional Duty‖ rates equal to the effective Indian excise duty rates applicable to similar
Indian products under the Indian Customs & Central Excise Tariff will continue to be levied on the
imports into India of products manufactured in the medium and large scale units in Nepal.
5. In regard to additional duty collected by the Government of India in respect of manufactured
articles other than those manufactured in ―small‖ units; wherever it is established that the cost of
production of an article is higher in Nepal than the cost of production in a corresponding unit in
India, a sum representing such difference in the cost of production, but not exceeding 25 per cent
of the ―additional duty‖ collected by the Government of India, will be paid to His Majesty‘s
Government of Nepal provided His Majesty‘s Government of Nepal has given assistance to the
same extent to the (manufacturers) exporters.
6. Export of consignments from Nepal accompanied by the Certificate of Origin will normally not
be subjected to any detention or delays at the Indian customs border check posts and other places
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en route. However, in case of reasonable doubt about the authenticity of Certificate of Origin, the
Indian Customs Authority may seek a clarification from the certifying agency.
7. The importing country may request for consultations in the Joint Committee to take appropriate
measures in the event of imports in such a manner or in such quantities so as to cause or threaten to
cause injury to the domestic industry or a significant segment of it relating to the article.
8. Provisions made for some of the articles allowed to entry into India with free of customs duties
on fixed quota basis are as follows:
S.No
1.
2.
3.
Nepalese article
Quantity in MT per year
Vegetable fats (Vanaspati)
100,000 ( One hundred thousand)
Acrylic Yarn
10,000 (Ten thousand)
Copper products under Chapters 74 & 7,500 (Seven thousand five
Heading 85.44 of the H.S.Code
hundred)
4.
Zinc Oxide
2,500 (Two thousand five hundred)
However, it is stated in the Treaty that imports of the above four commodities into India in excess
of the fixed quota will be permitted under normal MFN rates of duty.7 And, they will be permitted
through the land Customs Stations (LCS) at Kakarbhitta/Naxalbari, Biratnagar/Jogbani,
Birganj/Raxaul, Bhairahawa/Nautanwa, Nepalgunj/Nepalgunj Road and Mahendranagar/ Banbasa.
Furthermore, the following articles are not be allowed under preferential entry from Nepal to
India on the basis of Certificate of Origin:
1. Alcoholic Liquors/ Beverages and their concentrates except industrial spirits,
2. Perfumes and Cosmetics with non-Nepalese / non-Indian Brand names,
3. Cigarettes and Tobacco
With regard to the articles that are not to allow under preferential treatment a provision has been
made stating the Government of India, in consultation with His Majesty‘s Government of Nepal,
may modify the list of articles. However, Nepalese beers can be imported into India on payment of
the applicable liquor excise duty equal to the effective excise duty as levied in India on Indian
beers under the relevant rules and regulations of India. This Treaty made an amendment in some
Articles of the earlier treaty. Noticeably, the Treaty introduced the value addition norms while
exporting to India and also adopted quantitative restrictions on some commodities or articles such
as vegetable ghee, acrylic yarn, copper products and zinc oxide.
The salient features of this Treaty can be viewed as:
detailed Rules of Origin incorporated to encourage genuine industrialization in Nepal and
to provide greater clarity and transparency
value addition norm - a very low value addition percentage has been agreed to by India of a
maximum ceiling for third country inputs fixed at 75 per cent for one year from 6th March,
2002 and 70 per cent thereafter, (i.e. a domestic value addition requirement of only 25 per
cent for the first year and 30 per cent thereafter)
Certain sensitive items will be allowed continued entry into India free of customs duty on
the basis of a special and liberal quota. No ceiling prescribed for imports of these items into
India on MFN basis.
Safeguard clause introduced with provision for the affected country to take appropriate
remedial measures only if joint consultations on surge do not yield results.
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The bilateral trade between India and Nepal is regulated by the Treaty of Trade. The current Treaty
has been in force for a period of Seven years with effect from 27.10.2009. Both sides have signed
the amended Treaty of Trade which comes into force on 27.10.2009. Under this Treaty, there is
free trade on mutually agreed to primary products from each other as indicated in Protocol to
Article IV of the Treaty. In the case of industrial goods produced in Nepal, Article V of the Treaty
provides for India to give, on a non-reciprocal basis, duty-free access to Nepalese goods without
any quantity restriction. This is subject to fulfilling the twin criterion of four-digit tariff head
change and value addition of 30% at ex-factory price in Nepal. This duty-free access is, however,
restricted to annual quotas on four sensitive items in the interest of the domestic industries in these
sectors. These are vanaspati (one lakh metric tones), Copper products and Acrylic Yarn (Ten
thousand metric tones each) and Zinc Oxide (2500 metric tones). The routes for bilateral trade can
be mutually decided; in the present Treaty, twenty Seven mutually agreed routes are prescribed for
bilateral trade. The Treaty provides for setting up Joint Committee in the event the imports under
the Treaty result in injury to the domestic industry in each country.
Treaty of Transit
Recognizing the fact that Nepal is a land-locked country and its need to have access to and from
the sea to promote its international trade, the Treaty made the provision in its Article I that the
contracting parties shall accord to ‗traffic in transit‘ freedom of transit across their respective
territories through routes mutually agreed upon. No distinction shall be made which is based on
flag of vessels, the places of origin, departure, entry, exist, destination, ownership of goods or
vessels. Further, exemption from customs duties and from all transit duties or other charges were
made except reasonable charges for transportation and such other charges as needed to
commensurate with the costs of services. In addition, for the convenience of traffic in transit the
contracting parties agreed to provide point or points of entry or existing warehouses or shed and
open space for the storage of traffic in transit awaiting customs clearance before onward
transmissions. As such the requirement in course of import and export of goods and articles from
Nepal was well established in this Treaty.
In order to facilitate the provisions made in the renewed Treaty of Trade 1996, it was felt some
modifications in the Treaty of Transit too. As such some Articles and clauses were modified as
well as revised in the Treaty of Transit, 1991. The major changes made in this Treaty can be
observed as follows:
i. The Indian customs authorities posted at Seaports/Border Land Customs Stations shall merely
check the ―one time lock‖ of the container put on by the shipping agent or the carrier authorized by
the shipping agent or the carrier authorized by the shipping company. If it is found intact, it will be
allowed for transportation of the containerized cargoes without examination unless there are valid
reasons to do otherwise.
ii. In case where the ―one time lock‖ on the container arriving at Seaports/Border Land Customs
Stations in India are found broken or defective, the Indian customs authorities shall make due
verification of the goods to check whether the goods are in accordance with the Customs Transit
Declaration and shall put fresh ―one time lock‖ and allow the containers to move to the destination.
The serial number of the new ―one time lock‖ shall be endorsed in the Customs Transit
Declaration.
iii. The procedures stated above are applicable to the Nepalese containerized export and import
cargoes moving to and from Seaports and Border Land Customs Stations in India.
Indo-Nepal Trade Treaty, 1996 indeed provided liberal framework in the arena of trade
relationship between these two countries. Katti remarks, of course quite rightly with regard to the
revised treaty stating that bilateral trade agreements is indeed a bold step in an effort to further
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boost bilateral trade and joint investment with Nepal. These new era earmarking a movement in
the direction of making SAPTA successful and the consequent Free Trade Area among the
member nations of the region a reality at the earliest. One of the significant promising
characteristics of this Treaty can be identified as to waive off the condition of material content in
the Nepalese goods while exporting to India. The provision of non-reciprocal basis duty free and
without quantitative restrictions access to the Nepalese manufactured articles in India was
available to Nepal as per the Treaty of Trade, 1991. But the content of raw material in the
exportable articles was being the central issue from the side of the Nepalese businessmen. This
issue was resolved by the provision in this Treaty.
This Treaty was signed on 5 January 1999 between the Government of India and His Majesty‘s
Government of Nepal with a desire to maintain, develop and strengthen the existing friendly
relations and cooperation between the two countries recognizing the need to facilitate the trafficin-transit through their territories. It was stated in the Treaty that it will remain in force up to the
5th January 2006 and will, thereafter, be automatically extended for a further period of seven years
at a time unless either of the parties gives to the other a written notice, six months in advance.
In the Article 1 of the Treaty provision was made that the Contracting Parties shall accord to
―traffic-in-transit‖ freedom of transit across their respective territories through routes mutually
agreed upon. No distinction shall be made which is based on flag of vessels, the places of origin,
departure, entry, exit, and destination, ownership of goods or vessels. Article II stated that each
Contracting Party shall have the right to take all indispensable measures to ensure that such
freedom, accorded by it on its territory, does not in any way infringe its legitimate interests of any
kind.
The provision of exemption from customs duties and from all transit duties or other charges was
also made for the traffic-in-transit, except reasonable charges for transportation and the costs of
services rendered in respect of such transit. Moreover, with a view to offer convenience of trafficin-transit the Contracting Parties agreed to provide, at point or points of entry or exit, warehouse or
sheds for the storage of traffic-in-transit awaiting customs clearance before onward transmission.
In order to extend the enjoy of freedom of the high seas, merchant ships sailing under the flag of
Nepal, the Treaty made the provision of providing treatment no less favorable than that accorded
to ships of any other foreign country in respect of matters relating to navigation, entry into and
departure from the ports, use of ports and harbor facilities, as well as loading and unloading dues,
taxes and other levies. In fact, this Treaty continued many of the provisions made by the earlier
treaties to provide transit facilities as needed by Nepal.
Treaty of Transit is very vital to a land-locked country like Nepal. It was well reckoned in this
Treaty. Fulfillments of social, economic and developmental needs largely depend upon the export
and import trade. And, trade depends much upon the transit procedures and facilities. As one of the
characteristics this Treaty made a provision of renewing automatically for a period of further seven
years. It can be viewed as one of the beautiful aspect of the Treaty. It minimizes the administrative
procedures that were seen in the past. This Indo-Nepal Treaty of Transit provided, as the earlier
transit treaties had made, port facilities to Nepal at Calcutta and specified 15 transit routes between
Calcutta and the India- Nepal border. In addition 22 entry/exit points along with India-Nepal
border for mutual trade and Nepal-Nepal transit have also been provided.
India provides transit facilities to the landlocked Nepal under the Treaty of Transit. The current
Treaty which was renewed in 27.10.2009 would be in force for a period of seven years up to
26.10.2016. This Treaty provides for free movement of traffic-in-transit across territories of each
other through mutually agreed routes for trade with third countries subject to taking measures to
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ensure that this does not infringe legitimate interests/security interests of each other. Traffic in
transit is exempted from customs/all transit duties. The Treaty provides for exit/entry points as
may be mutually agreed upon. India has allowed 15 transit routes to Nepal but so far not availed of
this facility from Nepal. Merchant ships of Nepal is accorded treatment no less favorable than that
accorded to ships of any other foreign country. Presently Kolkata/Haldia are the operational entry
points for Nepal‘s trade with third countries. They have requested for similar facilities at Mumbai
and Kandla.
Agreement of Cooperation to Control Unauthorized Trade
An Agreement of Cooperation to Control Unauthorized Trade was signed between the
Government of India and His Majesty‘s Government of Nepal (HMG/N) on 6 December 1991.
Article I of the Agreement well recognized that there is a long and open border between the two
countries and there is free movement of persons and goods across the border. It further notes that
they have the right to pursue independent foreign trade policies. In order to protect the interest of
both the countries the Article made the provision of taking all such measures that are necessary to
ensure that the economic interests of the other party are not adversely affected through
unauthorized trade between the two countries. As per the Article II of the Agreement, both the
countries agreed to cooperate effectively with each other to prevent infringement and
circumvention of the laws, rules and regulations of either country in regard to matters relating to
customs, narcotics and psychotropic substances, foreign exchange and foreign trade.
Article III of the Agreement further made the provision of prohibiting and cooperating each other
to prevent:
a. re-exports from its territory to third countries of goods imported from the other Contracting
Party and products which contain materials imported from the other Contracting Party exceeding
50 per cent of the ex-factory value of such products;
b. re-exports to the territory of the other Contracting Party of goods imported from third countries
and of products which contain imports from third countries exceeding 50 per cent of the ex-factory
value of such goods.
According to this Agreement, both the governments agreed to exchange with each other regularly
the lists of goods the import and export of which are prohibited, or restricted or subject to control
according to their respective laws and regulations. In this way commitment was made to cooperate
with each other in the prevention of unauthorized trade.
An Agreement of Cooperation (AoC) between His Majesty‘s Government of Nepal and the
Government of India was also signed to control unauthorized trade. Article III of the Agreement
made the provisions of:
i. each contracting party will prohibit and cooperate with each other to prevent reexports from its
territory to the third countries of goods imported from the other contracting party without
manufacturing activity, and
ii. re-exports to the territory of the other contracting party of goods imported from third countries
without manufacturing activity. However, it was stated that the provision of (i) stated above would
not be applicable in the case of the export of the Nepalese goods into India under the procedure set
out in Protocol V to the Treaty of Trade between His Majesty‘s Government of Nepal and the
Government of India.
This Agreement also expressed its commitment to cooperate and control unauthorized trade in
accordance with the provisions of the Agreement of Cooperation to Control Unauthorized Trade,
1991.
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Along with the Treaty of Trade, an agreement of cooperation to control unauthorized trade
between Nepal and India was signed in March 2002. In the agreement it was mutually agreed to
extend the validity of all the eight Articles of the Agreement of Cooperation between the
Government of India and His Majesty‘s Government of Nepal to control unauthorized trade in
their present form for a period of five years with effect from 6th March 2002. Thus, the agreement
did not modified or included any Articles but agree to continue under the existing provisions.
India and Nepal have also signed an Agreement of Cooperation to Control Unauthorized Trade
between the two countries. This Agreement was last renewed for Seven years with effect from
27.10.2009. The objective of this Agreement is to check illegal trade (smuggling) between the two
countries. This Agreement has also been renewed w.e.f. 27.10.2009 in its present form.
Impact on Structure and Trend of Nepal‘s Trade
The provisions on the Treaty of Trade and Transit between Nepal and India considerably
determine the direction of Nepalese international trade. There have been ups and downs in the
structure and trend of Nepalese export, in particular, since the first formal Treaty of Trade and
Commerce, 1950 with India. Impact of the subsequent Trade and Transit Treaties provides varying
scenarios in the export and import trade of Nepal.
Period between 1950 and 1970
The share of India was more than 95 per cent in the total trade transactions of Nepal during the
period of 1956/57 to 1959/60. Evidently, the total trade transactions with other countries were less
than 5 per cent. Imports from India were 98.5 per cent of the total import in the year 1964/65
whereas the percentage went on decreasing in the subsequent years. In 1965/66 it was 97.6 per
cent, in 1966/67 it was 96.8 per cent, in 1967/68 it was 92.3 per cent, in 1968/69 it was 93.2 per
cent and in the year 1969/70 it was 91.5 per cent of the total imports. Nepal‘s export to India was
98.3 per cent of the total exports of Nepal in 1964/65. It went on decreasing in the subsequent
years with a lower scale.
Period between 1971 and 1980
The share of India in total import of Nepal was 88.2 per cent in 1970/71. It declined over the
period and reached finally to 51.3 per cent in 1979/80. On the other hand, the share of third
countries in total import of Nepal was only 11.8 per cent in 1970/71. It climbed steadily over the
period and reached to 48.7 per cent in 1979/80. Likewise, the share of India in total export of
Nepal was 81.9 per cent in 1970/71. It steadily decreased during the period and reached to 45.3 per
cent in 1979/80. On the other hand, the share of other countries gradually picked up during the
same period. The share in the total export was 18.1 per cent in 1970/71, which increased to 54.7
per cent in 1979/80. As a result, the share of India in Nepal‘s total trade decreased from 85.9 per
cent (1970/71) to 49.8 per cent (1979/80) and that of the other countries, it increased from 14.1 per
cent (1970/71) to 50.2 per cent (1979/80).8
Period between 1981 and 1990
The share of India in the total export of Nepal was 61.7 per cent in 1980/81. The share declined
further in 1985/86 and reached to 40.3 per cent. However, the share of India in Nepal‘s total export
increased a little bit in 1986/87 and registered 43.5 per cent. The trend went on declining from that
year. As such, it was 24.7 per cent in 1988/89. It further declined in 1989/90 and revealed just 11.7
per cent. On the total import of Nepal, the share of India was 49.2 per cent in 1980/81, which went
on at a decreasing rate. The share of India in the total import of Nepal was, thus, 42.5 per cent in
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1985/86, 39.1 peer cent in 1986/87, 33.1 per cent in 1987/88 and 26.1 per cent in 1988/89. The
share came down still a little bit in 1989/90 and stood at 25.5 per cent.
Period between 1991 and 1995
In the year 1990/91, the share of India in the total export of Nepal was 21 per cent. It decreased in
the successive years and, thus, revealed 10.6 per cent and 9.6 per cent for the year 1991/92 and
1992/93. Situation in such a share improved marginally in 1993/94 revealing 12.5 per cent. The
share percentage was 17.7 percent and 18.5 per cent for 1994/95 and 1995/96. On the other hand,
the share of India in the total import of Nepal remained in between 30 per cent to 35 per cent
during that period. Such a share was 31.5 per cent in 1990/91, which increased in 1991/92 showing
35.2 per cent. In 1992/93 it was 33.3 per cent, in 1993/94 it was 35.4 per cent, in 1994/95 it was
30.8 per cent and it was 32.8 per cent in 1995/96.
Period between 1995 and 2001
It is interesting to note that the trend of the total trade, i.e. export and import, between Nepal and
India has increased from the year 1996/97 onward. Of course, it may be due to the outcome of
favorable provisions in the Indo-Nepal Trade Treaty of 1996. The share of India in the total export
of Nepal was 23.1 per cent in 1996/97. The trend escalated gradually in the successive years. It
was 32 per cent in 1997/98 while it was 35.1 per cent, 42.6 per cent and 47.7 per cent in the year
1998/99, 1999/2000 and 2000/01 respectively. The share of India in the total import of Nepal was
26.6 per cent in 1996/97, which gradually increased revealing 30.7 per cent, 36.7 per cent, 36.6 per
cent and 41.2 per cent in 1997/98, 1998/99,1999/2000 and 2000/01 respectively. In the year
2001/02, such a share is estimated to be 42.5 per cent.
Treaty of Trade 1996 has indeed played a crucial role in the foreign trade structure of Nepal. The
average exports per annum from Nepal to India during the period of 1991/92 to 1996/97 show 16.3
per cent out of the total export Nepalese trade. But the average exports from Nepal to India jumped
to 43.6 per cent during the period of 1997/98 to 2001/02. It can, thus, be noted as the phenomenal
impact of the Treaty on the trade structure of Nepal. Similarly, the import structure also presented
a different scenario but at a lower scale. The average imports from India were 31.8 per cent during
the period of 1991/92 to 1996/97. The ratio increased to 37.5 per cent during the period of 1997/98
to 2001/02.
The trend analysis of Indo-Nepal bilateral trade evidently indicates that the trade and transit
treaties held between these countries determine the volume of trade on the one hand, and the
direction of trade on the other. It can be seen, particularly, the level of exports from Nepal to India
fluctuating as the provisions in the treaties changes such as; the Articles relating to material
content, value addition norms, restrictions of the specific goods and articles and the quantity
restrictions of certain items.
Among the positive implications of the Indo-Nepal Trade Treaty s, one of the most important has
been to widen the basket of Nepalese export commodities to India. Besides the traditional
Nepalese exports like jute goods, pulses, ginger, oil cakes, cardamom, rosin, skin and hide and
skin, a number of new commodities have been added to the Nepalese export basket including
vanaspati, toothpaste, acrylic and polyester yarn, Ayurvedic medicine, soap, turpentine, brooms
and handicrafts, copper wire and other copper products, paper and wax products. A total of 184
odd Nepalese products are being exported to India at present.
Trade structure analyses in the above sections indicate that there has been a significant correlation
between the Indo-Nepal Trade and Transit Treaties on the Nepalese trade. Specifically, the liberal
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provisions in the treaties have contributed significantly in the expansion of trade between Nepal
and India. Export trade of Nepal, as compared to the import trade, can be seen fluctuating very
speedily. It is to be noted that export trade has a significant impact on the balance of payments.
Policy Implications
The Trade and Transit Treaties between Nepal and India not only make a firm basis for the foreign
trade of Nepal but also reflect on the macroeconomic policy framework of Nepal in many
instances. It is not unnatural that the export to and import from India vary in accordance with the
inclusion, exclusion or modifications of certain provisions in the Protocol of the Treaty in the case
of Nepal. Because a large proportion of Nepal‘s foreign trade is shared with India. But the national
policy framework and priorities are also seen being affected by the Treaties.
Nepal did not take initiative to become the member of then global trading regime, GATT, a
predecessor of WTO, until 1989 following a trade dispute with India. However, the dispute lasted
for 15 months, and new treaties were signed in 1991. Hence, the urgency for Nepal to become a
WTO member so as to be protected under GATT Article V on transit rights, weakened. It chose for
the observer status, and did not convert that into an application to join the WTO until 1997. Since,
then, the country has been undertaking steps gradually as per the accession process.9 It provides a
fine example of the role of Trade and Transit Treaties and their impact on the policy framework of
Nepal. After the signing of the Treaty of Trade and Treaty of Transit in 1991 one can observe the
introduction as well as amendment of several policies for instance, economic and trade
liberalization, foreign direct investment etc. Similarly various Acts were revised and amended in
1992. These reform initiatives cannot be viewed as the consequences of the bilateral treaties as the
sole reason. However, improved bilateral trade relations between the two countries did influence
adoption of such measures.
Assessment of Nepal‘s offer to Provide Transit Facility to China and India for their Bilateral
Trade
Development of Present Context
Since long back Nepal was having foreign trade with India and China. Nepal as a landlocked
country has some compulsion to depend on neighboring countries for her foreign trade. She has to
depend on India for transit transportation. The transit providing countries generally impose very
cumbersome transit procedures, time consuming customs formalities, charges and safety measures
etc. which may be seen unnecessary for transit receiving countries. For long time the relation of
China and India remained cool. The economic growth of both countries has brought them together
for the improvement of bilateral relation which opened the market opportunities to each other. For
India China is in third rank on import and six on export. These recent developments in trading
sector are being fruitful to both nations.
The strength of traditional transit routes are being evaluated by both neighboring countries. Nepal
was used as the transit point in the days back by them. The development of roads in Chinese side,
Indian side and Nepal has opened the possibilities of the use of the traditional route in modern
context. On the request of neighbors it is expected to provide transit route to India and China
through Nepal. Trade liberalization in the modern world has created opportunities for trade
integration and search for efficient effective supply chain and wide connectivity. So the land
locked countries are now going to change their status by being land linking countries providing
their land for transit use to their neighbors. Nepal's willingness of being transit point will bring
opportunities to the national economy. As a result, attention of foreign investors may draw due to
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convenient transport linkage with big markets in addition to growth of service sector through this
activity.
Overland Trade of China and India
History of this region shows that Nepal was transit nation to run business between Tibet and India.
The bilateral trade of China and India was interrupted after the war of 1962. It was resumed in
1978 and developed after they entered into a bilateral agreement based on MFN in 1984. India had
focused trade with main land China because the trade with Tibet was negligible. A Memorandum
of Understanding was signed during the visit of Chinese Prime Minister Mr. Li-Peng in 1991 as a
result of which the border trade was resumed. Two border points were made operational from the
north east of India for India-China overland trade which was confined for the goods of daily use of
local resident at the nearby border. The trade is carried within June to October leaving rest of the
month‘s trade less due to high altitude covering with snow. At the time of Peking visit of Indian
Prime Minister in 2003 both leaders agreed to open third point that is Nathu La pass in Sikkim.
Lepulekh and Shipklia passes were already in operation in India-China border. It is comparatively
shortest one from Lhasa. Recently the Nathu La pass has been operational. However, it is very
difficult one because of high mountains and snow fall. India's trade with mainland China is
increasing every year. The trend of India–China trade is shown in the following table:Bilateral trade of China and India (US $ Million)
S.N. Trade/FY April-March
2001/02
2002/03
1
India‘s Total Export
43826.7
52719.4
2
India‘s Exports to China
951.9
1975.5
3
Percentage growth
14.5
107.5
4
Share % in total Export
2.2
3.7
5
India‘s Total Import
514133
61412.1
6
India‘s imports from china
2036.4
2792.0
7
Percentage growth
35.6
37.1
8
Share % in total Import
4.0
4.5
9
India‘s Total trade
95240.0
114131.5
10
Percentage growth
0.1
19.8
11
Share % in total Trade
3.1
4.2
12
Exchange rate Us$1=1IC
47.69
48.39
Source: - Report of Study Committee on Transit point NPC 2005
2003/04
63843.0
2955.1
49.5
4.6
78149.6
4053.2
45.2
5.2
141992.6
24.4
4.9
45.99
The above table reveals that in recent years India‘s Trade with China is increasing. The share in
total is also increasing in considerable amount. Import from China is increasing in faster way than
before. So India seems eager to improve her export to China. India can probably reach to Central
Asian countries which are rich in natural resources such as petroleum and gas economically only
through this route. China also is looking the large Indian market for her products. Both are trying
to increase their export and import at present. The developing scenario opens certain opportunities
to Nepal for being a transit nation.
Prospect of Development of Transit Transport Corridors
The transport infrastructures in northern Nepal are not satisfactory. The southern part of the
country has relatively developed road network which provides rail road connectivity in the border.
The rail and roads connection with India provides access to Indian seaport. Recently China has
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completed the construction of Railway connecting Lhasa to Beijing. This railway service will be
extended upto Shi-gatshe in near future. Now, Lhasa is well connected by roads to major cities of
mainland China. In the year 1962 Kodari highway established transport connectivity to north
border by road. It established overland link with People's Republic of China. The road has
followed the river trail and it is not so wide and subjected to the problem of land slide in each year
in rainy season. It cannot accommodate heavy traffic of huge vehicles. So it will not be
comfortable to the forthcoming transit point. There is a need of developing this road. Department
of Roads has prepared a plan to develop connectivity with Indian and Chinese road–railway
network. Department of Roads has identified eight potential north-south road corridors which are
given below:Potential north south roads corridors
S.N
Transit road corridors
Total length km
1
Existing Km
Mohana-Dhangadi-Atari415
308
Baitadi-DarchulaTinkar
2
Nepalgunj-Surkhet-Jumla581
213
Hilsa-Yari-Purang
3
Bhairahawa-Pokhara467
272
Jomsom-Korala(Lizhi)
4
Birgunj-Galchi-Rasuwa340
318
Saprubeshi
5
Birgunj-Naubise393
393
Kathmandu-Tatopani
Nylamu
6
Janakpur-Dolakha295
241
Lamabagar-China border
7
Rani-Itahari-Hile419
229
Kimathanka-China border
8
Kechana-Taplejung460
268
Olangchunggola-( Rio)
Source: - Study committee on transit point National Planning Commission 2005
Need, for
construction
107
368
195
22
-
54
190
192
The above table states that the shortest potential transit routes are Birgunj-Saprubeshi and
Janakpur-Lamabagar. Bhairahawa-Pokhara–Jomsom Korala routes and Birgunj Galchi Saprubesi
roads are under construction and are supposed to be completed within few years. Mohana Tinkar
pass road also is under construction and in Surkhet-Jumla sector and only 107 km is remained for
further constructions. After completion this road will bear importance of religious tourism
connecting Mansarowar in Tibet. The Jomsom Lomanthang Korala road is only 80 km which is
targeted for completion within two years. This pass is only 5000 meters from sea level and very
potential for transit purpose. Government of China has committed for the construction of the road
from Rasuwagadi to Chinese border. Chinese side has revised the survey and reduced the length of
road from 22km to 16 km. The rest part of the road is already connected with highway.
ADB is conducting feasibility study of Dakshinkali-Hetauda fast track road and is going to
improve Galchi-Rasuwagadi part of Birgunj-Saprubeshi corridor under their financial assistance
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India and South Asia
this year. World Bank had initiated studies on alternate low cost corridors from Hetauda to
Kathmandu but it could not be materialized.
Benefit and Cost for Transit State
Nepal will get less tangible and more intangible benefits as a transit state. Small towns can be
changed into big cities. The customs infrastructures will be improved. Creation of new dry ports
may help facilitate the trade integration. It is certain that China will extend rail link to Shi-Gatse
very soon, the second biggest city, tourist hub and Seat of Panchen Lama. Distance of Nepal
border from Shi-gatshe is 500 km. Thereafter, if it is extended to Nepal border, one dry port may
be constructed in Panchkhal or other suitable place in the long run. This is a dream, which may be
realized in near future. Recent media news says that China has already been requested to connect
Nathu La pass in Sikkim by railway which is 450 km from Lhasa.
However, Nepal could be a better choice than Sikkim to reach to hub of Indian market i.e. Central
India for China. GON may like to request the Chinese Government to connect the Nepal border at
the earliest, which will facilitate in making Nepal transit state among others. If Nepal happens to
be the transit state the foreign investor will see prospect to invest in Nepal. The multinational
companies may produce in large quantity to capture the big markets of two big economies. It might
increase the possibilities of increase in foreign investment in service sector industries. The
creations of investment opportunities will strengthen the tax base. The opportunities of mass scale
production targeting the huge market eventually will contribute to poverty reduction. Nepal‘s north
side is less developed than the south. Now in a changed political situation, it requires a people
centered and decentralized development strategy, a strong focus on improving this north-south
connectivity and needs remote areas to link the economic growth hubs emerging in the mid hills
and terai to these areas. This will improve development inputs and improve well being of people
with greater efficiency.
To address special problems of remote settlement, government must implement more specific and
targeted development program for these reasons. The above transit corridors may also serve one
criteria for dividing development region or to make federal zones to Nepal‘s upcoming
restructuring plan of the country physically by political parties. In addition to Nepal‘s development
strategy to reduce poverty, these corridors will also help national integration. Nepalgunj-SurkhetJumla-Hilsa-Yari-Purang or Mohana-Dhangadi-Attari- Baitadi-Darchula-Tinkar corridor may
yield millions of rupees and indirect benefit by Facilitating millions of Indian religious tourists to
Mansarovar or Kailash perennially.
One prerequisite for this would be establishment of a small Consulate Office in Surkhet or
Dhangadi by People‘s Republic of China to provide visa facility to tourists. It is noticed that some
Indian tourists are going to Mansarovar now via Kathmandu. The transport connectivity among the
neighbors contributes to trade integration at regional and sub-regional level. The development of
transport infrastructure helps improve supply chain and enhance consumption and supply in
regional and sub-regional level. The major benefit to Nepal is to have potential transit status and
benefit from economic diversification and expansion. It can enhance the relation with both the
neighbors. The northern neighbor China with a population of 1.24 billion and southern neighbor
India with a population of 1.05 billion together represent the largest market in the world. Nepal can
be benefited with the growing relationship of these countries. The opportunity of being transit
point not only connect both neighbors but also opens the access to the central Asia and Russia that
are rich in natural resources such as petroleum and natural gas. The development of high speed
railways and roads will certainly reduce the time and cost of transit transport.
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The new concept of Nepal being transit state also opens up new area of regional cooperation; it is
because two big countries are linked through land bridge of Nepal. It will contribute to the concept
of Asian Highway also that can connect South and North including Western part of China and
beyond up to Central Asia. The maps showing in this connection are given in being a transit state
is full of challenges. Acting as a transit state for overland trade is not without the absences of
disadvantages. The development and management of costly transport infrastructures is a critical
task. Nepal government has to develop a lot of infrastructure with huge investment for which
donor agencies need to be mobilized. It is doubtful whether the present technical capability can
manage the task of transit transport traffic or not. Present transporters or service providers if don‘t
enhance their institutional capacity and competitiveness, they may loss their employments and
income. National industries that are enjoying benefit in the name of protection to national
industries may have lost their sole benefit. Big investors and business houses may capture the trade
and transport sectors leaving the small traders behind. Thus, it is important for Nepal as how to
ensure the interest of small business and trade and national security, protect national economy
from cut throat competition and control cross border smuggling of goods. To facilitate transit trade
between India and china through Nepal a model Transit Declaration Form at the first entry or exit
point.
__________________________________________
References
1
.World Trade Organisation and India – Challenges and Perspectives by V.R. Panchamukhi, 2000.
WTO Regime, Host Country Policies and Global Patterns of Multinational Enterprises‘Activity: Implications of
Recent Quantitative Studies for India by Nagesh Kumar, 2000
3
Liberalisation Outward Orientation and In-house R&D Activity of Multinational and Local Firms: A Quantitative
Exploration for Indian Manufacturing by Nagesh Kumar and Aradhna Agarwal, 2000
4
World Trade Organisation and India – Challenges and Perspectives by V.R. Panchamukhi, 2000
5
WTO Regime, Host Country Policies and Global Patterns of Multinational Enterprises‘ Activity: Implications of
Recent Quantitative Studies for India by Nagesh Kumar, 2000
6
. China as # 1: Threat or Opportunity? by Ramgopal Agarwala, 2001
7
Market Access for Industrial Sector in WTO Negotiations An Agenda for Developing Countries by Rajesh Mehta,
2001
8
. China as # 1: Threat or Opportunity? by Ramgopal Agarwala, 2001
9
. Market Access for Industrial Sector in WTO Negotiations An Agenda for Developing Countries by Rajesh Mehta,
2001
2.
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India and South Asia
MALDIVES AND GEO-POLITICS OF
INDIA, CHINA AND SRI LANKA
The Maldives‘ blessing is also its curse: strategically situated in the Indian Ocean, one of the
world‘s most vital economic and military routes, it is at the mercy of its more
powerful Asian neighbors.
Satheesan Kumaaran
Editor-in-chief, Voice of Voiceless
Satheesan
Kumaaran
holds
B.Sc.
(Biology), Honours BA (Political Science),
MA-IS with the specialization in
International Law and International
Relations and MA (Political Science). He
is the publisher & editor-in-chief of the
journal, Voice of Voiceless.
Satheesan Kumaaran is a paralegal
advocate – licensed by the Law Society.
He obtained an Alternate Dispute
Resolution Certificate (ADR) making his
proficiency in assisting in matters of
mediation and conflict resolution. He
founded a legal firm in Canada in
September 2010 which is a fully licensed
firm that offers its clients knowledgeable
and
qualified
legal
advice
and
representation.
He specialized in
Immigration, SABS (Accident Benefits – Personal Injury Claims), Small Claims, Traffic Tickets,
Landlord and Tenant and Criminal Pardon.
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India and South Asia
MALDIVES AND GEO-POLITICS OF INDIA, CHINA AND SRI LANKA
―Let us not forget, the Portuguese invaded us because of strategic position. Many covetous eyes
are focused on us right now for the same reason,‖ Maldives President, Gayoom, said in 1982. For
once, Gayoom was right. This crucial route accounts for half of the world‘s containerized freight, a
third of its bulk cargo, and two-thirds of all oil shipments travel through the Indian Ocean.
It is home to several critical checkpoints such as the Suez Canal (Egypt), Bob el Mandeb
(Djibouti-Yemen), the Strait of Hormuz (Iran-Oman), and the Strait of Malacca (Malaysia –
Indonesia), the latter two being the passage ways where roughly $260 billion USD worth of oil
goes through annually. Whoever connects these four critically important access waterways
together will have considerable political, economic, and military power.
Currently, some 300 ships traverse the Indian Ocean every day and on an average, 40 super tankers
pass through the nine-degree channel daily; annually, three hundred and eighty oil tankers visit
Indian ports. Unsurprisingly, India wants to be firmly anchored in the region. But so do China and
Sri Lanka, who have their own interests. The Maldives are smack in the middle of India, China,
and Sri Lanka‘s geo-political ambitions.
Maldivian SOS to India
The scenically endowed Maldives is surrounded by much stronger countries. Economically, the
Maldives is dwarfed by India. With an economy that depends on tourism and fishing while
shipping, banking and manufacturing sectors grow slowly, and a GDP growth averaged about 10
percent in 1980s, India‘s economic growth was at 9.4 percent for the fiscal year 2006–2007.
Throughout the 1990s and early 2000, the Maldivian economy fluctuated between 16.2 percent in
1990 to 7.5 percent in 2004. In 2005, as a result of the tsunami, the GDP contracted by about 3.6
percent, since its fisheries and tourism are affected by any natural disasters (eighty percent of the
area of Maldives is one meter or less above sea level). The latest figure (2007) shows the GDP at
5.5 percent. Indian investors have turned their eyes towards Maldives to establish the hospitality
industry.
The correlation between the two countries shows that, as a small country with greater accessibility
through the Indian Ocean and friendly relations with the Islamic countries, Maldives would not
able to do well economically. However, India is surpassing all other south Asian nations, after
suffering economically not too long ago.
It is not only economic might that the Maldives face from India. The Maldives‘ vulnerability to the
whims of greater powers was clearly demonstrated in the 1980s. The Sri Lankan People‘s
Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE) defeated the Maldives National Defence Force
in the 1988 military coup with only 200 men. Unable to defend himself and cope with external
threats, President Gayoom launched a message of appeal to India. In response, India sent its naval
ships and 500 troops to Maldives, freed the tiny island-nation from the control of the PLOTE
within 24 hrs, and handed the administration back to President Gayoom.
The 1988 debacle could very well repeat itself: The Maldives National Defence Force (MNDF)
primarily tasked with reinforcing the Maldives Police Service (MPS) and ensuring security in the
exclusive economic zone, is small in size and limited supply of serviceable equipment, and would
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be inadequate against external aggression. Since Britain unilaterally withdrew its last air and naval
base on Maldives soil in 1976, leaving it virtually defenceless, Maldives has had to cooperate with
all external anti-and pro-India forces, while still remaining loyal to India.
There is a reason why India came to Gayoom‘s rescue. India‘s bid to become an international
superpower has it working overtime to build its naval force into one of the finest in the world, with
sophisticated modern technologies to monitor the entire Indian Ocean and beyond, and the
Maldives figures into this equation. Since the time of Jawaharlal Nehru, India has eyed the
Maldives as the perfect location for its naval practices.
On March 28, 1958, standing on the quarterdeck of INS Mysore, the second cruiser to be acquired
by independent India‘s navy, Nehru said, ―We cannot afford to be weak at sea...history has shown
that whatever power controls the Indian Ocean has, in the first instance, India‘s seaborne trade at
her mercy, and in the second, India‘s very independence itself.‖
Succeeding governments have tried to fulfil Nehru‘s vision, and now India has the world‘s fourth
largest navy. Today, the Indian navy has over 55,000 men and women, including 5,000 naval
aviation personnel and 2,000 Marine Commandos (MARCOS). The Indian navy‘s hope is not only
to guard its coast but also its distant oceanic frontiers. This means extending its reach as far as
Sumatra and Malacca Straits in the east and all territories within that limit; the Cape of Good
Hope, Madagascar, Mauritius, Socotra, Aden and the Persian Gulf in the west; and in the south, Sri
Lanka and Maldives.
India knows that it is in its best interests to not rock the boat when it comes to the Maldives.
Politically and diplomatically, India favours Gayoom and later Mohamed Nasheed. When
Gayoom‘s opponents demonstrated on several occasions, especially in 2004 and 2006, where
hundreds of demonstrators died, the opposition leaders were summoned to India. After meeting
with the Indian leaders, they remained silent and did not return to the streets against Gayoom. The
Indian government maintains a façade of leading player in the effort to improve democratic
reforms slowly, but in reality, they have also proved to be a roadblock to democratising the
Maldives. This suits Gayoom just fine. Gayoom is a teeter-totter politician with both anti–and proIndia approaches because he does not want to alienate various Delhi administrations; to do so
would destabilize Maldivian political and economic security. In turn, Delhi has been a friend that
Gayoom and later Mohamed Nasheed can turn to.
The current President Mohamed Nasheed told reporters in November 2011 that Maldives will
never do anything that threatens India's security. He further said: "―India has always helped us in
times of need. We will always be India's friend and we believe that we cannot find a better friend
than India,‖ he said when asked if Sino-Maldivian cooperation could negatively impact on
relations with India.
Sri Lanka: from one island friend to another
As much as it seems that Delhi is the most visible actor in the Maldives, Sri Lanka is present as
well, mostly in the economic sphere. In fact, as of 1988, it has been Sri Lanka - and not India - that
has had a more significant economic, diplomatic, political, and cultural involvement in the
Maldives. Sri Lanka dominated trade with the Maldives state until the early 1970s, providing 65
percent of Male‘s imports from the South Asian region. By contrast, India‘s share was only 32
percent. Ten percent of the Maldives‘ exports were to Sri Lanka, whereas India‘s share was a
miniscule 0.03 percent.
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In the 1980s, Sri Lanka attempted to use the Maldives (buttressed by a natural harbour,
Trincomalee) as a neutralizing force against the India factor and protect itself from any possible
threats emanating from India. Sri Lanka tried to cultivate links with extra-regional powers to guard
itself against India, even going so far as to express its desire to give base facilities to the U.S. in the
1980s. Sri Lanka did not trust India, fearing that India would turn its back against Sri Lanka. On
the other hand India pleased Colombo on several occasions.
The Srima-Shastri agreement of 1964 and the Indira-Sirimavo supplementary agreement of 1974
paved the way for the deportation of approximately 600,000 persons of Indian origin from Sri
Lanka to India. On another occasion, Kachchatheevu, only approximately 1.6 km long and
slightly over 300 metres wide, located northeast of Rameswaram in Tamil Nadu and southwest of
Sri Lanka's Delft Island, and originally part of India, was handed over to Sri Lanka by India, in
1974, under the Shasthri-Srimavo pact. Relations between India and Sri Lanka have become bitter
after these, and other, bitter events.
Even though India was pleasing Sri Lanka, Sri Lanka did not respect India. In one instance, Sri
Lanka allowed Pakistani war planes to land on its soil, antagonizing India while India fought
against the West Pakistani armed forces in East Pakistan to liberate the Bengalis. Bangladesh
gained independence after the defeating the Pakistani armed forces in 1971. In revenge and under
pressure from Tamil Nadu, India had no choice but to support the Eelam Tamil militants in India.
Indira Gandhi ordered India‘s external and internal intelligence wings to provide military training
for the Tamil militants. India provided material and morale support to Eelam Tamils to fight
against Sri Lanka. This made Sri Lanka as a suspicious country.
Much of the policy divergence in the 1980s arose out of the Sri Lankan government‘s conscious
decision to use its strategic location against Indian interests. After Indira Gandhi was killed by her
Sikh bodyguards in 1984, her pilot-son who had no political or diplomatic knowledge became the
Prime Minister. His advisors told him that India should never antagonize Sri Lanka because of its
strategic location and importantly for the natural harbour on the island, which could be a threat to
India if any other powers put a base there. That is why Rajiv Gandhi, the then-Indian Prime
Minister, quickly signed a pact with Sri Lankan President J. R. Jayewardene.
A cunning Sri Lankan politician, Jayewardene, received a promise from Rajiv Gandhi that India
would never act against the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Sri Lanka. This prompted India
to send the Indian armed forces under the guise of keeping peace, and of a bringing permanent
resolution to the Tamil conflict in Sri Lanka. Things did not happen as Rajiv or his advisors
thought. India fought a war with the Tamil Tigers from 1987 to 1990, and Rajiv was killed
allegedly by the LTTE‘s suicide squad in Tamil Nadu in 1991.
After Congress won the elections in 1991 led by P. V. Narasimha Rao who headed the Indian
government from 1991 to 1996, India maintained a hands-off policy towards Sri Lanka, and things
spiralled downward after the Bharathiya Janatha Party (BJP) came to power with the support of
south Indian political parties. As a result, Sri Lanka saw India as a threat to its sovereignty and
territorial integrity. Despite India‘s commitment that the Sri Lanka‘s ethnic conflict should
resolved peacefully within the united Sri Lanka, Sri Lanka remains suspicious of India playing
double-standard on this issue.
The Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) and other radical parties in Sri Lanka believe that India is
attempting to directly influence the lives of Sri Lankans. They believe that under the guise of
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helping Sri Lanka through the promise of providing electricity and other money aid for other
projects, India is trying to become important and influential partner of the government to keep Sri
Lanka in check for its own benefits.
Sri Lanka‘s weight in the Maldives causes many analysts to argue that if one particular country
wanted to establish a good presence in the Indian Ocean, they would need to be able to exercise
considerable influence over Sri Lanka, which would in turn give it greater leverage in the
Maldives. China appears to have understood this, because it offered $1 billion USD in 2007 for
projects that included the Norochcholai Coal Power Project, the Hambantota Port Development
Project, the supply of 100 railway carriages and Multiple Diesel Units to the Sri Lanka Railway,
and the construction of a Performing Arts Theatre. India, in contrast, has invested less than $ 500
million USD.
China‘s long march to the Maldives
Since the 1988 coup where India sent its military to drive out the PLOTE, the Maldivian
government has maintained a pro-India policy regarding security. Yet the Maldives does not want
to alienate China either. Since its independence from the British in 1965, the Maldives has not
permitted the development of any military base by any world power, with the only exception being
a British air base on its Gan Island in Addu Atoll until 1976, when the British withdrew and
returned the island to the Maldivian government. The subsequent military vacancy in Gan Island
prompted the Soviet Union to submit a request, via India, for access to the abandoned military base
to counter American and British influence in the region, but the Maldives rejected the proposal.
The Maldivian government then made a U-turn in its policy. China has looked at Burma,
Bangladesh, Pakistan, and the Maldives as the ideal place for bases to monitor the activities of the
Indian and American marine activities (China has established a deep-sea port at Gwadar in the
Pakistani province of Baluchistan to protect and police its oil supplies coming from the Persian
Gulf, and it is considering setting up similar deep-sea ports in Burma and Bangladesh). In 2001,
the Maldives and China signed a deal allowing China to set up a naval base in Marao. With 85
percent of China‘s trade conducted by sea, and India and the United States‘ opposition to a
Chinese naval base on Maldivian soil, this will definitely give the Maldivian government
headaches in the years to come.
Nonetheless, the Maldives approved the deal because it needed the economic support of a booming
China. While construction of the Chinese base is not underway yet, Chinese officials claim that the
base will be ready by 2010. This, coupled with China‘s declaration in March to increase its
defence budget for 2008 to $ 59 billion USD, a rise of 17.8 percent over 2007, caused world
powers to sit up and take note as well. The March 3, 2008, Pentagon report presented to the United
States Congress on China‘s military development alerted India to stay vigilant about Chinese
activities, and emphasized the need for cooperation between the U.S. and India to keep China at
bay. Naturally, India will consider the Maldives one such post to keep tabs on Chinese sea activity.
India and China‘s fight over oil to squelch the thirst of their energy demands will also shape their
dealings with the Maldives in the future. Economists predict that the world‘s demand for oil will
grow from the current 75 million barrels per day to 120 million barrels per day by 2025, with 80
percent of that increase going to Asian customers. India would be the leading consumer. India sits
across from these major commercial routes and energy lifelines and is only 600 miles from the
Persian Gulf, putting India in a position to greatly influence the secure movement of shipping
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along the Sea Line of Communication in the Indian Ocean region, which only makes China more
anxious to plunge its own weight into the Indian Ocean.
But, while India has become one of the world‘s largest importers of petroleum products, the US-which has to pass through the Maldives to get from its military bases in Diego Garcia and the
Middle East-- remains the principal external influence on the world‘s petroleum market. Both have
a common interest in ensuring a steady flow of oil from the Gulf and at reasonable prices. This is
clear from the recently inaugurated South Asia Regional Port Security Cooperative (SARPSCO). It
brings together stakeholders from Bangladesh, Comoros, India, Madagascar, the Maldives,
Mauritius, Oman, Pakistan and Sri Lanka.
The four-day inaugural meeting of SARPSCO, entitled ―Partnering for a Safer Sea Conference,‖
hosted by the Maldives Ministry of Transport and Communication, began on May 19, 2008. It is a
clear example that the stakeholders of this group are friends of both India and the U.S. This also
shows that the U.S. is trying to bring India and Pakistan together, allowing them to have more
face-to-face meetings through the auspices of the U.S.
In his speech given at the conference, Maldives‘ President, Maumoon Abdul Gayoom, asserted
that the nine countries‘ vigilance is crucial to combat the maritime threats they jointly face. U.S.
Coast Guard Rear Admiral, Craig E. Bone, said, if crimes such as illegal fishing, human smuggling
and the transportation of illegal cargoes and drugs cannot be collectively combated, then neither
can terrorism and piracy. He further said: ―Establishing the group sends a clear message to
terrorists and criminals in the South Asia and Indian Ocean region that they will be detected, they
will be interdicted and their activities will not be tolerated.‖
However, the U.S. announced that it would only act as a facilitator and it won‘t be a member of the
group. On the other hand, the U.S. Ambassador to Sri Lanka and Maldives, Robert Blake, who
was also heading the U.S. delegation to the conference, said, ―Cargo containers and international
seaports pose potentially attractive targets for terrorists...A successful attack against a port could
cripple a nation's economy and disrupt international shipping worldwide.‖
The formation of the SARPSCO is a surprise to the many countries who share the Indian Ocean,
and is what prompted the U.S. and India to form the group and the venue for the inaugural
conference chosen was Maldives. It is no doubt that the U.S. and India are coming much closer
than never ever before. This alone is a clear contemporary example how the U.S. and India
consider Maldives and Sri Lanka important in the Indian Ocean.
The more India and China compete for power in the Indian Ocean, the more the Maldives seeks to
maintain good relations with all. But, Male‘s political philosophy of pleasing everyone will one
day leave one discontented player – Male itself.
(The author can be reached at e-mail: [email protected])
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HUMAN SECURITY IN SOUTH ASIA
Dr. SANJEEV BHADAURIA
Associate Professor,
Dept. of Defence and Strategic Studies,
Allahabad Central University
Allahabad-211002
Contact-09415218516
e-mail: [email protected]
Dr. Sanjeev Bhadauria, Associate Professor at the Dept.
of Defence and Strategic Studies, Central University of
Allahabad, Allahabad has done his doctorate (D.Phil.) on
Indo-US Relations (1971-85) from the University of
Allahabad. He was a Fellow of the International Visitor
Program of the United States Information Agency (USIA).
He is the Secretary of the National Congress for Defence
Studies (NCDS) and the Associate Editor of the Indian Journal of Strategic Studies (IJSS)
published by the University of Allahabad. He is a keen researcher in the field of International
Relations and National Security who has contributed many articles in National Journals and
Chapters in edited books besides authoring two books and a monograph on ‘National
Security’. His forthcoming publications are “India and the United States: From Estranged to
Engaged Democracies” and an edited book on the “Proliferation of Small Arms and Light
Weapons in South Asia.”
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HUMAN SECURITY IN SOUTH ASIA
In the post-Cold War era it has become increasingly evident that ―security‖
involves far more than matters of national defense. Non-military threats such
as poverty, hunger, disease, and environmental degradation, among others,
know no borders and can affect people in all nations. In recent years,
therefore, the concept of ―human security‖ has attracted attention as a means
to understand global problems. In its most basic form, human security
represents ―freedom from fear and freedom from want‖ (UNDP Human
Development Report, 1994).
The process of democratization, nation building and peace making along with
an unending search for security in South Asia is facing formidable challenges.
The task of creating a common national identity around the core values of
democracy, secularism, economic development and social justice superseding
the multitude of primordial, rather localized, groups based on caste, ethnicity,
language or religion, remains incomplete. If not the paradigm as a whole, at
least the state in its intended functions, its role and legitimacy has been put
into question. The post 9/11 approaches stress on the dilution of political
sovereignty as has been traditionally understood. Trans-national approaches
argue that the ‗State‘ is no longer the central actor in international relations.
The agency for change in international relations is not the ‗State‘ exclusively, it
being only one of the actors on the international scene.
Further, there are ambiguities about State power, especially in the context of
overlapping jurisdictions. The source of erosion of jurisdictional authority of
sovereign state is in both, supra-national integration and sub-national
disintegration. The former refers to the growth of international law, regional
economic organizations, globalization of markets, growing environmental and
human concerns, etc. The latter refer to the decline of national consensus and
the growth of ethnic nationalism. Attention has shifted to multi-centralism,
trans-nationalism or inter-dependence. Issues like environment, gender and
humanitarian problems have taken the center stage. There is a stress on
subjectivity, culture, ideology and history.1
There have been major advances in the last 50 years: infant mortality rates
have dropped to less than 60 per 1000 births; adult illiteracy has
been reduced almost half; primary-school enrollment has come to include more
than three-quarters of the school age population, with notable increases for
girls; life expectancy has also significantly increased due to vast improvement
in medical sciences. Yet, these impressive achievements stand in stark contrast
to persistent poverty, striking inequities in the distribution of the benefits of
development, and wide-scale social exclusion or marginalization. The UNDP
report indicated that 1.3 billion people (mainly women and children) in the
developing world live on less than 1 US$ a day; 800 million people are
malnourished; disparities between the rich and the poor remain vast in most
regions, particularly in Africa, Asia and Latin America. These deplorable
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India and South Asia
conditions of the human being all around the world had forced the social
scientists to think and formulate their policies for the overall development and
security of the humanity.
To the millions in the developing countries in South Asia, efforts at ensuring
State Security make little meaning as long as they are steeped in hunger,
malnutrition and illiteracy. When their very survival is at stake and their
economic base are severely threatened, their social and political life affected
almost on a day to day basis by strife and unorganized violence and by ethnic,
sectarian and domestic conflicts then National Security as traditionally
understood losses its importance and salience and the emphasis shifts to
Human dimensions of Security or Human Security. Human security demands
respect for and implementation of all human rights, including the various
fundamental freedoms, the right to dignity and the right to development.
HUMAN SECURITY
Since the end of the Cold War, the phrase ―Human Security‖ has increasingly
surfaced as most attracting a most debatable issue. The term ―Human Security‖
itself suggests a departure from the complicated organ of the Cold War, mostly
dominated with State centric issues of thermo-nuclear holocaust, strategic
alliances, compliance and deterrence. With the end of five decades of
superpower competition, the world seemed ready for a new security concept
which stressed security from threats other than aggression and alliances.
The objective of human security is to safeguard the vital core of all
human lives from critical pervasive threats, in a way that is consistent
with long-term human fulfillment. Thus, Human Security requires both the
basic material needs are met (food, shelter, education, health care etc.) and
the achievement of human dignity that ―incorporates personal autonomy,
control over one‘s life and unlimited participation in the life and unhindered
participation in the life of the community‖. As Amitav Acharaya notes: ―We
have three different conceptions of Human Security today: one focusing on the
human costs of violent conflict, another stressing human needs in the path to
sustainable development. A third conception, approximating the first rights
(meaning Human Rights) dimensions of Human Security without necessarily
linking to the costs of violent conflict‖.2
Lincoln C. Chen has identified 3 key strategies to achieve human security protection, promotion and prevention. In situations of acute insecurity
progressive utilization of protection measures for relief, establishing safety nets
and supporting peace keeping. For chronic insecurity poverty should be the
focus of concern and development likely cure. To protect established human
security regimes and to provide a warning against future challenges a
preventive course of action based on information, diplomacy and sanctions.3
The UNDP argues that although there have always been two main components
of Human Security – freedom from fear and freedom from want – the concept
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of security has tended to be more concerned with the former rather than latter,
and accordingly the concept needs to shift its emphasis from stressing
territorial security to people‘s security, from concentrating on achieving security
through weapons to concentrating on achieving security through sustainable
Human Development.
After considering wide range of definitions, one can easily be convinced that
human security is an elastic and contested notion. But at its core, human
security is security for people, rather than security exclusively for states and/or
governments. It might be argued that the distinction is meaningless, what
challenges the survival of states also threatens the survival of its people. In this
argument also the survivability and well being of the population of any state is
important as without any population the notion of state is false. The fact
remains that security of the ‗state‘ in developing areas is more often than not
at odds with the security of the nation. Although every state aspires to
become a proper nation state, this can not be achieved if the people of the
state can‘t be protected, nurtured and cared for.
After conceptualizing human security it will be pertinent to see what it means to
seek ways to safeguard and enhance citizens‘ vital freedoms. There are the
following established and suggested themes:
1. Economic security (job insecurity, unemployment, poverty,
economic inequality)
2. Environmental security (air and water pollution, deforestation, soil
degradation)
3. Political security (land / border disputes, war, terrorism, nuclear
proliferation)
4. Food security (hunger, famine, malnutrition, food aid, food
production, agri-business)
5. Personal security (gender discrimination, racism, crime, industrial
safety)
6. Health security (communicable diseases, pollution-related illnesses,
occupational-related illnesses)
7. Community security (cultural preservation / dissolution, linguistic
human rights, ethnic conflict, religious persecution)
The nature of threat to a nation‘s security stability and progress is multi-polar,
i.e. non-military, internal and external. The security management would require
being dynamic and taking into account this multi-polar nature of threat. This
phase of extreme volatility can have serious repercussions unless nations have
a well formulated ‗National Security Strategy‘ which is dynamic and resilient so
as to be capable of absorbing midcourse corrections. Therefore, there is a
necessity to carry out a reassessment of the National Security perspective.
IDENTIFICATION OF CAUSES OF CONFLICT
South Asia, as one of the unique regions on the planet, continues to be volatile
and in the grips of an ongoing crisis. Today, a deep sense of anxiety and
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uneasiness looms over South Asia, stemming from a variety of reasons poverty, civil war, ethnic conflicts, terrorism, communal and political violence,
religious extremism, power asymmetry within the region, the arms race,
militarization, gross and systematic violation of human rights and geo-political
and strategic changes. Even though South Asian countries have a common
cultural background and shared political experience, these countries are
characterized by multi-ethnic societies with striking internal divisions along
linguistic, regional, communal and sectarian lines.
In recent times, the worsening security situation in most countries in South
Asia is of serious concern. What we witness in South Asia today is a clear signal
of lack of peace, security and development. The rise of extremism in most
South Asian countries is an ultimate threat to human security. The increasing
trend of politics of violence and extremism in South Asia is mainly the result of
faulty national policies and the interference of external powers.
The region's vast potential is hostage to unresolved inter-state and intra-state
conflicts. In most of the states, the governments have failed in providing good
governance and solving social problems such as unemployment, social injustice,
and poverty. The political culture in these states has been unable to meet the
challenges faced by society from time to time. Growing tendencies of ethnic
solidarities, identification with rising religious fundamentalism and ethnocentric
cultural aspirations are gaining support, which destroys national unity and
integration in different South Asian nations.
South Asia is the home of a major chunk of humanity, amongst them about one
third live in abject poverty, the figures ranges from 20 to fifty per cent in
several nations considering nationally defined poverty lines. Unemployment
within the region has grown by 3 to 4 per cent in last one decade and in some
countries by the rate of 7 to 8 percent. Education the life line of human capital
and critical determinant of economic progress has not crossed the figure of fifty
per cent of the population in several South Asian countries indicating the state
in the region.
In the context of developing countries of South Asia, the core values which
mostly standout include social, political, economic, democratic set-up,
secularism and federalism. The erosion of any one of these is bound to erode
the legitimacy of the state and hence constitutes a threat to its security. An
effort must be made to emphasize the causes of conflict in specific regions of
countries in South Asia and then provide analytical tools that could point
towards a solution. An attempt has seldom been made to establish a link
between general theory of social change and specific policies meant for the
orderly resolution of conflict. The objectives could be specified in terms of the
following questions:
1. What are the cultural meanings and legal/institutional attributes of
legitimate demands of particular regions in South Asian countries?
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-This is with reference to the regions where there is internal disturbance in
respective countries.
2. Why has the record of ‗high governance‘ registered a sharp decline
in some parts of South Asia during the last few decades?
-The government in power is expected to provide the sheltering environment
for human development, the social peace and freedom from fear that make
development practical. Just as surely, good human development strategies can
relieve the privations and inequalities – and remedy the ills of bad governance
– that jeopardize human security.
3. How does the organization of the civil service or bureaucracy affect
the maintenance of law and order and in formulating/implementing
respective policies?
- Their performance and the practicality of their policies holds the key.
4. How have the policies of ‗economic reforms‘ affected the ‗law and
order‘?
- The haphazard development as a result is more often than not is the
cause for internal disturbance.
5. How does social mobilization and political organization on the basis
of caste, language religions, tribe and region affect political order?
-This calls for prompt action on all fronts: first, that of prevention, by
promoting steady, balanced economic growth, while protecting human rights
and minority rights and adopting political agreements that ensure the equitable
representation of all groups.
6. How does domestic politics affect the political order in the countries
of South Asia?
-The petty politics is found to be the culprit behind the domestic agenda.
The overall objective should be to examine the problem of social disorder and
political conflict in countries not as a ‗symptomatic‘ problem but as a ‗systemic‘
one brought about by forces of social and economic transition and political
conjecture, responding to a specific set of objective conditions in different parts
of the respective countries, and only then we can hope to contribute to rational
policies and action and the minimization of the problem, if not complete
eradication.
This paper offers an analysis of the various issues of human security in the
region with a view to identify possible common grounds that could
enhance its policy relevance whereby people are made safer by an open,
tolerant and responsive state, capable of ensuring the protection of all its
citizens. At the same time, improving human security reinforces the state by
strengthening its legitimacy and its stability.
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It is strongly felt that there should be a conscious effort to unite the social
scientist and the policy maker on a common endeavour and only then we can
expect to achieve a synthesis of theory and practice to their common good and
will contribute towards the achievement of cooperation between various
sections of society along with just and humane governance.
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
In the South Asian region some independent variables can be outlined which
alone or in combination account for the sorry state of affairs.
(1) ‗Law and order‘ management: Who are the ‗real‘ managers? How are
they trained, equipped, paid, supervised and held politically accountable? What
are the methods of conflict adjudication at local, district, regional and national
levels?
--The executive set up is basically a legacy of the British which has probably
outlived its utility in the changed circumstances after these countries became
independent. The judicial system has also failed to deliver as far as the
aspirations of the people are concerned.
(2) Redistributive policies: What kind of legislation is made which makes it
necessary for people to believe as they do and sometimes irrationally?
--Of interest here are labour laws, agrarian reforms, minimum wages laws,
welfare legislations, positive discrimination (including reservation) etc.
(3) Constitutional sanction for ‗sacred beliefs‘: Non-negotiable values
such as group identity, ethnicity, shared communal and religious ideals are
being used as a basis for division within society.
-- Accommodation as a basis of constitution solution of different problems is a
major cause of concern in divided societies of countries in South Asia.
(4) Rules of succession, recruitment of new elites and political order:
The system laid down is old but still being followed without suitable
amendments.
--The variables to be investigated would include elections as method of elite
recruitment and the effectiveness of election commissions in maintaining free
and fair elections in democratic set ups.
(5) Human Migration: Mass Human migrations and refugees also pose
serious problems for security.
--Major countries in South Asia have faced several waves of migrations and
refugees over the past five decades which needs to be checked and if possible
reversed. Although, it is a very difficult task because of religious, national and
historical patterns which run across boundaries of different countries in different
regions and this domestic problem cannot be separated from relations between
the countries.4
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(6) Disintegration of Institutions: The political institutions of countries of
South Asia find themselves under severe strain being weighed down by both old
and new problems.
--The political arrangements of early years dominated by educated nationalist
elite are virtually coming apart. The legitimacy enjoyed by those who managed
the system has become gradually eroded due to corruption at higher level. The
capacity to govern has declined in inverse proportion to the capability to
accommodate.
It has been pointed out by many that ‗deinstitutionalization‘ is the main cause
of the decline of orderly rule in respective countries. But it is difficult to
conjecture about the policy alternative that could restore a state of ‗orderly
rule‘ at this stage. But it requires serious thinking.
THE OBJECTIVE
The challenges in the post cold war period appear to be less military and more
economic and technical in nature. The focus seems to be very much on the
human dimension of security. The security problems facing developing
countries like those in South Asia are a reflection of the laborious process of
nation building. At the root of the problem lies the reality of social inequalities
and economic disparities. Therefore, along the path of development both
‗freedom from fear‘ and ‗freedom from want‘ have to go hand in hand. The
former is a battle for peace, that is a battle on the security front; whereas, the
latter is on social and economic front. It is now widely recognized that ‗state
security‘ may not lead to ‗human security. In fact over emphasis on ‗state
security‘ often endangers human security5 and in turn Human Rights.
As Bary Buzan rightly concludes as follows: 6
(1) That security has a meaning independent of the state at the level of the
individual;
(2) That individual security is affected both positively and negatively by the
state, and that the grounds for disharmony between individual and national
security represent a permanent contradiction; and
(3) That individual pursuit of security has a variety of influences on national
security, both as problem and as stimulus and constraint.
THE GENESIS
Struggles will continue in all probability under conditions of uneven
development, increasing dependence on the centre, and acute scarcity of
resources. Lastly, the issue of issues- improving the living conditions and
raising the standards of living of the majority living below poverty line even
remotely approaching the modern standards which has never really been
anybody‘s agenda right through. Therefore, reduction of the disparities in
income and a balanced regional industrial development must be effected to
minimize the vulnerability.
It has been well established that Security & Development have a symbiotic
relationship. Without security there can be no development & without
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development security has no meaning. Development is an overarching term
encompassing economic growth though agricultural improvement &
Industrialization, modernization, democratization, secularization, national
integration and nation building process. Anything that comes in the way is a
threat to National Security which in turn has to contend with law & order
problems, proxy war and Low Intensity Conflict and evolve adequate responses
to deal with militancy, insurgency, terrorist violence and irregular warfare. All
these maladies are eating into the vitals of nation-states in South Asia. These
evils rather than being causes are actually effects of various psychological,
political & social anomalies. The frequent use of the Army to fight internal
disturbances a not a healthy trend and increase in judicial activism which rather
than being a healthy sign indicates the ailment of our participative democracy.
Corruption in society and particularly in high political offices is another factor
eroding the credibility of the State. Unless these are dealt with security will
remain elusive.
OTHER PROBLEMS AND NON-MILITARY THREATS
The root of the other problems to nation‘s security lie in the rapidly widening
gap between expectation and achievement or satisfaction, especially when
society has been rapidly losing its historical roots of family life, spiritual solace
and traditional, cultural, moral/ethical values. Forces of globalization and the
social change generated by new technologies and global communication seem
to be bringing in a reorientation toward greater materialism especially in the
younger generation. Technology has created a revolution of rising expectations.
Satellite based audio-visual communication systems bring to remotest part of
the countries in South Asia images that enhance awareness but they can also
be culturally and psychologically very destabilizing. They are also expediting the
value erosion and the process of value transition.
An assessment of the other threats is also desirable. Today, the most pervasive
force in our world is globalization. Although globalization is inexorable, its
benefits are not. It can expand access to technology that enriches life and
technology that destroys it. It can equalize economic opportunity and
accentuate economic disparity. It can make dictatorships more vulnerable to
the spread of liberating ideas and democracies more vulnerable to the spread of
terrorism, disease and financial turmoil.
The area that has gained prominence in the era of globalization is that of
human rights. There is a need to make a distinction between the approaches to
human rights of the developed world and the developing world. The Third World
holds that economic development has to precede the full flowering of civil and
political rights and that a greater value needs to be placed on community and
family than on individual rights. It can be further argued that in the desire to
achieve distributive justice there is an undue emphasis on liberty rights and not
welfare rights of the people. The respective countries should have the right to
interpret human rights in accordance to their history, culture, polity, and
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economy. Thus the broad application of Amnesty approach to human rights
would have to be tempered with the ground situation mentioned above.
The threat posed by the convergence of organized crime, drug trafficking and
terrorist acts are no longer insular, distinct activities that can be contained and
eradicated through traditional enforcement. Instead they are integrated
activities which through their very commission have a reverberating impact on
the vital national interests. We are now threatened by self inflicted, swiftly
moving environmental alterations about whose long term biological and
ecological consequences we are painfully ignorant. Dwindling reserves of
strategic grade resources like oil and ecological imbalances now threaten the
security of nations.
Some of the short term mitigations of these dangers, such as greater energy
efficiency, rapid banning of chlorofluorocarbons, or modest reductions in
nuclear arsenals are comparatively easy and at some level are already
underway. But other far reaching approaches will encounter widespread inertia,
denial and resistance. In this category are conversion from fossil fuels to a nonpolluting energy economy, a continuing swift reversal of the nuclear arms race
and a voluntary halt to population growth without which many of the other
approaches to preserve the environment will be nullified. The liberal agenda of
globalization has also raised the specter of cultural threats of convergence.
DEMOCRACY - THE VIABLE OPTION
Today it is politically incorrect to argue in favour of any system that is at
divergence with the Anglo-Saxon representative model called democracy. It
needs to be pointed out that the post-colonial world has been experimenting
with several versions of legitimacy. Legitimacy though a representative
mandate would have to search for roots in the political culture of the state
concerned. The Third World reaction to this comes as a cultural resurgence to
the convergence cosmopolitan culture.7 These Third World civilizations in South
Asia grew in the belief that such values like modernization, westernization,
secularization, all adopted at the expense of traditional values, and would lead
to power and prosperity. In reality, these societies suffered problems of poverty
and deprivation through rapid and unplanned urbanization and an imbalance in
the distribution of wealth. The reassertion of traditional values is visible in the
use of religion for social justice and identity. Such a reassertion is not
‗fundamentalism‘ as is popularly perceived as fundamentalism can only be an
aberration of this trend.
It has recognized that such non-military pressures like trade, intellectual
property rights, environment and technology control as a threat to national
security. Trade embargoes, technology control regimes and diplomatic
pressures to sign various treaties were growing in recent times. Some of the
key threats which can be included in the area of internal security are
fundamentalism, communalism, migration and Norco-terrorism. In the area of
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nationalism are on the social order.8 A new security policy would have to
involve the non- military sectors and also evolve a coordinated national
response to such threats which could be addressed in a better way in a
democratic set up.
THE STRATEGY
Although, countries in the last ten years or so has adopted its global strategy to
meet new challenges and build a reasonably open, and dynamic economy; it
has not yielded the desired developmental results and the reasons are obvious.
It can be well appreciated that countries in South Asia like India which are
multi-ethnic, multi-religious, multi-lingual which since independence have been
striving to evolve into a composite culture on the one hand and scrambling for
modernization and rapid industrialization on the other. It is to be noted that
most of the countries in South Asia had been completely de-industrialized
before independence. During the years after independence, these countries
have undertaken the most ambitious and gigantic task of transforming on
orthodox society of an ancient civilization into a modern state, from an agrarian
economy to an industrialized system though a democratic process. The process
is bound to be slower than most of its people wanted and a degree of
turbulence was inevitable in such a colossal change.
Besides the turbulence and tension that is incidental to the process of
development these countries have been constantly contending with the problem
of ‗regime interest‘ versus ‗national interest‘. The dichotomy of ‗regime interest‘
and ‗national interest‘ is manifested variously and hinders the acculturation
process by giving rise to minorityism, casteism and communalism on microlevel as well as undermines the federal structure of our polity on macro-level.
This is possible because while the form of politics is proclaimed as secular, its
style is essentially casteist and communal. This discrepancy in form and style of
politics is a major source of instability in the respective political systems.
The economic rights of the people are limited only by considerations of
economic development and national security, which take precedence over the
individual‘s economic rights and consume a lion‘s share of the annual budget of
the countries. While the low priority given to economic rights can be justified on
the basis of national security, in the final analysis, priorities are determined by
the ideological commitment of the leadership which in turn, depends upon the
distribution of political and economic power within the system. Hence, the social
and economic development to a large extent and not ideology seems to be the
greatest hurdle in the quest for the realization of human rights.9
CONCLUSIONS
Before finally drawing the conclusions it is conceded as Rosecrance puts it
‗one of the fundamental problem in the international system is the formulation
of objectives and policies on a purely domestic basis‘.10 The point to ponder is
whether the developing countries are in a position to do so without the pulls
and pressures from the developed world who create a hostile environment. But
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the truth of the matter is that it is ultimately ‗national interest‘ and not any
utopian philosophy which determines the priority and concerns of National
decision making. The countries in South Asia like others are no exception to it
and should resist such pressures and concentrate on the security threats from
within rather than without.
In order to cope with the present and future challenges to the internal and
human security, the respective countries need a dedicated, enlightened and
decisive leadership and an efficient agency to look into the security matters and
arrange a time bound redressal of the issues. These countries do not have a
tradition of institutionalized planning of strategic policy. Traditionally, there has
always been a distinction between home, foreign and defence policies and has
also sought to keep Science and Technology along with other sectors in
watertight compartments. It is only in recent times that these traditional
barriers are collapsing giving rise to a holistic approach which would be useful.
Lack of vision and inappropriate designing to achieve human security makes it
additional susceptible, and leave fewer scopes of convalescing. Prerequisite is
to just accept the price of human security particularly for bringing change in life
of citizens. The political approach to Internal Security and in turn national
Security is vital for formulating a total Security policy which will optimize the
gains. Our perception of National Security must go beyond safeguarding the
borders and maintaining law and order. It must embrace such human security
issues as pointed out above besides ensuring the physical security of our
citizens.
As human security is a global and inclusive concept, some of its aspects –
extreme poverty, terrorism, drug trafficking, environmental degradation, illegal
immigration and AIDS – go far beyond national boundaries. That is why
regional cooperation is essential in order to achieve tangible results.
THE AGENDA
Priority can solely be set once attaining human security becomes an agenda
and sumptuous spending on strategic affairs is diverted to social sector. Sooner
governments realize the price of human security the better for everyone. The
ranking in development index is a lesson for all governments of the region. Still
there's time for a new starting or else we have a tendency to can engulf in
issues with few achievements here and there to count and to be fallaciously
happy with them.
A gearing up of the economy definitely is the need of the hour. National
Security cannot be maintained unless national economies can be sustained.11 A
grand National Strategy which is ―the part of the decision making process that
conceptualizes and establishes goals and objectives designed to protect and
enhance national interests in the international environment.‖ is required. This
National Strategy is urgently needed to set the house in order, preserve
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internal harmony, providing for basic human needs and rights without which
security is illusory.
It is a settled fact that the best source of security is a general dynamic,
equitable and balanced development. When development is not even it
inevitably creates turbulence inside the state and endangers security from
external sources as well which has been the case in most of the countries of
South Asia. Therefore, reduction of the disparities in income and a balanced
regional industrial development must be effected. Time has come for prompt
action on all fronts: that of prevention, by promoting steady, balanced
economic growth, while protecting human rights and minority rights and
adopting political agreements that ensure the equitable representation of all
groups.
Mostly all major conflicts that have occurred in the last decade, nearly all of
them have been within countries rather than between nations. The picture is
going to be grimmer and challenging in the coming decades if we do not bring
about the dawn of ―real freedom we have clamoured for, and that real freedom
in turn will bring food to our starving people, clothing for them, housing for
them and all manners of opportunities of progress‖. There will be no lasting
peace without sustainable endogenous development, which attacks the root
causes of division and of entrenched poverty and exclusion. One of the main
keys to human security is the achievement of all forms of development –
individual, social, economic and sustainable. Human security and human
development serve and strengthen each other.
Human security provides the sheltering environment for human development,
the social peace and freedom from fear that make development practical. Just
as surely, good human development strategies can relieve the privations and
inequalities – and remedy the ills of bad governance – that jeopardize human
security.
NOTES AND REFERENCES
1. Rana, A.P. (1998) ―Reconstructing International Relations as a field of Study in India: A program for Studying
International Relations, The Baroda Perspective, Political Science Quarterly, 36, (1), March, 84–85.
2. Acharya, Amitav (2004) ‗Fight Terrorism—But Carefully,‘ The 5th Column, Far Eastern Economic Review, (9)
September.
3. Lincoln C. Chen (1995) ―Human Security: Concepts and Approaches.‖ in Common Security in Asia New Concepts
of Human Security. (eds.) Tatsuro Matsumae and Lincoln C. Chen. Tokyo: Tokai University Press, 139.
4. Buzan, Barry (1983) ‗People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations’, New
York: Harvester Wheatsheaf Books Ltd., 107.
5. Khan, A.R. (2000) ‘Globalisation and Non-Traditional Security in South Asia’, Colombo :RCSS News letter, 6 (1),
4.
6. Buzan, Barry (1983) ‗People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations’, New
York: Harvester Wheatsheaf Books Ltd., 33.
7. Malik, V.P. (1996) ‗New Challenges to National Security‘, Savarkar Memorial Lecture, Pune : DDSS
8. For details see Brown, Lester (1977) ‗Redefining National Security‘ World Watch Washington: Paper No. 14, 3738. The purpose of national security deliberations, says the author should not be to maximise ‗military strength‘ but
to maximise ‗national security‘.
9. Gautam, O.P. (1982) ‗Human Rights in India’, New York : Praeger Publication, 182
10. Rosecrance, Richard (1973) ‗International Relations : Peace of War‘, New York: McGraw Hill, 18
11. For a brief but well informed note on Islamic Resurgence see Background Brief, (1994) London :Foreign and
Commonwealth Office, October.
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INDO–BHUTAN RELATIONS
AS A
MODEL OF COOPERATION BETWEEN SMALL STATES AND BIG POWERS
MARIAN GALLENKAMP
South Asia Institute, University of Heidelberg ;
Bhutan Research Organisation
MARIAN GALLENKAMP is a senior researcher and PhD candidate at
the South Asia Institute‟s Department of Political Science at Heidelberg
University, Germany. He holds a master‟s degree in Political Science
and South Asian Politics and has specialized in transition studies,
democratic theory and the politics of Bhutan. Mr. Gallenkamp has
worked extensively on the Kingdom of Bhutan, writing for the Institute
of Peace and Conflict Studies in New Delhi, the Heidelberg Papers in
South Asian and Comparative Politics, the German South Asia research
network, and openDemocracy. His current research is concerned with
the applicability of western concepts of democracy in the developing
world and the fusion of indigenous traditions and norms with modern
ideas of democratic institutions and procedures. He is also the author
of www.bhutan-research.org, an internet knowledgebase for the study
of politics and democracy in Bhutan, providing a wide array of
information to scholars and students that are interested in and work on the subject.
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INDO–BHUTAN RELATIONS AS A MODEL OF COOPERATION
BETWEEN SMALL STATES AND BIG POWERS
MARIAN GALLENKAMP
The bilateral relationship between the Kingdom of Bhutan and the Republic of India is a truly
exceptional example of how mutually beneficial cooperation is possible between two countries that
dispose of starkly different power resources. On the one hand there is India, the world‘s largest
democracy, second most populous nation, fourth most powerful military and fifth largest economy,
on the other hand there is Bhutan, one of the world‘s youngest and smallest democracies, a Least
Developed Country (according to the United Nations), the world‘s 167th largest economy and a
negligible military power.1 And yet, the immense power asymmetry between the two neighbors
has not let to a pure ‗command and obedience‘ relationship, thanks to farsighted and responsible
leaders and policy makers.
Although traditional trade and cultural links between India and Bhutan existed for centuries, the
beginning of formalized diplomatic relations between Bhutan and British India can be traced back
to the treaty of Sinchula of 1865, by which the brief but fierce war over the southern Duars in
Assam and Bengal was ended. At this point it is important to note that Bhutan escaped colonial
rule and was able to maintain its independence vis-a-vis the British.2 Though there remains some
controversy as to Bhutan‘s status until 1949, even the 1910 treaty of Phunakha, in which relations
were further formalized and Bhutan agreed to be guided in its foreign policy by the government of
British India, cannot be seen as a surrender of its sovereignty as an independent state. The British
never send administration or civil servant officers to Bhutan, the Government of India Act of 1935
did not extend to the territory of Bhutan, and it did not occupy the legal position of an Indian
princely state.3 When India gained her independence in 1947, the uncertainty in Bhutan was great.
While it had maintained cordial relations with the British administration as the latter secured
Bhutan‘s independence and self-chosen isolation, the government of Bhutan had at first been
apprehensive about the independence movement in India. It took two years of negotiations before a
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new treaty was in place and formalized bilateral relations between India and Bhutan until its
renegotiation in 2007.
While it would have been easy for the Indian government to coerce Bhutan into being a part of
India, Prime Minister Nehru did chose not to. The trust he build in Bhutan in general and with its
third king in particular by ensuring the kingdoms independence, his adventurous state visit in 1958
and his firm commitment to protect Bhutan‘s sovereignty when tensions along the Sino-Indian
border grew, can be seen as the solid foundation for this exceptional relationship.4
From the very beginning, India helped Bhutan to develop its economy, infrastructure, health and
education system as it almost entirely financed the first five-year-plans. Although New Delhi
formally held a prerogative over Bhutan‘s foreign policy, the government in Thimphu began to
diversify its foreign relations beginning in the mid-1960s. It joined the Colombo Plan in 1963 and
became a full member of the United Nations in 1971. Diplomatic relations in the form of resident
representatives between India and Bhutan were established in 1968 and later upgraded to full
ambassadorial relations in 1978. Bhutan was also among the first nations to acknowledge the
independent state of Bangladesh.
Today, relations between India and Bhutan have expanded far beyond their traditional fields of
cooperation and are more diverse than ever. Frequent visits and exchanges of top officials from
both sides ensure a constant flow of information and deepen trust and understanding for each
other‘s problems, challenges and sensitivities.
India‘s neutral and at times even pro Bhutan stance on the refugee issue, probably one of the most
sensitive issues for the Himalayan kingdom, has enabled Bhutan to follow and develop its very
own and unique vision of political change, economic growth and cultural preservation. Without
going into the controversies that surround the events of the late 1980s and early 1990s, India, as
the only one holding true leverage over Bhutan, refrained from taking sides, pressuring or even
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intervening in this crisis. That must have dispersed many Bhutanese concerns that came up, after
the situation in Sikkim had deteriorated in the mid-1970s and the resulting intervention by India.5
Bhutan on the other hand was able to return that favor when it launched Operation All Clear in
December 2003, flushing out Indian militants from its southern borderlands. The surprising
success of that first ever test for the small but efficient Bhutanese military has shown that defense
cooperation between India and Bhutan has produced beneficial synergies for both countries,
securing a porous border from Indian militants that seek safe haven in the vast forests of southern
Bhutan to launch attacks on India and, on the other hand, from radical elements and terrorists in
the camps in Nepal that seek to carry out attacks against Bhutan.6 To sustain the success of the
2003 operation, both countries meet regularly to discuss border management and security, the last
time being the 7th meeting in September 2011.
A major field where defense and development cooperation are being connected is India‘s support
for all major infrastructure projects in Bhutan. Until the 1960s there were no trafficable roads in
Bhutan. For India, access to Bhutan was important with view to the mounting tensions along the
Sino-Indian border and Bhutan needed roads and other infrastructure for its development and
connection to the outside world. In 1961 India‘s Border Road Organisation launched project
Dantak, which is still operating in Bhutan, having built all major roads and the international airport
at Paro.7
With India‘s growing hunger for electricity, another field of cooperation became one of the most
important in bilateral relations. Hydropower projects, funded by India and build in Bhutan, have
contributed to an enormous extent to Bhutan‘s economic growth. Being the cleanest energy
available in Bhutan, these projects support its vision of Gross National happiness, of which
environmental protection is an important cornerstone, provide an opportunity to fully electrify
Bhutan and to create jobs in the construction industry. According to the 2006 agreement on
cooperation in hydropower and the amending protocol of 2009, India pledged to develop 10,000
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MW of electricity through 3 new hydropower projects in Bhutan by 2020.8 The hydropower
projects have not only boosted Bhutan‘s GDP (in 2010 they contributed 17.6% of the GDP 9), but
also reversed its trade balance with India. While the trade balance with India was negative up to
2005, the export of electricity to India has produced a surplus in recent years.10
In other areas of cooperation, Bhutan‘s unprecedented transition to democracy is a major factor for
the deepening of bilateral relations especially in political terms. From the very beginning of
political reforms in Bhutan in the 1950s, the decentralization in the 1980s and 90s, up to the
liberalization and democratization in the 2000s11, Indian leaders and political institutions have
stood firmly alongside Bhutan‘s, providing guidance, adivice, and technical support. Cooperation
between the two countries‘ legislatures have been established12 and India‘s Central Election
Commission has provided education, equipment and advice for its Bhutanese counterpart,
contributing largely to the astonishing professionalization of the Election Commission of Bhutan,
which in turn has evolved into one of the major guardians of Bhutan‘s young democracy.13
In conclusion one can safely assume that bilateral relations between India and Bhutan are destined
to remain as intense, respectful and cordial in the coming years, as they have been for the past
decades. The potential for even closer cooperation, especially in the education sector, e.g. Bhutan‘s
education city and the collaboration with the All India Institute of Medical Sciences to establish a
medical college in Bhutan14 , is great. Although Bhutan still is and will remain dependent on India
to an overwhelming extend (India is Bhutan‘s largest trading and recipient of aid), this huge
dependency has not let India to simply take and command from Bhutan what it wants, but to a
relationship that is marked by respect and an esteem for mutually beneficial cooperation. Indian
Prime minister Manmohan Singh found the perfect words to express this relationship, when he
addressed the joint sitting of the first democratically elected parliament of Bhutan in 2008, the year
of Bhutan‘s successful transition to democracy, of the centenary celebration of Bhutan‘s
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monarchy, the coronation of His Majesty King Jigme Khesar Namgyal Wangchuck, 5th king of
Bhutan, and the 50 year anniversary of Prime Minister Nehru‘s historical visit to the kingdom:
―As Bhutan enters a new era in its history, you can continue to count on India, as a
friend and – may I say – an admirer of Bhutan. India will stand by you as a factor of
stability and support in your quest for greater prosperity and happiness.―15
References:
1
Figures on population and the economy have been taken from rankings in the CIA World Fact Book, available at
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2001rank.html (for the economy) and
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2119rank.html (for population). For military
capabilities and strength refer to http://www.globalfirepower.com/ and the International Institute for Strategic Studies‘
publication ‗The Military Balance 2011‘.
2
Cf. White, Jean Claude (1909), Sikhim & Bhutan — Twenty-One Years on the North-East Frontier, 1887-1908
(Delhi: Low Price Publications), 264-284.
3
Cf. Mitra, Debamitra (2010), Indo-Bhutan Relations: Political Process, Conflict and Crisis (Delhi: Academic
Excellence), 20ff.
4
Cf. Rahul, Ram (1997), Royal Bhutan: A Political History (New Delhi: Vikas), 27-29.
5
Cf. Kharat, Rajesh S. (2005), Foreign Policy of Bhutan (New Delhi: Manak), 73f.
6
Cf. Gallenkamp, Marian (2010), Between China, India and the Refugees: Understanding Bhutan‘s National Security
Scenario, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS Issue Brief No. 154), available at
http://www.ipcs.org/pdf_file/issue/IB154-Marian-Bhutan.pdf.
7
For more details please visit Dantak‘s website at http://www.bro.nic.in/indexmain.asp?projectid=23.
8
For details refer to the Indian Embassy in Thimphu at http://www.indianembassythimphu.bt/mega.html.
9
National Account Statistics 2010, National Statistics Bureau, Royal Government of Bhutan 2011. Available at
http://www.nsb.gov.bt/pub/nar/nar2011.pdf.
10
Statistical Yearbook of Bhutan 2010, National Statistics Bureau, Royal Government of Bhutan 2010. Available at
http://www.nsb.gov.bt/pub/syb/syb2010.pdf.
11
For more details please refer to Gallenkamp, Marian (2011), The History of Institutional Change in the Kingdom of
Bhutan: A Tale of Vision, Resolve, and Power, Heidelberg Papers in South Asian and Comparative Politics, Working
Paper No. 61. Available at http://archiv.ub.uniheidelberg.de/volltextserver/volltexte/2011/12042/pdf/Heidelberg_Papers_61_Gallenkamp.pdf.
12
Memorandum of Understanding between the National Assembly of Bhutan and the Lok Sabha of the Republic of
India, 2011. http://www.nab.gov.bt/downloads/32MoU_merged.pdf.
13
Cf. Gallenkamp, Marian (2011), The long way of consolidating and learning democracy: Bhutan‘s local government
elections 2011 openDemocracy article on 13 September 2011. Available at http://www.opendemocracy.net/mariangallenkamp/long-way-of-consolidating-and-learning-democracy-bhutan‘s-local-government-electio.
14
Kuensel Online, 1 May 2010, ‗Foundation laid for fu ture of medicine in Bhutan‘,
http://www.kuenselonline.com/2011/?p=14290.
15
http://www.nab.gov.bt/speech/manmohan.pdf
***********************
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India and South Asia
Modernity, De-Secularising Public Sphere
and the Predicaments of Democratisation in South Asia
Dr. Sanjeev Kumar H.M.
Assistant Professor,
Department of International Relations
South Asian University, New Delhi
[email protected]
[email protected]
Education: M.A. in Political Science (2000) Karnatak University,
Dharwad, Karnataka
M. Phil. (2002), Ph.D. (2005) Karnatak University, Dharwad,
Karnataka
Research Interests:
Democratisation in South Asia, India-Pakistan Relations and
Subcontinental Security, Multiculturalism, Globalisation and the
identity of Muslims, Political Parties and the Foreign Policy
Making Process in India.
Recent publications:
‘The Politics of Muslim Identity and the Nature of Public Imagination in India: Media and Films as
Major Determinants’ in European Journal of Economic and Political Studies (EJEPS.) Edr. Yilmaz Ihsan,
Vol. 4 (1), summer 2011, pp. 171-187. [P-ISSN: 1307-6000] (co-authored)
‘Competing Conceptions of Nationhood: Cultural Dimensions of India-Pakistan Conflict and the SubContinental Security Dynamics’ in The International Journal of Interdisciplinary Social Sciences,
University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, USA. Edr. Mary Kalantzis and Bill Cope, Vol. 5, Issue 9, 2010,
pp: 203-212. [ISSN: 1833-1882].
‘Capitalism, Multiculturalism and the Global Identity of Islam’ in European Journal of Economic and
Political Studies (EJEPS). Edr. Yilmaz Ihsan, Vol. 3 (1), summer 2010, pp.61-81. [P-ISSN: 1307-6000]
(co-authored)
‘Internal Dynamics of Sub-Continental Security: Indo Pak Tensions and the Political Response’ in
India Quarterly, Edr. Partha Ghosh, Vol. 66, No. 1, Jan-March 2010, pp: 35-50.
‘Post-September 11 crisis in International Relations and the State of Multicultural Societies’ Economic
and Political Weekly, Vol. No. XLIV, No.3, 17-23, January 2009, pp: 47-55.
‘The Pakistan Factor in India’s Domestic Politics’ [Forthcoming in South Asian Survey].
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FPRC Journal No. 9
India and South Asia
Modernity, De-Secularising Public Sphere and
the Predicaments of Democratisation in South Asia
Abstract:
The main aim of this paper is to reconnoiter the underlying conundrums pertaining to the existence of an
antithetical equation between modernity and democratisation in South Asia. The paper argues that this paradox has
got deeply structured in the region because the compound process involving the advent of modernity, coalesced
with the mature institutionalisation of democratic culture has been challenged by fractious forces that are engaged
in fishing in choppy waters of the transitional phase. For achieving their disingenuous motives, these anti-modernist
forces have contested the democratic institutions and governance structure in the name of preservation of their
identity and its protection from alien infringement which has drastically de-secularised the public sphere in the
polities of the region. In the light of this, the paper discusses as to how ethno-religious fanatics (Hindu, Islamic and
the Sinhalese), have fractiously intervened in coercing South Asia into a path of de-modernisation by de-secularising
the public sphere which has inflicted a severe quagmire of governance and heavily plagued the process of State
construction and nation-building in the region.
Key words:
Democratisation, Modernisation, Democratic Institutionalisation, Democratic culture, De-secularisation, Public
sphere
Introduction:
Rapid modernisation of societies tends to reciprocate by facilitating the democratisation
of political processes. This in turn, results in the rationalisation of power and ensures proper
accountability of the Government towards the public. But, there still exists large parts of the
globe which are constantly grappling with the challenges of democratic transition and of the
guarantee of stable process of State construction. Even with the frenetic pace of
modernisation represented by corporate globalisation, liberal democracy, considered to be
an epitome of modernity, seems to have not yet succeeded in establishing itself as an
unchallenged global phenomenon. Macro-regional forces anti-thetical to democratic values
such as ethno-cultural and religious fanatics have fiercely contested democratic processes.
South Asia presents itself as an epitome of this paradox and worse, the region’s tryst with
democratisation has been a tale of unhappy political experience, marked by rampant spate of
structured violence and intra-regional tensions.
Representative of this fact, incompetence of the democratically elected political class in
Pakistan, Bangladesh and Afghanistan have rendered opportunities to the anti-democratic
and extremist forces, to infringe upon the democratic and secular space of the polity.
Similarly in India and Sri Lanka, weakness of the democratic State has led to the emergence
or intensification of ethno-religious strife and anti-regime activities. So, while problemetising
the question of the success of the process of institutionalisation of democratic culture, each
region must be visualised with a micro-cosmic approach. In the case of South Asia, it may be
stated that the polities of the region are democratising, with the process of State construction
still in the nascence because the region has recently emerged out of colonial fetters. The
inevitable result in such circumstance has been violence as the societies are divided on the
basis of diverse linguistic, cultural and tribal identities.
An interrogation into the region’s engagement with democracy unearths the greenness
of its experience in terms of democratic institutionalisation. This pretext however is
insufficient to exonerate the region from the scourge of democratic juvenility, as more than
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India and South Asia
six decades of experiment with democratic institutions merely seems to have been
inadequate for the polities of the region to transform into mature and stable democracies.
Hence, “the euphoria of global democratisation gave way to a number of sobering realities
and it soon became apparent that democratic transitions were only half of the equation.
Equally problematic were the dilemmas involved in democratic consolidation. The new
democracies were confronted with a plethora of political and economic problems with which
they had to contend, many continuing to suffer from the squalid legacies of the authoritarian
systems they had replaced. These included among others, the challenges of economic
liberalization and globalization, the modalities and procedures necessary for conducting
elections and other necessary democratic practices, reformulating civil-military relations and
ensuring that democratic pacts and bargains were observed.” (Kamarava 2000: 188)
The phenomenon manifests in South Asia as the rapid spate of globalisation tends to get
impeded by the anti-modernist forces contesting for identity like ethno-religious fanatics
(Hindu, Islamic and the Sinhalese), who have fractiously intervened to impel the process of
de-modernisation in the region. So “in the field of contemporary culture, we have become a
witness to contradictory but inter-twined historical processes that are operating
simultaneously. A globalizing tendency, where the economies and cultures around the world
are getting embedded increasingly in a more and more pervasive global web; and a localizing
tendency, expressed in its extreme form by a number of insurgencies on the basis of ethnic,
religious and other local identities.” (Goonatilake 1997: 225-226)
This is mainly because “modern processes entirely differ from previous socio-cultural
processes, due to its dynamism, the degree to which they under cut traditional habits, and
customs and their global impact.” (Giddens 1991: 1-3) Clipped to this, the democratising
trends must not merely be seen as a pre-destined fate in politics, but its pervasive influence
in cultural life as a whole is immense. (Mannheim 1992: 171) The present paper predicates
its contention upon the premise that the processes of modernisation are inextricably linked
with democratisation and in this way, both processes are convoluted to each other. In view of
this, a broad consideration of the chequered mosaic of conflict and peace embedded in South
Asia’s geopolitical dynamics leads us to ruminate over some of the dominant themes that
have tended to capture our attention. They include, democratisation and modernity, State
construction and nation-building, independence and nationalism (a legacy of colonial past)
and, the subtle but intricate linkages between religion and State (accentuated by the desecularisation of the public sphere). These themes are imbued deeply and their pervasive
influence considerably affects the politico-strategic dynamics of the region. On the basis of
this, the paper attempts at probing the underlying factors that have placed modernity and
democratisation at loggerheads and engendered profound crisis of governance, State
construction and nation building in South Asia.
Decolonisation or De-democratisation?
The triadic inter-lacing of democracy, capitalism and imperialism has produced varied
types of unpropitious consequences and disrupted the true essence of democratic culture. As
contemplated in the discourse of Western theory, democracy was supposed to be an
emancipatory mechanism that harboured and promoted an egalitarian society. However, as a
marked paradox, it turned out to be a dexterously crafted mechanism for engendering and
sustaining a capitalist economic system and promote the patently absurd individualistic
connotation of a liberal society. Tinged with the sugar-coated self-extolling declamation of
ethical supremacy, the West-generated democratic system of governance and its global
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manifestation; the liberal international order have acted as a concealing device for
camouflaging the maladies of capitalism and imperialism. Thus, all this ultimately led to the
emergence of duel faced connotations of democracy.
On the one hand, democracy got imbued in the value system of modern Western
societies as its people were brought up in the traditions laid down by Hobbes, Locke, Mill and
Green and democratic culture became an indubitable way of life that got deeply entrenched
in the psyche of the people. This was because the institutionalisation of democratic values
emerged simultaneously and matured together in a temporary parallel development of other
modern processes that included the rise of industrial capitalism, urbanisation, rationalisation
and secularisation. The concatenation of these forces configured together and formed a
modern society in the West. While on the other hand, due to the rapid expansion of
capitalism and imperialism in the wake of industrial revolution and the spread of colonial
interventions, the very notion of democracy began to assume contradictory meanings. This
was primarily because the apologists of capitalism and colonialism sought to defend their
actions on the pretext of the ethical supremacy of democracy and asserted their inherent
right to promote its expansion where it is absent.
By building the ‘doctrine of harmony of interests’ among the democratic regimes, the
privileged order that is the dominant world powers intended to invoke their acts as an
ingenious moral device in order to justify and maintain their own dominant position. Hence,
once industrial capitalism and the manifestation of its class configuration became the
recognised structures of the society, the doctrine of harmony of interests in the form of
international peace as a mutual interest of symmetric political formations, that is
democracies, became the ideology of a dominant group which attempted to maintain its
predominance by asserting the identity of its interests with those of the community as a
whole. (Carr 1939: 58 and 102) Thus, either it may be in the form of State-engineered
exploitation of subaltern sections of the society or, the obnoxious interventions in the name
of saving democracy; be it the cold war excesses in Korea and Vietnam or the post cold war
overindulgence in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq, or even for that matter, the contemplated
pre-emptive actions by the US in Iran, Syria and North Korea, all exemplify the commonness
of intention displayed by the Western imperialist powers. The monolithic explanation for all
this is apparent, the capitalist forces in the West in all these acts have endeavoured to
achieve one fundamental aim that is to hegemonise both domestic societies and global
politics and for this, democracy has proved to be a perfect normative pretext. This
phenomenon becomes ostensible in the US strategy of fostering an ‘America first strategy’
that combined the idea of promoting forward thinking Americanisation abroad, while
simultaneously attempting to restore the values of a mythical America at home. (Lieven
2004: 31)
Hence in this way, democracy’s ethical image was distorted and when it was transmitted
to peripheral zones like South Asia, it lost its entire positive image and became merely a jack
for hoisting the hegemonic designs of a long established powerful class in the society, mainly
because in regions such as South Asia, democracy emerged as an anachrony. It was superimposed by the outgoing colonial administration in collusion with the dominant groups of
the local societies. Colonialism thus brought in with it institutional forms of modern Europe
and hence inflicted a capitalist model of State upon the post-colonial territories. The elite in
South Asian polities emulated the historical and ideological trajectories of the former
masters, hence, expediting the expansion of the industrial capitalist economic prototypes.
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(Chatterjee 1993:14) Through a subtle coalitional interdependence, the colonial powers and
the dominant local groups crafted political formations in a manner that suitably guarded the
interests of both; the continuation of the political influence of the coloniser and also the
maintenance of domestic socio-political hegemony of the already powerful local elite. So, a
liaison which was peculiar and intricate but marked by shrewd reciprocity, transpired
between the erstwhile capitalist colonial masters and the nascent post-colonial political
class. Nandy (1983: 145) has tellingly described this type of relationship between the
coloniser and the colonised as that of the intimate enemy, wherein the victim internalises the
values, norms and belief systems of the victimiser and in this way the victim emerges as the
mere image of the victimiser.
This esoteric interdependence brought in a new kind of pre-eminence of the Western
capitalist powers over their former colonial spheres which have been termed as neo-colonial
dominance. With it also, democracy emerged as a tool of hegemony for the already dominant
local groups in the societies of South Asia. The adventitious foisting of Western style
democratic governance also transpired as an ideological anachronism for the nascent States
and hence domestic political incompetence in democracies has been a critical feature of
South Asian polities. So, the autochthonous groups of these States that were already
dominant such as the Punjabis, the most affluent community in Pakistan, the upper class
Hindu elite that enjoyed a hegemonic footing in the Indian or the Nepalese society since
thousands of years and, the socially and economically stronger Sinhalese in Sri Lanka,
became both benefactors and the beneficiaries of a democratic State. The socio-economic
under-development of the region largely helped the dominant actors in the society to
maneuver their way to the pinnacle of political power. Thus a democratic State proved to be
more advantageous for the powerful actors in the society, who nurtured motives for a
quixotic perpetuation of their hegemony.
This rendered the democratic State to become an instrument for the maintenance of
social hegemony by the powerful groups, resulting in subaltern discontent that fountained
anti-regime sentiments, leading to frequent political destabilisations. In this way, democratic
elites in such nascent democracies did not seem to actively try to or succeed in consolidating
democracy culturally.” The ensuing democratic system often ends up comprising largely
isolated, elite groups whose main interests lie in securing their own positions within the new
institutions of the democratic system (especially in the parliament or their own political
party) rather than representing their constituents. So, democratic transition from above, in
short, face the potential rather than inherent danger of resulting in elitist quasi-democratic
polities that have all the institutional and structural trappings of democracy but lack a strong
cultural component that would give them a strong resonance among the different strata of
the society.” (Kamarava 2000: 190)
Such a scenario makes burlesque of a democracy, by occluding the path of progress for
the weak and underprivileged sections of the society. So, the struggle for the illusory social
amelioration by the oppressed classes has been a futile endeavour and emancipation has
merely remained as a mirage. Representative of this, the potent political contestations
handed down by political parties embodying backward class interest in the Indian State of
Uttar Pradesh like the Samajwadi Party and Bahujan Samaj Party to the Bharatiya Janata
Party or the Congress dominated by upper class Hindu elite, seems to have not translated
into any seminal social construction in the form of status reversal for the common Dalits or
the other backward classes. Such scenario may be subjected to a multi-causal explanation.
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However, it may be stated here that one dominant cause for this may be that the State in
South Asia emerged as the only harbinger of modernity and was supposed to be the sole
engine of social transformation and catalyst of various modern processes in a society which
was still plagued by the domineering propensity of long-standing traditional structures. This
pushed the region into the theatrics of a conflict, between the modern liberal State with its
reformative agenda and the deep-rooted and archaic socio-cultural structures with their
hegemonic tendencies. It generated immense social tensions and political friction, leading us
to the notion that democracy must emanate inherently and cannot be simulated. All this has
led to what could be called here as the de-democratisation of the region.
Towards De-modernisation and the Volatility of Democratic Processes:
The inability to achieve a fully baked modern society has been an instrumental force in
retarding the process of democratisation in South Asia. It has made the process more
excruciating and also prolonged the solution of numerous other problems of the region.
“Normally, the democratisation process goes through four stages. Decay of authoritarian
regime, transition to democracy, consolidation of democracy and maturity of democracy.”
(Shin 1994: 143-144) The polities of South Asia are undergoing through different stages of
democratisation and the entire region is not passing through the same stage. Hence, the pace
of democratisation of the region is rather sluggish. A glimpse at the current political
dynamics in different polities of the region will symbolise this phenomenon.
To begin with, Maldives, Nepal, Bhutan and Afghanistan, have just crossed the first stage
that is, decay of authoritarian regime. The two countries whose process of democratisation
has suffered mainly because of pulls towards de-modernisation are Maldives and
Afghanistan. Since independence, Maldives has been governed by two successive
authoritarian regimes, the first one led by Ibrahim Nasir who ruled from 1968 to 1978 and
Maumoon Abdul Gayoom who ruled since 1978. Recently, the democratic process was
initiated and the country moved closer to liberal governance by adopting its constitution in
2008. But the crux of the matter here is that legal system in Maldives is still Islamic in
character which deeply impinges upon the secular space of the polity and hampers
democratic processes. Afghanistan has been the most unfortunate country in the region, as
political stability has always been an illusion. Either it has been a battle ground for big
powers, or, it several times got enmeshed in the cross-fire of conflict between indigenous
groups contesting for greater socio-political space. The most horrendous aspect of this
quagmire was the Talibanisation of the country.
Although, Taliban was dislodged by US intervention, but democratic stability is still to be
achieved. Largely due to the resurgence of the neo-Taliban movement and, a major shock to
the peace process in the country effected by the recent assassination of its former president
Burhanuddin Rabbani. The incident has been yet another apparent manifestation of the
pervasive influence that the radical Islamist group Taliban still exercise in the political
sphere of Afghanistan. The success rate for the Taliban in 2011 has been chilling. From 2001
to 2010, only a handful of Afghan leaders died at the hands of the resistance. But off late, the
situation seems to have changed dramatically. It is now obvious that the Taliban can choose
their targets at will. The recent Taliban operations reveal indirectly that the group has
infiltrated into the higher echelons of the bureaucracy and the security services. In the past
three months, Taliban has launched three big attacks on targets inside Kabul using suicide
bombers and commandos with rocket propelled grenades. (Cherian 2011: 97) Thus, the most
significant obstacle to the process of democratisation in Afghanistan and Maldives has been
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the inertia towards modernisation exhibited by the conservative Islamic forces. This stems
from their aversion to the Western model of development and the belief that Islam and
democracy cannot be reconciled. (Bashiriyeh 1993: 143)
Yet another fitting illustration of the factors imbued in a democratic system that impel
the socio-political structures towards de-modernisation is the dogmatic orthodoxy of a caste
based social hierarchy in the region’s countries like India and Nepal. In India for instance,
caste system exists as an anti-modernist force, retrograding the process of building a modern
liberal society. It is so deeply entrenched in the polity’s culture that despite State initiated
processes of modernisation, leading to conspicuous transitions in the modes of production;
caste system did not undergo drastic changes in its form, content and meaning. (Bhal 1997:
1336) So, such a circumstance makes way for occidental criticisms that oriental civilisations
including India have not seen any basic change in their social structure, despite the advent of
European political, economic and industrial revolution. (Wittfogel 1957: 80)
When we consider the relationship between caste and politics, the vicious equation
tends to suspend history and a modernising society neither becomes fully modern, nor
remains utterly traditional. It merely is able to shunt from the thresholds of tradition and
modernity. In the course there occurs a metamorphosis in both the traditional social
structures, belief systems and also the modern institutions of governance and social control.
In this context, Lloyd Rudolph and Susanne Rudolph in their book, The Modernity of Tradition:
Political Development in India, stressing the variations in meaning of modernity and tradition,
attempt to demonstrate as to how there has occurred in India, a compression of these two
phenomenons resulting in the formation of unique social structures. They also tend to show
as to how in India traditional structures and norms have been adapted or transformed to
serve the needs of a modernising society. The authors ultimately question whether objective
historical conditions, such as advanced industrialisation, urbanisation, or literacy, are
requisites for political modernisation. (Rudolph and Rudolph 1984) In view of this, it could
be argued that the emergence of the modern State in India did not mean that the traditional
social structures entirely disappeared. In turn, archaic social structure, determined by caste
system began to impose itself upon politics and social dynamics.
Thus, caste system in India has its own impact on modern politics or vice-versa, modern
politics in India has tended to condition itself in accordance with a caste oriented society.
Henceforth, caste and politics seem to be inextricably linked up with each other. Casteism in
politics and politicisation of caste, are two distinct propositions that feed upon each other in
a vicious cycle. Its impact has been mordacious, resulting in the polarisation of the Indian
society. This trend is still a part of modern India, despite neo-liberal reforms, directed
towards achieving the prodigious goal of becoming a mega industrial-capitalist economy.
Ending of caste based social inequalities was one of the foremost challenges for postindependent India. Lamentably, despite constitutional fantasy of constructing an egalitarian
society through affirmative action, existence of caste based social disparities is still a hard
reality and subaltern emancipation has remained as a fictitious dream. As a contrast caste
has become a crucial political weapon, in the post-independent Indian politics and has been
instrumental in determining political equations in the process of shaping and sharing power.
The Quagmire of Governance and the Bottlenecks of Democratisation:
One of the most crucial components that determine the success of the process of
democratisation is the existence of a flawless governance mechanism. Deplorably, this
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problem has factored deeply in bringing the pace of democratisation to its knees in South
Asia. The plausible reasons for this may be explored in the asymmetric patterns of the
processes of democratisation in the region leading to the persistence of structural
instabilities. Pakistan and Bangladesh for instance, are at cross-roads, having to pass through
dual stages of democratisation that is transition to democracy and consolidation of
democracy. These countries have been frequently oscillating between democratic and
authoritarian regimes. Hence consolidation of democracy is the major problem that these
countries are grappling with.
The military takeover of Bangladesh in 1975 meant that liberal democracy got doomed
in its embryonic stage. The return to democracy after 1991 has been a traumatic political
journey wherein the concept of home-grown democracy has become a tool of rhetoric to veil
the authoritarian and whimsical character of the popular political class. In a sense, the term
democracy had lost almost all of its liberal characteristics in the country. Despite satisfying
the elementary conditions of a minimalist democracy, it had not made significant progress
towards consolidation of the democratic institutions, mainly because the democratically
elected leaders behaved in an autocratic manner and used State power to patronise their
supporters and subvert their opponents.
The leaders of the two main political parties, Begum Khaleda Zia of the Bangladesh
National Party and Sheikh Hasina of the Avami League, had turned the country into a
scaffolding to decapitate the democratic architecture by their involvement in fierce political
confrontation. During the second stint of democratic governance, the country witnessed an
opera of dynastic feuds between the Avami League and the B.N.P. The severe economic
inequalities that has bedeviled the country ever since its independence, seems to have
factored deeply in accentuating such structural inadequacies of Bangladesh’s politics.
Poverty has been a bane on its society that has bridled modernisation process. More than
three decades of bad governance, did not help the cause of liquidating poverty, in turn it has
had a metastatic influence in accentuating the problem in the entire polity.
Although Pakistan is often characterised as a failing State, the reality is much more
complex. “Despite frequent changes and periodic bouts of military rule, the country’s political
system is actually highly predictable and surprisingly resilient. Pakistan is run by two groups
of political actors, a civilian aristocracy consisting of wealthy agricultural land owners and
their industrial counterparts, and the army.” (Schmidt 2009: 29) The question of political
stability thus has been particularly a critical one in Pakistan and the army has exploited this
unsettled situation for its own advantage and wielded considerable influence over the
country’s domestic politics and foreign affairs. Hence, the key problem for Pakistan has not
been establishment of democracy; rather, it has been the problem of its consolidation.
“A consolidated democracy is one where none of the major political actors, parties or
organised interests, forces, institutions consider that there is any alternative to the
democratic process to gain power and that no political institutions or groups have claim to
veto the democratically elected decision-makers.” (Linz 1997: 158) But in Pakistan, the
military has always fancied its chance of acquiring control over civilian institutions,
whenever the democratic institutions have become flimsy due to the incompetence of the
political class. Besides this, the psychological perceptions of Punjabi-Pashtun elite are rooted
in the culture of Punjab and the Northwest Frontier region. This culture supposedly
inculcates an unwillingness to accept defeat, transferring the responsibility to someone else,
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a strong urge to dominate, certain recklessness, and a deep desire for revenge. Some of the
traits are represented by the Pakistan army. (Singh 1995: 23)
Hence, the issue of democracy as against authoritarianism in Pakistan still remains
unresolved. The defence forces have ruled Pakistan for the same period as that of the
political class. This has severely affected the country’s governance structure, by enfeebling
the democratic institutions in turn, creating wider spaces for intervention of the defence
forces. Most astonishingly, the military has never faced resistance while assuming power.
Rather, it has been invited by political parties and the public at large. In fact, for all practical
purposes in Pakistan no political institution has the steam to circumvent any decision of the
army. This totally ridicules what Linz has argued regarding a consolidated democracy, where
none can veto the decisions of the democratically elected decision-makers. In Pakistan it is
the other way round; nobody seems to be in a position to challenge the decisions of the army.
The futile endeavour of the present democratic Government to bring the ISI under the
purview of the interior ministry, perspicuously established this phenomenon. Hence, it is
quite clear that the civilian rulers of Pakistan do not have the ability to exert real control over
the ISI or the army.
Now, let us consider yet another country that has struggled to consolidate democracy.
Nepal, the tiny Himalayan country has been witnessing political instability for decades which
has smothered the process of democratisation. The most crucial hurdle in this regard has
been the ideological friction between liberalism of the democrats and authoritarianism of
monarchy and other conservative forces. This strife usually ended in the regime being
transformed into a royal autocracy, by the declaration of emergency and royal take over of all
executive powers. At the time of emergency, the royal Nepalese army was endowed with
enormous powers, resulting in all the dissenting voices being pummeled severely.
The chronic putschist tendency reflected by the power paranoid monarchy and the
fragile and self-seeking democratic forces, led to large scale public discontent which basically
seems to have fanned the reactionary left wing Maoist rebellion that transpired in the 1990s.
The severe poverty and the hegemonic character of the caste based social hierarchy in Nepal,
might have also played a vital role in intensifying the Maoist movement. After the royal
massacre of 2001 and the subsequent palace engineered deportations of the democratic
institutions, the civil war intensified. The problem was compounded by the imponderable
triangular struggle between the authoritarian king Gyanendra, the self seeking democrats
and the reactionary Maoists, for the control of the State. However the morass has been ended
by the people’s movement of 2006 and now the country is passing through a phase of
tectonic transformation.
Further, if we look at Sri Lanka, it may be stated that the most crucial impediment that
has been in the way of democratisation is the ethno-cultural dichotomy and the resultant
conflict. The cultural construction of Sri Lankan ethnic identities can be located within two
dispositions toward the past, history and heritage. The former associated with Sinhala
identity is sharply defined and clearly instantiated, the other is a vague, though rich
potentially. (Daniel 1996: 27) Ethno-nationalistic strife has been one predominant force that
shaped the contemporary domestic and foreign affairs of the country. The rampant civil war
not only undermined the authority of the State, but it had also created a productive ground
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cultural divide has been the hegemonic designs of a fringe of Sinhalese, whose overall
economic status has been markedly better than others; the Tamils or the Muslims. The
control over material resources facilitated the Sinhalese to get a strong hold upon the
political sphere and also translate it into a position of hegemony.
Thus, the political use of Buddhist ideology by the Sinhalese nationalists, to foist the
hegemony of a fringe has polarised Sri Lankan society. (See Tambiah 1986 and 1992) It has
thus contributed significantly to the radicalisation of Tamil political aspirations and also
eroded the foundations of the liberal polity in the country. The manifestation of this has been
the pattern of electoral practices in the country. As, the two major political parties the United
National Party and the Sri Lankan Freedom Party, have done enough to complicate the
morass. This has been apparent in their penchant towards bolstering the Sinhalese
nationalists’ endeavours to perpetuate their own hegemony. Both parties have played the
ethnic card dexterously for acquiring political mileage. Neil De Votta has called the broad
framework of this process as ‘politics of ethnic outbidding’. It is this electoral competition
between UNP and SLFP to persuade Sinhalese voters that they are the best equipped to
ensure Sinhalese dominance, that marginalized the Tamils from the State, reinforced the
ideology of Sinhalese ethnic and political supremacy and eventually created conditions for
Tamil separatist insurgency. (Uyangoda 2007: 41)
India has been the only country of South Asia that has been able to consolidate and
stabilise democratic institutions. However, it has not been able to produce a vibrant and
matured democracy and still several pitfalls plague its institutional structures. One plausible
explanation for this may be traced in the country’s history and to support it, some aspects of
colonial transition in India can be considered. One of the most crucial factors that facilitated
the British to colonise India, was the lack of discipline and civic sense, or what Foucault has
called ‘Governmentality’, among Indians. The British providentially possessed these qualities
and hence were able to colonise such a large country. Apart from this, the existence of
feudalism in pre-colonial India, acted as a crucial catalyst in the process of colonisation.
(Guha 1998:31)
During the epoch of colonial transition, such a situation suited both British and local
feudal lords in conserving their respective interests. For the British, the continuation of an
agrarian society with a feudal order was advantageous for them because capitalist economic
transformation meant that the entire substructure of their colonial policy was froth with
perils. Feudal class on the other hand were interested in preserving the status quo which was
derived out of a nexus with the colonial administration and, this proved to be highly
beneficial in their endeavours to perpetuate the traditional structures of feudal authority.
Their collaborative endeavours thus helped the persistence of feudalism in the country. Due
to this feudal/colonial condominium, the modernisation process was drastically effected, as
the Indian psyche has been severely influenced by this cultural legacy, even after the
postcolonial transition.
Hence, it must be noted here that the birth of a modern democratic State in India, was
not coincided by the ending of feudalism, implying that the archaic hegemonic socio-cultural
structures crafted for the perpetuation of the dominant groups in the society and a feudal
structure of political-economy also continued to exist. Indian democracy at the outset, thus
encountered an agrarian society with a much smaller industrial sector and an adjunct
poverty. So, democratic politics primarily became a tool for advancing the cause of
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promoting the grant of subsidies for agriculture, rather than contemplating upon building a
thriving industrial economy. Yet another aspect of British administration was that the
colonial authority was firmly braced by the levers of bureaucratic control. The post-colonial
transition did not usher in with the erosion of the massive strong-hold of a class of
bureaucratic elite upon India’s public affairs.
Adding to this, in India, there was no political discourse of the demotic character
regarding democratic institutions that could seep into popular consciousness. This historical
lacuna and the continuation of feudal structures of domination with a predominantly
agrarian society and the domineering influence of the bureaucracy, largely contributed to the
persistence of lack of Governmentality among Indians, even in the post-colonial State. It also
facilitated the newly crafted politico-bureaucratic architecture, to gain excessive control over
the realm of public affairs. The introduction of a planned economy and the Government’s
policies that sanctioned the creation of a large public sector of core industries, further led to
the enormous expansion of bureaucratic influence on the developmental affairs of the
country. This concoction of vested interests manifest in the coalitional inter-dependence
between, the political class, bureaucracy and the feudal/capitalist combine accentuated the
quagmire of governance and fostered the process of de-democratisation of the polity.
De-secularisation of the public sphere and incarceration of democratic processes:
The de-secularisation of public sphere has been manifest in the entire South Asian
region, in the form of hegemonic influence of the majority religion upon the deep ravines of
the secular space of each polity. To begin with, “for all the resilience, Pakistan faces a threat
to its very existence that its self-absorbed political culture is singularly ill equipped to resist.
Over the past two decades the forces of radical Islam have constituted a rising tide that now
threatens to wash over a Pakistani ruling establishment that has been content to simply
muddle through for far too long. Religious parties may not do well at the ballot box, but the
religious question has been at the forefront of political debate about what kind of country
Pakistan should be ever since its founding as a home land for the South Asian Muslims.”
(Schmidt 2009: 34) So, the dogmatic influence of Islamic fundamentalism has been one of the
most critical problems that have bedeviled the civil society in Pakistan. It has not only been a
major hindrance to the modernisation process, but its omnibus presence has resulted in the
unfolding of a persistent threat of a Taliban like Islamic takeover. The pervasive influence of
Islamic fundamentalism is apparently evident in Pakistan in the iconisation of people like
Mumtaz Qadri, the policeman who shot dead Salman Taseer, the governor of Pakistan’s
Punjab province, who was engaged in a campaign for amending the country’s blasphemy
laws, and, myriad of lawyers volunteering to stand in Qadri’s defence. Since the assassination
of Taseer and the killing of Shahbaz Bhatti, the minister of minorities for supporting Taseer’s
campaign, the fear of death has silenced the bravest moderate voices in Pakistan. The world wide shock and outrage over the killings seems to have had little effect in the country. This is
manifest in incidents such as the expulsion from school of a 13-year old girl, on charges of
blasphemy for misspelling the prophet’s name. Owing to all this, the Government of Pakistan
has dropped the idea of amending the blasphemy laws. This sorry state of affairs owes much
to the long-term policy of the Pakistani State of encouraging religious radicalism in pursuit of
regional strategic goals. (The Hindu 2011: 11)
The most serious aspect in this connection is the Mullah-military condominium because
the military has often shown a willingness to partner with the Islamists in order to dominate
domestic politics. (Markey 2007: 85) The growing apprehensions expressed by the US in
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recent times regarding the existence of a liaison between the ISI and the Haqqani terror
network, symbolises this phenomenon to a considerable extent. So, this is the greatest threat
that contemporary Pakistan is facing. This precarious situation has led the Pakistani
citizenery into a conundrum, where they may have to make a choice between a weak
democratic Government, always vulnerable to the extremist pressures, or support a military
regime which may be authoritarian but considered to be a potential hedge against the
extremists. Hence in such a predicament, the civil society comes to the inelectable conclusion
that it would be better to support a military rule which would at least prevent the worst case
proposition of State collapse and an Islamic takeover, rather than commiserate a fragile
democratic establishment under which their existence itself may be in jeopardy.
Similarly in Bangladesh, Begum Khalida Zia led B.N.P.’s attempts at bracing its position
through a massive Islamisation drive, tore apart the secular fabric of Bangladesh’s society
since 2001. This has not only impaired the modernisation process, but it has also
considerably enfeebled the democratic institutions of the country. All these developments
spawned a tumultuous situation in Bangladesh, which saturated into a political impasse of
the highest order in 2006 and drove the country nearly into a massive civil war. In this
predicament, the military was compelled to take the centre stage, again demonstrating the
political bankruptcy of the country’s democratically elected leaders. This in itself seems to be
an apt explanation for the failure of democracy in Bangladesh. The values that impelled the
national movement in 1971 and the people’s movement against the military regime in 1991
were thrown into thin air by a fractious political class and its unholy alliance with the
conservative religious extremists, leaving adequate space for the military to meddle in civic
affairs.
Hence, a review of the state of democracy in Maldives, Bangladesh, Afghanistan and
Pakistan, reflects upon the fact that Islamic extremism has been a common denominator that
has retarded the process of democratisation by de-secularising the public sphere. Islamic
extremism has acted as a countervailing force to modernisation as it advocates anti-thetical
versions to contemporary paradigms of modernity and this tendency, seems to have
jeopardised the democratisation process in these countries. Contextualising India in this
regard, the situation expresses itself in the domineering propensity of a dogmatic Hindu
social order that has not only inhibited the construction of a democratic society and reduced
democratic governance to mere caricatures, but also has fostered communal chasms in an
ecclectical society so onerously built by distilled minds in the past. All this is accomplished
by a cabal consisting of: the apologists of an imperious Hindu social order who petition for
the maintenance of the socio-cultural preponderance of the upper strata in the Varna system
and oppose subaltern emancipation; the fundamentalist practitioners of the doctrine of one
nation one culture or the Hindu nationalist ideologues; and their fascist political patrons. The
recipe for hegemony is simple and patent, hijack the State for protecting Hindu political
interests and in pursuance of this capture the majority mood by glorifying the rhetoric of
Hindu nationhood. While doing this, attempts are also being made to emasculate any positive
action by the secular intelligentsia to clear the air of hatred by way of vilifying and
ghettoising them.
The catalytic impact to this effect has been imparted by the recent Hindutva backlash
which has surfaced since the 1990s, due to the rapid expansion of Hindutva politics. As the
Indian economy has been globalising, there was an unprecedented upsurge of Hindutva
radicalism operating with a fierce anti-Muslim agenda. Owing to this, an overtly expanding
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Hinduised public domain dehumanised the Muslims in such a manner that a large
populous has been reified into accepting that a Musalman is a foreigner and a distinct other
and hence, his existential rights must depend upon the comforts of the majority. The
phenomenon became apparent as, the symbols of Hindu religiosity such as Ram temple
began to perspicuously acquire nationalist overtones and penetrated deep into the political
consciousness of the powerful Hindu middle class. On their part, Muslims in this regard are
widely being projected as the greatest threat to such epitomes of nationalist pride.
This also exhibits the broad political agenda of a section of the majority Hindu
community, who have sought to radicalise the idea of a ‘Hindu Rastra’ and associated its
achievement to the exorcising of its enemy that is Islam. This radical cultural theorising of
the Islamic evil demonology surfaced with the ignominious demolition of the Babri Masjid
and the soap opera of Hindutva radicalism since has not relented with the pogrom of Gujarat
representing itself as a part of this continuum. Thus a tolerant and ecclectical India nurtured
for centuries by a sense of coexistence and shared heritage adored as the Ganga-Jamuni
Tehzeeb, seems to be getting pulverised.
What is more menacing is that the de-secularisation of the public sphere in India and its
constant Hinduisation is dexterously cultivated under the neo-liberal economic regime, by
the emerging state-temple-corporate complex, replacing the more secular public institutions
of the Nehruvian era. On February 4, 2006, a new temple Shri Hari Mandir was opened in
Porbandar, Gujarat. This is a grand sandstone temple with a priest training school called
Sandipani Vidyaniketan. It is a joint venture of the Gujarat government, the business house of
the Ambanis and the charismatic kathakar (religious preacher), Ramesh Bhai Oza. The
temple was inaugurated by the then Vice-President of India with the Chief Minister in
attendance. In this way, the state-temple-corporate complex is creating new institutional
spaces where Hinduism is renewing itself so as to remain relevant to new social context
created by the totalising force of global political economy. But in the process of renewing
itself, it is also taking on nationalistic overtones by turning rituals into politicised assertions
of Hindu identity. Thus, ordinary Hindu rituals end up merging the worship of god with the
worship of the nation. Due to all this, it may be argued that secular India stands as a
misnomer, if we reckon the extent of space Hindu majoritarianism has acquired in the late
Twentieth century.
Conclusion:
Modernisation by ending traditional structures of social hegemony is the pressing
requirement for, peace, security and stability of South Asia. Until this happens, prospects for
democratisation of the region appears nebulous, significantly because the traditional forces
of dominance have fiercely contested the doctrines of modernity with an adherence to
archaic socio-cultural framework and politico-economic principles. This has rendered the
polities of South Asia to be mired in history and squinted their national visions. Prioritisation
of parochial loyalties such as caste, religion or language over that of the nation-State has
produced catastrophic consequences. This tendency ultimately has strongly deterred the
process of democratisation, by affecting socio-cultural transformation which is an urgent
imperative for modernisation. Above all, the existence of asymmetry in the levels of technoeconomic development and diverse kinds of socio-cultural dichotomies among the polities of
South Asia, has rendered the overall democratisation of the entire region, into a sought of
cognitive complexity.
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Fighting terrorism: India - Bangladesh cooperation
Dr. Joyeeta Bhattacharjee
Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi
New Delhi
Joyeeta
Bhattacharjee
is
an
Associate Fellow at the Observer
Research Foundation, New Delhi. She
holds a PhD from Assam University, Silchar. Her research interest includes
Bangladesh, India-Bangladesh Relations and conflict Resolution.
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Fighting terrorism: India - Bangladesh cooperation
Introduction: - India and Bangladesh cooperation in fighting terrorism improved
significantly in past few year. Before this paper goes any further it wants to
specify its understanding of terrorism. Here any group or person is regarded as
terrorist if its action tries to invoke fear in mind of the masses and disturb
normalcy. Hence, this paper treats insurgents, militants and extremists
individuals or organisations as terrorist if their activities tend to create fear in
minds of common people.
After Sheikh Hasina led Awami League formed government in January 2009, the
bilateral cooperation between India and Bangladesh on counter terrorism
experienced a major lift. Contrary to the past, when, Bangladesh‟s reluctance to
act against forces inimical to India‟s interest evoked irritation. Today,
cooperation on counter terrorism is a benchmark of enhanced relationship
between two countries. But there is scepticism about the future of this
cooperation. Doubt arise due to the internal politics of Bangladesh since there
are differences among political parties regarding the nature of country‟s
relationship with India. The fear is that change of party in the government might
change the dynamics of this relationship. In this paper an effort is made to find
out ways that could help in sustaining the present cooperation. In this regard,
the paper first tries to understand the problem of terrorism in India; also it
attempts to study the problem to terrorism in Bangladesh and makes an
assessment of the bilateral cooperation between India and Bangladesh.
Terror landscape in India: - India is facing problem of terrorism since its
independence in 1947. Many of Indian states have experienced violent incidents
of terrorism perpetrated by various groups with divergent motives. The north
eastern states have witnessed incidents of terrorism carried out by various
insurgent groups, most of whom have taken up arms to secure their ethnic or
linguistic identity. In Jammu and Kashmir, acts of terrorism are undertaken by
secessionist groups, who took up arms to secede the state from India to
establish an independent sovereign state based on ethno-religious identity.
There are also incidences of religious terrorism in certain states like Punjab that
saw a rise in the 80‟s where groups launched armed movement to create a
separate nation called Khalistan across religious lines. The intensity of Khalistan
movement has decreased over the years but religious terrorism is quite active till
today. Many of the sectarian groups like Indian Mujahedeen and Abhinav Bharat
have undertaken acts of terrorism to establish their sectarian ideologies.
Religious terrorism has become pan-Indian in nature. Religious terrorism is a
major threat facing the country today. Again, India has a long history of Maoist
terrorism known as Naxalism. Although, the movement was active is some parts
of the country like Paschim Banga (erst while West Bengal), Andhra Pradesh and
Orissa but it is spreading in other states also. Naxalism is regarded as a pan
India threat.
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Terrorist groups in India are either home-grown or have been externally
sponsored. Naxal movement in India are home grown while many of the
religious terrorist groups like Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) are externally sponsored.
Pakistan‟s Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) has been encouraging establishment of
many of such groups and to undertake subversive activities within India. The
Mumbai attack of November 26, 2008 is a case in point. Again, there are many
of the groups those emerged as indigenous but have established external
linkages, for example- United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) or the
Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagaland. These groups often use countries like
Myanmar, Bangladesh, and Bhutan to run their operations across border. In
this process they often develop linkages with not only terrorist organisations of
these countries but on occasions also develop connections with intelligence
organisations of these countries as some of them are critical of India. ULFA was
known of having linkages with Bangladesh‟s intelligence agency Directorate
General of Forces Intelligence and also with ISI. These linkages have had helped
to secure safe havens for these groups in the neighbouring countries and also
contributed in pursuing their activities across border. Existence of safe havens
abroad has emerged as a major challenge for countering terrorism and
insurgency in India.
India does not have any formally declared counter-terrorism doctrine. However,
India‟s counter terrorism policy is based on two principles. Firstly, the army
takes the lead role in dealing with cross border terrorism emanating from
countries like Pakistan, Bangladesh Myanmar, in areas far from the
international border police is the first resort in dealing with terrorism and army
is called upon only when its help is sought by the police. Secondly, the “heart
and mind” approach or the root cause approach which looks into the causes that
led to the rise of terrorism in areas. This approach is applied only for indigenous
groups. The two principles have led to evolution of two different counterterrorism policies. The first is a counter terrorist policy which regards terrorist as
a threat to national security and seeks to eradicate them whatever be the causes
for their terrorism. The approach is applied to deal with externally sponsored
terrorism. The second policy is one which is applied to only to indigenous groups
whether religious or ethnic or separatist or Maoist extremists. This view
terrorism as a phenomenon with political, economic, social or other causes
which needs to be approached simultaneously with a campaign to neutralise the
terrorist.
India‟s record not has been that bad as it is often highlighted India achieved
major success in tackling terrorism in states like Punjab, Nagaland, Mizoram
and Tripura. Although the problem of terrorism is continuing, India‟s multiple
terrorism and insurgent movements have weakened over the years. To South
Asian Terrorism Portal a major terrorism watch website claimed that the number
of fatalities due to terrorist incidences have reduced significantly over the years.
In 2001 when terrorism was at its peak the total number of fatalities was 5839,
in 2009 deaths was 2232 and in 2010 it was only 1902.
Besides initiatives taken by the government, cooperation from neighbouring
countries like Bhutan and Myanmar played a major role in achieving these
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successes. In 2003 Bhutan undertook operation All Clear and dismantled ULFA
camps. India was also urging Bangladesh to take action against anti India
groups who were active in that country but it for a long time declined to accept
existence of any of such groups. However, since 2009 there has been significant
change in Bangladesh‟s attitude in addressing India‟s concern and have
forwarded substantial cooperation. It was cooperation from Bangladesh that led
to the arrests of some important leaders of insurgent groups like- ULFA
chairman Aurobindo Rajknowa, National Democratic Front of Bodoland chief
Ranjan Daimary. Besides, Bangladesh has also acted against many of the
religion based militant organisation like LeT those were using its soil to run
subversive activities against India.
Many wonders reasons behind Bangladesh‟s sudden change of attitude. The
popular perception is coming of Awami League to power, which is known to be
India friendly. Certainly, no one can overlook Awami League‟s role in rise of
warmth between the two countries. Still, there might be some more reasons that
inspired the country to go ahead because Awami League was also in power
earlier(1996-2001), but it did not act against such groups then. To investigate
the reasons it is necessary to study the landscape of terrorism in Bangladesh.
Bangladesh landscape Bangladesh faces three kinds of terror threats- a)
threat posed by radical religious militant groups, b) left wing terrorism and c)
threats posed by ethnic insurgent groups of the Chittagong Hill tracts. The
country has been successful in reducing the intensity of the threat emanating
from ethnic insurgent by undertaking conflict resolution initiative which led to
signing of a peace accord that resulted in renunciation of violence by insurgent
groups. Also, Bangladesh has been able to contain left wing terrorism and has
prevented it from spiralling by using strong military action. The capability of left
wing terrorist to strike across the country has diminished significantly and is
concentrated only to some pockets. The most dominant threat that exists today
in Bangladesh is religious militancy.
Although there are various religious militant organizations in Bangladesh with
diverse modus operandi, there is a commonality in their ideology. Most of these
groups aspire to establish a new state order by uprooting the present system.
The common goal have made easier for these groups to establish linkages with
other groups, which in turn has contributed to the widening their network and
also has helped in sustaining their activities despite actions taken by the state.
In Bangladesh, the loss of lives as a result of religious militancy is far less
compared to other South Asian nations. These groups have been fairly
successful in invoking a climate of extreme fear both within and outside the
country. The targets of these groups are either random or symbolic and have
included both individual and institutions. These acts of violence are aimed to
generate reaction, publicizing there cause and in some cases revenge that
contribute in influencing the society.
Religious militancy had its roots in Bangladesh in the early nineties when a
group of Afghan veteran established Harkatul Jihad Bangladesh (Huji-B). But
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the activities of such groups remained dormant. It was in the early part of the
first decade of this new century that the world became aware of the rise of
radical religious militancy in Bangladesh due to an article published in the Far
Eastern Review (FER). These groups were so secretive in their activities that even
the government of that time failed to notice the growth of their network. Hence, it
declined to accept the report of the FER. The government was taken aback by
the country wide bombing of August 2005. The August 2005 bombing proved the
strength of these organizations and the intensity of damage which they could
cause.
Initially, Bangladesh tried to address this problem through military action. It
undertook measures like banning of militant organizations like Huji-B and
Jamaatul Mujahedeen Bangladesh (JMB), carrying counter terror drives that led
to arrest of top leaders of JMB. Counter terror drives unfolded many facets of
this problem that led to the realization that military means is not enough for
fighting militancy. The investigation revealed the nexus between the militant
organizations and various charitable organizations involved in activities like
running orphanages, religious educational institutions etc. These charitable
organizations not only facilitated financial support but also contributed in
mobilizing support and supplying cadres for these organizations. With this
realization Bangladesh has undertaken many measures like not only banning
those NGO, but also addressing factors that might be exploited by such
scrupulous groups to misled people. Example include engaging with religious
leaders for proper interpretation of religious literatures, reforming educational
institutions and upgrading curriculum so that students attending madrasas can
keep pace with the changing needs of the time and be at par with the students
attending mainstream education institutions. Bangladesh deserves praise for its
counter terror initiative and the model could be a lesson for other countries.
Bangladesh‟s approach towards counter terror was based on the belief that these
groups were home-grown and devoid of international linkages. There were,
however, whisper about these groups having international linkages. India was
most vocal in claiming cross border linkages of Bangladesh‟s groups. India even
accused Huji-B to be involved in the blast of Sankat Mochan temple in Vanarasi
in 2006. However, arrest of LeT operatives in October 2009 added a new
dynamics to the issue. Subsequent investigations that followed revealed
existence of international organizations in Bangladesh for over a decade and
their linkages with domestic groups and all were part of a terror network whose
main objective is to destabilize the region. Another aspect has been the linkages
of international criminal syndicates with international militant organizations
who work in close proximity in Bangladesh adding a new dimension to the
problem.
Diaspora‟s role is also significant in understanding the problem of terrorism in
Bangladesh. Unlike the popular belief that only the madrasa educated comprise
the cadre base of militant organizations, many of youth who have received formal
educations even foreign education with degrees like PhDs joining such groups.
Presence of educated people have helped these organisations in acquiring
sophisticated technologies and establishing of cyber cells. Also, there are cases
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where foreign nationals of Bangladeshi origin, influenced by various militant
organizations, have set up bases in Bangladesh and have imparted arms
training. The diaspora also has been a significant funding source as they often
send large amount of money for charities which are often directed to the militant
organizations.
Taking account of the experiences elucidated above Bangladesh realised that its
stability could be threatened if such groups continue to exist in its soil. Looking
into the cross border linkages of terrorist groups Bangladesh realised that the
problem terrorism could be resolved only by cooperating with neighbouring
countries.
India-Bangladesh Cooperation for Tackling Terror: - A three-tier bilateral
institutional mechanism was set up between India and Bangladesh in 1994 to
resolve security and border management issues. The first level talks is between
Director General (DG), Border Security Force (BSF) and DG, Border Guards
Bangladesh (BGB); the second is a Joint Working Group (JWG) at the level of
Joint Secretaries of both the countries; and the third is the talk at Home
Secretary level. But the cooperation could not make much progress except few
officials meetings in some intervals.
Bangladesh started to think seriously about cooperation after the military
backed caretaker government came to power in January 2007, which undertook
major counter terrorism measures within the country. Its interest to cooperate
with India was reflected during Home Secretaries meeting in 2007, in which
some major declaration were made with intention of strengthening the ties.
Besides, during the meeting the two sides declaring to fight terrorism jointly,
both the sides agreed to revive the mechanism of JWG. It was decided in the
meeting that the JWG would try to find ways for expeditious action on Interpol's
Red Corner Notice (RCN) pending against fugitives. The two sides also
acknowledged need for sustained cooperation and information sharing would
benefit both, the two sides also suggested real time exchange of actionable
information between the security agencies of the two countries in addition to the
existing mechanism of information sharing between BSF and BDR. These
initiatives played a significant role in preparing ground for the cooperation that
followed later.
Meanwhile, general public also wanted the government to act. It was evident
from the fact that Awami League in its election manifesto declared that if it is
voted to power it will take action against anti India forces active in Bangladesh‟s
soil. So, it was the public support that inspired political leadership to act.
Since Awami League came to power them the summit level meetings are taking
place regularly. Regular summit level meetings which have played an important
role not only in voicing each other concerns but also in find solutions. To
strengthen the cooperation further the two sides have signed few agreements like
A) Agreement on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters.
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B) Agreement on Combating Terrorism, Organized crime and illicit Drug
Trafficking
C) Agreement on Transfer of Sentenced Persons.
Again, Nodal points between India and Bangladesh have been set up for sharing
of information of mutual concern.
Also, militaries of both the countries have undertaken joint counter terror and
counter insurgency exercises with the objective of joint learning that also
facilitate confidence building.
Conclusion: - India and Bangladesh cooperation on terrorism followed out of the
realisation that every country is vulnerable to terrorism. Terrorism is a common
threat and can not be fought alone. Hence, there is need for cooperation. To
sustain this cooperation there is a need for constant vigilance so that the
momentum is not lost. This is possible only when there is right political will. For
dawn of right kind of political will there is need for public pressure. So, public
support is important and it will follow if the public realises its interest. Hence,
there is need for increasing interactions among people of India and Bangladesh
so that there is a feeling of commonality. In this regard, improving economic ties
could be a major step forward as people of Bangladesh might feel its interest is
threatened if there is slow down in the bilateral relations. A stable IndiaBangladesh cooperation is very important for peace and stability of both the
countries and also for South Asia.
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Relevance of SAARC in a multi-polar world with India and China trying
to expand their ―Spheres of Influence‖
Balaji Chandramohan
Balaji Chandramohan
is the Editor Asia for World Security Network and
Editor India for Atlantic Sentinel. He is the
member of think-tanks such as Institute of
Defence Studies and Analyses and New Zealand
Institute of International Affairs. He alternates his life between New Delhi, India
and Wellington, New Zealand
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Relevance of SAARC in a multi-polar world with India and China trying
to expand their ―Spheres of Influence‖
As the geo-politics at the international stage is moving towards from a uni-polar to a multipolar world with the rise of countries such as Brazil, India and China, it will worth to study the
relevance of regional multi-lateral organizations such as the South Asian Association of the
Regional Co-operation (SAARC) and how it supplants the United Nations objectives such as
eradication of poverty, counter-terrorism measures and the establishment of international
peace and security.1
To trace the importance of regional organizations it is important to trace the genesis of
regional multi-lateral organizations right from the time when observations made by countries
in the 1945 San Francisco Conference. It was observed then on the effectiveness of whether
United Nations (UN) could fulfil the regional perspectives and aspirations and how UN
accommodated that in its mandate. In that context, I‘ll explain the relevance of SAARC
tracing its origin in the 1985 and how it had evolved in three decades with a chance from the
situation where the annual summits were ‗hijacked‘ by India-Pakistan to a situation which‘s
relative better now with the member countries thinking seriously about the establishment of
the SAARC University.
SAARC has started to attract as a viable forum among the countries in the Asia- Pacific such
as Australia, Iran and China and so the challenges that it faces from other regional
organizations such as The Association of Southeast Asian Nations ( ASEAN) and Bay of Bengal
Initiative for Multi Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC).2 Further, it‘s also
true that better trade relations among the SAARC member nations will improve the inter
trade balance and improve the economy of the member nations at a time when the western
economy is reeling under recession and the boom that‘s supposedly being witnessed in
countries of the Asia-Pacific such as India and China.
Regional organizations within the scope of the UN:
When the victorious world allied leaders were discussing the scope of new world order after
the World War II, the newly would be independent nations of Asia and Africa wanted to have
a regional scope for solving their disputes. It‘s said that apart from the issue of veto among
the permanent members the issue that member- nations had issues when joining the UN was
whether their sovereignty would be compromised by joining an organizations such as UN. To
help assuage the member nations their aspirations for regional settlement of disputes will be
considered helped them to become members.
In that context, many regional organizations were formed in from 1945. Some of the
organizations such as African Union, North Atlantic Treaty Organizations, Australia New
Zealand United States Treaty and Arab Union were formed for regional understanding of the
political issues. Some of the regional organizations such as NATO were military and some like
African Union or the South Asian Association of the Regional Co-operation are meant for
addressing the regional issues amicably.
However, all the regional organizations per se needs to be within the scope of the UN and
should compile with the UN mandate of establishing International peace and security.
History of the SAARC
The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) is an organization of South
Asian nations, founded in December 1985 and dedicated to economic, technological, social,
and cultural development emphasizing collective self-reliance. Its seven founding members
are Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka.
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Afghanistan joined the organization in 2005. Meetings of heads of state are usually scheduled
annually; meetings of foreign secretaries, twice annually. It is headquartered in Kathmandu,
Nepal. The 11 stated areas of cooperation are agriculture; education, culture, and sports;
health, population, and child welfare; the environment and meteorology; rurals development
(including the SAARC Youth Volunteers Program); tourism; transport; science and
technology; communications.
The SAARC Secretariat was established in Kathmandu on 16 January 1987 and was
inaugurated by Late King Birendra Bir Bikram Shah of Nepal. It is headed by a Secretary
General appointed by the Council of Ministers from Member Countries in alphabetical order for
a three-year term. He is assisted by the Professional and the General Services Staff, and also
an appropriate number of functional units called Divisions assigned to Directors on deputation
from Member States. The Secretariat coordinates and monitors implementation of activities,
prepares for and services meetings, and serves as a channel of communication between the
Association and its Member States as well as other regional organizations. Iran is an observer
nation in SAARC. Afghanistan became a SAARC member in 2007.
The representation of SAARC as major regional block is increasing and is rivaling the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), African Union and European Union. China
has sought to become a member of SAARC, besides four other countries - Mauritius, Iran,
Australia and Myanmar wants to become from a observer nation to a permanent one.
Second, SAFTA was set up in 2004 to ensure a gradual reduction of trade tariffs between
South Asian countries, and came into force in 2006. India the biggest nation in the region
would make attempts to phase out non-tariff barriers with SAARC countries India believes
that non-tariff barriers are ―irritant force in trade relations with member nations. Afghanistan
joined SAFTA in Feb 2008.
With the dawn of the twenty-first century, South Asian region has undergone radical
transformation. Many countries have expressed their willingness to join SAARC. Australia is an
observer nation, New Zealand wishes to become one such and Vietnam and Malaysia have
expressed their willingness to be observer nations.
Over the years, the SAARC members have expressed their unwillingness on signing a free
trade agreement. Though India has several trade pacts with Maldives, Nepal, Bhutan and Sri
Lanka, similar trade agreements with Pakistan and Bangladesh have been stalled due to
political and economic concerns on both sides. India has been constructing a barrier across its
borders with Bangladesh and Pakistan. In 1993, SAARC countries signed an agreement to
gradually lower tariffs within the region, in Dhaka. Eleven years later, at the 12th SAARC
Summit at Islamabad, SAARC countries devised the South Asia Free Trade Agreement which
created a framework for the establishment of a free trade area covering 1.6 billion people.
This agreement went into force on January 1, 2008. Under this agreement, SAARC members
will bring their duties down to 20 per cent by 2009.
Relevance of SAARC:
With the rise of China and other Middle Powers such as Brazil, Australia, India, Turkey and
Indonesia, the world politics is slowly moving from the uni-polar hegemonic United States
world to a multi-polar world.3 In that context, the regional organizations which will be able to
understand the sensitivity is the need in a multi-polar world.
Second, as pointed by Robert Kaplan in his book Monsoon the Indian Ocean will be the
―Centre Stage for the 21st century‖ with both India and China vying for Spheres of Influence
with the United States acting as an offshore balancer.
Robert Kaplan in his book ―Monsoon‖ had mentioned that the area between the Gulf of Aden
in the west to the Malacca Strait in the east as the ―Centre state of the 21 st century‖. If India
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has to graduate from being a regional power in South Asia to a great power in Asia-Pacific, it
needs to control these vital links in the Indian Ocean by both hard power and soft power
through Naval Diplomacy.
India shows the characteristics of both continental and maritime country Indian policy makers
has concentrated more on its former as New Delhi has to overstretch its diplomatic initiatives
vis-à-vis Pakistan since Independence in 1947. But with India‘s economy growing and with a
place secured in the world affairs in the 21st century, India should now start re- linking its
historical maritime and cultural contacts politically through Naval Diplomacy.
If it‘s true as envisaged by the American journalist that Indian Ocean could be the centre
stage for the 21st century then there is a need for India to use Naval Diplomacy as an
effective way of projecting its Soft Power.
Traditionally, all great powers that aspired to control the Indian Ocean had sought a base in
the Maldives - Portugal, the Netherlands, Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet
Union. The southern most islands of the Maldives, the Gan Island in the Seenu Atoll, served
as a base for the British Royal Navy during World WarII. Gan met the requirements for safe,
deep anchorage in a strategic area.
In addition to Gan, Antsiranana (Diego-Suarez), Diego Garcia, Aldabra and Farquhar islands
and le Desroches in Seychelles are other important strategic locations in the Western Indian
Ocean. These are the vital choke points in the Indian Ocean.
The Naval Base in Gan was set up by Britain in response to Japanese advances against
Singapore and Indonesia during World War II. During the Cold War, in 1957, it was
transferred to the British Royal Air Force (RAF). The RAF vacated it in 1971 after Maldives
gained independence in 1965.
The recent SAARC summits in a way clearly buttressed this concept. In the recently concluded
17th SAARC summit held in Maldives, the usual hijacking of the Summit by India and Pakistan
issue was set aside with greater understanding of the South Asia region. Besides that India
tried to court the countries in the SAARC so that it won‘t be lured by the Yuan Diplomacy
unleashed by China.
On previous occasions, the SAARC summit served as opportunity for diplomatic engagement
between India and Pakistan. China, which is increasing its presence in the region, has applied
for non-permanent SAARC membership much to the displeasure of India
The United States also serves as an observer in the SAARC summit. With the increasingly
strong Asian economies in mind, it is likely to use the future summits to expand its trade
relations in South Asia.
Earlier, the Bhutan‘s SAARC summit held in 2010 was first South Asian multi-lateral forum
meeting after the Mumbai 26/11 attacks on India. India used the summit as leverage to put
pressures on its neighbours, such as Pakistan and Bangladesh,4 to dismantle the
infrastructure for terrorism, including actions to be taken against non-state actors harbouring
extremist sentiments.
India‘s Monroe Doctrine
India in many ways has tried to push its agenda through the SAARC summit. The SAARC
summits have been a test of India‘s Monroe Doctrine which‘s actively now challenged by
China as it sees more interest in the South Asia.5
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The representation of SAARC as major regional block is increasing and no doubt rivalling the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), African Union and European Union. Including
India, other countries in the SAARC are wooed to trade with China which‘s geographically
more proximate. China has sought to become a member of SAARC, besides four other
countries - Mauritius, Iran, Australia and Myanmar wants to become from a observer nation to
a permanent one.6
Second, SAFTA was set up in 2004 to ensure a gradual reduction of trade tariffs between
South Asian countries, and came into force in 2006. India the biggest nation in the region
would make attempts to phase out non-tariff barriers with SAARC country India believes that
non-tariff barriers are ―irritant force in trade relations with member nations. Afghanistan
joined SAFTA in Feb 2008.
In conclusion
With the dawn of the twenty-first century, South Asian region has undergone radical
transformation. It has witnessed a strong democratic sweep. Most of the South Asian
economies have registered impressive growth trajectories. Some of its countries have also
emerged as the hub of global terrorism. The international community has become far more
involved in South Asian affairs due to the nuclearisation of the region. SAARC cannot but keep
pace with the changing regional dynamics. It has moved ahead on its economic agenda and
expanded its reach not only by adding new members (Afghanistan) but also by opening itself
to the participation of many other countries, including China , Iran and the US , as
Observers.7
With the emergence of a multi-polar world in which India is poised to play a major role in
International Institutions such as the United Nations, it will be interesting to see on how India
could play effective role in the regional institutions strengthening such as the SAARC. On the
other hand, SAARC will also test itself against other regional institutions such as the
BIMSTEC, ASEAN, APEC and the SCO.
Further, as Indian Ocean and South Asia assumes importance in geo-political chess board,
SAARC as an organization will undergo rapid transformation from being an annual unofficial
bi-lateral summit between India and Pakistan to a much greater institution which forms an
important cog in the wheel of International politics.
End notes
1) The Emerging Dimensions of SAARC ( Edited by S.D. Muni )
2) SAARC and European Union ( K K Bhargava and Ross Masood)
3) China breaks the Himalayan barrier ( Asia times, May 1, 2010 )
4) THIMPHU 28-30 Apr 2010 Bhutan hosts 16th SAARC summit
(World News Forecast, April 28, 2010)
http://www.newsahead.com/preview/2010/04/28/thimphu-28-30apr-2010-bhutan-hosts-16th-saarc-summit/index.php
5) Beijing in SAARC ( Indian express, April 21, 2010)
http://www.indianexpress.com/news/beijing-in-saarc/609108/0
6) Balancing Act in Thimphu ( Indian express, April 28, 2010)
http://www.indianexpress.com/news/balancing-act-in-thimphu/612291/
7) the Great Game Folio ( Indian express, April 29, 2010)
http://www.indianexpress.com/news/the-great-game-folio/612580/
8) India's 'Monroe Doctrine' and Asia's Maritime Future ( IDSA, Strategic
SAARC Organization (http://74.125.153.132/search?
q=cache:l2mvsgE6BjcJ:www.saarc-sec.org/
+SAARC&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=in)
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Indian Ocean: US, China and South Asia
Ravi Sundaralingam
Academic Secretary
ASATiC
(Academy of Science and Arts for the Tamil Communities in Ceylon)
E-mail : Ravi. [email protected]
Organisation: Academy of Science and
Arts for the Tamil communities in Ceylon
(ASATiC); Patron: Lord Prof. M. Desai
Joined Eelam Revolutionary Organisations
(EROS) in 1976, and served as its UK
representative from June 1987. Continued to maintain the research wing of the organisation,
the Eelam Research Organisers (EROS) even after the ban on the organisation by the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Reorganised its academic part, the ASATiC with
Lord. Prof. M. Desai as patron. Organised politically landmark seminars and conferences on
behalf of ASATiC. Written several research documents, articles on politics, political economy,
sociology, strategies, maths and physics. Contributor to the South Asia Analysis Group since
2006. Written a book on structure of Tamil literature.
Education: BSc (Hon), MSc, PhD Research work up to MPhil in Theoritical Physics.
Educated at: Imperial College, London, Cambridge University, Queen Mary College,
University of London.
Profession: Teacher in technological college, London.
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Indian Ocean: US, China and South Asia
Indian Ocean has been the major sea-lane since trade began between nations and people. Ships
from China and Middle East frequented the Indian coasts, which made India one of the wealthiest
places on earth at that time, before the colonial powers crossed the ‘Cape of Good Hope’. Even
for the crisis in the Middle East and the political upheavals in the littoral states, and the US
nuclear base Diego Garcia, the ocean remained dormant, except for the factory fishing ships from
the East. Even the Afghan war that marked the beginning of the demise of Soviet Empire, and the
Gulf wars that followed it, which marked the advent of ‘market globalisation’, didn’t disturb that
normalcy profusely.
However globalisation and the advances India and China have made, the withdrawal of US from
Iraq and soon Afghanistan, rather than its invasions, the recycling of leadership in the “Arab
main-land”, piracy, Sunni-militancy, and the enormous wealth beneath the seas are attracting the
attention of many analysts. Recent Iranian threat to block the Straight of Hormuz, may be
considered a boast, only helps those to reiterate the importance of the ocean. So we see many
theories and scenarios with the ocean as the setting for strategic battles between global powers,
and to the “end of time war” between civilisations and cultures.
However, as US is remodelling its global strategy with greater emphasise to the Asia-Pacific
region, the new dynamics created by the super power rivalries and their alliances with the
competing regional powers in the ocean is open for speculations.
Indian Ocean is a vast region from the tip of South Africa stretching to Australia that has variety
of people and ancient civilisations. It has conflicts due to the denial of peoples’ belongings and
basic human rights as individuals. It is also the home of the major world religions and religiously
inspired ideological conflicts. How these conflicts will collide and correspond, the internal and
regional dynamics develop and die out and, in general how they would all play into any strategy is
an interesting question.
Yet, India being the regional superpower, the floating aircraft career as some militarist put, and
China soon joining US as the other true global power, theorists and strategists assume the all
events can be addressed within the purview of the three sounds reasonable for a foreseeable
future.
Energy for growth
Economies trying to emerge out of feudal systems would have recognised energy as the driver of
socio-economic growth and, water as one of the most priced commodities, whatever the
economy. Not surprisingly, strategists in the advanced and advancing economies are placing
energy at the centre of their strategies and rebuild other issues around it according to the
alliances of the time. Where there is a ‘shortage’ water security is also considered alongside
energy, to define the concept of their national interest.
Therefore, in an increasingly integrating world economy, the picture and plans (i) to guarantee
energy supply, water security, and access to raw materials and trade, against real/imaginary
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threats, and (ii) to directly or indirectly control the above in part (i) in order to effect the growths
of any non-suitors are what essentially the strategies about.
Larger the picture bigger the plan, which has to include sub-plans that specifies the type of power
that is contemplating it.
These plans can be intricate or to some blatantly obvious. However, they are always clouded by
many real and spurious issues, arguments, and claims to create confusion. For a common man
distinguishing a bigger plan from its sub-plans is hugely a difficult task and, at times his better
judgement is also overcome by emotions. Then seeking the common thread within the sub-plans
at various times and settings, and building a pattern between the results due to strategies with
apparently different objectives to build a picture seem to be one way out of this problem.
The results, rather than the intensions and noble objectives, create the conditions people endure
and some enjoy. Therefore, it is the retrospective look at the strategies and events based on
results that is imperative. It is the most scientific form of analysis, building the bigger picture bit
by bit, which requires clear consciousness, beyond cultural or ideological restrictions. It is only
after extrapolating such a clear perspective connections should be made with expectations and
ideological positions to ascertain own strategy and tactics.
Strategy as a bigger picture
US is unambiguous about its determination to maintain its global hegemonic power, even for the
recent readjustments to its strategy announced by President Obama. That is, it wants to be the
major decision-making power in all four corners of the world. It has no qualm to use its military or
economic power through the established global financial institutions to perpetuate this idea in
the mind of strategists everywhere, unlike any other power in the history of mankind. Its
willingness to use every possible action, including the ultimate sanction the nuclear bomb,
chemical and biological weapons, inflict casualties with impunity, and ignore its own espoused
values on human rights is well documented.
While the Old-West Frontier approach in its global strategies is identified and criticised, very few
appreciate their subtlety in forward planning and potency.
The “war on terrorism” and “war on drugs” are two apparently separate US global strategies
addressing two totally different issues, with no real success according to its critics, home and
abroad.
If Afghan invasion was part of strategy of “war on terrorism”, then withdrawal troops from
Afghanistan and the ‘talks’ with Talibans without the knowledge or participation of the Afghan
government, suggest failure for its openly declared objectives. If the motivation to invade were to
stop the ‘proliferation of WMDs’, then just as in Libya, Iraq possessed none. However, even the
theory of ‘petro-dollar’ were to be considered as the motivation, then the agreement such as the
China and Japan has signed to maximise the use of their currencies for trade, and the collapse of
the banking system, plundering of the public purse to “re-capitalise” the “de-capitalising” banks
suggest failure again.
We note this claim was not only factually discredited, but also shown to be logically disingenuous
considering US tacit approval that allowed Pakistan to be a nuclear weapon state.
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Similarly, the US “war on drugs” can also be concluded as a great failure. After spending billions
of dollars in its campaigns the drug use and production have increased many folds, and nothing
positive can be said about them that is directly relevant to the Western citizens.
With these as evidence concluding these US strategies as failures is understandable. However,
beside these apparent failures the consequences of US efforts are viewed from our perspective of
an overall strategy, one could only argue for their successes.
Then what do we see that give them such credit, and the thread that runs through them both?
First of all, critics of US strategies have to recognise during the process of the Iraqi and Afghan
wars, and the other wars in the Balkans the West has enabled itself to take the ‘executive’
decisions on behalf of the UN, spread NATO’s domain south and eastwards, and reduced UN to a
supportive or observer role. Naturally, the UNSC is also reduced to as a forum for safeguarding its
members’ regional interests on the global stage, where only the West takes the initiatives.
Another important result that will have strategic consequences is the devaluing the deterrent of a
3rd world nuclear power, and thereby putting its regional or global claims into perspective.
Pakistan has neither the capacity to prevent US military operations inside its territory or refuse
facilities to carry out such operations (Gen. Musharraff, Stream, Al-Jeseera, 28.12.11). Thus,
having nuclear weapons no longer provides the clout of a global power once imagined. The threat
is only regional, which make little sense since to get the focus of the real global powers the local
powers have to hold their own to ransom.
Secondly, if we are correct in identifying “control over energy” and other resources as the
essential part of the strategy of any power, for the duel purpose of enhancing its economic
interests while suffocating the competitions, then it is only possible to associate success with US
strategies.
Iraq is the second largest resources base to Saudi Arabia and was one of the founder members of
the cartel OPEC. After the two US wars its production was reduced to less than half its level in
1979, with its facilities in ruins. It also put Saudi Arabia in a dominant position as a oil producing
country in the region and all but disbanded OPEC as a cartel that was. The survival dependency of
Arab-peninsula states on US has given US control over the supply side of the Middle East oil
production.
The impact on countries that depended entirely on imported oil by it removal are far deeper than
perhaps recognised. These difficulties would have been even harder if they had deals that
avoided exchange of hard currencies. Generally they would have suffered stunted growth and
experienced high inflation as direct results.
Wars in the resources based regions, though ethically repugnant, help the global powers to
maintain the competition to the minimum. Firstly, the supply side becomes an issue of
accessibility and guarantee, which tend to put off competitors away. Secondly, every war helps to
stagnate the socio-technological socio-economical progress of the people in the region, destroy
their socio-psychological perspectives, brutalise the societies and alters the natural process of
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social transition. Thus, push them back to a position not to be able to exploit their resources for
their own progress. In addition, the power becomes part of the dynamic equations in the region,
creating and enforcing dependency, allowing for the possibility of another cycle of internal
conflicts due to its presence.
During the decades of “war on drugs” drug production, distribution and the control over them
have became part of the lives of many Latin American countries. The national strategies of the
states and anti-state movements in the regions have become embroiled with drug cartels one
way or other. Oliver North saga involving triangular deal involving drugs and arms between Iran,
and the “freedom fighters” against the Sandinistas in Nicaragua was well documented to
understand the possibility the drug strategy offers to US. Thus for the cynics, the issue of US
weapons in the hands of drug cartels in Mexico or any other place is not an aberration, but what
they expect.
The growing relationship between the drug cartels and one time revolutionary movements for
example allows the US campaign against the leftwing groups in the energy and resources rich
South America to continue, as the epi-centre of drug production is moved from country to
country.
With no initiatives to blunt the financial incentives to control the supply and distribution sides of
the drugs in the major consumer markets in the West and US, where they criminalise the users
and dealers are like, as the demand continue to grow. Thus, the billions spent on the ground
merely help to maintain the high value of the drugs, acting almost like a subsidy, reducing the
value of human lives and thereby, the production and ‘transport’ costs. As a result the “war on
drug” all we see is the continued devastation and brutalisation of the societies and communities,
and stunted socio-economic progress.
Chinese involvement in the resource base regions is not new. During the heady days of
revolutionary fervour they have supported every revolutionary and national liberation movement
under the banner of “anti-imperialism”. That was when ruling party fully subscribed to the
teaching of Marxism-Leninism understood imperialism as the highest form of capitalism, before
the Sino-Soviet split and understanding its interests cannot remain within one big socialist-camp.
Thereafter, it has been purportedly working for a multi-polar universe and even partnered US in
Africa, to bring down the Soviet Empire. It didn’t have the slightest ideological problem of being
identified with US policy in Africa that also involved sustaining the Apartheid regime in South
Africa.
Following the disintegration of the Soviet Empire, US loosing its initiatives in Africa, China took
advantage to continue to build its relationship in Africa, supporting ‘rogue’ states with ‘soft loans’
and business propositions. The past investment with likes of Mobutu Sese Seko regimes has given
China inroads, and it is using them well to burrow its way into Africa, as the tribal communities
massacred each other and depleted the value of their resources. Though, China has made good
progress in furthering its interests, irrespective of the plight of the people, it is the West that still
has the largest hold on the wealth of Africa.
The wars in Af-Pakistan and Central Asian regions have raged for more than two decades. During
this time the needs of Pakistan, India and other energy parched parts of South Asia have
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increased, yet their levels are conditioned by what is accessible and price of oil & gas in the
market.
It is a paradox that people next to the oil and gas fields are denied the benefits from them, while
countries far away declare their rights to access. Idea to bring gas from Iran to South Asia died
before it even reached the design table, and the plans to connect Gulf oil terminus, were just
plans and no more. Meanwhile, Indian strategists worked hard and achieved ‘success’ in
establishing presence in Central Asia, while Pakistani strategists tried to oust India from there
with Chinese support and by employing Afghan terror groups.
Meanwhile, China has been busy everywhere, as the people are engulfed with death and
destruction, signing deals and laying pipelines that zigzag the former Soviet republics that will
look like an extension to the Great wall of China from the sky.
Uni-polar or multi-polar world
For us, any distinction between an arsonist and a pilferer, who raids the burning scene difficult to
understand. Therefore, choice between China and US on ideological ground is a pretence and
false in practice therefore, untenable.
Then the question is the long-term strategy, the bigger picture that matters. In this it is obvious
both pursue opposite strategies; US, still the need and want to maintain the uni-polar world, at
least in military terms, and China at least tactically preferring a multi-polar world in every sense,
at least for the next few decades.
Those purely looking at the military, especially the technological capabilities estimate China is
twenty years behind US. Though this may be a factor in the Chinese strategy, the question
whether China (i) would ever wants to or (ii) could be a global superpower like US is rarely
addressed along with these assessments.
Here we add two other important differences as our observations for discussion.
Firstly, logistically due to its geographical position in the Pacific and, historically and economically
as a continuation of Europe, only US has the right to claim the global superpower role that it
assumes.
Russia, the only other country with similar geographical position neither has the socio-cultural
structures nor the scope of having them developed to ascend to that position once again.
China though, is strictly an Asia-Pacific nation. Its ties with outside its geographical space are
purely based on business deals, trade and convenient alliances.
Therefore, how it will overcome this logistical problem largely depends on its future technological
capabilities or the dependability of its alliances.
Technological advances though happen in leap and bounces. China as an ancient civilisation was
perhaps, the first innovator of technology and a pioneer of applied science. Only an unscientific
person would suggest that China would not be ahead of US in technology one day.
Yet, the nagging doubts are there of this happening in the military field as China has never been a
warlike country. Its territory was invaded by every other nation around it until China invaded
India. The advantages the aggressive new nations like US have because of the wars they get
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involved are enormous. The evolution of the simple army personnel carriers against the threat of
IEDs in Afghanistan is sufficient to illustrate this aspect.
However, its alliances outside its natural space are suspect, especially if it involves an aspiring
power. Without details we see Pakistan as a clear example to this.
If this alliance has the basis for a very long mutually prosperous strategic dependency then it
would imply China is strategically committed to the multi-polar world than using it just a tactical
ploy.
Secondly, as the largest of the Mongoloid nations it has the socio-cultural relations with others
around, which bound to give China the super-guardian role in the long run. However, the
relations outside are not based on any solid ground laid by linguistic relationships between the
peoples in its region.
How people reason, argue, make sense of the world around them are strongly influenced by the
way make words, sentences, and paragraphs. It is not an accident that Christianity or Buddhism
evolved outside the Asia-Pacific region and Confucianism in China. Even among the IndoEuropean speakers, the chasm between the monotheists and polytheists is an unresolved socioideological issue. In fact, in the context of socio-ideological ground China has no bigger advantage
than India with the ASEAN group of peoples.
Japan has been the second economy for more than 50 years, and has contributed to the
advancement of science and technology a good deal. Its industries are all over the world and
many from outside the region have been on scholarships for further studies or spent time for
collaborative work. Yet, we don’t see mass immigration from the developing world giving a
headache to the Japanese nor do they encourage it. Even the people from the neighbourhood,
despite its investment and assistance to their economies don’t aspire to be part of the Japanese
society.
Is it just the ideology that makes those cursing and fleeing the NATO bombs in Iraq or Af-Pak
regions wanting to reach the West than China?
China does not offer anything socio-culturally tangible to the Indo-European speakers that would
stop them following the worst of the Western culture, which some call Western barbarism. Those
fighting against Western hegemony or exploitation of their countries are no longer attracted by
the rehashed Chinese version of the western Marxist-Leninist ideology, but their own brand of
ideologies and indigenous fortitude or even the ‘human-rights’ arguments borrowed from the
West.
The developing world, except for Africa, are linguistically Indo-European and there is a natural
affinity with its most popular language, English. More than two centuries of British rule and US
influence in the Latin America have only helped to reinforce this inherent link with socioeconomic and socio-psychological unifications on a vast scale. The education system it has
introduced, transplanting anything the indigenous systems had was the largest revolution the
world has ever witnessed. Today, every one of us studies Western science and technology and
social sciences, albeit in local languages. Even for the interpretations during translations, the vast
parts of the scientific and technological works in symbolic forms are linguistically Western.
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Therefore, to argue a global power can project itself through alliances and deals alone with
peoples and places it has no socio-cultural and socio-ideological connections seems incredible at
the present.
Hence, we would conclude China is not likely therefore, would want to be a global power as US.
That meant it could only pursue a strategy towards a multi-polar world, at least for the present,
not just militarily, but also economically to ensure its energy security and future prospects.
In the context of the Indian Ocean, it would mean using every possible avenue to curb India
becoming the sole arbitrator of power, which in its eyes do not contradict its strategy for a multipolar world.
For China, proliferation of regional powers means maximising the complexity, thereby increasing
the options for alliances with aspirant powers.
South Asian perspective
Though US is the only global military power, it is not an Asian power. Its involvement in the Indian
Ocean is induced by its need either to counter a possible challenging power or an ideology. Its
energy needs or trade do not depend on the ocean routes, except as the champion for those
depend on it.
Strategically US does not even recognise the ocean as one contiguous region but, dislocated
pockets of influence. Unlike the past, when it simply instructed the powers within these pockets
towards its policies, US now enters into ‘partnership’ with a regional power of its choice,
according to needs.
With the “Arab Spring” the North African part of the “Arab world” is coming into the European
sphere of influence, a result US could accept under new circumstances.
However, the Arab-peninsular is within US control, and uses it as a swing-factor to nullify any
unforeseen or hidden outcome by its various strategies, deployed in the various parts of the
ocean.
If it is the Sunni-terrorism then it can front the ideological counter against it, while ensuring the
‘moderates’ among them are part of the new process along the “Arab Spring”, as with the Islamic
groups in Egypt and other North African states.
If it were the Islamic-overspill from the Iranian revolution then it can be used to organise the
Sunni fronts as in Lebanon or Palestine, and send troops as with Bahrain.
But more importantly, if there is a shortage in oil supply, either by design or accident it is there to
manage the outcomes to US desires.
However, just as Saddam or Gaddafi, dictators with assumed power and unaccountable wealth
have the tendency to go beyond their remit, and that could one day be an interesting situation
for US with the rulers of Arab-peninsular.
Global energy requirements and the lack of oil production from Iraq and Libya, and now
difficulties posed by the proposed sanctions against Iran put the Arab-peninsular in an
advantages position. This may appear as another reason for the shift in balance towards the
Sunnis in the region, already argued for by the situations in Iraq and Af-Pak region.
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However, as one of the largest oil producer with huge unexplored deposits, Russia may have a
say on this matter. Thus, the subdivision of the ocean using the Arab-peninsular as a factor will
come into question at some point.
Though evidently blessed with two nuclear powers, South Asia is not privileged to have an energy
policy for the region as a whole and, in fact, it does not have any common strategy for anything at
all.
With the history and rivalry, the turmoil that engulf the Af-Pak region such complain might sound
baseless. Yet, not so dissimilar conditions existed in Europe following the two the world wars and
many revolutions as there are nations. The lessons learned then still motivate those in control of
EU to continue with the apparently failing project.
The bitter experiences for Pakistan, entering into strategic relationships with two global powers,
should be truly reflected upon. Similarly, the deficiencies in the long proposed marriage between
India and US, “the advent of the inevitable”, should be also thought through.
Those in South Asia concerned with the strategic configurations in the Indian Ocean should first
and foremost decide who are “their people” before identifying their interests and the strategies
to safeguard them.
Strategy based on the interest of an entire region is not an easy task, especially when the
societies are in various stages of social transition. That requires special confidence building
measures, which in itself may form the best part of the strategy required. Here we mean
approaches, not even the actualisation of anything straight away, such as to build a common
framework for the “values and rights of the peoples of South Asia”, and a common emergency
and aids program.
The conflicts between China and India, and the special relationship China has with Pakistan are
often suggested are the reasons for countries in South Asia to make a choice between US and
China. These are real and immediate issues that cannot be dismissed by noble intentions of our
own.
Yet, Chinese political strategy towards India has primarily been to ward off a permanent strategic
relationship with US and, secondly, to curb India’s ambition to be a global power. If there were a
choice between the two, China would rather have India as a global power than a strategic partner
with US.
Neither US nor China are seriously concerned about the future of the littorals in the Indian
Ocean. The rivalry in the ocean if true, are due to issues outside it, therefore alliances proposed
are unlikely to last the time. It is because of inevitably temporary nature of these relationships
the danger of being used without cares exist. Therein also lies the incentive: the need to have a
common program for the region, irrespective of the obstacles posed by every issue catalogued,
which more than anything outweigh the need choose between the two or be part of any of their
strategies.
References and further reading :
Alkadiri Raad, Fareed Mohamedi; Middle East Research and Information Project, MER227; “World Oil Markets
and the Invasion of Iraq”
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Bouton. Marshall M, Centre for a New American Security, Working Paper, US-India Initiative Series, October
2010; “America’s Interests in India”
Curtis Lisa, Dean Cheng: Backgrounder, The Heritage Foundation, No. 2583, July 18, 2011; “The China
Challenge: A Srtaregic Vision for US – India Relations”
Hilali. A. Z, Department of Political Science, University of Peshawar, Pakistan; “Cold War Politics of Superpowers
in South Asia”
Jaffe. Amy Myers; James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, Rice University, March 2007; “Iraq’s Oil Sector:
Past, Present and Future”
Kapila Subhash, SAAG, April 22, 2000, “India-USA Strategic Partnership – The advent of the inevitable”
Pant. Harsh. V, The Asia-Pacific Journal, May 3, 2010; “China’s Naval Expansion in the Indian Ocean and IndiaChina Rivalry”
Raghavan V. R, “India-China Relations A Military Perspective”
Raghuraman. V, Sajal Ghosh, Conferation of Indian Industry, March 2003; “Indo-US Cooperartion in EnergyIndian Perspective”
Ravi Sundaralingam, SAAG, 2010; “Arab Awakening: Divergence in the Arab world”, “Pakistan’s misfortunes: Is
there a South Asian perspective?”
Sameer Saxena, Captain, Indian Navy; “One Ocean, Two Shades, Perceptions about the Indian Ocean”
Yang Dali, Zhao Hong, “The Rise of India: China’s Perspectives and Responses”
Zhang Guihong, Faultlines; “US-India Relations Implications for China”
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The Af-Pak situation – India‘s response
Ullas Sharma,
Ullas Sharma,
46, MBA, publisher of
academic books. Was a columnist with the
now defunct yellowtimws.org for two years.
Worked closely with Prof. Burchard Brentjes
(Univ. of Halle, Germany) on various books
including Taliban: A Shadow Over Afghanistan. Lives with his wife and two sons in
Bangalore, India
Website: www.sharma24.wordpress.com – This blog is about international relations
and social and political developments with focus on South Asia.
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The Af-Pak situation – India’s response
Summary:
This article deals with the fluid situation in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region. Afghanistan is India‘s backyard and we
have had traditional close ties with this vital nation. The NATO led invasion of 2001 has led to a situation where the
world‘s eyes are on this beautiful landlocked country of mountains and valleys which has been the grave yard of many
an empire. Being the gateway to oil rich Central Asia the importance of Afghanistan cannot be underestimated. This is
a look at the current situation in this volatile nation and how India has responded and how we could make sure our
interests in the region are not marginalized. The role of a nuclear Pakistan with an increasingly radicalized society is
also explored.
The invasion of Afghanistan by NATO in 2001 was a major event in the recent history of South
Asia in general and Afghanistan in particular. NATO forces along with the Northern Alliance
militia unseated the Taliban regime and took control of the seat of power that is Kabul.
Remarkably the Taliban disappeared as quickly and seamlessly as they had appeared in mid-90‘s.
Some were captured and others killed but most just melted into the populace. But that was not the
end of the Taliban. Soon this rabidly radical force appeared again and a war between NATO forces
and the Taliban went on intermittently. NATO found it difficult to subdue this radical outfit
completely. The knowledge of the Af-Pak terrain which has deep ravines, mountains and valleys
provided a good hideout to the Taliban. The effective use of IED‘s and small weapons stopped the
ISAF in its tracks. The West tried to unravel the conundrum that was Afghanistan. They began by
a massive dose of aid which was to be used for developmental purposes. The idea was to win the
hearts and minds of the people of Afghanistan. But it was not as simple as it seemed. Afghanistan,
like any other nation in the region is not a homogeneous whole.
Afghanistan - Ethnicity
The ethnicity of Afghanistan has a politics of its own. A look at the ethnic divide will give us an
idea of the complex nature of Afghan society. Pashtuns or Pathans are the largest group with 40%
of the population. Pashtuns are divided into various tribes, the major ones being Durrani and
Ghilzai.
Tajiks make the second largest group at 25%. Ahmed Shah Masood, the legendary Northern war
lord was a Tajik. Other prominent ethnic groups are Hazaras, 18 percent; Uzbeks, 6.3 percent;
Turkmen, 2.5 percent; Qizilbash, 1.0; and 6.9 percent others.1
Pashtuns being by far the largest ethnic group have traditionally played leading role in Afghan
politics. The situation gets complicated when one finds that while the Durand Line2 may have
demarcated the Afghanistan-Pakistan border the ethnicity and the culture on both sides is the same.
Pakistan has a healthy population of Pashtuns and their affinity with their brethren across the
border cannot be wished away. Looking at the close ties and the undeniable link between the
people of Afghanistan and Pakistan president Obama rightly coined the phrase Af-Pak as one
linked to the other. He saw the close cultural and ethnic ties between the Pashtuns of the two
nations and understood that looking at Afghanistan problem in isolation would be denying the
linkages from across the border.
India and Afghanistan
India has had close cultural and political ties with Afghanistan for centuries. While it would be
futile to go as far as the Gandhara School of Art and the Buddhist influence since times
immemorial, the desecration of the Bamiyan Buddhas by the notorious Taliban a few years ago
does come to mind.
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India has had close ties with the Pashtuns on both sides of the Durand Line. The Pathans have been
a permanent feature in Indian cities and have traditionally been into money lending and selling of
dry fruits. The tallest leader of the Pashtuns and a Bharat Ratna awardee was the giant of a man
who we fondly call Frontier Gandhi – Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan3. The Pashtuns of Pakistan never
accepted the division of the country. They always wanted a united India. Gaffar Khan refused to be
buried in Pakistan having spent 52 years of his life in pre-partition British-India and Pakistani jails.
His funeral was held in Jalalabad.
What is true for the Pashtuns of Pakistan is true for Pashtuns of Afghanistan. There is an affinity
between India and Afghanistan that cannot be denied. The people of India and Afghanistan may be
cut off by borders but the mutual respect and affinity is very much there. Afghanistan is India‘s
backyard and whatever happens in Afghanistan has repercussions in India. Afghans have always
seen India as a close friend and neighbor. It must also be remembered that slain Afghan president
Dr. Muhammad Najibullah‘s family found refuge in India once the Taliban overran Kabul.
America‘s War on Terror
Post 9/11 attack the Americans decided to go after terrorists who had perpetrated the dastardly
attack. The Taliban were on American radar and they were pushed out of Afghanistan. Hamid
Karzai, a Pashtun was made the president and the abominable Taliban were history. But were the
Taliban defeated? They may have lost a battle or two but the war goes on. Till date Taliban have
not been completely subdued. The problem is both cultural as well as demographic. The proud
Pashtun sees any foreign interference as an insult. They see this as an assault on their tradition,
culture and religion. Luckily for them they have their brothers across the border in Pakistan and
they find refuge there when things get tough in Afghanistan.
Picture I: American Facilities in Afghanistan
Source:
http://www.google.co.in/imgres?imgurl=http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/images/ce
ntcom_ef-map2005.gif&imgrefurl=http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/centcommap2.htm&h=600&w=640&sz=49&tbnid=44pFK4z07BXHQM:&tbnh=90&tbnw=96&prev=/sear
ch%3Fq%3DAmerican%2Bbases%2Bin%2BAfghanistan%2Bmap%26tbm%3Disch%26tbo%3Du
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&zoom=1&q=American+bases+in+Afghanistan+map&docid=3G4LyWyw661RuM&hl=en&sa=X
&ei=IBvsTsiKLM7NrQfezaT4CA&ved=0CFAQ9QEwBg&dur=189
The problem is so perilous that the Americans did not know what to do till they began using
drones inside Pakistan territory to target militants who crossed the border and found refuge in the
tribal agencies of Pakistan. The use of drones was started during George W. Bush‘s presidency but
this was intensified under President Barack Obama. The use of drones to attack perceived targets
has seen a massive reaction from people in Pakistan. There has been collateral damage which
cannot be denied but there have been some successes too. The death of Taliban leader Baitullah
Mehsud was in a drone strike in August 2009. But the successes have been few and far between.
The drones have been useful in keeping the Taliban at bay, and that is in effect the major
contribution of these ferocious war machines. The Predator drones have become a nightmare of
sorts for the people in region straddling Afghanistan-Pakistan.
Pakistan‘s role in War on Terror
Afghanistan being a land locked country, for NATO to wage war in Afghanistan the role of
Pakistan was critical. Billions of dollars worth of war and logistical material was needed for the
NATO forces. Pakistan had been an ally of the West for long. The US and its allies therefore
thought they could depend on Pakistan in this war on terror. Remember Pakistan and the US had
closely allied during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in supporting the mujaheddin. Pakistan
too promised all support to the West in their war on terror. One reason why Pakistan was not
averse to American presence in Afghanistan was that since all resources will pass through Pakistan
on to Afghanistan they will have leverage with the West. In that their calculation was correct.
Pakistan was given millions of dollars as transit fee and billions of dollars in aid by the US.
The Americans however found that their efforts were invariably coming to a naught and there was
hardly any movement forward. The Taliban were like a mirage that they could never really reach.
They tried to negotiate with various factions of the Taliban including that of Mullah Omar of the
infamous Quetta shura but things went back to where they started. The Haqqani‘s - Jalaluddin and
Sirajuddin remain a thorn in their side as do Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Hakimullah Mehsud (some
reports suggest Hakimullah Mehsud is dead). There are in all some 30 Taliban outfits and
Americans have used both carrot and stick to bring them around. There have been meetings
facilitated by Pakistan and their intelligence wing the ISI but the threat from the Taliban has not
subsided.
The Americans soon realized that Pakistan was more of a sanctuary for the Taliban than anything
else. They also realized that Pakistan‘s ISI had close links with the Taliban which they had built
over the years from the ‗80‘s when many of these outfits were fighting the Soviets. They found
that Pakistan was playing a double game in running with the hares and hunting with the hounds.
Pakistan saw these tribal outfits loosely called the Taliban as a strategic asset. The Tehrik-e
Taliban Pakistan was an extension of these outfits within Pakistan and had active support of the ISI
and the Pakistan army.
American fears were proved right when Osama bin Laden was found ensconced in a huge mansion
near an army college outside of Abottabad. This was right under the nose of the Pakistan army.
How Osama was neutralized is well known as is the way in which Pakistan establishment denied
any knowledge of the presence of Osama bin Laden within Pakistan territory.
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The last straw on the camel‘s back was the attack by the Taliban on the American embassy in
Kabul on 13th Sept, 2011. Earlier, in February 2010, the Taliban had attacked the Indian embassy
in Kabul and an Indian diplomat had died in the attack. The relations between the US and Pakistan
have touched an all time low. The conflagration between American forces and Pakistan Rangers in
November 2011, where 24 Pakistan soldiers were killed in Mohmand agency, saw Islamabad
reacting sharply4. The Shamsi airbase in Balochistan from where drone attacks were carried out
has been vacated by the American forces and this has worsened matters.
The Pakistan strategy has always been to make sure the Americans are not in a comfortable
position. They see Pakistan interests in Afghanistan as strategic depth and want that a regime of
their choice be installed in Kabul. They are wary of Indian presence in smaller towns like Jalalabad
and Mazar – e Sharief where India has had consulates for decades. This tug of war has been going
on for long.
President Obama announced last year that American troops will start withdrawing in 2014 and that
Afghan forces will take over the internal security from then on. This has emboldened Pakistan and
they see this as American acceptance of a veritable defeat in Afghanistan. Many Pakistan military
experts have already proclaimed Afghanistan as a bigger defeat for the Americans than even
Vietnam.
The problem gets even more vitiated when one finds that Americans have withdrawn completely
from Iraq. This gives hopes to radical outfits that were they to keep up the pressure the Americans
could decide to withdraw completely from Afghanistan too. Pakistan is therefore loath to let go
their ‗strategic assets‘ that they plan to use – the Taliban, once the Americans withdraw. They
would be damned if they would let any major Taliban outfit to come to any agreement with the
Americans. For them a say in Kabul is intrinsically more important than anything that they can
ever get from the Americans. However, it is also true that Pakistan is losing a lot in the process.
TAPI and the continued American interest
No sensible power in today‘s world can afford to spend billions of dollars on an operation that is
thousands of miles away from home and which has no perceptible security implications even in the
medium and long term. A fact that needs to be mentioned is that while there were Saudis and
Egyptians in the 9/11 terror attacks there were no Afghans or Pashtuns involved. Then why is the
US spending billions of dollars on a military operation in a remote part of the world?
The answer to this question lies in the Central Asian oil cache which if uncorked could mean
billions of dollars in revenue to the West. The West has for long been trying to fructify the
Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India gas pipeline termed TAPI5. This 1680km long gas
pipeline was to be built from Daultabad to Fazilka in India. The now defunct Unocal was at the
center of these efforts earlier but later withdrew. American interest in TAPI is very real and one of
the main reasons why they continue to have presence in Afghanistan. They have been trying to
reason with Pakistan and the various tribal war lords for long to ensure the safety of the proposed
pipeline but nothing much has come of it.
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Picture II: Proposed Trans-Afghanistan Gas Pipeline.
Source:http://www.democraticunderground.com/http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/
duboard.php?az=view_all&address=389x7159913
For once American interests and those of the host nations find congruence. Were TAPI to fructify
Pakistan and Afghanistan could make millions of dollars in transit revenues and all nations could
get gas cheap. There was a conclave in January 2011 in Ashgabat where Afghanistan, Pakistan and
India signed a treaty for the proposed pipeline and even made a tentative pledge of the price
thereof. Of course all met because of the pressure from the United States but the fact that US
administration was keen on such a treaty shows how important TAPI is for American interests in
the region.
Pakistan is a global hub of terror is something no one contests. Were they to dismantle the terror
structure and honestly help the Americans in bringing peace to the region Pakistan would stand to
gain immensely! Pakistan is a land of plenty. It has everything – from fertile land to ports and hard
working hardy people. The problem is that Pakistan does not understand that they need to build
institutions and focus on development and infrastructure. Most of the infrastructure is of British
vintage. Their propensity to use terror as a state policy means that precious resources are diverted
to issues that give little economic return. Rather than keep looking out they must look within. If
they do, they would realize that the disproportionate influence that the Army wields has had
debilitating effect on the economy and polity of Pakistan. It would be to Pakistan‘s benefit to
honestly be a part of the West‘s war on terror. Were the ‗pipeline of peace‘ 6 as some experts call
TAPI, to fructify Pakistan will have strategic depth both in Afghanistan and a strategic hold over
India as they will have the keys to India‘s energy needs.
China and the Af-Pak problem
China may not have a direct role in the Af-Pak region but that does not mean they are standing on
the sidelines watching. They have already built a pipeline from Turkmenistan to Xinjiang and have
access to cheap gas. China‘s most notable efforts in Afghanistan include a $3.5 billion project for
the development of the Aynak copper mine in Logar Province and associated transport and
electricity-generating facilities, making it the largest foreign direct investment in Afghanistan‘s
history. Chinese companies are also bidding for an iron ore deposit west of Kabul and oil and gas
deposits in northern Afghanistan7. But Chinese interest in Afghanistan is not limited to economics
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alone. They are concerned about terrorism in Xinjiang and have identified Pakistan-Afghanistan as
the source of terror. The close Sino-Pak ties mean that they can always ask Pakistan to hand over
any terror suspect they want. China is also equally keen to check India‘s growth as it sees its
southern neighbor a threat to its own global ambitions. The TAPI will give India access to cheap
gas which could mean economic edge for Indian enterprises. China is not too keen for TAPI to
fructify. While Beijing wants to check terror activity in Xinjiang it is equally concerned about
American forays in the region as well as the closer Indo-US cooperation.
The road ahead for India
Indian interests in Afghanistan are permanent, and that is an undeniable fact. It is also a fact that
American position in Afghanistan is fluid. It is unclear whether the US will withdraw completely
post 2014 or will it have a salutary presence in this war torn country. A lot will depend on who
wins the 2012 US elections. If there is continuity and if the global economic situation does not
improve there is every chance that Americans would want to withdraw completely from the region.
A recalcitrant Pakistan makes US presence in Afghanistan a constant source of anxiety for DC.
The economics of war are such that it is a drain on the economy. Yet, the US would not want to let
all this effort go waste.
Post attack in Kabul on American embassy, India and Afghanistan has inked pacts in the field of
security, trade and mining and in other related fields. Americans are keen that Indian army trains
Afghan forces to get them ready to take over from them post 2014. India has acceded to the
demand. India might help Afghanistan with some small weapons too. India has announced an aid
package of over the $2.5 billion. We have already built the Zaranj-Delaram highway and are also
building the Afghan parliament. Afghan students receive Indian scholarships and some are even
invited to study in Indian universities. Indo-Afghan ties remain deep and strong.
With all this upside the fact remains that peace in Afghanistan remains elusive. Any real chances
of peace in the region got a rude jolt with the assassination of Burhanuddin Rabbani8 on 20th Sept,
2011. It is alleged that ISI backed Taliban outfits were behind the assassination. India will
continue to engage with Afghanistan in all fields. Clearly Pakistan‘s intention is to keep the
Afghanistan pot boiling. Islamabad is preparing for a post American withdrawal from the region. If
Americans feel that they cannot keep going with a Pakistan hell bent on making things difficult for
them then they might have no option but to withdraw completely. Pakistan‘s absence from the
Bonn conference on Afghanistan was a pointer to the fact that their policy is to take a tough stand.
They have the backing of their friends and allies and that gives them the confidence to defy the
West. Some Russian diplomats have lately begun calling Pakistan a friend and an ally.
India will need to be ready for the worse post 2014. The one difference between Iraq and
Afghanistan is that while in Iraq the Americans were not overtly welcomed by the leadership in
Baghdad, in Afghanistan no leader in his right mind would want the West to leave. Hamid Karzai
is very keen that the Americans stay in Afghanistan till such time that things settle down – which
could mean decades. India will continue to support Afghanistan in every possible way. Manmohan
Singh‘s much maligned Sharm el-Sheikh and Mohali initiative was to make sure that Pakistan was
assured of friendship and goodwill of India such that it gave a free hand to Islamabad to focus on
the western front and to deal with terror there. That Pakistan refused to take any meaningful action
again shows how myopic Islamabad‘s vision is when it comes to recognizing what is good for
them.
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If the West were to withdraw completely from Afghanistan anytime in future without completely
decimating the Taliban, which looks highly improbable, then India and Afghanistan and the region
will be back to square one. It will be mid 90‘s revisited. There is every possibility that we might
see the return of the Taliban in Kabul and various factions of the Taliban will then fight it out as
they did then. The strides that Afghanistan has made economically and otherwise will then be lost.
From the American point of view they can do only so much and no more. India will then be on the
back foot and without a charismatic leader like Ahmed Shah Masood, India will find the going
particularly difficult.
As I write this piece the news is that the US has frozen $700 million of aid to Pakistan. The US
will arm twist Pakistan into cooperating as they have done earlier. Pakistan is in a perilous
economic state and was it not for American largess they would have to default on debt payment.
The acrimony bordering on enmity between US and Pakistan does not auger well for the region. It
is in the interest of all parties to cooperate for betterment of the region. As far as India is concerned
we would like to see a stable, viable and forward looking Afghanistan. Our vision for Pakistan is
no different. While India will cooperate with the West in every conceivable way to bring peace and
stability to the region we must also be ready for any eventuality that may arise in this volatile part
of South Asia.
The way out
Peace in South Asia is an objective close to the hearts of the 1.8billion people that inhabit this
region. We have a responsibility towards them. Terror emanating from Pakistan is a real threat to
peace in the region. Americans entered Afghanistan safe in the knowledge that their ally and friend
Pakistan would be by their side. American military and intelligence have had a close relationship
with their counterparts in Pakistan. The huge aid that Washington keeps pouring helps Islamabad
maintain an army of more than half a million with modern armaments. Were it not for American
aid the Pakistan army would not be able to sustain itself. Some have called the Pakistan army a
mercenary outfit of the Americans.
But the Pakistan army is not doing Washington‘s bidding lately. The reasons are as outlined earlier
in this essay – their obsession with strategic depth in Afghanistan. Clearly, the objectives of
Washington and those of Islamabad do not match. Pakistan in its defense points out that they have
also been victims of terror and more than 20,000 Pakistanis have lost their lives to terror attacks.
While it is true that Pakistan has also faced terror strikes it is also true that Pakistan is a victim of
its own terror machinery and that is a vital difference. Pakistan has nurtured radicals and these
radicals threaten to take over the country. The murder of Punjab governor Salman Taseer and the
way the gunman who killed Taseer was hailed as a hero - being showered with flower petals,
shows which way the country is headed. Radicalism in Pakistan has taken firm roots. This is a
threat not only to Pakistan, South Asia but to world peace.
Things get infinitely more complicated when one finds that Pakistan is a nuclear weapon state.
Remarkably, the Pakistan nuclear program organized and furthered by Pakistan establishment
under A.Q. Khan had silent American blessings. This was in mid80‘s at the height of the Cold
War. Since then a lot of water has flown down the Jhelum. Today, Pakistan is a close ally of
China and Beijing is helping Pakistan build nuclear reactors and in effect helping Islamabad with
its nuclear program. The various missiles in Pakistan‘s arsenal are also of North Korean origin,
another strong ally of China.
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There is a school of thought which believes that the various terror strikes in India and around the
world that have their origins in Pakistan would not have taken place if Pakistan were not a nuclear
weapons state. There is a lot of truth in this assertion. The 1993 Mumbai blasts, the Mumbai train
blast of 2003 and 2006, the Parliament attack of 2001 and the 26/11 Mumbai attacks may not have
happened if Pakistan were not a nuclear weapon state. Some attacks in the West like the 7/7
London bombings as well as the March 2004 Madrid train bombings could have also been
avoided. A nightmarish scenario is one where some radical Islamist outfits get access to a nuclear
device. What if some lunatic finds even a miniature nuclear device that can be carried in a suitcase
but enough to destroy a mid-size American, European or Indian city? Most probably Pakistan will
not share nuclear weapons with terrorist outfits that are directly linked to Pakistan but a Hamas or
a Salafi jihadist procuring a nuclear device which cannot be easily linked to Pakistan is more
probable. The consequences are unimaginable.
Picture: III
Source: Reuters
http://blogs.reuters.com/pakistan/2009/08/13/graphic-pakistani-nuclear-facilities/
Pakistan‘s unwarranted ambitions in Afghanistan also stem from the fact that they are a nuclear
weapon state and therefore aim higher9. There are theorists who advocate de-nuking
Pakistan. And these voices have been heard from George W. Bush‘s times. For peace and
development in the region - a non-nuclear Pakistan state is perhaps what is warranted. West‘s war
on terror and their forays into Afghanistan will have some meaning if before they withdraw from
the region, partially or completely, they ensure that Pakistan becomes a nuclear weapons‘ free
nation. Were such an exercise undertaken successfully the West will find many things falling in
place automatically. Terror emanating from Pakistan will subside and the world will be a safer
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place. Development will become Pakistan‘s priority as it should and this will usher in an era of
peace and prosperity in the region.
The problem in undertaking any such initiative that will help Islamabad see the futility of nurturing
a nuclear weapons program is that region imbalances will make this a very difficult task. A rising
India is seen as a threat by China. What the Americans did during the Cold War China is doing
now – propping up Pakistan as a counter weight to India. Americans have negated any requests by
Islamabad for more nuclear reactors. They are however ready to help Pakistan with state of the art
thermal power plants with minimal environmental damage for their energy needs, as Hillary
Clinton suggested in one of her trips to Pakistan. China on the other hand is helping Pakistan in
every conceivable way in furthering its nuclear program. It is not suggested that Pakistan close
down all nuclear plants, but what is surely required is that the weapons program be rolled back and
any stockpile made benign. This will also mean that Pakistan nuclear program be monitored under
strict IAEA guidelines.
Conclusion
If the West were to convince Beijing the futility and the danger of a nuclear Pakistan maybe denuking Pakistan may not be as difficult as we perceive. The question is will Beijing see reason in
the argument for a nuclear weapons free Pakistan? West is engaged with the Iran question as of
now. A possible conflagration in the Persian Gulf is a real possibility. While the Iranian question is
surely worth pursuing and India is also against any proliferation in the Middle East, the Pakistani
nuclear ambitions, if curtailed will solve a lot of problems for the West and the region. If NATO
were to withdraw from Afghanistan without de-nuking Pakistan they would have wasted an
opportunity and the whole Afghan operation then cannot be called a success, whatever the West
might posture. It is true that Beijing will be loathe to be party to de-nuking Pakistan, but it is also
true that were the West to show resolve the Chinese will have no option but to go along with the
West. Any such move is in the interest of the region, for world peace and perhaps most importantly
for the people of Pakistan.
India will of course help in any initiative that helps Pakistan abandon its nuclear weapons program.
But India cannot depend on the sagacity of the West and other world powers including Russia and
China. What India can and must do is keep up its engagement with Afghanistan and help them
economically and strategically. We must work with the West towards a peaceful and stable
Afghanistan. We must also keep in mind any possible scenarios in the medium and long term and
be ready for any eventuality that might arise in this crucial nation to make sure our interests are not
marginalized.
Notes:
1. Afghanistan Ethnic Groups: file:///C:/Users/Guest/Downloads/Afghanistan%20-%20Ethnic%20Groups.htm
2. Durand Line is the root of the AfPak conflict
file:///C:/Users/Guest/Downloads/IntelliBriefs%20%20Durand%20Line%20is%20the%20root%20of%20the%20AfPak%20conflict.htm
3. Afghanistan – not the right war either by Ullas Sharma http://sharma24.wordpress.com/2009/10/05/afghanistan-%E2%80%93-not-theright-war-either/
4. Pakistan cleared ISAF airstrikes that killed its own troops By Bill Roggio, Long War Journal http://www.longwarjournal.org/threatmatrix/archives/2011/12/pakistan_cleared_isaf_airstrik.php
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5. TAPI Pipeline A Regional Geo-economic Advantage or Political Effort to Isolate Iran? by Ali Valigholizadeh
file:///C:/Users/Guest/Downloads/TAPI%20Pipeline.htm
6. The Pipeline of Peace and the Importance of Sharing by Ullas Sharma http://sharma24.wordpress.com/2009/11/03/the-pipeline-ofpeace-and-the-importance-of-sharing/
7. China and the ―AfPak‖ Issue by Michael D. Swaine
8. War between elephants and horses at AF-PAK: post-bin Laden opportunities by Emrah Usta
file:///C:/Users/Guest/Downloads/War%20between%20elephants%20and%20horses%20at%20AF-PAK%20%20postbin%20Laden%20opportunities%20br%20%20i%20by%20%20i%20%20%20b%20Emrah%20Usta%20%20%20b%20.htm
9. US plans to denuke Pakistan in a decade http://intellibriefs.blogspot.com/2004/12/us-plans-to-denuke-pakistan-in-decade.html
**************
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Overcoming Regional Insecurity through Human Security:
an analysis of the potential for intra-regional cooperation for regional enhancement in South Asia
Dr. Maneesha S. Wanasinghe – Pasqual
Department of International Relations
University of Colombo
Email. [email protected]
Education : BA in Modern History (Hons), University of
Colombo Sri Lanka; MA in International Peace Studies,
Joan B. Kroc Institute, University of Notre Dame, USA; Ph.D.
in Conflict Analysis, School of Conflict Analysis and
Resolution, George Mason University, USA. SEDA Qualified
(UK) and CTHE Qualified (Sri Lanka) lecturer.
Specializations:
Conflict
Analysis;
Peacebuilding;
International Relations; Peace Studies; Human Security;
and Human Rights.
Main research interests Main research interests, though eclectic, remain predominantly
focused on Conflict Analysis and Human Security. Currently working on Zones of Peace and
Gender Rights, has conducted research on Human Security issues and foreign policy, Peace
Education and Human Rights. Ms. Wanasinghe - Pasquel has also conducted extensive
research on Diaspora as well as Peace Education. Interests also include area studies on
America, South Asia, South East Asia and the Pacific, and Europe.
Having obtained a First Class in Modern History was awarded the Tikiriabayasinghe
Memorial Gold Medal for best performance in History Special (1998). A Junior Fulbright
Scholar (2000-2002) and a recipient of the George Mason Federation scholarship (2004).
Conference presentations – which include human rights, peace education, foreign policy,
human security, diaspora, conflict analysis, and narrative analysis – highlight the range of
interests.
Volunteer positions include Secretary, Sri Lanka Federation of University Women (SLFUW)
and the Council Member, Sri Lanka Historical Association.
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Overcoming Regional Insecurity through Human Security:
an analysis of the potential for intra-regional cooperation for regional enhancement in South Asia
Introduction
South Asia, home to over a billion and a quarter people1, is often portrayed negatively as the
home of the poor2, the malnourished and the hungry3, and the under-educated. This is
harshly made evident when glancing at certain data-sets that present India, Bangladesh and
Pakistan having over forty percent under-weight children4. The region has also gained the
unpopular distinction of housing terrorist groups. In India alone, according to some
estimates, there are over 170 groups designated as extremists or terrorists5 Moreover, the
South Asian region overall, according to World Defense Network, ranks low in the global
peace index6. Thus, whilst the eight countries that constitute South Asia – consisting of
Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka – has
consistently retained their independence, intra-regional security has habitually been
threatened, thereby hindering the national (i.e. traditional) security of each country of the
region. Moreover, due to insecurities and the socio-economic and cultural problems that
result from under-development, conflict, among others, the citizens of these countries have
also regularly faced the daunting obstacles to their own security – i.e. their Human Security.
Despite the negative outlook presented, it is possible to state that in the 21 st century, the
region is at a cross-road. It is possible to speculate that if the leadership of the eight countries
takes initiatives to cooperate regionally on Human Security matters, the countries of the
region do have to potential to claw their way out of the quagmire.
Objective of the Research
The core objective of this paper is argues for the shifting of focus from traditional security to
human security in order to enhance regional security. This paper strives to introduce the
nuances of the concept of Human Security, examine the Human Security issues faced by the
countries of the South Asian region and speculate on how regional cooperation can resolve
traditional security concerns resulting from trust issues, misunderstandings and
misinterpretations which have hindered true regional cooperation. The paper argues that by
focusing on overcoming intra-regional Human Security matters, it is possible to reduce
traditional security concerns.
Regional Integration
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South Asia formally began its regional integration in 1985, when South Asian Association for
Regional Cooperation (SAARC) was created. It was hoped, perhaps idealistically, that such
integration would develop a regional identity and enhance regional economic and sociocultural integration. Since its inception, SAARC has established the South Asian Preferential
Trade Agreement or SAPTA (1993) and the South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA in 2006)
but integration as a region remains minimalist and frustratingly superficial.
While the potential exists for applying the European model of integration to South Asia,
especially since there exist an assumption that economic integration would result in
‘commercial peace’ with reduction of intra-regional conflicts,7 the lack of formal regional
integration, even in the guise of commercial integration, has unfortunately resulted in the
continuing of intra-regional conflicts. The most prevalent is the Indio-Pakistan conflict, which
has been in existence – currently simmering – since 1947 when the two nations emerged as
independent nations. Moreover, there is a continued interference in internal issues of each
other. From the elite top-level to the grassroots level, there is little integration within the
region and this has resulted not only in enhanced insecurity but also continued
underutilization of the economic potential that is South Asia.
This is not to say that regionalism alone causes the complete disappearance of traditional
security concerns. Rather, as commented on by Than, “traditional security threats in the form
of insurgencies remained relevant though seemingly diminishing”8
Traditional Security
At the outset, it is vital to emphasize that this paper does not examine in detail the concept of
‘security’ as it pertains to state security. However, in brief, traditional security focuses on the
state and is military by nature. This traditional notion of security in any case is not the topic
of regional cooperation in South Asia. The SAARC intentionally does not deal with security9.
As noted by Dieter, the security dilemma of South Asia, as depicted in the India-Pakistan
relationships is that “independent action taken by one state to build up its own strength and
security makes the other more insecure.”10Security of South Asia as a region, as noted by
Nye, often faces security dilemmas because of misunderstandings and misinformation11. The
added threat of trans-border terrorism and the impact of intra-state and extra-regional
players to security concerns of South Asia is a growing. The only solution appears to be, as
this paper argues, is to shift focus and examine ways of ensuring Human Security of the
individuals and through that, ensure traditional Security.
Thus,
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The concept of security has undergone an unexpected change from the 1980s.
Objections against the realist security discourse have emerged from the request that
the principal unit of security should not be the state. Security should be defined in
terms of the safety of the individual or some other form of polity but individual ...
against starvation, loss of property, violations of bodily integrity, torture and other
forms of aggression together with the protection of the integrity of states.12
By reinterpreting security, it is possible for the divided South Asian countries to unite,
especially since there is a strongly-held belief in Pakistan that security, which
includes “the land and the people, the government and its ideology, external and
internal forces, and political, military, economic, physical, and psychological
dimensions, threat to a state’s security always comes from neighboring states: “The
potential enemy is the neighbor, only the neighbor, and always the neighbor; every
neighbor is a potential enemy, provided there is a clash of interest grave enough to
make acceptable the waging of war”13.
Therefore, security is interlinked with defense but, Human Security can be a prerequisite for
national security.14 However, South Asia as a region and all the countries within it have
consistently focused on traditional security at the expense of enhancing intra-regional
cohesiveness, peace and security through Human Security.15
Human Security
The United Nations Development Program (UNDP), in introducing Human Security, defined it
as “a child who did not die, a disease that did not spread, a job that was not cut, an ethnic
tension that did not explode into violence.”16
Human Security as a concept entails freedoms from fear and want17. It is also possible to reconceptualize this as the state’s responsibility to protect18 which, while interpreted by some
as a threat to state sovereignty19, can also be construed as a form of collective security for the
individual. Indeed, Human Security is a people-centered approach that involves the
protection or shielding of the vital core – human rights, right to dignity, and quality of life
beyond survival – of all human lives against tragically critical and pervasive threats that
directly or indirectly hinder human fulfillment. This adaptation of Human Security
definition20 highlights the minimalist expectations of Human Security. Whilst the concept of
Human Security examines personal, political, food, health, economic, community and
environmental insecurities that threaten individuals, this concept complements as opposed
to endangering traditional security. It is indivisible, meaning that “the security of each of us
depends on that of the other, and that one set of security concerns cannot be considered or
addressed in isolation from others”.21 Human Security examines menace beyond violence,
threats that are direct and indirect, with or without agency.
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It is pertinent to note here that different threats and how to overcome the threats has
resulted in the minimalist versus the maximalist definitions of Human Security. Whilst
freedom from fear is considered the minimalist understanding of Human Security, freedom
from want as well as freedom from fear is considered to be part of the maximalist definition.
Despite the ever-constant debate on the definition of Human Security, what is interesting to
note is that the traditional understanding of ‘security’ has broadened from military to nonmilitary threats, and deepened from state to individuals.
Human Security though initially feared as a threat to state sovereignty and by the developing
nations as another tool of the western world – a blank cheque – that would allow them to
interfere in the internal governing of nation-states22, is fast growing to be a mechanism to
judge the suitability of a state to govern people. To reiterate, the International Canadian
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), to waylay any fear that this would
hinder state/traditional security, informed of the importance of the dual responsibilities of
states: externally to respect sovereignty (traditional security) and internally to respect the
dignity and human rights of its citizens.23 Furthermore, if intervening due to state negligence
relating to Human Security matters, the intervening faction/s also has a responsibility to
protect along with the responsibility to prevent, react and to rebuild if intervening.
Human Security Issues in South Asia
It is possible to speculate that in general, threats to individuals (i.e. Human Security
concerns) in South Asia stem from (wo)man-made intra-regional internal and inter-state
conflicts, miss-governance, including nepotism, corruption, exploitation, hatred-filled
rhetoric to gain/retain power, etc; (wo)man-made extra-regional issues such as global
economic downturns, neo-colonialism, human-induced environmental degradation; along
with nature-induced natural disasters, epidemics, and environmental changes.
Moreover, Greater emphasis on military security has resulted in an increase of 44 percent in
military expenditure in South Asia, which is relatively the highest in the world … As
compared to their excessively wasteful and increasingly military spending, the people suffer
in innumerable ways as depicted by one of the lowest levels of human development indices,
lagging behind even Sub-Saharan Africa on certain crucial human indicators. In India, 34.7
percent of the population live below US$ 1 a day, share of poorest 20 percent in national
income/consumption stands at 8.1 percent, 47 percent children are underweight for their
age – one percent less than Afghanistan24
The sources of insecurity in South Asia involve not only the traditional security concerns.
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Poverty, food insecurity, competition over scarce resources, environmental
degradation, transnational movements of populations, drugs and arms, ethnic and
religious conflicts … pose more serious problems to South Asian peace and security …
Traditional sovereignty and military capacity are scarcely relevant when human
security concerns such as ethnicity, religion, region, space, environment, governance,
economy and human rights turn into flashpoints of violent conflict.25
What is possible and what is impossible in the context of South Asia must be taken into
account. This paper, to reiterate, argues for a shift in the understanding of security in order
to enhance regional peace.
Enhancing Traditional Security through Human Security
Not only is it possible for traditional security to be enhanced through Human Security, but,
this paper broadly presents two ways – which should be intertwined – of achieving that
outcome. The first – whilst time consuming, would most likely yield long-term success – is
the bottom-up regionalism. The second, with SAARC as the example, is the top-down
regionalism which strives to integrate the eight countries of South Asia through developing
socio-cultural and economic ties.
Whilst the former is a more informal regionalism, the latter regarding SAARC has been the
focus of numerous discussions, albeit in the negative. This paper argues that if SAARC is to
truly integrate under the parameters given in its constitution, this formal integration would
focus on Human Security. This would enable the region to strengthen as a region. A
declaration such as the “Barcelona Report on a Human Security Doctrine for Europe”26 alone,
however, is insufficient since South Asian integration remains relatively superficial even
after a quarter century. The requirement is to transform how these eight nations perceive
integration: reduce the traditional security lens and approach from a Human Security lens. It
is then possible to examine interstate issues such as water supply, epidemics, migration, and
environmental degradation from a more holistic perspective rather than from the narrow
security lens.
This is not as easy as it sounds because each of the countries of South Asia is suspicious of the
other and moreover, India’s policy never to hold multilateral negotiations on security
matters – thereby hindering talks for example, between India, Nepal and Bangladesh
regarding the Gangis river water issue – in-itself is a stumbling block to regional integration.
Formal integration therefore must be strengthened through informal integration. Human
Security, as noted above, is people-centered. Individuals must be empowered to ensure their
own security. Informal integration that focuses on trans-border Human Security issues is not
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only possible but achievable. As noted by Quadir, there appears to be a growth in transborder coalitions among the civil societies from different countries.27 This “regionalism from
below” is encouraged by the growth of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), including
International Writers Convention, Forum on Tolerance and Peace … Forum on Civil Society,
Human Rights and Good Governance, South Asian Child Worker’s Association, Citizens
Against War, the Action Committee Against Arms Race, Alliance for a Secular and Democratic
South Asia, Pakistan-India Peoples Forum for Peace and Democracy, Coalition for Nuclear
Disarmament and Peace, Action Against Sexual Exploitation of Children, and Doctors for
Peace and Development.28
Human Security, if it is to be effectively achieved, must take the form of peacebuilding,
whereby the whole society takes part in its establishment and growth. Peacebuilding
encompasses the work of the elite-level top-down decision-makers, the bottom-up of the
grassroots and the middle-level connectors.
In Conclusion
The paper argued for a different approach to overcoming regional insecurity through using a
Human Security lens. By perceiving security from a traditional lens narrows the
understanding of security and, more significantly, hindered regional integration. The
potential for intra-regional cooperation for the fulfillment of individual and state security is
through the combination of formal and informal integration, i.e., through regional
peacebuilding.
End notes
1http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/SOUTHASIAEXT/0,,menuPK:158851~pagePK:146732~piP
K:146813~theSitePK:223547,00.html
2Note: according to World Bank calculations, South Asia has the largest number of people under $1 a day, amounting
to 596 million as of 2010 http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/povDuplic.html
3 http://www.worldhunger.org/articles/Learn/world%20hunger%20facts%202002.htm
4See www.worldbank.org
5http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/terroristoutfits/index.html
6See: http://www.defence.pk/forums/strategic-geopolitical-issues/61259-south-asia-ranks-low-global-peaceindex.html and http://archives.dawn.com/?s=pakistan+ranked+fifth+most+unstable+country
7Golam Rabbani (2007 ) “Regional Peace through economic integration: the applicability of the European model in
South Asia” in Heribert Dieter eds. The Evolution of Regionalism in Asia: economic and security issues.
8 Tin Maung Maung Than (2007) “Politics and Security in Southeast Asia: trends and challenges” in Daljit Singh ed.
Political and Security Dynamics of South and Southeast Asia p. 80
9Smruti S. Pattanaik, Medha Bisht and Kartik Bommakanti “SAARC: A journey through history” Institute for Defense
Studies and Analysis
10Dieter 186
11 Nye 1993: 37
12 Harald Kleinschmidt (2006) Migration, regional integration and human security: the formation and maintenance
of transnational spaces
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13A. I. Akram “Security and Stability in South Asia” in S. Cohen ed., The Security of South Asia. Quoted in Rekha Datta
(2008) Beyond Realism: Human Security in India and Pakistan in the Twenty-First Century. p. 16
14Muthiah Alagappa (2003) Asian security order: instrumental and normative features.
15See. Hans Gunter Brauch et al., eds., (2009) Facing Global Environmental Change: environmental, human, energy,
food, health and water security concepts; P. R. Chari and Sonika Gupta eds., (2003) Human Security in South Asia:
gender, energy, migration and globalization.
16 UNDP (1994)
17http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr1994/
18See: http://www.iciss.ca/report2-en.asp and http://www.humansecurity-chs.org/finalreport/Outlines/outline.html
19For example: http://www.g77.org/
20Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh and Arundha I. Chenoy (2007) Human Security: concepts and implications.
21 Farah Faizal and Swarna Rajagopalan (2005) Women, Security, South Asia: a clearing of the thicket. p. 11
22 Ibid.
23http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/files/R2PSummary.pdf
24South Asian Journal January 19 2004, Quoted in Rekha Datta (2008) Beyond Realism: Human Security in India and
Pakistan in the Twenty-First Century. p. 7
25Vandana Asantha and Ashok C. Shakla (2003) Security in South Asia: trends and directions. p. 61
26http://individual.utoronto.ca/humansecurity/PDF/vonBredow.pdf
27 Quadir, op cit.
28 Ibid 120
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