Saying “Non” Tom Conner, Ph.D. St. Norbert College

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Saying “Non”:
The French Rejection of the European Constitution and its Global Implications*
Tom Conner, Ph.D.
St. Norbert College
Summary: This paper will examine the implications of the French rejection of the European constitution not
only in terms of European construction but also in terms of global relations, in particular between the EU
and the US. Are the French “non” and the Dutch “nee” hiccups resulting from a poorly prepared meal eaten
on the run, or symptoms of a more serious malady, which will cripple the European behemoth and possibly
send him to an early grave? In the pages that follow I will argue that it is primarily the latter. Although I
will focus on France, I will refer to several other countries in passing, especially Britain and Germany. In
Part I, I will review what happened in France and elsewhere in Europe and situate events in context; in Part
II, I will explore the reasons why the French rejected the European constitution; in Part III, finally, I will
address the impact of the French “non” on global relations.
Part I: The French and Dutch Rejection of the European Constitution and Its Aftermath
French voters overwhelmingly rejected the proposed European constitution by 55% in
a referendum held on Sunday, May 29, 2005, making France the first nation to say “no”
to an even more tightknit Europe. The proposed constitution ostensibly would rationalize
the decision-making process in the 25-member EU, making it easier to implement full
economic and political integration. Voter participation in France topped the 70% mark.1
No doubt this seismic day will haunt the EU for years to come and likely reduce
President Jacques Chirac to a lame-duck president. He dissolved the Chamber of
Deputies back in 1997 to obtain a stronger majority for reform (including escalated
European integration) and this year grudgingly called for a popular referendum on the
constitution (Brussels mandates that member states ratify it), but, lo and behold, he ended
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up losing both votes. Because of a plethora of domestic problems the referendum
amounted to a plebiscite on Chirac himself, so small wonder that the result was a shock.
His popularity stands at a rock bottom, never before seen 21%. The ever unpredictable
Chirac, a veritable “Jacques in the Box,” in a surprise move reshuffled his government in
a futile attempt at damage control, appointing his long-time protégé and presumed heir
Dominique de Villepin Prime Minister and reappointing his old nemesis “Sarko,” the
diminutive modern-day Napoleon, free market maverick gunslinger, and likely next
president of France, Nicolas Sarkozy Minister of the Interior.2 How did Sarkozy thank his
benefactor (who admittedly had no choice but to appoint him either Prime Minister or
Minister of the Interior)? By comparing him to the ineffectual and diddling Louis XVI on
the eve of the French Revolution. In an informal speech on Bastille Day, July 14 (which
is the French national holiday), the brazen Sarkozy announced, alluding to the king’s
hobby of taking apart locks and putting them back together again: “Je n’ai pas vocation à
démonter tranquillement les serrures à Versailles pendant que la France gronde” [“I do
not intend to sit here and dismantle locks while France is grumbling”] (Ridet, “Lors de sa
‘garden-party’”). The animosity between the two men is wellknown. Only a year earlier,
just before banishing Sarkozy from the government when he took the helm of the rightof-center governing majority UMP (Union pour la Majorité Présidentielle), Chirac had
declared: “Je décide, il exécute” [“I decide, he obeys”]. Now Sarkozy has elbowed his
way back into the government and looks like he will stay for the duration, poised to move
into the Elysée palace in 2007 when Chirac leaves office.
*
This paper was completed in July 2005, before all the immediate outcomes of the French vote were
known. I added a few remarks in October 2005, on the eve of the European Studies Conference, regarding
the recent elections in Germany. All translations are my own unless otherwise indicated.
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When the results of the referendum became known, Chirac also conferred with
German Chancellor Gerhardt Schröder, so that the erstwhile Franco-German power
couple could develop a plan of action to present at the upcoming meeting of the European
Council in Brussels, which would be discussing a new long-term European budget for the
period 2007-2013 and salvaging what it could of its public image. France and Germany
had essentially engineered the evolution of the EU (Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman
were both Frenchmen, Konrad Adenauer a German), spearheading all the grand
initiatives that created a single market, from the European Steel and Coal Union in the
1950s to the single currency; but they have lost their preeminence in an enlarged EU.
Once again Chirac appears to be a loss for what to do, justifying former President
François Mitterrand’s oft-quoted sarcastic remark: “Chirac runs fast but knows not
where.” The very notion of holding a summit to discuss not the No vote but the budget
for an organization in crisis appears preposterous even to seasoned political observers, as
though leaders across Europe were in a state of denial or at least bewildered and at a loss
for what to do next.
It came as no surprise to anyone, therefore, that budget negotiations in Brussels
collapsed. It was too much to expect that leaders could focus on the budget when the very
identity of the EU seemed to be in question and voters everywhere (and not only in
France and the Netherlands) demanded accountability. “Domestic politics and national
interests defeated lofty notions of sacrifice and solidarity for the benefit of all” (Sciolino,
“Shame and Anger as EU Budget Talks Collapse”), underscoring the EU’s lack of a
common vision for the future. In point of fact, there was no shortage of issues to disagree
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about. For example, the French were as intransigent on their farm subsidies as the British
were on the $6 billion annual rebate of their contributions to the EU budget. The EU’s ten
new members3 were watching this latest installment of the time-honored and never
ending battle between “Sweet France” and “perfidious Albion” from the stands, hoping
that they would not go home empty-handed, but generous or perhaps savvy enough to
give up some short-term aid in order to reach an agreement that would benefit them in the
long run, causing more than a little embarrassment among the six founding members of
the EU. As the disappointed Prime Minister of Poland, Marek Belka, said: “Nobody will
be able to say that for Poland, the European Union is just a pile of money” (Sciolino,
“Shame and Anger as EU Budget Talks Collapse”).
Less than a month earlier (on May 12), the German Bundestag (lower house of
Parliament) had overwhelmingly voted to ratify the European Constitution, just before
(on May 22) German voters gave Chancellor Schröder a humiliating thumbs-down in
regional elections in the heartland of North Rhine-Westphalia, the country’s most
populous state, where Social Democrats (SPD) had not lost an election in almost four
decades. The defeat of the Social Democrats was expected; what was not expected was
the German chancellor’s response: feeling that he no longer had a mandate to govern, he
decided to call for a snap election in September, which still, on the eve of the European
Studies Conference in October, have not produced a working German government. This
turn of events is ironic since the Christian Democrats (CDU) (led by East German-born
Angela Merkl) is likely to impose even harsher reforms of the welfare state, which will
further alienate many of the very same voters who rejected Schröder in the first place.
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Obviously, a protest vote usually has limited appeal in the long run because what voters
get is often worse than what they already have: they are not likely to appreciate what the
French call a “horse cure” to jumpstart the German economy, even though the long-term
effects might be beneficial, as was the case in Great Britain, whose GNP recently surged
ahead of France’s. The only political parties that are likely to post long-term gains in
Germany are extremist and populist.
Meanwhile, in the UK, Tony Blair just barely won reelection in May 2005, but he
wisely postponed any discussion of the European Constitution, waiting to see how it sat
with voters in the six founding nations of the EU (France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the
Netherlands, Luxemburg). Now he has publicly called for a “time for reflection”
(Sciolino, “French ‘No’ Vote on Constitution Rattles Europe”) before deciding whether
or not to entrust the fate of the Constitution to British voters. Basically what Blair wants
is more of an emphasis on a free market with no barriers of any kind, and he will use
Britain’s six-month-long presidency of the EU, beginning on July 1, to promote his
scaled-down, back-to-basics Anglophone vision of Europe, which has more in common
with the erstwhile EFTA (European Free Trade Association)4 than it does with the mutant
hegemon in Brussels that we now call the European Union (previously the European
Community [EC] and the European Economic Community [EEC]). Moreover, Blair is
not alone. Most of the Scandinavian countries, as well as a number of former Soviet
satellites, such as Poland and Estonia, share his distrust of political integration and argue
that much still remains to be done to implement full economic integration, which is
absolutely essential if Europe is to be able to compete with China or emerging economic
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powerhouses such as India in the decades to come. If London’s successful bid to host the
2012 Summer Olympics is any indication (London beat out Paris in a down-to-the-wire
competition),5 it is the British vision of Europe that will prevail. All things considered,
this has been an annus horribilis for Chirac and for France. Being awarded the Games
would have provided a welcome distraction for a nation in crisis, done wonders for the
president’s bruised ego, and bolstered the French people’s faith in their nation’s ability
to lead Europe.
Three days after the French referendum, on June 1, Dutch voters also said “nee,” an
even larger majority (61.6%) rejecting the constitution. Clearly, the EU is facing its worst
crisis ever; as the Prime Minister of Luxemburg, Jean-Claude Juncker, the outgoing EU
president, stated: “Europe is not in a crisis. It is in a profound crisis” (Gumbel). However,
as for right now, the long-term outcomes of the French vote are still difficult to gauge.
There may never be another referendum in France (if the EU decides to drop the idea of a
constitution), or it may be postponed indefinitely, or a second referendum may be held in
the near future after a period of reflection. It is too early to tell what will happen.
Although, as of June 1, 2005, ten nations approved the Constitution (Lithuania,
Hungary, Slovenia, Italy, Greece, Slovakia, Germany, Spain, Austria, Luxemburg), it
seems doomed after being rejected by two of the founding nations of the EU. The “yes”
vote by new member states in eastern Europe has less weight, for obvious reasons, since
there is a widespread perception in many quarters that they are motivated above all by
economic self-interest. Actually, in most European nations it is the politicians and not the
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people who ratify the constitution, fueling populist resentment everywhere against such
an undemocratic and elitist notion of a “referendum.” The bottom line is that the Teflon
smart alecks in their fancy suits flying around Europe in business class would do well to
read the history books, in order to remind themselves of what transpired in France in the
summer of 1789. The people presented their grievances in special Cahiers de doléance,
to be brought forward by their representatives to the Estates General at Versailles, but
political leaders did not see the writing on the wall, and before they knew it a revolution
had begun and the Old Regime existed no more. Today, too, the people demand to be
heard, and it would not be wise to pretend that nothing has happened. As Tony Blair
blurted out after meeting with Chirac on June 14, “Let’s be very honest: If there was a
referendum in most parts of Europe at the moment, the answer would be no” (Sciolino,
“For EU Leaders, a Bitter Tussle Over Money”). For the EU to move on, there must be a
prolonged period of consultation with the people and a renewed focus of attention. Is the
EU expanding just for the sake of expanding (as now seems to be the case)? Would it not
be wiser, instead, to focus on measures that would improve the quality of life for
Europeans? Whose organization is this, anyway? To many people the EU has
degenerated into an irresponsible, unwieldy, and even corrupt organization whose main
purpose seems to be to guarantee a comfortable lifestyle for tens of thousands of aloof
and self-important Eurocrats. Perhaps the “no” vote will empower ordinary citizens
everywhere to take charge, which is bad news for Turkey and other nations hoping to
gain admittance in the near future. However, as William Pfaff writes, for the EU to be
able to help others it must first put its own house in order: “the first obligation of any
political society, whether national or multinational, is to itself, its own security, integrity,
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and successful functioning. The European Union has to be a success in order to have a
constructive influence on others, and this is what has seemed in jeopardy” (Pfaff “What’s
Left of the Union?”).
The European constitution must be ratified by all 25 member states, and the
ratification process is supposed to continue until November 2006, if all goes according to
plan, but now everything is up in the air. Government leaders in France and the
Netherlands are mulling their next move, and are likely to ask that the Constitution be
revised before they send it back to the people again in a few years’ time. In the meantime,
the ratification process will most likely be suspended, all the more so since Danish voters
are very likely to vote no as well in September. Tiny but powerful Luxemburg is the only
country that decided to conduct a referendum after the French vote and, not surprisingly,
the constitution carried comfortably by 56.5%. However, not too much ought to be read
into this approval by voters because Luxemburg with its 459,000 inhabitants, has always
been at the vanguard of European integration and, like it or not, clearly is not comparable
to either France or the Netherlands in size, population, GNP, or socioeconomic diversity.
In fact, few European nations have provisions in their constitutions for a referendum
(France is a notable exception in this regard), entrusting monumental decisions to
parliament (which, of course, does not always reflect popular will on a particular issue!).
Governments seldom listen to the people for long, or only long enough for the people to
forget, and then pretend that nothing has happened. The rhetoric coming out of Paris
these days is hardly encouraging from a democratic point of view. After his defeat at the
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polls, Chirac declared with Olympian understatement: “Le vote en France et aux PaysBas traduit des interrogations, de fortes attentes, des préoccupations” [“The vote in
France and in the Netherlands expresses questions, high expectations, preoccupations”],
adding that “dans le respect du message des Français, je m’emploierai dans les semaines
à venir à assurer nos partenaires de l’ancrage de la France dans l’union et de la force de
son ambition européenne” [“as far as the message sent by the French people is concerned,
I will work hard in coming weeks to assure our partners of France’s solid place in the
Union and of the strength of its European ambitions”] (AP). This last statement
completely contradicts the results of the referendum and ignores the fact that it followed
the most intense public debate on the EU ever held in France. Which part of the word
‘no’ did Mr. Chirac not understand? Perhaps he thought that this ‘no’ was ‘no, not now’
and not a ‘no, never.’ For once, ordinary folks had taken the trouble to become informed
about a complex question. Never before had there been an issue that so galvanized public
opinion and encouraged people to familiarize themselves with the facts, dissect the sterile
prose of the constitution, and examine its implications--at town hall meetings, in study
groups, and, of course, in cafés. If the French people voted no, they did so for a reason,
because in the words of the editor of Le Monde, Jean-Marie Colombani, “une majorité
des Français n’a pas, ou n’a plus, envie d’Europe” [“A majority of the French does not
want or no longer wants Europe”] (Colombani, “L’impasse”).
Governments everywhere (and not only in Europe) seem to have a predilection for the
tango: two steps forward, one step back. No “no” is forever. Just look at Québec, where
citizens in the 1990s voted several times not to withdraw from Canada and where
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referendum upon referendum was still held, as though the pro-independence government
did not want to accept the people’s verdict. The same is likely to happen in France, where
the government will submit draft upon draft until it finally gets its way and can
triumphantly announce that the sovereign people have spoken and given their seal of
approval. As the inimitable and perspicacious columnist William Pfaff wrote with his
typical panache, the situation is positively Brechtian. After the East German workers’
revolt against the Communist authorities in 1953, the Communist poet-sage wistfully
remarked that “the times required electing not a new government but a new people”
(Pfaff, “EU’s problem with ‘no’”). However, today it is as though governments around
Europe really did not get the message: voters did not reject Europe as much as what they
perceive to be an open-ended expansion project which eventually would include not only
Turkey but also virtually every other independent and not yet independent state that is a
part of the greater European landmass, and, why not, North Africa and the Middle East,
too. Bulgaria and Romania have already been promised admission in 2007. Albania and
Ukraine would be next in line. Russia has well-known European ambitions. Where do
you draw the line? How many members can fit into the EU before it comes apart at the
seams? Thirty? Thirty-five? After all, the Council of Europe has forty-six members and
contains many of the states just mentioned, including Turkey, Russia, Ukraine, Moldova,
several Balkan countries (which will never be members of the EU so long as they refuse
to surrender war criminals from the former Yugoslavia), and a few of the Caucasian
states. It does not, however, include the Middle East or North Africa since these regions
do not fulfill the rigorous yet controversial definition of Europe provided by the Council
in 1994, according to which a member state’s territory must be “situated in part or in
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whole on the European continent and its culture must be closely linked to European
culture” (Le Monde June 24, 2005).
If the Council of Europe can accommodate such a mishmash of nations, why can’t the
EU do the same? However, the two organizations are fundamentally different. Whereas
the EU strives to promote political, economic and social cooperation and integration, the
Council of Europe, historically, has been more concerned with the “protection of
democracy and the rule of law; the protection of human rights; the promotion of Europe’s
cultural identity and diversity; addressing problems facing European society, including
discrimination, xenophobia, environmental protection, AIDS, drugs and organized crime;
and encouraging democratic stability via reform” (Wikipedia). The impact of the EU on
ordinary people’s lives is far greater, and today ordinary folks everywhere are demanding
a voice about their future. What it all boils down to is that the common man and woman
are rejecting attempts by Brussels to “de-Europeanize” Europe and, at the risk of
appearing politically incorrect, would rather cling to what remains of the odd blend of
Christianity and the Enlightenment that makes up the core of European values, instead of
committing to some half-baked abstract internationalist notion of Europe concocted by
bureaucrats out of touch with and far removed from the electorate they supposedly serve.
At the very least leaders could have done a better job of explaining to the electorate why
Europe needed a constitution and, more specifically, what the 450 million citizens in the
25 member states of the EU stood to gain from it. The perception today in many quarters
is that the EU costs more to run than it is worth.
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European integration has progressed at a rapid rate of late and increasingly has an air
of inevitability about it, so much so that it is hard to imagine that anything short of a fullscale war on the European continent would cause the EU to shelve its plans for full
economic, political, and military integration in accordance with the Maastricht Treaty of
1992, which was ratified by all member states (18 at the time). Nonetheless, the EU is
facing a crisis, the worst in what will soon be its fifty-year history. True, the organization
will not go away anytime soon--existing treaties ensure that it will continue to function
much as before; however, political integration is on hold indefinitely, and negotiations
with aspirant members such as Turkey (the EU agreed in late 2004 to open negotiations
with it in October 2005) are likely to be a prolonged and perhaps inconclusive process.
Part II: Why the French Rejected the European Constitution
Essentially, the “no” vote does not represent a rejection of the 448 articles of the
Constitution, which far from all voters fully understood despite their best efforts since it
is written in virtually impenetrable “bureaucratese,” which various governmentsponsored brochures for public consumption and a slough of other publications did little
to offset. Nor is the “no” vote a rejection of the EU as a whole. Rather, the vote expresses
a heartfelt “no” in extremis to the many implications, real and especially perceived, of the
constitution. The French “no” is a signal to Brussels to slow down, to give member
nations a much needed time-out in order to tend to other, more urgent matters first. In
France, voters are probably more concerned about record-high unemployment (11%), the
likely membership of Muslim Turkey, and the ills of globalization/Americanization than
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they are about the separation of powers among the various branches of the EU (or any of
the other 448 articles of the Constitution), more worried about the erosion of the welfare
state and the gradual elimination of rights and benefits (les acquis sociaux) that took
decades to implement and that are now slowly being dismantled; (just this year, for
instance, the French government decided that Pentecost Monday would no longer be a
public holiday, and it has been nibbling away at the recently instituted 35-hour work
week. However, more than anything else the average voter, on the Left as well as on the
Right, is fed up with the haughty and heavy-handed ways of anonymous Eurocrats in
Brussels who can pontificate on everything from the size of park benches in faraway
Sweden to arcane articles of bureaucratic procedure and yet cannot solve “simple”
problems such as illegal immigration, human trafficking, and drug smuggling.6
Of course, these problems are not all the fault of the EU, but there is a widespread
perception among people everywhere that the EU is somehow responsible for the steady
outsourcing of jobs to low-wage countries and that the EU has been transformed from
what used to be an exclusive circle of highly developed and prosperous nations into a
paupers’ United Nations of Europe that will accept virtually anyone. In Western Europe
in particular (in the Netherlands it was a major reason why the constitution was defeated)
it is widely assumed that certain wealthy countries pay more than their fair share and
therefore have little or nothing to gain from membership. The EU would respond to these
allegations that its main raison d’être is to make Europe more competitive and that more
reform, not less, will be needed to put it on a par with the US and enable it to respond to
the challenges and opportunities of the twenty-first century.
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In a purely French context, the “no” vote, however, could also be construed as a
protest against the growing alienation between the people and the institutions of
government, thus as a desire to reform the constitution undergirding the Fifth Republic, a
constitution that was created by General de Gaulle in 1958 and has been in effect ever
since with few modifications (the most important of which was the election of the
president through a popular vote). Following the referendum the debate in the French
press on a possible Sixth Republic was once again revived (see, for example, Mathieu
Castagnet), and its proponents on both the Left and Right argued for what would amount
to a British-style regime, in which the prime minister would be directly responsible to
parliament and not, as now, to the president, who appoints the government and can
dissolve parliament. When the French people in a referendum in 2000 approved the new
five-year term for the president, they did so thinking that it would increase voter
influence and reduce popular disaffection with the government; but it is unclear how an
executive presidency that has diminished powers can coexist with an executive
government that has increased authority. The dilemma of French politics since the early
1980s has been recurring “cohabitations” when the president and prime minister have
belonged to different sides of the political spectrum (Left, Right), reducing the
effectiveness of both and creating the impression that no one is really in charge.
Brussels has become a modern-day Babel that is better at having its mountains of
documents translated into all the member languages than providing for their constituents
and solving the problems they face in their everyday lives. As one right-wing observer,
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Philippe de Villiers, put it: “On a tous une raison de voter non” [“We all have a reason to
vote no”] (Colombani). Now it is time to gauge the French reaction. As for right now,
official France appears shell-shocked. In the words of Jean-Luc Dehaene, a former
Belgian prime minister and one of the architects of the Constitution: “It is clear that the
French ‘no’ brings Europe to a kind of standstill.… The French are completely without
orientation and in a period of complete uncertainty” (Sciolino, “French ‘No’ Vote on
Constitution Rattles Europe”). For all practical purposes the European Constitution is
dead: no other nation’s vote matters any longer, now that voters in one of the founding
members have rejected it. Ironically, even in defeat, France stands tall, but, granted,
French officialdom would have preferred another outcome on May 29! For now, the
wheels of the EU will grind on, albeit under a cloud of uncertainty.
Part III: The Impact of the French “no” on Global Relations
After looking at some of the implications of the French rejection of the European
Constitution in terms of European construction, let me now consider the impact of the
French “no” with regard to global relations, in particular between the EU and the US.
President Bush must be rubbing his hands with glee since the Europeans appear to be
self-destructing right before his eyes. He must wish that the French vote had come two
years ago as he prepared to launch his war in Iraq and when the threat of a FrancoGerman front against US militarism was still semi-credible. Although most of official
Europe (interestingly, popular opinion everywhere was strongly against the war) stood
behind President Bush at that time (Britain, Italy, Spain, and even Denmark, as well as all
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of the new eastern European NATO and EU members), France and Germany (together
with Russia) apparently commanded sufficient respect to make Bush at least think twice
before giving the go-ahead to launch the assault on Iraq. Today the situation is quite
different. Dominique de Villepin, the outspoken French foreign minister who confronted
Colin Powell at the UN in the spring of 2003, is now the prime minister of France;
however, he is a much diminished, indeed emasculated figure with no experience in
economic matters and must now deal with more mundane problems such as
unemployment, sluggish economic growth, and a falling Euro ($1.23 on June 3). The
dollar has risen 12% against the Euro so far in 2005 (and 7% against the yen), which
suggests that the dollar will once again become the world currency of choice… for better
and worse. On the upside, foreign lenders and investors will find the US more attractive,
so interest rates will remain low. On the downside, American exports will suffer, imports
will increase, and the trade deficit will continue to grow exponentially.
France is emblematic of European woes (low growth, high unemployment, and a
reluctance to restructure in order to become more competitive in world markets), and de
Villepin, who has never held elected office, hardly measures up this time round. The
strapping 6_4_ “silver fox” with dashing looks, French accent, and monogrammed shirts
was a formidable presence in the General Assembly on that memorable day in the spring
of 2003 when he argued forcefully against going to war in Iraq, living proof that de
Gaulle’s dream of France representing a credible “third way” was not dead. But now this
haughty aristocrat is a fish out of water in Paris, out of touch with the electorate. Indeed,
most everyone across the political spectrum in France called his move to Matignon (the
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office and residence of the French prime minister) an insult to the French people. He is
hardly a threat to Washington any longer, even though his appointment must be seen with
suspicion inside the Beltway (if you are Donald Rumsfeld, someone like Dominique de
Villepin still looks, talks, and acts “frog”).
Adding to the general instability in the world is the UN’s unfortunate loss of clout-some would even say relevance--after the American decision to go to war in Iraq despite
the recommendation of the world body to exhaust all peaceful options; its decline has
been so steep that Bush, adding insult to injury, has nominated John Bolton as UN
ambassador. Since the Iraq war began, Secretary-General Kofi Annan has called it
“illegal” (just before the presidential election, in fact, which was hardly a coincidence)
and again has badgered the US about its unwillingness to recognize the International
Criminal Court and to pay its obligatory dues. The inability of the UN to prevent the war
in Iraq, as well as recent charges of misconduct by its peacekeepers abroad, coupled with
graft and corruption that reach all the way up to its highest echelons,7 have seriously
crippled it, making it a prime candidate for radical downsizing. After some hesitation,
Bush has nevertheless decided to continue supporting Kofi Annan (whom the US
installed in 1997), believing that a weak UN better serves American interests. Despite its
failings it is undeniable that the UN has done much good8 and that the world certainly is
better off with an imperfect world body than without it.
It stands to reason that the French “no” to the European constitution has ramifications
well beyond Europe and no doubt will facilitate US hegemonic aspirations, justifying
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American unilateralism, as it were, and even lending it an aura of respectability. Chirac
had hoped that a European Constitution would issue in a multipolar world order in which
Europe (and especially France) would be able to act as a counterbalance to the US and
mediate in global security issues, for example, Iran’s nuclear program. Such an
arrangement would usher in a new Atlantic modus vivendi between rival siblings
separated by an ocean: they would enjoy a feeling of independence and be free to snub
each other from time to time (usually to please a home audience), but would surely come
to each other’s aid if necessary, as they have on numerous occasions in the past.
However, after the “no” vote” in France, Chirac’s multipolar world order is not likely to
come to pass any time soon. Not only is Europe already divided (witness the war in Iraq,
which was supported by most of the EU except France and Germany), but it still lacks a
credible military deterrent and is unwilling to acquire one, since, first, it still is content to
live under the American nuclear umbrella, and, second, believes, rightly or wrongly, that
the so-called “war on terror” is best fought by counterintelligence at home, rather than by
soldiers on the ground in a foreign country.
Seen from the vantage point of the White House, the EU is about as capable of selfgovernance and action as the UN, where France and Germany tried hard to stave off the
American-led war in Iraq. However, to Washington a divided Europe (along with a
divided France) is to be preferred to a united France/Europe that is anti-American.
According to the twisted logic of geopolitics, a divided enemy is the ultimate reward of
Realpolitik, but divided allies rank a close second since such a situation enables the US to
plot its next move on the chessboard of international relations and consolidate its
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dominance over one and all.9 Historically, the US supports a strong and unified Europe,
which contributes to prosperity and stability everywhere, but at the same time it is clear
that Washington “would rather deal with a divided Europe that can be picked off one
nation at a time” (Eizenstaat). Nevertheless, a prosperous and democratic Europe, with or
without a constitution, is in America’s best strategic interest because we share a
commitment to democratic values and human rights. The peaceful transformation of
eastern Europe, which presumably is in our national interest (at least it coincides with the
official rhetoric coming out of Washington these days about the spread of democracy and
national self-determination) never would have been possible without the EU. For most
former Soviet satellites the prospect of one day joining the EU has invariably
strengthened efforts to make a fundamental change from a Soviet-style dictatorship to a
free-market democracy. Thus, once the dust has settled in Brussels, one would hope that
the US would work harder to restore and develop good working relations not only with
the individual nations that make up the EU, exerting an extra effort to make up with
France and Germany, but also with the organization’s executive branches. Europe may
never have a president or foreign minister, but the US should ignore then Secretary of
State Henry Kissinger’s quip that he would not know whom to call if he wanted to call
Europe. Europe is more unified today than it ever was in the past and, to continue the
simile, if Washington wanted to call Europe there would be someone to take the call in
the European Commission and the European Council, the two executive branches of the
EU. Actually, President Bush has already placed such a “call,” because when he visited
Europe in the spring of 2005 he went first to Brussels, where he met not only with several
heads of state (including Chirac and Schröder) but also with the leaders of both the
20
European Council (representing the governments of member states) and the European
Commission (the executive branch of the EU). Regardless of what happens to the
European constitution, a growing working relationship between Washington and the
upper echelons of the EU is bound to develop in the future if for no other reason than that
the EU already has considerable executive power in a wide range of domains. It is easier
to deal with one interlocutor than with 25, even though the diversity represented by so
many member states would seem to preclude a consensus on many important issues and
make bilateral negotiations between the US and the EU difficult and frustrating.
Finally, the emergence of an Anglophone, Eurosceptic, and Atlanticist Europe, led by
Britain and including most of the recent member states in eastern Europe, will be
welcomed by Washington, which has wisely refrained from commenting officially about
the quagmire of the EU constitution. This “new” Europe, which the Bush administration
contrasted with the “old” Europe during the buildup to the Iraq war, no doubt will
become more prominent in the future, but this is not to say that Europe forever will be
divided into a pro-American and an anti-American camp. European sensibilities are
complex, and political allegiances will shift according to the needs of the moment. Spain
backed the Iraq war to begin with but replaced its pro-war prime minister after the
Madrid bombings. The same is likely to occur in recessionary Italy, where the postBerlusconi age looms ever closer and there is absolutely no reason to believe that
conservative Danish Prime Minister Rasmussen will remain in power for long when 90%
of Danes are against the war. A Sarkozy presidency in France presumably will mean that
France, too, will embrace far-reaching structural reform and move toward a more liberal,
21
deregulatory, “Anglophone,” “free-trade-first” Europe. The truth of the matter is that the
European Union is too complex today for there to be anything like a consensus on
important issues of foreign, economic, fiscal, or environmental policy. In the future we
are likely to see more of what we are seeing today: a multi-network Europe, i.e.,
subgroups or short-term alliances between states that share similar interests in one area or
another and cooperate out of self-interest. E pluribus unum still may be the dream of the
six founding members of the EU (a “United States of Europe” certainly was the dream of
many of the visionaries who conceived of a union between European nations after World
War II), but the reality today is another and Ex uno plura has become the inoffical and de
facto motto of Europe. No one is prepared to fight and die for Europe yet, so European
construction has a long way to go before there can be anything that remotely resembles a
European identity. In the meantime we are stuck with European-unionized, globalized
nations that are gradually losing their national characteristics and trying to come to grips
with who they are and what they want from the future.
Conclusion
To conclude, the rejection of the European constitution by French and Dutch voters
will interrupt the ratification process in the short term, possibly leading to the scrapping
of the constitution altogether, produce a stalemate in efforts to rationalize the French
economy (the status quo between modernizers and traditionalists might continue
indefinitely), and, finally, reduce Chirac to a lame duck president, paving the way for the
hyperambitious Nicolas Sarkozy to succeed him. Until now Chirac has harbored plans to
run for reelection once again, in 2007, for a record third term;10 however, this scenario is
22
not likely to happen after the referendum. As noted above, France may also seriously
consider reforming its own constitution, possibly leading to a Sixth Republic. In addition
to growing economic and political uncertainty at home, France is facing the inevitable
decline of French as a world language, which is a real blow to its pride. Since the end of
its colonial empire (which, just like the EU, served national prestige as much as or more
than economic gain) France has clung to the illusion that French still was a world
language. Today French has lost ground to English, which is the new lingua franca of the
international community. Not only has the study of French declined worldwide (including
in the former French empire), but today meetings of the European Council in Brussels are
typically held in English and only one-third of all official documents are now translated
into French (McGuire). In the long term, continued integration and, of course, indefinite
expansion of the EU will become more difficult, not to say controversial. It is unlikely,
for example, that France will continue to support Turkey’s bid for membership. Most
important, it can only be hoped that governments everywhere will listen to and address
voters’ concerns and take this opportunity to step back and reflect on the future identity
of Europe.
Globally, the rejection of the constitution in France and the Netherlands, as well as the
growing hostility not only to the constitution but also to European integration, period, is
likely to lead to a weakened Europe in the short term. However, I predict that the EU will
emerge from this crisis both more focused and just as effective as it is today, albeit less
ambitious. No doubt there will never be a “United States of Europe.” Rather, what we
will see is a multifaceted, multiple-track Europe concerned mainly with economic
23
integration but open to political, fiscal, judicial, environmental, and educational
integration for those member states that desire it.
Notes
1
This was the 10th referendum in the 47-year history of the Fifth Republic and only the second time that
voters rejected a proposal by the President of the Republic. In 1969 de Gaulle resigned after losing a
referendum on a plan to reform the Senate.
2
The Bush government has given its imprimatur to Sarkozy. Witness this accolade by the American
ambassador to Paris coming just three months after de Villepin’s remarkable speech in the UN: “Vous êtes
le ministre le plus efficace et le plus populaire depuis Fouchet” (Philippe Ridet, “Nicolas et Dominique”).
3
The EU went from 15 to 25 members in 2004 when Cyprus (the Greek part), the Czech Republic, Estonia,
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia joined.
4
EFTA was founded in 1960 by Austria, Denmark, Britain, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, and Switzerland to
offset the formation of the EU. Britain, which of course was not allowed to join the EEC (the predecessor
of the EU) as long as de Gaulle was in power, spearheaded EFTA but has since joined the EU, as have all
the other EFTA nations except for Norway and Switzerland.
5
However, if the terror attack against public transport in London had happened just one day earlier, there
is every reason to believe that London would not have been awarded the Games.
6
For an in-depth discussion of social issues in contemporary France, see Kokoreff and Rodriguez.
7
“Kofigate” is growing in magnitude as I write. Although Kofi Annan in all likelihood has not profited
himself, it now appears that he lied about his contacts with the besieged consulting firm Cotecna, which
oversaw the UN’s “oil-for-food” program with Iraq and siphoned off $10-$15 billion in bribes and kickbacks to various individuals around the world, including the Deputy Secretary-General of the UN, Benon
Sevan.
8
Yet the United Nations also can claim “many real accomplishments: decolonization, elimination of
apartheid, peacekeeping missions, behind-the-scenes peacemaking, the development and extension of the
rule of law, the promotion of the norms of human rights, gender empowerment, assistance to refugees, and
collective action for such common problems as resource depletion and environmental degradation. On
balance, the world has been a better and less bloodier place with the United Nations’ help” (Thakur).
9
For a good discussion of the French referendum’s impact on Franco-American relations, see Eizenstaat.
10
According to the French constitution, no one may run for reelection more than once; however, since the
term limit was changed (also by referendum) from seven years to five in 2000. Chirac may run again since
technically speaking his third term would only be his second five-year term.
24
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