IINTERNATIONAL RELATIONS READING LIST FOR COMPREHENSIVE EXAMS

IINTERNATIONAL RELATIONS READING LIST FOR COMPREHENSIVE
EXAMS
Department of Political Science, University of California – Santa Barbara
Version Updated 2014
This reading list is intended for political science graduate students who are preparing to take
the PhD qualifying exam in International Relations. This list includes the minimum
recommended reading for each part of the exam. Students are expected to be familiar
with additional readings beyond this core set.
PART I: GENERAL INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY
THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO IR
Anthology
• Carlsnaes, Walter, Thomas Risse, and Beth A. Simmons, eds. Handbook of international
relations. Sage, 2002.
Realism
• Morgenthau, Hans. Politics Among Nations: The struggle for power and peace. New York:
Alfred Knopf, 1948. (Also Liberalism)
• Waltz, Kenneth N. Theory of International Politics. NY: McGraw Hill, 1979.
• Jervis, Robert. Perception and misperception in international politics. Princeton University
Press, 1976.
• Cederman, Lars-Erik. Emergent actors in world politics: how states and nations develop and
dissolve. Princeton University Press, 1997.
Liberalism
• Doyle, Michael W. "Liberalism and world politics." APSR 80, no. 4 (1986): 1151.
• Moravcsik, Andrew. "Taking preferences seriously: A liberal theory of international
politics." IO 51, no. 04 (1997): 513-553.
• Adler, Emanuel, and Michael Barnett, eds. Security Communities. Cambridge University
Press, 1998.
English School
• Bull, Hedley. The anarchical society: a study of order in world politics. Columbia University
Press, 2002.
Constructivism
• Wendt, Alexander. Social theory of international politics. Cambridge University Press,
1999. (or Wendt, Alexander. "Anarchy is what states make of it: the social
construction of power politics." IO 46, no. 02 (1992): 391-425.)
• Hopf, Ted. "The promise of constructivism in international relations theory." IS 23,
no. 1 (1998): 171-200.
Strategic Choice
• Lake, David A. and Robert Powell, eds., Strategic Choice and International Relations.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999.
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Levy, Jack S. "Prospect theory, rational choice, and international relations."
International Studies Quarterly 41, no. 1 (1997): 87-112.
Critiques
• Feaver, Peter D., Gunther Hellmann, Randall L. Schweller, Jeffrey W. Taliaferro,
William C. Wohlforth, Jeffrey W. Legro, and Andrew Moravcsik. "Brother, can you
spare a paradigm?(Or was anybody ever a realist?)." IS 25, no. 1 (2000): 165.
• Lake, David A. “Theory is Dead, Long Live Theory: The End of the Great Debates
and the Rise of Eclecticism in International Relations,” EJIR 19, 3 (2013), pp.567587.
• Ayoob, Mohammed. The Third World security predicament: state making, regional conflict, and
the international system. L. Rienner Publishers, 1995.
• Tickner, J. Ann. Gender in international relations: Feminist perspectives on achieving global
security. Columbia University Press, 1992.
• Wœver, Ole. “The Sociology of a Not So International Discipline: American and
European Developments in International Relations,” IO 52, 4 (1998), pp.687-727.
INTERNATIONAL ORDER
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March, James G., and Johan P. Olsen. "The institutional dynamics of international
political orders." IO 52, no. 04 (1998): 943-969.
Lake, David A. Hierarchy in International Relations. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 2009.
Ikenberry, G. John. After victory: Institutions, strategic restraint, and the rebuilding of order
after major wars. Princeton University Press, 2009.
Krasner, Stephen D. Sovereignty: organized hypocrisy. Princeton University Press, 1999.
Cooley, Alexander and Hendrik Spruyt. Contracting states: Sovereign transfers in
international relations. Princeton University Press, 2009.
REGIMES AND INSTITUTIONS
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Keohane, Robert O., and Lisa L. Martin. "The promise of institutionalist theory." IS
20, no. 1 (1995): 39-51.
Martin, Lisa L., and Beth A. Simmons, eds. International Institutions: An IO reader. MIT
Press, 2001.
Mearsheimer, John "The false promise of international institutions." IS (1994): 5.
Busch, Marc L. "Overlapping institutions, forum shopping, and dispute settlement in
international trade." IO 61, no. 04 (2007): 735-761.
Davis, Christina L. Food fights over free trade: how international institutions promote agricultural
trade liberalization. Princeton University Press, 2003.
Haas, Ernst B. Beyond the nation state: Functionalism and IO. ECPR Press, 2008.
COOPERATION
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James Fearon, “Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation,” IO, 52, 2
(1998), pp.269-305.
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Downs, George W., David M. Rocke, and Peter N. Barsoom. "Is the good news
about compliance good news about cooperation?." IO 50, no. 03 (1996): 379-406. (In
Martin and Simmons, 2001)
Jervis, Robert. "Cooperation under the security dilemma." World Politics 30, no. 02
(1978): 167-214.
Martin, Lisa L. Coercive cooperation: Explaining multilateral economic sanctions. Princeton
University Press, 1993.
Oye, Kenneth A.Cooperation under anarchy. Princeton University Press, 1986.
NORMS, IDEAS, AND IDENTITY
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Keck, Margaret and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 1998).
Philpott, Daniel. Revolutions in sovereignty: How ideas shaped modern international relations.
Princeton University Press, 2001.
Finnemore, Martha. National interests in international society. Cornell University
Press,1996.
Mueller, John E. Retreat from doomsday: The obsolescence of major war. New York: Basic
Books, 1989.
Klotz, Audie. "Norms reconstituting interests: global racial equality and US sanctions
against South Africa." IO 49, no. 03 (1995): 451-478.
Hymans, Jacques. "The changing color of money: European currency iconography
and collective identity." EJIR 10, no. 1 (2004): 5-31.
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS
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Bass, Gary. Stay the Hand of Vengence: the politics of war crimes tribunals. Princeton
University Press, 2000.
Abbott, Kenneth W. and Duncan Snidal. "Hard and soft law in international
governance." IO 54, no. 03 (2000): 421-456.
Goldsmith, Jack L., and Eric A. Posner. The limits of international law. Vol. 199. New
York: Oxford University Press, 2005.
Franck, Thomas M., Fairness in international law and institutions. Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1995.
Koh, Harold Hongju. "Why do nations obey international law?." (1997): 2599.
Human Rights
Simmons, Beth A. Mobilizing for human rights: international law in domestic politics.
Cambridge University Press, 2009.
Hafner-Burton, Emilie. Making human rights a reality. Princeton University Press, 2013.
Conrad, Courtenay Ryals, and Will H. Moore. "What stops the torture?."American
Journal of Political Science 54, no. 2 (2010): 459-476.
Fariss, Christopher J. "Respect for Human Rights has Improved Over Time:
Modeling the Changing Standard of Accountability." APSR (2014): 1-22.
VII. States, Groups and Individuals (Second and First Image)
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Individuals
• Institute of international studies (Berkeley, Calif.). Structure of decision: The cognitive maps
of political elites. Edited by Robert M. Axelrod. Vol. 404. Princeton University Press,
1976.
• Byman, Daniel L., and Kenneth M. Pollack. "Let us now praise great men: bringing
the statesman back in." IS 25, no. 4 (2001): 107-146.
•
Hudson, Valerie M. "Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor‐Specific Theory and the Ground
of International Relations." Foreign Policy Analysis 1, no. 1 (2005): 1-30.
States/Groups
• Tajfel, Henri, and John C. Turner. "An integrative theory of intergroup conflict." The
social psychology of intergroup relations 33, no. 47 (1979): 74.
• Putnam, Robert D. "Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games."
IO 42, no. 03 (1988): 427-460.
• Gourevitch, Peter. "The second image reversed: the international sources of
domestic politics." IO 32, no. 04 (1978): 881-912.
• Stephan, Maria J., and Erica Chenoweth. "Why civil resistance works: The strategic
logic of nonviolent conflict." IS 33, no. 1 (2008): 7-44.
METHODOLOGICAL APPROACHES AND CRITIQUES IN IR
Approaches
• King, Gary, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba. Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific
Interference in Qualitative Research. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994.
• Bennett, Andrew and Alexander George. Case Studies and Theory Development in the
Social Sciences. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2005.
• Lave, Charles A. and James G. March. An introduction to models in the social sciences.
University Press of America, 1993.
• Findley, Michael G., Daniel L. Nielson, and J.C. Sharman, “Using Field Experiments
in International Relations: A Randomized Study of Anonymous Incorporation,” IO
67, 4 (2013), pp.657-693.
• Goldgeier, James M. and Philip E. Tetlock. "Psychology and international relations
theory." Annual Review of Political Science 4, no. 1 (2001): 67-92.
• Mahoney, James and Gary Goertz. "A tale of two cultures: Contrasting quantitative
and qualitative research." Political Analysis 14, no. 3 (2006): 227.
• Bernstein, Steven, Richard Ned Lebow, Janice Gross Stein, and Steven Weber. "God
gave physics the easy problems: adapting social science to an unpredictable world."
EJIR 6, no. 1 (2000): 43-76.
Rationality
• Popper, Karl Raimund. "Of clouds and clocks: an approach to the problem of
rationality and the freedom of man." Thinking Clearly about Psychology: Essays on Matters
of Public Interest 1 (1991): 100.
• Simon, Herbert Alexander. Models of bounded rationality: Empirically grounded economic
reason. Vol. 3. MIT press, 1982.
• Kahler, Miles. "Rationality in international relations." IO 52, no. 04 (1998): 919.
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Milner, Helen V. "Rationalizing politics: The emerging synthesis of international,
American, and comparative politics." IO 52, no. 04 (1998): 759-786.
History/Small N
• Trachtenberg, Marc. History and strategy. Princeton University Press, 1991.
• Bennett, Andrew, and Colin Elman. "Complex causal relations and case study
methods: the example of path dependence." Political Analysis 14, no. 3 (2006): 250267.
• Gaddis, John Lewis. "International relations theory and the end of the Cold War." IS
(1992): 5-58.
Internal/External Validity
• David Singer, J. "The level-of-analysis problem in international relations." World
Politics 14, no. 01 (1961): 77-92.
• Henrich, Joseph, Steven J. Heine, and Ara Norenzayan. "The weirdest people in the
world?." Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33, no. 2-3 (2010): 61-83.
• Walt, Stephen M. "Rigor or rigor mortis? Rational choice and security studies." IS 23,
no. 4 (1999): 5-48.
• Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and James D. Morrow, “Sorting Through the Wealth of
Notions,” IS 24 (1999): 56-73.
Econometrics
• Guido Imbens and Jeffrey Woolridge, “Recent Developments in the Econometrics
of Program Evaluation,” Journal of Economic Literature 47 (2009): 5-86.
• Joshua Angrist. Mostly Harmless Econometrics: An Empiricist’s Companion
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), Chps 1-3.
PART II: INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY
GENERAL SURVEYS / ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES
Benjamin J. Cohen (2008), International Political Economy: An Intellectual History.
Benjamin J. Cohen (2014), Advanced Introduction to International Political Economy.
David Lake (2009), “Open Economy Politics: A Critical Review,” Review of
International Organizations 4:3, 219-244.
Thomas Oatley (2011), “The Reductionist Gamble: Open Economy Politics in the
Global Economy,” International Organization 65:2, 311-341.
Nicola Phillips and Catherine E. Weaver, eds. (2011), International Political
Economy: Debating the Past, Present and Future.
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CLASSICS
David A. Baldwin (1985), Economic Statecraft.
Robert Gilpin, Global Political Economy (2001). [This is an updated version of Gilpin,
The Political Economy of International Relations, 1987.]
Albert O. Hirschman (1945/1969), National Power and the Structure of Foreign
Trade.
Peter J. Katzenstein (1977), Between Power and Plenty.
Robert O. Keohane (1984), After Hegemony.
Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence, fourth edition
(2012). [This is an updated version of the classic book originally published in 1977,
with some new material on globalization.]
Charles P. Kindleberger (1973), The World in Depression, 1929-1939.
Susan Strange (1994), States and Markets, second edition. [Originally published in
1988.]
ANTHOLOGIES
Benjamin J. Cohen, ed. (2005), International Political Economy.
Benjamin J. Cohen (2011), International Political Economy, four volumes.
John Ravenhill, ed. (2014), Global Political Economy, fourth edition.
Richard Stubbs and Geoffrey R. D. Underhill, eds. (2006), Political Economy and the
Changing Global Order, third edition.
ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE
Claire Cutler et al., eds. (1999), Private Authority and International Affairs.
Judith L. Goldstein et al., eds. (2001), Legalization and World Politics.
Stephen D. Krasner (1983), International Regimes.
Barbara Koremenos et al., eds. (2004), The Rational Design of International
Institutions.
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Joseph Jupille et al. (2013), Institutional Choice and Global Commerce.
David A. Lake (1993), “Leadership, Hegemony, and the International Economy:
Naked Emperor or Tattered Monarch with Potential?” International Studies
Quarterly 37:4, 459-489.
INTERNATIONAL MONEY AND FINANCE
David Andrews, ed. (2006), International Monetary Power.
J. Lawrence Broz and Jeffry A. Frieden (2001), “The Political Economy of
International Monetary Relations,” Annual Review of Political Science 4, 317-343.
Benjamin J. Cohen (1998), The Geography of Money.
Benjamin J. Cohen (2004), The Future of Money.
Jeffry A. Frieden (2014), Currency Politics: The Political Economy of Exchange Rate
Policy.
Jonathan Kirshner (1995), Currency and Coercion.
INTERNATIONAL TRADE
Dale E. Copeland (2015), Economic Interdependence and War.
Joanne Gowa (1994), Allies, Adversaries, and International Trade.
Michael J. Hiscox (2002), International Trade and Political Conflict.
Mary Anne Madeira (2014), “The New Politics of the New Trade: The Political
Economy of Intra-Industry Trade,” in David A. Deese, ed., Handbook of the
International Political Economy of Trade.
Helen V. Milner (2014), “International Trade,” in Walter Carlsnaes et al., eds.,
Handbook of International Relations, second edition.
Ronald Rogowski (1989), Commerce and Coalitions.
GLOBALIZATION
Emilie Hafner-Burton et al. (2009), “Network Analysis for International Relations,”
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International Organization 63:3, 559-592.
Paul Hirst et al. (2009), Globalization in Question, third edition, 1-21.
Miles Kahler and David A. Lake, eds. (2003), Governance in a Global Economy.
Peter Katzenstein (2005), A World of Regions.
B. Simmons et al. (2006), “Introduction: The International Diffusion of Liberalism,”
International Organization 60, 781-810.
Susan Strange (1996), The Retreat of the State.
PART III: INTERNATIONAL SECURITY/FOREIGN POLICY
WHY DO WARS HAPPEN?
1. Structural Theories of War
a. Kenneth N. Waltz. Man, the State, and War (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1959).
b. Siverson, Randolph M., and Michael P. Sullivan. 1983. “The Distribution of
Power and the Onset of War.” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 27(3): 473–94.
c. Doran, Charles F., and Wes Parsons. 1980. “War and the Cycle of Relative
Power.” The American Political Science Review, 74(4):947–65.
d. Beck, Nathaniel. 1991. “The Illusion of Cycles in International Relations.”
International Studies Quarterly, 35(4): 455–76.
e. Powell, Robert. 1996. “Stability and the Distribution of Power.” World
Politics, 48(2): 239–67.
2. Behavioral Theories of War and Peace
a. Bennett, D. Scott, and Allan C. Stam. 2004. The Behavioral Origins of War. Ann
Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
(Chapters 4 and 5,
b. Siverson, Randolph M., and Harvey Starr. 1990. “Opportunity, Willingness,
and the Diffusion of War.” American Political Science Review, 84(1).
c. Gartzke, Erik, and Michael W. Simon. 1999. “‘Hot Hand’: A Critical Analysis
of Enduring Rivalries.” Journal of Politics, 61(3): 777–798.
3. Bargaining Theories of Crisis, War, and Peace
a. Geoffrey Blainey, The Causes of War, 3rd ed. (New York: Free Press, 1988
b. James Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for War,” International Organization
49:3 (Summer 1995): 379-414.
c. Robert Powell, The Shadow of Power (Princeton University Press, 1999),
d. Gartzke, Erik. 1999. “War Is in the Error Term.” International Organization,
53(3): 567– 587.
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e. Slantchev, Branislav L. 2002. “The Principle of Convergence in Wartime
Negotiations.” American Political Science Review, 47(4): 621–632
F. Robert Powell (2004), “The Inefficient Use of Power: Costly Conflict with
Complete Information,” American Political Science Review 98(2): 231-241
DIPLOMACY AND SIGNALLING IN CRISIS BARGAINING
1. Costly Signaling and Audience Costs
a. Schelling, Thomas C. 1966. Arms and Influence. New Haven: Yale Press.
b. James Fearon, "Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands versus
Sinking Costs," Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 41, February 1997
c. James Fearon, "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of
International Disputes," APSR, vol. 88, September 1994, pp. 577-592.
d. Jack Snyder and Erica Borghard, “The Cost of Empty Threats: A Penny, not
a Pound,” APSR, vol. 105, August 2011, pp. 437-56.
2. Conventional and Nuclear Deterrence
a. Huth, Paul, and Bruce M. Russett. 1984. “What Makes Deterrence Work?
Cases from 1900 to 1980.” World Politics, 36(4): 496–526
b. Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate
Renewed, 2nd ed. (New York: Norton, 2003).
C. Powell, Robert. 1990. Nuclear Deterrence Theory: The Search for Credibility.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
ALLIANCES: PUBLIC GOODS, BURDEN SHARING, AND SECURITY
a. Stephen M. Walt, "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power,"
International Security, Vol. 9, No. 4 (Spring, 1985), pp. 3-43
b. Morrow, James D. 1991. “Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the
Capability Aggregation Model of Alliances.” AJPS, 35(4): 904–933.
c. Leeds, Brett Ashley. 2003. “Alliance Reliability in Times of War: Explaining
State Decisions to Violate Treaties.” International Organization, 57(4): 801–827.
d. Gartzke, Erik and Kristian S. Gleditsch. 2004. “Why Democracies May
Actually Be Less Reliable Allies.” American Journal of Political Science, 48(4)
E. Brett Ashley Leeds, "Do Alliances Deter Aggression? The Influence of
Military Alliances on the Initiation of Militarized Disputes," American Journal
of Political Science, Vol. 47, No. 3 (Jul., 2003), pp. 427-439
DOMESTIC POLITICS AND INTERSTATE WAR
1. Democratic Peace
a. Kenneth A. Schulz. Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2001).
b. Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, James D. Morrow, Randolph M. Siverson, and
Alastair Smith. 1999. “An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic
Peace.” American Political Science Review 93 (December): 791–807
c. David A. Lake, “Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War,” APSR 86/1
(March 1992): 24-37.
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2. Skeptics
a. Sebastian Rosato, “The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory,”
American Political Science Review 97 (2003): 585-602.
b. David Kinsella, “No Rest for the Democratic Peace,” APSR (2005): 453-457.
NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
a. Scott D. Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in
Search of a Bomb,” IS 21/3 (Winter 1996/97): 54-86.
b. Todd Sechser and Matthew Fuhrmann, “Crisis Bargaining and Nuclear Blackmail,” International Organization 67 (2013): 173-195.
c. Gartzke, E., & Jo, D. J. 2009. Bargaining, nuclear proliferation, and interstate
disputes. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 53(2), 209-233.
d. Christopher Way and Jessica Weeks, “Making it Personal: Regime Type and
Nuclear Proliferation,” AJPS, 2014.
e. Matthew Kroenig, “Exporting the Bomb: Why States Provide Sensitive Nuclear Assistance,” American Political Science Review 103 (2009): 113-132.
TERRORISM AND NON-STATE THREATS
1. Strategic Purposes
a. Andrew Kydd and Barbara F. Walter. 2002. “Sabotaging the Peace: The
Politics of Extremist Violence.” International Organization 56 (2): 263-296.
b. Andrew Kydd and Barbara F. Walter. 2006. “The Strategies of Terrorism.”
International Security 31 (1): 49-79.
c. Robert Pape. Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (NewYork: Random House, 2005) or Robert Pape, “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism,” American Political Science Review 97:3 (August 2003): 343-361.
2. Organizing Terror
a. Eli Berman. 2009. Radical, Religious, and Violent: The New Economics of Terrorism
(MIT Press)
b. Bueno de Mesquita, Ethan. 2005. "The Quality of Terror". American Journal of
Political Science 49: 515-530.
c. Jeremy Weinstein. 2006. Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press)
3. Motivation of Terrorists?
a. Alan Krueger. 2008. What Makes a Terrorist: The Economics and Roots of Terrorism
(Princeton University Press)
b. Jeff Victoroff. 2005. “The Mind of A Terrorist: A Review and Critique of
Psychological Approaches.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 49 (1): 3-42.
CIVIL WAR, NON-STATE THREATS, AND COUNTERINSURGENCY
1. Causes of Civil War
a. Lake, David. “International Relations Theory and Internal Conflict: Insights
from the Interstices”. International Studies Review 5, 4 (December 2003): 81-89.
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2.
3.
4.
5.
b. James Fearon and David Laitin. 2003. “Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War.”
American Political Science Review 97 (1): 75-90.
c. Edward Miguel, Shanker Satyanath, and Ernest Sergenti. 2004. “Economic
Shocks and Civil Conflict: An Instrumental Variables Approach,” Journal of
Political Economy 112: 725-753.
Duration and Consequences of Civil War
a. James D. Fearon. 2004. “Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer
Than Others?” Journal of Peace Research 41 (3): 275-302.
b. Cunningham, D. E. (2006). Veto players and civil war duration. American
Journal of Political Science, 50(4), 875-892.
c. Suzanne Werner and Amy Yuen, “Making and Keeping Peace,” IO (2005)
Settling Civil Wars
a. Virginia Page Fortna. 2003. “Scraps of Paper? Agreements and the Durability
of Peace,” International Organization 57 (2): 337-372.
b. Virginia Page Fortna, Peace Time: Cease-Fire Agreements and the Durability of Peace (Princeton,
2004).
Why People Fight?
a. Ted Robert Gurr. Why Men Rebel (1971)
b. Macartan Humphreys and Jeremy Weinstein. 2008. “Who Fights? The
Determinants of Participation in Civil War,” AJPS 52 (2): 436-455.
Policies to Combat Non-State threats: Counterterrorism and COIN
a. Lyall, J. (2010). Are coethnics more effective counterinsurgents? Evidence
from the Second Chechen War. American Political Science Review, 104(1), 1-20.
b. Berman, E., Shapiro, J. N., & Felter, J. H. (2011). Can hearts and minds be
bought? The economics of counterinsurgency in Iraq. Journal of Political
Economy, 119(4), 766-819.
FOREIGN POLICY AND SECURITY
1. Public Opinion, Casualties, and the Use of Force
a. Christopher Gelpi, Peter D. Feaver, and Jason Reifler, Paying the Human Costs of
War: American Public Opinion and Casualties in Military Conflicts (Princeton, 2008).
b. Adam J. Berinsky, “Assuming the Costs of War: Events, Elites, and American
Public Support for Military Conflict,” JOP 69/4 (November 2007): 975-97.
c. Peter D. Feaver and Christopher Gelpi, Choosing Your Battles: American Civil-Military
Relations and the Use of Force (Princeton, 2004).
d. Scott Sigmund Gartner and Gary M. Segura, “War, Casualties, and Public
Opinion,” JCR 42/3 (June 1998): 278-300.
e. John E. Mueller, War, Presidents, and Public Opinion (New York: Wiley, 1973).
2. Leaders, Decision-making, and War
a. Rose McDermott, Presidential Leadership, Illness, and Decision-Making (Cambridge, 2008).
b. Michael Horowitz, Rose McDermott, and Allan C. Stam, “Leader Age, Regime
Type, and Violent International Relations,” JCR 49/5 (October 2005): 661-85.
c. Dominic D. P. Johnson, Overconfidence and War: The Havoc and Glory of Positive Illusions
(Harvard, 2004).
d. Jack S. Levy, “Misperception and the Causes of War: Theoretical Linkages and
Analytical Problems,” WP 36/1 (October 1983): 76-99.
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