Core-periphery relations in the European migration control

Core-periphery relations in the
European migration control system
Ferruccio Pastore (CeSPI, Rome)
IMISCOE Conference on:
“(Irregular) Transit Migration in the European
space: Theory, Politics, and Research
Methodology”
18-20 April 2008 (Koç University, Istanbul)
The European migration control system
and the politics of transit migration
• Migration controls as increasingly central attribute of
sovereignty
• BUT failure of migratory unilateralism
• Internationalization of migration controls as global trend
(although in different forms)
• Studied mainly from the point of view of political theory
(externalisation/outsourcing/privatisation literature) and human
rights – Less international relations
• Expanding European migration control system (EMCS) as a
case study, not one among many, but most structured migration
control system worldwide
• Analyse the development of the EMCS focusing on coreperiphery relations. Diachronic approach (different stages)
Cores and peripheries in European
history, always shifting…
…and always contentious!
The quiet core of the contemporary
European migration control system
Apach (France)
Schengen (Lux.)
Perl (Germany))
1995-2008: the third (and less glamorous)
European enlargement (beside EU and €)
STAGE I: The making of the core of EMCS
► Until 1973-4: Only formal
Controls
►1973-1985: Unilateral and
competitive closure
►1985: Schengen agreement
►1990: Implementing
Convention
►1995: Entry into force in the
green core
►Italy, Austria, Greece as
red “transit belt”
STAGE II: The Southern enlargement of the core
► 1997-8: Full integration of
Austria and Italy
►2000: Greece is also
admitted as part of the core
►Eastern Europe
emerges as “transit
belt”
►Western Balkans,
Turkey and North Africa
still perceived
more as sources
STAGE III: The Northern and Eastern enlargements
► 2001: Scandinavian
enlargement (limited impact
on irregular migration patterns)
►2004: EU-10 accession
►2007: EU-2 accession
►2007: Schengen Eastern
enlargement (EU-10 but
Cyprus)
►Western Balkans, former
CIS, Turkey, N. Africa, etc.
in “transit belt” (transit boom)
►2005 Ceuta and Melilla;
2006 Lampedusa and
Canarias: focus on
Sub-Saharan A. as source
STAGE IV: The Transit Belt expands further South
►July 2006: Rabat EU-Africa
conference on M&D
►November 2006: Tripoli
EU-AU+ Conference on M&D
►December 2007: Lisbon
Africa-EU Summit
►Migration Great Game
enlarges to whole Africa:
New “candidates” as “transit
countries” (i.e. privileged control
partners): Senegal, Niger
►When transit countries are
failed states, intervention not
ruled out (Chad)
Political lessons and policy implications
European integration successful in expanding sphere
of freedom of circulation
Now this expansive phase seems to be almost over,
but for
•Western Balkans visa facilitation and accession
•other visa facilitation negotiations (Russia)
•Turkish path to accession (?)
•freedom of circulation within ENP soon dropped
For all the others, the only chance is to access the
Transit Belt and be picked up as privileged control
partner
Costs/benefits of becoming “transit country”
COSTS
Altering priorities: Neglecting
immigration (Libya) or emigration
(Morocco) internally destabilising
BENEFITS
EU and bilateral money for
migration control (often
dual use)
Worsening of political/economic
relations with poorer neighbours
More bargaining power in
negotiations about own
emigration (e.g. quotas)
Worsening of human rights record 
loss of international popularity
Overall gain in strategic
relevance (paradox:
irregular flows as asset)
More funds  reinforcement of
security sector within administration
 political regression