Ius cogens

Ius cogens
Art. 53 Convenzione di Vienna 1969
• Articolo 53
Trattati in conflitto con una norma imperativa del diritto internazionale
generale (ius cogens)
E’ nullo qualsiasi trattato che, al momento della sua
conclusione, è in conflitto con una norma imperativa del
diritto internazionale generale.
Art. 53
Ai fini della presente Convenzione, una norma
imperativa del diritto internazionale generale è una
norma accettata e riconosciuta dalla comunità
internazionale degli Stati nel suo complesso come
norma alla quale non è consentita alcuna deroga e che
può essere modificata soltanto da un'altra norma del
diritto internazionale generale avente lo stesso
carattere.
Risoluzione Assemblea Generale 34/65 B
del 29 novembre 1979
Question of Palestine
Accordi di pace di Camp David tra Israele,
Egitto e USA
Obblighi erga omnes
CIG caso Barcelona Traction (1970), par. 33:
….In particular, an essential distinction should be drawn
between the obligations of a State towards the international
community as a whole, and those arising vis-à-vis another
State in the field of diplomatic protection. By their very
nature the former are the concern of all States. In view of the
importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to
have a legal interest in their protection; they are obligations
erga omnes.
Segue…
Par. 34:
Such obligations derive, for example, in contemporary international
law, from the outlawing of acts of aggression, and of genocide, as also
from the principles and rules concerning the basic rights of the human
person, including protection from slavery and racial discrimination.
Some of the corresponding rights of protection have entered into the
body of general international law (Reservations to the Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Advisory
Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 23); others are conferred by
international instruments of a universal or quasi-universal character.
Risoluzione IDI Cracovia 2005
Definizione di obblighi erga omnes:
(a) an obligation under general international law that a State owes in
any given case to the international community, in view of its
common values and its concern for compliance, so that a breach of
that obligation enables all States to take action; or
(b) an obligation under a multilateral treaty that a State party to the
treaty owes in any given case to all the other States parties to the
same treaty, in view of their common values and concern for
compliance, so that a breach of that obligation enables all these
States to take action.
Congo c. Ruanda 2006, par. 64 (decisione
sulla giurisdizione)
The Court will begin by reaffirming that “the principles underlying
the [Genocide] Convention are principles which are recognized by
civilized nations as binding on States, even without any conventional
obligation” and that a consequence of that conception is “the universal
character both of the condemnation of genocide and of the cooperation required ‘in order to liberate mankind from such an odious
scourge’ (Preamble to the Convention)” (Reservations to the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 23).
Segue…
The mere fact that rights and obligations erga omnes may be
at issue in a dispute would not give the Court jurisdiction to
entertain that dispute. The same applies to the relationship
between peremptory norms of general international law (jus
cogens) and the establishment of the Court’s jurisdiction : the
fact that a dispute relates to compliance with a norm having
such a character, which is assuredly the case with regard to
the prohibition of genocide, cannot of itself provide a basis
for the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain that dispute.
CEDU-caso Al Adsani c. Regno Unito (2001)
61. While the Court accepts, on the basis of these authorities, that the
prohibition of torture has achieved the status of a peremptory norm
in international law (…)
… Notwithstanding the special character of the prohibition of torture in
international law, the Court is unable to discern in the international
instruments, judicial authorities or other materials before it any firm
basis for concluding that, as a matter of international law, a State no
longer enjoys immunity from civil suit in the courts of another State
where acts of torture are alleged.
Corte di Cassazione, sezioni unite n. 5044/04,
11.03.2004 (caso Ferrini)
È ricorrente l’affermazione che i crimini internazionali «minacciano l’umanità
intera e minano le fondamenta stesse della coesistenza internazionale…. Si
tratta, infatti, di delitti che si concretano nella violazione, particolarmente
grave per intensità o sistematicità (arg. ex articolo 40, secondo comma, del
Progetto sulla responsabilità internazionale degli Stati, adottato nell’agosto
del 2001 dalla Commissione di diritto internazionale dell’ONU), dei diritti
fondamentali della persona umana, la cui tutela è affidata a norme
inderogabili che si collocano al vertice dell’ordinamento internazionale,
prevalendo su ogni altra norma, sia di carattere convenzionale che
consuetudinario (Tribunale penale per la ex Jugoslavia, 10 dicembre 1998,
Furunduzija, 153-155; 14 gennaio 2000, Kupreskic, 520; Corte europea dei
diritti dell’uomo, 21 novembre 2001, Al-Adsani c. Regno Unito, 61) e, quindi,
anche su quelle in tema di immunità.
…segue
Il riconoscimento dell’immunità dalla giurisdizione in favore degli Stati che si
siano resi responsabili di tali misfatti si pone in palese contrasto con i dati
normativi appena ricordati, poiché detto riconoscimento, lungi dal favorire,
ostacola la tutela di valori, la cui protezione è da considerare invece, alla
stregua di tali norme e principi, essenziale per l’intera Comunità
internazionale, tanto da giustificare, nelle ipotesi più gravi, anche forme di
reazione obbligatorie. E non può esservi dubbio che l’antinomia debba
essere risolta dando prevalenza alle norme di rango più elevato, come
puntualizzato nelle opinioni dissidenti espresse dai giudici di minoranza (otto
contro nove) allegate alla sentenza Al-Adsani (retro, § 9): quindi, escludendo
che, in ipotesi siffatte, lo Stato possa giovarsi dell’immunità della
giurisdizione straniera.
ICJ - Caso Germania c. Italia
(argomento dell’Italia)
92. The Court now turns to the second strand in Italy’s argument,
which emphasizes the jus cogens status of the rules which were
violated by Germany during the period 1943-1945. This strand of the
argument rests on the premise that there is a conflict between jus
cogens rules forming part of the law of armed conflict and according
immunity to Germany.
Since jus cogens rules always prevail over any inconsistent rule of
international law, whether contained in a treaty or in customary
international law, so the argument runs, and since the rule which
accords one State immunity before the courts of another does not have
the status of jus cogens, the rule of immunity must give way.
ICJ - Germania c. Italia
risposta della Corte
93. This argument therefore depends upon the existence of a conflict
between a rule, or rules, of jus cogens, and the rule of customary law
which requires one State to accord immunity to another. In the opinion
of the Court, however, no such conflict exists. Assuming for this
purpose that the rules of the law of armed conflict which prohibit the
murder of civilians in occupied territory, the deportation of civilian
inhabitants to slave labour and the deportation of prisoners of war to
slave labour are rules of jus cogens, there is no conflict between those
rules and the rules on State immunity.
…Segue
The two sets of rules address different matters. The rules of State
immunity are procedural in character and are confined to determining
whether or not the courts of one State may exercise jurisdiction in
respect of another State.
They do not bear upon the question whether or not the conduct in
respect of which the proceedings are brought was lawful or unlawful.